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The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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President Ford Reviews U.S. Relations With the Rest of the World

*Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress*¹

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, distinguished guests, my very good friends in the Congress, and fellow Americans: I stand before you tonight after many agonizing hours and very solemn prayers for guidance by the Almighty.

In my report on the state of the Union in January, I concentrated on two subjects which were uppermost in the minds of the American people—urgent actions for the recovery of our economy and a comprehensive program to make the United States independent of foreign sources of energy. I thank the Congress for the action that it has taken thus far in my response for economic recommendations. I look forward to early approval of a national energy program to meet our country's long-range and emergency needs in the field of energy.

Tonight it is my purpose to review our relations with the rest of the world in the spirit of candor and consultation which I have sought to maintain with my former colleagues and with our countrymen from the time that I took office.

It is the first priority of my Presidency to sustain and strengthen the mutual trust and respect which must exist among Americans and their government if we are to deal successfully with the challenges confronting us both at home and abroad.

The leadership of the United States of America since the end of World War II has sustained and advanced the security, well-being, and freedom of millions of human beings besides ourselves.

Despite some setbacks, despite some mis-

takes, the United States has made peace a real prospect for us and for all nations. I know firsthand that the Congress has been a partner in the development and in the support of American foreign policy which five Presidents before me have carried forward, with changes of course but not of destination.

The course which our country chooses in the world today has never been of greater significance for ourselves as a nation and for all mankind.

We build from a solid foundation.

Our alliances with great industrial democracies in Europe, North America, and Japan remain strong, with a greater degree of consultation and equity than ever before.

With the Soviet Union we have moved across a broad front toward a more stable, if still competitive, relationship. We have begun to control the spiral of strategic nuclear armaments.

After two decades of mutual estrangement, we have achieved an historic opening with the People's Republic of China.

In the best American tradition, we have committed, often with striking success, our influence and good offices to help contain conflicts and settle disputes in many, many regions of the world. We have, for example, helped the parties of the Middle East take the first steps toward living with one another in peace.

We have opened a new dialogue with Latin America, looking toward a healthier hemispheric partnership.

We are developing closer relations with the nations of Africa.

We have exercised international leader-

¹ Made on Apr. 10 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 14).

ship on the great new issues of our interdependent world, such as energy, food, environment, and the law of the sea.

The American people can be proud of what their nation has achieved and helped others to accomplish, but we have from time to time suffered setbacks and disappointments in foreign policy. Some were events over which we had no control; some were difficulties we imposed upon ourselves.

We live in a time of testing and of a time of change. Our world, a world of economic uncertainty, political unrest, and threats to the peace, does not allow us the luxury of abdication or domestic discord.

I recall quite vividly the words of President Truman to the Congress when the United States faced a far greater challenge at the end of the Second World War. If I might quote: "If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own Nation."²

President Truman's resolution must guide us today. Our purpose is not to point the finger of blame, but to build upon our many successes, to repair damage where we find it, to recover our balance, to move ahead as a united people. Tonight is a time for straight talk among friends about where we stand and where we are going.

Human Tragedy in Viet-Nam and Cambodia

A vast human tragedy has befallen our friends in Viet-Nam and Cambodia.

Tonight I shall not talk only of obligations arising from legal documents. Who can forget the enormous sacrifices of blood, dedication, and treasure that we made in Viet-Nam?

Under five Presidents and 12 Congresses, the United States was engaged in Indochina. Millions of Americans served, thousands died, and many more were wounded, imprisoned, or lost. Over \$150 billion have been appropriated for that war by the Congress of the United States.

And after years of effort, we negotiated, under the most difficult circumstances, a settlement which made it possible for us to remove our military forces and bring home with pride our American prisoners. This settlement, if its terms had been adhered to, would have permitted our South Vietnamese ally, with our material and moral support, to maintain its security and rebuild after two decades of war.

The chances for an enduring peace after the last American fighting man left Viet-Nam in 1973 rested on two publicly stated premises: First, that if necessary the United States would help sustain the terms of the Paris accords it signed two years ago; second, that the United States would provide adequate economic and military assistance to South Viet-Nam.

Let us refresh our memories for just a moment. The universal consensus in the United States at that time, late 1972, was that if we could end our own involvement and obtain the release of our prisoners, we would provide adequate material support to South Viet-Nam.

The North Vietnamese, from the moment they signed the Paris accords, systematically violated the cease-fire and other provisions of that agreement. Flagrantly disregarding the ban on the infiltration of troops, the North Vietnamese illegally introduced over 350,000 men into the South. In direct violation of the agreement, they sent in the most modern equipment in massive amounts. Meanwhile, they continued to receive large quantities of supplies and arms from their friends.

In the face of this situation, the United States—torn as it was by the emotions of a decade of war—was unable to respond. We deprived ourselves by law of the ability to enforce the agreement, thus giving North Viet-Nam assurance that it could violate that agreement with impunity. Next, we reduced our economic and arms aid to South Viet-Nam. Finally, we signaled our increasing reluctance to give any support to that nation struggling for its survival.

Encouraged by these developments, the North Vietnamese, in recent months, began

² For President Truman's address before a joint session of the Congress on Mar. 12, 1947, see BULLETIN of Mar. 23, 1947, p. 543.

sending even their reserve divisions into South Viet-Nam. Some 20 divisions, virtually their entire army, are now in South Viet-Nam.

The Government of South Viet-Nam, uncertain of further American assistance, hastily ordered a strategic withdrawal to more defensible positions. This extremely difficult maneuver, decided upon without consultations, was poorly executed, hampered by floods of refugees, and thus led to panic. The results are painfully obvious and profoundly moving.

Military and Humanitarian Assistance

In my first public comment on this tragic development, I called for a new sense of national unity and purpose. I said I would not engage in recriminations or attempts to assess the blame.

I reiterate that tonight. In the same spirit, I welcome the statement of the distinguished majority leader of the U.S. Senate earlier this week, and I quote: "It is time for the Congress and the President to work together in the area of foreign as well as domestic policy."

So, let us start afresh. I am here to work with the Congress. In the conduct of foreign affairs, Presidential initiative and ability to act swiftly in emergencies are essential to our national interest.

With respect to North Viet-Nam, I call upon Hanoi—and ask the Congress to join with me in this call—to cease military operations immediately and to honor the terms of the Paris agreement.

The United States is urgently requesting the signatories of the Paris Conference to meet their obligations to use their influence to halt the fighting and to enforce the 1973 accords. Diplomatic notes to this effect have been sent to all members of the Paris Conference, including the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

The situation in South Viet-Nam and Cambodia has reached a critical phase requiring immediate and positive decisions by this government. The options before us are few, and the time is very short:

—On the one hand, the United States could do nothing more; let the Government of South Viet-Nam save itself and what is left of its territory, if it can; let those South Vietnamese civilians who have worked with us for a decade or more save their lives and their families, if they can; in short, shut our eyes and wash our hands of the whole affair, if we can.

—Or, on the other hand, I could ask the Congress for authority to enforce the Paris accords with our troops and our tanks and our aircraft and our artillery and carry the war to the enemy.

There are two narrower options:

—First, stick with my January request that Congress appropriate \$300 million for military assistance for South Viet-Nam and seek additional funds for economic and humanitarian purposes; or

—Increase my requests for both emergency military and humanitarian assistance to levels which, by best estimates, might enable the South Vietnamese to stem the on-rushing aggression, to stabilize the military situation, permit the chance of a negotiated political settlement between the North and South Vietnamese, and if the very worst were to happen, at least allow the orderly evacuation of Americans and endangered South Vietnamese to places of safety.

Let me now state my considerations and my conclusions.

I have received a full report from General Weyand [Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, United States Army], whom I sent to Viet-Nam to assess the situation. He advises that the current military situation is very critical but that South Viet-Nam is continuing to defend itself with the resources available. However, he feels that if there is to be any chance of success for their defense plan, South Viet-Nam needs urgently an additional \$722 million in very specific military supplies from the United States.

In my judgment, a stabilization of the military situation offers the best opportunity for a political solution.

I must, of course, as I think each of you

would, consider the safety of nearly 6,000 Americans who remain in South Viet-Nam and tens of thousands of South Vietnamese employees of the U.S. Government, of news agencies, of contractors and businesses, for many years whose lives, with their dependents', are in very grave peril. There are tens of thousands of other South Vietnamese intellectuals, professors, teachers, editors, and opinion leaders who have supported the South Vietnamese cause and the alliance with the United States to whom we have a profound moral obligation.

I am also mindful of our posture toward the rest of the world and particularly of our future relations with the free nations of Asia. These nations must not think for a minute that the United States is pulling out on them or intends to abandon them to aggression.

I have therefore concluded that the national interests of the United States and the cause of world stability require that we continue to give both military and humanitarian assistance to the South Vietnamese.

Assistance to South Viet-Nam at this stage must be swift and adequate. Drift and indecision invite far deeper disaster. The sums I had requested before the major North Vietnamese offensive and the sudden South Vietnamese retreat are obviously inadequate. Halfhearted action would be worse than none. We must act together and act decisively.

I am therefore asking the Congress to appropriate without delay \$722 million for emergency military assistance and an initial sum of \$250 million for economic and humanitarian aid for South Viet-Nam.

The situation in South Viet-Nam is changing very rapidly, and the need for emergency food, medicine, and refugee relief is growing by the hour. I will work with the Congress in the days ahead to develop humanitarian assistance to meet these very pressing needs.

Fundamental decency requires that we do everything in our power to ease the misery and the pain of the monumental human crisis which has befallen the people of Viet-Nam.

Millions have fled in the face of the Communist onslaught and are now homeless and are now destitute.

I hereby pledge in the name of the American people that the United States will make a maximum humanitarian effort to help care for and feed these hopeless victims.

And now I ask the Congress to clarify immediately its restrictions on the use of U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia for the limited purposes of protecting American lives by insuring their evacuation, if this should be necessary. And I also ask prompt revision of the law to cover those Vietnamese to whom we have a very special obligation and whose lives may be endangered should the worst come to pass.

I hope that this authority will never have to be used, but if it is needed, there will be no time for congressional debate.

Because of the gravity of the situation, I ask the Congress to complete action on all of these measures not later than April 19.

In Cambodia, the situation is tragic. The United States and the Cambodian Government have each made major efforts over a long period and through many channels to end that conflict; but because of their military successes, steady external support, and their awareness of American legal restrictions, the Communist side has shown no interest in negotiation, compromise, or a political solution.

And yet, for the past three months, the beleaguered people of Phnom Penh have fought on, hoping against hope that the United States would not desert them but instead provide the arms and ammunition they so badly needed.

I have received a moving letter from the new Acting President of Cambodia, Sautham Khoy, and let me quote it for you:

Dear Mr. President (he wrote), As the American Congress reconvenes to reconsider your urgent request for supplemental assistance for the Khmer Republic, I appeal to you to convey to the American legislators our plea not to deny these vital resources to us, if a nonmilitary solution is to emerge from this tragic five-year-old conflict.

To find a peaceful end to the conflict we need time. I do not know how much time, but we all fully

realize that the agony of the Khmer people cannot and must not go on much longer. However, for the immediate future, we need the rice to feed the hungry and the ammunition and the weapons to defend ourselves against those who want to impose their will by force [of arms]. A denial by the American people of the means for us to carry on will leave us no alternative but inevitably abandoning our search for a solution which will give our citizens some freedom of choice as to their future. For a number of years now, the Cambodian people have placed their trust in America. I cannot believe that this confidence was misplaced and that suddenly America will deny us the means which might give us a chance to find an acceptable solution to our conflict.

This letter speaks for itself. In January, I requested food and ammunition for the brave Cambodians, and I regret to say that, as of this evening, it may be soon too late.

Members of the Congress, my fellow Americans, this moment of tragedy for Indochina is a time of trial for us. It is a time for national resolve.

It has been said that the United States is overextended, that we have too many commitments too far from home, that we must reexamine what our truly vital interests are and shape our strategy to conform to them. I find no fault with this as a theory, but in the real world, such a course must be pursued carefully and in close coordination with solid progress toward overall reduction in worldwide tensions.

We cannot in the meantime abandon our friends while our adversaries support and encourage theirs. We cannot dismantle our defenses, our diplomacy, or our intelligence capability while others increase and strengthen theirs.

Let us put an end to self-inflicted wounds. Let us remember that our national unity is a most priceless asset. Let us deny our adversaries the satisfaction of using Viet-Nam to pit Americans against Americans.

At this moment, the United States must present to the world a united front.

Above all, let's keep events in Southeast Asia in their proper perspective. The security and the progress of hundreds of millions of people everywhere depend importantly on us.

Let no potential adversary believe that our difficulties or our debates mean a slackening of our national will. We will stand by our friends, we will honor our commitments, and we will uphold our country's principles.

The American people know that our strength, our authority, and our leadership have helped prevent a third world war for more than a generation. We will not shrink from this duty in the decades ahead.

Let me now review with you the basic elements of our foreign policy, speaking candidly about our strengths and some of our difficulties.

Relations With Friends in Asia and Europe

We must, first of all, face the fact that what has happened in Indochina has disquieted many of our friends, especially in Asia. We must deal with this situation promptly and firmly. To this end, I have already scheduled meetings with the leaders of Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Indonesia, and I expect to meet with the leaders of other Asian countries as well.

A key country in this respect is Japan. The warm welcome I received in Japan last November vividly symbolized for both our peoples the friendship and the solidarity of this extraordinary partnership. I look forward, as I am sure all of you do, with very special pleasure to welcoming the Emperor when he visits the United States later this year. We consider our security treaty with Japan the cornerstone of stability in the vast reaches of Asia and the Pacific. Our relations are crucial to our mutual well-being. Together, we are working energetically on the international multilateral agenda—in trade, energy, and food. We will continue the process of strengthening our friendship, mutual security, and prosperity.

Also, of course, of fundamental importance is our mutual security relationship with the Republic of Korea, which I reaffirmed on my recent visit.

Our relations with Europe have never been stronger. There are no peoples with whom America's destiny has been more

closely linked. There are no peoples whose friendship and cooperation are more needed for the future; for none of the members of the Atlantic community can be secure, none can prosper, none can advance unless we all do so together. More than ever, these times demand our close collaboration in order:

—To maintain the secure anchor of our common security in this time of international riptides.

—To work together on the promising negotiations with our potential adversaries.

—To pool our energies on the great new economic challenge that faces us.

In addition to this traditional agenda, there are new problems involving energy, raw materials, and the environment. The Atlantic nations face many and complex negotiations and decisions. It is time to take stock, to consult on our future, to affirm once again our cohesion and our common destiny. I therefore expect to join with the other leaders of the Atlantic alliance at a Western summit in the very near future.

Complex Greek-Turkish Dispute Over Cyprus

Before this NATO meeting, I earnestly ask the Congress to weigh the broader considerations and consequences of its past actions on the complex Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus. Our foreign policy cannot be simply a collection of special economic or ethnic or ideological interests. There must be a deep concern for the overall design of our international actions. To achieve this design for peace and to assure that our individual acts have some coherence, the executive must have some flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy.

U.S. military assistance to an old and faithful ally, Turkey, has been cut off by action of the Congress. This has imposed an embargo on military purchases by Turkey, extending even to items already paid for—an unprecedented act against a friend.

These moves, I know, were sincerely intended to influence Turkey in the Cyprus negotiations. I deeply share the concern of many citizens for the immense human suf-

fering on Cyprus. I sympathize with the new democratic government in Greece. We are continuing our earnest efforts to find equitable solutions to the problems which exist between Greece and Turkey. But the result of the congressional action has been:

—To block progress toward reconciliation, thereby prolonging the suffering on Cyprus.

—To complicate our ability to promote successful negotiations.

—To increase the danger of a broader conflict.

Our longstanding relationship with Turkey is not simply a favor to Turkey; it is a clear and essential mutual interest. Turkey lies on the rim of the Soviet Union and at the gates of the Middle East. It is vital to the security of the eastern Mediterranean, the southern flank of Western Europe, and the collective security of the Western alliance. Our U.S. military bases in Turkey are as critical to our own security as they are to the defense of NATO.

I therefore call upon the Congress to lift the American arms embargo against our Turkish ally by passing the bipartisan Mansfield-Scott bill now before the Senate. Only this will enable us to work with Greece and Turkey to resolve the differences between our allies. I accept and indeed welcome the bill's requirement for monthly reports to the Congress on progress toward a Cyprus settlement. But unless this is done with dispatch, forces may be set in motion within and between the two nations which could not be reversed.

At the same time, in order to strengthen the democratic government of Greece and to reaffirm our traditional ties with the people of Greece, we are actively discussing a program of economic and military assistance with them. We will shortly be submitting specific requests to the Congress in this regard.

Proposed Amendments to Trade Act

A vital element of our foreign policy is our relationship with the developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

These countries must know that America is a true, that America is a concerned, friend reliable both in word and deed.

As evidence of this friendship, I urge the Congress to reconsider one provision of the 1974 Trade Act which has had an unfortunate and unintended impact on our relations with Latin America, where we have such a long tie of friendship and cooperation. Under this legislation, all members of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] were excluded from our generalized system of trade preferences. This, unfortunately, punished two South American friends, Ecuador and Venezuela, as well as other OPEC nations such as Nigeria and Indonesia, none of which participated in last year's oil embargo. This exclusion has seriously complicated our new dialogue with our friends in this hemisphere.

I therefore endorse the amendments which have been introduced in the Congress to provide executive authority to waive those restrictions of the Trade Act that are incompatible with our national interest.

Peacemaking Efforts in the Middle East

The interests of America, as well as our allies, are vitally affected by what happens in the Middle East. So long as the state of tension continues, it threatens military crisis, the weakening of our alliances, the stability of the world economy, and confrontation with the nuclear superpowers. These are intolerable risks.

Because we are in the unique position of being able to deal with all the parties, we have, at their request, been engaged for the past year and a half in the peacemaking effort unparalleled in the history of the region.

Our policy has brought remarkable successes on the road to peace. Last year, two major disengagement agreements were negotiated and implemented with our help. For the first time in 30 years, a process of negotiation on the basic political issues was begun—and is continuing.

Unfortunately, the latest efforts to reach a further interim agreement between Israel

and Egypt have been suspended. The issues dividing the parties are vital to them and not amenable to easy and to quick solutions.

However, the United States will not be discouraged. The momentum toward peace that has been achieved over the last 18 months must and will be maintained.

The active role of the United States must and will be continued. The drift toward war must and will be prevented.

I pledge the United States to a major effort for peace in the Middle East, an effort which I know has the solid support of the American people and their Congress.

We are now examining how best to proceed. We have agreed in principle to reconvene the Geneva Conference. We are prepared as well to explore other forums.

The United States will move ahead on whatever course looks most promising, either toward an overall settlement or interim agreements should the parties themselves desire them. We will not accept stagnation or stalemate with all its attendant risks to peace and prosperity and to our relations in and outside of the region.

Relations With Potential Adversaries

The national interest and national security require as well that we reduce the dangers of war. We shall strive to do so by continuing to improve our relations with potential adversaries.

The United States and the Soviet Union share an interest in lessening tensions and building a more stable relationship. During this process we have never had any illusions. We know that we are dealing with a nation that reflects different principles and is our competitor in many parts of the globe.

Through a combination of firmness and flexibility, the United States, in recent years, laid the basis of a more reliable relationship, founded on mutual interest and mutual restraint.

But we cannot expect the Soviet Union to show restraint in the face of the U.S. weakness or irresolution. As long as I am President, America will maintain its strength, its alliances, and its principles as a prerequisite

to a more peaceful planet. As long as I am President, we will not permit détente to become a license to fish in troubled waters. Détente must be—and I trust will be—a two-way relationship.

Central to U.S.-Soviet relations today is the critical negotiation to control strategic nuclear weapons. We hope to turn the Vladivostok agreements into a final agreement this year at the time of General Secretary Brezhnev's visit to the United States. Such an agreement would, for the first time, put a ceiling on the strategic arms race. It would mark a turning point in postwar history and would be a crucial step in lifting from mankind the threat of nuclear war.

Our use of trade and economic sanctions as weapons to alter the internal conduct of other nations must also be seriously reexamined. However well-intentioned the goals, the fact is that some of our recent actions in the economic field have been self-defeating. They are not achieving the objectives intended by the Congress. And they have damaged our foreign policy.

The Trade Act of 1974 prohibits most-favored-nation treatment, credit and investment guarantees, and commercial agreements with the Soviet Union so long as their emigration policies fail to meet our criteria. The Soviet Union has therefore refused to put into effect the important 1972 trade agreement between our two countries.

As a result, Western Europe and Japan have stepped into the breach. Those countries have extended credits to the Soviet Union exceeding \$8 billion in the last six months. These are economic opportunities—jobs and business—which could have gone to Americans.

There should be no illusions about the nature of the Soviet system, but there should be no illusions about how to deal with it. Our belief in the right of peoples of the world freely to emigrate has been well demonstrated. This legislation, however, not only harmed our relations with the Soviet Union but seriously complicated the prospects of those seeking to emigrate. The favorable trend, aided by quiet diplomacy, by which

emigration increased from 400 in 1968 to over 33,000 in 1973 has been seriously set back. Remedial legislation is urgently needed in our national interest.

With the People's Republic of China, we are firmly fixed on the course set forth in the Shanghai communique. Stability in Asia and the world requires our constructive relations with one-fourth of the human race. After two decades of mutual isolation and hostility, we have, in recent years, built a promising foundation. Deep differences in our philosophy and social systems will endure, but so should our mutual long-term interests and the goals to which our countries have jointly subscribed in Shanghai.

I will visit China later this year to reaffirm these interests and to accelerate the improvement in our relations, and I was glad to welcome the distinguished Speaker and the distinguished minority leader of the House back today from their constructive visit to the People's Republic of China.

New Economic and Technological Issues

Let me talk about new challenges. The issues I have discussed are the most pressing of the traditional agenda on foreign policy, but ahead of us also is a vast new agenda of issues in an interdependent world.

The United States—with its economic power, its technology, its zest for new horizons—is the acknowledged world leader in dealing with many of these challenges. If this is a moment of uncertainty in the world, it is even more a moment of rare opportunity:

—We are summoned to meet one of man's most basic challenges: hunger. At the World Food Conference last November in Rome, the United States outlined a comprehensive program to close the ominous gap between population growth and food production over the long term. Our technological skill and our enormous productive capacity are crucial to accomplishing this task.

—The old order—in trade, finance, and raw materials—is changing, and American leadership is needed in the creation of new

institutions and practices for worldwide prosperity and progress.

—The world's oceans, with their immense resources and strategic importance, must become areas of cooperation rather than conflict. American policy is directed to that end.

—Technology must be harnessed to the service of mankind while protecting the environment. This, too, is an arena for American leadership.

—The interests and the aspirations of the developed and developing nations must be reconciled in a manner that is both realistic and humane. This is our goal in this new era.

One of the finest success stories in our foreign policy is our cooperative effort with other major energy-consuming nations. In little more than a year, together with our partners:

—We have created the International Energy Agency.

—We have negotiated an emergency sharing arrangement which helps to reduce the dangers of an embargo.

—We have launched major international conservation efforts.

—We have developed a massive program for the development of alternative sources of energy.

But the fate of all of these programs depends crucially on what we do at home. Every month that passes brings us closer to the day when we will be dependent on imported energy for 50 percent of our requirements. A new embargo under these conditions could have a devastating impact on jobs, industrial expansion, and inflation at home. Our economy cannot be left to the mercy of decisions over which we have no control. And I call upon the Congress to act affirmatively.

Essential Elements of National Security

In a world where information is power, a vital element of our national security lies in our intelligence services. They are essential to our nation's security in peace as in war. Americans can be grateful for the impor-

tant, but largely unsung, contributions and achievements of the intelligence services of this nation.

It is entirely proper that this system be subject to congressional review. But a sensationalized public debate over legitimate intelligence activities is a disservice to this nation and a threat to our intelligence system. It ties our hands while our potential enemies operate with secrecy, with skill, and with vast resources. Any investigation must be conducted with maximum discretion and dispatch, to avoid crippling a vital national institution.

Let me speak quite frankly to some in this Chamber, and perhaps to some not in this Chamber. The Central Intelligence Agency has been of maximum importance to Presidents before me. The Central Intelligence Agency has been of maximum importance to me. The Central Intelligence Agency, and its associated intelligence organizations, could be of maximum importance to some of you in this audience who might be President at some later date.

I think it would be catastrophic for the Congress, or anyone else, to destroy the usefulness by dismantling, in effect, our intelligence systems, upon which we rest so heavily.

Now, as Congress oversees intelligence activities it must, of course, organize itself to do so in a responsible way. It has been traditional for the executive to consult with the Congress through specially protected procedures that safeguard essential secrets, but recently some of those procedures have been altered in a way that makes the protection of vital information very, very difficult.

I will say to the leaders of the Congress, the House and the Senate, that I will work with them to devise procedures which will meet the needs of the Congress for review of intelligence agency activities and the needs of the nation for an effective intelligence service.

Underlying any successful foreign policy is the strength and the credibility of our defense posture. We are strong and we are ready, and we intend to remain so.

Improvement of relations with adversaries does not mean any relaxation of our national vigilance. On the contrary, it is the firm maintenance of both strength and vigilance that makes possible steady progress toward a safer and a more peaceful world.

The national security budget that I have submitted is the minimum the United States needs in this critical hour. The Congress should review it carefully, and I know it will. But it is my considered judgment that any significant reduction, revision, would endanger our national security and thus jeopardize the peace.

Let no ally doubt our determination to maintain a defense second to none, and let no adversary be tempted to test our readiness or our resolve.

History is testing us today. We cannot afford indecision, disunity, or disarray in the conduct of our foreign affairs. You and I can resolve here and now that this nation shall move ahead with wisdom, with assurance, and with national unity.

The world looks to us for the vigor and for the vision that we have demonstrated so often in the past in great moments of our national history.

And as I look down the road, I see a confident America, secure in its strengths, secure in its values—and determined to maintain both.

I see a conciliatory America, extending its hand to allies and adversaries alike, forming bonds of cooperation to deal with the vast problems facing us all.

I see a compassionate America, its heart reaching out to orphans, to refugees, and to our fellow human beings afflicted by war, by tyranny, and by hunger.

As President, entrusted by the Constitution with primary responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs, I renew the pledge I made last August: to work cooperatively with the Congress.

I ask that the Congress help to keep America's word good throughout the world. We are one nation, one government, and we must have one foreign policy.

In an hour far darker than this, Abraham Lincoln told his fellow citizens, and I quote:

... we cannot escape history. We of this Congress and this administration will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us.

We who are entrusted by the people with the great decisions that fashion their future can escape neither responsibilities nor our consciences.

By what we do now, the world will know our courage, our constancy, and our compassion.

The spirit of America is good, and the heart of America is strong. Let us be proud of what we have done and confident of what we can do. And may God ever guide us to do what is right.

President Ford Reiterates Request for Assistance to Cambodia

Following is a statement read to news correspondents on April 12 by Ronald H. Nesscn, Press Secretary to President Ford.

White House press release dated April 12

The President has asked me to express his concern over some reports that his speech on Thursday night, April 10, indicated that he was withdrawing or otherwise not renewing his request for urgent assistance to Cambodia.

The President's proposal for aid to Cambodia is still before the Congress. We maintain the request we have consistently and emphatically urged upon the Congress for three months.

The letter from Cambodian leader Saukham Khoy, cited by the President, reemphasized that request. The President's statement that it might soon be too late pointed out the urgency of the need.

The President still hopes that the Congress will act quickly to approve assistance to Cambodia.

U.S. Calls on North Viet-Nam To End Military Offensive

Following are texts of a note delivered by U.S. Missions on April 10 to non-Vietnamese participants in the International Conference on Viet-Nam and members of the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) and of a note delivered to the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam at Paris by the U.S. Embassy on April 11.

NOTE TO NON-VIETNAMESE PARTICIPANTS IN CONFERENCE AND MEMBERS OF ICCS

Press release 193 dated April 11

The Department of State of the United States of America presents its compliments to [the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Ministry of External Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Republic of China, Great Britain, France, Hungary, Poland, Indonesia, Iran, and Secretary General of the U.N. Kurt Waldheim] and has the honor to refer to the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam signed at Paris January 27, 1973; to the Act of the International Conference on Viet-Nam signed at Paris March 2, 1973; and to the Department's Diplomatic Note of January 11, 1975, on the situation in Viet-Nam.

More than two years ago, the signatories of the Paris Agreement accepted a solemn obligation to end the fighting in Viet-Nam and to shift the conflict there from the battlefield to the negotiating table. All nations and peoples who love peace had the right to expect from that Agreement that the South Vietnamese people would be able to peacefully determine their own future and their own political institutions after the Paris Agreement was signed. The parties to the International Conference on Viet-Nam undertook a responsibility to support and uphold the settlement which the Agreement embodied.

The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has undertaken a massive, all-out offensive against South Viet-Nam in total contempt of the Paris Agreement. Their forces, which were built up over the past two years in violation of the Agreement, are more numerous and better equipped with modern weaponry than ever before during the course of the war. A human flight of historic proportions has taken place before the advancing North Vietnamese armies, and untold misery has been inflicted on the land which has already seen more than its share of misery.

We believe the suffering of the South Vietnamese people must be ended. It must be ended now. We therefore call upon the [addressee] to join the Government of the United States of America in calling upon Hanoi to cease its military operations immediately and to honor the terms of the Paris Agreement. The United States is requesting all the parties to the Act of the International Conference to meet their obligations to use their influence to halt the fighting and enforce the Paris Agreement.

The United States Government looks forward to prompt and constructive responses to this Note from all the parties.

NOTE TO NORTH VIET-NAM

Press release 193A dated April 11

The Department of State of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and has the honor to refer to the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam signed at Paris January 27, 1973; and to the Act of the International Conference on Viet-Nam signed at Paris March 2, 1973.

More than two years ago, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, as a signatory of the Paris Agreement and the Act of the International Conference on Viet-Nam, accepted a solemn obligation to end the fighting in Viet-Nam and to shift the conflict there

from the battlefield to the negotiating table. All nations and peoples who love peace hoped and expected from these Agreements that the South Vietnamese people would be able to peacefully determine their own future. Tragically, these hopes and expectations have been shattered by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam's total violation of these Accords.

The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has now undertaken a massive, all-out offensive against South Viet-Nam in total contempt of these Agreements. DRV forces in South Viet-Nam, which have been built up over the past two years in contravention of the Paris Agreement, are more numerous and better equipped than ever before during the course of the entire war. This North Vietnamese invasion has produced a human flight of refugees which is of historic proportions. By this calculated use of immense force North Viet-Nam has inflicted untold misery on a land which has already seen its share of misery.

We believe the suffering of the South Vietnamese people must be ended and must be ended now. We therefore advise the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to cease immediately its military offensive against South Viet-Nam and to honor the terms of the Paris Agreement. If the DRV does not reverse its present military course, it should have no doubt that it will be held responsible for the consequences.

Assistance in Evacuating Refugees From South Vietnamese Seaports

Statement by President Ford¹

A severe emergency exists in the coastal communities of South Viet-Nam which are swollen with helpless civilian refugees who have fled the North Viet-Nam offensive. They are desperately in need of any assistance we and other nations can provide.

To help the refugees reach safe haven

¹ Issued on Mar. 29 (text from White House press release).

further south, I have ordered American naval transports and contract vessels to assist in the evacuation of refugees from the coastal seaports.

I also call upon all nations and corporations that have ships in the vicinity of the South Vietnamese coast to help evacuate refugees to safety in the south.

I have directed that U.S. Government resources be made available to meet immediate humanitarian needs, and I have appointed Mr. Daniel Parker, Administrator of the Agency of International Development, as my Special Coordinator for Disaster Relief.

U.S. Personnel Evacuated From Phnom Penh

Following is a statement by President Ford issued on April 12, together with a statement issued on April 11 by Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD

White House press release dated April 12

In view of the seriously deteriorating military situation around the Cambodian Capital of Phnom Penh, and on the basis of the recommendations of the American Ambassador to the Khmer Republic, I have instructed the personnel of the U.S. Mission to leave Phnom Penh.

In accordance with those instructions, American personnel have been evacuated. I also authorized that a number of Cambodians whose lives would have been jeopardized if they had remained in Cambodia be evacuated with the American Mission.

I sincerely regret that there was not timely action on my request to the Congress to enable the United States to continue to provide the assistance necessary to the survival of the Government of the Khmer Republic. That government had asked for this assistance and had clearly proven itself worthy of our help.

The United States wishes Cambodia to find its place in the world as an independent, neutral, and united country, living in peace. Our assistance was sought for that purpose. We also made numerous and vigorous diplomatic efforts, from the first to the last, to find a compromise settlement.

I decided with a heavy heart on the evacuation of American personnel from Cambodia because of my responsibility for the safety of the Americans who have served there so valiantly. Despite that evacuation we will continue to do whatever possible to support an independent, peaceful, neutral, and unified Cambodia.

We can all take deep pride in the U.S. armed forces that were engaged in this evacuation operation. It was carried out with great skill and in a manner that reflects the highest credit on all of those American servicemen who participated. I am deeply grateful to them for a job well done.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

In view of the seriously deteriorating military situation around Phnom Penh, the evacuation of all U.S. Mission personnel is taking place. We regret this development because of its obvious implications for the Government of the Khmer Republic.

This evacuation is taking place in an effort to insure the safety of U.S. citizens in Cambodia. To the extent we have the capability in the airlift we are also undertaking to evacuate third-country nationals working for the U.S. Government, U.S. press services, voluntary agencies, et cetera, as well as Cambodian employees of the U.S. Mission and their families and as many other Cambodians who have been associated with us as circumstances permit.

Because of the effective interdiction of Phnom Penh airport now by Khmer Communists' rockets, artillery, and mortars, this evacuation is being carried out by U.S. military helicopters from landing zones near the

American Mission in Phnom Penh. The evacuation operation is being protected as necessary by a security force of U.S. marines. Tactical aircraft are in the vicinity in the event they are needed. There is no intention to use force, but if necessary it will be applied only to protect the lives of evacuees.

The evacuees will be taken temporarily to Thailand before being moved onward to their destination of choice.

Because of the U.S. Ambassador's efforts in the past few weeks to reduce the number of potential evacuees to the barest minimum, we are not certain that we have up-to-date figures on the numbers likely to be involved. However, we anticipate that there will be several hundred people involved, including some 150 Americans.

President Ford Saddened by Deaths in Viet-Nam Orphan Airlift Crash

*Statement by President Ford*¹

I am deeply saddened at the loss of so many lives in the crash of the U.S. C-54 mercy flight today near Saigon.

I wish to convey my heartfelt condolences to the families and friends of the victims, many of whom were coming to new homes in the United States, and to the volunteers who were caring for them on the flight.

Our mission of mercy will continue. The survivors will be flown here when they are physically able. Other waiting orphans will make the journey.

This tragedy must not deter us from offering new hope for the living. The government and people of the United States offer this hope in our rededication to assisting the Vietnamese orphans as best and as quickly as we can.

¹ Issued at Palm Springs, Calif., on Apr. 4 (text from White House press release).

President Ford's News Conference at San Diego April 3

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford at San Diego, Calif., April 3.¹

I have a short opening statement:

We are seeing a great human tragedy as untold numbers of Vietnamese flee the North Vietnamese onslaught. The United States has been doing, and will continue to do, its utmost to assist these people.

I have directed all available naval ships to stand off Indochina to do whatever is necessary to assist. We have appealed to the United Nations to use its moral influence to permit these innocent people to leave, and we call on North Viet-Nam to permit the movement of refugees to the area of their choice.

While I have been in California, I have been spending many hours on the refugee problem and our humanitarian efforts. I have directed that money from a \$2 million special foreign aid children's fund be made available to fly 2,000 South Vietnamese orphans to the United States as soon as possible. I have also directed American officials in Saigon to act immediately to cut red tape and other bureaucratic obstacles preventing these children from coming to the United States.

I have directed that C-5A aircraft and other aircraft especially equipped to care for these orphans during the flight be sent to Saigon. I expect these flights to begin within the next 36 to 48 hours. These orphans will be flown to Travis Air Force Base in California and other bases on the west coast and cared for in those locations. These 2,000 Vietnamese orphans are all in the process

of being adopted by American families.

This is the least we can do, and we will do much, much more.

The first question is from Mr. George Dissinger of the San Diego Tribune.

Q. Mr. President, are you ready to accept a Communist takeover of South Viet-Nam and Cambodia?

President Ford: I would hope that that would not take place in either case. My whole congressional life in recent years was aimed at avoiding it. My complete efforts as President of the United States were aimed at avoiding that.

I am an optimist, despite the sad and tragic events that we see unfolding. I will do my utmost in the future—as I have in the past—to avoid that result.

Q. Mr. President, I understand you are soon going to ask Congress for new authority to extend humanitarian aid in Southeast Asia. I wondered if you stand by your request, though, for more military aid for South Viet-Nam.

President Ford: We do intend to ask for more humanitarian aid. I should point out that the Administration's request for \$135 million for humanitarian aid in South Viet-Nam was unfortunately reduced to \$55 million by congressional action. Obviously, we will ask for more; the precise amount we have not yet determined.

We will continue to push for the \$300 million that we have asked for and Congress had authorized for military assistance to South Viet-Nam, and the possibility exists that we may ask for more.

Q. Mr. President, how and why did the United States miscalculate the intentions of the will of the South Vietnamese to resist?

¹For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 7.

President Ford: I don't believe that we miscalculated the will of the South Vietnamese to carry on their fight for their own freedom.

There were several situations that developed that I think got beyond the control of the Vietnamese people. The unilateral military decision to withdraw created a chaotic situation in Viet-Nam that appears to have brought about tremendous disorganization.

I believe that the will of the South Vietnamese people to fight for their freedom is best evidenced by the fact that they are fleeing from the North Vietnamese, and that clearly is an indication they don't want to live under the kind of government that exists in North Viet-Nam.

The will of the South Vietnamese people, I think, still exists. They want freedom under a different kind of government than has existed in North Viet-Nam. The problem is how to organize that will under the traumatic experiences of the present.

Q. Unilateral decision by whom?

President Ford: It was a unilateral decision by President Thieu to order a withdrawal from the broad, exposed areas that were under the control of the South Vietnamese military.

Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press International].

Q. Mr. President, what is your response to the South Vietnamese Ambassador to Washington's statement that we had not lived up to the Paris peace accords and that the Communists are safer allies?

President Ford: I won't comment on his statement. I will say this: that the North Vietnamese repeatedly and in massive efforts violated the Paris peace accords. They sent North Vietnamese regular forces into South Viet-Nam in massive numbers—I think around 150,000 to 175,000 well-trained North Vietnamese regular forces—in violation of the Paris peace accords, moved into South Viet-Nam. We have objected to that violation.

I still believe that the United States, in this case and in other cases, is a reliable ally. And although I am saddened by the

events that we have read about and seen, it is a tragedy unbelievable in its ramifications.

I must say that I am frustrated by the action of the Congress in not responding to some of the requests for both economic and humanitarian and military assistance in South Viet-Nam. And I am frustrated by the limitations that were placed on the Chief Executive over the last two years.

But let me add very strongly: I am convinced that this country is going to continue its leadership. We will stand by our allies, and I specifically warn any adversaries they should not, under any circumstances, feel that the tragedy of Viet-Nam is an indication that the American people have lost their will or their desire to stand up for freedom anyplace in the world.

Q. Well, Mr. President, can you explain why President Thieu, with our close military ties as allies, did not tell you what he was going to do in terms of the retreat?

President Ford: I think the only answer to that can come from President Thieu.

Q. Mr. Ford, recently you said the fall of Cambodia could threaten the national security of this country. Now, considering the probable fall of South Viet-Nam to Communist forces, do you feel that will threaten our national security, and if so, how?

President Ford: At the moment, I do not anticipate the fall of South Viet-Nam, and I greatly respect and admire the tremendous fight that the Government and the people of Cambodia are putting up against the insurgents who are trying to take over Cambodia.

I believe that in any case where the United States does not live up to its moral or treaty obligations, it can't help but have an adverse impact on other allies we have around the world.

We read in European papers to the effect that Western Europe ought to have some questions. Let me say to our Western European allies: We are going to stand behind our commitments to NATO, and we are going to stand behind our commitments to other allies around the world.

But there has to be in the minds of some people a feeling that maybe the tragedy of Indochina might affect our relations with their country. I repeat, the United States is going to continue its leadership and stand by its allies.

Q. Are you, in fact, a believer of the domino theory—if Southeast Asia falls, then perhaps some of the other countries in the Pacific are next?

President Ford: I believe there is a great deal of credibility to the domino theory. I hope it does not happen. I hope that other countries in Southeast Asia—Thailand, the Philippines—don't misread the will of the American people and the leadership of this country to believing that we are going to abandon our position in Southeast Asia. We are not. But I do know from the things I read and the messages that I hear that some of them do get uneasy. I hope and trust they believe me when I say we are going to stand by our allies.

Q. Mr. President, as you are well aware, there are about 7,000 Americans still in Saigon. They are in danger not only from Communist attack but from South Vietnamese reprisals. There are reports that the South Vietnamese are in a bad temper toward Americans. Do you feel that under the War Powers Act and also under the limitations voted by Congress in 1973 on combat by Americans in Indochina that you could send troops in to protect those Americans, and would you, if it came to that?

President Ford: I can assure you that I will abide totally with the War Powers Act that was enacted by the Congress several years ago. At the same time, I likewise assure you that we have contingency plans to meet all problems involving evacuation, if that should become necessary. At this point, I do not believe that I should answer specifically how those contingency plans might be carried out.

Q. Sir, you don't want to talk specifically. Can you tell us, however, if you do believe that you do have the authority to send in troops? You are not saying, I understand,

whether you would, but do you have the authority?

President Ford: It is my interpretation of that legislation that a President has certain limited authority to protect American lives. And to that extent, I will use that law.

Q. Mr. President, despite your statement here this morning about war orphans, there apparently is a lot of red tape in Washington. A San Diego man who is trying to get four Vietnamese children out of that country has received hundreds of calls from people all over the Western United States wanting to help, even adopt children. But despite this outpouring of compassion by the American people, all he gets in Washington is, "No way. There is nothing that can be done." Why is he running into this problem, if we are trying to help?

President Ford: Well, having had some experience in the past with the Federal bureaucracy when we had a similar problem involving Korean orphans, I understand the frustration and the problem.

But I am assured that all bureaucratic red tape is being eliminated to the maximum degree and that we will make a total effort, as I indicated in my opening statement, to see to it that South Vietnamese war orphans are brought to the United States.

Q. Do you think something can be done before it is too late for many of them?

President Ford: I can only say we will do what has to be done, what can be done as a practical matter. I cannot guarantee that every single South Vietnamese war orphan will get here, but I can assure you that we intend to do everything possible in that humanitarian effort.

Q. Mr. President, if it would alleviate the refugee problem in South Viet-Nam and bring about something of a temporary ceasefire, would you urge President Thieu to resign?

President Ford: I don't believe that it is my prerogative to tell the head of state elected by the people to leave office. I don't

believe whether it is one head of state or another makes any difference in our efforts to help in the humanitarian program.

We are going to carry it on, I hope, with the full cooperation of the South Vietnamese Government. And I don't think it is appropriate for me to ask him, under these circumstances, to resign. And I don't think his resignation would have any significance on our humanitarian efforts.

Q. In that regard, are there any plans underway by the U.S. Government to accept large numbers of Vietnamese refugees in this country other than the 2,000 orphans that you have talked about?

President Ford: Under existing law, action by the Attorney General can permit refugees who are fleeing problems in their own country to come to the United States. This authority was used after World War II. This authority was used after the Hungarian invasion by the Soviet Union.

This authority has been used on a number of other occasions. I can assure you that that authority is being examined, and if it will be helpful, I certainly will approve it.

Q. Mr. President, you spoke a few minutes ago about being frustrated by the limitations of the War Powers Act. If it were not forbidden now, would you like to send American planes and naval forces and possibly ground forces into Viet-Nam to try to turn the situation around?

President Ford: I have said that there are no plans whatsoever for U.S. military involvement in Viet-Nam. On the other hand, I think history does prove that if a Chief Executive has a potential, it to some extent is a deterrent against aggressors.

Q. So, that is your frustration, because you do not have that power to at least threaten the possibility?

President Ford: I did not use the word "threat." I said the potential for power, I think, over the years has indicated that potential is a deterrent against aggression by one country against another.

Q. Mr. President, some people are saying this week that despite all our massive aid in Viet-Nam and all the lives that were lost there, that the whole thing has come to nothing. Now, how do you feel about this, and do you think there is any lesson to be learned in what has been happening over there?

President Ford: I believe that the program of the previous four or five Presidents—President Kennedy, President Johnson, President Nixon, and myself—were aimed at the—in the right direction, that we should help those people who are willing to fight for freedom for themselves.

That was a sound policy. Unfortunately, events that were beyond our control as a country have made it appear that that policy was wrong. I still believe that policy was right if the United States had carried it out as we promised to do at the time of the Paris peace accords, where we promised, with the signing of the Paris peace accords, that we would make military hardware available to the South Vietnamese Government on a replacement, one-for-one basis. Unfortunately, we did not carry out that promise.

Q. Well, are you blaming Congress for this, then?

President Ford: I am not assessing blame on anyone. The facts are that in fiscal year 1974 there was a substantial reduction made by the Congress in the amount of military equipment requested for South Viet-Nam.

In fiscal year 1975, the current fiscal year, the Administration asked for \$1.4 billion in military assistance for South Viet-Nam. Congress put a ceiling of \$1 billion on it and actually appropriated only \$700 million.

Those are the facts. I think it is up to the American people to pass judgment on who was at fault or where the blame may rest. That is a current judgment.

I think historians in the future will write who was to blame in this tragic situation. But the American people ought to know the facts. And the facts are as I have indicated.

I think it is a great tragedy, what we are seeing in Viet-Nam today. I think it could have been avoided. But I am not going to point a finger. The American people will make that judgment. I think it is more important for me and the American people and the Congress, in the weeks and months ahead, to do what we can to work together to meet the problems of the future.

That is what I intend to do, and I will go more than halfway with the Congress in seeking to achieve that result. I think we have the capability in America. I think we have the will to overcome what appears to be a disaster in Southeast Asia. To the extent that I can, I hope to give that leadership.

Q. Mr. President, regardless of what caused it, it seems apparent that for the first time in our nation's history, the enemy is about to win a war where Americans fought and died. Do you think those 55,000 lives were wasted?

President Ford: I do not think they were wasted, providing the United States had carried out the solemn commitments that were made in Paris, at the time American fighting was stopped in South Viet-Nam—at a time when the agreement provided that all of our troops should be withdrawn, that all of our POW's should be returned. If we had carried out the commitments that were made at that time, the tragic sacrifices that were made by many—those who were killed, those who were wounded—would not have been in vain. But when I see us not carrying through, then it raises a quite different question.

Q. Is that a yes, then, sir?

President Ford: I still think there is an opportunity to salvage the situation in Viet-Nam, and if we salvage it, giving the South Vietnamese an opportunity to fight for their freedom, which I think they are anxious to do if given an honest opportunity, then there was not a sacrifice that was inappropriate or unwise.

Q. In a speech you are going to deliver here in San Diego this afternoon, you warn

against fatalism, despair, and the prophets of doom. And yet, as I look back over the past eight months or a year—and I don't mean to suggest that these are in any way your responsibility or fault—I have a laundry list which cites Portugal as having a leftist government raising serious questions about its future in NATO; Greece and Turkey are at each other's throats, threatening the southern flanks of that alliance; we are familiar that Secretary Kissinger's mission failed in his peace talks with Egypt and Israel; and we don't need to rehash the situation in Cambodia and South Viet-Nam.

That being the case, sir, how can you say that the world outlook—and particularly as you address it in your speech next week on the state of the world—is anything but bleak for the United States, when many of the minuses which I cited are actually pluses for the Soviets?

President Ford: Well, the speech that I am giving to Congress and to the American people next week will deal with many of the problems that you have raised. I think we do face a crisis. But I am optimistic that if the Congress joins with me and the American people support the Congress and me, as President, we can overcome those difficulties.

We can play a constructive role in Portugal, not interfering with their internal decisions, but Portugal is an important ally in Western Europe.

We can find ways to solve the problem in Cyprus and, hopefully, keep both Greece and Turkey strong and viable members of NATO.

We can, despite the difficulties that transpire in the Middle East in the last several weeks, find a way to keep a peace movement moving in that very volatile area. It may mean—and probably does—that we will have to take the problem to Geneva. I would have preferred it otherwise.

But the facts are that if Congress and the American people and the President work together—as I expect they will—then in my judgment, those disappointments can become pluses.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Palm Springs April 5

Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger at Palm Springs, Calif., on April 5.

Press release 183 dated April 5

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, I just want to bring you up to date on the discussions that have been taking place. The President, General Weyand [Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, United States Army], and I met for about an hour and one-half this morning. General Weyand gave us a report about the military situation in South Viet-Nam as he sees it and some of the options which he believes should be considered.

The President invited General Weyand to return this afternoon, and on that occasion he will bring along with him two intelligence experts, as well as the Defense Department expert who has been handling military supplies. We will then go into the question of the political situation and the long-term supply situation in detail.

The President has also ordered an NSC [National Security Council] meeting for probably Tuesday afternoon. It could slip until Wednesday morning to permit General Weyand and his team to report to the entire NSC. In the meantime, he has ordered that the NSC staff, in close cooperation with the other agencies, develop for their NSC meeting a statement of the various options before us.

These are the procedures that are going to be followed. I make these points in order to indicate that we are at the very early stages of considering the report of General Weyand. No decisions will be taken while the President is in Palm Springs. Rather, we will use this opportunity for the fullest possible briefing of the President, and then

the staffs in Washington are going to analyze the reports, prepare the options, and then the entire NSC will consider the matter.

I might also point out that we are considering releasing the report of General Weyand after the President has had an opportunity to study it, with just some minor deletions, by the middle of the week so the public can have the general appreciation. This is where we stand, and I will be glad to answer questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, considering the enormous amount of military equipment that has been lost in South Viet-Nam by the deterioration of the South Vietnamese Army, do you see any conceivable way that you can justify sending additional military equipment to South Viet-Nam until at least the South Vietnamese Army shows it can stand and hold its own territory?

Secretary Kissinger: The determination that has to be made is with respect to the military capacity of the South Vietnamese Army to defend the remaining territories. We have received another detailed analysis from General Weyand as to some estimates of what would be required to effect this.

The loss of territory in the north—I think it is important to understand what the military situation was. In flagrant violation of article 7 of the Paris accords, the North Vietnamese have introduced almost their entire army into South Viet-Nam, so that there are 18 North Vietnamese divisions in South Viet-Nam at this moment, leaving only two or three divisions in North Viet-Nam; and this is in flagrant, total violation of solemn agreements which were endorsed by the international community.

That created an unbalanced military situation in the north in which whatever the

South Vietnamese did it would be wrong. If they stood, they were going to be defeated piecemeal. If they retreated, they ran the risk of disintegration of the units that were retreating, which is in fact what happened.

But one of the aspects of our examination is of course what the military situation is and what degree of American help can be significant.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can the South Vietnamese Army defend the remaining territory, and what are the requirements of their army now to defend that territory?

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out, this is of course one of the issues that has to be looked at. There is a possibility for the South Vietnamese military forces to stabilize the situation. The next question is for what length of time and against what level of attack.

Then there is also the moral question for the United States—whether when an ally with which it has been associated for 10 years wishes to defend itself, whether it is the United States that should make the decision for it by withholding supplies, that it should no longer defend itself.

These are all questions that are involved in the examination that is now going on.

Q. Mr. Secretary, General Thieu [Nguyen Van Thieu, President of the Republic of Viet-Nam] seems to have adopted some of the Administration's language in explaining about why he retreated; namely, that the United States failed to supply him with aid. In fact, he said it would be an act of betrayal if we continued to fail to supply aid. Now, how is that going to help your problems with the U.S. Congress?

Secretary Kissinger: I think, Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], that one of the most important things that all of us can do—the Administration, Congress, and if I may say so, the press as well—is to recognize that we are facing a great human tragedy and that we don't try to gloat over arguments that may have been made or to try to pick on things that men who obviously

are in despair now may be saying.

There are certain facts in the situation which may be difficult and unpleasant, but which are nevertheless true. It is a fact that the aid levels to Viet-Nam were cut by a third the first year and by another 50 percent the following year.

This coincided with a worldwide inflation and a fourfold increase in fuel prices, so that a situation was created, for a variety of reasons, in which almost all of the American military aid had to be given for ammunition and for fuel, very little for spare parts, and none for new equipment.

Even the ammunition had to be rationed, according to General Weyand, and so that individual guns could, for example, fire only two rounds a day. To what extent did such a situation contribute to the demoralization of the army, and to what extent the certainty, as they were looking at the situation, of constantly declining aid levels produced a decision to withdraw, which in turn produced a panic, I think is fairly evident.

This is far from saying this was the intention of those who cut the aid, and I think it is safe to say that you can tell from the public statements that senior Administration officials made that there was no expectation of a massive North Vietnamese attack this year.

So, there were a number of factors involved here, and I think there is some merit in what General Thieu is saying now. I think some of the adjectives he used are those of a desperate man who is in great anguish. And I think it is also fair to say that the United States, for 10 years, put in a great deal of its efforts and of its blood and of its treasure, and that, too, should weigh in the scale, and that we made a very great effort through a long period of time. So, we have to evaluate it over an extended period of time.

Q. Could I just follow that a moment? We keep talking about a massive North Vietnamese invasion, and many of us have been led to believe that this was a case of withdrawal by General Thieu. The President commented on that in San Diego, saying it was a poorly planned and unnecessary affair.

Would you be more precise about what happened?

Secretary Kissinger: To the best of our understanding, what happened was the following: In December, the North Vietnamese plan was to continue an intensified version of the operations of last year; that is to say, to pick off outlying district towns and perhaps to attack one or two provincial capitals.

In January, for a variety of reasons, the North Vietnamese decided to make a larger attack, and they concentrated on the Province of Phuoc Long, in total violation of the Paris accords. When they succeeded in that operation without significant opposition from the South Vietnamese Government, which felt itself overextended, and without any military reaction or even military moves by the United States, they decided to make an all-out attack this year.

From the middle of January on, a massive infiltration of North Vietnamese divisions started. President Thieu at that point was faced with a situation—also President Thieu found out during the battle of Ban Me Thuot, which followed the battle of Phuoc Long, of his fleet of C-130's only six were flyable because of the absence of spare parts so that his strategic mobility had been substantially reduced.

As he saw the North Vietnamese buildup and as he saw the prospects of American aid in any case declining whatever the decision of the Congress would be—I think it was a reasonable assumption that the level of aid would be declining—he made the strategic decision of consolidating his forces this year, depriving the North Vietnamese of the momentum of this campaign season, use his supplies up in the battles next year, and hope for new appropriations in 1977. This was his strategic assessment.

In terms of a strategic assessment, it made a lot of sense. The trouble was that in executing it, it was not planned with sufficient care, with sufficient understanding of the logistic system of South Viet-Nam. And it was compounded by the fact that the South Vietnamese divisions have their dependents living with them—so that when a

South Vietnamese division moved, all of their dependents moved with them, which in turn triggered a mass exodus of refugees, immobilizing these armies, and at some point along this retreat that turned into a panic where the soldiers were trying to take care of their families.

So, the decision was triggered by a correct evaluation of his prospects, the prospects being that if he kept his units strung out, they would probably be defeated by this massive North Vietnamese invasion; and to try to get to a more consolidated line, in executing what was probably a correct strategic decision, he of course brought about consequences with which we are familiar, which are tragic. I am just trying to explain our best understanding of what happened.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States has spent about \$140-\$150 billion in South Viet-Nam. What is it that makes the Administration think that \$300 million, or even an amount somewhat larger than that, would do any good? What is it that makes you think additional money is ever going to be able to make the South Vietnamese Army fight or solve the situation, when you spend \$140-\$150 billion and you are in the situation you are in now?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, as I pointed out, this whole situation is going to be reviewed by the National Security Council on Tuesday, and I do not want to prejudge all of these decisions.

There is, however, also involved a question of the obligations a country has that for 10 years has fought somewhere, which has encouraged millions of people to associate themselves with the United States, and whether it should then refuse to let them defend themselves if they want to defend themselves.

This is one argument on the military side. On the humanitarian side, I think it is important and decisive that the United States has an obligation to the hundreds of thousands who were closely associated with it and must make a maximum effort on the level of refugees and otherwise.

Q. I am not talking about the humanitarian side, Mr. Secretary. I am asking, in effect, whether \$140-\$150 billion is not as much moral obligation as the United States can undertake?

Secretary Kissinger: That is the decision that will have to be made by first the President and then the Congress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you anticipate that the President would make these decisions in time to tell us about them in the so-called "state of the world" address Thursday?

Secretary Kissinger: I have not had an opportunity to discuss with the President in great detail what he intends to say in this address. My impression is he will deal with the immediate foreign policy situation that he feels the United States is confronting, and I would think it is extremely probable that he would put before the Congress on that occasion at least some preliminary ideas of at least some immediate measures that in his judgment have to be taken.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the New York Times has a report from Paris this morning that the French Government has initiated plans to implement the Paris peace accords and to reach a settlement on that basis. Also, that the French are going to be active in all of Viet-Nam in humanitarian and refugee work. Do you have any comment on that? Have you been informed of this, and what is the outlook of this taking place?

Secretary Kissinger: We would gratefully welcome any attempt by any nation, including France, to participate in the humanitarian effort.

Secondly, we have attempted to encourage all of the signatories of the Paris accords to bring about their implementation; and therefore, if France is attempting to bring about an implementation of the Paris accords, we would certainly look at their proposals with sympathy.

We have not received an official French proposal—and, indeed, I was not aware of this particular report—but the United States

strongly favors the implementation of the Paris accords, which have been grossly and outrageously violated by Hanoi, and it would support the efforts of any country that would attempt to bring about an implementation of those accords.

Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International].

Q. Mr. Secretary, we have heard around here that this is not our war. We have also seen some pretty pessimistic reports from everywhere that the ball game is over. And also, you seem to neglect the area while you are concentrating on the Middle East. What do you have to say for that? Do you think Southeast Asia is still as viable as you thought it was two years ago?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, my trip to the Middle East to deal with the question that I was dealing with, other problems, had been scheduled for many months; and when I left on the trip to the Middle East, we had a crisis in Cambodia, the nature of which was well understood and which really required a congressional decision. It did not require decisions by the Administration.

We did not expect an imminent crisis in Viet-Nam, and you remember that the Secretary of Defense stated a view, which all of us shared, that the attacks this year would not be of a critical nature; so that the disintegration of the situation in the northern half of Viet-Nam was quite unexpected to us in the sense that we were not told in advance of the decision to evacuate.

It really did not reach the proportions it has until after my return from the Middle East. There is no question that South Viet-Nam faces an extremely grave situation. There are 18 North Vietnamese divisions in South Viet-Nam, in blatant violation of the Paris accords. And there is no agreement in history that is self-enforcing. If the signatories of the agreement cannot enforce it, either by actions of their own or by aid to the aggrieved parties, then a difficult situation is inevitable.

Under the Paris accords, North Viet-Nam was not permitted to infiltrate or to add any additional forces to those it already had in

South Viet-Nam. At that time, it had something like 80,000 to 100,000 people in South Viet-Nam. Today, it has closer to 400,000 in South Viet-Nam.

Under the Paris accords, North Viet-Nam was not permitted to introduce new equipment except through ICCS [International Commission of Control and Supervision] checkpoints and in replacement on a one-to-one basis for equipment that had been lost, damaged, and destroyed.

The North Vietnamese never even permitted the establishment of these checkpoints and totally disregarded the agreement. This is what brought about the change in the military situation, which was compounded by the fact that the South Vietnamese Army inventories were running down while the North Vietnamese inventories were increasing.

This is the objective structure of what happened in the last two years.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the Administration any indication from the Democratic leadership of Congress that Congress will be any more receptive to providing more military aid now than they were before they went into recess?

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, the Congress is in recess right now, and I am confident that the President is going to be in touch with the congressional leadership.

He has not had an opportunity, to the best of my knowledge, to be in touch with the congressional leadership, but again, let me make one point: It is unavoidable that when one analyzes the causes of a situation, it may be taken as a criticism of this or that group.

I think, in the history of Viet-Nam, there is enough criticism to go around. There have been mistakes made by the executive branch, and there have been misjudgments made by the legislative.

I think the major requirement for the United States, recognizing that we will now have a difficult set of decisions and a difficult set of debates, is to come out of this with dignity and without adding to the bitterness and viciousness which has so drained

us over the years. We will try to do our best to contribute to this. Whether we will always succeed, I don't know.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said at your last press conference, in some very strong language, that the problem was that this was now a question of what kind of people we are and whether or not we will destroy deliberately an ally.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right.

Q. The scenario that you gave us today indicates that while that \$300 million would have been needed, there was a proper, comprehensible decision to make, yet it was poorly executed, and that is why we have the problem. Your scenario does not really seem to back up the question of laying the blame.

Secretary Kissinger: Wait just a minute. It is not just a question of \$300 million. It is a question that since 1973 the combination of declining aid levels, inflation, and rising fuel prices has led to a constant attrition of the South Vietnamese Army. It is not just a decision of this Congress to delay \$300 million. It is a process that has been going on for a period of two years.

The statement I made in the press conference, which was under slightly different military conditions, at least as they were then perceived in Washington, was in terms of those decisions; but nevertheless it is a very important moral question for the United States whether when people who, with its encouragement, have fought for many years should in their hour of extremity be told by the United States that while they want to continue fighting that the United States would no longer help them defend themselves against an enemy who has never been told by its allies that there is a limit beyond which they won't support them.

I maintain that is a question that we ought to ask ourselves as a people. Regardless of the probable outcome of the war, I think it is a serious question. It is not meant necessarily as a criticism of anybody, and I really believe that at this moment, having

paid so much in our national unity on this issue, we should conduct this debate not with an attitude of who is going to pin the blame on whom, but with an attitude that we are facing a great tragedy in which there is involved something of American credibility, something of American honor, something of how we are perceived by other people in the world, on which serious people may have different questions but in which, for God's sake, we ought to stop talking as if one side had the monopoly of wisdom, morality, and insight and that serious people trying to deal with this problem are trying to run a confidence game. This is all that I am trying to suggest.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may continue, my question really was getting toward, are you personally convinced that if we had voted that extra \$300 million that was requested for the emergency supplemental or if we had actually appropriated the full amount requested in the beginning, \$1.4 billion, that we would not have faced the situation we now face, either at this time or sometime down the road?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe personally that it is not just the \$300 million. It is the \$300 million coming on top of a lot of other things. I believe that if it had not been for the moralities of executive authority resulting from Watergate, if the aid levels had been appropriate over the years, and if we had been freer to conduct foreign policy than was possible under these circumstances—partly for reasons in which the executive shares a responsibility—I believe that certainly the difficulties we face this year could have been avoided for a number of years.

For how long, it is hard to say, but very often, if we look over the postwar period, a period of time gain gets a possibility of things developing. But I would add, moreover, that it would have made a lot of difference to us as a people, that if it happened, if it had more clearly happened as a result of actions not so much under our control. But I would finally add, since you asked the question, and I did not volunteer this statement, that at some point in this

discussion—we now cannot avoid the discussion—at some point in this discussion we ought to stop this inquiry and ask ourselves where we go from here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I have two questions. One is, you keep referring to the massive violations by the North Vietnamese, and in view of their record, I wonder why you thought at the time the agreements were negotiated, or at any other time, that they were going to abide by them? We knew very early, as you said, they did not allow us to establish checkpoints.

My other question is, do you think there would be any benefit if the United States were able to provide some military aid now, through bombing or any other measure, to stem the tide of what is going on?

Secretary Kissinger: The first thing I think the people ought to remember is the kind of national debate that was going on in the United States in 1971 and 1972. I think it is indisputable that there was overwhelming consensus developing that the United States should end its participation in the war.

And you may remember that before I went on my last negotiation, the Democratic caucus had already voted to set a terminal date to our participation in the war; that is, January 1973.

Let me point out this did not affect the actual terms of the negotiations, which were substantially agreed to before that. So, I am simply trying to reconstruct the national mood, which was that the American military participation in the war had to be ended.

The major debate that then occurred was whether the United States should deliberately overthrow the government with which it was associated; and that we refused to do.

Now, that the North Vietnamese would press against the edges of the agreement was to be expected. What was not to be expected was that, partly through legislative action and partly through our internal divisions, we would find ourselves in a position where a forceful diplomacy became extremely difficult, and this certainly accelerated the violations and made them substantially free.

So, we had no illusions that we were dealing with a country other than one that had violated every other agreement that it had made, but under the conditions in which the agreement was made of a strong period in American foreign policy, we believed that we would be able to exercise sufficient influence on the situation to keep the violations to manageable proportions and also to obtain sufficient aid to permit the South Vietnamese to handle the problem.

So, those expectations, for reasons that no one could possibly predict at that time, were not fulfilled.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a look at the future rather than the past. I have two questions. One, isn't it likely that if we provided the \$300 million at this point, the likelihood would be that it would only prolong the fighting, cost more lives, and end in the same result? Two, the President and General Weyand have said they think the situation is salvageable. I wonder what evidence you have to give any hope that it is salvageable?

Secretary Kissinger: The President will study all the recommendations of General Weyand, plus the judgment of all of his senior advisers over the next days, and I think it is for the President then to make the judgment and to state it in his press conference.

I would like also to point out that even if this situation should finally wind up in some negotiation, it is not a matter of indifference whether it is done in such a way that permits the maximum extraction of refugees and of those whose very lives are at stake in the present situation.

So, there are very many levels of objectives that can be set. There is a point of view, which we will be examining, that the situation can be stabilized by a combination of the shortened lines, infusion of American aid, and other measures. That point of view, together with other points of view, will be considered over the next few days, and the President will report his conclusions to the Congress on Thursday.

My point in appearing here is to tell you primarily what the status of our discussion

is at this moment; and at this moment the President has really done nothing but spend about 90 percent of his time listening and asking questions to the purely military aspect of General Weyand's report.

He will get a further discussion of that this afternoon, together with the intelligence appraisal, and then this whole matter will be submitted to the National Security Council; so I do not want to preempt his decisions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it would seem time is of the essence, and with the events happening as quickly as they are over there, isn't time being wasted with the President being out here? Isn't this whole policy-making process being delayed because of the distances between here and Washington?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not going to answer that question. Isn't time being wasted?

Q. Isn't time being wasted in the policy-making decision with NSC being all back in Washington, you are here, General Weyand is here, the President is here. Couldn't it be done faster if everything was concentrated back there? It seems the middle of the week is awfully late for something so important.

Secretary Kissinger: There are about \$175 million left in the pipeline in the current appropriations. We are expediting the shipment of that equipment to Viet-Nam. No matter what decision is made by the President, it could not take effect for a number of weeks.

Therefore we believe in decisions of this importance it is extremely crucial that there be a very careful and a very prayerful examination of all the choices before us, and there is no effective delay, no matter what decisions the President eventually decides.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you answer the other part of that question about whether bombing is still an option and whether that would be of any assistance, help to the South Vietnamese?

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, the introduction of American military forces in or over Viet-Nam is prohibited by specific

legislation that was passed in July 1973, which was, I may say, another complicated factor in the enforcement of the agreement.

It is not so much a question of what we would have done. It is a question of what the other side knew we could not possibly do. Therefore, before any such action could be contemplated, the President would have to ask authority from the Congress to do that; and I do not anticipate that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the questions that is troubling many Americans and some people in this room, as you have already judged, is that what is happening in Viet-Nam today was foreseen by many people once the American troops withdrew. My question is, why then must the nation be asked to wear a hair shirt because of what has happened?

Secretary Kissinger: The problem is not whether the nation must be made to wear a hair shirt. The President is trying, to the best of his abilities, to make clear what he takes to be the causes of that situation.

We will never know whether it would have happened if enforcement had been carried out more aggressively and aid had been given more substantially. He is simply trying to point out his analysis of what brought about the present situation. After all, the people who predicted this could have been wrong. Maybe they could have been right. We do not know now.

Q. You do acknowledge that a great many people did predict it?

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, yes, and I am saying, of course, there were many people who made that argument, and that still does not change the question of whether the United States, having made all these investments, should not have carried out at least its moral obligations more fully.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what some of the options are that are being considered? We are not going to get a chance to talk to General Weyand, so we don't know what the suggestions are.

Secretary Kissinger: I really cannot prop-

erly go into it. Partly this is due to the fact that this morning General Weyand concentrated, I would say, exclusively on two things—his analysis of the reasons for the development of the military situation and, secondly, his analysis of the military prospects.

We have not yet covered the humanitarian problems, the evacuation problems of refugees, the possibilities that were alluded to, of which we have no formal indication, of restoration of the Paris accords.

So, all of these will have to be issues that will have to be examined in developing the options, but what we are planning is to go over that this afternoon, to sketch out some of the main options as we see them.

Then, the Embassy staff, together with General Weyand, the Defense Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency, will pull them together into a more comprehensive option paper, which will then be put before the National Security Council on Tuesday or, at the latest, Wednesday morning.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President spoke in his press conference of solemn commitments we had made to South Viet-Nam. This, I am sure you are aware, has raised many questions of secret agreements or tacit understandings or that kind of thing. First of all, what solemn commitments was the President referring to? Was he referring only to the one-for-one replacement, which, as I understand it, was not a commitment but an option? And if he was not referring to that, what was he talking about?

Secretary Kissinger: As I have explained, I think, at a previous press conference, he was not talking of a legal commitment. He was talking of a moral commitment. I believe that the South Vietnamese had every reason to think that if they permitted American troops to withdraw and if they enabled us to retrieve our prisoners, that we would carry out what we had called the Vietnamization process in enabling them to defend themselves.

We did not give them any specific figures, and we did not give them any definite prom-

ises, except to indicate that obviously, having signed the Paris agreement, we would have an interest in its enforcement.

But I believe that what the President was talking about was a moral obligation, not a legal commitment. He was talking about something growing out of a 10-year engagement of the United States ended by our withdrawal, not about secret clauses in particular documents.

There is no question that when we were negotiating the agreement we ourselves believed that the American debate had not concerned economic or military aid; and I think if you check the record, there was no debate on that subject at the time.

The American debate had concerned the question of whether enough Americans had died there and whether the South Vietnamese should not be able to defend themselves, and I believe, in all fairness, we all have to admit to ourselves, that we all believed that if the South Vietnamese would make the effort to defend themselves, there would be great receptivity in this country to help them do it as long as our prisoners could come back and Americans could stop dying there. That was the assumption within which we were operating, and I think if you read the back files of newspapers and congressional debates, that was the essence of our debate at the time.

Therefore it was never put in the form of a legal commitment, and it is not that we are violating a legal commitment. It is the President's perception of the moral obligation growing out of the context of events.

I just want to say again, many of you have heard me brief on this subject now for six years, and I think none of you have ever heard me question the travail and concern of those who have opposed the war, and all we can ask is that those of you who have been critical ought to keep in mind that there is a great human tragedy that those in the Administration are viewing and they are trying to deal with it in the best interest of the United States and in the best interests of world peace.

Thank you.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170, 7616). Done at Vienna July 7, 1971. Entered into force December 19, 1974.

Proclaimed by the President: April 2, 1975.

Customs

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: Romania (with declaration), March 6, 1975.

Energy

Agreement on an international energy program. Done at Paris November 18, 1974.¹

Accession deposited: New Zealand, March 11, 1975.

Gas

Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. Done at Geneva June 17, 1925. Entered into force February 8, 1928.

Ratification deposited: United States, April 10, 1975 (with reservation).

Entered into force for the United States: April 10, 1975.

Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

Accession deposited: Qatar, April 4, 1975.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: Mexico, April 7, 1975.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.¹

Acceptance deposited: Greece, February 28, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 15, 1971.¹

Acceptance deposited: Greece, February 28, 1975.

Patents

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24, 1971. Enters into force October 7, 1975.

Proclaimed by the President: April 2, 1975.

Program-Carrying Signals—

Distribution by Satellite

Convention relating to the distribution of programme-carrying signals transmitted by satellite. Done at Brussels May 21, 1974.¹

Signature: Yugoslavia, March 31, 1975.

Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972.¹

Accession deposited: Canada (with a declaration), March 7, 1975.

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London November 1, 1974.¹

Signature: Spain (subject to ratification), March 4, 1975.

Sea, Exploration of

Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen September 12, 1964. Entered into force July 22, 1968; for the United States April 18, 1973. TIAS 7628.

Protocol to the convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (TIAS 7628). Done at Copenhagen August 13, 1970.¹

Accession deposited: German Democratic Republic, February 17, 1975.

Tourism

Statutes of the World Tourism Organization (WTO). Done at Mexico City September 27, 1970. Entered into force November 1, 1974.²

Declarations of approval deposited: Bangladesh, February 19, 1975; Cuba, January 8, 1975; Czechoslovakia, February 10, 1975; Dahomey, December 31, 1974; Ecuador, February 11, 1975; El Salvador, February 11, 1975; Hungary, November 12, 1974; Israel, January 20, 1975; Poland, February 21, 1975; Uganda, December 12, 1974.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Open for signature at Washington from March 25 through April 14, 1975. Enters into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.

Signatures: Mauritius, March 25, 1975; Brazil, March 31, 1975; Korea, April 3, 1975; Pakistan, April 4, 1975; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with statement) April 8, 1975; Algeria, Austria, Egypt, Guatemala, South Africa, United States, April 10, 1975; Australia, Finland, Morocco, April 11, 1975.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Open for signature at Washington from March 25 through April 14, 1975. Enters into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.

Signature: United States (with statement), April 10, 1975.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement concerning shrimp, with annexes, agreed minutes, exchanges of notes and aide memoire. Signed at Brasilia March 14, 1975. Enters into force on the date mutually agreed by exchange of notes, upon completion of the internal procedures of both parties.

Chile

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 25, 1974 (TIAS 7993). Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago April 1, 1975. Entered into force April 1, 1975.

Italy

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Rome January 18, 1973. Entered into force March 11, 1975.

Proclaimed by the President: April 2, 1975.

Sri Lanka

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Colombo March 25, 1975. Entered into force March 25, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

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Check List of Department of State

Press Releases: April 7-13

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Release issued prior to April 7 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 183 of April 5.

No.	Date	Subject
*184	4/7	Easum sworn in as Ambassador to Nigeria (biographic data).
*185	4/9	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, May 5.
*186	4/9	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, May 9.
*187	4/9	Bowlder sworn in as Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa (biographic data).
†188	4/9	U.S.-Colombia joint communique.
*189	4/10	Laise sworn in as Director General of the Foreign Service (biographic data).
*190	4/10	International Women's Year staff appointments.
*191	4/10	Overseas Schools Advisory Council, May 12.
*192	4/11	Shlaudeman sworn in as Ambassador to Venezuela (biographic data).
193	4/11	Diplomatic note on Viet-Nam.
193A	4/11	Diplomatic note to North Viet-Nam.
*194	4/11	Ruckelshaus to chair Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year.
*194A	4/11	Agenda of Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year.
*194B	4/11	Members of Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year.
*195	4/11	U.S. and Jamaica extend textile agreement.
*196	4/11	Seven leaders in higher education to visit the Soviet Union.

*Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.