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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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A New National Partnership

Address by Secretary Kissinger[1]

A half century ago Winston Churchill, in his book "The World Crisis," observed that in happier times it was the custom for statesmen to "rejoice in that protecting Providence which had preserved us through so many dangers and brought us at last into a secure and prosperous age." But "little did they know," Churchill wrote, "that the worst perils had still to be encountered, and the greatest triumphs had yet to be won."

The same may be said of our age. We are at the end of three decades of a foreign policy which, on the whole, brought peace and prosperity to the world and which was conducted by administrations of both our major parties. Inevitably there were failures, but they were dwarfed by the long-term accomplishments.

Now we are entering a new era. Old international patterns are crumbling; old slogans are uninstructive; old solutions are unavailing. The world has become interdependent in economics, in communications, in human aspirations. No one nation, no one part of the world, can prosper or be secure in isolation.

For America, involvement in world affairs is no longer an act of choice, but the expression of a reality. When weapons span continents in minutes, our security is bound up with world security. When our factories and farms and our financial strength are so closely linked with other countries and peoples, our prosperity is tied to world prosperity. The first truly world crisis is that which we face now. It requires the first truly global solutions.

The world stands uneasily poised between unprecedented chaos and the opportunity for unparalleled creativity. The next few years will determine whether interdependence will foster common progress or common disaster. Our generation has the opportunity to shape a new cooperative international system; if we fail to act with vision, we will condemn ourselves to mounting domestic and international crises.

Had we a choice, America would not have selected this moment to be so challenged. We have endured enough in the past decade to have earned a respite: assassinations, racial and generational turbulence, a divisive war, the fall of one President and the resignation of another.

Nor are the other great democracies better prepared. Adjusting to a loss of power and influence, assailed by recession and inflation, they, too, feel their domestic burdens weighing down their capacity to act boldly.

But no nation can choose the timing of its fate. The tides of history take no account of the fatigue of the helmsman. Posterity will reward not the difficulty of the challenge, only the adequacy of the response.

For the United States, the present situation is laced with irony. A decade of upheaval has taught us the limitations of our power. Experience and maturity have dispelled any illusion that we could shape events as we pleased. Long after other nations, we have acquired a sense of tragedy. Yet our people

[1] Made before the Los Angeles World Affairs Council at Los Angeles, Calif., on Jan. 24 (text from press release 27).

and our institutions have emerged from our trials with a resilience that is the envy of other nations, who know—even when we forget—that America's strength is unique and American leadership indispensable. In the face of all vicissitudes, our nation continues to be the standard-bearer of political freedom, economic and social progress, and humanitarian concern—as it has for 200 years.

Thirty years ago America, after centuries of isolation, found within itself unimagined capacities of statesmanship and creativity. Men of both parties and many persuasions —like Truman and Eisenhower, Vandenberg and Marshall, Acheson and Dulles—built a national consensus for responsible American leadership in the world.

Their work helped fashion the economic recovery of Europe and Japan and stabilized the postwar world in a period of international tension. These were the indispensable foundations on which, in recent years, we have been able to regularize relations with our adversaries and chart new dimensions of cooperation with our allies.

To marshal our energies for the challenge of interdependence requires a return to fundamentals. It was a confident—perhaps even brash—America that launched its postwar labors. It was an America essentially united on ultimate goals that took on the task of restoring order from the chaos of war. Three decades of global exertions and the war in Viet-Nam have gravely weakened this sense of common purpose. We have no more urgent task than to rediscover it.

Only in this way can we give effect to the root reality of our age which President Ford described in his state of the Union address:

> At no time in our peacetime history has the state of the nation depended more heavily on the state of the world; and seldom, if ever, has the state of the world depended more heavily on the state of our nation.

Let me turn, then, to an examination of the issues before us in international affairs: Our traditional agenda of peace and war, the new issues of interdependence, and the need for a partnership between the executive and legislative branches of our government.

The Traditional Agenda of Peace and War

The traditional issues of peace and war addressed by the postwar generation will require our continuing effort, for we live in a world of political turmoil and proliferating nuclear technology.

Our foreign policy is built upon the bedrock of solidarity with our allies. Geography, history, economic ties, shared heritage, and common political values bind us closely together. The stability of the postwar world—and our recent progress in improving our relations with our adversaries—have crucially depended on the strength and constancy of our alliances. Today, in a new era of challenge and opportunity, we naturally turn first to our friends to seek cooperative solutions to new global issues such as energy. This is why we have sought to strengthen our ties with our Atlantic partners and Japan and have begun a new dialogue in the Western Hemisphere.

The second major traditional effort of our foreign policy has been to fashion more stable relations with our adversaries.

There can be no peaceful international order without a constructive relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union—the two nations with the power to destroy mankind.

The moral antagonism between our two systems cannot be ignored; it is at the heart of the problem. Nevertheless we have succeeded in reducing tensions and in beginning to lay the basis for a more cooperative future. The agreements limiting strategic arms, the Berlin agreement, the significant easing of tensions across the heart of Europe, the growing network of cooperative bilateral relations with the Soviet Union—these mark an undeniable improvement over the situation just a few years ago.

The recent Vladivostok accord envisages another agreement placing a long-term ceiling on the principal strategic weapons of both sides. For the first time in the nuclear age, the strategic planning of each side will take place in the context of stable and therefore more reassuring assumptions about the programs of the other side instead of being

driven by fear or self-fulfilling projections. The stage will be set for negotiations aimed at reducing the strategic arsenals of both sides. We shall turn to that task as soon as we have transformed the Vladivostok principles into a completed agreement.

The course of improving U.S.-Soviet relations will not always be easy, as the recent Soviet rejection of our trade legislation has demonstrated. It must nevertheless be pursued with conviction, despite disappointments and obstacles. In the nuclear age there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence.

Just as we have recognized that a stable international environment demands a more productive relationship with the Soviet Union, so we have learned that there can be no real assurance of a peaceful world so long as one-quarter of the world's people are excluded from the family of nations. We have therefore ended a generation of estrangement and confrontation with the People's Republic of China and sought to develop a new relationship in keeping with the principles of the Shanghai communique. Progress in our bilateral relations has opened useful channels of communication and reduced regional and global tensions. Our new and growing relationship with the People's Republic of China is now an accepted and enduring feature of the world scene.

A third traditional element of our foreign policy has been the effort to resolve conflicts without war. In a world of 150 nations, many chronic disputes and tensions continue to spawn human suffering and dangers to peace. It has always been America's policy to offer our help to promote peaceful settlement and to separate local disputes from big-power rivalry. In the Middle East, in Cyprus, in Indochina, in South Asia, on urgent multilateral issues such as nuclear proliferation, the United States stands ready to serve the cause of peace.

The New Issues of Interdependence

Progress in dealing with our traditional agenda is no longer enough. A new and unprecedented kind of issue has emerged. The problems of energy, resources, environment, population, the uses of space and the seas, now rank with the questions of military security, ideology, and territorial rivalry which have traditionally made up the diplomatic agenda.

With hindsight, there is little difficulty in identifying the moments in history when humanity broke from old ways and moved in a new direction. But for those living through such times it is usually difficult to see events as more than a series of unrelated crises. How often has man been able to perceive the ultimate significance of events occurring during his lifetime? How many times has he been able to summon the will to shape rather than submit to destiny?

The nuclear age permanently changed America's conviction that our security was assured behind two broad oceans. Now the crises of energy and food foreshadow an equally dramatic recognition that the very basis of America's strength—its economic vitality—is inextricably tied to the world's economic well-being.

Urgent issues illustrate the reality of interdependence:

—The industrial nations built a generation of prosperity on imported fuel at sustainable prices. Now we confront a cartel that can manipulate the supply and price of oil almost at will, threatening jobs, output, and stability.

—We and a few other countries have achieved immense productivity in agriculture. Now we see the survival and well-being of much of humanity threatened because world food production has not kept pace with population growth.

—For 30 years we and the industrial countries achieved steady economic growth. Now the economies of all industrialized countries are simultaneously afflicted by inflation and recession, and no nation can solve the problem alone.

Yet the interdependence that earlier fostered our prosperity and now threatens our decline can usher in a new period of progress if we perceive our common interest and act boldly to serve it. It requires a new level of

political wisdom, a new standard of responsibility, and a new vigor of diplomacy.

Overcoming the Energy Crisis

Clearly, the energy crisis is the most pressing issue on the new agenda. In the American view, a permanent solution is possible based on the following principles.

The first imperative is solidarity among the major consumers. Alone, no consuming country, except possibly the United States, can defend itself against an oil embargo or a withdrawal of oil money. Alone, no country, except perhaps the United States, can invest enough to develop new energy sources for self-sufficiency. But if the United States acted alone, it would doom the other industrialized nations to economic stagnation and political weakness; this would soon undermine our own economic well-being. Only by collective action can the consuming countries free their economies from excessive dependence on imported oil and their political life from a sense of impotence.

We have made important progress since the Washington Energy Conference met less than a year ago. Last November, the United States and 15 other countries signed an unprecedented agreement to assist each other in the event of a new oil emergency. That agreement commits each nation to build an emergency stock of oil; in case of a new embargo, each will cut its consumption by the same percentage and available oil will be shared. Thus, selective pressure would be blunted and an embargo against one would be an embargo against all.

Equally important, we have moved dramatically toward financial solidarity. Only last week, the major consuming nations agreed to create a solidarity fund of $25 billion, less than two months after it was first proposed by the United States. Through the creation of this fund, the industrial nations have gained significant protection against shifts, withdrawals, or cutoffs of funds from the petrodollar earners. The industrial countries will now be able to offset financial shifts of oil producer funds by loans to each other from the $25 billion mutual insurance fund. The United States considers this rapid and decisive decision for the creation of the solidarity fund to be of the greatest political and economic significance.

The second imperative is a major reduction in consumer dependence on imported oil. The safety nets of sharing and financial guarantees are important for the short term. But our long-term security requires a determined and concerted effort to reduce energy consumption—on the highways and in our homes, in the very style of our lives. Equally important will be a speedup in the development of alternative energy sources such as nuclear power, coal, oil shale, and the oil of the outer continental shelf, Alaska, the North Sea, and elsewhere.

Cooperative action among the consumer nations will reinforce our own efforts in this country. The International Energy Agency (IEA), created last year, and other countries acting in parallel with it, such as France, are responding to the crisis with substantial conservation programs of their own. And the United States will shortly propose to the IEA a large-scale collective program to develop alternative energy sources through price and other incentives to investors and through joint research and development.

Such policies will be costly and complex; some will be unpleasant and politically unpopular. But we face a choice: Either we act now, and decisively, to insure national self-sufficiency in energy by 1985, or we remain prey to economic disruption and to an increasing loss of control over our future. This, bluntly, is the meaning of President Ford's energy program which he laid before the Congress in his state of the Union message.

The third imperative is an eventual dialogue between consumers and producers. Ultimately the energy problem must be solved through cooperation between consumers and producers. The United States, as a matter of evident necessity, seeks such a dialogue in a spirit of good will and of conciliation. But just as the producers are

free to concert and discuss among themselves, so too are the consumers.

A principal purpose of consumer cooperation will be to prepare substantive positions for a producer dialogue to insure that it will be fruitful. The consumer nations should neither petition nor threaten. They should be prepared to discuss the whole range of issues of interdependence: assured supplies, a fair return to the producers of a depleting resource, security of investment, the relationship between oil and the state of the world economy.

Over the long term, producers and consumers, developed and developing nations, all depend on the same global economic system for the realization of their aspirations. It is this system which is now in jeopardy, and therefore the well-being of all nations is threatened. We must—together and in a cooperative spirit—restore the vitality of the world economy in the interests of all mankind.

Though we are far from having overcome the energy crisis, the outlines of a solution are discernible. The right course is clear, progress is being made, and success is well within our capacity. Indeed, the energy crisis which accelerated the economic difficulties of the industrial democracies can become the vehicle by which they reclaim control over their future and shape a more cooperative world.

Meeting Present and Projected Food Deficit

At a time when the industrial world calls for a sense of global responsibility from the producers of raw materials, it has an obligation to demonstrate a similar sense of responsibility with respect to its own surplus commodities.

Nowhere is this more urgent than in the case of food. A handful of countries, led by the United States, produce most of the world's surplus food. Meanwhile, in other parts of the globe, hundreds of millions do not eat enough for decent and productive lives. In many areas, up to 50 percent of the children die before the age of five, millions of them from malnutrition. And according to present projections, the world's food deficit could rise from the current 25 million tons to 85 million tons by 1985.

The current situation, as well as the even more foreboding future, is inconsistent with international stability, disruptive of cooperative global relationships, and totally repugnant to our moral values.

For these reasons the United States called for the World Food Conference which met in Rome last November. It was clear to us—as we emphasized at the conference—that no one nation could possibly produce enough to make up the world's food deficit and that a comprehensive international effort was required on six fronts:

—To expand food production in exporting countries and to coordinate their agricultural policies so that their capacity is used fully and well.

—To expand massively food production in the developing countries.

—To develop better means of food distribution and financing.

—To improve not just the quantity but also the quality of food which the poorest and most vulnerable groups receive.

—To insure against emergencies through an international system of global food reserves.

—To augment the food aid of the United States and other surplus countries until food production in developing countries increases.

In the next two months the United States will make further proposals to implement this program, and we will substantially increase our own food assistance.

However, food aid is essentially an emergency measure. There is no chance of meeting an 85-million-ton deficit without the rapid application of technology and capital to the expansion of food production where it is most needed, in the developing world. Other surplus producers, the industrialized nations, and the oil producers must join in this enterprise.

Energy and food are only two of the most urgent issues. At stake is a restructuring

of the world economy in commodities, trade, monetary relations, and investment.

Politically, if we succeed, it means the shaping of a new international order. For the industrial democracies, it involves regaining their economic health and the sense that their future is in their own hands; for the producing and developing nations, it holds the promise of a stable long-term economic relationship that can insure mutual progress for the remainder of the century.

The Need for National Unity

The agenda of war and peace, fuel and food, places a great responsibility upon America. The urgency of our challenges, the magnitude of the effort required, and the impact which our actions will have on our entire society all require an exceptional degree of public understanding and the effective participation and support of Congress.

Our foreign policy has been most effective when it reflected broad nonpartisan support. Close collaboration between the executive and legislative branches insured the success of the historic postwar American initiatives and sustained our foreign policy for two decades thereafter. More recently, during the harrowing time of Watergate, the spirit of responsible bipartisanship insulated our foreign policy from the trauma of domestic institutional crisis. For this, the nation owes the Congress a profound debt of gratitude.

A spirit of nonpartisan cooperation is even more essential today. The bitterness that has marked so much of our national dialogue for over a decade no longer has reason or place. Public debate once again must find its ultimate limit in a general recognition that we are engaged in a common enterprise.

To appeal for renewed nonpartisan cooperation in foreign policy reflects not a preference but a national necessity. Foreign nations must deal with our government as an entity, not as a complex of divided institutions. They must be able to count on our maintaining both our national will and our specific undertakings. If they misjudge either, they may be tempted into irresponsibility or grow reluctant to link their destiny to ours. If our divisions lead to a failure of policy, it is the country which will suffer, not one group or one party or one administration. If our cooperation promotes success, it is the nation which will benefit.

In his first address to Congress, President Ford pledged his administration to the principle of communication, conciliation, compromise, and cooperation. In that spirit, and on behalf of the President, I invite the Congress to a new national partnership in the conduct of our foreign policy. Topether with new conceptions of foreign policy, we must define new principles of executive-legislative relations—principles which reconcile the unmistakable claims of congressional supervision and the urgent requirements of purposeful American world leadership.

The administration will make every effort to meet congressional concerns. We will dedicate ourselves to strengthening the mutual sense of trust with the Congress. We do not ask for a blank check. We take seriously the view that over the past decade there often has been a breakdown of communication between the executive and legislative branches.

We have made major efforts to consult the Congress and to keep it informed. As Secretary of State, confirmed by the Senate, I have considered this a principal responsibility of my office. Therefore, in less than 16 months in office, I have testified 37 times before congressional committees and have consulted even more frequently with individual Members and groups.

Nevertheless, we recognize that a new partnership requires a willingness to explore new approaches. Specifically, the administration will strive to evoke the advice and consent of the Congress in its broadest sense. We know that congressional support presupposes that both Houses are kept informed of the administration's premises and purposes as well as of the facts on which its decisions are based. In the process, the administration will seek the views of as many Members of Congress concerned with a particular issue as possible. In short, the administration will strongly support the effort of the Congress to meet its constitutional

obligations with wisdom and imagination.

Beyond the general requirement of advice and consent, the role of legislation and appropriations in defining the basic directions of policy is traditional. The administration may disagree with a particular decision; we may argue vigorously for a different course, as we have, for example, concerning the necessity of adequate aid to support the self-defense of allies in Indochina. But we welcome the indispensable contribution of Congress to the general direction of national policy.

At the same time, it is important to recognize that the legislative process—deliberation, debate, and statutory law—is much less well-suited to the detailed supervision of the day-to-day conduct of diplomacy. Legal prescriptions, by their very nature, lose sight of the sense of nuance and the feeling for the interrelationship of issues on which foreign policy success or failure so often depends. This is why the conduct of negotiations has always been preeminently an executive responsibility, though the national commitments which a completed agreement entails must necessarily have legislative and public support.

The growing tendency of the Congress to legislate in detail the day-to-day or week-to-week conduct of our foreign affairs raises grave issues. American policy—given the wide range of our interests and responsibilities—must be a coherent and a purposeful whole. The way we act in our relations with one country almost inevitably affects our relationship with others. To single out individual countries for special legislative attention has unintended but inevitable consequences and risks unraveling the entire fabric of our foreign policy.

Paradoxically, the President and the Congress share the same immediate objectives on most of the issues that have recently become sources of dispute. Too often, differences as to tactics have defeated the very purposes that both branches meant to serve, because the legislative sanctions were too public or too drastic or too undiscriminating. Our inability to implement the trade agreement with the Soviet Union is a case in point; another is the impact of restrictions on aid to Turkey on our efforts both to advance the Cyprus peace negotiations and to safeguard our wider security interests in the eastern Mediterranean; yet another is the damage to our Western Hemisphere relations, specifically in Ecuador and Venezuela, caused by an amendment designed to withhold special tariff preferences from OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries.

In fairness, it must be pointed out that Congressmen and Senators must represent the particular views of their constituencies. All reflect an electorate impatient with foreign turmoil and insistent that international responsibilities be shared more equitably. In a period of domestic recession the case for foreign aid becomes increasingly difficult to make. And yet the reality of interdependence links our destiny ever more closely with the rest of the world.

It is therefore understandable that one of the issues on which the Congress and the executive branch have recently divided is the degree to which foreign aid cutoffs—military or economic—can be used to bring about changes in the policies of other nations. Whether foreign aid should be used as an instrument of pressure depends on the way foreign aid is conceived.

The administration is convinced that foreign aid to be viable must serve American national interests above all, including the broad interest we have in a stable world. If an important American interest is served by the aid relationship, it is a wise investment; if not, our resources are being squandered, even if we have no specific grievances against the recipient.

For moral and practical reasons, we must recognize that a challenge to the recipient's sovereignty tends to generate reactions that far transcend the merit of most of the issues in dispute. Instead of influencing conduct in ways we desire, cutting aid is likely to harden positions. The very leverage we need is almost always lost; our bilateral political relationship is impaired, usually for no commensurable benefit; and other friends and allies begin to question whether we under-

stand our own national interest and whether we can be a reliable longer term partner.

These issues have little to do with the age-old tension between morality and expediency. Foreign policy, by its nature, must combine a desire to achieve the ideal with a recognition of what is practical. The fact of sovereignty implies compromise, and each compromise involves an element of pragmatism. On the other hand, a purely expedient policy will lack all roots and become the prisoner of events. The difficult choices are not between principle and expediency but between two objectives both of which are good, or between courses of action both of which are difficult or dangerous. To achieve a fruitful balance is the central dilemma of foreign policy.

The effort to strengthen executive-legislative bonds is complicated by the new character of the Congress. New principles of participation and organization are taking hold. The number of Congressmen and Senators concerned with foreign policy issues has expanded beyond the traditional committees. Traditional procedures—focused as they are on the congressional leadership and the committees—may no longer prove adequate to the desires of an increasingly individualistic membership.

As the range of consultation expands, the problem of confidentiality increases. Confidentiality in negotiations facilitates compromise; it must not be considered by the Congress as a cloak of deception; it must not be used by the executive to avoid its responsibilities to the Congress.

Some of these problems are inherent in the system of checks and balances by which we have thrived. The separation of powers produces a healthy and potentially creative tension between the executive and the legislative branches of government. Partnership should not seek to make either branch a rubber stamp for the other. But if old patterns of executive-legislative relations are in flux, now is the time for both branches to concert to fashion new principles and practices of collaboration. The administration stands ready to join with the Congress in devising procedures appropriate to the need for a truly national and long-range foreign policy. We would welcome congressional suggestions through whatever device the Congress may choose, and we will respond in the same spirit.

In the meantime, the administration will strive to achieve a national consensus through close consultation, the nonpartisan conduct of foreign policy, and restraint in the exercise of executive authority.

The problem of achieving a new national partnership is difficult. I am confident that, working together, the executive and the Congress will solve it and thereby enhance the vitality of our democratic institutions and the purposefulness of our foreign policy.

In 1947, when another moment of crisis summoned us to consensus and creation, a Member of the Senate recalled Lincoln's words to the Congress:

> The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.

We have learned more than once that this century demands much of America. And now we are challenged once again "to think anew and act anew" so that we may help ourselves and the world find the way to a time of hope. Let us resolve to move forward together, transforming challenge into opportunity and opportunity into achievement.

No genuine democracy can or should obtain total unanimity. But we can strive for a consensus about our national goals and chart a common course. If we act with large spirit, history could record this as a time of great creativity, and the last quarter of this century could be remembered as that period when mankind fashioned the first truly global community.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of January 28

Press release 35 dated January 28

Secretary Kissinger: We will go right into questions. Stewart [Stewart Hensley, United Press International].

Q. Mr. Secretary, this question deals with the decision of the Government of Argentina to postpone, cancel, or otherwise delay the proposed March meeting of Foreign Ministers, and their explanation that it's due to the rigidity and lack of equity on the part of the U.S. trade bill toward Ecuador and Venezuela. I have two questions on it.

One is, do you think this is a totality of the reasons, or do you think that Cuba figures in it to some extent? And the second question is whether in view of this you feel that your effort to begin a new dialogue has really suffered a severe setback.

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the postponement of the meeting in Argentina, I have been in very close contact with Foreign Minister [of Argentina Alberto] Vignes and with other of my colleagues in the Western Hemisphere.

Their reason seems to me, as stated, their objection to the provision in the Trade Act which includes Ecuador and Venezuela in the ban on generalized preferences. And as you know, that is because they are members of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries].

Now, I stated the administration position on this yesterday. I testified against this provision when the Trade Act was being considered. The President, in signing the Trade Act, had this provision in mind when he pointed out that not all of the provisions were agreeable to the administration. The State Department issued a statement sometime afterward, pointing out that it thought the application of this provision to Venezuela and Ecuador was too rigid.

Nevertheless, we believe that even though we disagree with the action of the Congress —we believe that the action of those two governments in refusing to come to the Buenos Aires meeting was unjustified. They knew very well that, according to our constitutional processes, no relief could be given until we have had an opportunity for full consultation with the Congress. And they knew also that we would consult with the Congress and that we had reason to believe that the Congress would be sympathetic to our views.

Now, moreover, even though we objected to some of the provisions of the trade bill with respect to Latin America, it is important to keep in mind that $750 million in Latin American exports are going to enter the United States duty free under the provisions of the Trade Act and that whatever inequities existed could have been worked out.

And as I pointed out yesterday, as part of the new dialogue the United States has declared that it would not use pressure with respect to its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere but it is also inappropriate that our neighbors should attempt to use pressure against the United States.

Now, with respect to your specific question: Cuba had absolutely nothing to do with this; because we had had full consultations on how to handle the issue of Cuba with our Western Hemisphere neighbors, and a substantial consensus was emerging on how the issue of Cuba sanctions could be handled at the Buenos Aires meeting, and there had been no dispute with respect to that.

Do I believe that the new dialogue is in jeopardy? As with respect to the setback that was suffered by détente, the postponement of the Buenos Aires meeting is obviously not to be desired.

On the other hand, any foreign policy to be effective must reflect the mutual interests of all parties.

The United States believes very strongly that a strengthening of Western Hemisphere ties is in the interest of all of the countries in the Western Hemisphere. We have been prepared, and remain prepared, to make strengthened hemisphere relations one of the cardinal aspects of our foreign policy. And we are convinced that the mutuality of interests and the long tradition of cooperation in the Western Hemisphere will overcome this temporary difficulty. And we look forward to working very closely with our friends in the Western Hemisphere and strengthening our relationship.

"Crisis of Authority"

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have been quoted in the newspaper recently as having grave doubts about the long-term power of survival of American society. Did you say that, and do you believe it?

Secretary Kissinger: I stated—I don't know what this particular story refers to—that I believe that all of Western democracies at the present are suffering from a crisis of authority. And I believe that it is very difficult to conduct policy when governments are unwilling to make short-term sacrifices—unwilling or unable—for the long-term benefit. So I believe, as a historian and as an analyst, that there is this problem.

I believe at the same time, as somebody in a position of responsibility, that these problems are solvable and that we can solve them. And therefore I am confident in our ability to overcome our difficulties. But I don't think that this has to take the form of denying that difficulties exist.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with regard to the sudden Soviet cancellation of the '72 trade pact, do you intend to lead a new effort to try to get the restrictions, the congressional restrictions that encumbered that Trade Act that led to the cancellation, removed in the coming weeks or months?

Secretary Kissinger: I continue to believe in the principles that were reflected in the Trade Agreement in 1972 that could not be carried out. I think now that we should assess the situation in the light of the Soviet refusal to accept some of the provisions in the legislation that was passed by the Congress. We will then, in some weeks, begin consultation with the Congress as to the appropriate steps to be taken so that the next time we put forward trade legislation it will be on the basis of some consensus between the administration and the Congress, in order to avoid some of the difficulties that arose previously.

Q. In order to get the Jackson amendment removed?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the particular methods that should be used and how to deal with the objections should be worked out in consultation between the administration and those leaders of the Congress that have a particular interest in this issue.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you mean when you say you believe the Western democracies are suffering from a crisis of authority? Do you mean that their central governments are not strong enough, or that the leaders aren't strong enough? I don't know exactly what you mean by that "crisis of authority."

Secretary Kissinger: We haven't had a crisis resulting from public statements by me in quite a while. [Laughter.] In at least two weeks. [Laughter.]

I am saying the problem for any society is, first, whether it is able to recognize the problems it is facing, secondly, whether it is willing to deal with these problems on the basis of long-range decisions.

At the time the problems can be mastered, it is never possible to prove that an action is in fact necessary, and you always face one set of conjectures with another set of conjectures.

So what is needed is a consensus in the leadership and between the leadership and the parliament that enables the government, or the society, to act with confidence and with some long-range mission. I think this is a problem in many countries today, and it has many causes. Part of the cause is the complexity of the issues, which makes it very difficult to subject them to the sort of debate that was easier when one dealt with much more simple problems.

It's often been remarked that on such issues as the defense budget it is very difficult for the layman to form an opinion on the basis of the facts that he can absorb, even if they are all available to him. So this is a problem.

It is a problem, however—and I repeat—which is solvable. It is a problem which I attempted to address last week when I called for new cooperation between the administration and the Congress. It is not a problem to be solved by confrontation.

The Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, considering the difficulty of this phase of the Middle East negotiations, and now looking back at the reaction to your remarks, do you think it was a mistake to leave open the possibility of American military intervention in the Middle East oilfields in the gravest of emergencies?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think what I said and the way it was interpreted were not always identical. I believe that what I said was true and it was necessary. It is irrelevant to the issues which we now confront. And I have repeatedly stated that the United States will deal with the issues of energy on the basis of a dialogue with the producers and with an attitude of conciliation and cooperation.

The contingency to which I referred, as I pointed out previously, could arise only if warfare were originated against the United States. And I don't foresee this.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you bring us up to date on the diplomatic situation in the Middle East? Specifically, what are your travel plans? Secondly, do you think it's possible to reconcile Egypt's desire for further regaining of territory—in particular the passes and the oilfields which President Sadat referred to—with Israel's desire for further political acceptance by the Arabs?

Secretary Kissinger: First, I think you all recognize that we are dealing in the Middle East with an enormously delicate problem affecting the relations between Israel and its neighbors, the relations of Israel's neighbors to each other, and the relationship of outside powers to the whole area. And in this extremely complex and very dangerous situation, it is necessary for us to move with care and, hopefully, with some thoughtfulness.

My plans are within the next few weeks—and the precise date has not yet been set, but I hope to be able to announce it early next week—to go within the next few weeks on an exploratory trip to the Middle East. It will not be a trip designed to settle anything or to generate a "shuttle diplomacy." It will be designed to have firsthand talks with all of the major participants—all of the Arab countries that I previously visited, as well as Israel—in order to see what the real possibilities of a solution might be.

I personally believe that the two interests—which you correctly defined—of Egypt for the return of some territory, and of Israel for some progress toward peace, can be reconciled. And I believe also that the alternative to reconciling it will be serious for all of the parties concerned.

Public and Congressional Accountability

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your references earlier to a crisis of authority in the West—some members of Congress, of course, would say that there is a crisis of accountability that has caused the difficulty in the conduct of foreign affairs. How do you reconcile these two problems?

And if you would, I would like to direct your attention particularly to the ongoing state of U.S.-Soviet relations. After the current problem we have on trade, we have the

additional larger problem in many respects coming up on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] negotiations. Now, you face these two problems, authority and accountability.

Secretary Kissinger: I think you are absolutely right, Murrey [Murrey Marder, Washington Post]. Any democracy faces the problem of how to reconcile the need for authority with the requirements of accountability. You need authority because foreign countries can only deal with a government. They can not, and should not, begin to lobby in the legislative process of a society. And therefore the ability to conduct foreign policy depends on the expectation of other countries of the degree to which one's commitments can be carried out and one's word means anything.

On the other hand, obviously in a democracy there must be full accountability. I have attempted to be understanding of this problem. As I pointed out previously, I have testified 38 times before congressional committees in 16 months in office and have met nearly a hundred times with other congressional groups on an informal basis.

At the same time, I recognize that the necessity of presenting a united front to foreign countries may impose additional requirements of consultation, and I am prepared to undertake them and so is the entire administration.

Now, with respect to the SALT agreement, we shall brief the relevant congressional committees of the essential features of our plans. I think we have to come to some understanding with the Congress about the necessity on the one hand of keeping the Congress properly informed and, on the other hand, of not having every detail of the negotiation become subject to public controversy, because that would freeze the negotiating process and would lead to rigidity.

So all I can say is I'm aware of the problem. I'm not saying it should be solved by giving the executive discretion. I think it requires self-restraint on both the executive's part and the Congress' part.

Q. I would like to pursue that one bit. On the question of accountability you are obviously facing—the administration is facing—not a congressional desire to grant greater authority for the conduct of secret diplomacy but, on the contrary, a demand for greater openness and increasing restrictiveness on secret diplomacy.

Now, is this not one of the fundamental problems here—that while you referred, for example, to having testified 38 times, most of that testimony was in closed session? Don't you feel some need here to be more responsive to the public discussion of foreign policy which you have referred to in the past but it appears to have diminished?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Murrey, unfortunately, I don't have the statistics here of the number of public speeches I have given and the number of press conferences I've held. And it seems that criticism modulates between not being sufficiently available to the press and seducing the press. But be that as it may, I recognize the need for public accountability as well as congressional accountability. I believe at the same time that it is necessary for everyone interested in accountability also to recognize the limits of the detail to which this can take place at particular stages of negotiations. We will do the maximum that we think is consistent with the national interest. And we will interpret this very widely. And we are open to suggestions as to how the public presentation can be improved.

But I think it is necessary for everybody concerned with the problem of public accountability, as well as everyone concerned with the question of authority, to look again at the limits to which they should push their claims.

The Trade Act and the Soviet Union

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a public impression that the administration accepted the conditions of the Jackson amendment, however reluctantly. I would like to ask you whether, if you had anticipated the Soviet reaction to the trade bill, whether you would have advised the President not to sign it.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to go into a debate about every detail of the negotiations that led to the so-called compromise. And once matters had reached this point where it became necessary, we were already at a very narrow margin. I don't want to review all these events, because we should look into the future—because there is no purpose being served.

Would I have recommended to the President that he not sign it? That's very hard to know. One has to remember that it was believed that the trade bill was in the essential interests of the United States and in the essential interests of a more open trading system among all of the industrialized countries, as well as giving special benefits to the developing countries in the special preference system. And, therefore, to recommend the President to veto this because there were aspects of it in the granting of MFN [most favored nation] to the Soviet Union would have been a very heavy responsibility.

As it turned out, I believed that, while it would be a close call, the agreement that was made with Senator Jackson would probably stick. And therefore I agree with those who say that it was entered into in good faith by all of the parties. So the issue never arose.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech in Los Angeles you referred to your dissatisfaction with legislative restrictions on foreign policy. Does this dissatisfaction lead you to attempt to try to repeal or modify the Church-Case amendment or the War Powers Act? Or, more importantly, the restrictions on the end use of military aid?

Secretary Kissinger: Now, let's get the distinctions clear. First of all, let me make one point with respect to what Murrey said previously.

The issue isn't secret diplomacy. Some diplomacy has to be secret, and some of it has to be open. And I think that balance can be established.

Now, with respect to legislative restrictions, I made a distinction between two categories of legislative restrictions: those that attempt to set main lines of policy, such as the Church-Case amendment. With those the administration can agree or disagree, but it cannot challenge the right of the Congress to set the main lines of the policy by legislation. The second is the attempt to write into law detailed prescriptions, country by country, for specific measures. That, we believe, will generally have consequences that are out of proportion to the objectives that are sought to be obtained. Those we deplore, and those we will attempt to resist.

Now, if the Congress passes a law on the main direction of a policy with which we disagree, we may ask them to change it. The two cases you have mentioned, even though they were passed at the time over administration objection, at least the first one, we will not ask them to reverse.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the thing that troubles me about that is, do you—and I think you do, and why do you is really the question—put Jackson-Vanik in the second category and not in the first? Didn't Jackson-Vanik indeed represent a national attitude about freedom and democracy, et cetera, and not really some tinkering with day-to-day minor details?

Secretary Kissinger: I'm glad that you already answered the first of your two questions—

Q. I think you do put it in category 2.

Secretary Kissinger: When we get these press conferences back on a more frequent basis, I guess we will get two-thirds of the questions answered by those who put them.

On the Jackson-Vanik—I don't think I want to insist, on a theoretical point, on whether it is in the first category or in the second category. On the Jackson-Vanik amendment, the administration always supported the objectives of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. And the administration, before the Jackson-Vanik amendment was ever introduced, had managed to bring about an increase in emigration from an average of 400 to a level of about 38,000 a year. So there was no dispute whatever between the administration and the supporters of Jack-

son-Vanik about basic values and basic objectives. The administration consistently maintained that the method of a legislative prescription in this case was not the appropriate method and might backfire.

Now, whether that was because it was in the second category that I pointed out or in the first category, I don't really want to insist upon. Nor do I want to challenge the right of the Congress to pass such an action.

And finally, I really don't think much purpose is served by prolonging the debate over the past—of how we got to this point—because we did try to work together with the Congress on a good-faith basis, once it had embarked on a course which we considered unwise, to try to resolve the ensuing difficulty.

If we go back on the trade legislation, we will try to achieve the objectives which we share with the Congress by methods that may be more appropriate to the objective. We will not give up.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us how you estimate the prospects of a summit meeting with regard to the CSCE Conference [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] and what significance a summit could have for détente, East-West détente?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I believe that the European Security Conference is making good progress. The issues—as you know, they are discussing them in various categories called "baskets," and the issues in most of these categories are beginning to be resolved. There are some unresolved issues with respect to general principles and some unresolved issues with respect to human contacts. But progress has been made in all of these categories.

I believe, therefore, that if the conference is concluded along the lines that are now foreseeable, a summit conclusion is highly probable. I believe that a successful outcome of the European Security Conference would contribute to détente.

Cyprus Negotiations

Q. Mr. Secretary, next week, February 5, is the deadline by which time the administration has to report progress on Cyprus. What kind of report do you think you will be able to give to Congress by that date? Otherwise aid to Turkey is cut off.

Secretary Kissinger: I can only stress what I have said previously.

The United States gives aid to Turkey not as a favor to Turkey, but in the interests of Western security. And I think anybody looking at a map and analyzing foreseeable trouble spots must recognize this. Therefore the administration is opposed to the cutoff of aid to Turkey, regardless of what progress may be made in the negotiations.

Secondly, the administration favors rapid progress in the negotiations over Cyprus and has supported this progress. And I believe that all of the parties, including the Greek side—and especially the Greek side—would have to agree that the United States has made major efforts.

I believe that some progress is possible and will be made—can be made before February 5. And we will be in touch with the Congress either late this week or early next week. And I have stayed in very close contact with those Members of the Congress and the Senate that have had a particular interest in this question to keep them informed of the state of the negotiations.

So by the end of this week—as you know, the parties now meet twice a week in Nicosia—and by the end of this week, after their second meeting this week, I will be in touch with the parties, and we will discuss that with the Congress.

Assistance to Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Robert Byrd said this morning the leaders of both parties in Congress have told President Ford that it will be difficult, if not impossible, to get more aid to South Viet-Nam. Where does that leave the situation?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let us make clear what it is we have asked for. And let me express the hope that what we are asking for doesn't rekindle the entire debate on Viet-Nam, because that is emphatically not involved.

Last year the administration asked for $1.4 billion for military aid to Viet-Nam. The Congress authorized $1 billion. It appropriated $700 million. We are asking the Congress to appropriate the $300 million difference between what it had already authorized and what it actually appropriated, in the light of the stepped-up military operations in Viet-Nam.

This is not an issue of principle of whether or not we should be in Viet-Nam. The issue is whether any case at all can be made for giving inadequate aid to Viet-Nam. And we believe there can be no case for a deliberate decision to give less than the adequate aid, and aid that the Congress had already authorized to be given, so that it could not have been even an issue of principle for the Congress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the Middle East, several months ago you said you wouldn't be returning to the Middle East unless you were fairly sure that your presence there would lead to an agreement. You are now saying that you are going back there on an exploratory mission. Why have you changed your tactics?

Secretary Kissinger: I have changed my tactics at the request of all of the parties, and based on the belief that the urgency of the situation requires that this step be taken. I have also pointed out in this press conference that I am hopeful that progress can be made. And I am going there with that attitude.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to your saying that it serves no useful purpose to go over the Jackson-Vanik amendment, it has become an issue in Washington to apportion some blame on this issue. Now, this has ramifications for U.S. relations with the Soviet Union because some people say the Soviet Union reneged. It has ramifications for your dealing with Congress because some people feel you have blamed Congress. Because of that problem, could you deal with this a little further and talk to us about the situation?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I stated my view, and the administration's view, with respect to the amendment in two public testimonies before the Congress in which I pointed out why we were opposed not to the objectives—I want to repeat that—but to the methods.

I don't think any purpose is served in trying to apportion blame now. I agree with those who say that the discussions between the Congress and the administration were conducted in good faith by both sides. At this point, we should address the question of where we go in the future, and not how we got where we are.

Military Situation in Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your assessment of the situation in Indochina, particularly Viet-Nam, two years after the agreement which you labored over, and what went wrong?

Secretary Kissinger: I think if you remember the intense discussions that were going on in the United States during the negotiation of the agreement, you will recall that the overwhelming objective that was attempted to be served was to disengage American military forces from Indochina and to return our prisoners from North Viet-Nam.

Under the conditions that we then confronted—which was an increasing domestic debate on this issue—those were the principal objectives that could be achieved. The alternative—namely, to impose a different kind of solution—would have required a more prolonged military operation by the United States.

Secondly, what has gone wrong, if anything has gone wrong, is that it was the belief of those who signed the agreement—certainly a belief that was encouraged by the United States, as well as by the public debate here—that the objection in the United States was not to our supporting a government that was trying to defend itself by its own efforts. Our national objection was to the presence of American forces in Viet-Nam.

Now, the military situation in Viet-Nam was reasonably good until last June. At that

point, we had to impose cuts—no new equipment could be sent, and only inadequate ammunition. This brought about a reduction in the ammunition expenditure by the Vietnamese Army. This in turn led to an increase in casualties, to a loss of mobility, and therefore to a deterioration in the military situation.

All that we have ever said was that the settlement would put South Viet-Nam in a position where it had a chance to defend itself. That chance exists. That chance depends on adequate American assistance. And that is the chance we are asking for.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I have a question I would like to follow up on your first reply on the Middle East. In that reply, you said that you believe the Egyptian desire for additional territory in Sinai, together with the Israeli desire for specific political concessions, can be reconciled. I understand that you probably don't want to get into the specific demands that Israel is asking from Egypt. But perhaps you can give us some general criteria for what types of political acts Egypt may offer to Israel that would satisfy Israel. And the second part of the question is—the questioner had specifically referred to the oilfields and the passes—were you referring to those specific points as possibly being reconciled?

Secretary Kissinger: I think all of you have to accept the fact that I cannot possibly go into the details of the negotiation before I have gone to the Middle East. And therefore, with all due respect, I cannot possibly answer this question.

Q. Mr. Secretary, along this line, but not asking you to go into any details of the negotiations, in your discussions with the Arab countries in the Middle East, have you found any evidence that the Arab world is prepared to accept the existence of Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: It is my impression that there is an increasing willingness to accept the existence of Israel as part of the process of peace, yes.

Detente and Southeast Asia

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the areas where détente has never worked very well is in Southeast Asia. During the course of the time when détente was running relatively smoothly, did you ever try to make it clear to the Soviets that responsible behavior in the form of limiting military supplies—which tend to wind up in South Viet-Nam and fuel the war there—would not be acceptable? In other words, have you tried to work out that end of the equation?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, it is an interesting question to determine what you mean by the phrase "is not acceptable." The answer to your question depends on what is it we would do if the Soviet Union ignores us. And if you look at the catalogue of things available for us to do under present circumstances in the way of either retaliation or of benefits, you will find that it is not an infinitely large one.

The answer to your question is, yes, we have raised this issue both with the Soviet Union and with the People's Republic of China. And I think the efficacy of it cannot be determined by determining whether supplies have stopped altogether, but has to be seen in relation to how much more might have been done and then to assess it in relationship to that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you plan to travel to Latin America during the month of February?

Secretary Kissinger: I plan—I don't think I have announced it, as some of my colleagues seem to have announced—I do plan to travel to Latin America, certainly before the OAS meeting here in April. The exact date I would like to work out after my trip to the Middle East has been more firmly settled. But I want to say now that I place great stress on our relationship with Latin America and that I will go at the earliest opportunity that I can do justice to this visit.

Q. Could you tell us about your meeting with the former President this weekend?

Specifically, could you tell us if you discussed with him his cooperating in any way with the current investigations into the CIA operation?

Secretary Kissinger: I did not discuss with the former President anything whatever having to do with any investigation now being conducted in Washington, and specifically not that investigation. It was a general review of the international situation and personal talk. It had no specific mission. But it seemed to me that a man who has appointed me to two senior positions in the government deserved the courtesy of a visit when I was that close.

Stewart [Stewart Hensley].

Q. Well, this is just tying up a loose end. But when you were responding to Mr. Freed's [Kenneth J. Freed, Associated Press] question about the illness which afflicts some of the democratic countries, you said it was easier to get a consensus between the executive and the parliament when problems were simpler.

Secretary Kissinger: That's right.

Q. In answering Mr. Marder's question about accountability, you harked back to the —I think it was the Chicago speech, or possibly Los Angeles, in which you said you promised wider consultation but with increased confidentiality, which seems rather paradoxical to me, although I'm willing to believe you can do it. [Laughter.] But there's one more element, and I'm wondering if that element is not what is missing from what you told Mr. Freed about in the answer to his question—and that is that problems now are not as simple as they were at the time of Senator Vandenberg and the bipartisan foreign policy. And how do you get around the complexity of these problems in your accountability?

Secretary Kissinger: Look, I'm not trying to score points here now. I'm trying to call attention to a very serious problem—and a a problem that if as societies we do not solve, it will not be a victory for an administration or a victory for the countries; it will be a defeat for everything we stand for—everything we are trying to achieve.

I did not say I want more consultation and more confidentiality. I listed a whole set of problems that are very real problems. One is how you can have congressional control without legislative restriction. I frankly do not know the answer exactly to this.

Q. That is what I wanted to know.

Secretary Kissinger: That is one problem—how you can have congressional control without the Congress necessarily passing laws.

The second problem is how you can have increased consultation and at the same time, on key issues, maintain increased confidentiality.

Now, I have to say that recently I have been briefing some key members of the Congress on some of the key aspects of the Cyprus negotiation and there have been no leaks whatsoever and I consider this a very important achievement—I don't want to imply that there have been leaks previously.

And what I wanted to do in my speech was to call attention to what really may become a major problem for this country and, because so much depends on this country, a major problem for all free countries. I did not mean to blame anybody. I don't think it does any good to aim for victories by either branch. I think we have to explore a serious solution—to which I confess I do not know all the answers.

Q. That was what prompted my question.

Arms Policy in Persian Gulf

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been concern expressed in Congress about the buildup of various countries in the Persian Gulf and of American arms going to these countries. There were expressions of concern about arms going to Oman when they had not gone before and a feeling that war could break out at any time, once these countries build up enough, without enough reason for war to break out, and that the United States has

taken a major role in this. Could you talk about our interest in the Persian Gulf and why the United States is doing what it's doing?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, in determining whether the United States is unnecessarily giving arms or determining the wisdom of American arms policy in the area, one has to ask a number of questions.

First, what is the security concern of the countries involved—that is to say, do they perceive that they face a real threat? The second question is: Is this security concern well founded? Thirdly, does the United States have any relationship to that security concern? Fourthly, what would happen if the United States did not supply the arms?

And I think each of these arms programs has to be assessed in relation to these or similar questions. And I think you will find—or at least I hope you would find—that we could answer, in the overwhelming majority of the cases, these questions in a positive sense—that is to say, that there is a security problem which these countries feel; that often the security problem is caused by a neighbor supported by Soviet or other Communist arms; that, therefore, if the country did not receive the arms, it would be subject to this neighbor or else it would get these arms from other sources.

And these are the principles we are trying to apply in our arms sales, especially in an area such as the Persian Gulf, in which we have, after all, a very major strategic interest.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you outline some of the main topics which you think will be discussed when Mr. Wilson comes here—and, particularly, can you say whether the issue of the Persian Gulf will be discussed?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, our relationship with the Government of the United Kingdom is extremely close, and we keep each other informed about our major foreign policy initiatives and our major approach to international affairs in the frankest possible way.

One result is that there is rarely a very set agenda for the meetings—or, rather, the agenda is the world situation broken down into its constituent elements. Therefore it is reasonable to assume that the Middle East, including the Persian Gulf, will play a significant role in the discussions with Prime Minister Wilson.

I don't know whether the Persian Gulf will be specially singled out. These discussions are usually rather unstructured, but they're extremely frank; and we will put our entire views before Prime Minister Wilson.

The press: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

U.S. Regrets Postponement of Buenos Aires Meeting

Department Statement, January 27

The United States regrets that the Government of Argentina, in consultation with the other countries of the hemisphere, has postponed the Buenos Aires meeting of Foreign Ministers scheduled for late March.

The proximate cause of the postponement is the apparent exclusion of all OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] countries, including Ecuador and Venezuela, from the new tariff preference system. As is well known, the administration opposed this and other restrictions contained in the trade bill and has pledged to work with the Congress to correct them. The President and Secretary of State Kissinger so stated publicly, as did our Representative to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States last week.

Given these statements regarding our views and intentions, we cannot but consider it inappropriate that some Latin American countries have insisted on conditions for the Buenos Aires meeting which they know to

be incompatible with our constitutional processes, as well as substantively unjust.

There is no question—and we have emphasized this to our Latin American friends—that, despite certain deficiencies in the Trade Act, there are many benefits. For example, under our proposed system of tariff preferences, we estimate that more than 30 percent by value of dutiable Latin American exports to the United States will be granted tariff-free treatment. In absolute amounts, tariffs will be eliminated on over $750 million worth of Latin American exports to the United States. It should also be noted that Latin American exports to the United States have more than doubled in value since 1972.

The Trade Act also authorizes us to begin the multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva. These negotiations will lead to reduction of tariff and nontariff barriers to trade of great importance to all the developing countries, including Latin America. Moreover, they will benefit Latin America and, indeed, the entire world trading community by providing a deterrent to protectionism around the world—a matter of vital import given today's economic climate.

The United States, in the fall of 1973, began a new dialogue with Latin America to improve relations with our traditional friends in the Western Hemisphere. We hoped that both sides would develop a closer understanding of each other's problems. Over the past year we have jointly made significant progress toward this objective. In this process the United States has renounced any method of pressure as obsolete and inappropriate to the new relationship we seek. We believe this is a reciprocal obligation. Pressure from the south is as inappropriate as pressure from the north.

We will continue to work with our Latin American friends on the problems which have arisen in connection with the Trade Act in a spirit of friendship. We will address cooperatively the many issues which comprise the agenda of the new dialogue in the same spirit of conciliation and friendship.

The Trade Act and Latin America

Following is the text of a memorandum which was distributed to Latin American and Caribbean Ambassadors at a briefing at the Department of State on January 14.

THE TRADE ACT AND LATIN AMERICA

The Trade Act, signed into law by the President on January 3, 1975, is of considerable importance to Latin America.

It is a long and complex statute. The Act touches nearly every aspect of U.S. trade policy. And, although the legislation was under consideration in the Congress for nearly two years, the Committees responsible for it were making changes in its text until the final day of Congressional consideration. In fact, the text of the Act, because it is so long, is not yet generally available from the Government Printing Office. Early comment about the legislation has therefore been forced to rely on press reports, some of which have been partial or inaccurate.

It is the purpose of this Memorandum to summarize the legislation as it relates to the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean, to make clear the policy the United States will adopt in implementing the Act, and to analyze the important benefits which Latin America may anticipate as the law is put into effect. The Memorandum addresses three major issues:

—the authorization for the U.S. Government to implement a system of generalized tariff preferences (GSP) for imports from developing countries;

—the forthcoming worldwide multilateral trade negotiations (MTN), which the Trade Act has now made possible; and

—the significance of the legislation for the U.S. countervailing duty system.

1. *Generalized Preferences.* The Trade Act of 1974 contains authority for the United States to grant tariff preferences to imports from developing countries—GSP, in short.

The new law provides that the United States may accord temporary (10-year) duty-free treatment for a range of manufactured and semi-manufactured products and selected agricultural and primary products. Eighteen other nations have similar—though in some cases much less liberal—preference systems.

The new U.S. preferences will fulfill a commitment undertaken in the Declaration of Tlatelolco that the U.S. Government would make a maximum effort to secure passage of such legislation.

GSP and most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff concessions are two very different concepts. GSP is temporary and nonbinding. Each industrialized country is free to withdraw it at any time. MFN tariff cuts are bound. MFN tariff reductions cannot be withdrawn from GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] members without the granting of compensation. The major GSP systems of most major countries have quantitative limitations in the form of tariff quotas and competitive need ceilings which trigger a return to ordinary—nonpreferential—MFN tariff duty rates. Thus, various products of substantial interest to the Latin American countries are not eligible for the preferences of the other developed nations and will not be eligible for the new U.S. GSP. Those products will, however, be eligible for the multilateral tariff reductions anticipated in the course and as a part of the trade negotiations themselves. Thus, even with GSP, on a significant number of products it will be in the long-term interest of the Latin American countries to have the ordinary rates of duty negotiated down to as low a point as possible in the MTN.

In general, U.S. tariffs are already low. This is the result of successive rounds of tariff negotiations. Now, nearly 60 percent of U.S. imports from Latin America enter duty free. The duty on the remainder averages only 8 percent. Therefore, while preferences may be marginally helpful in the short run in some particular product areas, over the longer run MFN tariff reductions and action on nontariff barriers—as set forth in the following section of this Memorandum—will prove to be far more important and beneficial to most Latin American countries.

The Administration worked closely with the Latin American countries to solicit their requests for specifications of products to be included in our GSP product lists. The GSP product lists are now nearing completion. Wherever possible, these lists include the products requested by the Latin American countries. As a result the lists of agricultural and primary products to be submitted later this month to the International Trade Commission will be significantly larger in terms both of numbers of items and dollar trade coverage than were the illustrative lists prepared for and submitted to the UNCTAD and OECD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] in 1970. Preliminary indications are that over 30 percent by value of the remaining U.S. dutiable imports from Latin America—that is to say, over three quarters of a billion dollars of Latin American exports to the United States based on 1972 trade values —will be included in our system of GSP.

The new legislation, unfortunately, contains provisions which could exclude certain categories of developing countries from preferences. The Administration consistently opposed these criteria as being excessively rigid. We are currently examining the legislation to determine what leeway it may contain. We will work in a spirit of cooperation with the Congress to seek necessary accommodations.

2. *The Multilateral Trade Negotiations.* While GSP will be helpful in encouraging Latin American export diversification, the multilateral trade negotiations now made possible by the new Trade Act will go deeper, and be of considerably more lasting importance for all of Latin America. These negotiations will fix the structure of global trade for a long term future, and will touch the export interests of every country in the hemisphere.

In September 1973, 102 countries agreed, in the celebrated Tokyo Declaration, to undertake a new round of multilateral trade

negotiations. The negotiations anticipated by the Declaration were dedicated to the following aims:

—the expansion and liberalization of world trade through significant dismantling of tariff barriers, of nontariff barriers and of other conditions and restraints which distort world trade;

—the improvement in the world trading system, so that it conforms more closely to current conditions and realities; and

—the securing of benefits for the trade of developing countries, including substantially greater access for their products to markets around the world.

Without the authority established in the Trade Act, the international effort contemplated by the Tokyo Declaration to expand trade and to reform the world trading system—in which almost all Latin American countries are participating—would have been aborted. In other words, the consequences of not having the negotiating power in the Trade Act, particularly in view of the current world economic conditions, would have been severe, and most adverse in fact to the very countries whose development goals depend most heavily on diversifying and expanding exports. Rather than opening new opportunities for trade, the virtually certain result of a failure to enact the new U.S. Trade Act would have been contraction.

With the Trade Act now in hand, the United States is prepared to move toward the achievement of the aims set out in the Tokyo Declaration. The United States will move rapidly.

Committees and working parties have been meeting in Geneva. A further meeting in Geneva of the Trade Negotiating Committee is scheduled for February; this will mark the real beginning of the trade negotiations. The U.S. Government will be there. It hopes that all Latin American countries will actively participate.

The tariff cutting authority provided in the Trade Act is substantial—6 percent of existing duty rates above 5 percent ad valorem, and authority to go to zero for rates of 5 percent ad valorem or less. It is the firm intention of the United States to use this authority vigorously, to secure the greatest possible reciprocal reduction in tariffs among the major developed trading countries. Major beneficiaries of such reductions will be the developing countries, including particularly Latin America.

Even more important than the lowering of tariff barriers will be the elimination or reduction of nontariff barriers. As tariffs have been progressively reduced over the years, nontariff barriers and other similar measures distorting trade have played an increasingly pernicious role as restraints on trade expansion. The Trade Act provides unprecedented authority for the harmonization, reduction or elimination of the nontariff barriers in this country and in all other major trading nations which now burden international trade, including that of Latin America.

The United States is acutely aware that in many cases these nontariff barriers are particularly burdensome to the exports of developing countries. It anticipates that some of the more onerous of these nontariff barriers may be subject to reduction or elimination through the negotiation of new sets of international rules on market access. Such new rules are also provided for in the Trade Act. The United States will do what it can to bring this about. For example, the United States will seek revision of the existing international safeguard procedures under the GATT to deal with problems associated with an exceptionally rapid growth of imports in a way which will make resort to safeguard actions less politically contentious and subject all the while to greater international surveillance and discipline, while hopefully eliminating import quotas maintained illegally under present GATT rules. Similarly, the problem of export subsidies and corresponding countervailing duties can be approached by the development of an international code on these issues, as can problems of government procurement and product standardization.

The United States will adopt a strategy in the forthcoming negotiations which will give particular consideration to the interests and needs of developing countries, including Latin American interests. The United States is committed to consult closely with the Latin Americans in the course of the multilateral trade negotiations to develop common positions. In part toward this end, there has been formed among the various U.S. Government agencies an interdepartmental Subgroup on Latin America. This Subgroup is reviewing the effects of our trade policies on Latin America. It will ensure that Latin American trade interests are fully considered in the implementation of U.S. trade policy in the coming multilateral trade negotiations.

3. *Countervailing Duties.* Finally, the Act also contains important new developments in connection with countervailing duty proceedings. In addition to the possibility of a multilateral code governing export subsidies and countervailing action, referred to above, the Trade Act also gives the Secretary of the Treasury discretionary authority to refrain from imposing duties for up to four years in those special cases where (1) adequate steps have been taken to reduce or eliminate the adverse effects of the bounty or grant; and (2) there is a reasonable prospect that successful trade agreements will be entered into on nontariff barriers; and (3) the imposition of duties would seriously jeopardize these negotiations.

4. *Conclusion.* The Trade Act of 1974 contains many elements. Only a few have been mentioned here. It is not a perfect law. Every provision in it is not as the Administration would have wished. But its major, overriding significance is clear—the demonstration that the United States remains committed to a liberal and open world trading system, and is prepared to make considerable concessions for that purpose, and will work with other countries in the Geneva trade negotiations in pursuit of that commitment.

The United States is convinced that such a system is in the best interest of all countries—developed and developing—and essential to the achievement of the common objective of a stable, healthy world economic order.

This is a matter of profound importance to Latin America. If the trade negotiations which are now made possible by the new Act are successful, Latin America will be able to look forward to increased opportunities for export earnings in the United States and in the other industrialized countries as well. Had the Act not been passed, those negotiations would not have been possible. Given the international economic situation, the strong tendencies of the major trading nations would have been toward isolationist trade policies. This would have had profoundly adverse effects on the export prospects of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

The United States is in the process of working out the implementation of the Trade Act. In that process, we look forward to a continuing dialogue and cooperation with the countries of the hemisphere.

WASHINGTON, D.C., *January 14, 1975.*

"A Conversation With President Ford"—An Interview for NBC Television and Radio

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of an interview with President Ford by John Chancellor and Tom Brokaw broadcast live on NBC television and radio on January 23.[1]

. . . . .

Mr. Chancellor: Now you told, I think it was Time magazine, that we might have gas rationing if we get another oil embargo. Is that correct?

President Ford: Another oil embargo which would deprive us of anywhere from 6 to 7 million barrels of oil a day would create a very serious crisis.

Mr. Chancellor: But is that a likelihood, sir? As I understand it, of those 7 million barrels a day, only about 8 percent come from the Arab countries, or 10 or something like that.

President Ford: I can't give you that particular statistic. It would depend, of course, on whether the Shah of Iran or Venezuela or some of the other oil-producing countries cooperated.

At the time of the October 1973 oil embargo, we did get some black-market oil. We got it from some of the noncooperating countries; but in the interval, the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] nations have solidified their organization a great deal more than they did before. So, we might have a solid front this time rather than one that was more flexible.

Mr. Chancellor: In other words, you are worried not about an Arab oil boycott but a boycott by all the oil-producing countries that belong to OPEC?

President Ford: That is correct.

Mr. Chancellor: Do you regard that as a political—

President Ford: It is a possibility.

Mr. Chancellor: And in that case, that would produce the necessity for a gas rationing system?

President Ford: It would produce the necessity for more drastic action. I think gas rationing in and of itself would probably be the last resort, just as it was following the 1973 embargo.

At that time, as you remember, John, in order to be prepared, Bill Simon, who was then the energy boss, had printed I don't know how many gas rationing coupons. We have those available now; they are in storage. I think they cost about $10 million to print, but they are available in case we have the kind of a crisis that would be infinitely more serious than even the one of 1973.

Mr. Chancellor: Mr. President, you have talked also about energy independence, and it is a key to your whole program. As I recall, of the 17 million barrels of oil a day we use in this country, about 7, as you say, come from other countries.

Let me just put it to you in a tendentious way. An awful lot of experts are saying that it will be impossible for us by 1985 to be totally free of foreign supplies of energy. Do you really think we can make it?

President Ford: The plan that I have submitted does not contemplate that we will be

[1] For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 27.

totally free of foreign oil, but the percentage of reliance we have, or will have, on foreign oil will be far less.

At the present time, for example, John, 37 percent of our crude oil use comes from foreign sources. In contrast to 1960—we were exporting oil. But in the interval between 1960 and the present time—we are now using 37 to 38 percent of foreign oil for our energy uses.

Now, if my plan goes through, if the Congress accepts it and we implement it and everything goes well, by 1985, if I recall, instead of 37 or 38 percent dependence on foreign oil, we will be down to about 10 percent. Well, a 10 percent cutoff, with all the contingency plans we might have, we can handle without any crisis.

Mr. Chancellor: Tom, may I just follow up on that?

Mr. Brokaw: You are doing just fine, John.

Mr. Chancellor: The other day at your press conference, you were asked about Dr. Kissinger's quote on the possibility of military intervention. And something surprised me, sir. You have been in politics for a long time, and you are as expert a question-ducker as anybody in that trade. Why didn't you duck that question? Why didn't you just say, "Well that's hypothetical?" You did go into some detail on it.

President Ford: I did. I in part reiterated what I had said, I think, at a previous news conference. I wanted it made as clear as I possibly could that this country, in case of economic strangulation—and the key word is "strangulation"—we had to be prepared, without specifying what we might do, to take the necessary action for our self-preservation.

When you are being strangled, it is a question of either dying or living. And when you use the word "strangulation" in relationship to the existence of the United States or its nonexistence, I think the public has to have a reassurance, our people, that we are not going to permit America to be strangled to death. And so, I, in my willingness to be as frank—but with moderation—I thought I ought to say what I said then. And I have amplified it, I hope clarified it, here.

Mr. Chancellor: The New Republic this week has a story saying that there are three American divisions being sent to the Middle East, or being prepared for the Middle East. We called the Pentagon, and we got a confirmation on that, that one is air mobile, one is airborne, and one is armored. And it is a little unclear as to whether this is a contingency plan, because we don't know where we would put the divisions in the Middle East. Could you shed any light on that?

President Ford: I don't think I ought to talk about any particular military contingency plans, John. I think what I said concerning strangulation and Dr. Kissinger's comment is about as far as I ought to go.

Mr. Chancellor: Then we have reached a point where another question would be unproductive on that?

President Ford: I think you are right.

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, you said the other day that—speaking of that general area—you think there is a serious danger of war in the Middle East. Earlier this year, you were quoted as saying, something over 70 percent. Has it gone up recently?

President Ford: I don't think I ought to talk in terms of percentage, Tom. There is a serious danger of war in the Middle East. I have had conferences with representatives of all the nations, practically, in the Middle East. I have talked to people in Europe. I have talked to other experts, and everybody says it is a very potentially volatile situation.

It is my judgment that we might have a very good opportunity to be successful in what we call our step-by-step process. I hope our optimism is borne out. We are certainly going to try.

Mr. Brokaw: Is it tied to Secretary Kissinger's next trip to that part of the world?

President Ford: Well, he is going because we think it might be fruitful, but we don't want to raise expectations. We have to be

realistic, but if we don't try to move in this direction at this time, I think we might lose a unique opportunity.

Mr. Brokaw: Should we not succeed this time, Mr. President, do you think it is probably time that we have to abandon this step-by-step process and go on to Geneva as the Soviets would like to have us do?

President Ford: I think that is a distinct possibility. We prefer the process that has been successful so far, but if there is no progress, then I think we undoubtedly would be forced to go to Geneva.

I wouldn't be any more optimistic; in fact, I would be less optimistic if the matter was thrown on the doorstep of Geneva.

Mr. Chancellor: Mr. President, really, the Russians have been shut out of Middle Eastern diplomacy since Dr. Kissinger began step-by-step diplomacy. Why was that? Couldn't the Russians play more of a positive role than they are doing? They are arming the Arabs to the teeth, and that is really about all we have been able to see or all they have been allowed to do under the way that we have set our policies.

President Ford: I am not as authoritative on what was done during the October war of 1973 in the Middle East as I am now, of course. I can assure you that we do keep contact with the Soviet Union at the present time. We are not trying to shut them out of the process of trying to find an answer in the Middle East. They can play, and they have played, a constructive role, even under the current circumstances.

So, I think it is unfair and not accurate to say that they are not playing a part. We are taking a course of action where it is more visible perhaps that we are doing something, but I say sincerely that the Soviet Union is playing a part even at the present time.

Mr. Chancellor: Would you tell us what you think about the idea that is going around a little bit—and perhaps you have heard it as well, perhaps you know a great deal about it, I don't know—that if the Israelis made a significant pullback on various fronts in the Middle East that that could be followed by some sort of American guarantee for their security?

President Ford: John, I really do not think I ought to get into the details of what might or might not be the grounds for a negotiated settlement. This is a very difficult area because of the long history of jealousies, antagonisms, and it is so delicate I really do not think I ought to get into the details of what might or might not be the grounds for a settlement.

Mr. Chancellor: Would you entertain a question based on the reported Israeli desire for a threefold increase in our aid to them?

President Ford: The United States, over the years, has been very generous in economic and military aid for Israel. On the other hand, we have been quite generous to a number of Arab nations. The State of Israel does need adequate military capability to protect its boundaries, or its territorial integrity.

I think because of the commonality of interest that we have with Israel in the Middle East that it is in our interest as well as theirs to be helpful to them, both militarily and economically. There has been no determination by me or by us as to the amount of that aid.

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, I wonder if we can come back at you again about Israel's security in another way. As you know, reporters don't give up easily on some of these questions.

President Ford: I found that out, Tom.

Mr. Brokaw: On a long-range basis, do you think that it is possible for Israel to be truly secure in the Middle East without a U.S. guarantee of some kind?

President Ford: Well, of course, Israel, to my knowledge, Tom, has never asked for any U.S. manpower or any guarantee from us for their security or their territorial integrity. I think the Israelis, if they are

given adequate arms and sufficient economic help, can handle the situation in the Middle East. Now, the last war, unfortunately, was much more severe from their point of view than the three previous ones. And I suspect that with the Arabs having more sophisticated weapons and probably a better military capability, another war might even be worse. That is one reason why we wish to accelerate the efforts to find some answers over there.

But, I think the Israelis, with adequate equipment and their determination and sufficient economic aid, won't have to have U.S. guarantees of any kind.

Mr. Brokaw: I wonder if we can move to another area in the world, or would you like to go back to the Middle East?

Mr. Chancellor: I have one question I would like to put to the President.

Sir, when we talk about strangulation—and I hope we don't talk about it any more tonight after this, because I do think it is the hypothetical—I agree with you on that—what about the moral implications? If a country is being strangled by another country or set of countries that own a natural resource, is it moral to go and take that? It is their oil; it is not ours. Isn't that a troublesome question?

President Ford: I think it is a troublesome question. It may not be right, John, but I think if you go back over the history of mankind, wars *have* been fought over natural resources from time immemorial. I would hope that in this decade or in this century and beyond, we would not have to have wars for those purposes, and we certainly are not contemplating any such action. But history, in the years before us, indicates quite clearly that that was one of the reasons why nations fought one another.

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, what are our objectives now in Southeast Asia, in Viet-Nam, particularly?

President Ford: Viet-Nam, after all the lives that were lost there, Americans, over 50,000, and after the tremendous expenditures that we made in American dollars, several years, more than $30 billion a year—it seems to me that we ought to try and give the South Vietnamese the opportunity through military assistance to protect their way of life.

This is what we have done traditionally as Americans. Certainly, since the end of World War II, we have helped innumerable nations in military arms and economic assistance to help themselves to maintain their own freedom.

The American people believe, I think, historically that if a country and a people want to protect their way of life against aggression, we will help them in a humanitarian way and in a military way with arms and funds if they are willing to fight for themselves. This is within our tradition as Americans.

And the South Vietnamese apparently do wish to maintain their national integrity and their independence. I think it is in our best tradition as Americans to help them at the present time.

Mr. Brokaw: How much longer and how deep does our commitment go to the South Vietnamese?

President Ford: I don't think there is any long-term commitment. As a matter of fact, the American Ambassador there, Graham Martin, has told me, as well as Dr. Kissinger, that he thinks if adequate dollars which are translated into arms and economic aid—if that was made available that within two or three years the South Vietnamese would be over the hump militarily as well as economically.

Now, I am sure we have been told that before, but they had made substantial progress until they began to run a little short of ammunition, until inflation started in the last few months to accelerate.

I happen to think that Graham Martin, who is a very hardnosed, very dedicated man, and very realistic, is right. And I hope the Congress will go along with this extra supplemental that I am asking for to help the South Vietnamese protect themselves.

Mr. Chancellor: Sir, that is $300 million

you have asked for the South Vietnamese. And given what you have just said—well, I am just going to phrase it this way—will we see the light at the end of the tunnel if we give them $300 million?

President Ford: The best estimates of the experts that are out there, both military and civilian, tell me that $300 million in this fiscal year is the minimum. A year ago when the budget was submitted for military assistance for South Viet-Nam, it was $1.4 billion. Congress cut it in half, which meant that South Vietnamese rangers going out on patrol instead of having an adequate supply of hand grenades and weapons were cut in half, which of course has undercut their military capability and has made them conserve and not be as strong.

Now, $300 million doesn't take them back up to where they were or where it was proposed they should be. But the experts say who are on the scene, who have seen the fighting and have looked at the stocks and the reserves, tell me that that would be adequate for the current circumstances.

Mr. Chancellor: Mr. President, does it make you uneasy to sit on that couch in this room and have experts in Viet-Nam saying only a little bit more, and it will be all right? We did hear that for so many years.

President Ford: I think you have to think pretty hard about it, but a lot of skeptics, John, said the money we were going to make available for the rehabilitation of Europe after World War II wouldn't do any good, and of course the investment we made did pay off. A lot of people have said the money that we made available to Israel wouldn't be helpful in bringing about the peace that has been achieved there for the last year and a half or so, but it did. It helped.

I think an investment of $300 million at this time in South Viet-Nam could very likely be a key for the preservation of their freedom and might conceivably force the North Vietnamese to stop violating the Paris accords of January 1973.

When you look at the agreement that was signed—and I happened to be there at the time of the signing in January of 1973—the North Vietnamese agreed not to infiltrate. The facts are they have infiltrated with countless thousands—I think close to 100,000 from North Viet-Nam down to South Viet-Nam. They are attacking cities, metropolitan areas. They have refused to permit us to do anything about our U.S. missing in action in North Viet-Nam. They have refused to negotiate any political settlement between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam. They have called off the meetings either in Paris or in Saigon.

So here is a country—South Viet-Nam—that is faced with an attitude on the part of the North Vietnamese of total disregard of the agreement that was signed about two years ago. I think the South Vietnamese deserve some help in this crisis.

Mr. Brokaw: Mr. President, underlying all of this in much of this interview is a kind of supposition on your part, I guess, that the American public is willing to carry the burdens that it has carried in the past. Do you believe that? Is that your view of the world, kind of, and the view of this country?

President Ford: Yes, and I am proud of that, Tom. The United States—we are fortunate. We have a substantial economy. We have good people who by tradition—certainly since the end of World War II—have assumed a great responsibility. We rehabilitated Europe. We helped Japan—both in the case of Germany and Japan, enemies that we defeated.

We have helped underdeveloped countries in Latin America, in Africa, in Southeast Asia. I think we should be proud of the fact that we are willing to share our great wealth with others less fortunate than we.

And it gives us an opportunity to be a leader setting an example for others. And when you look at it from our own selfish point of view, what we have done has basically helped America; but in addition, it has helped millions and millions of other people. We should be proud of it. We should not be critical of our efforts.

. . . . .

Proclamation Raising Import Fees for Oil and Oil Products Signed

Remarks by President Ford [1]

In my state of the Union address, I set forth the nation's energy goals to assure that our future is as secure and productive as our past. This proclamation that I am about to sign is the first step down the long and difficult road toward regaining our energy freedom. The proclamation will gradually impose higher fees on imported oil, and this will result in substantial energy conservation by the United States.

As we begin to achieve our near-term conservation goals, the nation will once again be going in the right direction, which is away from energy dependence. Each day that passes without strong and tough action, which this proclamation is, results in a further drain on our national wealth and on the job it creates for the American people. Each day without action means that our economy becomes more and more vulnerable to serious disruption. Each day without action increases the threat to our national security and welfare.

This proclamation, which is just as fair and equitable as the law permits, must now be followed by positive congressional action. The nation needs a fully comprehensive and long-range energy program, one that increases domestic energy supplies and encourages lasting conservation. To reach our national goals, we need the help of each American and especially their representatives in the Congress.

I look forward to vigorous debate and serious congressional hearings on our comprehensive energy plan. The crucial point is that this proclamation moves us in the right direction while we work to enact the energy legislation. The tactics of delay and proposals which would allow our dependency and vulnerability to increase will not be tolerated by the American people, nor should they be.

The new energy-saving fees put us on the right path. There are problems ahead. There will be hardships. Let us get on with the job of solving this serious energy problem.

[1] Made in the Oval Office at the White House on Jan. 23 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 27). For text of Proclamation 4341, see 40 *Fed. Reg.* 3965.

Ambassador Johnson Discusses Prospects for SALT Talks

The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) resumed at Geneva on January 31. Following is the transcript of an interview with Ambassador at Large U. Alexis Johnson, U.S. Representative to the talks, conducted at Washington by Paul Sisco of United Press International, for broadcast on Eurovision on January 29.

Press release 36 dated January 29

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Ambassador, the SALT talks resume at the tail end of January in Geneva. What would you say is the prime aim of this session?

Ambassador Johnson: Well, we have been given the mandate by the leaders on both sides—by President Ford and by General Secretary Brezhnev—to conclude, or to write, an agreement which will implement the agreement which they entered into and agreed upon in Vladivostok in November.

They agreed upon, you might say, the broad outlines of the agreement; and the job that the Soviet negotiator, Minister Semenov [Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semenov], and I will be having, together with our delegations, will be to translate this into the specifics of an agreement which can be signed by both governments.

Mr. Sisco: Well, now, obviously you enter these talks optimistic, but are you optimistic that something concrete will come out of this particular session?

Ambassador Johnson: I certainly am, because I think that the agreement that was entered into at Vladivostok is so concrete and contains such constructive elements in it that I feel that it is going to be possible

for us to write an agreement which will commend itself to both governments.

Now, this doesn't mean it is going to be easy. Vladivostok did not seek to answer all the questions, but it does mean that we have a more solid basis now than we have ever had in the past for writing a new agreement.

Mr. Sisco: Of course, I am sure you are aware of certain criticisms of the Vladivostok agreement, that the 2,400 nuclear missile total many people thought far too high. How do you feel about that? Is there a chance that that can be reduced when we get down to the fine print?

Ambassador Johnson: I have no inhibitions or reservations whatsoever about the validity, importance, and desirability of the Vladivostok agreement. The Vladivostok agreement, to my mind, represented a very significant breakthrough, as the term has been used, and I agree, given my own background, that it was a breakthrough.

Since I entered the negotiations, we have been talking over the past few years about reductions; and we, the United States, have been taking the position that in order to negotiate reductions, it was first necessary for the two sides to arrive at a common level and then reduce from that level.

Well, up to now, the problem has always been the difficulty of arriving at an agreement on a common level. The Soviets have insisted upon there being compensations, they call it—that is, their having a somewhat higher number because of various factors—and thus they would start from a higher figure than we would start from.

The big breakthrough at Vladivostok was that the Soviets agreed with us on starting from a common level. Now, having reached that common level, I think it will facilitate negotiations in the future on reductions. In fact, that Vladivostok agreement says that we will enter into negotiations on reductions.

Now, the agreement has been criticized because it doesn't include reductions, also. However, you have to start some place. And I think that the Vladivostok agreement is a very important breakthrough toward starting on a further path that will lead both sides toward reductions.

Mr. Sisco: Well, you don't believe that that 2,400 figure was just arbitrarily set too high. One part of that criticism, if I may add—some people say the Russians actually wanted a lower figure. Is that right? Is that true?

Ambassador Johnson: I never heard that statement made.

Mr. Sisco: That was in some press clippings I have seen.

Ambassador Johnson: As a matter of fact, the 2,400 figure is a figure somewhat in between what we have and what the Russians have. So it is a compromise figure, you might say.

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Ambassador, I wonder if you feel that your job in the last few weeks has become harder because of the Russian's rejections of the trade treaty, apparently a little bit cracking of this U.S.-Soviet détente. Do you think perhaps they are going to be a little tougher?

Ambassador Johnson: I don't want to predict what their attitude is going to be, except that I go into these talks with the conviction that both sides want them to succeed. No matter what other problems there may be in our relations, it seems to me that both countries have an overwhelming interest in preventing the holocaust of a nuclear war. And I am going into these talks with the idea that they are going to succeed. I hope and expect that my Soviet colleague will be doing the same.

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Ambassador, on the same plane, sort of, the United States and Soviets are at least talking to limit nuclear weapons. What about the proliferation of nuclear weaponry for other nations? I am thinking really of the Mideast where obviously the Arabian countries are going to have the money, at least, perhaps to get into the nuclear race. Is there something that the United

States and the Soviets together can do to limit the spreading of nuclear weapons?

Ambassador Johnson: Well, as you know, both countries have signed the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and both countries have supported the Nonproliferation Treaty. And, as you know, also an NPT review conference will be taking place in the course of this year. So both countries are still supporting the principles involved in the Nonproliferation Treaty. We in the SALT talks do not directly deal with this matter.

Mr. Sisco: What are some of the nuts and bolts of this talk? How long do you expect to be there, and something along that line?

Ambassador Johnson: Well, that's a question my wife asks me. I am not able to answer it that firmly. I expect to be there as long as it is necessary to do the job.

Mr. Sisco: Looking way down the road, and a bit philosophically, can you foresee a time when perhaps there will be no nuclear weaponry, and we don't have this big thing hanging over our shoulders and minds?

Ambassador Johnson: I wish I could say that, but I don't see the possibility at the present time.

In this connection, Mr. Sisco, in connection with this agreement, I think people understandably keep searching for some magic formula that will dispose of this whole question once and for all—eliminate all nuclear weapons—or there be a definitive agreement between ourselves and the Soviet Union that will last for a long time, last indefinitely into the future.

I just don't think that there is such a formula. I think that, given the growth of technology, given the developments in both countries, between the two countries as well as elsewhere in the world, I think this whole question of arms limitation, and particularly the limitation of strategic arms, is going to be something that both countries are going to have to deal with on a continuing basis now and into the future.

I think this is one of the advantages of this present agreement at Vladivostok. It was agreed that we will not try to write something that will last indefinitely into the future. It was agreed that we will try to write something that will have a life of 10 years. Ten years is a span in this field that it is possible to foresee and anticipate developments, and thus I think that we have brought this into a framework which makes it manageable.

This agreement isn't going to end all problems. This agreement, as I said, is simply, I think, the beginning of—or let's say, a further step in this process of negotiating and reaching understandings between ourselves and the Soviet Union in this very dynamic field.

Mr. Sisco: If I may touch on something that you touched on earlier, I am wondering whether perhaps the decline of Mr. Brezhnev —you mentioned Mr. Brezhnev and President Ford signed the agreement—and there is a strong feeling that perhaps he lost some influence in the Soviet Union. Do you think this makes your job harder, or do you know anything that might go along that line?

Ambassador Johnson: I just don't think it would be useful for me to speculate. I deal with the representative of the Soviet Government. He deals with it as a representative of that government.

Mr. Sisco: Mr. Ambassador, just on another philosophical note, do you feel that perhaps it might have been better not to have nuclear weaponry at all in the last 25–30 years?

Ambassador Johnson: Yes, I would certainly agree, if it had been possible. And you will recall that the United States, when it had a monopoly on nuclear weaponry, made a proposal, the Baruch proposal, wasn't it, back in 1946, that nuclear weapons be outlawed, in effect, and that all nuclear energy be brought under international control. And you will recall that that was turned down at the time.

Now, as long as nuclear weapons exist, I think it important that the United States maintain its deterrent posture. And of

course the Soviet Union has been seeking parity with the United States in nuclear weapons.

As long as deterrence can be maintained, I have hopes that nuclear war can be averted between the two powers, and that, in effect, is what the SALT talks are all about. The SALT talks are not about eliminating all nuclear weapons. The SALT talks are establishing a relationship between the two countries on the level of weapons such as not to encourage either side to initiate nuclear war.

The theme of the talks, if you will, as far as I am concerned, in many ways, is stability; that is, that our weapons systems and our strategic nuclear forces are not such as to bring about instability, particularly in a crisis situation, so that deterrence can be maintained and stability can be maintained in relationships between our two countries.

Mr. Sisco: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

U.S.-India Economic and Commercial Subcommission Meets at Washington

Joint Communique [1]

The Economic and Commercial Subcommission of the India-U.S. Joint Commission held its first meeting in Washington on January 20–21, 1975, to discuss ways to broaden economic and commercial relationships between the two countries. Progress made by the Subcommission underscored a new stage in U.S.-Indian economic relations based on an increasing and closer cooperation in a wide range of activities in trade, agricultural inputs, taxation, investment and industry.

The meetings were chaired by Indian Finance Secretary M. G. Kaul and Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Thomas O. Enders. Two other subcommissions, one on science and technology and one on education and culture, will meet during the next few weeks. The subcommission meetings are in preparation for a meeting of the Joint Commission, chaired by the Secretary of State, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, and the Minister for External Affairs, Shri Y. B. Chavan, which will be held in Washington on March 13–14, 1975.

The Subcommission decided on specific steps to expand economic relations between the two countries. Toward this objective, the two sides agreed that a Joint Business Council should be established to increase direct contacts between the business sectors, including Indian public sector enterprises, in industrial and commercial projects of high priority.

Indian officials expressed their interest in expanding the scope and magnitude of Indian exports to the United States and agreed to provide a list of non-traditional products with potential for increased exports to the United States. The U.S. delegation provided a list of product categories in which the U.S. is interested in expanding its exports to India. Both sides agreed to cooperate in such trade expansion on a Government-Government and Government-private business basis. Both sides also agreed upon the need for a regular and timely exchange of information on marketing conditions and regulations which might affect their exports to each other.

The Indian and U.S. delegations exchanged views on the U.S. Trade Act of 1974. The Subcommission discussed provisions considered to be of particular relevance and benefit to India, and also examined questions relating to the implementation of a U.S. system of generalized tariff preferences.

Concerning problems faced by India as a result of recent short supply of key commodities, U.S. agricultural experts gave a detailed presentation of current and projected market developments, especially in the areas of fertilizers and pesticides. Considering the importance of agriculture to the two economies, the delegates decided to form a special working group which will meet immediately to concentrate on the supply of certain agricultural inputs in short supply including developing long-term

[1] Issued on Jan. 21 (text from press release 23).

Indian capacity for production of these items.

To improve the climate for U.S. investment in India, the two sides agreed to hold talks within the next few weeks on a possible double taxation treaty.

The Subcommission also explored new ways to stimulate cooperation between U.S. and Indian firms in the development of high technology and export oriented industries and in cooperative ventures in third countries. Both Governments, in cooperation with the proposed Joint Business Council, will actively cooperate to assure that such opportunities are fully utilized.

President Vetoes Bill To Provide Nontariff Barrier on Filberts

Memorandum of Disapproval [1]

I am withholding my approval from H.R. 2933, a bill which would amend the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act to make existing grade and quality restrictions on certain imported commodities applicable to imported filberts.

In my judgment, the bill would be unfair to the American consumer and the American farmer, as well as prejudicial to the interests of American trade policy.

H.R. 2933 would be unfair to the consumer because it could unnecessarily increase prices for filbert products. Existing law already requires all imported foodstuffs to meet health standards prescribed under the Food and Drug Act.

The bill could also produce unfair consequences for the farmer by causing the loss of some of his important markets abroad. It could result at best in comparatively limited benefits for domestic producers while risking retaliation from abroad against the larger volume of other products exported by our farmers.

Finally, the bill would be prejudicial to our trade policy because it would be inconsistent with our obligations under the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade. It would erect a non-tariff trade barrier at a time when we are trying to persuade other nations to dismantle theirs.

Although there are other commodities which are subject to the same statutory restrictions that H.R. 2933 would impose on filberts, no new commodities have been included in that list since January of 1971. I cannot in good conscience support the addition of a new commodity just after signing into law the new Trade Act which has a major aim of eliminating non-tariff trade barriers.

For the foregoing reasons, I am compelled to withhold my approval from H.R. 2933.

GERALD R. FORD

THE WHITE HOUSE, *January 3, 1975.*

[1] Issued on Jan. 4 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 13).

Notice of Time for Filing Claims Against Syria by U.S. Nationals

Department Announcement [1]

Notice is hereby given that the Department of State will receive at its Office of the Legal Adviser, located at 2201 C Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20520, during the period beginning February 3, 1975, and ending August 4, 1975, claims against the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic by U.S. nationals for the nationalization, expropriation or sequestration of, or other measures directed against their property by the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic.

[1] Issued on Jan. 27 (text from press release 30).

President Ford Requests Additional Funds for Assistance to Viet-Nam and Cambodia

Message to the Congress [1]

To the Congress of the United States:

Two years ago the Paris Agreement was signed, and several weeks later was endorsed by major nations including the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and the People's Republic of China. We had succeeded in negotiating an Agreement that provided the framework for lasting peace in Southeast Asia. This Agreement would have worked had Hanoi matched our side's efforts to implement it. Unfortunately, the other side has chosen to violate most of the major provisions of this Accord.

The South Vietnamese and Cambodians are fighting hard in their own defense, as recent casualty figures clearly demonstrate. With adequate U.S material assistance, they can hold their own. We cannot turn our backs on these embattled countries. U.S. unwillingness to provide adequate assistance to allies fighting for their lives would seriously affect our credibility throughout the world as an ally. And this credibility is essential to our national security.

Vietnam

When the Paris Agreement was signed, all Americans hoped that it would provide a framework under which the Vietnamese people could make their own political choices and resolve their own problems in an atmosphere of peace.

In compliance with that Agreement, the United States withdrew its forces and its military advisors from Vietnam. In further compliance with the Agreement, the Republic of Vietnam offered a comprehensive political program designed to reconcile the differences between the South Vietnamese parties and to lead to free and supervised elections throughout all of South Vietnam. The Republic of Vietnam has repeatedly reiterated this offer and has several times proposed a specific date for a free election open to all South Vietnamese political groups.

Unfortunately, our hopes for peace and for reconciliation have been frustrated by the persistent refusal of the other side to abide by even the most fundamental provisions of the Agreement. North Vietnam has sent its forces into the South in such large numbers that its army in South Vietnam is now greater than ever, close to 289,000 troops. Hanoi has sent tanks, heavy artillery, and anti-aircraft weapons to South Vietnam by the hundreds. These troops and equipment are in South Vietnam for only one reason—to forceably impose the will of Hanoi on the South Vietnamese people. Moreover, Hanoi has refused to give a full accounting for our men missing in action in Vietnam.

The Communists have also violated the political provisions of the Paris Agreement. They have refused all South Vietnamese offers to set a specific date for free elections, and have now broken off negotiations with the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.

[1] Transmitted on Jan. 28 (text from White House press release).

In fact, they say that they will not negotiate with that Government as it is presently constituted, although they had committed themselves to do so.

Recent events have made it clear that North Vietnam is again trying to impose a solution by force. Earlier this month, North Vietnamese forces captured an entire province, the population centers of which were clearly under the control of the South Vietnamese Government when the Paris Agreement was signed. Our intelligence indicates, moreover, that their campaign will intensify further in coming months.

At a time when the North Vietnamese have been building up their forces and pressing their attacks, U.S. military aid to the South Vietnamese Government has not been sufficient to permit one-to-one replacement of equipment and supplies used up or destroyed, as permitted by the Paris Agreement. In fact, with the $700 million appropriation available in the current fiscal year, we have been able to provide no new tanks, airplanes, trucks, artillery pieces, or other major equipment, but only essential consumable items such as ammunition, gasoline, spare parts, and medical supplies. And in the face of the increased North Vietnamese pressure of recent months, these supplies have not kept pace with minimally essential expenditure. Stockpiles have been drawn down and will soon reach dangerously low levels.

Last year, some believed that cutting back our military assistance to the South Vietnamese Government would induce negotiations for a political settlement. Instead, the opposite has happened. North Vietnam is refusing negotiations and is increasing its military pressure.

I am gravely concerned about this situation. I am concerned because it poses a serious threat to the chances for political stability in Southeast Asia and to the progress that has been made in removing Vietnam as a major issue of contention between the great powers.

I am also concerned because what happens in Vietnam can affect the rest of the world. It cannot be in the interests of the United States to let other nations believe that we are prepared to look the other way when agreements that have been painstakingly negotiated are contemptuously violated. It cannot be in our interest to cause our friends all over the world to wonder whether we will support them if they comply with agreements that others violate.

When the United States signed the Paris Agreement, as when we pursued the policy of Vietnamization, we told the South Vietnamese, in effect, that we would not defend them with our military forces, but that we would provide them the means to defend themselves, as permitted by the Agreement. The South Vietnamese have performed effectively in accepting this challenge. They have demonstrated their determination and ability to defend themselves if they are provided the necessary military materiel with which to do so. We, however, may be judged remiss in keeping our end of the bargain.

We—the Executive and Legislative Branches together—must meet our responsibilities. As I have said earlier, the amount of assistance appropriated by the previous Congress is inadequate to the requirements of the situation.

I am, therefore, proposing:

—A supplemental appropriation of $300 million for military assistance to South Vietnam.

The $300 million in supplemental military assistance that I am requesting for South Vietnam represents the difference between the $1 billion which was authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1975 and the $700 million which has been appropriated. This amount does not meet all the needs of the South Vietnamese army in its defense against North Vietnam. It does not, for example, allow for replacement of equipment lost in combat. It is the minimum needed to prevent serious reversals by providing the South Vietnamese with the urgent supplies required for their self-defense against the current level of North Vietnamese attacks.

I believe that this additional aid will help to deter the North Vietnamese from further escalating their military pressure and provide them additional incentive to resume the political discussions envisaged under the Paris Agreement.

All Americans want to end the U.S. role in Vietnam. So do I. I believe, however, that we must end it in a way that will enhance the chances of world peace and sustain the purposes for which we have sacrificed so much.

Cambodia

Our objective in Cambodia is to restore peace and to allow the Khmer people an opportunity to decide freely who will govern them. To this end, our immediate goal in Cambodia is to facilitate an early negotiated settlement. The Cambodian Government has repeatedly called for talks without preconditions with the other Khmer parties. We have fully supported these proposals as well as the resolution passed by the United Nations General Assembly calling for early negotiations among Khmer parties.

Regrettably, there has been no progress. In fact, the Communists have intensified hostilities by attacking on the outskirts of Phnom Penh and attempting to cut the land and water routes to the capital. We must continue to aid the Cambodian Government in the face of externally supported military attacks. To refuse to provide the assistance needed would threaten the survival of the Khmer Republic and undermine the chances for peace and stability in the area.

The Cambodian Government forces, given adequate assistance, can hold their own. Once the insurgents realize that they cannot win by force of arms, I believe they will look to negotiations rather than war.

I am, therefore, proposing:

—Legislation to eliminate the current ceilings on military and economic assistance to Cambodia, and to authorize the appropriation of an additional $222 million for military aid for Cambodia, and

—An amendment to the fiscal year 1975 budget for the additional $222 million.

To provide the assistance necessary, the present restrictions on our military and economic aid to Cambodia must be removed and additional money provided. The $200 million in military assistance currently authorized was largely expended during the past six months in response to the significantly intensified enemy offensive action. In addition, I have utilized the $75 million drawdown of Department of Defense stocks authorized by Congress for this emergency situation. Since the beginning of the Communist offensive on January 1, ammunition expenditures have risen and will exhaust all available funds well before the end of this fiscal year. To meet minimum requirements for the survival of the Khmer Republic, I am requesting an additional $222 million in military assistance and the elimination of the present $200 million ceiling on military assistance to Cambodia. I am also requesting elimination of the $377 million ceiling on overall assistance to Cambodia. This is necessary to enable us to provide vital commodities, mostly food, under the Food for Peace program, to assure adequate food for the victims of war and to prevent the economic collapse of the country.

I know we all seek the same goals for Cambodia—a situation wherein the suffering and destruction has stopped and the Khmer people have the necessary security to rebuild their society and their country. These goals are attainable. With the minimal resources and flexibility I am requesting from you, the Congress, we can help the people of Cambodia to have a choice in determining their future. The consequences of refusing them this assistance will reach far beyond Cambodia's borders and impact severely on prospects for peace and stability in that region and the world. There is no question but that this assistance would serve the interests of the United States.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *January 28, 1975.*

TREATY INFORMATION

Outer Space Registration Convention Signed by United States

Statement by John Scali
U.S. Representative to the United Nations [1]

I am happy to sign on behalf of the United States the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space.

The United States was one of the leaders in the long negotiations that led to the Registration Convention, as we were in negotiating the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, the Astronaut Assistance and Return Agreement of 1968, and the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects of 1971. The new Registration Convention is another step in developing a cooperative and mutually beneficial legal order for the conduct of outer space activities. We hope it will meet with broad support and acceptance around the world.

The Registration Convention was negotiated over a three-year period beginning in 1972 and was agreed to in 1974 by all the states participating in the 37-member U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

It secures three objectives sought by the United States and other like-minded nations:

First, the convention will encourage every country launching objects into orbit around the earth or into other sustained space transit to maintain an orderly record of their launches.

Second, it establishes an international register of manmade space objects in orbit, to be kept by the Secretary General and to which there will be full and open access. This register will contain information concerning each object launched into space or beyond, including the name of the launching state or states, an appropriate designator for, or the registration number of, the object, the location and date of launch, basic orbital parameters, and a description of the general function of the object.

Third, the convention will provide for cooperative assistance by countries which have space monitoring and tracking facilities in the event that a country is unable to identify the nation of origin of a manmade space object which lands in its territory and causes damage.

[1] Made at U.N. Headquarters on Jan. 24 (text from USUN press release 4).

U.S. and Romania Sign Five-Year Agreement on Exchanges

Following are texts of a Department announcement issued December 26 and the U.S.-Romania five-year Agreement on Cultural and Scientific Exchanges and Cooperation signed at Bucharest on December 13.

Press release 547 dated December 26

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

On December 13, 1974, the United States and Romania signed a new five-year Agreement on Cultural and Scientific Exchanges and Cooperation, replacing the previous two-year accords at a lower level for programs in these fields. The agreement, which enters into force on January 1, 1975, provides for expanded cultural, scientific, and informational activity and incorporates in a separate article the 1969 understanding between the two countries which led to the establishment of the American Library in Bucharest.

A document outlining the specific program of exchanges and cooperation for the next two years was also signed by American Ambassador Harry G. Barnes, Jr., and Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister Vasile Gliga in a ceremony attended by members of the American Embassy and officials of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Romanian institutions involved in the program.[1]

[1] For text of the 1975–76 program, see press release 547 dated Dec. 26.

The agreement and program provide for exchanges of students, researchers, and university lecturers in Romanian and American studies, as well as for short-term visitors in all fields. Continuing and expanding exchanges and cooperation between Romanian agencies and American private and governmental organizations in the fields of science and technology were also incorporated in the accords as well as provisions for activities in the performing and creative arts, motion pictures, exhibits, communications media, and sports. The accords also provide for exchanges of political leaders.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA ON COOPERATION AND EXCHANGES IN THE CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL FIELDS

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania,

Considering the historic ties of friendship between the American and Romanian peoples;

Believing that exchanges and cooperation in cultural, educational, scientific, technological and other fields will contribute to further knowledge and mutual understanding between the American and Romanian peoples and to the continued development of mutually beneficial relations between the two countries;

Recognizing that exchanges and cooperation between institutions of the two countries will contribute to the cultural and material development of their peoples;

Considering the existing exchanges and cooperation in these fields between the two countries, and desiring their further expansion;

Desiring to develop their relations on the basis of the principles set forth in the joint statement of the Presidents of the two States on December 5, 1973,

Agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

1. The Parties will encourage and develop exchanges and cooperation in the arts, culture, communications media, education, tourism, sports, and in other fields of common interest on the basis of mutual benefit and respect. They will provide opportunities for and facilitate appropriate direct contacts and cooperative activities between organizations, institutions, and individuals of the two countries. Such exchanges, contacts and activities may include, but need not be limited to the following:

A. Exchange of students, instructors, professors, lecturers, researchers, education officials and specialists;

B. Exchange of books, periodicals, educational and teaching materials, including visual aids;

C. Organization of conferences, symposia, and seminars as well as joint research projects;

D. Direct cooperation and exchanges between universities and other institutions of higher education;

E. Study of the language, literature and culture of the two countries, at the University and other levels;

F. Exhibits of an artistic, cultural, educational or general informational nature;

G. Visits and exchanges of representatives in the fields of architecture, art, literature, music, theater and other arts, including professional and amateur groups of performing artists in music, dance and theater;

H. Showing of documentary and feature films, the organization of film weeks, as well as exchanges and other activities in the field of cinematography;

I. Visits and exchanges of athletes and athletic teams, as well as specialists in the fields of physical education and sports;

J. Visits and exchanges of journalists, editors, publishers and translators of literary works as well as cooperative activities between organizations in the fields of press, radio and television.

2. The Parties will facilitate:

A. Distribution of cultural, informational and other materials designed to enrich the mutual knowledge of the peoples and their cultural values.

B. Access to libraries, museums, cultural centers, reading rooms and archives and the development of direct relations between these and other cultural institutions through exchanges of social, cultural, technical and scientific books, publications and microfilms.

3. The Parties will encourage, with the consent of the authors and in accordance with the legal requirements of the two countries, the translation and publication of literary and scientific works as well as works of a general nature, of the other country.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will continue to facilitate the activities of the American and Romanian Libraries in conformity with the Understanding of August 3, 1969.

ARTICLE III

1. The Parties will encourage and develop exchanges and cooperation in the fields of science,

technology and health on the basis of mutual benefit. They will facilitate, as appropriate, cooperative activities and direct contacts between organizations, institutions and specialists of the two countries. Such activities, contacts, and exchanges may include, but need not be limited to the following:

A. Joint research, development and implementation of programs and projects in basic and applied sciences, as well as exchanges of experience and research results;

B. Visits, study trips, and exchanges between scientists and specialists;

C. Organization of joint courses, conferences, seminars and symposia;

D. Organization of scientific and technical exhibits and displays on a non-commercial basis;

E. Exchanges of scientific and technical documentation and information, including scientific and technical films;

F. Other forms of scientific and technical cooperation as may be mutually agreed.

2. The Parties will take all appropriate measures to encourage and achieve the fulfillment of agreements and understandings mentioned in periodic programs of exchanges.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties will also encourage the conclusion, when considered necessary and mutually beneficial, of other understandings, arrangements and periodic programs of exchanges in the fields covered by this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

This Agreement, and the exchanges, contacts, and activities under it will be carried out subject to the Constitution and to applicable laws and regulations of each country. Within this framework, both Parties will exert their best efforts to promote favorable conditions for the fulfillment of the Agreement and the exchanges, contacts and cooperative activities under it.

ARTICLE VI

For the purpose of implementing this Agreement, the Parties will conclude periodic programs of exchanges which will detail the activities and exchanges, as well as the financial conditions, to be carried out.

The Parties will meet periodically to review current activities, to take appropriate measures, and to consider future activities.

ARTICLE VII

This Agreement will enter into force on January 1, 1975. The Agreement is valid for five years and may be automatically extended for additional periods of five years. It may be modified only by prior agreement of the Parties.

The Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon written notice to the other Party at least six months prior to its expiration.

DONE at Bucharest, in duplicate, the day of December 13, 1974, in the English and Romanian languages, both equally authentic.

For the Government of the United States of America:

HARRY G. BARNES, JR.

For the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania:

VASILE GLIGA

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

Ratification deposited: Poland (with a reservation), January 28, 1975.

Customs

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.[1]

Accessions deposited: German Democratic Republic (with declarations), October 4, 1974; New Zealand, December 20, 1974.[2]

Maritime Matters

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 1973.[1]

Acceptances deposited: Canada, December 19, 1974; France (with a declaration), December 12, 1974.

Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.

Accession deposited: Iceland, December 18, 1974.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.[1]

Accession deposited: Thailand, January 9, 1975.

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna February 21, 1971.[1]

[1] Not in force.

[2] Not applicable to the Cook Islands, Niue, and the Tokelau Islands.

Ratification deposited: Poland (with reservations), January 3, 1975.
Accession deposited: Iceland, December 18, 1974.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900, 6109.
Acceptance deposited: Malta, January 10, 1975.
International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.[1]
Accession deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with a declaration), December 30, 1974.

Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes. Done at London November 2, 1973.[1]
Signatures: Australia (with a declaration), December 24, 1974; Brazil, December 12, 1974;[3] Ireland,[3] Netherlands,[2] December 30, 1974.
Protocol relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of marine pollution by substances other than oil. Done at London November 2, 1971.[1]
Signatures: Netherlands, December 30, 1974; New Zealand, December 23, 1974;[2] Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, December 30, 1974; United Kingdom, December 19, 1974.

Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.
Ratification deposited: Monaco, December 3, 1974.

Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force October 4, 1967; for the United States November 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.
Accession deposited: Zaïre, January 13, 1975.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974. Done at London November 1, 1974.[1]
Signatures: Belgium, December 17, 1914;[3] Poland, January 10, 1975.[3]

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975. Enters into force on deposit of the fifth instrument of ratification.
Signatures: France, January 14, 1975; United States, January 24, 1975.

Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.[1]
Signatures: Australia, Italy, December 30, 1974; Romania (with a reservation), December 27, 1974.

Trade

Protocol for the accession of the People's Republic of Bangladesh to the general agreement on tariffs and trade, with annex. Done at Geneva November 7, 1972. Entered into force December 16, 1972. TIAS 7552.
Acceptance deposited: Pakistan, January 17, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, January 27, 1975.
Accession deposited: Nigeria, January 28, 1975.
Protocol modifying and extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions.
Ratification deposited: Switzerland, January 27, 1975.

BILATERAL

Bulgaria

Consular convention, with agreed memorandum and exchange of letters. Signed at Sofia April 15, 1974.[1]
Ratified by the President: January 28, 1975.

Republic of China

Agreement extending the agreement of January 23, 1969, relating to cooperation in science and technology. Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei January 21, 1975. Entered into force January 23, 1975.

Malta

Agreement extending the agreement of June 14, 1967, as extended, relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Valletta December 27, 1974. Entered into force December 27, 1974.

United Kingdom

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of July 3, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4078, 4267, 6659, 6861), for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. Signed at Washington July 22, 1974.
Entered into force: January 27, 1975.

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[1] Not in force.
[2] Not applicable to the Cook Islands, Niue, and the Tokelau Islands.
[3] Subject to ratification.

PUBLICATIONS

First "Foreign Relations" Volume on China for 1949 Released

Press release 29 dated January 24 (for release January 31)

The Department of State released on January 31 volume IX in the series "Foreign Relations of the United States" for the year 1949. This volume is entitled "The Far East: China" and is one of two dealing with China for that year. The companion volume (VIII) is to be published subsequently.

The 1,441 pages of previously unpublished documentation contained in this volume set forth U.S. policy in a variety of important topics including the question of recognition of the new regime in mainland China, policy toward Taiwan, military and economic assistance to the Republic of China, financial and trade policy, the status of Tibet, and evacuation of Americans from the mainland. Documents are also included on the preparation and publication in August 1949 of "United States Relations With China" (also known as "the China White Paper"). The political and military situation in China and the status of U.S. diplomatic missions on the mainland will be covered in volume VIII.

The volume was prepared by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of Volume IX (Department of State publication 8774; GPO cat. no. S1.1:949/v. IX) may be obtained for $14.75 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should be made out to "Superintendent of Documents" and should be sent to the U.S. Government Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Belgium amending annex B to the agreement of January 27, 1950. TIAS 7866. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7866).

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft Products and Components. Agreement with the Netherlands. TIAS 7869. 9 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7869).

Military Assistance—Payments Under Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. Agreement with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 7871. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7871).

Military Assistance—Payments Under Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Ethiopia. TIAS 7872. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7872).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan amending the agreement of September 10, 1973, as amended. TIAS 7874. 3 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7874).

Military Assistance—Payments Under Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. Agreement with the Philippines. TIAS 7875. 3 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7875).

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: Jan. 27–Feb. 2

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to January 27 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 547 of December 26, 23 of January 21, and 27 and 29 of January 24.

No.	Date	Subject
30	1/27	Notice of time for filing claims against Syria by U.S. nationals.
*31	1/27	Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea, Mar. 1.
†32	1/27	U.S.-France Cooperative Science Program meeting.
*33	1/28	U.S.-Malta textile agreement extended.
*34	1/28	Program for the official visit of the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Harold Wilson, Jan. 29–Feb. 1.
35	1/28	Kissinger: news conference.
36	1/29	Johnson: interview for Eurovision.
*37	1/29	Ray sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Environmental and Scientific Affairs (biographic data).
*38	1/29	National Review Board for the Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange between East and West, Honolulu, Mar. 17–18.
*39	1/31	Todman sworn in as Ambassador to Costa Rica (biographic data).
*40	1/31	U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Feb. 25.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Name Index