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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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President Ford and President Giscard d'Estaing of France Meet in Martinique

President Ford and President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing met in Martinique December 14-16. Following are remarks by the two Presidents upon President Ford's arrival on December 14, their exchange of toasts at a dinner given by President Giscard d'Estaing that evening, their exchange of toasts at a dinner given by President Ford on December 15, the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger on December 16, and the text of a communique issued on December 16.

WELCOMING CEREMONY, DECEMBER 14

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December 23

President Giscard d'Estaing¹

Dear Mr. President: It is a great honor for this French land of the West Indies to welcome the President of the United States of America.

It is a real pleasure for me to extend to you and to all those accompanying you a most cordial welcome. As soon as you came into office, we both felt that we should establish a direct and personal contact. Such a contact is in keeping with the traditional relations between France and the United States. And in the present circumstances, we thought this would be especially useful.

Faced with the enormous changes taking place throughout the world, our two countries have, in different capacities and to various degrees, responsibilities to bear.

Belonging to the community of liberal de-

mocracies, their personality and their situation leave them sometimes—quite naturally, I would say—to assume different stands in the face of such changes. However, too old are their ties of friendship for them not to wish to harmonize such stands whenever necessary, and they are too deeply attached to the same ideal of freedom, progress, and peace not to be determined to succeed.

All this points to the importance of our meeting, as stressed by our partners in the European Community, hence also the frankness and cordiality with which I trust our talks will start and be concluded.

Mr. President, France of the Martinique offers to you and all those accompanying you its charm and its beauty. From the bottom of our heart, I wish you an excellent stay. Welcome, Mr. President.

President Ford

Mr. President, Madame Giscard d'Estaing, ladies and gentlemen: Thank you for your most gracious welcome to this beautiful, gorgeous island. I am delighted to be here.

Mr. President, this is an opportunity for us to become personally acquainted and to discuss the serious issues which confront our two countries. Our meeting vividly demonstrates the importance we attach to working together.

General Lafayette stopped here on his way to assist America to achieve its independence. The friendship of our two countries spans the oceans as well as the centuries. It is fitting that you and I, both given responsibilities for leadership in our respective countries this year, are taking this early opportunity

¹ President Giscard d'Estaing spoke in French on all three occasions.

to address problems of common interest and common concern.

We must combine our efforts with those of our friends and our allies if we are to meet the challenges of the last quarter of the 20th century. The list of the challenges is long, including such vital issues as food, energy, finance, and of course the fundamental security of our people and the quest for further reductions in international tensions.

Just as our talks mark the beginning of a personal relationship, I am confident that our nations will reaffirm the tradition of Franco-American cooperation in great endeavors.

I look forward to our meetings for the exchanges they will permit and our resulting understandings. In meeting here, we of course will be mindful not only of American and French interests but the contributions our efforts can make toward a more peaceful, stable, and prosperous world.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, DECEMBER 14

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December 23

President Giscard d'Estaing

Mr. President: A meeting between France and the United States is always a rendezvous of freedom and friendship. And what could be a better place for it than this island of Martinique, which cherishes the proud memory of having served as a naval base for the French fleet during the American War of Independence, and in two years' time, we will be celebrating together the successful outcome of that event.

It was in the name of freedom that our friendship was born, and we shall celebrate its 200th anniversary at the same time as the bicentennial of American independence.

It was also in the name of freedom that twice in the course of this century the active solidarity of the United States enabled France to preserve or to regain her independence.

Different as we may be, what appeals so much to us, the French, is all that in the United States symbolizes and means free-

dom: your vast spaces, your openness to new ideas and bold endeavors, your mastery of technology, which gives man his power over nature and lightens his burden.

Freedom and friendship have stamped their mark on the relations between our two countries. Freedom allows for their frankness and independence; friendship demands mutual understanding and cooperation.

This spirit of free dialogue and trust between partners who recognize the equality of their rights and duties, even if they are not equal in terms of resources or power, is characteristic of Franco-American relations, and there is nothing to prevent that the same spirit be applied to solving the major problems of the world today.

For our part, we express the wish that this spirit inspire the relations between the United States and the Europe that we are striving patiently—and we are bound to say slowly—to build.

It is only on condition that it can exist by its own accord that Europe will be for the United States a firm and reliable partner and for the world a factor of balance and peace.

We also wish that this spirit of dialogue should govern our thinking on the profound changes in the world scene.

As you were mentioning, you yourself, Mr. President, on your arrival here, the path of consultation, which is as far removed from that of confrontation as it is from that of capitulation, is the only one which is in keeping with the political, economic, and human needs of our time.

It is the path we followed when it was time to emerge from the cold war and, on our war-torn continent, to organize détente, entente, and cooperation, while maintaining actively our desire for independence in safeguarding our security.

It is the path we recommend be followed in the Middle East, where, in spite of the remarkable efforts of American diplomacy and the useful progress it has achieved, the situation remains a threatening one. A just and lasting settlement must, in our view, take into account the three legitimate aspirations of all parties concerned—those of the State of Israel, to live in peace within secure and

guaranteed boundaries; those of the Arab states, to recover their territorial integrity; and those of the Palestinian people, to have, as all peoples, a homeland.

It is also through consultation that we shall succeed in finding a solution to the problem caused by the increase in oil prices. This in no way excludes a prior harmonization of the positions within each of the major categories involved. It, however, presupposes that the purpose of this harmonization process be to prepare the meeting at the same table and at a fixed date of countries willing to reconcile their respective points of view in the peaceful interests of the world.

Mr. President, we shall be having talks in a climate of mutual trust on all these subjects of concern to the world today. These talks will once again demonstrate that the frankness of our discussions draws us together much more than it divides us, as should be between partners and allies when they have for each other, as I have for your country, a sense of their dignity and their sovereignty.

Mr. President, we all deeply regret the absence of Mrs. Ford, and I would like to ask you to be kind enough to convey to her our very warm and respectful wishes for a prompt recovery.

I drink this toast in your honor, Mr. President, as well as to the great people of the United States, to whom the French people, through me, extend their greetings in testimony of our two-centuries-old and everlasting friendships like our two countries.

Thank you.

President Ford

Mr. President: The hospitality extended to me has reflected in the warmth of the climate of this most remarkable island and the spirit of your kind words of welcome, and I am deeply grateful.

I am very, very proud to be the first American President in office to visit this part of the Caribbean, and I would like to express again my appreciation to you personally for suggesting Martinique as the location of our first meeting.

The United States and France, we all

know, have been very, very close. We have been extremely close friends for over two centuries. From our American Revolution through the darkest days of World War II, our countries have stood together in moments of crisis. And today, of fundamental importance to our countries and to the West, a strong Atlantic alliance safeguards our security.

As old friends and allies, Mr. President, we have much to talk about. On many, many points we shall agree; on others we may differ. But it is of the greatest importance, in my judgment, that we will talk with full candor since we share the same ideals. A relationship of confidence is absolutely essential. It is only through such a relationship, Mr. President, that our common objectives can best be served and our differing views reconciled.

As in the past, we jointly face, Mr. President, major challenges. This time the immediate danger is not war, but the problems of peace: inflation, balance of payments deficits, energy shortages, and, for many throughout the world, shortages of food itself. These problems unfortunately accentuate the interdependence of nations and the need for communication and cooperation.

At stake is the stability of every economy, the welfare of every nation. Unilateral measures, Mr. President, can no longer suffice in solving problems of such universal dimension.

Mr. President, you recently described this situation very vividly when you said the world is unhappy. Indeed, the world is troubled. But if we are to transcend our difficulties and successfully meet our challenges we, France and the United States, must cooperate.

We face a major problem in the field of energy. In dealing with it on the basis of consumer solidarity, we seek constructive dialogue, not confrontation. The United States is convinced that cooperation and solidarity among the consumer nations mark the surest way to reach understanding with the producer nations, which we all desire.

I am also looking forward, Mr. President, to exchanging impressions on East-West re-

lations and on our recent meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]. I am sure we will all agree that all of us in the West will benefit from close relationships as the policy of détente continues to develop.

Our interdependence requires that we—together with our friends and our partners—join in concerted measures or responses to the dangers which confront us all. Let us continue our historic relationship with renewed spirit and redoubled effort, as good and responsible friends.

Our common heritage gives me confidence that we will continue our joint endeavors for peace and stability in the world. Mr. President, it is with this objective that I look forward to our discussions tomorrow. I have every hope that our talks will strengthen the friendship between us, both in a bilateral sense and also as members of the alliance which Americans regard as the cornerstone of our foreign policy.

Ladies and gentlemen, in the spirit of strengthening our historic ties, I ask all of you to stand and to raise your glasses in honor of the President of the French Republic and his lovely wife.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, DECEMBER 15

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December 23

President Ford

Mr. President, Madame Giscard d'Estaing, our distinguished guests: Let me say with great personal conviction and strong feelings, we have enjoyed being here in a part of France. The warmth of the welcome of the people, the superb atmosphere created by the beauties of nature, have made this trip a wonderful experience for all of us.

Mr. President, the United States within a relatively few months is going to be celebrating our 200th anniversary. Whenever we think about that anniversary, we can't help but feel the participation that France played in the achievement of our independ-

ence. July 4, 1976, will bring back many, many memories of the help and assistance that France gave to our country at a very difficult and controversial period in our early history in America.

It is my understanding, Mr. President, that one of your ancestors, Admiral d'Estaing, did have an interest in and did help us at a period when we, the United States, were in our formative years. For that we thank you, and for all of the other great Frenchmen who were assisting America in our early days.

It is my understanding, Mr. President, that France is making a very meaningful contribution to our 200th anniversary with the "sight and sound" program that will be a highlight in Washington for the many, many thousands who will visit the Nation's Capital. We thank you for this contribution, and we are grateful for your feeling that France should participate in this way.

If I might now turn to our own personal relationship, which I say without any hesitancy or qualification—it was a pleasure to meet you and to have the opportunity of broadening a relationship and developing a friendship. It seems to me this can be meaningful in our relations between France and the United States. But even more meaningful, on a far broader basis, I am grateful for your statesmanship; I am most appreciative for your views that we have exchanged here on this occasion in a part of France.

And so, Mr. President, may I offer a toast to you and Madame Giscard d'Estaing and to the Republic of France. It is a pleasure and a privilege.

President Giscard d'Estaing

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: Mr. President, we have both come into office very recently, only a few months ago, and so—this is a source of deep satisfaction—we are both extremely young. Indeed, one can say it is a secret of youth, in fact, to be elected President.

Now, we are, however, young Presidents

of countries whose relations are very long-standing, indeed, as you yourself have just mentioned. And indeed, all you have to do is to look behind you at Fort-de-France—Fort-de-France, which has carried that name for three centuries and two centuries ago harbored the French fleet that sailed off the coast of the then young and new United States.

I would add that the relations between France and the United States are not merely a matter of what you might call the picturesque site of history or simply a matter of stories on the subject. No, it is something which reflects a deep and reciprocal mutual interest; it is something which has been borne out in numerous circumstances. For instance, when at the time of the First World War the United States came to the defense of France, the landing of the Americans on French territory was met with tremendous enthusiasm on the part of the French population.

And so when at the end of the Second World War, I myself was involved in the last stages of the war, the unit that I served in was a part of the 1st French Army which itself was under the 7th U.S. Army.

But the great problems of our times—even to those of us who, like ourselves, are deeply attached to tradition—the big problems of our time, I say, are in fact ahead of us and will call for considerable imagination and action. And that is why it was very important for me, Mr. President, to know whether these new problems and tasks could, in fact, be tackled with the very great country that you represent in a spirit of openness and mutual understanding.

And so, it was important for me to establish this personal contact with you yourself, sir, and the distinguished persons accompanying you. And yesterday morning, when I was meeting you at the airport, it occurred to me that during these two days we were in fact going to, perhaps, take initiatives and perform actions which would lead to solutions which could well have a lasting effect not only on our own relations but also, perhaps, on world affairs.

The results of our talks will be embodied in a communique which will be issued at the end of tomorrow morning, and if I were to divulge right now what the results of our talks have been, this would deprive the members of our staff from the pleasures of the late evening and early morning during which they would engage in the arduous task of preparing the suitable form of words.

But what I can say something about is the atmosphere of our talks, and what I would like to mention is their very cordial nature, the very simple way in which our talks have proceeded, the great frankness and the clarity of your positions, and the great competence with which you have led our discussions.

Now, on international gatherings or occasions such as this, people tend to wonder, in fact, who won, who came out on top, who gave the concessions, who, in fact, was the victor. But at the very outset, you will recall that I said it was my hope that, in fact, there would be neither a matter of concessions nor victors in a case like this, but we should both emerge from these talks with the feeling that we had, in fact, achieved something useful, realistic, and worthwhile in furthering the solutions of the problems that we are in fact discussing.

And could I say very sincerely, Mr. President, how very much Madame Giscard d'Estaing and myself deeply regret the absence of Mrs. Ford. We had been looking forward very much to meeting her here on this occasion, and I may say that some of the arrangements that had been made had been made precisely in anticipation of the pleasure of, for instance, having her with us today at lunch. Now, there is one great advantage of this situation, and that is that the rights of international affairs dictate that one cannot, twice running, invite the same head of state. That means, therefore, that despite the great pleasure that this would afford us, it would not be possible for us to invite you, sir, again so soon. But we could, of course, invite Mrs. Ford. And we would very much hope that she would accept,

and that you would be kind enough to accompany her.

Now, people in this world of ours very often ask themselves all sorts of questions and, indeed, one of the things they often wonder about, apparently, is why statesmen, in fact, are statesmen and why they accept to sacrifice many aspects of their existence to the responsibilities of state.

Now, as far as you are concerned—and I have seen this during our talks—and as far as I am concerned, the reason, perhaps, for which we do so is that we feel that we have, perhaps, a contribution to make in furthering the affairs of the world.

Now, the fact that the responsibilities that we have to shoulder at this particular time in history are particularly heavy at the same time means that our contribution will be a significant contribution.

Now, it is clear, however, that the affairs of mankind and the peace of the world do not depend solely on the action or the efforts of one country alone—however big that country may be—but will always depend on the combination, on the conjunction of the efforts of several. And I now know that it is quite clear that we will be able to work together.

Mr. President, when the French fleet left these waters two centuries ago for the North American Continent, there were doubtless, at the time of departure, great festivities on board, and I can well imagine that my ancestor may well have offered a toast on that occasion which would probably have had something to do with the wishes that he would have expressed concerning the continent that they were about to discover and would have expressed their hopes and their expectations.

Now, this evening, today, the situation to some extent is the other way around in that it is we who are hosting you here in Martinique, but the French Martinique of two centuries ago and the French Martinique of today, Mr. President, are deeply proud of having here the visit today of the President of the United States. Our friend the President.

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE, DECEMBER 16

Press release 533 dated December 16

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, we have distributed the communique, which is substantially self-explanatory. Let me make a few preliminary points.

First, as the President of the Republic said last night in his toast, both sides approached these discussions with the attitude not of who would get the maximum number of concessions from the other or who would be the victor in the negotiations—because we don't think of each other as antagonists, but as allies.

We looked at the outstanding problems, especially in the field of energy and economics, from the point of view of what was in the mutual benefit, the benefit of Europe and the United States, as well as the benefit of all the interested nations around the world. And therefore, with respect to the energy issue, which was one of the principal problems which was of course discussed, I think we achieved the synthesis of the French and American positions which took account of the American conviction that consumer cooperation was essential and the French belief—which, as a matter of fact, the United States has always shared—that consumer cooperation must lead rapidly to consumer-producer dialogue.

I would like to add that in addition to the substance of the communique, the conversations were conducted in an atmosphere of great cordiality and the relationship of confidence that has grown up between the two Presidents will help facilitate and guarantee the spirit of cooperation which we believe is one of the important results of this conference.

Having attended many similar meetings between French and American leaders, I must say I found this atmosphere the most positive and the one between the two leaders and one in which as far as the United States is concerned—the French President will undoubtedly speak for himself—we will continue in the exchanges that will be necessary to implement the various aspects of the

communiqué as well as the cooperation that is foreseen in the communiqué.

Now why don't I take your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us a run-down on the sequence of events that are going to happen in these conferences concerning the oil crisis? Which one takes place first, and what happens after that?

Secretary Kissinger: As the communiqué says, the steps should be taken in sequence, and the sequence is the one described in the communiqué; that is to say, there will first be an effort of some urgency to strengthen consumer cooperation in the field of conservation, of developing alternative sources of energy, and of setting up new mechanisms for financial solidarity.

Based on progress among the consumers, this will then lead to a preparatory meeting between consumers and producers, for which we set a target date for March 1975. Of course it depends on the progress the consumers make among themselves, but the United States will cooperate in bringing about the preparatory conferences and obviously will not use delaying tactics.

I think there is good will on all sides. We can make substantial progress among the consumers, and given the urgency of the situation, in fact, we must make substantial progress among the consumers.

After the completion of the preparatory discussions, we have foreseen intensive consultation among the consumers to develop common positions and common attitudes toward the consumer-producer substantive conference. The preparatory meeting will deal with procedure, agenda, participants, and will not deal with substance.

This is the sequence that the two Presidents have agreed upon, and again I would like to say that the United States has not considered its views as incompatible with those of France. In fact, at the Washington Energy Conference, we proposed that the consumer cooperation should lead to consumer-producer dialogue, and therefore we welcome the French initiative, and I think we can work cooperatively to achieve the common objective.

Q. Will France participate in this consumer effort to strengthen solidarity?

Secretary Kissinger: It says "existing institutions and agreements." There are a number of factors. France, of course, is not a member of the IEA [International Energy Agency], and we have not asked France to be a member of the IEA. It is my impression that France will work in parallel to the IEA in the same direction. For example, we have had occasion to point out that the French conservation program is going in the same direction as that of the IEA and in some respects goes beyond it.

The institutions or the mechanisms for financial solidarity we had proposed in my speech should be taken in the Group of Ten, in which France is of course a member; and therefore there is no difficulty about French participation in those.

With respect to alternative sources of energy, it may be that they are initially discussed in the IEA, but there is also a role there for European institutions, so we are not concerned with the legal structure.

It is our conviction that France will work parallel to our efforts and we will find the legal formula by which to implement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, doesn't that kind of informal arrangement give France the benefit of consumer organization that has already taken place without having any of the responsibilities, for example, in oil sharing?

Secretary Kissinger: No, it is our view that we are concerned with the substance, and therefore how France participates, under what legal form, is not of decisive concern to us.

As I pointed out, the financial institutions, for example, are not being done in the IEA to begin with. The conservation measures, once they have been agreed upon, do not really require any international party to implement. They can be implemented on a national basis.

I have the impression that we should stop talking about Franco-American relations in terms of confrontation and who is taking advantage of whom but rather in terms of

practical cooperation in which the actions of the two parties will be more important than the legal form—and that is our attitude, and it is our impression that was the French attitude at this meeting.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you please tell us what progress, if any, was made relative to your suggestion in Chicago of the \$25 billion fund for the shoring up of those economies that need it in light of the oil shortage?

Secretary Kissinger: We found the attitude of the French President very positive to this idea, and we have the impression that France will work with us in the Group of Ten to implement this idea.

Q. How do you account for the French change? All of a sudden you have peace, and it is lovely. What caused this after 10 years?

Secretary Kissinger: I didn't say there has been a French change. I described the results of this conference, and I can only say that both Presidents seem to me to be convinced of the urgent problems facing their countries and facing the industrialized countries and, indeed, facing the whole world.

And it was a discussion that was not conducted in slogans, but in terms of the issues; and when you confront the issues, I think certain conclusions are more or less inevitable.

I would also say that the manner in which both Presidents conducted the conversations, which was free of dogma on both sides—

Q. Free of what?

Secretary Kissinger: D-o-g-m-a—it is a Latin word, not German [laughter]. —contributed to the result but I don't want to claim any changes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, leaving aside the financial side in the Group of Ten, will the French participation in the conservation side be through the EEC [European Economic Community]; that is to say, are you contemplating here that the EEC will become an elective member of the IEA?

Secretary Kissinger: This is one possibility. It is not for the United States to prescribe how Europe should organize its energy policy. The United States would certainly have no objection and can see some advantages in a common energy policy on the part of Europe, and this in turn, of course, would permit the EEC to participate as a unit in the IEA. This is essentially up to the Europeans.

Q. Do you think it will happen?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me make a point. Obviously, the spirit of what has been agreed here in Martinique requires that France work in parallel on the same substance as the other principal consumers, and we believe that this can be done. This is one device for doing it, but we are prepared to find other consultative devices.

Q. Did you get any assurances from the President of France that they would be willing to do this at this meeting?

Secretary Kissinger: That they would be prepared to have a common European energy policy?

Q. Or that EEC would join the IEA?

Secretary Kissinger: We did not discuss the legal relationship of France to the IEA. We discussed the substantive relationship of the measures that needed to be taken; and as we pointed out, it is our view—and I think it is the common view—that certain substantive steps have to be taken in order to make the consumer-producer dialogue useful. And the United States, obviously, will know whether these steps have been taken.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will the March conference be composed of nations outside the major oil producers and also major oil consumers?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me make two points. The March date is a target date. It is not an absolutely fixed date, but we will work seriously to see whether it can be implemented. The original proposal was that it might be tripartite; that is, that some of the less developed consuming countries

might also participate. The United States is not opposed to this in principle; or to put it positively, the United States is prepared for this but the exact composition of either the preparatory or the final meeting has not yet been settled. This is one of the issues that has to be settled.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us further elaboration on the Mideast discussions? How much of the time was spent talking about the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: I think, in the Mideast discussion, the French point of view has been publicly stated and there was a full exchange of the respective points of view. No conclusions were reached or announced. This was mostly in the form of bringing about a fuller comprehension by each side of the views of the other.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you point two things out: What the gold agreement means and, also, what was our original request for compensation for the NATO bases?

Secretary Kissinger: What the gold agreement means is this: That there has been a fixed price for the valuation of gold which does not reflect the market price, and it means that each country is free to adopt current market prices as the basis for evaluation and therefore show on its books a value of gold reserves which corresponds more nearly to the market price of gold, which is about 3½ to 4 times larger than the fixed price of gold and therefore reflects more accurately the capacity of the reserves of each country to pay for deficits.

I frankly do not remember what the original figures were. I know the French figure that they first offered us was substantially below \$100 million, and I am certain the figure we asked for was substantially above; and this seemed to us to represent a fair compromise, but I don't remember what the figure was that we originally asked for.

Q. What of the apparent French suspicions that the United States is trying to dominate the policies of the industrialized world and dictating its terms?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to comment about French suspicions that were not expressed at the meeting. At the meeting we discussed how to deal with concrete issues, and we reached the results which I have described, so that the suspicions that I occasionally read in the French press were not expressed by French officials, and I therefore don't feel the need to comment on that.

Q. On the gold question, does the agreement you have reached imply also the central banks are free now to buy and sell gold at the market price?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to get into technical questions of gold purchases. What it means is that they can value their gold at the market price.

Q. It does mean that?

Secretary Kissinger: It goes no further than that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it the American view that the United States will do this or is it going to be a totally European proposition?

Secretary Kissinger: The valuation?

Q. Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: That is up to each country.

Q. I asked about the United States. Do you anticipate we will do it?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't have the impression that we will do it in the near future.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it the American view that a consumer-producer conference would have as a principal goal lower oil prices, and do the French share that view?

Secretary Kissinger: I think everybody agrees that lower oil prices are highly desirable, and it is the American view that oil prices should be stabilized at a lower level. I think we all agree that regardless of what happens to oil prices, the impact of the oil prices on the world economy and the means that are necessary to assure the stability of

the economies of the industrialized nations as well as a fair progress for the producer nations must be a subject of a consumer-producer dialogue. But the preparatory meeting is designed precisely to define the agenda as well as the procedures of such a dialogue, so it isn't possible to be conclusive about it at this moment.

Q. How is this going to be proposed to a country like Japan—consumer-producer country conference?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, we have been in the closest contact with the Government of Japan, and I had extensive conversations with the then Foreign Minister Kimura, which have been reaffirmed by the new Japanese Government. And of course the French Foreign Minister had been in Japan at about the same time that we were there. So it is my impression that what has been agreed upon here will have the support of the Government of Japan and reflect exactly the idea that the Government of Japan expressed to both of us. And it is also my view, based on conversations with the German Chancellor and with other major consuming nations in the NATO meeting in Brussels, that what was agreed to here will elicit a wide consensus.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, in elaboration on the Middle East question, does it appear that there was French acceptance of the U.S. idea of a step-by-step solution to the Arab-Israeli problem?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to speak for France, particularly since the President of the Republic is waiting to appear here.

My impression is that there is no French disagreement with the step-by-step approach, but having a more Cartesian up-bringing than we, France may perhaps feel it more necessary than we do to define the terminal point at the outset. I don't think there is any French disagreement with the step-by-step approach, if it can be achieved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it says in the communique that there has been accord on many questions. Could you point out the questions upon which there is disagreement?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not leaving this meeting with a spirit that there has been substantial disagreement on any question. I think "many questions" refers to the fact that in a limited amount of time only particular issues could be discussed and did not mean to imply that any issues that were discussed were left open to disagreement.

The Press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE, DECEMBER 16

COMMUNIQUE ISSUED FOLLOWING THE MEETINGS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE FRENCH REPUBLIC IN MARTINIQUE

The President of the United States, Gerald R. Ford, and the President of the French Republic, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, met in Martinique December 14-16, 1974, to discuss current issues of mutual concern. They were joined in their discussions by the Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger and Minister of Foreign Affairs Jean Sauvagnargues, and by Secretary of the Treasury William Simon and Minister of Finance Jean-Pierre Fourcade. The Ministers also held complementary side talks.

The meeting took place in an atmosphere of cordiality and mutual confidence. President Ford and President Giscard d'Estaing welcomed the opportunity to conduct detailed substantive discussions on the whole range of subjects of mutual concern. As traditional friends and allies, the two nations share common values and goals and the two Presidents expressed their determination to cooperate on this basis in efforts to solve common problems.

They reviewed the international situation in the economic, financial and monetary fields.

The two Presidents agreed that the Governments of the United States and of the European Community, in the name of which the French President spoke on this subject, must adopt consistent economic policies in order to be effective in avoiding unemployment while fighting inflation. In particular, they agreed on the importance of avoiding measures of a protectionist nature. And they decided to take the initiative in calling additional intergovernmental meetings should they prove necessary for achievement of the desired consistency of basic economic policies among industrial nations.

In the light of the rapid pace of change in international financial positions in the world today, the Presidents were in full agreement on the desirability of maintaining the momentum of consideration of

closer financial cooperation both within the International Monetary Fund and through supplementary measures. As one specific measure to strengthen the existing financial framework, the Presidents agreed that it would be appropriate for any Government which wished to do so to adopt current market prices as the basis of valuation for its gold holdings.

The two Presidents considered in depth the energy problem and its serious and disturbing effects on the world economy. They recognized the importance for the USA, the EEC and other industrialized nations of implementing policies for the conservation of energy, the development of existing and alternative sources of energy, and the setting up of new mechanisms of financial solidarity. They stressed the importance of solidarity among oil importing nations on these issues.

The two Presidents also exchanged views on the desirability of a dialogue between consumers and producers and in that connection discussed the proposal of the President of the French Republic of October 24 for a conference of oil exporting and importing countries. They agreed that it would be desirable to convene such a meeting at the earliest possible date. They regard it as important that all parties concerned should be better informed of their respective interests and concerns and that harmonious relations should be established among them in order to promote a healthy development of the world economy.

The two Presidents noted that their views on these matters are complementary and, in this context, they agreed that the following interrelated steps should be taken in sequence:

—They agreed that additional steps should be taken, within the framework of existing institutions and agreements to which they are a party, and in consultation with other interested consumers, to strengthen their cooperation. In particular, such cooperation should include programs of energy conservation, for the development of existing and alternative sources of energy and for financial solidarity.

—Based on substantial progress in the foregoing areas, the two Presidents agreed that it will be desirable to propose holding a preparatory meeting between consumers and producers to develop an agenda and procedures for a consumer/producer conference. The target date for such a preparatory meeting should be March 1975.

—The preparatory discussions will be followed by intensive consultations among consumer countries in order to prepare positions for the conference.

The two Presidents agreed that the actions enumerated above will be carried out in the most expeditious manner possible and in full awareness of the common interest in meeting this critical situation shared by the United States and France and all other countries involved.

President Ford and President Giscard d'Estaing reviewed current developments in East-West relations. They discussed their respective meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev, and Secretary Kissinger reported on his discussions with leaders of the People's Republic of China. They exchanged views on developments in East-West negotiations, including the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. They expressed their conviction that progress in easing tensions was being made.

The two Presidents exchanged views on the present situation in the Middle East. They agreed on the importance of early progress toward a just and lasting peace in that area.

President Giscard d'Estaing described current efforts by France and other members of the European Community to further the process of European unity. President Ford reaffirmed the continuing support of the United States for efforts to achieve European unity.

The two Presidents discussed the situation in Indochina. They noted that progress in Laos toward reconciliation and reunification was encouraging.

The two Presidents agreed on the need for all parties to support fully the Paris Peace Agreements on Vietnam. Regarding Cambodia, they expressed the hope that the contending parties would enter into negotiations in the near future rather than continuing the military struggle. They expressed the hope that following Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam might also find their political way towards civil peace.

The two Presidents renewed the pledges of both Governments to continue close relations in the field of defense as members of the Atlantic Alliance. They agreed that the cooperation between France and NATO is a significant factor in the security of Europe.

They noted with satisfaction that the positive steps in negotiations on SALT taken during the Soviet-American meeting at Vladivostok have reduced the threat of a nuclear arms race. The two Presidents explored how, as exporters of nuclear materials and technology, their two countries could coordinate their efforts to assure improved safeguards of nuclear materials.

The President of France indicated that his Government was prepared to reach a financial settlement in connection with the relocation of American forces and bases committed to NATO from France to other countries in 1967. The French offer of \$100 million in full settlement was formally accepted by President Ford.

The two Presidents concluded that the personal contact and discussion in this meeting had demonstrated accord on many questions and expressed their determination to maintain close contact for the purpose of broad cooperation in areas of common concern to the two countries.

President Ford Sets Import Quotas for Cattle and Meat From Canada

A PROCLAMATION¹

TEMPORARY QUANTITATIVE LIMITATION ON THE IM- PORTATION INTO THE UNITED STATES OF CERTAIN CATTLE, BEEF, VEAL, SWINE AND PORK FROM CAN- ADA

WHEREAS, Section 252(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882(a)) authorizes the President to impose duties or other import restrictions on the products of any foreign country establishing or maintaining unjustifiable import restrictions against United States agricultural products which impair the value of tariff commitments made to the United States, oppress the commerce of the United States, or prevent the expansion of trade on a mutually advantageous basis;

WHEREAS, Canada has imposed unjustifiable restrictions on cattle and meat imports from the United States;

WHEREAS, such restrictions violate the commitments of Canada made to the United States, including the provisions of Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, and impair the value of tariff commitments made to the United States, oppress the commerce of the United States and prevent the expansion of trade on a mutually advantageous basis; and

WHEREAS, I deem it necessary and appropriate to impose the restrictions hereinafter proclaimed on imports of cattle, beef, veal, swine, and pork, which are the products of Canada, in order to obtain the removal of such unjustifiable restrictions and to provide access for United States cattle and meat to the markets of Canada on an equitable basis;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States of America, acting under the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes, including Section 252(a) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1882(a)), do hereby proclaim (until such time as the President otherwise proclaims)—

(1) Subpart B of part 2 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States (TSUS) is amended by inserting in numerical sequence the following new items:

Item	Articles	Quota Quantity
	Whenever, in any 12-month period beginning August 12 in 1974 or in any succeeding year, the respective quantity or aggregate quantity of the cattle, the swine, the beef and veal, or the pork specified below, the product of Canada, has been entered, no such cattle, swine, beef and veal, or pork respectively, the product of Canada, may be entered during the remainder of such period:	
945.01	Cattle provided for in items 100.40, 100.43, 100.45, 100.53, and 100.55 of part I, schedule 1.	17,000 head (aggregate quantity).
945.02	Swine provided for in item 100.85 of part I, schedule 1.	50,000 head.
945.03	Beef and veal, fresh, chilled, frozen, prepared, or preserved, provided for in items 106.10 and 107.60, part 2B, schedule 1.	17,000,000 pounds (aggregate quantity).
945.04	Pork, fresh, chilled, frozen, prepared or preserved, provided for in items 106.40, 107.30 and 107.35, part 2B, schedule 1.	36,000,000 pounds (aggregate quantity).

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) hereof, not in excess of one-twelfth of the respective quota quantity specified for each item in said paragraph (1) may be entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption during the 30 day period beginning on the date of this proclamation.

(3) The provisions of this proclamation shall become effective upon publication in the Federal Register, but the provisions of paragraph (1) hereof do not apply to any articles in excess of the respective quota quantity specified for each item in said paragraph (1) which—

(a) prior to such date of publication, have been duly entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consumption or have been released under the provisions of section 448(b) of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. 1448(b)), or

(b) have been entered or withdrawn pursuant to paragraph (2) hereof.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this sixteenth day of November in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and seventy-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-ninth.

Gerald R. Ford

¹ No. 4335; 39 Fed. Reg. 40741, Nov. 20, 1974.

Department Reviews Main Elements of the Strategy To Resolve the Oil Crisis

*Statement by Thomas O. Enders
Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs¹*

The proposal made by Secretaries Kissinger and Simon [Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon] for a \$25 billion facility to back up capital markets over the next two years is part of a larger strategy to resolve the oil crisis. In this statement I propose to review the main elements of that strategy, situating the proposed financing facility in relation to them.

The starting point for analysis is the belief that unless the consumers take action to limit their dependence on oil imports, OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] probably has the will and the capability to maintain the real price of the oil they export and the financial surplus they are earning at roughly constant levels over the next several years, and possibly indefinitely.

OPEC is earning a total income of perhaps \$110 billion at the current annual rate, of which they spend for imports a little less than one-half. OPEC's import expenditures will of course rise in the future, in part because of inflation in the cost of manufactured goods they buy (but note that the current rate is only about 7 percent), in part because the new affluence and the new ambition of the producing countries will increase their spending.

But OPEC's total income will also rise. To

oil will be added a rapidly growing investment income. The volume of oil imports into the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries will increase as industrial growth resumes, perhaps at a rate of 4 or 5 percent a year.

New oil may be found at a more rapid rate, in Mexico, Peru, Malaysia, China. But with even the poor countries such as Indonesia and Nigeria disposing of unprecedented liquid assets, the cartel may retain for years the capacity to cut back production to sustain and increase prices.

Since total OPEC income has only to grow at a little more than one-half the annual rate of total OPEC spending to protect the financial surplus at the \$60 billion level, we must expect that in the absence of new action by the consumers the surplus will be sustained indefinitely. OECD estimates that if real prices for oil are constant, only in 1980 will the net surplus fall to \$50 billion a year, by which time OPEC will have accumulated assets of \$425 billion. Any increase in the real price of oil would be additional.

Hopeful arguments have been advanced to convince us that this will not happen.

Some say that OPEC members will see the damage an annual accumulation of this magnitude will cause to the industrial economies and let the real price of oil erode through inflation. There is no question that this would be a prudent course for the producers to adopt in their own interest. But we cannot count on them to do so. Because of ideology

¹ Made before the Joint Economic Committee of the Congress on Nov. 29. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

(monopoly action to raise commodity prices is a main plank of the "New Economic Order"), because of real or imagined scores to settle for past exploitation, because of the power and authority the new money gives, OPEC members are unlikely to let real prices erode if they can help it. Even if individual countries may wish to move prices downward, they are unlikely to be able to do so alone. For as a matter of practical politics, no country will be able to explain to its public why it gets less for its oil than do other OPEC members. Nor would it be a full solution simply to let prices erode by inflation; for sinking real prices would stimulate consumption again, thus slowing the absorption of the surplus. Thus, if the real price of oil were allowed to erode by one-third by the end of 1980, the cumulative OPEC surplus might fall only from \$425 to about \$375 billion.

Others say that OPEC will tire of accumulating surpluses and will cut back production, keeping oil in the ground as an investment rather than claims on the industrial economies. It is possible that this will happen. But if it does, the surplus will, if anything, grow; for as oil becomes scarcer, the price it commands will go up.

The important point is not to be able to make a precise forecast. There are too many variables for that. What matters is that there is a wide range of probable situations in which the OPEC financial surplus continues essentially intact for an indefinite period or falls only slowly.

What does that mean? It means that unless they act, the industrial democracies face an inexorably rising danger of financial collapse or depression, or both, over the next decade. As oil debts pile up in the industrial countries, first the weaker, then the stronger, will find their credit unacceptable and will try to balance their external accounts by restrictions on trade and on the level of economic activity. But one country's success in balancing its external accounts only will make the problem more urgent for others. For whether the industrial world runs its economies at a high level of activity or at a low level, the deficit to the oil producers will remain massive. Unless we are all willing to

take 20 percent unemployment, there is no way that deflation or restrictions can solve the problem.

But there is more. It is impossible that Europe, Japan, and America could undergo a decade of threatening financial collapse and low or no economic growth without the most shattering social and political upheavals. Already this year we have seen how inflation and no growth is embittering the political life of all the great democracies, undercutting the authority of leaders, setting class against class. And this is only the first year. It is no accident that the Soviet Union and China, securely self-sufficient in energy, with a sustained growth rate, have begun to analyze and exploit a great new crisis in capitalism.

Possible Effect of New Production on Prices

Apart from the United States and Britain, none of the major oil importers have the possibility of becoming self-sufficient within a decade, and self-sufficiency in energy cannot be the goal of the industrial economy as a whole for the foreseeable future.

But invulnerability to cartel action to raise prices is both a possible and a necessary goal.

At present, the consuming countries import approximately 30 million barrels of oil a day, mostly from OPEC sources. But current prices of about \$10 a barrel f.o.b. gulf are very attractive, and a worldwide oil boom is underway. Substantial finds of oil have been reported from Mexico, Peru, China, Malaysia; and the wave of exploration is just beginning. The owners of this new oil will understandably want to sell it at the going price, but they will also want to develop it sufficiently so that they can receive a substantial income. Together they may already represent the possibility of new production several years from now of 10 million barrels a day. And more will follow.

The impact of this prospective new production on price depends on the development of the market as a whole. OPEC members have shown that they are willing to cut back output to sustain price; Arab producers are currently working at less than three-quarters

capacity. With the enormous assets all producers are receiving, there is no doubt a margin for further cuts, even in the poorest countries. Thus, if the overall market were to increase from 30 to 40 million barrels a day over the decade, it might be possible for OPEC to accommodate the new producers and still sustain the price.

But if the market did not grow at all, the burden of adjustment on existing OPEC members would be more than they could adjust to. States now launching ambitious development programs would find that by the end of the decade they were receiving only about half the expected revenues. Negotiation of the required cutbacks in production would become more and more difficult. First, clandestine, then open, violations of production quotas would occur. Ultimately all efforts to sustain the artificial price would be abandoned.

There is no way we can know now the precise size of market at which OPEC efforts to rig prices become inviable in the face of new production. But it would clearly be wrong to start down this road with a goal that might turn out to be inadequate. To be sure they make this and any future oil cartel inviable, the goal of the consumers must be to hold their collective imports steady over the next 10 years.

Limiting Dependence on Imported Oil

This is a demanding goal, but we now believe from the analysis in our own Project Independence report, and from the OECD's long-term energy assessment, that it can be attained.

Our Project Independence report shows that we have many options for achieving substantial self-sufficiency by 1985.

On the supply side, policies to lease the Atlantic outer continental shelf, reopen the Pacific outer continental shelf, and tap the naval petroleum reserves can significantly increase domestic oil production. The Federal Energy Administration estimates potential increases at from 4 to 8 million barrels a day, depending on the level of price.

On the demand side, energy conservation

actions can significantly reduce the rate of growth of energy utilization by 1985. Standards for more efficient new autos, incentives to reduce miles traveled, incentives for improved thermal efficiency in existing homes and offices, and minimal thermal standards for new homes and offices could all contribute. Petroleum demand could be decreased by up to 2 million barrels a day, and electricity consumption would also fall.

Also on the demand side, further savings of limited oil and gas supplies can be achieved by policies that require switching from oil and natural gas to coal or coal-fired electric power. Up to 2½ million barrels a day of oil and 2½ trillion cubic feet of natural gas might be saved by this method, although environmental restrictions and capital costs are significant constraints.

On November 14 Secretary Kissinger announced the goal of reducing U.S. oil imports from over 6 million barrels a day to 1 million barrels a day in 1985. The administration is now working to develop Project Independence policy options for decision by the President. The President expects to submit his proposals to Congress in January.

The options open to Europe and Japan to limit their dependence on imported oil are less far-reaching, but they are by no means negligible. The OECD long-term energy assessment suggests that—with proper price policies—acceleration of North Sea oil and gas, the stabilization of coal production, and a major development of nuclear power could reduce European dependence on imported energy from the present two-thirds to about 40 percent. In Japan, a program of long-term conservation combined with the expected development of nuclear power could reduce dependence from 90 to about 80 percent.

If the United States goes to substantial self-sufficiency and Europe and Japan reduce their dependence in the manner indicated above, the level of oil imports by industrial countries will be no greater in 1985 than now.

Many policy instruments are available to achieve these goals. On the demand side, this choice ranges from voluntary programs of restraint, mandatory fuel switching, price de-

control, taxation, and various kinds of allocation. On the supply side, energy investments will come in at various levels of return and risk, and countries will have to be sure that there are adequate incentives to yield the level of output desired. Policy instruments available for this purpose include tax incentives, long-term contracts, deficiency payments, or subsidies for given projects and tariffs or other import protection.

All of our studies show that both demand and output are quite responsive to effective internal prices. Our Project Independence report indicates that the United States has many options for achieving substantial self-sufficiency at prices lower than world prices today but higher than internal prices in the past, with both demand restraint and new supplies playing an important role.

We must, however, distinguish between effective price levels insofar as they affect consumers and investors, and the means by which they are achieved. Such instruments as price decontrol, taxes, and tariffs all have different income and policy impacts, but they can be used to achieve the same effective price to the consumer. On the investment side some instruments, such as purchase agreements and project subsidies, would affect only new investment. Others, such as tariffs and tax incentives, could affect all investment. Each has different income and policy implications.

Each country will adopt the policy instruments best suited to its own energy and fiscal structure. However there are three potentially important areas for common action:

One is to adopt clear targets for the level of dependence each country wishes to achieve over the decade and national conservation and supply policies to achieve them. These targets and policies should then be examined and monitored together.

Second, it may be useful for the consuming countries to agree on the minimum level (although not the policy instruments), at which they will support new investment. This would back up the dependence targets by creating stable investment expectations throughout

the consuming countries; it would work to insure an equivalence of effort.

Third, the consumers can magnify their several investment efforts by entering joint research and development projects in energy and by creating a common fund to guarantee or finance energy projects in consuming countries.

Proposed Immediate Measures by Consumers

But these fundamental actions on supply and demand will take years to give results. How can we bring down our jeopardy to manageable proportions between now and then? Four things are needed.

One is an oil safety net, to make sure that we can act in concert, on the basis of equitable sharing, to counter any new embargo directed against all or any of the consuming countries. This protection is already in place. In Paris last week, 16 countries formally adhered to the International Energy Program (IEP), committing themselves to a far-reaching program of preparedness for, and solidarity in, a new embargo. The IEP creates a situation in which a restrictive act directed against any member becomes an act against all. It is the indispensable basis for all future cooperation among the consumers. Implementing legislation for this program will be submitted to Congress shortly for its consideration.

The second is an immediate effort by consuming countries to conserve oil, the only way open to them to lessen the financial drain in the short term. Even now, after the embargo and price increases, our studies show that there remains a significant margin for further savings of oil in both industry and personal consumption that can be realized without jeopardizing output or jobs. Worldwide, that margin is probably at least 3 million barrels a day. President Ford announced a savings program of 1 million barrels a day in October. We are monitoring its execution carefully in order to reinforce it if needed; and we are prepared to consider increasing the program to match others

in attaining the collective target of 3 million barrels.

The third action, within the IMF [International Monetary Fund] framework, is to make sure the financing needs of the developing countries can be met while waiting for the price of oil to come down. It would be very wrong to force the developing countries to abandon their growth programs and goals. We estimate at \$1.5-\$2 billion the gap in 1975 for which no financing has yet been found. Concessional terms will be needed. Secretaries Kissinger and Simon proposed that a new fund be established for this purpose, managed by the IMF and financed by oil producers, other contributions, and perhaps by profits from sales of IMF gold.

The final requirement is for a financial safety net. This is needed to make sure that no country is forced to take unwarranted restrictive trade or economic policy measures as a result of the maldistribution or instability of reflows of oil dollars and of the growing burden of oil debts.

So far private capital markets have performed well in receiving and redistributing the enormous flow of oil dollars. We believe there is substantial further room for expansion of the flows handled by private markets, but we cannot be sure of how great that expansive capacity is. Already there are some indications of approaching constraints. In banking, for example, there have been no significant additions to capital since the start of the oil crisis. Yet the total assets and liabilities built upon a given capital structure have increased greatly. At some point it will not be prudent for the banks to expand further without substantial new additions to capital, which will be difficult and costly to raise in current market conditions.

Thus, rather than test the limits of our present system, Secretaries Kissinger and Simon proposed creation of a new large-scale intergovernmental financing facility. This facility would be:

—Designed to back up, not substitute for, the workings of private capital markets.

—Temporary, intended to enable the con-

suming countries to pursue sound economic and trade policies while waiting for basic energy policy decisions to take effect.

—Not an aid fund, but rather a facility lending at commercial terms on the basis of established criteria for appropriate economic and energy policies pursued by the borrower.

—Structured so as to distribute risk equitably among the consuming countries.

—Subject to approval by Congress.

Each of the four proposed interim actions is important in itself; equally significant, both analytically and politically, is their linkage to each other and to the energy dependence targets and program. No country, certainly not the United States, will want to help another financially unless that other country is helping itself by conserving oil and joining a long-term effort to lessen dependence. And we must adopt a clear strategy to bring the price of oil down, and back up that strategy with the appropriate policy decisions, in order to be sure that the loans under the proposed facility will be repaid.

Need for Concerted Consumer Action

It has often been suggested that we can talk or pressure the oil producers into accepting a reduction in price.

Neither approach, in our judgment, is likely to lead to more than tardy or partial results. And there would be significant costs to adopting them: the false security our people would feel that we were solving the energy crisis when in reality we were only temporizing, or the damage to the structure of international security that might result.

Instead what Secretary Kissinger has proposed is a program of action designed to change conditions within the consuming countries themselves. Its purpose is not to create a position of force which can then be imposed upon the producers but, rather, to create conditions in which a new long-term equilibrium between oil producers and consumers can be achieved. That equilibrium must be such that the producers receive an appropriate price for their products while the

consumers can be free of the threat of embargo and of artificial action to raise prices.

Achievement of this result depends critically on the solidarity of the consuming countries. Since the start of the energy crisis there has been for each country the temptation to go it alone, try to work a special deal with the producers, or hope that the actions of others will end the crisis. In different ways each of us is uncomfortable with having his future depend so totally on others. But analysis of each country's position shows that going it alone is not a superior option for any consumer. Over the decade only the United States and Britain can go to self-sufficiency; all others will remain dependent on imported oil. All industrial countries, especially those heavily involved in trade, will be vulnerable to financial crisis. And if the United States and Britain can eventually solve the price and financial transfer problems by going self-sufficient, the only way Europe and Japan can is by cooperating with each other and with us. And in the meantime, no country, including the United States, can solve the price problem alone.

The crisis gives us no alternative to concerted consumer action. We believe that financial solidarity is an essential part.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

Western Investment in Communist Economies. A Selected Survey on Economic Interdependence. Prepared for the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. August 5, 1974. 83 pp.

Department of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1975. Report to accompany H.R. 15404. S. Rept. 93-1110. August 20, 1974. 53 pp.

Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Act. Report to accompany S. 1134. S. Rept. 93-1116. August 21, 1974. 68 pp.

Passport Application Fees. Report to accompany H.R. 15172. S. Rept. 93-1124. 5 pp.

Report on Nutrition and the International Situation. Prepared by the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs. September 1974. 57 pp.

THE UNITED NATIONS

U.N. Rejects Move To Change Representation of Cambodia

Following is a statement made in the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative John Scali on November 27, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly in votes on November 27 and November 29.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

USUN press release 184 dated November 27

The issue presented to this Assembly by the two resolutions before us is in essence very simple. One resolution proposes negotiations without preconditions for a peaceful settlement of the tragic conflict in Cambodia. The other demands a one-sided solution and offers only the prospect of continued war and more suffering by the Cambodian people. Which of these alternatives is consistent with the purposes for which this organization was founded? Which of these paths does our charter stake out as the road to justice and accepted international law?

One resolution¹ would have the Assembly itself decide for the Khmer people that Cambodia is to be represented not by its present government, but by an exile regime located over 2,000 miles from Phnom Penh. It should come as no surprise that the only nation located anywhere near Cambodia which sponsors this resolution is the country in whose capital this exiled regime happens to be located.

The other resolution² is sponsored by 23 nations, five of whom are among Cambodia's closest neighbors. They advocate a basic principle spelled out in this resolution by these opening lines: that the Khmer people

¹ U.N. doc. A/L.733.

² U.N. doc. A/L.737.

have a right themselves to solve their problems peacefully, free from outside interference. This resolution, unlike the other, does not call on the United Nations or anyone else to prejudge the decision of the Cambodian people. Instead, it proposes that the United Nations contribute positively to settlement in Cambodia by calling on the parties themselves to begin negotiations. Further, it asks the Secretary General to lend appropriate assistance, as he has done so effectively in the past.

Finally, the resolution sponsored by Cambodia's neighbors calls on all U.N. member states to respect the outcome of these peaceful discussions between the Cambodian parties, as my government is prepared to do. The United States supports efforts toward an honest compromise solution in Cambodia.

I must, however, reply to some speakers who again, in discussing this item, have spread harsh and ugly charges against the United States. I reject these charges. They are false. If their accusations were true—that a brutal military dictatorship has been foisted on the Cambodian people—why is it that the Cambodian Government continues to operate effectively and that the Cambodian people continue to fight heroically and with increasing success against the invaders, all of this long after the United States has ended all air support and sharply reduced its military assistance? Could it be because the Cambodian people are fighting for their independence against foreign troops on their soil?

Attempts by some speakers to present their special version of Cambodian history, in our view, are an effort to divert this Assembly from the real questions—namely, which are the only foreign forces intervening in Cambodia today, and which action by this Assembly seeks to deprive the Cambodian people of their right to self-determination?

For those who are unaware of, or who forget, Cambodia's real history, it may be useful to recall:

—That Prince Sihanouk was not removed by a palace coup;

—That the Government of Cambodia

which dismissed Prince Sihanouk in 1970 had been formed by Sihanouk himself less than a year before;

—That the Khmer National Assembly which ratified the decision and voted unanimously to depose Sihanouk was composed of members whom Sihanouk had personally selected and supported for election;

—That all during that period while Cambodians fought for their continued independence the total American Government presence in Phnom Penh consisted of two diplomatic officers and three military attaches; and

—That negotiations between the Khmer Government and North Viet-Nam were broken off unilaterally by North Viet-Nam on March 25, 1970. Four days later North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces attacked Khmer police and military posts. The present hostilities in Cambodia date from those attacks.

The United States is proud of the role it has played in helping the Khmer Government and people to stave off the continuing military attacks by insurgents and foreign military forces. We have also, however, stressed the need to initiate negotiations to end this conflict and to bring reconciliation, harmony, and self-determination to all of Cambodia. The United States is quite prepared to see Cambodia ruled by whatever government the Cambodian people may freely decide upon.

On August 12 President Ford told our Congress that the United States hopes to see an early compromise settlement in Cambodia. It is not the United States, but others, who have refused to leave Cambodia to the Cambodians.

Certainly the Government of the Khmer Republic has not put any obstacle in the way of a negotiated settlement. On July 9, 1974, that government offered to enter into negotiations without conditions at any time, with any representatives of the other Cambodian party, in order to bring the conflict to an end.

We have heard from some speakers a claim that the opposition forces in Cambodia control 90 percent of that country's territory and 80 percent of its people. If this is true,

then why, we must wonder, has the opposition no capital, no government, no machinery, no parliament—in fact, none of the normal attributes of a government? Why, indeed, has their nominal chief of state taken refuge in a foreign capital? Why does he not go home to receive the acclaim of the people, who, we are told, are eagerly awaiting his return? This seems to me a reasonable and fundamental question.

Reviewing the record I find, surprisingly, that these same speakers one year ago made identical claims in the debate in this hall. One year ago they claimed their proteges controlled 90 percent of the territory and 80 percent of the population. One would have expected that a year of alleged new victories would have been reflected in more impressive statistics this year. Why not claim 98 percent of the territory and 95 percent of the people this year? Indeed, why not ignore the hard reality of the existence of the Government of Cambodia altogether and claim 100 percent?

The fact is that despite the best efforts of a foreign inspired and assisted insurgency, and of the North Vietnamese Army, the Khmer Government has never ceased to maintain control over the vast majority of Cambodia's people and over the territory in which they live. North Vietnamese troops and their Cambodian supporters do indeed range through many areas of north and east Cambodia, but Sihanouk's supporters have neglected to explain to us that those areas of the country are very sparsely populated. The truth is that Prince Sihanouk does not return to lead his people because he has no safe haven in Cambodia, no real government or real following to return to.

I would like to ask why should this Assembly be asked to choose between two rival claimants to Cambodia's seat in the United Nations, one of which happens to be located outside the country? It is our view the United Nations has no business deciding which is the legitimate government of any member state.

I urge all members of this Assembly to consider carefully the views so eloquently set forth during this debate by the Asian

neighbors of the Khmer Republic. Surely the vast majority of U.N. members must share their desire to see peace in their part of the world by allowing Cambodia to determine its own destiny. Surely we will heed their warning about the dangers of continued conflict and join in their call for a negotiated settlement to the present hostilities. This is a decision which deeply involves their own security and their own future. We who live elsewhere, particularly those far away, have a responsibility to respect their views if we are to expect equal consideration in connection with problems in our areas.

The U.S. Government believes that the United Nations has a fundamental obligation to support the process of negotiation as the best means of resolving disputes and settling conflicts, wherever and whenever they arise. We are convinced that such a process serves the real interests of all parties to a dispute, in Cambodia as elsewhere. A negotiated settlement in Cambodia is overdue. This process should begin now.

Surely no one of us can really wish to prolong the agony of that country or its people. Surely we can all agree that it is time for the fighting to stop, for negotiations to begin, for compromises to be reached, and for compatriots to be reconciled.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ³

Restoration of the lawful rights of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia in the United Nations

The General Assembly,

Recalling the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

³ U.N. doc. A/RES/3238 (XXIX) and Corr. 1. On Nov. 27 the Assembly adopted by a vote of 56 (U.S.) to 54, with 24 abstentions, draft resolution A/L.737/Rev. 1 as revised, with the exception of the fifth preambular paragraph, a separate vote on that paragraph having resulted in a tie vote of 51-51, with 31 abstentions; on Nov. 29 the Assembly, by a vote of 102 (U.S.) to 0, with 32 abstentions, rejected the paragraph, which reads, "Considering that the lawful rights of the two Governments are only valid if it is determined that these rights emanate from the sovereign people of Cambodia as a whole,". Priority having been given to draft resolution A/L.737/Rev. 1, draft resolution A/L.733 was not pressed to a vote.

Recognizing that the situation in Cambodia is of concern to all Member States and especially to the countries situated close to the area,

Taking into account that, while the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia, presided over by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, exercises authority over a segment of Cambodia, the Government of the Khmer Republic still has control over a preponderant number of Cambodian people,

Believing that the Cambodian people themselves should be allowed to solve their own political problems peacefully, free from outside interference,

Believing also that such political settlement should be reached by the indigenous parties concerned, without external influence,

1. *Calls upon* all the Powers which have been influencing the two parties to the conflict to use their good offices for conciliation between these two parties with a view to restoring peace in Cambodia;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General, after due consultation, to lend appropriate assistance to the two contending parties claiming lawful rights in Cambodia and to report on the results to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session;

3. *Decides* not to press for any further action until Member States have an opportunity to examine the report of the Secretary-General.

U.S. Calls for Strengthening U.N. Disaster Relief Office

Following is a statement made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Joseph M. Segel on October 30, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the committee on November 6 and by the Assembly on November 29.

STATEMENT BY MR. SEGEL

USUN press release 153 dated October 30

I have listened with both interest and deep concern to Ambassador Berkol's [Faruk N. Berkol, of Turkey, U.N. Disaster Relief Coordinator] explanation of the limitations and needs of his Office in attempting to perform the duties assigned to it by the General Assembly. I commend him for his efforts and dedication in this cause.

Mr. Chairman, the subject we are dealing

with today is one that potentially affects hundreds of millions of people—it is a matter to which we all should devote the most earnest attention.

During the last 10 years alone, my government's records indicate that there have been 430 natural disasters around the world resulting in 3.5 million deaths, 400 million victims, and damage estimated at \$11 billion.

During this period, donor nations and organizations provided \$2.8 billion in emergency relief and rehabilitation—an immense effort involving monumental problems of coordination for which adequate machinery does not exist. One can only ask how much human suffering might have been alleviated if world disaster relief had been better organized.

As a further illustration of the problem we face, five weeks ago the U.S. Government, along with other governments, was providing assistance simultaneously to the victims of eight foreign disasters. On another occasion, we were trying to cope simultaneously with the needs of victims of 27 disasters.

Who in the General Assembly was really aware of the enormity of this problem when in 1971 it created the U.N. Disaster Relief Office and assigned to UNDRO a broad array of disaster relief and preparedness responsibilities, while giving it such limited resources? We now recognize, as does UNDRO itself, that its limited resources and staff have been a major constraint in the performance of the duties assigned by the General Assembly, particularly the much-needed function of donor coordination.

As matters now stand, donor governments must "fly blind" during much of a disaster emergency. They have to make action decisions with no assurance that their aid may not be duplicating help being sent by another government. By the same token, assumptions that other donors may be providing certain aid may be in error, with the result that serious omission may occur. And sometimes the particular equipment and goods sent are just not what is really needed.

For these reasons, Mr. Chairman, Secretary of State Kissinger called for strengthening UNDRO when he spoke to the Gen-

eral Assembly on September 23, 1974. What Secretary Kissinger had in mind was that the new infusion of strength should be focused on developing UNDRO's capability to coordinate—to serve as a worldwide clearing-house in collecting and disseminating timely information on disaster assessment, priority needs, donor offerings, storage and transportation availabilities. In the judgment of disaster experts, such a service would be of inestimable value to countries that suffer disasters and to donor countries as well. UNDRO is in a unique position to perform this essential role, coordinating assistance to disaster-stricken countries from governments, intergovernmental organizations, and private organizations.

We propose therefore that this Assembly authorize the Secretary General to undertake a management study, on a priority basis, which we believe can be completed within a month, to determine exactly what needs to be done to enable UNDRO to efficiently and effectively perform the function of mobilizing and coordinating disaster relief along the lines described. We further propose that the Secretary General be authorized to promptly implement the action plan that should result from this study, and that sufficient financial resources be contributed on a voluntary basis for this express purpose. We believe this can and should be done without prejudice to the continuation and possible improvement of UNDRO's activities in related areas, such as disaster prevention, predisaster planning, and training, which deserve separate consideration.

Hence, while concurring in the general thinking behind ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council] Resolution 1891, we propose at this time a more concentrated capability focused specifically on coordination. This would include, as necessary, probable increases in staff, communications equipment, and related services for a disaster information center and adequate funds for travel—especially for immediate on-the-spot assessment—and for other operating expenses. The precise needs, of course, would evolve from the aforementioned management study.

We specifically propose that the required

funding for the first three years be met from voluntary contributions, with the method of onward financing subject to review. The U.S. Government is prepared to make a voluntary contribution of up to \$750,000 to cover substantially all of the first year's cost; that is, for 1975. We would then expect to contribute our usual fair share of the voluntary contributions required to meet the costs for the succeeding biennium, and we hope others would contribute the balance required. Our offer is contingent, of course, on the development of a practical plan and budget and on the premise that the voluntary contributions resulting from this resolution would be devoted exclusively to creating the clearing-house and coordinating capability that is so desperately needed.

At the present time, Mr. Chairman, we are in the process of consulting with other delegations on this proposal, and we have a preliminary draft resolution for their study. We are trying to reach as many as possible, and we would be happy to give copies to any others who may be interested. After these consultations we expect to be in a position to propose a formal resolution for which we earnestly hope there will be wide support.¹

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ²

Strengthening of the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2816 (XXVI) of 14 December 1971 by which it created the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator and established its primary functions of co-ordinating disaster relief, especially through its role as an information clearing-house, and of assisting in disaster prevention and preparedness,

Endorsing Economic and Social Council resolution 1891 (LVII) of 31 July 1974, in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to investigate the feasibility of measures to strengthen the disaster prevention, pre-disaster planning and co-ordinating

¹ On Nov. 4 the United States introduced draft resolution A/C.2/L.1364; the resolution, as orally revised, was adopted by the committee on Nov. 6 without a vote.

² U.N. doc. A/RES/3243 (XXIX); adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 29 without a vote.

roles of the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator and to submit his findings to the Council at its fifty-ninth session, and in which the Council recommended that the General Assembly, at its twenty-ninth session, should reconsider the proposals of the Secretary-General for additional staff resources,

Taking note with appreciation of the report of the Secretary-General on assistance in cases of natural disaster and other disaster situations,³ and of the statement made to the Second Committee by the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator on the activities of his Office,

Noting in particular the statements in the Secretary-General's report that, while some progress has been made in the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator in establishing its assigned function of mobilizing and co-ordinating relief, the lack of staff and facilities, combined with the frequency, duration and simultaneity of disaster situations, has seriously impaired the effectiveness of the Office in discharging these and other responsibilities,

Concerned that lack of adequate co-ordination on a world-wide basis results, in some cases, in lapses in meeting priority needs and, in others, in costly duplication and in the supply of unneeded assistance,

Convinced that the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator is in a unique position, given adequate staff and facilities, to provide a world-wide system of mobilizing and co-ordinating disaster relief, including the collection and dissemination of information on disaster assessment, priority needs and donor assistance,

Convinced further that this capability should be strengthened, as a matter of priority and urgency and without prejudice to the disaster prevention and disaster preparedness roles assigned to the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator,

Convinced that disaster prevention and pre-disaster planning should form an integral part of the international development policy of Governments and of international organizations,

1. *Calls upon* the Secretary-General to provide sufficient staff, equipment and facilities to strengthen the capacity of the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator to provide an efficient and effective world-wide service of mobilizing and co-ordinating disaster relief, including particularly the collection and dissemination of information on disaster assessment, priority needs and donor assistance;

2. *Decides* that the additional costs of providing this strengthened capability should be met by voluntary contributions during the first year, commencing as soon as possible, and during the biennium 1976-1977, at which time the method of financing for succeeding periods shall be subject to review in the light of experience, with the understanding that the additional resources made available under the terms

of the present resolution should be concentrated on strengthening the co-ordinating capability of the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator, but without prejudice to any improvements that can be made in the roles of that Office in disaster prevention and in pre-disaster planning within the resources otherwise available to it;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take appropriate measures, drawing upon the aforementioned voluntary funds, to prepare a plan and budget for this increased capability, and to proceed with its immediate implementation;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, as called for in Economic and Social Council resolution 1891 (LVII), to continue to investigate the feasibility of measures to strengthen the United Nations machinery with regard to disaster prevention and pre-disaster planning;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the present resolution to the Economic and Social Council at its fifty-ninth session and to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170, 7616). Done at Vienna July 7, 1971.

Ratifications deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, October 22, 1974; Uganda, December 19, 1974.

Entered into force: December 19, 1974.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of opium and other drugs. Done at The Hague January 23, 1912. Entered into force February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912.

Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4, 1974.

Protocol amending the agreements, conventions, and protocols on narcotic drugs concluded at The Hague on January 23, 1912 (38 Stat. 1912), at Geneva on February 11, 1925, and February 19, 1925, and July 13, 1931 (48 Stat. 1543), at Bangkok on November 27, 1931, and at Geneva on June 26, 1936. Done at Lake Success, N.Y., December 11, 1946. TIAS 1671, 1859.

Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4, 1974.

³ U.N. doc. A/9637. [Footnote in original.]

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.

Notification of succession: Lesotho, November 4, 1974.

Safety at Sea

Amendments to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 26, 1968.¹

Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, December 2, 1974.²

Amendments to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London October 21, 1969.¹

Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, December 2, 1974.^{2,3}

Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions.

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, December 19, 1974.²

BILATERAL

Czechoslovakia

Consular convention, with agreed memorandum and related notes. Signed at Prague July 9, 1973.¹

Ratified by the President: December 16, 1974.

Jordan

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Amman November 27, 1974. Entered into force November 27, 1974.

Norway

Agreement amending annex C of the mutual defense assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 2016). Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo November 19 and 27, 1974. Entered into force November 27, 1974.

Panama

Agreement concerning payment to the United States of net proceeds from the sale of defense articles furnished under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama May 20 and December 6, 1974. Entered into force December 6, 1974; effective July 1, 1974.

¹ Not in force.

² Applicable to Berlin (West).

³ With a declaration.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$23.10; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 30¢ each.

Sierra Leone	Cat. No. S1.123:SI1	Pub. 8069	8 pp.
Uganda	Cat. No. S1.123:UG1	Pub. 7958	5 pp.
Venezuela	Cat. No. S1.123:V55	Pub. 7749	7 pp.
Western Samoa	Cat. No. S1.123:W52S	Pub. 8345	4 pp.
Zambia	Cat. No. S1.123:Z1	Pub. 7841	8 pp.

Aviation—Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigation Services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands and in Iceland. Agreements amending the agreements done at Geneva September 25, 1956, as amended. TIAS 7851. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7851).

Atomic Energy—Cooperation in Peaceful Application. Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency amending and extending the agreement of May 11, 1959. TIAS 7852. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7852).

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with Sweden amending the agreement of July 28, 1966, as amended. TIAS 7854. 10 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7854).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 7855. 16 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7855).

Extradition. Treaty with Denmark. TIAS 7864. 32 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7864).

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**Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: December 23-29**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to December 23 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 533 of December 16.

No.	Date	Subject
†541	12/23	"Foreign Relations," volume VI, the Far East and Australasia; 1948 (for release Dec. 30).
*542	12/23	Kissinger: news conference, United Nations, Dec. 21.
†543	12/23	TWA-Swissair airline capacity agreement.
*544	12/26	Carlucci sworn in as Ambassador to Portugal (biographic data).
*545	12/26	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Maritime Law, Jan. 24.
*545A	12/25	Scotes sworn in as Ambassador to the Yemen Arab Republic (biographic data).
*546	12/26	Study group 6 of the U.S. National Committee for the CC-IR.
†547	12/26	U.S.-Romanian cultural and scientific agreement.

* Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.