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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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SECRETARY KISSINGER HOLDS NEWS CONFERENCE
AT BRUSSELS 1

U.S. ABSTAINS ON PROPOSED OAS RESOLUTION
TO RESCIND THE SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA 8

THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM:
ADJUSTING TO PRESENT-DAY REALITIES
Address by Ambassador William S. Mailliard 19

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

For index see inside back cover

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Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference at Brussels

Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger at Brussels on December 13 at the conclusion of the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

Press release 530 dated December 13

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, let me simply say that I thought this was a most useful, very amicable meeting. The new format of restricted sessions makes for a better dialogue and less formal statements. I recognize it also makes for more erratic briefings, since not all delegations interpret the restrictions in a similar manner; and we will sort that out by the next NATO meeting. So, for those of you who have suffered from an excessive scrupulousness by our spokesman, my apologies.

Let me take your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a lot of confusion on this side of the Atlantic about a very important matter which bears on what you discussed here, which is—exactly what is the American policy now with regard to the price of oil? I refer, of course, to the reports on the Enders [Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs] statement at Yale?

Secretary Kissinger: My colleague Enders makes so many statements that when you say "at Yale" you imply that this is a very clearly circumscribed event. The American policy on the price of oil is that we believe that the present oil prices are too high and that, for the sake of the stability and progress of the world economy, it should be reduced and that this is also in the long-term interest of the producers.

In the absence of these price reductions, it is our policy that the consuming nations

should improve their cooperation in order to withstand the impact of these high prices and also to provide incentives for an ultimate reduction of prices. One of these efforts to mitigate the impact of high oil prices is to develop alternative sources of energy, and there have been some studies on whether an incentive should be created for these alternative sources of energy by creating a floor price so that if the price of oil sinks below that of the alternative sources of energy, there won't be massive economic dislocation. But at this point, this is a subject of study and consideration. It is not a governmental decision, and as I said, I think my colleague Enders was speaking in an academic environment academically.

Q. Concerning the energy problem, Mr. Secretary, do you think that there is any contradiction between the way the United States wants to start cooperation and the French way; and after your meeting with Mr. Sauvagnargues [Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic], do you think that agreement can be reached on the problem between both President Ford and Giscard d'Estaing in Martinique?

Secretary Kissinger: We are approaching the meeting in Martinique with the attitude of intending to find a solution to the differences that may exist. In principle, we do not believe that there is a contradiction; in fact, we believe that consumer cooperation is the prerequisite to producer dialogue, because otherwise the consumer-producer dialogue is going to turn into a repetition on multi-lateral basis of the bilateral dialogues that are already going on.

So we believe that solution is possible and that the two approaches, which are not contradictory, can be reconciled; and I would

like to point out that at the Washington Energy Conference last year [February 1974] the United States proposed that consumer cooperation should be followed by consumer-producer dialogue. In short, we are going to Martinique with the attitude that a solution is possible in the common interest of all of the consumers and, ultimately, in the common interest of both consumers and producers.

Q. I would like to know [after] the Atlantic Council, if you [feel] that there are yet major differences to overcome in the oil strategy, and second, if you are concerned about the present status of the alliance in the Mediterranean and if you ask of your allies an extra effort in this area?

Secretary Kissinger: On oil strategy, I think there is agreement—or I had the impression that there is agreement—about the sequence of moves that should be undertaken. Whether the definition of what constitutes consumer cooperation is as yet homogeneous, I am not sure; but we will try to work that out in Martinique. We certainly do not believe that the consumers should exhaust their energy in disputes among themselves. We are going to Martinique with a positive attitude and with the intention of finding a solution to the problem of the sequence, which I think will be relatively easy, and the definition of consumer cooperation, which we believe to be possible.

With respect to the Mediterranean, this is of course an area of concern. It was discussed in the NATO Council, and I do not think that there were significant differences of opinion.

Q. We heard that in the ministerial meeting you mentioned to your colleagues that you are pessimistic regarding a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. Is it because of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or is it because of the oil crisis?

Secretary Kissinger: It is totally untrue. I did not express pessimism about the possibility of a peaceful settlement. My sentence structure is so complicated that my colleagues sometimes miss the end of the sentence and

concentrate on the beginning [laughter]. So I would like to make absolutely clear that I am not pessimistic about the possibility of a peaceful settlement. The United States is making a major effort to produce progress toward a peaceful settlement, and I am not at all pessimistic about it. Quite the contrary.

Q. Can you put an end to these rumors that there is an American special army which is training now to occupy Arab oilfields as one of your ways to get—

Secretary Kissinger: There is no American army that is being trained to take over Arab oilfields.

Q. Do you see any hope of further political progress in the Middle East before Brezhnev's visit to Cairo?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States cannot make its actions dependent on the travels of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and therefore we will do our best to make progress as rapidly as possible. As you know, I have had talks with the Foreign Minister of Israel, and I expect to see him again in January, but we are not following a timetable which is dictated by the travels of Mr. Brezhnev nor, may I say, have we been asked by any Arab government to gear our actions to the travels of Mr. Brezhnev.

Q. I understand that the major part of the discussions held here this week dealt with questions of defense. What part of the Council time was devoted to the humanitarian problem of alleviating the suffering of 200,000 Greek Cypriot refugees who are spending the winter in tents?

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, I have spent personally a great deal of time with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, seeing each of them several times each day with the intention of narrowing the differences and finding an acceptable basis for negotiation. I did this because ultimately the alleviation of the suffering of the refugees in Cyprus, with which the U.S. Government is profoundly concerned, can best be achieved through a political solution of the Cyprus

problem. While I do not want to make any comments about these conversations, I am more hopeful than I was before I arrived that progress is possible and may become visible as events unfold.

In addition to this, the U.S. Government is profoundly concerned with the fate of the refugees and will in the interlude between now and a political settlement do its utmost to ease their plight. Moreover, the U.S. Government is prepared to use its influence with the parties to bring about a settlement which is just and equitable.

As far as the NATO meeting itself is concerned, it was thought best not to turn it into a confrontation, and I must say the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey both spoke with restraint and wisdom and in a manner which I think contributed to the hopes for a peaceful solution which we all share, and which may have been brought somewhat closer.

Q. Do you think that your talks with the two Ministers contributed to moderation between the two countries and that after your talks with them that the intercommunal talks in Cyprus will start soon?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that with respect to the intercommunal talks that any announcement with respect to that would have to come from Nicosia. And this is a matter for the two communities to decide and not for the American Secretary of State to determine or to announce. It is my impression that the talks—I don't know whether the talks contributed to an atmosphere of moderation or could build on an existing atmosphere of moderation. As I said, I am more hopeful than I was when I came here that progress can be made.

Q. I am a little puzzled by your expression of hope. A senior American official said earlier that very little could come out of these discussions in view of the American Congress' action to cut off aid to Turkey. Doesn't that still pertain?

Secretary Kissinger: That still pertains to the substance of the talks. The question concerns procedures. I believe that conditions

exist for progress and negotiations. I also believe that the actions of the American Congress, if they are maintained, will impede this progress. I have said so repeatedly.

Q. What are your views on the anxiety of Mr. Brezhnev for the European summit—for the summit of the European Security Conference—and the recent talks in France where France in some way endorsed the European Security Conference summit next year in Helsinki?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States has maintained the position, which it adopted together with its other allies, that the decision on whether there should be a summit should await the determination of the results of the second stage of the conference. This has been the American position and it remains the American position, and it is that if the results justify it we are prepared to go to a summit, and there has been no change in our position. I can't interpret the Franco-Soviet communique because it has been explained to me that there are subtleties in the French language that are untranslatable into English [laughter]. If that is so, it may be that they follow the same principles that I have just announced.

Q. Mr. Secretary, after your conversation with the Greek and Turkish Ministers, you are a little bit encouraged. Do you have the impression that a solution can be achieved if you could, for example, make a trip to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia?

Secretary Kissinger: None of you will ever know whether I understand French or not [laughter], but it is not necessary for my answer [laughter]. I would like to repeat what I said in reply to Mr. Freed [Kenneth J. Freed, Associated Press]. Whether substantive progress can be made depends in part on certain domestic legislative issues that are yet to be resolved in the United States. I would also like to emphasize again what I have said repeatedly—that the United States supports aid for Turkey not in order to take sides in the Greek-Turkish dispute and not as a favor to Turkey, but because it believes it is essential for the security of the

West. Now, if I understood the question correctly—whether it involves travels to Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia—we believe that the major problem is to get the talks started. And once the talks are started with the right attitude, the United States will be prepared to do what the parties request to accelerate them and to help them along. But I think we cannot determine this until the talks have been started. But I hope that progress can be made, and fairly soon.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, you speak French without subtlety. Very simply, it seems that some time ago you were very concerned about the internal Italian political situation. Are you still so concerned?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not believe that I have stated any public views on the interior situation of Italy. It is always complicated and always seems to get solved, and I think that I have so much difficulty conducting foreign policy that I don't want to get involved in the domestic politics of the country that produced Machiavelli [laughter].

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that you were not familiar with the subtleties of the French language, but I heard yesterday that you asked Mr. Sauvagnargues for his interpretation of the paragraph of the Rambouillet communique on the European Security Conference. Mr. Sauvagnargues gave it to you. He said that it had the same meaning as the Vladivostok communique, and you said that you did not agree. Is this true?

Secretary Kissinger: I think as a matter of principle we should not begin the practice of restricted sessions by then discussing what went on in restricted session. If, as I pointed out before, the communique from Rambouillet has the same meaning as the communique in Vladivostok, then, of course, we agree with it [laughter]. If it has a different meaning, then we would obviously have that degree of disagreement with it, since only two weeks before we found another formulation better. But I am willing to accept the French statement that it has exactly the same meaning.

Q. You are the representative of the most powerful and the richest nation in the world. You therefore have an enormous influence to which is added your own well-known personal dynamism. However, a number of countries and people are concerned because your power gives you the appearance of an elephant. When an elephant turns around, he sometimes does damage—even when making a gesture of friendship. What are you doing personally, Mr. Kissinger, to see to it that the elephant retains his goodness but is not too heavy when he leans in a certain direction [laughter]?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that this is a serious question actually, and it is a problem that the United States, because of its scale, can produce consequences with the best of intentions that are out of scale for some of its allies and partners. Now, knowing the problem doesn't necessarily mean that you know how to solve it, and as I pointed out yesterday to some of my colleagues, in the economic field, for example, we are prepared to discuss with our friends our long-term intentions and to hear their views before we make any irrevocable decisions. And the best solution we have is, one, that we should be aware of the problem, and secondly, that we should have intensive consultations with our allies in more fields than has been customary to give them an opportunity to learn our views and to give us an opportunity to learn their concerns. I know the word "consultation" is one of these that produces linguistic difficulties, and we are happy to call it by some other name if it helps matters.

Q. [Can you say what you feel will be the impact of] the economic recession and high oil prices on the NATO military alliance? Either now or in the future?

Secretary Kissinger: Some of these accounts have an even greater sense of the dramatic than the officials'. The basic issue is that in the twenties and thirties the problem of the industrialized countries was depression. Gradually a theory was developed, the

Keynesian theory, which was a means of overcoming depressions, and when it was applied on a sufficiently massive scale, it worked. The problem of the industrialized world since the war has been inflation—and inflation that sometimes continues even during periods of recession. This is an inherent problem of all Western societies for which no adequate theory exists; and therefore now under the impact of high oil prices, of concurrent inflation and potential recession, it is necessary to take decisive action to maintain both the economic stability and progress and the political stability of these countries. This is a well-known fact, and of course if it isn't mastered, political instability will grow, and therefore it is bound to affect defense.

This is a problem with which I believe all my colleagues agreed, and some of whom stated it much more eloquently than I did, and in which I had the impression that all the delegations agreed to work with great seriousness even in the absence of the adequate conception of how to approach it.

Q. Can we go back to the Turkish question? You said before leaving Washington that a cutoff in military aid to Turkey might undermine your talks on the Cyprus question. You have now had three days of talks with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers. Would you now say in fact that it did undermine your conversations?

Secretary Kissinger: I maintain two points which I think it is important to keep in mind. I cannot repeat them often enough.

American aid to Turkey is not given as a favor to Turkey. It is given for the common defense of the West. And when we start stopping aid to affect immediate tactical issues, we will over a period of time undermine the cohesion of the alliance—the security of the West—and create a totally wrong impression of the nature of our military aid. I therefore believe it is one of the most dangerous things that has been done.

Secondly, with respect to the talks—the talks as they have been now have not yet been undermined by it. If the aid is discon-

tinued, however, progress is extremely unlikely. Therefore we have held the talks up to now in the context of a situation in which progress can be made. It is my judgment that this progress will become very difficult if the aid is discontinued.

Let me just make one other point. I'm not saying this in order to back Turkey against Greece. I stated on Saturday in Washington that the United States believes that conciliation on the part of Turkey is very important and that it will support a solution which is fair to all sides, and that was the spirit with which I talked to both Foreign Ministers.

Q. Do you think that after this Ministerial Council meeting NATO will remain more united and coherent?

Secretary Kissinger: I think this meeting was probably the best that I've attended as Secretary of State. Probably because the format of the restricted meeting and the absence of formal speeches and a freer give-and-take permitted a discussion of the more essential issues, and secondly, because I have the impression that the Foreign Ministers of the alliance understand the fundamental issues that confront the West and acted in a cooperative and constructive spirit, and there were no significant divisions.

North Atlantic Ministerial Council Meets at Brussels

Following is the text of a communique issued on December 13 at the conclusion of the regular ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council at Brussels.

Press release 532 dated December 16

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Brussels on 12th and 13th December, 1974. At the close of the year which marked the 25th Anniversary of the Alliance, Ministers noted with satisfaction that member countries remain firmly committed to the Alliance and that this had

found solemn expression in the Ottawa Declaration.

2. Ministers reviewed developments in East-West relations. They noted the progress, albeit uneven, towards détente over the past six months. They stated their readiness to continue their efforts to make progress in their negotiations and exchanges with the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries aimed at steady improvement in East-West relations. Noting, however, the increase in the military strength of the Warsaw Pact countries, and bearing in mind that security is the prerequisite for the policy of détente, they expressed their determination to maintain their own defensive military strength.

3. Ministers had a broad discussion on the implications of the current economic situation for the maintenance of Alliance defense and noted the efforts made at both the national and international levels to overcome the difficulties confronting the economies of the allied countries. They reaffirmed their determination to seek appropriate solutions in the spirit of cooperation and mutual confidence which characterizes their relations. Ministers decided to continue to consult on the repercussions of economic developments on areas within the direct sphere of competence of the Alliance.

4. Ministers noted that at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe there had been enough progress to show that substantial results were possible. Nonetheless, important questions remain to be resolved. Ministers expressed the undiminished determination of their Governments to work patiently and constructively towards balanced and substantial results under all the agenda headings of the Conference, so as to bring about a satisfactory conclusion to the Conference as a whole as soon as may be possible.

5. Ministers of the participating countries reviewed the state of the negotiations in Vienna on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. These negotiations have as their general objective to contribute to a more stable relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe, and their success would advance détente. These Ministers were resolved to pursue these negotiations with a

view to ensuring undiminished security for all parties, at a lower level of forces in Central Europe. They reaffirmed their commitment to the establishment of approximate parity in the form of an agreed common ceiling for the ground force manpower of NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the area of reductions. They considered that a first phase reduction agreement covering United States and Soviet ground forces would be an important and practical first step in this direction. They noted that the negotiations have, so far, not produced results and expressed the hope that a constructive response to the Allied proposals would soon be forthcoming. They reaffirmed the importance they attach to the principle to which they adhere in these negotiations that NATO forces should not be reduced except in the context of a Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Agreement with the East.

6. Ministers heard a report from the United States Secretary of State on the continuing United States efforts towards the further limitation of strategic offensive arms in the light of President Ford's recent talks with Mr. Brezhnev. They noted with satisfaction the significant progress towards limitation of strategic nuclear weapons achieved in Vladivostok. They expressed the hope that this progress will lead to the early conclusion of a satisfactory SALT II Agreement. They also expressed appreciation for continuing consultations within the Alliance with respect to the SALT negotiations.

7. The Ministers reviewed the developments concerning Berlin and Germany which have taken place since their last meeting in June 1974, especially as regards the application of those provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement relating to the Western Sectors of Berlin. They considered, in particular, traffic and ties between the Western Sectors and the Federal Republic of Germany and the representation abroad of the interests of those sectors by the Federal Republic of Germany. They emphasized the importance to the viability and security of the city of all provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement. The Ministers also emphasized that there is an essential connection between dé-

tente in Europe and the situation relating to Berlin.

8. Ministers expressed their concern about the situation in the Middle East which could have dangerous consequences for world peace and thus for the security of the members of the Alliance. They reaffirmed the overriding importance they attach to fresh progress towards a just and lasting peace in this area. They likewise welcomed the contributions which Allied Governments continue to make to United Nations peace-keeping activities. Ministers noted the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared by the Permanent Council on their instructions. They found the instability in the area disquieting, warranting special vigilance on the part of the Allies. They invited the Permanent Council to continue consultations on this subject and to report further.

9. As regards Greek-Turkish relations, Ministers heard a report by the Secretary General under the terms of his watching brief established by the Ministerial session of May 1964. They expressed the firm hope that relations between these two Allied countries would rapidly return to normal.

10. Ministers noted the progress of the work of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society, especially on solar and geothermal energy resources as well as on coastal water pollution, improved sewage disposal, urban transport and health care. Ministers also noted the start of projects on the disposal of hazardous wastes and action to follow up completed CCMS studies on the prevention of ocean oil spills, road safety improvement, cleaner air and purer river water, thus enhancing the quality of life for their citizens.

11. The Ministers directed the Council in permanent session to consider and decide on the date and place of the Spring session of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

U.S. and Spain Hold Second Session of Talks on Cooperation

*Text of Joint Communiqué*¹

The second round of negotiations on Spanish-American cooperation took place in Washington from December 9 to 12. The Spanish delegation was headed by Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Juan José Rovira, and included members of the Spanish Foreign Office and military representatives led by General Gutierrez Mellado of the Spanish High General Staff. The American delegation was headed by Ambassador-at-Large Robert McCloskey and included members of the Department of State and representatives of the Department of Defense, led by Rear Admiral Patrick Hannifin.

The conversations proceeded according to the agenda and work program adopted at the first round of talks held in Madrid in November. This second round focussed on the defense aspects in the relationship between the two countries in the light of the Joint Declaration of Principles signed last July, and included exchanges of views on this subject by the military advisors of the two delegations.² Both sides described their respective positions and proceeded to explore areas for more detailed discussions.

The conversations took place in a frank and cordial atmosphere and it was agreed that the next round of talks will take place in Madrid on January 27. The Spanish Ambassador, His Excellency, Jaime Alba, hosted a lunch for Acting Secretary of State Robert Ingersoll and the American delegation, and Ambassador McCloskey offered a lunch to Under Secretary Rovira and the Spanish delegation.

¹ Issued on Dec. 12 (text from press release 524).

² For text of the declaration, see BULLETIN of Aug. 5, 1974, p. 231.

U.S. Abstains on Proposed OAS Resolution To Rescind the Sanctions Against Cuba

The 15th Meeting of Consultation of the Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States was held at Quito November 8-12 to consider a resolution to rescind the sanctions against Cuba. The resolution did not obtain the two-thirds majority required under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). Following is a statement made in the meeting on November 12 by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll, who was chairman of the U.S. delegation, together with the transcript of a news conference held after the meeting by William D. Rogers, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and William S. Mailliard, U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS.

STATEMENT BY DEPUTY SECRETARY INGERSOLL IN THE OAS MEETING OF CONSULTATION

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Foreign Ministers and Special Delegates: We have remained silent prior to the vote because we wished to avoid even the appearance of influencing by our remarks or by our actions the outcome of this Meeting of Consultation. Now I think a word of explanation of our vote is in order.

As most of you are aware, the United States was initially opposed to a review of Resolution I at this time. We were persuaded by other nations that the issue should be discussed. We voted for the convocation of this meeting. And we have carefully attended these sessions and considered the statements of each of the members.

The resolution convoking this meeting received unanimous approval in the Permanent Council of the OAS. It placed before us

the important question of sanctions against Cuba. Ten years have passed since Resolution I was enacted by the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs. It is natural that we should review that decision.

We recognize that a majority now exists for lifting sanctions. On the other hand, we also recall that the measures contained in Resolution I were adopted in 1964 by an overwhelming majority of the OAS member states. Some states here today were, with good reason, among the most persuasive advocates of sanctions. For some of us, evidence of Cuban hostility is fresh in our minds. Though 10 years have passed, the states of the Americas have still received no clear satisfaction that Cuba has abandoned the export of revolution.

We have also taken into account another consideration. It is of the essence of the new dialogue not merely that we consider the major issues confronting this hemisphere, but that we do so in the spirit President Rodriguez Lara of our host country, Ecuador, so well laid before us Friday, when he said that a fundamental part of our responsibility was to:

... openly and freely express the position of our countries. —While at the same time seeing that the possible differences of opinion that may arise in no way affect the Inter-American solidarity that we seek to strengthen.

We have considered all these factors in coming to our decision to abstain. But our abstention should not be taken as a sign of anything other than the fact that the United States has voted in accordance with its own perception of this question at this time. We respect the views of the majority who have

voted for this resolution. We have not voted "no," and we have not worked against the resolution. We also respect the views of those who entertain such serious reservations with respect to Cuba and who therefore have felt it necessary to vote against.

If this Meeting of Consultation has not produced a conclusive result, it has at least aired in a constructive way the fact that there is no easy solution to the problem of a country which deals with some on the basis of hostility and with others on the basis of a more normal relationship.

I should add that the United States looks forward to the day when the Cuban issue is no longer a divisive issue for us. Cuba has absorbed far too much of our attention in recent years. We need to turn our energies to the more important questions. We must not let a failure of agreement on the Cuban issue at this time obscure our common interest in working together toward mutually beneficial relationships on the major issues of this decade.

Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to the Government of Ecuador, to President Rodriguez Lara, and to Foreign Minister Lucio-Paredes, for acting as hosts of this important inter-American meeting. We are fortunate to have such an able and experienced chairman in Foreign Minister Lucio-Paredes. We are grateful for your excellent preparations and hospitality. Your high sense of responsibility toward the inter-American system should be an example to us all.

NEWS CONFERENCE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS AND AMBASSADOR MAILLIARD

Q. I would like to ask where you are going from here?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Back to Washington. [Laughter.]

Q. On this issue, what do you foresee?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: You mean on the Cuban issue in the international organization concept? Well, I would say that since

Text of Draft OAS Resolution To Rescind the Sanctions Against Cuba¹

DRAFT RESOLUTION SUBMITTED BY THE DELEGATIONS OF COLOMBIA, COSTA RICA AND VENEZUELA

WHEREAS:

The Permanent Council of the Organization of American States, by resolution CP/RES. 117 (133-74) of September 20, 1974, which was approved unanimously, convoked this Meeting so that the Organ of Consultation of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, mindful of strict respect for the principle of non-intervention by one State in the affairs of other States, and bearing in mind the change in the circumstances prevailing when measures were adopted against the Government of Cuba, might decide whether the rescinding of Resolution I of the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Washington, D.C., in 1964, is justified;

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs and the Special Delegates stated the position of their respective governments with regard to the subject matter of the resolution convoking the meeting,

THE FIFTEENTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

RESOLVES:

1. To rescind Resolution I of the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, held in Washington in 1964.

2. To request the Governments of the American States to faithfully observe the principle of non-intervention and to abstain from any act inconsistent therewith.

3. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of the text of the present resolution.

¹ The resolution did not obtain the two-thirds majority required for adoption; the vote was 12 to 3, with 6 abstentions (U.S.).

the resolution failed, according to the terms of the treaty there's no change in the legal status. What may occur in bilateral relationships of various member countries remains to be seen.

Q. On the basis of your intimate knowledge of what goes on inside the inter-Ameri-

can community, Mr. Ambassador, what countries do you think, as a result of having failed to get the two-thirds vote they wanted here, might just go ahead and recognize Cuba?

Ambassador Mailliard: I don't think I'd want to name countries. A lot of statements have been made over the last few weeks and months by some countries that said no matter whether the sanctions were lifted or not they would not renew relations. Some others said they probably would. I don't think it's up to us to speculate on what another sovereign nation is going to do.

Q. Mr. Rogers, is there any chance that the Cuban issue might come up in the interval before the new-dialogue meeting in March in Buenos Aires or the General Assembly in April?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I suppose the answer is that there's a chance that it will. Obviously, this will not be the last time we will hear the Cuban issue, and it could come up in a variety of fora. I think it's important to point out that Resolution No. I of the 1964 meeting of Foreign Ministers specifically provides that the Permanent Council is authorized to deal with the question of raising Cuban sanctions in a specific manner under specific terms set down in that very resolution. So that the resolution itself establishes another forum in which this question can be raised, and there are a wide variety of other juridical ways that it's imaginable the question will come up in the OAS itself.

Q. Mr. Rogers, we understand that there have been some private conversations around. I assume within the delegation and the other foreign delegations, as to what the United States might accept at this meeting. Could you tell us what it was that we might have accepted that they never offered us?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We didn't have any fallback positions, Mr. Manitzas [Frank Manitzas, CBS]. I take it you're saying in terms of lifting the sanctions itself? No. Our posture, our position from the very beginning—and we attempted to make this

clear to the other member states—was that we were not opposed to the calling of this meeting if they thought it desirable, at the Foreign Ministers level, that we were prepared to come and participate and listen. We adopted the policy from the very outset, and carried it through with great care, of not influencing or arm-twisting any other state with respect to their position or vote. That is a position we have followed through on from the beginning to the end of this conference. We regard that as an affirmative contribution to the dialogue itself at this conference, and that is essentially the position we brought from the beginning and carried through to the end of it.

Q. Then there was no language that they could have offered you in the resolution on Cuba that you could have voted for—that the United States could have voted for?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We didn't have any fallback position that we were prepared to accept on this. We wanted to listen to what everyone had to say and to see what the essential weight of opinion was on the part of the other states.

Q. I'd like to ask you, if you could tell us now, the degree to which you made this clear, your delegation's position of abstention from debate, and any resolution, to Foreign Ministers with whom you or Secretary Ingersoll met here, and on what dates? What I am driving at is that it seems to have been the case that until Saturday, Latin delegations were not really sure of the policy you just described, and we ourselves in briefing sessions here were being given the impression that there was a fallback position and that there were things that could have been done, whereas we now know, as do the Latin countries, that your instructions were to abstain and there was no change in those instructions.

Assistant Secretary Rogers: That's a fair question. I think I'd like to divide the answer up into two parts, or at least our position up into two parts, because we thought about that very carefully. When I say that, I mean the time when we would announce the fact

that we were going to abstain with respect to the resolution drafted in Washington and which was on the table here at this meeting.

We did decide at the very outset that we would adopt what I personally regard as a new and healthy posture on the part of the United States, and that was not to pressure any country with respect to our point of view about the issues at the meeting or with respect to how that country ought to vote. That posture we announced long before the meeting began, and as I say, we followed through the entire meeting, both in the halls of the meeting room itself and in our private conversations with the other delegations, in a manner which was utterly consistent with that non-arm-twisting posture by the United States.

We did not, you are quite right, announce—before we arrived or at the time we arrived—that we were going to abstain under any circumstances. The reason was that, had we announced we were going to abstain with respect to the pending resolution, that in itself would have been inconsistent with the neutrality of a non-arm-twisting policy. Because that might have had an effect on certain delegations and committed them to a position of abstention before they had heard the views of the other member states.

So that essentially our posture was divided up into those two aspects—one, our policy of non-arm-twisting, and two, the final vote we would take. The first part we announced at the very outset. The second part we did not announce until we were sure that each state had a chance to hear what the others had to say and had made up its mind as to how it was going to vote.

Is that responsive to your question?

Q. Yes it is, sir.

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Good.

Q. Mr. Rogers, when did you actually make up your mind to abstain—here, while coming, or two weeks ago?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I think that's a fair question and let me try to answer as quickly as I can. The answer is that we had, let's say, 90 percent or 80 percent decided

to abstain with respect to that resolution, the one that had been predrafted in Washington and was on the table here, assuming that we were correct in our prophecy as to what the parliamentary situation was going to be and what the general international situation was going to be, and assuming that no other new and imaginative proposals were put on the table which we hadn't foreseen.

What I'm trying to say is that we were not locked into that position absolutely hard and fast, and had this matter, in terms of the parliamentary situations, positions of other delegations, or other factors been different than they finally turned out to be, we would reconsider that.

Is that responsive to your question, Juan [Juan Walte, United Press International]?

Q. Mr. Rogers, if it were a differently worded resolution, could it have been voted for?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: That is pretty hypothetical, Anita [Anita Gumpert, Agence France Presse], in terms of saying what had to really hit the table with a strong consensus of other Latin American support.

Q. Excuse me, Mr. Secretary, for pinning this down slightly more. Did you or Ambassador Mailliard or Secretary Kissinger, to your knowledge, at any time, give any tacit or passive encouragement to the sponsoring countries or give to them the impression by smiles [laughter] that you might shift your position from abstention to favorable under certain conditions? [Laughter.] In other words, did you give them the impression at any time that you or the United States or the State Department would be glad to see the sanctions lifted with strictly Latin American support?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: These are really two different questions, I think. The first question was, did we ever signal to them by a smile or a hint, in other words a body-language diplomacy? [Laughter.] The answer I have to give you is that we didn't intend to.

Q. Did you?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Did we? I don't have the foggiest idea. As I say, I may have smiled. If I did, I apologize if I did mislead them. I don't know [laughter], you learn something in this diplomatic game all the time. Did you prefer to comment on that?

Ambassador Mailliard: No, I think that's absolutely right. How they may have interpreted things, I think is a little difficult for us to tell. But, certainly as far as the co-sponsors were concerned, we told them a long, long time ago that they shouldn't count on us for either opposition or support.

Q. You told them that specifically, sir?

Ambassador Mailliard: Yes. Very specifically.

Q. Mr. Rogers, we've seen the new dialogue working here with no arm-twisting, etc., or at least it's what you say is going on. What is going to happen when you see that they have the 14 votes? Will you still continue this new dialogue of sitting back and let it go or wait for them to come to you? Or is the new dialogue going to have "clause three" that we have to defend our interests and we will move out? In other words, in this case, you had a better count than the sponsors. There was never any need for you to move to make certain a position was not adopted against the position that you wanted. What happens when you see they have the 14 votes? What happens to this new dialogue then?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: If I understand the question correctly, Frank, it is what would be our position in terms of pressure and arm-twisting and U.S. posture when there are 14 votes to lift the sanctions.

Q. When there are 14 votes against the position the United States has, how are you going to work the new dialogue? Obviously it is easy to see it working when someone is doing your work for you, in a sense. I'm not saying you were having it done for you, but they were doing it. What happens when you have to go out and start moving bodies

and moving votes yourself? How are you going to do this with the new dialogue?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I think you misstate the proposition, in a sense, Frank. We didn't have a position. We were not opposed to a lifting of the sanctions.

Had we been opposed, if it had been some other measure and we had been opposed, we would have, in a new-dialogue way, frankly stated our position on this matter. That's part of the new dialogue—that every country ought to speak up with respect to its own interests.

In this particular instance the fundamental point of this conference is that the United States did not have a position in opposition to the lifting of the sanctions. We did not. And we didn't say to any country that we did. And we did not vote against it. We made perfectly clear to the sponsors, and they understood it, that they had a clear field. They had a clear shot at lifting those sanctions if they could make it work. And we were not going to lift a finger against them. And we played by that rule from the very beginning to the very end.

Now, that, essentially, it seems to me is precisely consistent with the new dialogue. If we had a position in opposition, you would have heard about it, as has been the case in all the other conferences in the past.

Ambassador Mailliard: You also made an assumption when you said that we had a better count. We didn't know for sure whether there would be 14 votes or not.

Q. I'd like to pick up on the last part of the last question, and that is, if they had had the 14 votes would it have been in the interests of the United States to have the sanctions lifted without our having to cast a vote in favor?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I'm not sure—

Q. The last part of the last question had to do with whether the United States really would have welcomed the lifting of the sanctions without the United States having to cast a vote in favor of it.

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We never

said that, because that would have been an announcement of our position.

Q. No, I know you didn't say it, but would it be fair to say it would be an assumption?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: You want to know what was in our secret hearts?

Q. That's right.

Assistant Secretary Rogers: That would be telling, wouldn't it? No, I don't mean to be captious about it.

Ambassador Mailliard: I think that there is such a simple answer to that, it might be hard to believe; but if two-thirds of the member states had concluded that the sanctions should be lifted, then I think you have to question whether there were any sanctions at all. So that there wasn't a question of where our interests lay. It depended upon the parliamentary situation. If that overwhelming a majority of the Latins felt that this was no longer a viable position, it would have been pretty foolish for us, it seems to me, to take a contrary view.

Q. Mr. Rogers, how do you view the effects of this vote on the strength of the OAS? Do you think that the potency of the OAS has been increased by this vote, or do you think it has been a setback for the OAS? And in your talks since the vote with other delegations, what have their feelings been as to the effect of this on the OAS?

Ambassador Mailliard: A little bit. This meeting was convened under the Rio Treaty. The only reason this meeting was held was because of the concern of a number of countries that the binding obligations of the Rio Treaty appeared not to be being observed, to the extent that several countries did not comply with their obligations under the treaty. I think this is really what has caused the whole thing to operate.

So, I think if you are talking about the Rio Treaty alone and you're going to be candid, you got to say that if now, even though the sanctions are not lifted, an appreciable number of other countries renew bilateral relations, then the Rio Treaty is to some extent weakened. But to translate that into the destruction of the inter-American

system, I think, is a vast exaggeration of the problem.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as far as you know, is the March meeting of the Foreign Ministers going to come off as scheduled in Buenos Aires, and second, would this whole business come up again at that meeting?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Yes. As far as we know the March meeting is on track. We look forward to it with a great sense of anticipation. The Secretary will be there. We will be discussing real new-dialogue issues across the board, the vast number of fundamental and first-order issues that were on the agendas, as you know, both at Tlatelolco and Atlanta. We do not see this one-issue meeting here as having any serious effect on the March meeting in Buenos Aires.

Q. [Question unintelligible but concerned correspondent's contention that "countries defeated were supposed to be democratic and representative governments," and countries which "won" were "vastly more aggressive."] Do you think this has harmed the inter-American system?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I don't know if the inter-American system is harmed by whether one category of countries wins or another category of countries loses. That tends to make distinctions between countries that I think are not a solid basis for the conduct of relations within an international organization.

The fact of the matter is that the basic problem, as Ambassador Mailliard just has pointed out, is the structure—the juridical structure—of the Rio Treaty itself. The Rio Treaty itself, in the first instance, required that the sanctions be imposed on the basis of a two-thirds vote.

At that time the proponents of the sanctions had the uphill struggle of getting two-thirds. They got enough or more than that because of the fact that Venezuela, as you know, one of the countries now a proponent of the lifting of the sanctions, felt itself threatened. And at that time, it was Rómulo Betancourt's government—one of the embattled democracies of all time, which was operating, as I well remember, under the

threat of military attack or guerrilla attack on the elections at that time—which was one of the initiators of the sanctions. And the sanctions required a two-thirds vote then.

The fact of the matter is that the same rule applies today under the Rio Treaty, for better or for worse, and two-thirds are required to lift it, and the fact of the matter was that the lifting of the mandated sanctions under Resolution I of the 1964 meeting could not command a two-thirds majority.

Now, there are lots of things you could say about that, and one of them may well be that the juridical structure of the Rio Treaty ought to be changed, and we are perfectly prepared to look at that question. But I don't think we ought to talk about this as an ultimate and disturbing defeat for some people and a victory for others. It may indicate that we have got to look for better ways for arriving at consensus within the system. And as I said, the United States is quite well prepared to do that.

Q. I have a question about the participation at the Buenos Aires meeting. One of the issues there is whether or not to invite Cuba. First, have you been asked by the Argentine Government how you feel about it, and how do you feel about it?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: The answer is no.

Q. The second, how do you feel about it?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I'll wait till Vignes [Argentine Foreign Minister Alberto Vignes] asks the Secretary.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a theoretical question. Under the terms of the Rio Treaty the signatories are bound by the decision, obviously. If there had been a two-thirds majority here in favor of lifting the sanctions, both commercial and diplomatic, against Cuba, would the United States have gone along and resumed relations with Cuba immediately, or within a reasonable time?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Yes, that's a fair question, and I think you're quite right to ask it in a way which emphasizes

the difference between a resolution here which would ostensibly have repealed the 1964 resolution of the Foreign Ministers meeting and what then happens bilaterally.

Now, the legal effect of the resolution which didn't achieve the two-thirds majority at this meeting essentially would have been to repeal the adoption of the measures by the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in 1964, which, in our legal view, became binding on all the states—that they terminate diplomatic relations, that they terminate commercial relations, and that they do whatever they can with respect to maritime commerce to reduce trade with Cuba. Those were requirements which were and still are, in our view, binding on all member states of the OAS. Had those requirements been eliminated, it would then have been up to each country to decide what to do.

The United States had terminated diplomatic relations and had instituted a number of measures with respect to its commercial relations with Cuba prior to the 1964 resolution, and by the same token those measures—termination of diplomatic relations, and measures affecting commerce—would have legally survived the action here at Quito, had the resolution which was proposed gathered the two-thirds vote. Now, what we would thereafter have done bilaterally, if you will, with Cuba really would have been essentially a Cuba-U.S. question, and essentially it still is a Cuba-U.S. question. And we have made no statement with respect to our posture in terms of how quickly we would have moved on that issue, and on what basis.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Ford administration has said that the United States unilaterally would not renew diplomatic relations without consultation with the OAS members, and that was the reason this meeting was called for; but now, we are sort of bound in the other direction, not to forge détente with Cuba. In other words, we sort of block off the whole liberal sector of the U.S. Congress by seeing this resolution fail today. Could that have been one of the Ford administration's approaches?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I don't think so. It seems to me what you are suggesting is that we manipulated the result here. And what I have been trying to say all day long is that we did our best—we may have failed just because we are who we are—but we really did our serious, legitimate best to eliminate any manipulation or pressure or arm-twisting by the United States. Now you may not credit that, or it may sound, in an inter-American context, difficult to believe in view of the history we all know of U.S. efforts in this respect. But it is the case.

Q. Well, you know, this is a very positive new statement. It comes out very positive, but the effect of your policy has had a very negative effect on the OAS. So I don't see how you can call it a positive policy when its effect is so negative.

Assistant Secretary Rogers: As I said, we don't regard the effect as negative on the OAS. In the first instance, with all due respect, there are lots of other issues in the inter-American system. I realize that Cuba is the big issue theatrically and in terms of public controversy. But we have a lot of other things that we have been attempting to talk about in the new-dialogue way with Latin America. And we think, in a sense, that the positive contribution we have made is to demonstrate that the United States is not going to dominate this inter-American system in the future; that we are not striving for artificial consensus; that we are not trying to create synthetic agreement. This is a positive contribution not just to the discussion of the Cuban issue but to the discussion of a wide number of other issues, many of them in the minds of some people much more fundamental than this Cuban question. I will furthermore say that this is not the last time, I regret to say, that we are going to hear about the Cuban issue in the inter-American context or the last opportunity that the inter-American system is going to have to come to grips with this narrowing question of sanctions.

Q. (Spanish) [Question semi-intelligible but concerned correspondent's contention

that countries like Chile and Paraguay had "won" and "democratically elected governments such as Colombia and Venezuela had lost," and what effect this would have on the inter-American system.]

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I think it's unfair—or at least it's not a matter of significance which countries happen to line up on the same side of the vote, as I said, for the reasons that we have tried to make clear. That is to say, the desire of the United States was to avoid pressure and arm-twisting on this Cuban issue.

The reasons the other countries voted the way they did were explained by the representatives of those countries. It is my firm belief that they did not vote the way they did just because the United States was voting the way it did. They voted the way they did, as I think Minister Blanco [Uruguayan Foreign Minister Juan Carlos Blanco] in particular expressed very clearly as far as Uruguay was concerned, because they were not persuaded that Cuba has an equally neutral attitude with respect to internal affairs within Uruguay. Now, that essentially is the reason for the Uruguayan position.

In the case of all the other countries, they took the positions they took for the reasons they took them, and the mere fact that country *x* is one category and country *y* is in another category, I regard as having little significance.

Q. Let's carry Mr. O'Mara's [Richard O'Mara, Baltimore Sun] question a step further. Whatever the scenario may be in your own minds in Washington for developing bilateral relations with Cuba, whatever that timetable may be, has it now been affected, has it now been set back? Are you now incapable of moving ahead with whatever you might, in your own minds, want to move ahead with because of the decision taken here today?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Well, quite frankly, because we didn't have a timetable and we don't have an agenda for Cuban relations, our basic position is that we have been and will continue to abide by the OAS

resolution. As I say, as President Ford has said, as to when and to the extent that our Cuban policy changes, we will be doing that in consultation with the other members of the Organization and consistent with its regulations. We have not had a timetable nor do we have a formal agenda for business with Cuba. Is that responsive to your question?

Q. Can I carry it one step further?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Sure.

Q. Does this prevent you from establishing any kind of timetable? In other words, does that question of bilateral relations now absolutely guide you with respect to the OAS?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Well that's a fair question, and if I can answer it candidly without you guys reading a lot into the entrails of my answer, let me say this. As a matter of law, we are forbidden, obviously, from having diplomatic relations with Cuba. That does not, however, prohibit us from considering whether to establish. In other words, we can think unthinkable thoughts, even though we can't do illegal things. I'll be quoted on that one, I can see it [laughter.] Don't write that down. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Rogers, could you give us some information on the priorities of the United States vis-a-vis Latin America right now? It seems that the problems we are having now are over trade—in the economic fields. It seems to be less political, which means that Cuba is really not one of our considerations. Tell us something about the situation with the multinationals.

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Right. I think that's a very good question. I think it does put the issues here somewhat better in perspective. I'm never sure whether it's an expression of my personal boredom with the Cuban issue or a legitimate feeling that the economic questions really are the dominant ones in the inter-American system

today. But, whichever the reason for my feelings about it, I do feel that way. There is no doubt that these are the really great issues of the time. They are enormously complicated; they are enormously determinative of the well-being of the people of Latin America; they get much closer, in my judgment, to the realities of life in this hemisphere and in the United States than the obstructions of the Cuban issue; and therefore, in my temperamental approach to these problems, are much more important to think about now.

What are they? They are essentially the issues we tend to lump under the heading economic, but they relate to a wide variety of things. As you point out, the issues that have come up with respect to transnational corporations. As you know—at the earlier meetings of the Foreign Ministers under the new dialogue—this has been a matter of great concern to them. It involves all kinds of questions ranging from across-the-board investment disputes to honoring of contracts and a wide variety of other things.

The question of transfer of technology, which is a matter of fundamental concern throughout Latin America, whichever Foreign Ministers you talk to—all our Ambassadors report back constantly this preoccupation with the question of access to technology and science.

A wide variety of other questions having to do with access to raw materials, prices of raw materials including petroleum, and obviously the fundamental question for such enormous numbers of people throughout the world today; that is, food.

These are the issues that we are very anxious to get on with, with the other members of the inter-American system. And it is my profound conviction that whatever the diagnosis of this Quito meeting, it does not affect the priority of those questions, nor the capacity of us in the hemisphere to come to grips with it. I have talked to a wide number of Foreign Ministers here, and I see no diminution in their desire to

come to grips in an inter-American context with those fundamental economic questions.

Q. What could you tell us about the United States—the State Department's attitude toward today's decision. Could you say whether it is happy about it and pleased with this decision?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: No. I don't think we want to characterize a response in that sense.

Q. Mr. Secretary, suppose six months from now the United States would like to establish relations with Cuba in such a meeting as this and suppose two-thirds of the members of the OAS oppose?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: That's marvelously hypothetical. [Laughter.] What would happen? I have a fundamental rule at press conferences never to answer a hypothetical question. But I think it's fair today to point out that there are a wide variety of ways in which the question of the 1964 resolution can be approached in addition to the Foreign Ministers meeting that has been held here.

Q. (unintelligible)

Ambassador Mailliard: The Permanent Council is clearly authorized to do this and is sitting in Washington all the time. So any time that they got the right number of votes, this could be done expressly under the provision of the '64 resolution. But the Permanent Council also can convoke itself into an organ of consultation, meeting provisionally, so that anytime there's a will with the necessary two-thirds vote, it could be done very quickly if anybody wants to do it.

Q. Mr. Rogers, even though the United States might seem to think that there are more important issues than the Cuban issue, this meeting was to consider the Cuban issue. If I look up Mr. Ingersoll's declaration this morning, I don't see very much about Cuba and about what the United States thinks about Cuba. [remainder of question unintelligible.]

Assistant Secretary Rogers: I suppose that the best answer was the statement in the press today which was attributed to an unnamed Latin American who said, "We denounce the United States when it pushes us around and we denounce the United States when it doesn't."

We could easily have spoken to the question whether or not essentially Castro would have continued to affect the peace and security of the hemisphere. We decided not to do that. We could not have taken both postures. That is to say, we could not have taken our hands-off posture, our no-pressure posture, and at the same time have spoken on the issue that the other countries did. We decided as I say, in this particular instance, to adopt a hands-off, no-pressure policy; and basically that was the attitude with which we came to the meeting and stuck with all the way through.

Q. I'd still like to go back to the question of how does this policy work? You have to discuss and you have to move and you have to lobby. What are you going to call this new dialogue? Are we going to go back to 1962, the way the United States worked then, or how is it going to work when you're obviously the underdog, which you were not this time?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We didn't feel—

Q. Well, you didn't care one way or the other.

Assistant Secretary Rogers: Right.

Q. What do you do when you're the underdog? How are you going to work this new dialogue?

Assistant Secretary Rogers: We're going to have to speak up. But I think what you're saying is correct, or at least I would affirm that we tend to regard the Cuban issue in terms of our posture as ever so much more sensitive than a wide variety of other issues.

In other words, on a wide variety of other kinds of question—the economic questions we were talking about before, a number of

other political questions—we don't have this sense that we have to be restrained. We don't have this feeling that taking a position on this is going to tend to be dominating.

We do have that feeling on the Cuban question. And the history bears us out on that—history on the Cuban issue essentially, on which the United States has been quite outspoken. In any event, whatever the history may have been, we feel that the Cuban issue is a very sensitized one and we feel that the best contribution we could make on that was the policy which I've tried to explain here, of restraint and no pressure.

We will not feel that way with respect to a lot of other issues, and we don't. We speak up. It's not really a question of whether you're an underdog or overdog. Most of the questions that we're discussing in an inter-American context we don't discuss in the theatrical way we've done it here in Quito these last few days. We discuss it in somewhat more diplomatic fashion, and it doesn't work usually by adding up the votes on a yes-no-abstention kind of artificial approach to the problem. Most particularly, for example, at meetings of the Foreign Ministers' new dialogue, that was all done by consensus. They don't add up votes.

Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and Week

A PROCLAMATION¹

Two hundred years ago, in September 1774, the First Continental Congress assembled in Carpenters' Hall, in Philadelphia, and set in motion a course of human events which created the United States. The system of government begun there, and the high principles on which it rests, continues today as the source of vitality for our society.

Anticipating the bicentennial of this Nation's independence, now is an excellent time to pause and consider the groundwork the delegates to Philadelphia laid for our independence. The First Continental Congress adopted a resolution asserting, among

other things, the rights of the American people to life, liberty, and property; to participation in the legislative councils of government; to the heritage of the common law; to trial by jury; and to assemble and petition for redress of grievances. This resolution foreshadowed the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights.

It is altogether fitting to mark the 200th anniversary of this noble beginning of the Continental Congress. Beyond that, it is imperative that all of us study and cherish the ideas and ideals which bore fruit in the great constitutional documents of our country. At the same time, we should take the opportunity, whenever possible, to strengthen the liberties which have been assured us in the Bill of Rights, ratified one hundred and eighty-three years ago this week, on December 15, 1791.


America's concern with human rights is not something that ends at our borders. Benjamin Franklin wrote to a friend in 1789:

"God grant, that not only the Love of Liberty, but a thorough Knowledge of the Rights of Man, may pervade all the Nations of the Earth, so that a Philosopher may set his Foot anywhere on its Surface, and say, 'This is my Country'."

Franklin's spirit of universality has found rich modern expression in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The link between it and our Bill of Rights is clear. On December 10, we celebrate the twenty-sixth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. The General Assembly said that the Universal Declaration stands as "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and nations," reminding us that "recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world."

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim December 10, 1974, as Human Rights Day and December 15, 1974, as Bill of Rights Day. I call upon the people of the United States to observe the week beginning December 10, 1974, as Human Rights Week. Further, I ask all Americans to reflect deeply on the values inherent in the Bill of Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and draw on those values to promote peace, justice, and civility at home and around the world.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this third day of December, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-ninth.



¹ No. 4337; 39 *Fed. Reg.* 42335.

The Inter-American System: Adjusting to Present-Day Realities

Address by William S. Mailliard

*Ambassador to the Organization of American States*¹

Even perceptive and informed Americans who maintain a healthy interest in foreign affairs are not likely to have a comprehensive grasp of the inter-American system and the Organization of American States. Our eastern press and media, for the most part, are Europe oriented. Here in the West they do pay more attention to Pacific affairs, but nowhere except possibly in the states of the southern tier is there much emphasis on hemispheric happenings.

This is not to say that Latin America is a lost continent or anything like it. But impressions gathered from the media are largely surface impressions dealing with generalities or with certain hot political issues. Thus we hear that Latin America is important but neglected, or we get stories about the Panama Canal issue or the Cuban issue. We do not see much in the way of treatment of the texture and significance of the web of relationships between the United States and its neighbors to the south that we call the inter-American system.

The inter-American system has been a pathfinder in the field of international organization. It is the name we give to a collection of multilateral institutions linking the United States with the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean. And many of the most important principles of the U.N. Charter, such as nonintervention and the juridical equality of states, first saw the light in the context of the inter-American relationship.

The movement toward unity of the Amer-

icas goes back a long way, to Simón Bolívar's Congress of Panama in 1826. At that time, George Washington's dictum of no entangling alliances held sway, and the debates of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate for that year show that Bolívar's dream of a Congress of the Americas was thought so novel an experiment and so fraught with unknown perils that the United States should not participate. In fact we did not.

It was not until 1889 that the United States participated in an international conference of American states. Today's inter-American system has its roots in that meeting.

I don't intend to try to escape from today's reality by taking refuge in history, but I think it is worth noting that we in the Western Hemisphere were the pioneers of the world in establishing a free association of sovereign nations to deal with mutual problems. For many decades, until the F.D.R. Good Neighbor policy, we tended to look on Latin America as our private preserve. In turn the nations of Latin America tended to look at our multilateral association as a means of ordering state-to-state behavior and restricting the inclination of the United States to intervene whenever she perceived her interests to be involved. As time went on, we slowly came to accept, much as an emerging adult accepts the rules of society, the need for rules of the road that would order the relationships among us.

Thus has evolved an ever more complex inter-American system to maintain some kind

¹ Made before the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco at San Francisco, Calif., on Nov. 22.

of balance between what was originally a collection of relatively poor and weak nations and a disconcertingly and steadily increasingly powerful neighbor.

Varied Activities of the OAS

Now, what is the inter-American system as we know it today? Substantively, it deals with almost every facet of our association: with peace and security; economic and social development; educational, scientific, and cultural cooperation; human rights; technical assistance and training; disaster relief; health; agricultural research; problems of women, children, and Indians; highways; ports and harbors; tourism; export promotion; and more. Most of this is dealt with by the OAS itself or by one of its specialized organizations, such as the Pan American Health Organization or the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences. But some hemispheric intergovernmental organizations are not part of the OAS structure, although they are considered part of the inter-American system, the most important of these being the Inter-American Development Bank, created in 1959.

I wonder if many people in this country fully realize how farflung and varied the total activities of the OAS really are, in fields other than peace and security and economic policy. The OAS, through its General Secretariat—headed by former Ecuadorean President Galo Plaza—and also through several specialized technical organizations, carries out action programs amounting to over \$100 million a year. Most of this goes to operate programs of technical assistance related to promotion of Latin American development. The OAS annually grants thousands of fellowships, conducts dozens of training courses, and issues technical publications on a great variety of development-related subjects.

I would like to cite one of the specialized organizations, the Pan American Health Organization, which is also a regional agency of the World Health Organization. Originally created in 1902 to stem the spread of communicable diseases across national boundaries,

PAHO today is recognized as the health agency of the Americas. In addition to its work in the control of communicable diseases, PAHO is active in the development and promotion of health manpower, family health and population dynamics, health services and delivery of health care, and environmental health.

There have been many notable achievements in the health of the Americas through the efforts of PAHO, but perhaps none as successful as the smallpox eradication program. As part of the global effort to eradicate smallpox, PAHO's program in the Americas achieved the ultimate in April 1971, when the last vestige of the disease in Brazil was declared eliminated and all of the Americas free of the scourge of centuries.

The OAS has done valuable and worthwhile work in the field of human rights through the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, a commission of seven members chosen to serve in their personal capacity.

In education the OAS has focused on innovative approaches to expanding educational opportunities at the lowest possible cost. In the area of science the OAS has concentrated on developing the institutional structure to enable countries to capitalize on existing scientific know-how and to developing in-country capacities to develop solutions to specific scientific and technological problems. In culture the OAS has concentrated on developing an awareness of and publicizing the rich cultural heritage of the region.

Most OAS programs aim at increasing the technical proficiency of the countries. Some examples include assistance in hydrographic studies in the Andean region, assistance to Argentina in the establishment of a net-worth tax, and sending teams to assist in the reconstruction of Managua. In the fiscal year 1972-73 this assistance involved over 600 experts and also included contributions from European countries and Japan.

An OAS committee conducts country reviews of the development programs and plans of the member states. These reviews bring together representatives of the country, and of lending agencies such as the

World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, and have proved valuable in focusing attention on the need for economic planning and in developing increased technical and managerial expertise in the economic sectors of the nations. The OAS also provides the mechanism, through the relatively new Special Committee for Consultation and Negotiation, for the United States to meet in a relatively informal and nonpolitical setting to discuss U.S. economic policies and practices which have an impact on Latin America.

I have deliberately overloaded your circuits with seemingly dry facts about what the OAS really does with its money.

As a practicing politician for many years and now as a practicing diplomat, I have learned that the allocation of resources determines to a great extent the priorities of an organization. It should be clear to you that the priorities of the inter-American system lie in the field of development.

We are associated in this endeavor because it is in our national interest that all the people of Latin America reach high standards of economic well-being. There is a strong moral aspect to this that I would not slight, but beyond that, development contributes to political stability in the hemisphere and to the opening of new trade opportunities.

One last word about the distribution of resources. We have accepted in international organizations the principle that the rich pay more. Perhaps it is proof of priorities that not only do the Latin American nations contribute more to the OAS than they do to the United Nations, but they also pay up more promptly!

Informal Procedures of the New Dialogue

Any multinational organization is complex, with competing national interests trying to reach accommodation. Where these interests run head-on into each other, agreements are often impossible to achieve. For example, the deliberative bodies of the inter-American system can quibble endlessly over hypothetical points and legalistic interpreta-

tions. But when the members want to take action, these same bodies are capable of rapid and forceful decision.

Since the founding of the OAS in 1948, there have been no prolonged conflicts in the Western Hemisphere. The Dominican-Venezuelan crisis of 1960, the Cuban crisis of 1962, and the Honduras-El Salvador five-day war in 1969 are examples which quickly come to mind in which the system demonstrated its ability to act decisively.

Now, however, the increasingly interdependent nature of our world, growing nationalism in this hemisphere, and the shift from bipolarity to a multipolar scheme of world relationships have brought on an era of flux in the inter-American relationship. This sparked an effort to adjust this relationship to today's realities.

In 1973 then-Foreign Minister of Colombia Alfredo Vasquez Carrizosa suggested to the Secretary of State that there be a reappraisal of relations between the United States and the rest of the nations of the hemisphere. Secretary Kissinger responded to this overture in October when he addressed the Foreign Ministers of this hemisphere who were attending the U.N. General Assembly, calling for a new dialogue among us. The Secretary's initiative was greeted with enthusiasm.

The new dialogue was to involve new procedures and a new atmosphere. It marked a new era in inter-American diplomacy in which problems and conflicts, even on the most sensitive issues, were brought out on the table and discussed frankly but without the need for public posturing.

The new dialogue actually began at an informal meeting of Foreign Ministers last February in a part of Mexico City called Tlatelolco. Conversations centered on eight key issues that had been identified by the Latin American Foreign Ministers in a preparatory meeting in Colombia. These were cooperation for development, coercive measures of an economic nature, restructuring of the inter-American system, solution of the Panama Canal question, structure of the international trade and monetary system, transnational or multinational enterprises,

transfer of technology, and the general panorama of Latin American-U.S. relations. The issues were discussed in a constructive, informal manner without votes or resolutions.

At Tlatelolco the Foreign Ministers called for "a new, vigorous spirit of inter-American solidarity." They expressed "confidence that the spirit of Tlatelolco will inspire a new creative effort in their relations."

The Ministers stressed that development should be integral, embracing the economic, social, and cultural life of their nations. Specifically, the United States pledged to make maximum efforts to secure congressional approval of the system of generalized preferences and then work with the other countries of the hemisphere to apply these preferences in the most beneficial manner. It further pledged to maintain present economic assistance levels and to facilitate the flow of resources toward countries most affected by rising energy costs. The United States also suggested the establishment of a factfinding or conciliation procedure that would limit the scope of controversies arising from private foreign investment by separating issues of fact from those of law, thus providing an objective basis for solution of such disputes without detriment to sovereignty.

They met again in Washington in April under the informal procedures of the dialogue and a few days later implemented certain decisions at the OAS General Assembly in Atlanta. They entrusted other major topics, such as the transfer of technology and multinational corporations to ad hoc working groups. The Ministers are scheduled to meet again in Buenos Aires in March.

The question logically arises as to why it was necessary to bypass, at least initially, the established regional institutions. In part it is because two participants in the dialogue, Guyana and the Bahamas, are not at present members of the OAS. But in part it is also due to the rigidity and formalism of the OAS meetings such as the General Assembly, which do not at present lend themselves to real dialogue. The OAS is going through a period of reform, and there is general agreement—and some progress to date—to simplify and to admit the fresh

winds of the dialogue into these structures. I would venture a personal opinion, not an official prediction, that in time the freedom and the informality of the dialogue will be married to the institutional framework of the OAS.

Effect of the Quito Meeting

Two weeks ago the Foreign Ministers of the hemisphere met in Quito to consider whether the diplomatic and economic sanctions imposed on Cuba in 1964 should be lifted. The resolution to lift the sanctions received a majority but fell short of the necessary two-thirds vote required by the Rio Treaty. The effect is to continue the obligation to refrain from any diplomatic or economic commerce with the Castro regime. But in reality, five Rio Treaty countries and four other hemisphere countries already have such ties, and others may establish such ties.

The position of the United States at this meeting was one of absolute neutrality, and we abstained on the resolution. The outcome—minus U.S. lobbying in any direction—demonstrates that Latin America does not have a single-minded view on the Cuban issue. As Deputy Secretary Ingersoll said:

If this Meeting of Consultation has not produced a conclusive result, it has at least aired in a constructive way the fact that there is no easy solution to the problem of a country which deals with some on the basis of hostility and with others on the basis of a more normal relationship.

He also said:

I should add that the United States looks forward to the day when the Cuban issue is no longer a divisive issue for us. Cuba has absorbed far too much of our attention in recent years. We need to turn our energies to the more important questions. We must not let a failure of agreement on the Cuban issue at this time obscure our common interest in working together toward mutually beneficial relationships on the major issues of this decade.

Since a majority of the countries favor removing sanctions, we have to ask ourselves if the procedures outlined in the treaty are appropriate; that is, should the treaty be amended to respond to majority will. This is one of the subjects presently being con-

sidered by the Special Committee to Study the OAS and Recommend Changes for Restructuring It.

The special committee has also been reviewing the OAS system to assist in the development process. Some feel the system is deficient in that it does not provide a mechanism to counter what are called "coercive acts" which, in a manner analogous to military aggression, threaten the economic security of a country; and they advocate a mechanism similar to that of the Rio Treaty providing for collective denunciations, sanctions, et cetera. We feel this approach to the problems of development is wrong and that it distracts the attention of the member states from the real problems—and the realistic solutions. In one modern and interdependent world, numerous factors affect a country's development, including global monetary and trade developments and even national disasters. Many are beyond the power of any one country to cope with, and collective action is desirable. We have proposed, among other things, that the provisions for consulting together be expanded. We are working to achieve understanding on this issue.

Only last week, as a member of the U.S. delegation to the Quito meeting, I heard repeated predictions that the future of the inter-American system itself was at stake, that the failure of the Quito meeting to carry out the will of the majority would cause the entire inter-American system, including its very important defense treaty—the Rio Treaty—to crumble. But the system has been accustomed to crises throughout its long history. Eighty-four years have passed since its institutional beginnings. Considering what has happened in the passage of those years, in the Americas and in the world, it is remarkable that an organization comprised of nations of so many different viewpoints could endure at all—but it has endured.

Our commitment to the inter-American system is rooted in history and national interest. In my view the limitations on success are often inherent in associations of sovereign states and reflect less strongly on the

validity of the structure, in this instance the inter-American system, than on the wisdom of the governments that are its constituents. This was the 15th time that the Foreign Ministers have gathered on specific political issues since the 1948 OAS Charter of Bogotá. Most of these meetings have produced important results.

I have been involved, one way or another, in OAS matters for nearly two decades. Since March 1974 I have been engaged in them full time. I am not tempted to engage in handwringing. I have been and still am critical, I hope constructively so, of certain attributes and aspects of the OAS. I believe the flaws are correctable, and intend to work to that end. Winston Churchill's dictum about democracy is easily transferable to the inter-American system. But on the whole there are more pluses than minuses, and I hope and believe that the inter-American system is susceptible to change and improvement so that its many components, particularly the OAS, can continue to serve the interests of all who live on this portion of our shrinking globe. If we didn't already have an OAS, we would almost surely have to invent one.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

- Political Prisoners in South Vietnam and the Philippines. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. May 1–June 5, 1974. 127 pp.
- Implementation of the Lodge and Katzenbach Recommendations on the United Nations. Report prepared for the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs by the Department of State. June 1974. 39 pp.
- Review of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. June 18–20, 1974. 92 pp.
- Turkish Opium Ban Negotiations. Hearing before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. July 16, 1974. 79 pp.
- Reorientation and Commercial Relations of the Economies of Eastern Europe. A compendium of papers submitted to the Joint Economic Committee. August 16, 1974. 771 pp.

Presidential Determination on Sale of Wheat and Rice to Syria

MEMORANDUM OF NOVEMBER 4, 1974¹

[Presidential Determination No. 75-7]

Finding and Determination—Syria


Memorandum for the Secretary of State;
the Secretary of Agriculture

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, November 4, 1974.

Pursuant to the authority vested in me under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (hereinafter "the Act"), I hereby:

(a) Find, pursuant to Section 103(d)(3) of the Act, that the making of an agreement with the Government of Syria for the sale, under Title I of the Act, of 75 thousand metric tons of wheat and 25 thousand metric tons of rice is in the national interest of the United States; and

(b) Determine and certify, pursuant to Section 410 of the Act and Section 620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, that, in the event it may be applicable, it is in the national interest of the United States to waive the prohibitions contained in those sections against assistance under Title I of the Act for the sale to Syria of 75 thousand metric tons of wheat and 25 thousand metric tons of rice.



STATEMENT OF REASONS THAT SALES UNDER TITLE I OF THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1954, AS AMENDED (PUB. L. 480), TO SYRIA ARE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Syria is a key to our efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Our success will depend in part on Syrian confidence in our intention to develop a broad and constructive bilateral relationship with that country. A program for concessional sales of agricultural commodities to Syria will constitute a tangible demonstration of our intended role in that regard.

In response to current Syrian needs, it is proposed

to export to that country 75 thousand metric tons of wheat and 25 thousand metric tons of rice financed under Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (Pub. L. 480). This amount is based on Syria's needs for not more than one fiscal year.

In order to enter into an agreement with the Government of Syria for such a sale under Title I, it is necessary that the President find and determine that such sales would be in the national interest of the United States. Section 103(d)(3) of Pub. L. 480 prohibits the sale of agricultural commodities under Title I of the Act to any nation which sells or furnishes or permits ships or aircraft under its registry to transport to or from Cuba or North Vietnam any equipment, materials, or commodities (so long as those countries are governed by Communist regimes). However, if such activities are limited to the furnishing, selling, or selling and transporting to Cuba medical supplies, non-strategic agricultural or food commodities, sales agreements may be made if the President finds they are in the national interest of the United States.

Although Syria has been trading with Cuba in recent years, our information indicates that it has not traded with North Vietnam. Syrian ships or aircraft have not called at Cuba or North Vietnam. The best information available indicates that current Syrian trade with Cuba is limited to non-strategic agricultural commodities within the meaning of Section 103(d)(3).

Section 410 applies to assistance under Title I of Pub. L. 480 the prohibitions contained in Section 620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, relating to naturalization [sic] or expropriation of property owned by Americans; the prohibitions of Section 620(e), however, may be waived by the President if he determines and certifies that such a waiver is important to the national interest of the United States. There are several potential claims involving property rights and interests of Americans in Syria which might make Section 410 applicable to Syria, and these will be the subject of separate negotiations with Syria.

The considerations noted above, however, make the proposed sale important to the national interest of the United States notwithstanding the prohibitions contained in Sections 103(d)(3) and 410 of Pub. L. 480.

¹ 39 Fed. Reg. 40005, Nov. 13, 1974.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences

Scheduled January Through March ¹

GATT/UNCTAD International Trade Center Joint Advisory Group	Geneva	Jan. 4-8
U.N. ECOSOC Organizational Meeting for 58th Session	New York	Jan. 6-9
UNIDROIT Committee of Experts on Hotelkeepers	Rome	Jan. 6-10
ESCAP Committee on Economic Planning	Bangkok	Jan. 6-14
UNCITRAL Working Group on Negotiable Instruments	Geneva	Jan. 6-17
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Social Development	New York	Jan. 6-24
IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision, Stability, and Load Line: 17th Session.	London	Jan. 13-17
FAO Intergovernmental Group on Rice: 18th Session	Rome	Jan. 13-17
Western Hemisphere Working Group on Transnational Enterprises	Washington	Jan. 13-17
ILO Working Party on Structure: 2d Session	Geneva	Jan. 13-20
UNDP Governing Council: 19th Session	New York	Jan. 13-31
ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting for Woodworking Industries: 2d Session.	Geneva	Jan. 14-24
OAS Meeting on Private International Law: 1st Session	Panamá	Jan. 14-31
Preparatory Committee for U.N. Conference/Exposition on Human Settlements: 1st Meeting.	New York	Jan. 15-24
Customs Cooperation Council Working Party on Customs Enforcement: 3d Session.	Brussels	Jan. 20-24
ECE Committee of Experts on Transport of Dangerous Goods	Geneva	Jan. 20-24
FAO Intergovernmental Group on Hard Fibers	Manila	Jan. 20-25
UNIDO Permanent Committee: 5th Session, 2d Part	Vienna	Jan. 20-27
WHO Executive Board: 55th Session	Geneva	Jan. 20-31
ITU/CCITT Working Party of Study Groups I and II	Geneva	Jan. 20-Feb. 4
U.N. ECOSOC Ad Hoc Working Group on Rules of Procedure	New York	Jan. 27-31
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights Working Groups	Geneva	Jan. 27-31
IMCO Subcommittee on Carriage of Dangerous Goods: 24th Session.	London	Jan. 27-31
ECE Committee of Experts on Transport of Perishable Foodstuffs	Geneva	Jan. 27-31
IMCO/ILO Joint Committee on Training	Geneva	Jan. 27-31
Customs Cooperation Council Chemists Committee	Brussels	Jan. 27-Feb. 1
UNCITRAL Working Group on International Shipping Legislation	New York	Jan. 27-Feb. 7
ICAO Committee on Aircraft Noise: 4th Meeting	Montreal	Jan. 27-Feb. 14
WIPO Committee of Experts on Protection of Phonograms	Geneva	January
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Science and Technology for Development Working Group.	New York	January
UNESCO/IBE Council: 11th Session	Geneva	January

¹ This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on December 13, lists international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period January-March 1975. Nongovernmental conferences are not included.

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCITT, International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; ESCAP, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross; IGOSS, Integrated Global Ocean Station System; IHD, International Hydrological Decade; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OAS, Organization of American States; UNCITRAL, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNDP, United Nations Development Program; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNIDO, United Nations Industrial Development Organization; UNIDROIT, International Institute for the Unification of Private Law; WIPO, World Intellectual Property Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

ICAO Panel on Application of Space Techniques Relating to Aviation: 6th Meeting.	Montreal	January or February
UNESCO/IOC Working Committee for an Integrated Global Ocean Station System: 4th Session.	Paris	Feb. 3
ECE Inland Transport Committee	Geneva	Feb. 3-7
IMCO Subcommittee on Ship Design and Equipment: 13th Session	London	Feb. 3-7
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations .	New York	Feb. 3-7
U.N. Preparatory Committee for Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference: 3d Meeting.	Geneva	Feb. 3-14
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Human Rights	Geneva	Feb. 3-Mar. 7
ICRC Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts: 2d Session.	Geneva	Feb. 3-Apr. 18
U.N. Geneva Group Consultations	Geneva	Feb. 4-5
UNESCO/IOC Working Committee for IGOSS and WMO Executive Committee on Meteorological Aspects of Ocean Affairs: 4th Joint Meeting.	Paris	Feb. 4-12
U.N. Conference on the Relation of States and International Organizations.	Vienna	Feb. 4-Mar. 15
Western Hemisphere Working Group on Transnational Enterprises	Washington	Feb. 10-14
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on General Safety Provisions	Geneva	Feb. 10-14
IMCO Legal Committee: 25th Session	London	Feb. 10-14
UNESCO/IOC International Coordination Group for the Cooperative Investigation of the Caribbean and Adjacent Regions: 7th Session	Jamaica	Feb. 10-14
UNCITRAL Working Group on International Sale of Goods . .	New York	Feb. 10-21
UNCTAD Committee on Commodities: 8th Session	Geneva	Feb. 10-21
Customs Cooperation Council Harmonized System Committee: 5th Session.	Brussels	Feb. 10-21
U.N. ECOSOC Policy and Coordination Committee	New York	Feb. 10-28
U.N. Outer Space Committee Legal Subcommittee	New York	Feb. 10-Mar. 7
WIPO Government Experts on Revision of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property.	Geneva	Feb. 11-17
ECE Working Party on Facilitation of International Trade Procedures.	Geneva	Feb. 17-21
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Container Transport	Geneva	Feb. 17-21
IMCO Ad Hoc Working Group on the IMCO Convention: 1st Session.	London	Feb. 17-21
FAO Committee on Wood-Based Panel Products: 4th Session . .	New Delhi	Feb. 17-21
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs	Geneva	Feb. 17-Mar. 7
ILO Governing Body: 195th Session	Geneva	Feb. 17-Mar. 7
WIPO Coordination Committee: Extraordinary Session	Geneva	Feb. 18
U.N. ECOSOC Population Commission	New York	Feb. 18-28
ECE Senior Advisers to ECE Governments on Environmental Problems.	Geneva	Feb. 24-28
ECA Conference of Ministers	Nairobi	Feb. 24-28
Customs Cooperation Council Working Party of the Technical Committee: 9th Session.	Brussels	Feb. 24-28
IMCO Subcommittee on Radio Communications: 14th Session . .	London	Feb. 24-28
ESCAP: 31st Session	New Delhi	Feb. 26-Mar. 7
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (resumed) . . .	Geneva	February
IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Navigation: 17th Session . .	London	February
WMO Tropical Experiment Board: 7th Session	Geneva	February
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	February
UNESCO/IHD Bureau: 16th Session	Paris	February
ECE Senior Economic Advisers	Geneva	Mar. 3-7
UNESCO/IOC Executive Council of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission: 5th Session	Venice	Mar. 3-8
Customs Cooperation Council: 87th and 88th Sessions	Brussels	Mar. 3-14
North Pacific Fur Seal Commission: 18th Meeting	Washington	Mar. 3-22
ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems	Geneva	Mar. 10-14
IMCO Subcommittee on Safety of Fishing Vessels: 17th Session .	London	Mar. 10-14
U.N. ECOSOC Committee for Program and Coordination	New York	Mar. 10-14
UNCTAD Trade and Development Board: 6th Session	Geneva	Mar. 10-21
ITU/CCITT Working Party III and Study Group I	Geneva	Mar. 10-21
UNIDO: 2d General Conference	Lima	Mar. 12-26
WIPO Permanent Committee, Legal-Technical Program for Acquisition by Developing Countries of Technology Related to Industrial Property.	Geneva	Mar. 17-21

ECE Group of Experts on Construction of Vehicles	Geneva	Mar. 17-21
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 32d Session	London	Mar. 17-21
FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Program	Rome	Mar. 17-25
3d U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea: 3d Session	Geneva	Mar. 17-May 10
Customs Cooperation Council Valuation Committee: 66th and 67th Sessions.	Brussels	Mar. 18-27
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Customs Questions Concerning Containers.	Geneva	Mar. 24-28
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Natural Resources	Tokyo	Mar. 24-Apr. 4
FAO Study Group on Oilseeds, Fats, and Oils	Rome	Mar. 26-28
UNCITRAL: 8th Session	Geneva	March
U.N. Consultative Committee of Experts on the International Women's Year Conference.	Geneva	March
ICAO Meteorological Operational Telecommunications Network in Europe Regional Planning Group: 10th Meeting.	Paris	March
ICAO Automated Data Interchange System Panel: 6th Meeting	Montreal	March
UNESCO Executive Committee of the International Campaign To Save the Monuments of Nubia: 25th Session.	Aswan	March
UNESCO Meeting of Government Experts on the International Recognition of Studies, Diplomas, and Degrees in Higher Education in the Arab States.	Middle East	March
WIPO Joint Ad Hoc Committee on the International Patent Classification, Strasbourg Agreement.	Geneva	March
Meeting of Foreign Ministers of Latin America	Buenos Aires	March
WMO Panel on Meteorological Satellites: 2d Session	Geneva	March

U.S. Endorses UNHCR Efforts To Solve Refugee Problems

Following is a statement made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., on November 25.

USUN press release 178 dated November 25

The occasion for the review of the annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)¹ is always something of a sad one; for we must then focus our attention on the worldwide phenomenon of refugees, a picture of suffering, deprivation, and desolation. Refugee problems differ widely from each other in their origin and in their nature. But they all present a picture of uprooted, homeless human beings casting their lot among and desperately placing their hopes in the more fortunate people of other lands.

But against this facade of tragedy we have reason for some solace and even some optimism. Surely we must all take heart from

the deeply constructive and determined efforts of the High Commissioner and his Office as they direct the rehabilitation of the refugees. Indeed, the Office of the UNHCR—concerned as it is with rebuilding the lives of those who have been victims of oppression, persecution, warfare—stands as a shining symbol of man's humanitarian endeavor in behalf of his fellow man. The variety and complexity of the High Commissioner's wide-ranging services for refugees are a tribute to the conscientious and resourceful manner in which he approaches his task.

During the past year, as in previous years, the UNHCR has devoted special attention where needed to the rehabilitation of severely handicapped refugees. These are refugees who for any of a variety of physical, mental, or social disabilities are completely unable to fend for themselves. Through tireless efforts and through unmatched expertise, working on an individual case basis, the UNHCR has continued to develop satisfactory solutions for these otherwise helpless individuals. The UNHCR program for the handicapped refugees is surely in the highest humanitarian tradition of the United Nations and reflects great credit upon it.

¹ U.N. doc. A/9612 and addenda.

Once again my government wishes to stress in this forum the overriding importance among the High Commissioner's manifold activities of his function of providing international protection for refugees. It is difficult to overemphasize the significance to refugees of insuring liberal asylum policies and practices and, above all, of making certain that no refugee is required to return to any country where he would face persecution. It is the High Commissioner's task to work unceasingly toward affording such guarantee. His chief tools in so doing are the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. As the committee knows, article 33 of the convention contains an unequivocal prohibition upon Contracting States against the refoulement of refugees "in any manner whatsoever" to territories where their life or freedom would be threatened on grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.

But beyond the insuring of asylum for refugees, the High Commissioner, through his international protection role, is also charged with securing for refugees the status and rights within asylum countries or third countries which will enable them to live in dignity, to become self-supporting, and to cease being refugees. Here again the international treaties which I have mentioned, the Refugee Convention and Protocol, form the principal instruments for the High Commissioner in securing for refugees the cardinal element of protection.

The High Commissioner, Prince Sadrudin Aga Khan, in paragraph 22, page 6, of his annual report, has deplored the fact that during the past year certain countries have repatriated refugees involuntarily, directly contrary to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to article 33 of the Refugee Convention. My government joins with the High Commissioner in condemning the inhumane practice of refoulement. The principle that refugees must not be repatriated against their will, and the right of a refugee to seek

and secure asylum, have become ever more firmly embedded in international law. The general application of non-refoulement should be facilitated by the increasing acceptance of the maxim that the granting of asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act and should not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any state. My government will continue to attach primary importance, as concerns the work of the UNHCR, to his role of international protection.

We are gratified to note in this connection that the High Commissioner in his annual report characterizes his role of international protection as "the prime function of UNHCR and the cornerstone of the work of assistance to refugees." My government wishes to commend the High Commissioner for the emphasis he has placed on this aspect of his duties during the past year. We note particularly that during the year the High Commissioner made a renewed worldwide effort—both through public appeal and through individual letters to governments—recommending strongly to those nations which have not yet acceded to the protocol or convention that they do so. The rights for refugees which are embodied in these international treaties can lead to just and lasting solutions to refugee problems in humanitarian terms. Such solutions in turn can help promote the reduction of tensions, the solution of broader issues, and the stability of concerned nations.

Last year, once again, the High Commissioner conducted his material assistance program in a highly constructive and imaginative manner. We note that the UNHCR devoted the major share of total financial commitments under the program to problems in Africa, where the need is very great. The United States is fully in accord with that commitment. At the same time, we observe that the High Commissioner has pursued his material assistance program with equal effectiveness in Latin America, Europe, and the Middle East. We salute the High Commissioner for his promptness, effectiveness, and flexibility in meeting the diverse chal-

allenges involved in the relief and rehabilitation of refugees in many categories worldwide.

It should not pass unnoticed that the UNHCR in all cases concerns himself at once with the total task of rehabilitating the refugee so that he can cease being a refugee and can take his place as a self-supporting person in the society of his new country. The combination of rights for refugees, secured through the international protection function, and the tangible assistance and rehabilitation of the refugees which the material assistance program affords gives the refugee the opportunity to live in dignity, self-respect, and self-sufficiency.

My country has a national heritage of concern for oppressed and homeless refugees. That concern dates back to the very founding of our Republic 200 years ago and is expressed today in part through our worldwide support for refugee assistance programs. During fiscal year 1974 the United States contributed some \$174 million, primarily in cash but also in food commodities, to assist refugees all over the world who fall within the concern of the UNHCR, and some \$149 million additionally for refugees not within the UNHCR mandate.

The past year has been an eventful one for the UNHCR in relation to the carrying out of the special tasks entrusted to it by the Secretary General under the UNHCR "good offices" function. It is indeed fortunate that the High Commissioner is willing and competent to respond so ably in meeting special emergency problems which lie beyond the normal boundaries of UNHCR concern. The UNHCR has perhaps-unequaled experience among United Nations agencies in dealing with emergency humanitarian needs of people and in solving their related problems. Thus we note that during the past year the High Commissioner has been deeply involved in the repatriation of uprooted Pakistanis and Bengalees, in completing the search for homes for Asians who had to leave Uganda, with commencing an initiative to-

ward the relief and rehabilitation of uprooted and displaced persons in all areas of Viet-Nam and Laos, with the relief and resettlement of refugees in and from Chile, and in carrying out his assigned role as coordinator of humanitarian assistance in Cyprus.

My government strongly endorses the manner in which the High Commissioner has performed these imposing tasks. There can be no doubt that the successful implementation and conclusion of the two-way repatriation movement between Bangladesh and Pakistan contributed to reconciliation on the subcontinent, as the governments concerned have themselves declared. We welcome the High Commissioner's initiative in Indochina and will cooperate with it, as we have with respect to the UNHCR activities in behalf of Chilean refugees. The international community may take heart and solace in the determined manner in which the UNHCR has successfully found permanent homes for every one of the Uganda Asians of undetermined nationality who had previously been moved by the UNHCR to transit centers in Europe.

Finally, my Government is deeply gratified at the vigorous and successful manner in which the UNHCR is discharging his special role, assigned to him by the Secretary General, as coordinator for humanitarian assistance in Cyprus. The United States has been pleased to respond to the High Commissioner's appeal for \$22 million for this purpose with the pledge of a contribution of \$7.3 million, in addition to the \$3.2 million in assistance which we had provided before the UNHCR assumed this task.

My government feels strongly that the increase in magnitude of the High Commissioner's material assistance program, and the increasing calls upon the UNHCR to use his "good offices" in situations which normally do not fall within UNHCR concern (such as the Cyprus problem and the South Asian repatriation program) should not be allowed to impede or infringe upon the High Commissioner's first priority to provide international protection for refugees who are

the regular concern of the UNHCR Office. I do not suggest that the High Commissioner has in any way been delinquent in carrying out his protection mandate. I merely wish to stress that my government, like the High Commissioner, attaches primary importance to international protection among all UNHCR activities.

The wide-ranging and apparently ever-increasing scope of UNHCR activities in the field of material assistance—both for refugees who are normally of UNHCR concern and for those assisted under his “good offices”—surely justifies the High Commissioner’s request that the General Assembly authorize him to allocate up to \$2 million annually from the UNHCR Emergency Fund. Experience has shown that these allocations, up to \$500,000 for any one emergency, are desperately needed in crisis situations. My government strongly supports this proposal.

It is noted that the committee is again to consider the question of whether to establish a definite date for the convening of a conference of plenipotentiaries to finalize the draft convention on territorial asylum. The United States is of course eager to see the advancement in the world of recognition and implementation of the important humane principle of asylum. We support therefore the convening in due course of a conference of plenipotentiaries toward the finalization and ultimate adoption of an effective, realistic treaty on asylum. The present draft is a promising start toward such a convention. We believe, however, that the draft raises quite a number of questions which need to be resolved and that it requires considerable work. The next step, in our view, therefore is to convene a committee to perform the task of perfecting the present draft. We believe that the draft which emanates from this committee should then be resubmitted to governments for their consideration prior to the setting of any definite date for a final conference of plenipotentiaries. I would like to stress that it is our belief that such a procedure would contribute to the prospects for ultimately opening for accession a treaty which would receive wide support among nations.

I cannot conclude my remarks without making one more observation on the work of the High Commissioner and his staff. We have all heard others express the well-deserved tributes to him for his work, his dedication, and his zeal in looking after those who need and needed his help. Yet all this would not have been possible had it not been for the confidence and support my colleagues and their governments were able to give him. I wish therefore to express my government’s appreciation, to which, if I may, I add my own personal thanks, to all of you for making possible the ways and means for the High Commissioner to be able to act with dispatch and with compassion in mitigating hardships among those who needed us and in giving some basis for hope, to those who yearned for it, that mankind had not forsaken them.

United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 10017.

Economic and Social Council

- World Population Conference background papers:
International mortality trends: some main facts and implications. Prepared by George J. Stoltz, professor of economics, Indiana University. E/CONF.60/CBP/17. June 4, 1974. 29 pp.
Population, food supply and agricultural development. Prepared by the Food and Agriculture Organization. E/CONF.60/CBP/25. June 4, 1974. 27 pp.
Health trends and prospects in relation to population and development. Prepared by the World Health Organization. E/CONF.60/CBP/26. June 5, 1974. 51 pp.
Summary country statements concerning population change and development. E/CONF.60/CBP/33. June 21, 1974. 68 pp.
The role of international assistance in the population fields. Prepared by the U.N. Fund for Population Activities. E/CONF.60/CBP/24. July 3, 1974. 36 pp.
Summaries of background papers commissioned for the World Population Conference. E/CONF.60/CBP/35. July 12, 1974. 73 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: December 16, 1974.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright convention, as revised, concerning the application of that convention to works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright convention, as revised, concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Ratification deposited: Monaco, September 13, 1974.

Gas

Protocol for the prohibition of the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare. Done at Geneva June 17, 1925. Entered into force February 8, 1928.²

Senate advice and consent to ratification: December 16, 1974 (with reservation).

Maritime Matters

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 1973.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: December 16, 1974.

Patents

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24, 1971. Enters into force October 7, 1975.

Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited: Spain, November 29, 1974.

Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that accession deposited: Australia, November 12, 1974.

Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: Brazil, November 26, 1974.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Accession deposited: Bolivia, December 19, 1974.

Operating agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with annex. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Signature: Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones of Bolivia, December 19, 1974.

Satellites

Agreement concerning conditions for the furnishing of assistance by NASA for the launching of the French-German Symphonie communications satellites. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 21 and 24, 1974, between France and the United States and between the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States. Entered into force June 24, 1974.

Wills

Convention providing a uniform law on the form of an international will, with annex. Done at Washington October 26, 1973.¹

Signature: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, December 17, 1974.²

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 4, 1974 (TIAS 7949). Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca December 2, 1974. Entered into force December 2, 1974.

Bulgaria

Consular convention, with agreed memorandum and exchange of letters. Signed at Sofia April 15, 1974.¹

Senate advice and consent to ratification: December 16, 1974.

El Salvador

Agreement relating to the payment to the United States of the net proceeds from the sale of defense articles by El Salvador. Effected by exchange of notes at San Salvador October 24 and

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

³ With statement.

December 6, 1974. Entered into force December 6, 1974; effective July 1, 1974.

Israel

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Washington December 16, 1974. Entered into force December 16, 1974.

Italy

Exchange of letters concerning the application of the convention of March 30, 1955 (TIAS 3679), for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Effected by exchange of letters at Rome December 13, 1974. Applicable provisionally on and after January 1, 1974.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Note—\$23.10; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 30¢ each.

Liechtenstein	Cat. No. S1.123:L62	Pub. 8610	4 pp.
Mauritania	Cat. No. S1.123:M44/2	Pub. 8169	6 pp.
Norway	Cat. No. S1.123:N83	Pub. 8228	4 pp.
Paraguay	Cat. No. S1.123:P21	Pub. 8098	5 pp.
Philippines	Cat. No. S1.123:P53	Pub. 7750	8 pp.

Atomic Energy—Application of Safeguards Pursuant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Protocol with Thailand and the International Atomic Energy Agency. TIAS 7833. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7833).

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with the Republic of China amending the agreement of April 4, 1972. TIAS 7834. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7834).

Food and Agriculture Organization—Amendments to the Constitution. TIAS 7836. 6 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7836).

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Declaration on the provisional accession of the Philippines. TIAS 7839. 8 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7839).

International Trade in Textiles. TIAS 7840. 62 pp. 65¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7840).

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with Spain. TIAS 7841. 39 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7841).

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with the Republic of Korea amending and extending the agreement of November 24, 1972. TIAS 7842. 18 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7842).

Tracking Station—Kwajalein Island. Agreement with Japan. TIAS 7843. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7843).

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with Portugal. TIAS 7844. 33 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7844).

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with the Republic of Viet-Nam extending the agreement of April 22, 1959, as amended and extended. TIAS 7846. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7846).

Passport Visas. Agreement with Mexico amending the agreement of October 28 and November 10 and 12, 1953. TIAS 7847. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7847).

Atomic Energy—Application of Safeguards by the IAEA to the United States-South Africa Cooperation Agreement. Agreement with South Africa and the International Atomic Energy Agency amending the agreement of July 26, 1967. TIAS 7848. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7848).

Atomic Energy—Application of Safeguards Pursuant to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Protocol with Thailand and the International Atomic Energy Agency terminating the agreement of September 30, 1964, and the protocol of May 16, 1974. TIAS 7849. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7849).

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agreement with Thailand. TIAS 7850. 16 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7850).

Congress. Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy 23

Cuba
Text of Draft OAS Resolution To Rescind the Sanctions Against Cuba 8
U.S. Abstains on Proposed OAS Resolution To Rescind the Sanctions Against Cuba (Ingersoll, Mailliard, Rogers) 8

Cyprus. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference at Brussels 1

Energy. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference at Brussels 1

Foreign Aid. Presidential Determination on Sale of Wheat and Rice to Syria (text) . . 24

France. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference at Brussels 1

Greece. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference at Brussels 1

Human Rights. Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and Week (proclamation) . . 18

International Organizations and Conferences. Calendar of International Conferences . . 25

Latin America. The Inter-American System: Adjusting to Present-Day Realities (Mailliard) 19

Middle East. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference at Brussels 1

North Atlantic Treaty Organization
North Atlantic Ministerial Council Meets at Brussels (communique) 5
Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference at Brussels 1

Organization of American States
The Inter-American System: Adjusting to Present-Day Realities (Mailliard) 19
Text of Draft OAS Resolution To Rescind the Sanctions Against Cuba 8
U.S. Abstains on Proposed OAS Resolution To Rescind the Sanctions Against Cuba (Ingersoll, Mailliard, Rogers) 8

Presidential Documents
Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and Week (proclamation) 18
Presidential Determination on Sale of Wheat and Rice to Syria 24

Publications. GPO Sales Publications . . . 32

Refugees. U.S. Endorses UNHCR Efforts To Solve Refugee Problems (Ferguson) . . 27

Spain. U.S. and Spain Hold Second Session of Talks on Cooperation (joint communique) . 7

Syria. Presidential Determination on Sale of Wheat and Rice to Syria (text) 24

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 31

Turkey. Secretary Kissinger Holds News Conference at Brussels 1

United Nations
Bill of Rights Day, Human Rights Day and Week (proclamation) 18
United Nations Documents 30
U.S. Endorses UNHCR Efforts To Solve Refugee Problems (Ferguson) 27

Name Index

Ferguson, Clarence Clyde, Jr 27
Ford, President 18, 24
Ingersoll, Robert S 8
Kissinger, Secretary 1
Mailliard, William S 8, 19
Rogers, William D 8

**Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: December 16-22**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.
Releases issued prior to December 16 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 524 of December 12 and 530 of December 13.

No.	Date	Subject
*531	12/16	Kissinger: death of Walter Lippmann.
532	12/16	NATO ministerial meeting communique, Brussels.
†533	12/16	Kissinger: news conference, Martinique.
*534	12/17	Britton sworn in as Ambassador to Barbados and to Grenada (biographic data).
†535	12/17	Kissinger: Board of Foreign Scholarships dinner.
*536	12/17	Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs.
†537	12/18	Kissinger, Linowitz: remarks following meeting, 12/17.
†538	12/18	U.S.-Japan bilateral fisheries agreements.
*539	12/19	Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Jan. 21.
*540	12/20	Biographic data on Secretary Kissinger.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.