THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXI • No. 1853 • December 30, 1974

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $29.80, foreign $37.25
Single copy 60 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of December 7

Press release 518 dated December 7

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, my apologies for having made you come in on Saturday. I had planned to do this on Monday but forgot that I have a congressional appearance on Monday afternoon and Foreign Minister [of Israel Yigal] Allon on Monday morning.

I'd like to begin by reading a brief statement on military aid to Turkey, which I am doing on behalf of the President as well as myself.

As you know, Congress in October enacted legislation which will cut off military assistance to Turkey on December 10. As you are also aware, the Senate has now acted to extend the period prior to such a cutoff. It is absolutely essential, and the President and I strongly urge, that the House take similar action immediately.

To begin with, the congressional decision to terminate military assistance to Turkey has not served the purpose it was designed to accomplish. Rather, it undermines the ability of the U.S. Government to assist in bringing about a just settlement of the tragic conflict on Cyprus.

We had made progress with the Turkish Government in the development of steps designed to make possible the initiation of negotiations.

Congressional action in October setting a terminal date for military assistance contributed substantially to the difficulties that have prevented the beginning of negotiations. Unless the Congress acts now to permit the continued flow of military assistance, further efforts by the United States to assist in resolving the crisis will be thwarted and our ability to play a future useful role will be undermined.

The United States has made it clear that it does not approve of actions taken by Turkey on Cyprus. We have equally made clear that Turkey should display flexibility and a concern for the interests of the other parties in that dispute.

The United States will continue to do all it can to assist the parties in arriving at an equitable and enduring resolution of the Cyprus problem. But if we are deprived of diplomatic flexibility, there will be little that we will be able to accomplish.

Even more important, the U.S. military assistance to Turkey is not, and has never been, granted as a favor. It has been the view of the U.S. Government since 1947 that the security of Turkey is vital to the security of the eastern Mediterranean, to NATO Europe, and therefore to the security of the Atlantic community.

These are the reasons, and these alone, that we grant military assistance. They were compelling when we first decided to grant such aid. They are equally compelling today.

In 1947, our commitment to assist Greece and Turkey marked the turning point in the building of a security system which has contributed to Western security. Are we now to establish a new turning point which will mark the end of our commitment to a system which has served the free countries so well?

The security interests of the West may be irreparably damaged unless the Congress takes immediate action to permit military assistance to Turkey to continue.

This statement is made on behalf of the President as well as myself.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you would care to use this, what I assume is a first public opportunity to answer the critics of the Vladivostok agreement. I had in mind especially two points. One, the argument that the

number you agreed upon in Vladivostok is too high and really wouldn't stop the nuclear arms race. And, second, that the throw-weight issue, which a senior official called a phony issue, wouldn't be phony, would be more serious, if the Soviets started MIRV'ing [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles] their large missiles.

The Vladivostok Strategic Arms Agreement

Secretary Kissinger: Let me make a few comments about the Vladivostok agreement.

Throughout the SALT Two [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] negotiations, our negotiators strove for the following objectives:

—One, to achieve a ceiling on the number of total delivery vehicles.

—Second, to achieve a ceiling on the number of MIRV'ed delivery vehicles.

—Third, to have these ceilings equal.

—Fourth, not to count forward-based systems.

—Fifth, not to count the British and French nuclear forces.

—Sixth, not to give compensation to any other geographic factors.

—And then we thought other technical objectives, such as the freedom to mix, which means that each side should be free to compose its strategic forces substantially according to its best judgment.

All of these objectives were achieved in the SALT Two negotiations.

Now, with respect to the total numbers. The significance of the numbers is that for the first time in the nuclear age, a ceiling has been put on the strategic forces of both sides. For the first time in the nuclear age, for a 10-year period the arms race will not be driven by the fear of what the other side might be able to do but only by the agreed ceilings that have been established.

This can be justly described as a major breakthrough, and its significance becomes all the more clear if one compares the numbers not with some hypothetical model that one might have in mind but with what would have happened in the absence of this agreement.

In order to reach these numbers, the Soviet Union will have slightly to reduce its strategic forces, by some 5 percent, I would guess. If this agreement had not been reached, all our intelligence estimates agreed that both with respect to MIRV's and with respect to total numbers of forces that the Soviet Union would build would be considerably larger than those foreseen in the agreement, giving us the problem of whether we were to match these forces or whether we would permit a growing numerical gap against us to arise. So it is not a fair comparison to compare these figures with some abstract model but only with, one, the reality of existing strategic forces, and, second, what would, according to the best judgment of our intelligence community, have happened in the absence of such an agreement.

With respect to the argument that at this level a substantial capacity for overkill exists, this would be true at almost any foreseeable level, or at any level that has been publicly suggested by any of the protagonists in this debate. This is a problem that is inherent in the nature of nuclear weapons and in the size of existing nuclear stockpiles.

So, I repeat, the significance of this agreement is that for a 10-year period it means that the arms race will not be driven by the fear of each side of the building capabilities of the other side.

Now the argument that it does not stop the qualitative arms race. It is of course extremely difficult to stop qualitative changes in the best of circumstances, because it is very difficult to control what one is not able to describe, which is inherent in the nature of technological change.

However, it reduces substantially the incentive of an unlimited qualitative arms race. The nightmare in qualitative changes has always been the linkage of qualitative change with quantity. And it is the combination of technological improvement with increases in numbers that has produced the various models for strategic superiority that people were concerned about.

It is extremely difficult to conceive how, under the provisions of this agreement, foreseeable technological changes, if either side acts with a moderate—with even a modicum of circumspection—can produce strategic superiority.

And this gets to the throw-weight point and to the adjective "phony" as applied to the throw-weight point. It is rather difficult to be drawn into a debate about an adjective taken out of context from a deep-background discussion. But let me sum up my views with respect to throw weight.

Throw weight is, of course, one measure of strategic power. Throw weight is significant when it is converted into numbers of warheads and if these warheads are of sufficient accuracy to threaten a definable part of the opposing side's target system. It therefore is a function both of the power of the weapons and of the vulnerability of the targets. If one side acquires additional throw weight, the other side has the choice either of increasing its throw weight or reducing the vulnerability of the targets. For example, putting larger throw-weight missiles into our holes does not reduce the vulnerability of our silos. It increases the vulnerability of Soviet silos.

The major target system that is threatened by increases of throw weights are land-based silos. Over a period of 10 years, these are likely to become vulnerable on both sides, regardless of the throw weight that either side has, simply by improvement in accuracy and improvements in yield.

Under the agreement, the United States has the ability to increase its throw weight substantially if it is judged in our interests to do so. Even though there is a limitation on building new silos, our existing silos can accommodate missiles of a throw weight many times larger than the one we now have. And if we increased them by the permitted 15 percent, we can increase the throw weight even more. So there is no effective limit on the increase in our throw weight if we decide to match the Soviet throw weight.

We must remember, moreover, that the decision to accept the differential in throw weight was made six years ago, or 10 years ago, as a unilateral decision by the United States and has nothing to do with this agreement.

But the major point I want to make is this: We have the possibility of increasing our throw weight. We have also the possibility of increasing the invulnerability of our forces by reducing reliance on land-based silos and increasing the number of our submarine-based missiles.

We will not match throw weight simply for the abstract purpose of being equal in every category. We will take whatever measures are necessary to assure the invulnerability of our forces and to maintain strategic equivalence. If we should determine that we need to increase our throw weight, we will do so, and there is nothing in this agreement to constrain us from doing so. And therefore from this point of view, the throw-weight argument is an unreal issue.

International Energy Policy

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am sure there may be more questions about SALT, but I can't think of them at the moment, so I would like to ask you whether—

Secretary Kissinger: I am able to answer without a specific question. [Laughter.]

Q. Three weeks ago in Chicago you made a major speech calling for international cooperation to attack the energy problem and achieve a basis of consumer solidarity. Now, have you had any indications that this is going anywhere, that it is making an impression in Europe, and in that connection, do you intend next week, while you are over there in Brussels, to work on this at all?

Secretary Kissinger: The history of the discussion with respect to consumer solidarity since the Washington Energy Conference has been that in fact there has always been more progress than has been generally apparent.

For example, in the interval between the Washington Energy Conference last February and October of this year, there was set

up the International Energy Agency and the system of emergency sharing, which creates at least a safety net in the case of some new embargo.

Since then, I have made specific proposals on how to take the next step in conservation and financial solidarity at Chicago.

We have had preliminary explorations with other consumers on that subject, specifically with the Federal Republic and with Japan and with others. And we are optimistic that the basic objectives of my Chicago speech can be realized and will be realized.

There will be technical disagreements about the size of the fund and other matters of this kind, but I am basically optimistic that the objectives that we set ourselves will be achieved, perhaps in an undramatic fashion.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to put another way the same question—why is it that the United States has not yet announced its own program of conservation measures?

Secretary Kissinger: The President, as he stated in his October speech to the Congress, wanted to give, and intends to give, the system of voluntary restraints a maximum opportunity to work. The President went over my Chicago speech in great detail before I gave it. He is fully aware of the domestic implications of the international program we have set forth. And based on extensive conversations I have had with him, I am certain that the United States will, in a measurable time, take the measures that are indicated by our program.

Strategic Arms Limitation

Q. Mr. Secretary, to return to the SALT question again, a senior American official was quoted as saying that the figures agreed on MIRV levels could have been lower. What did he mean? If they could have been lower, why were they not lower?

Secretary Kissinger: There are too many senior officials speaking on background. [Laughter.]

Q. I would think so, also, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: I was saying that the MIRV limits resulted substantially from American proposals and not from Soviet proposals. Basically, the judgment of our Defense Department was that once the MIRV's went beyond the point where, over a period of time, the land-based missiles might become vulnerable, a difference of a few hundred was not decisive. And therefore we geared the MIRV limits to a minimum program that we had established as being in the interest of our own security and made the proposed number consistent with that program. No major attempt was made to see whether a hundred less would have worked.

Q. Well, isn't that one of the major points in which the agreement is being criticized; namely, that these differences amount to, for example, in the case of a Trident submarine, a difference of 24 missiles can involve an expenditure of over a billion dollars per submarine. Is that not the basis for the criticism by Senator Jackson, particularly, that the agreement can result in the expenditure of additional billions of dollars beyond which the United States originally planned its own program?

Secretary Kissinger: That is certainly incorrect. These levels do not involve expenditures beyond the levels that the United States had planned. But what the critics would also point out is that the levels at which we would have had to spend if the arms programs of both sides had gone on in an unconstrained manner—the very people who had insisted all along on numerical equality are now accusing us of having too-high levels of arms, at a level of equality below the existing Soviet forces and substantially below the foreseeable Soviet forces. Therefore the alternative to this agreement in an unconstrained situation, according to the very dicta of equality, would have been that we would have had to spend considerably more than we will have to spend under this agreement. And this agreement does not make us spend any more than we had planned to spend to begin with.

Q. I thought Secretary [of Defense James R.] Schlesinger yesterday indicated that it would, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: I think Secretary Schlesinger indicated yesterday that in composing our forces, some additional—I do not believe that he meant to indicate that it required additional expenditures beyond those planned. He may have meant to indicate that it might involve additional expenditures beyond those that are now being spent.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we have become so inured to catastrophe that the figures 2,400 and 1,320 have an almost reasonable sound. But the projection has been made that by 1985 under this agreement the United States will have about 11,000 warheads and the Soviet Union 8,000 or 9,000. What would the warhead figure have been without this agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, without this agreement, on the projections of Soviet forces, they could have ranged anywhere from 20,000, certainly above 11,000, even for the Soviet forces. And again, I repeat, one has to compare here what would have happened without the agreement.

Secondly, one has to analyze the significance of the fact that a ceiling exists so that now, as I said before, the arms race is not driven by the expectations of each side or the worst fears of each side.

Thirdly, when people say one should have held out for lower numbers, the operational significance of holding out for lower numbers would be a substantially increased budget for our strategic forces next year. The only way we could plausibly have achieved lower numbers is to begin building up our strategic forces dramatically in order to produce an incentive to reduce numbers on the other side. On the basis of existing trends, where the gap would be increasing against us if we didn't increase our numbers, the incentive to achieve ceilings would decline and not increase. And therefore all these propositions must be seen in terms of the alternatives and not simply as abstract statements of desirable objectives.

Q. The projected figures I gave are ceiling figures, but do they not also represent the inherent and enormous overkill of which you spoke?

Secretary Kissinger: The word "overkill" is a figure of speech. If either side aims to exterminate the civilian population of the other, then it represents overkill. If you want strategic forces for specific military objectives, then whether it represents overkill gets you into complicated areas of strategic analysis.

If the figure had been 200 less, this so-called overkill problem would not have been substantially affected.

Once you have achieved a ceiling on strategic forces and a ceiling on MIRV's, it is our judgment that the follow-on negotiations for reductions will be a lot easier than they will be under conditions where both sides are still increasing their forces. Because the very argument that I have made of why it was not decisively different whether the level was 2,400 or 2,200 or, for that matter, 2,000 will then work in favor of the reductions.

Relations With the People's Republic of China

Q. Mr. Secretary, on your last trip to China, the announcement came that President Ford would be going there next year. And also he has mentioned that he wanted to maintain the momentum of development of relations. What effect will this have on our relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan, and what effect does it have toward establishing relations with the mainland?

Secretary Kissinger: We have stated constantly since the signing of the Shanghai communique that our objective was to bring about over a period of time normalization of relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States.

The visit of the President, following on the discussions that I have had in Peking, will be one further step along that route. The timing, the methods, and the forms remain to be determined as time goes on.

Visit of Canadian Prime Minister

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe the Trudeau-Ford meetings last week did anything to alleviate a possible trade war between Canada and the United States, and could you give us your explanation for the rather cold reception given to Trudeau by the administration?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I think that the meetings between the Prime Minister and the President contributed substantially to the improvement of relations between the two countries and to the dialogue between the two countries.

I read that Prime Minister Trudeau was given a cold reception. This was certainly not our intention. It was an unofficial visit; it was always understood to be an informal visit. We followed the protocol that is used for these visits.

I attended all the meetings. And the relationship between the Prime Minister and the President was unusually cordial. And in fact, after the formal part was over—I don't know whether that was announced, but the President took Trudeau to the family quarters, and the Prime Minister and the President and the two Foreign Ministers sat around and had drinks for another hour.

So I just don't agree that it was a cool reception. The meeting was extremely cordial. And insofar as good personal relations between leaders contribute to easing foreign policy decisions, I think it made a major contribution.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the backdown on the oil, will the United States retaliate in any way?

Secretary Kissinger: The backdown on the oil is a complicated problem, because it is a major domestic issue in Canada. And I think this is an issue that Canada and we will have an opportunity to discuss over many months.

U.S. Reaction to U.N. Bloc Voting

Q. Mr. Secretary, Ambassador Scali made a speech to the United Nations yesterday that indicates we are taking a new tack, a new policy, toward that organization. Could you expand on that, please?

Secretary Kissinger: We have been disturbed by some of the trends in the United Nations.

We believe that it is unfortunate that there is a bloc that votes automatically, regardless of the merits of the dispute. And we have some questions about the procedures that were adopted on various deliberations. We believe that if the United Nations is to fulfill its functions, it is essential for the debates in the General Assembly to be related at least to some extent to the merits of the dispute rather than to automatic voting patterns. And I think there must be a scrupulous observance of the charter and of the procedures.

We thought it was desirable for Ambassador Scali to express our concerns.

Middle East Diplomacy

Q. Mr. Secretary, there were two rather interesting developments in the Middle East in the last couple of days. One—Prime Minister Rabin's statement that Israel was prepared to make far-reaching territorial compromises. And a day or so before that, a story in Ha'Aretz in which Rabin was said to be willing to drop Israel's previous demand for a declaration of nonbelligerency from Egypt in return for demilitarization of the Sinai and creating a de facto situation. To what extent do you believe that these apparent concessions have made it easier for a new round of negotiations to begin with Egypt?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, Foreign Minister Allon is coming here tomorrow. And to put minds at ease, I will be meeting him at the airport.

Foreign Minister Allon will be here tomorrow. We will then have discussions as to what the next steps might be.

We have felt very strongly that this phase of Middle East diplomacy should be done with a minimum of public declarations. And I don't believe that I would be contributing to progress by adding my voice to all of the

perhaps excessive speculations that have already been made. We hope that progress can be achieved.

Emigration From Soviet Union

Q. Mr. Secretary, this week you assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that through interested groups you would know whether the Russians were violating certain agreements they had reached with you.

Secretary Kissinger: Senate Finance Committee.

Q. Right—Finance. My accent. But at the same time, you testified that you could only speculate whether the decline by about 40 percent in 1974 was a result of decisions by applicants or whether it was affected by our administration's inability to live up to the terms of the trade agreement. Which statement is operative?

Secretary Kissinger: I said that we would know whether applicants would be restrained from applying, whether there would be harassment of applicants, whether visas would be granted in relation to the numbers of applications, through a variety of sources.

We are still operating under the old guidelines where nobody is claiming that these three principles are being rigidly observed. So we still are reasonably confident that what I said is achieveable—that is, that we will know whether there is interference with applications.

Q. But you don't know yet.

Secretary Kissinger: Not that I would want to speculate publicly.

Steps To Solve the Energy Problem

Q. Mr. Secretary, you talked before about the energy problem. I would like to go back to that. You said the United States will in the measurable period of time take certain steps. Is the administration now considering steps such as higher taxes on gasoline purchases or restrictions on gasoline purchases? Are those concrete steps you are considering? And is the measurable period of time you are talking about when the President has to address the nation at the time of the state of the Union?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have some idea of the program the President is now considering. I think the announcement of such a program obviously has to be left to the President. I would be surprised if it were delayed much beyond the address to the Congress when it reassembles. And that this is the time period in which I think the decisions will be taken. What the specific measures are, I think I will have to leave for Presidential announcement.

Q. It goes beyond volunteer efforts.

Secretary Kissinger: That is my impression.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on the international aspects of that, you referred earlier to your belief that the program for financial assistance to deficit countries, the $25 billion program, would be achieved ultimately despite some technical objections to the form and the size of it. Could you be more explicit, sir? Prime Minister Trudeau has expressed publicly his preference to go the IMF [International Monetary Fund] route. So did West German Chancellor Schmidt. And could you also tell us what your hopes are for bringing France into a degree of cooperation with the industrial nations' policy?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the financial facility, the decision that the industrial nations have to make is whether they will finance their deficits, at least to some extent, by their own efforts or whether they want to put themselves into a position of being completely dependent on the producers for financing those deficits. This is an essentially political decision that they have to make.

We believe that it is important for the consuming nations to create at least some financial mechanisms to take care of at least some of the most difficult problems associated with the balance of payments.

We found in the initial discussions of the

emergency sharing program that many technical objections were voiced, which as the program became refined, were overcome. I still believe that when the problem of financial solidarity is viewed in its wider perspective, as something other than a purely technical financial problem, but something having to do with the political solidarity and in some respects the domestic tranquillity of the advanced consuming nations, that the advantages of doing it initially through methods such as we proposed will become overriding.

Now, with respect to France—we have always favored French participation in the efforts that we are proposing. The French have suggested a producer conference.

We are not opposed to a producer conference in principle. But it is misleading to give the impression that there is no consumer-producer dialogue going on now. The United States is engaged in an active consumer-producer dialogue through a number of commissions we have set up, such as with Saudi Arabia and Iran, through the frequent exchanges we have with Algeria. So we are engaged in a very active consumer-producer dialogue. The question we face is whether we want a consumer-producer conference in which all the consumers, or most of the consumers, meet most of the producers in a multilateral framework.

The only advantage of a multilateral framework is if there is a degree of consumer solidarity and a degree of consumer agreement as to basic approaches. Otherwise the producer conference will merely repeat the bilateral dialogues that are already going on.

Therefore the United States is prepared in principle to go along with a producer dialogue on a multilateral basis if it is preceded by consumer cooperation. And we are prepared to find mechanisms by which France can associate itself with this consumer cooperation.

It is our impression that this problem is soluble. It is certainly soluble from our side, because we have no interest at all to exclude France, and I think it is in the common interest of both consumers and producers that we proceed by the methods that I have outlined.

Possibilities of Cyprus Negotiations

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with your opening statement on aid, the aid bill and the possible damage that would be done by the House turning down the aid bill, on the relationship with Turkey. You have said a number of times in the past that you have been on the verge of achieving a breakthrough on the Cyprus question. Where does that stand now? Can you offer the House any hope that if they approve the bill that at some period before the cutoff date you will be able to achieve a breakthrough?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me make two separate points:

First, military aid to Turkey is not given primarily in the context of the Cyprus question. Military aid to Turkey is part of the overall defense of the free world. It has always been considered as an essential part of NATO, and given the foreseeable crises in the eastern Mediterranean, it would seem to us axiomatic that one should not drive Turkey out of a defense relationship with the United States at this particularly crucial period.

So the fundamental point we are making is that military assistance to Turkey is not a favor we do to Turkey. It is a reflection of a basic relationship.

Secondly, on negotiations with respect to Cyprus, the United States has indicated on a number of occasions that in our view, concessions should be made by Turkey—that we would use our influence in that direction. And we have talked to the Greek, Cypriot, and Turkish Governments in that sense.

The congressional action in October provided a major setback to these efforts. The domestic crisis in Turkey was another principal factor.

We believe that over a period of the next few months, progress in getting negotiations started can be achieved. Indeed, it was my intention, well known to the parties long before this issue came up—and the

appointments had been made—to talk to both the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers at some length within the framework of the NATO meeting to see whether matters could not be moved forward.

Now I would like to emphasize that the question of military aid to Turkey does not indicate any particular predeliction toward Turkey—nor does it indicate any support for Turkey on the particular issues that are before us in Greek-Turkish negotiations or on the Cypriot issue. It is to be seen in the context of the overall security of the West.

I do believe that progress is possible in negotiations on Cyprus, and the United States is certainly prepared to use its influence in the direction that I have indicated.

Incentives for Restraint by Superpowers

Q. Mr. Secretary, last Tuesday, during your second session before the Senate Finance Committee, you were asked by Senator Byrd [Harry F. Byrd, Jr.] to confirm that Soviet action during the October war was a violation of the May 1972 U.S.-Soviet agreement on détente. And you candidly admitted that Soviet action was indeed in violation of that agreement. What has happened since the last war to indicate to you that Soviet action during another war, if another war would erupt in the Middle East, would not be a violation?

Secretary Kissinger: My answer — the question was a little more specific, and my answer was more precise.

The question was: If the Soviet Union encouraged other countries to participate in the war in the Middle East, that this would constitute a violation of the principles that have been established. And I would have to say that if the Soviet Union encouraged other countries to participate, this would be considered a violation of the principles.

We are seeking to produce the maximum incentives for Soviet restraint on a global basis, including the Middle East, through a variety of measures, including of course direct conversations on the subject.

I would say that in fact the SALT agreement ought to provide incentives for restraint if it is viewed as it should be—as a political and not only a military decision.

What the Soviet Union will do in a specific crisis, I cannot now foretell. Our attitude, in any event, is clear: We do not believe that either of the superpowers should encourage a widening of any conflict that might arise.

Foreign Investment in the United States

Q. Mr. Secretary, as you are aware, sir, the governments of the Middle Eastern countries and citizens of those countries are using their oil money to buy into Western industries, most recently in Germany, and there was an unsuccessful attempt to buy into Lockheed Aircraft in this country. Yesterday, the Secretary of Defense indicated some reservations about any third countries and their nationals buying into key American industries, particularly defense industries and particularly those which have access to classified information.

What could you tell us is the official U.S. position on this, and have we made representations to other governments?

Secretary Kissinger: No, we have not made representations to other governments, partly because we are not absolutely clear what the nature of the representation is that we ought to be making—since, on the one hand, we are trying to get them to spend oil income in this country.

What we are doing is to start a study on the implications of substantial investments, at least in the United States—how we can keep track of them and what the complete implications are, or at least to identify the dangers against which we should guard. We have just begun thinking about this, and it will take us several weeks to form a clear judgment.

U.S. Policy Toward Expropriation

Q. Mr. Secretary, this morning the Venezuelan Government announced nationalization of U.S. Steel and Bethlehem Steel the first of the year. Now the companies, appar-

ently, have agreed to the terms of the settlements, so that legalities don't arise—but I was wondering whether you, in general, have any attitude toward this and whether you foresee any trend in Latin America along this line?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have not yet seen the precise terms of the settlement. It is my understanding that the expropriation was negotiated with the companies, and my impression is that the companies are not dissatisfied by the terms.

The U.S. position is that while we do not recommend expropriation, and indeed, while it runs counter to the investment of private capital, which may be one of the best sources for the underdeveloped countries of capital, we do not, as a government, object to it if there is fair compensation and due legal process. And this seems to have been the case in Venezuela, though I want to study the precise terms.

Need for Solidarity Among Energy Consumers

Q. Mr. Secretary, let's just get back to your Chicago speech. What kind of time scale do you envisage, and when do you think, and how will you certify that the consumers have made—in the main—expressed sufficient solidarity to the producers; and in that sense, how do you envisage bringing France into it?

Secretary Kissinger: We believe that substantial progress toward consumer solidarity can be made within the next three or four months. We will know when adequate consumer solidarity has been achieved. We have rather clear ideas. They are, after all, the yardsticks that we have laid down in the Chicago speech.

On the other hand, we won't pretend that there is consumer solidarity when there isn't, and if there isn't, we will continue our own consumer-producer dialogue.

Q. Well, at what point—I mean at what point do you think France can be persuaded that she has made the right gestures?

Secretary Kissinger: We are not interested in gestures—we are interested in reality. And we are not looking for excuses by which to pretend that solidarity has been achieved.

There is a rather clear program—progress toward a program—that would enable us to proceed with a multilateral producer dialogue, and we think this can be settled amicably and with good will.

I believe that the conversations between President Ford and the French President in Martinique are going to make major progress toward this objective—at least this is the attitude with which we will approach it.

Complex Middle East Negotiations

Q. At Rabat—but before the [*Yasir*] *Arafat visit to the General Assembly, where he was hailed—President Sadat of Egypt promised you that he would continue along with your step-by-step strategy on the Middle East.*

Now that position of Egypt seems a good deal more awkward than it may have seemed at the time, and you are seeing Allon, and Mr. Brezhnev is going to Cairo in January. Is Egypt still able to deliver on this promise, and what initiatives do you have with the Egyptians between now and the Brezhnev visit?

Secretary Kissinger: As I have pointed out, we believe that the next phase of Middle East diplomacy will be most effective if we don't speculate about the intentions of various parties.

I have heard nothing so far to indicate that the positions that were publicly announced at the beginning of November have changed. Obviously, the Middle East is a volatile area in which conditions can change. I have not heard anything to this effect, nor do I have any indication that it has happened, so we just have to see what—

Q. To follow up—when are you going to see your next Egyptian official? And where?

Secretary Kissinger: No plans exist, right now, for my seeing any Egyptian official.

The SALT Agreement and Defense Spending

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Jackson, in the memorandum he distributed yesterday, called on his colleagues to send back the SALT agreement as it stands now, on the grounds that the numbers are too high. What would be the effect on overall political relationships with the Soviet Union if in fact you were not able to get approval of the agreement, if in fact it were signed with the numbers as they are now?

Secretary Kissinger: I would say two things:

If the Senate or the Congress wants to send back the agreement to us with instructions to get lower numbers, they better send with it an authorization in the appropriations bill for $5–$10 billion to increase our strategic forces. It doesn't make any sense to instruct us to get better numbers without at the same time being prepared to pay the price of the arms buildup that will be the only possible incentive by which an agreement for lower numbers could be achieved. Of course the point might then also be reached at which 2,400 would represent a reduction of the overall forces of both sides—and so some theoretical satisfaction might be achieved politically.

One would have to say that the Soviet Union made very major concessions in Vladivostok. Anybody familiar with the negotiating record must know that the Soviet Union gave up its position on a whole range of issues. Now, if this, too, leads to a divisive debate in the United States, and if the pattern of the trade bill is repeated, I think then the Soviet Union will only be able to conclude that a political détente with us faces domestic difficulties of an insuperable nature in the United States.

And therefore I believe that the consequences of such an action would be extremely serious on the political level. And the consequences in terms of the arms race would be equally serious. To refuse this agreement without being prepared for a massive increase in defense spending, especially on strategic forces, would compound all the difficulties that we confront.

The South Korean Regime and U.S. Aid

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you were in South Korea with President Ford, did you discuss with President Park the release of the political prisoners and the restoration of a democratic government, in view of the strong congressional opposition to further military aid to such a repressive regime?

Secretary Kissinger: The Presidential Press Secretary pointed out in Korea that the subject was discussed, but it wouldn't be appropriate to go into detail.

The press: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your time this morning.

The Trade Reform Act and Today's World Economic Problems

Address by President Ford [1]

It is a great privilege and a very high honor to have the opportunity of participating in this American Conference on Trade. And at the outset, let me assure you that I thank you and I congratulate you on the magnificent efforts that you have made during the day and previously, and I exhort you to continue your efforts until we are successful in the achievement of the objective that has been determined, which is in the best interest of our country.

Within the last several weeks, I traveled about halfway around the world. I met leaders of Japan, Korea, and the Soviet Union, and I am here tonight to call on you, my fellow Americans, to come with me on an even greater journey, a journey that could be, without a question of a doubt, the most important in our lives, yours and mine, and will affect countless of Americans for many, many years to come.

It is, very simply put, to redefine, to reshape, the role of the United States in world trade. Those of you who are serious and cognizant, and all of you are, about the problems we face on this globe, you know that it is a new world out there. We are witnessing today a worldwide economic revolution.

New, acute economic problems and concerns have moved onto the world scene with startling swiftness. Nations, large as well as small, are redefining their national interests. Some talk in terms of economic bloc or area advantages. And there are those who face the increasing threat of a simple, very stark reality—survival.

The United States and most nations face the most serious economic challenge of the postwar period. Problems of energy, food, inflation, recession, pose unprecedented threats in all parts of the world. They threaten employment; they threaten income; they jeopardize international economic cooperation; and they menace political and security relationships that the United States has taken a generation to construct.

Unless we approach these problems constructively and cooperatively with our principal trading partners, we in the world may face a crisis of the most serious proportions.

These times call for positive, constructive American leadership. The United States cannot afford to drift in a sea of international uncertainty at a time when its highest economic interests call for very decisive actions. We cannot honestly claim leadership of the free world if we do not influence—with practical policies and real purpose—greater economic cooperation.

We must be under no illusion that we can go it alone. I think that is why all of you are here tonight and why I am here. And that is the reason the journey we undertake here must go on vigorously, effectively, and constructively. The word must go out from here tonight to the American people and to the people of other nations, and especially our friends in the Congress, that America has made a very serious decision: We must pass the Trade Reform Act—now. It is essential to the future of the United States trade policy and that of the world as well.

[1] Made at Washington on Dec. 3 before the American Conference on Trade, sponsored by a number of business, agriculture, consumer, and civic organizations (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Dec. 9).

The health of our domestic economy and the strength—yes, the very structure—of our international economic relations are deeply involved.

The Congress must act—and I say this with the utmost seriousness—or its inaction will gravely affect my efforts or anybody else's efforts to turn our economy upward. It will severely limit my ability, or the ability of anybody else, to work for international economic cooperation abroad.

You and I know that this legislation will, in all probability, be long delayed, possibly stymied forever, if it is not passed in the current session of this Congress. From a very practical point of view, it means that for the next year or more when the economic situation calls for decisive decisions, I will serve as your President without the power to fulfill my responsibilities in the crucial area of our nation's trade.

This vital bill, the trade reform bill, has been pending before Congress for nearly two years. Actually, no President of the United States has had the authority to negotiate international trade matters since 1967. International trade relations have not been really revamped since that time. It has been 40 years, as we look back over the pages of history, since passage of the nation's historic and fundamental Trade Agreements Act of 1934.

The central issue of trade reform is the close interrelationship between our domestic economy on the one hand and our economic international relations. And let us look at this important interrelationship for just a moment.

Admittedly, the American economy is in a recession at the present time. Inflation pressures are many. Fear of unemployment is increasing among our people.

The highest priority of this administration in the weeks and months ahead, as has been said since I took office four months ago, will be to attack these growing and changing economic problems. And one of the most effective ways to start is to pass the trade reform legislation in our national self-interest.

Obviously, I will need the full cooperation of the Congress. That is essential for all 213 million Americans. I will. And I have certainly welcomed the comments by the Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield, for bipartisan cooperation. I commend the Senate Committee on Finance and Chairman Russell Long for acting with restraint and not attaching unrelated amendments.

The international economy faces very similar difficulties. Inflation is a worldwide problem. Most of the economies of the industrialized world have swung into a downward cycle, partly as a consequence of inflationary distortions.

International cooperation is absolutely essential if the world is to conquer this twin illness of global recession and global inflation. We in the United States must develop a coordinated domestic and international approach to inflation and to recession. Trade is vital, essential, critical, to that program.

Two-way trade for America amounted to $163 billion for the first 10 months of this calendar year. Those are the latest figures. This leaves our current trade balance at a deficit of some $2.3 billion. This is due chiefly to the huge increase in the cost of imported oil. In the first 10 months of this year, oil imports cost us $20.1 billion compared to $7.8 billion for all of 1973. Thus, without the enormous increase in oil costs, we would have a good-sized surplus this year. The United States enjoyed a $1.3 billion surplus last year. This is important to note: Our exports for the first 10 months of this year are running at an annual rate of 36 percent above 1973.

These exports add up to many jobs for Americans in all parts of our country and in all sectors of our society. Some 3 million American workers owe their livelihood to our American exports—from stevedores to aircraft machinists to white-collar workers staffing American corporations. Even the smallest of our business organizations in this country, three out of five successful American exporters have fewer than 100 employees. More than 20 percent of American farm income derives from sales abroad.

Trade—everybody in this room knows—is the bread-and-butter issue to workers and

businesses in our communities, large, small, in all parts of our 50 states. That means farms on the one hand, business on the other, and industry as a whole.

Over the years the effect of trade on our economy has been highly favorable. The U.S. economy—consumers, workers—benefits from imports as well as exports. The explanation is relatively simple: Our total imports for the first 10 months of this year amounted to approximately $83 billion. About $37 billion of that figure were essential to American production—metals, foods, chemicals, minerals, including oil.

Many American businesses are heavily dependent on imported materials. Let me offer just a couple of specific examples of how imports help us as an industrial nation.

We are almost entirely dependent on foreign countries for such vital materials as chromium, platinum, titanium, manganese. More than 85 percent of our aluminum comes from overseas; so does most of our bauxite.

When we add the vigor from these imports to the strength of exporting, we can see the significance of trade to America's economic health. Trade adds to the income, the income of the American labor force, and to our economic preeminence in the world at large.

There will be no plus in our balance of trade this year because of the severe, high cost of importing oil. Otherwise, we could be and would be very much in the black.

Naturally, I consider the price we are paying for oil as much too high. It is raising havoc on our domestic economy. If you deduct the increased cost of oil imports, the United States exhibits a favorable trade balance of nearly $8 billion during the first six months of 1974.

Oil price increases are upsetting the entire international economic system. The adjustments, the answers must come from international bargaining, from international cooperation, and that is the top priority of this administration.

The overall effect of our trade is highly favorable, but the Trade Reform Act makes specific provision to assist those who might be adversely affected by imports. No sectors of our economy will be left to face serious disruptions. The legislation clearly states—and I will vigorously support such provisions—that we will assist workers, firms, communities adversely affected by imports.

In these very difficult times, it may be tempting for some in our great country to turn inward. Powerful forces in this country are not only thinking but actually urging an inward course on legislation, not only in the Trade Reform Act but in many other pieces of legislation. This, in my judgment, would reverse American postwar trade and other policies and would be enormously harmful to us as to the rest of the globe, our allies as well as our adversaries.

It is my strong feeling—and I say this with the deepest conviction—let us turn outward to view the complex picture of international trade. Our nation lives and acts in the world community within a very intricate framework. It is the framework of political, security, and economic ties that binds nations everywhere together.

There are those in the world who believe that unilateral and bilateral action promoting their own self-interest is the quickest and the most promising solution to their problems. I categorically reject that view. We must believe, and I certainly do, that this policy can only lead to conflict—an unending series of flareups and disputes in all parts of the world.

In contrast, the United States believes—and I am committed to this policy if the Congress will urgently let me negotiate—that the only real answer is the long-range solution of total world cooperation. I seek multilateral solutions to common problems that will benefit all nations, but I need the Trade Reform Act, and I need it now, if the President of the United States is to have any voice in the international scene.

Let me spell out, if I might, some of the consequences if I do not obtain this legislation from this Congress before it adjourns.

The coming GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] international trade negotiations involving 105 members would be dealt a crippling setback. I would lack the

necessary legislative authority to implement my accords or any accords; therefore it would be virtually impossible to arrive at any substantial trade agreements.

The U.S. international political, military, economic commitments would be seriously undermined. This, in my opinion, would encourage unrest and would certainly encourage world instability.

But let's be even more precise, if I might. In energy, Secretaries Kissinger and Bill Simon [William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury] are working diligently on international cooperation. But this cooperation cannot be one in a world involved with increasing strife in trade.

The international monetary system needs significant improvement. If we slide back into trade wars, we undermine our honest efforts to keep the international monetary system functioning effectively. Friendly trade is a must if we are to improve our market imbalances.

Trade is necessary so that developing countries can pay back various forms of outside assistance. Some of the developing nations are directly involved in our own growth. They own raw materials and other commodities in short supply essential to our development.

The Trade Reform Act offers me sufficient negotiating authority to achieve a substantial reduction in tariff levels on a worldwide basis. It would allow me to work toward greater market access for U.S. products abroad, adding innumerable thousands of jobs in our own 50 states.

This means jobs for Americans. That means a healthier economy. That means Congress has a duty and an obligation to pass this legislation now.

Let me use one other fact, if I might. I can assure you from my recent experiences that the Soviets are not sitting back. They are not looking for a seat as a spectator. They want and they will get part of the action.

The Soviets are ready to trade—politically, economically—but it will take time. It will take negotiation on the one hand, some very hard bargaining on the other. We have made a good beginning politically, a breakthrough on controlling the latest generation of nuclear weapons, a breakthrough for peace. Let us make the same breakthrough for trade essential for détente and progress around the world.

In 1973, the United States achieved a trade surplus of more than $1 billion from the Soviet Union. Another $900 million surplus came from other Communist countries around the world. Trade with these nations was, therefore, a very crucial factor in our overall trade surplus of $1.7 [$1.3] billion in 1973.

The Soviets will not deal unless we work to achieve mutually beneficial economic policies, including the elimination of discrimination against their trade, and unless we are willing to provide appropriate levels of credit within the framework established by the Congress.

Let's be very clear about this. Our competitive trading partners of Western Europe and Japan are issuing credits to Communist countries with which they are now trading. Their record shows that the Soviet credit is good. The credits we issue are small compared to our Western trading partners.

The world today looks to the United States of America for leadership. We have provided this since the end of World War II. We did not provide it prior to World War II. Therefore I would find it inexcusable, as would many Members of Congress and many Americans, if this legislation were to die as a result of delay and procrastination.

The Congress and the executive branch have cooperated more closely—and I might say at a greater length—on this bill than in any other single piece of legislation in the past six years. I can recount in the four months that I have been President a number of meetings with various Senators, various other Members of the Congress, in trying to find a reasonable, constructive compromise on how we might move this legislation forward. And I can assure you that I will personally continue these efforts in the remaining weeks of this session of the Congress.

And let me add this, if I might. And I see

how many members of my Cabinet are here—three, four. They are being told tonight, and everybody in their departments, that this is the job of highest priority—to get this legislation through between now and adjournment. And I will add a P.S. If they don't get it through, they are at fault, and you are, too. [Laughter.]

Well, let me just conclude with these observations and comments. I would find it inexcusable if this legislation were to become encumbered with nonrelated or nongermane amendments. This is somewhat technical, but those of us who have struggled in the Congress for some time know precisely what it means. These would be unrelated amendments, not related to the fundamentals of trade legislation under any circumstances.

They would be amendments that had no prior consideration at all in the Senate Committee on Finance. They would be extraneous to the subject matter that has brought all of you to the Nation's Capital.

I think the time has come; it is far too serious for this important legislation to be encumbered by these nonrelated or nongermane amendments. So, as you go through the halls and into the offices on Capitol Hill, make the point strongly, effectively, that this legislation must stand on its own and should not be overwhelmed with amendments that have no relationship to trade per se.

At this critical moment in our legislative history on this legislation, I don't think we can afford the gamesmanship of nonrelated, nongermane amendments.

I see some former colleagues of mine in the House of Representatives. In the main, we were able to keep nongermane amendments out of the House version of the bill. The burden is now on the United States Senate to do exactly the same.

And let me conclude with these final observations, if I might. I happen to believe that a society is great if its people think greatly, if its people act greatly, and this is a moment for greatness in America.

The journey which we together have started here tonight has no end. For the labor we undertake will never be complete—to help build a world economy that will contribute to the health and prosperity of people everywhere throughout this globe.

Every nation must carry its share of that great burden to uplift itself on the one hand and others as we move ahead. Every nation must reach out, out to others, to work together, to share in sweat and in sacrifice, secure in the knowledge that none will have to go it alone. This truly, as I see it, could be one of the world's finest hours. With your help, with our cooperation, and with the dedication of everybody, we can make it so.

Thank you very, very much.

Letters of Credence

Grenada

The newly appointed Ambassador of the State of Grenada, Marie J. McIntyre, presented her credentials to President Ford on November 29.[1]

Honduras

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Honduras, Roberto Lazarus, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 29.[1]

Luxembourg

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Adrien F. J. Meisch, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 29.[1]

United Arab Emirates

The newly appointed Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates, Saeed Ahmad Ghobash, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 29.[1]

Uruguay

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, Jose Perez Caldas, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 29.[1]

[1] For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated Nov. 29.

Chancellor Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany Visits the United States

Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, made an official visit to the United States December 4–7. He met with President Ford and other government officials in Washington December 5–6. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Ford and Chancellor Schmidt at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on December 5 and their exchange of toasts at a White House dinner that evening, together with the text of a joint statement issued on December 6.

REMARKS AT WELCOMING CEREMONY

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December 9

President Ford

Chancellor Schmidt, gentlemen: I am delighted to welcome you here in Washington, our Nation's Capital, on behalf of the American people.

This is your first visit, Mr. Chancellor, to the United States as the leader of the German Federal Government. It comes at an historic time for both of our countries.

We in the United States are on the eve of our bicentennial. One of the things that we are particularly aware of is the prominent role played by men and women of German descent in the building of America over the past two centuries. They have made tremendous contributions in fields as widespread as education and science, culture and the arts.

A few months ago the Federal Republic of Germany marked its own 25th anniversary. During this quarter century the Federal Republic has become one of the world's leading political and economic powers, and also one of its most responsible.

Throughout this entire period of relations between our two countries, it has been marked by a very close friendship and a very close cooperation, and we are particularly proud of that association.

Mr. Chancellor, we live in demanding times. In the effort to solve the formidable economic and political problems confronting us today, close cooperation and mutual help have become infinitely more important than ever. Only by working together can we overcome the current difficulties facing our economies and international economy.

I believe we can do it, and speaking for the American people, I appreciate the support your government has shown for strengthened economic cooperation in the international field.

We also recognize your international contributions in dealing with the problems of energy, food, and financial pressures.

A keystone, of course, of our present and future cooperation is the Atlantic alliance. At a time when all members of the alliance confront budgetary difficulties, difficult choices for all of them, we applaud and endorse your country's positive attitude toward maintaining the strength of NATO.

We also appreciate, Mr. Chancellor, your cooperation in helping to assure that no nation bear an unfair burden of the cost of our common defense.

We will have many important issues to discuss today and tomorrow, Mr. Chancellor. I look forward to those discussions in full confidence that these talks will contribute significantly to our efforts in creating more stable political and economic conditions throughout the world. I know that your

visit will further strengthen the already close friendship and partnership between the Federal Republic and the United States.

Mr. Chancellor, America bids you and your party a most cordial welcome.

Chancellor Schmidt

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: Thank you, Mr. President, very much for your warm welcome and for the kind words, regardful words, addressed to me and my party.

As you said, it is not my first visit to the United States, but the first time that I have come to this country as the head of government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

I am particularly glad to have this opportunity so soon after you, Mr. President, have assumed your office in order to exchange views on the main questions which do concern us.

In today's world we are faced with a multitude of difficult problems whose solutions will make unprecedented demands on our countries and will require us to harness our strength in the common effort.

The world is threatened by severe economic disruption. The Middle East conflict, whose settlement your administration is working so hard to bring about, and the energy crisis, which followed in its wake, have suddenly opened our eyes to the fragile nature of the foundations on which our economic and social and political stability does rest.

The strengthening of these foundations is a task that does concern us all, and which we can only master through broad international cooperation, as you said.

We in Germany are conscious of this challenge, and we are preparing ourselves to meet it. In this search we do attach specific importance to close cooperation and consultation between the United States of America and Europe and my own country.

The partnership between the United States and Europe has stood the test. It has existed for more than 25 years in the Atlantic alliance, which was strengthened by the Declaration of Ottawa in the middle of this year. It has also reflected our common efforts to promote détente in Europe and in the world.

We are resolved to do everything within our capability to strengthen and to further develop this partnership.

The untroubled friendship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany seems to be an excellent basis for this, and it is my firm conviction that our meeting, Mr. President, will bring us closer to this goal.

Thank you very much.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December 9

President Ford

Mr. Chancellor: It is a great privilege and a pleasure for me and our people to have you and your Foreign Secretary, Mr. Genscher, and the others from your party visiting us in Washington on this occasion.

We, of course, feel that this gathering is a reaffirmation of the longstanding friendship of your people as well as ours, your government as well as ours, a friendship that has a very broad base in military security, economic relations, people-to-people relations.

Of course, the pages of history in the United States are filled with contributions made over the 200 years of our nation's history, contributions made by people from your country.

It goes back as far as Baron Von Steuben, who was probably the finest military training officer as well as a fighting officer, who took a pretty ragged American outfit at Valley Forge and made it capable and competent to meet the challenges in the next spring.

And, of course, Abraham Lincoln had a very outstanding German who was a member of his Cabinet, who contributed significantly to our history in that day and that era.

Of course, the contribution by people from Germany to our country also includes the arts, it includes science, it includes literature. And as Larry Brown and I know,

there are some outstanding Germans who have contributed to our proficiency in athletics. One who may come to mind for some of us in the older age group, Lou Gehrig, was probably a legendary baseball player in our athletic history, and his ancestry, of course, was that of your country.

But with the people who have helped to make America great, and those that are working with us today in the field of the military, the economic areas, the rapport I think is good for not only each of us but for the world at large.

Twenty-five years of your history has been a period of 25 years of close personal relationship to the United States, and vice versa.

We seem to have the same philosophical views, the same ideological opinions as to how you can move ahead. We tend to subscribe in America to the views of one of Germany's greatest minds, one of the world's greatest—I am told, as I read history—Goethe. He once wrote that we can only earn our freedom and our existence by struggling for it every day.

For 25 years, day in and day out, the Federal Republic and the United States have worked together for a freer, better world in a spirit of mutual friendship and great mutual respect.

So, it is my privilege, Mr. Chancellor, in the spirit of our friendship and cooperation and mutual interest, to offer a toast to you and all that you embody and that of your great country: To the Chancellor and to the Federal Republic and its people.

Chancellor Schmidt

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, ladies and gentlemen: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for the kind and warm words you have addressed to my party and to me. I think one of the two of us has to confess to this distinguished gathering that, despite the fact that we did not intend to solve any bilateral problems between ourselves, because we don't have any bilateral problems [laughter], nevertheless we did make a bilateral agreement just tonight insofar as we agreed to put away the speeches which were made for us. [Laughter.]

And so, the President did and I am going to do it, but we allowed for just one quotation from the speeches. You will later on detect me, or observe me, looking to my paper once. But before so doing, I would like to point out that I think you were especially generous, Mr. President, in talking of the last 25 years of our really very good and ever-improving relationship, a relationship between your great country and ours.

You were very gracious not to mention periods of history before that—I will not dig into it. But I would like to say that my compatriots and I myself, we are really thankful for the great help which we have received from your people immediately after the war and that we also are thankful for having had your assistance, your standing firm on matters vital for our own sake; for instance, for your standing firm on Berlin all these years.

You have just come back to the United States from a meeting with the number-one man of the Soviet Union. From what I understand from your report to us, you have clearly added one step further in the policy of bringing about balance in the world and the stability of that balance, and bringing about détente, if you wish to call it that, a policy which we have followed, both of our nations, both of our governments, parallel to each other, as we have all these long decades followed in common the policy of making ourselves capable, if need should arise, to defend ourselves against threats or pressures from outside.

It seems to me that so far we have been very successful together with our other partners within the Atlantic alliance. In the meantime, new problems have come up which we did not foresee 10 years ago, referring to the Middle East or referring to the oil price explosion—I think one might call it an explosion—and all our economies so far have not adapted to that enormous change, whether it is in the field of real incomes, whether that is in the field of balance of payments, whether it is in the field of aggravating the process of inflation.

We have talked at length today, and also your Secretaries and aides and my party have talked at length, about economic problems. We have exchanged our analyses, we have exchanged our attitudes, our plans for future actions. Advice was given freely and taken from both sides—this is the point where I have to look to my paper [laughter]—because I wrote down in my own handwriting a little quote.

I think it is from some American. He is not as famous as Goethe. Nevertheless, it reads: "Free advice is the kind that costs you nothing unless you act upon it." [Laughter.]

So, I warn you, Mr. President, to be careful in acting upon our advice, and we will be careful on our side as well.

But coming back to a more serious aspect of the matter, I think I could say on behalf of my party, especially my colleague Genscher, and the rest, that we were very thankful for this free exchange of analyses and thoughts and of the plans we might put into operation in the next time, because we do really feel that your great country, five times as big—I mean in economic size—than ours and our second biggest in terms of foreign trade, we do really feel that both our responsibilities, vis-a-vis the world's economy as a whole and the other partners in the free-world economy, request from us that we try as much as one can to coordinate our economic policies as we have coordinated our defense policies, as we have coordinated our détente policies, as we tried to coordinate our policies all over the globe.

Now, at this present stage I think in the economic field there lies a great part of our faith, not only of your people, also of ours, also of other peoples in the world.

If the economic future becomes bleak and uncertain, economic uncertainty and economic failure can lead to economic unrest not only, but also social unrest and also domestic political unrest in a number of countries, not in the first instance in the United States of America, not in the first instance in our country, but we might be infected in the course of time.

I think all my compatriots heard with great satisfaction what you said this afternoon about you would not permit an aggravation of the downward trend of the economy, which at present is characterizing all our economies.

I am not going to too much dig into that field. I only wanted—using this as an example, the economic exercise of ours as an example—to express again, sir, our gratitude for this really free and frank and candid exchange of views and to express our gratitude for the endeavor on both sides to coordinate and harmonize our policies, which in fact does not mean that both of our parts have to exactly operate along the same lines, but means that we will have to follow complementary policies in order to achieve the same goal that we have in common.

Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to rise and drink to the President of the United States and our charming hostess.

TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT

Joint United States-Federal Republic of Germany Statement

The President of the United States of America Gerald R. Ford and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Schmidt met in Washington on December 5 and 6, 1974. They reaffirmed the relationship of friendship and trust and confidence between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, and they held wide-ranging talks embracing international and economic problems, security and defense policy, and current East-West discussions. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger and Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher participated in the discussions between the President and the Chancellor and held complementary talks. In the economic talks, the President was joined by members of his Economic Policy Board and the Chancellor was accompanied by representatives of labor and business.

The President and the Chancellor reviewed the world economic situation in depth and explored effective solutions for current economic problems. They were agreed that international energy problems, the sharp increases in world prices, the contraction of economic activities, and large-scale payments imbalance constitute a severe threat to political and social stability in many countries. A

creative new effort to coordinate economic policies between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, together with its partners in the European Community, will be required to master these difficulties.

The United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany recognize the responsibility which falls to them for ensuring a prosperous international economy and safeguarding world trade. In this context they attach great significance to the upcoming multilateral trade negotiations. They reaffirmed their international pledges to avoid trade and payments restrictions which adversely affect other countries.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that in current circumstances they both have a responsibility to manage their domestic economic policies so as simultaneously to strengthen output and employment and to avoid new inflationary impulses. They affirmed that both countries have a need to encourage investment, to combat rising unemployment, and to act to increase confidence in the financial and the economic outlook. They recognized that the two countries are at different points in their fight against inflation, and that policies will take that fact into account. They are determined not to permit a serious deterioration in their economies to occur. If necessary, they will step in with adequate measures to prevent it.

The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany agreed that determination and cooperation are also necessary in dealing with energy-related problems. They underlined the importance of the International Energy Agency set up within the framework of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] to coordinate the energy policies of the industrialized countries. They attach particular importance to measures to reduce dependence on imported energy through conservation, more economic use of energy, and opening up of alternative sources. They stressed the need for cooperation in the field of research, notably in relation to coal processing and gasification.

Despite cooperative efforts to reduce dependence on energy imports, the President and the Chancellor recognized that in the coming year there will continue to be large scale imbalances in trade among nations and a corresponding necessity for large international flows of funds. They recognized that these flows for the most part have been, and in all probability will continue to be, handled by existing private and official channels. At the same time they agreed on the necessity of close cooperation among the financial authorities to insure the continued safe and orderly functioning of financial institutions in their expanding international roles. They agreed on the importance of the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral financial agencies being in a position in 1975 to provide flexible responsive financial assistance to any member nation facing international payments difficulties arising from the rapidly changing world economic situation. In addition, to insure that industrial countries which follow prudent and cooperative economic and energy policies have access to adequate financial resources in case of need, the President and the Chancellor agreed that early consideration should be given by these nations to the establishment of a supplementary financial safety net in the framework of the OECD.

The President and the Chancellor also stressed their determination to improve cooperation with the oil-producing countries. They expressed the conviction that further economic progress in the world, both in the developing and the developed countries, can only be resolved by means of world-wide cooperation.

The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany recognize the necessity of international cooperation to improve the international food situation. They will undertake prompt discussions on an international system of nationally-held grain reserves, increased global food production and substantial growth in food output in developing countries in order to prevent the recurrence of major food problems in the future. Both recognize the need for cooperation between food producers and consumers to ensure equitable adjustment to shortages and deficits.

The discussions on political questions centered on the North Atlantic Alliance, the evolution of East-West relations, and the situation in the Mediterranean and in the Near East.

The President and the Chancellor reviewed the progress of matters before the Alliance on the eve of the NATO Ministerial meeting to be convened next week in Brussels. They agreed on the continuing importance to the Allies of maintaining their political cohesion and strong defenses as the indispensable prerequisites for continued efforts to advance the process of East-West detente. Against the background of current challenges to their strength and solidarity, they reaffirmed their support for the principles of the Declaration on Atlantic Relations signed by Allied Heads of Government in June 1974.

The President and the Chancellor reiterated their resolve to contribute to the process of detente and the growth of cooperation between East and West. President Ford reviewed the SALT negotiations in the light of his talks with General Secretary Brezhnev in Vladivostok. They noted with satisfaction that it has been agreed to aim for limitations on strategic nuclear weapons on the basis of equality. The Chancellor expressed his appreciation for the progress achieved in Vladivostok which he considered most important for the pursuit of the policy of detente and safeguarding peace. President Ford

and Chancellor Schmidt agreed that the understandings of Vladivostok would have a salutary effect on the overall development of East-West relations.

The two delegations also discussed the state of negotiations in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions [MBFR] in Central Europe. They confirmed their shared view that the aim of MBFR should be to arrive at a common ceiling for forces of both alliance systems.

Both sides expressed the hope that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would soon complete its initial consideration of texts dealing with all items on the agenda. It would then be possible to enter into the final stage of the negotiations. They agreed that certain progress had recently been made in reaching agreement on such areas as family reunification and improved access to printed information. They noted, however, that important texts still remain to be agreed, especially with regard to the Declaration of Principles governing Relations between States.

The President and Secretary of State Kissinger reviewed the United States' efforts to contribute to progress toward the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Both sides emphasized the importance of the disengagement agreements and of further results in the negotiating process.

As to developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, both sides stressed the responsibility of the parties immediately concerned. They stated their readiness to encourage Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus in the search for a mutually acceptable settlement of the dispute on the basis of the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

The German side reviewed the state of the relations of the Federal Republic of Germany with the GDR [German Democratic Republic] and of the issue of foreign representation of West Berlin by the Federal Republic of Germany. Both sides were agreed on the importance of maintaining and developing the ties between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin as well as full and complete implementation of all other parts of the Quadripartite Agreement.

The President and the Federal Chancellor reaffirmed the attachment of their Governments and peoples to the high purposes of the United Nations. They reviewed the proceedings of the current General Assembly and expressed their hope that the spirit of cooperation would prevail over divergences and divisions so that the cause of international harmony, cooperation and a sound and enduring peace would be furthered.

The President and the Chancellor agreed to remain in close touch with one another, and to consult on all matters of mutual interest as might be required in the future.

Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada Visits Washington

Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, visited Washington December 4. Following is an exchange of toasts between President Ford and Prime Minister Trudeau at a dinner in the Blue Room at the White House that evening.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December 9

PRESIDENT FORD

Mr. Prime Minister and gentlemen: Let me say at the outset we are delighted to have you as our guests. I must say on behalf of my wife, she made a very special effort. This is the first opportunity she has had to have this room for this purpose, and she said she hoped that you would enjoy the atmosphere and setup. And if you say yes, I will tell her.

Let me, on a more serious note, say that we are delighted to have you here because of our deep respect and affection for you as the leader of one of our great friends and allies.

Let me add, if I might, that we in the United States know of no other country where the United States has some 4,000 or 5,000 miles of border, when you consider not only the north and south and also Alaska. And so there is a great reason for us to have a rapport and a particular affection, people to people and country to country.

And I might say the first trip that I ever took out of the United States—I was quite young and quite thrilled—was the trip that I took from Detroit to Windsor. [Laughter.] They didn't preclude me from going to Windsor, and I had no trouble getting back. [Laughter.]

But that was a thrill to me, and it was my first trip out of our country and to a foreign country.

But my memories of that trip left me with a great remembrance of the relationship that our country has with yours. The truth is, of course, good friends often have many

differences, and among friends differences fortunately can be better debated or discussed than they can when a different relationship exists.

I have heard it said many times—and Rog Morton formerly served in the Congress—and Gale McGee and George Aiken and Bob McEwin; I hope I haven't missed any of the Members of Congress—we often say in the Congress that you can disagree without being disagreeable. And that is the way I think our relations between your country and ours has proceeded in the past, and I hope will proceed in the future.

We do have some differences. I felt that our meeting today was one of the most constructive, one of the most friendly, and with each of us expressing where we had some differences. It was a point of view and an understanding. If you have an understanding, I think you can come to reasonable and rational conclusions.

I look forward to subsequent meetings with you to broaden our personal friendship and to expand our two national relationships. It has been a pleasure for me to get to know your Ambassador. He did present to me about a week or 10 days ago a very thoughtful gift on behalf of your government commemorating the 1976 Olympics, which are to be held in Montreal.

It brought to my mind the fact that in 1976 we are celebrating our 200th anniversary. I hope that the people that come to your Olympics—and I hope to come if you will invite me, Mr. Prime Minister; I like that snow, you know—and that some of the visitors that come to the United States will go to Montreal and Canada, and vice versa.

But speaking of Montreal, I have had the privilege a long time ago of skiing at Mont Tremblant and Saint Jovite, which I thought was tremendous and I still do. And that was another experience that gave me a great affection and admiration for the people of Canada.

So, with my personal affection for you and the Canadian people and the United States strong conviction about our relationship, to you and your country, if I might, I would like to offer a toast to you, Prime Minister of Canada, and to the Canadian people and to the Queen.

PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU

Mr. President, gentlemen, and friends: When Canadians travel abroad, Mr. President, they spend all the time explaining to other people how they are different from the Americans. There is a great belief in other lands that Canadians and Americans are exactly the same. I am particularly distressed to find this when we are dealing with the Common Market. We are different, and we have different problems and different economic requirements.

But it does happen that we have to show how similar we are and how close our two peoples are. And the best example, I can find, when I have to explain that kind of thing, is to talk about in summer, in the baseball stadium in Montreal where tens of thousands of Canadians get together to cheer for the Canadian team against the visiting American team when every one of the players on both sides is American. [Laughter.] When I have stayed in some of your American cities, it is another story. In winter in your hockey forums, they cheer for the local team, and probably 95 percent of the players on both sides are Canadians—and the best ones.

And this, I think, shows really how close the people are in their goals, in their ways of living, in their love of sports, in their values, even in standards of their own lives.

And that makes your job and mine, Mr. President, so much easier when we meet. We find that most of the subjects which have to be discussed between heads of governments or heads of states when they meet, in our case, have been settled by the people themselves. The figure I was giving you this afternoon of 66 percent of the trade between our two countries being free trade, tariff free, and it will be 81 percent if that trade reform bill gets passed in the form that it went to the Senate committee.

So much of this is done by the people themselves in the trade area, in the cultural area, and the knowledge of each other by the constant visits across the border, that when we meet it is always a pleasant occasion.

As you said, and I realized this afternoon, we can talk to each other in complete candor. We know how the electorates and the press and the House of Representatives or the Senate or the House of Commons will react to various situations. And it is so much—we talk the same language—it is so much easier to deal with problems in this context.

You, as President, have been exposed to the electorates much more frequently than I have. I daresay that I have walked in the valley of the shadow and feel a little more closer than you have. But I think we would both agree that our peoples, Canadian and the American peoples, would cease to support us overnight if they thought that we were embarking on courses which were not friendly, which were not based on cooperation and understanding, on the desire to solve any differences that arise in that spirit of friendship rather than the spirit of hostility.

We, as your neighbors, realize the importance of the leadership that the United States is giving to today's world. Your great success in Vladivostok is something that was received in Canada with immense satisfaction. We know that in matters of Atlantic security, détente, and disarmament—we know that we can follow your lead because the principles on which your policies are based are the same as ours. And I think you know that you can trust us to support those principles in areas we consider essential.

For these reasons, I must say our tasks are easier, and I think we should renew the resolves that we mentioned to each other earlier that we will continue this type of meeting on an informal, nonprotocol, or the minimum protocol.

It has a great advantage for us to gather around a table such as this, a very beautiful one. Mrs. Ford will be told that we were struck by its beauty and the warmth of this room and the repast. Did she do the cooking? [Laughter.]

As far as the Olympics are concerned, we very much hope you will come and you will come before that, and that perhaps, perchance, we will find some way of being the forerunners in some ski race—

President Ford: I'm too young! [Laughter].

Prime Minister Trudeau: —prepared to test for the winter Olympics wherever they happen.

Mr. President, we hope you will come before that, that you will find it convenient, as your predecessor did, to talk on a very informal basis even by phone or by quick visits in and out which do away with all formality, permit us to come to the point right quickly, and to solve whatever small problems we may have.

So with this in mind and in the hopes that our friendship of which we talked and the candor with which we talked, will be brought out in the spirit of cooperation and understanding and the fairness with which all our meetings together are inspired, I would ask our guests here to raise their glasses in a toast to the President of the United States.

Foreign Service Dead Honored at Memorial Ceremony

Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger and Thomas Boyatt, President of the American Foreign Service Association, at an AFSA memorial ceremony on November 15, Foreign Service Day.

Press release 502 dated November 18

MR. BOYATT

Mr. Secretary, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: In 1933 the American Foreign Service Association established a memorial plaque to commemorate those of our colleagues losing their lives under tragic, heroic, or otherwise inspirational circumstances in the service of this country abroad.

The first name on that list, William Pal-

frey, dates from 1780. In the two centuries which have elapsed since then, 110 names have been added—35 in the last decade, 10 in the last two years. And today it is our sad duty and our privilege to honor 11 additional colleagues whose names are on the plaque. Those colleagues are:

EVERETT D. REESE, AID, killed in 1955 in Viet-Nam when the plane he was riding in was shot down.

THOMAS RAGSDALE, Department of Agriculture, serving with AID, captured in 1968 during the Tet offensive. His body was found after the cease-fire.

DONALD V. FREEMAN, AID, killed in 1967 by Vietnamese machinegun fire.

ALBERT A. FARKAS, AID, killed by sniper fire in the Vinh Long area in 1968.

ROBERT W. BROWN, JR., Department of Defense, serving with AID, killed by the Viet Cong in 1968.

ROBERT W. HUBBARD, Department of Defense, serving with AID, killed in Hue in 1968.

RUDOLPH KAISER, AID, died in a Viet Cong ambush in the Mekong Delta in 1972.

JOHN PAUL VANN, Associate Director for AID, killed in a helicopter in a night battle in Kontum in 1972.

JOHN S. PATTERSON, vice consul in Hermosillo, Mexico, slain in 1974 while being held captive by kidnappers.

RODGER P. DAVIES, Ambassador to Cyprus, struck down by sniper fire in Nicosia during a mob attack this year on the American Embassy.

We all know what these terrible losses mean. Our colleagues involved lost their lives. The families lost loved ones. We lost friends. And this nation lost dedicated, effective, and brave public servants.

Earlier this year, in a public forum in New York City, former Secretary Dean Rusk said the following: "The gallantry of the Foreign Service in posts of danger and hardship is deeply moving if seldom recorded."

Well, we are here today to make such a record. And we call upon our fellow citizens in the Congress and the public at large to bear witness to the professionalism and dedication of Foreign Service people in life. And let us never forget that even as we talk hundreds, and maybe thousands, of our colleagues are overseas facing assassins' bullets, kidnappings, hijacking, skijacking, mob action, or deadly disease, as well as their courage and sacrifice and death.

We invited President Ford to be at this ceremony today, and he very much wanted to be here, but his duties would not permit it. He has asked me to read the following message to you:

> I send my warmest greetings to all who participate in this special ceremony at the Department of State to pay tribute to eleven members of the Foreign Service who lost their lives abroad in service to their country. These men, whose names have been added to the memorial plaque maintained by the American Foreign Service Association, will be part of an honored roster of heroism spanning almost two centuries—from William Palfrey in 1780 to Ambassador Rodger Davies in 1974. These dedicated Foreign Service personnel will always be an inspiring example of courage and devotion.
>
> This occasion also gives me an opportunity to express our nation's appreciation to all the men and women of our Foreign Service for their selfless dedication, both at home and abroad, in helping to guarantee world peace and the future well-being of our country.

I would now like to call on Secretary Kissinger, who also has a message for us: Secretary Kissinger.

SECRETARY KISSINGER

Mr. Boyatt, ladies and gentlemen: We meet here on a somber occasion which reminds us that the most important word is the word "service" when we talk of the Foreign Service.

We think here not only of what our friends have accomplished who are no longer with us but what they attempted to do. Most of our work is mundane and ordinary. And in the day-to-day business of diplomacy we forget that—we sometimes forget—that what we are really here for is to build and to preserve the peace. No generation has had a more noble and a more important task, because no generation has faced the risks of ours or has confronted a world in such turmoil, with such suffering, and with such opportunity for lasting change.

I did not know all of those whom we honor today, but I worked with some of them. And therefore we are not dealing with statistics, but with a human experience. And all of us have been associated—all of us here have been associated with all of the men involved.

They went to posts in which they knew

that their mission was to help bring the peace or to alleviate suffering but where they might become the symbol for hatred or the object of a blind retribution. But they went and did their duty. And in so doing they ennobled all of us and reminded us that nothing is more important than to bring about a world in which such sacrifices will no longer be necessary and in which our officers can serve abroad under conditions that would fulfill the hopes and aspirations of those who gave their lives and of their families.

So we think of them with pride and affection and as an inspiration to the best in the Foreign Service.

Thank you.

Additional Food for Peace Wheat To Be Sent to Bangladesh

AID press release 74-80 dated November 8

Bangladesh, plagued by severe floods and food shortages, will receive an additional 100,000 metric tons of wheat and wheat flour on concessional terms under the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food for Peace program, USDA and the Agency for International Development announced on November 8.

Severe monsoon flooding struck Bangladesh this summer and destroyed or damaged large quantities of stored and standing rice. The concessional wheat sale announced on November 8, along with a similar sale of 150,000 tons of U.S. wheat and rice in October, will help Bangdalesh alleviate its major food shortage. The 100,000 tons of wheat and wheat flour, valued at $18.9 million in the export market, will provide almost a pound of wheat per day for 7½ million people for one month.

The first shipments of wheat under the earlier sale should arrive in Bangladesh in early December. Under the terms of the new sale, the United States is to be repaid in U.S. dollars over 40 years, with no repayment of principal due in the first 10 years. Interest is payable at 2 percent during the first 10 years and 3 percent thereafter.

The agreement also allows the Government of Bangladesh to sell the grain on the open market and to use the proceeds for rehabilitation and development programs, particularly those intended to increase the nation's food production, as well as direct relief. Included would be more research in solving the problems of small farmers, strengthening formal and informal training programs, better food storage and distribution facilities, and improved land and water management.

Previous emergency assistance for flood relief has totaled $3,086,865. The U.S. relief efforts included a cash donation by U.S. Ambassador Davis Eugene Boster to the Prime Minister's Relief Fund, an airlift from Guam of 596 tents and 14,946 blankets, and an airlift from the United States of 133,000 pounds of Civil Defense protein-fortified biscuits. The first 500-ton shipment of an additional 6,000 tons of biscuits was scheduled to arrive on November 8. AID also provided vegetable seeds from the United States.

In addition, AID has authorized the use of $4 million under a previously committed AID relief and rehabilitation grant for purchase within Bangladesh of building materials to help restoration of flood-damaged homes and for purchase of locally available seeds to permit the farmers to replant crops.

Since Bangladesh achieved independence in in 1971, the United States has granted or loaned on concessional terms more than $500 million toward the economic development of the South Asian nation.

Secretary Kissinger Calls for Early Passage of Trade Reform Act

Statement by Secretary Kissinger [1]

Thank you, Mr. Chairman [Senator Russell B. Long of Louisiana], for this opportunity to appear before your committee and particularly for your patience while scheduling difficulties were being worked out.

Let me first address the question of why the administration places such a high priority on passage of the Trade Reform Act—a priority which has increased since the bill was first introduced. At a time when the economic stability of the world has been severely shaken and difficult times still lie ahead, it is of critical importance to demonstrate that the nations of the world can still resolve critical economic problems and conduct their trading relationships in a spirit of compromise and a recognition of interdependence.

There are many causes of the current worldwide economic crisis. But one of the principal problems is the unwillingness of too many nations to face the facts of interdependence. The application of ever more restrictive trade practices, the insistence on the unfettered exploitation of national advantage, threatens the world with a return to the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the thirties.

The U.S. Government has repeatedly urged the nations of the world to raise their sights and to avoid ruinous confrontation. In the fields of food and energy we have made far-reaching and detailed proposals to give effect to the principles of interdependence for the common benefit. The trade negotiations which will be made possible by the bill before you are part of this overall design.

The major trading nations stand today uneasily poised between liberalized trade and unilateral restrictive actions leading toward autarky. If they choose the second course, global economic difficulties will be magnified and an international economic crisis will be upon us. This in turn will make all other international problems more difficult to solve. For such a catastrophe to result from our failure to act would be a blow to international stability of potentially historic proportions.

In my testimony before this committee of March 7, 1974, I stated the objectives of the Trade Act to be as follows:

—A mutual reduction of trade barriers among industrialized countries.

—A joint response by industrialized countries to the aspirations of developing countries which require the expansion of exports to sustain their development programs.

—A normalization of trade relations between the United States and the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

—A new start on emerging trade issues that are not covered under the present trade rules and procedures.

—Finally, the preservation and enhancement of a global multilateral economic relationship and the dampening of tendencies toward discriminatory arrangements among selected groups of countries.

[1] Made before the Senate Committee on Finance on Dec. 3 (text from press release 516). The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Mr. Chairman, the importance of these objectives has been emphasized by events since. I am confident that current economic problems can be solved. We should bear in mind that the foreign policy implications of the Trade Reform Act are not limited to those provisions on which I wish to direct my main comments—our trade relations with Communist countries and generalized preferences for developing countries. The bill in its entirety is an absolutely essential tool if the United States is to be in a position to manage effectively its overall relations—political and economic—at a time when the world economy is at a critical point.

The Emigration Issue

Mr. Chairman, you have asked me to return to your committee to comment specifically on the emigration issue as it relates to title IV of the trade bill, a problem dealt with in the Jackson-Vanik amendment to title IV.

Let me state at the outset that I deal with this matter with considerable misgiving because what is said on this occasion could, if not handled with utmost care, deal a serious setback both to the cause of freer emigration from the U.S.S.R. and to the more hopeful trend in U.S.-Soviet relations that has been maintained for the last few years and was recently strengthened in the President's meeting with Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] in Vladivostok.

As you are well aware, the administration since the beginning of détente had been making quiet representations on the issue of emigration. We were never indifferent to, nor did we condone, restrictions placed on emigration. We understood the concerns of those private American groups that expressed their views on this troubling subject. We believed, based on repeated Soviet statements and experience, that making this issue a subject of state-to-state relations might have an adverse effect on emigration from the U.S.S.R. as well as jeopardize the basic relationship which had made the steadily rising emigration possible in the first place. We were convinced that our most effective means for exerting beneficial influence was by working for a broad improvement in relations and dealing with emigration by informal means.

It is difficult, of course, to know the precise causes for changes in emigration rates. We know that during the period of improving relations and quiet representations, it rose from 400 in 1968 to about 33,500 in 1973. We believe that increase as well as recent favorable actions on longstanding hardship cases was due at least in part to what we had done privately and unobtrusively. We are also convinced that these methods led to the suspension of the emigration tax in 1973. We can only speculate whether the decline by about 40 percent in 1974 was the result of decisions of potential applicants or whether it was also affected by the administration's inability to live up to the terms of the trade agreement we had negotiated with the Soviet Union in 1972.

Nevertheless, we were aware that substantial opinion in the Congress favored a different approach. We recognized that if our government was to be equipped with the necessary means for conducting an effective foreign policy it would be necessary to deal with the emigration issue in the trade bill. As I stated in my previous testimony before this committee, we regard mutually beneficial economic contact with the U.S.S.R. as an important element in our overall effort to develop incentives for responsible and restrained international conduct.

I therefore remained in close contact with leaders of the Congress in an effort to find a means of reconciling the different points of view. I remember that I was urged to do so by several members of this committee when I testified before you on March 7 of this year. Shortly afterwards, I began meeting regularly with Senators Jackson, Ribicoff, and Javits to see whether a compromise was possible on the basis of assurances that did not reflect formal governmental commitments but nevertheless met widespread humanitarian concerns.

We had, as you know, been told repeatedly that the Soviet Union considered the issue

of emigration a matter of its own domestic legislation and practices not subject to international negotiation. With this as a background, I must state flatly that if I were to assert here that a formal agreement on emigration from the U.S.S.R. exists between our governments, that statement would immediately be repudiated by the Soviet Government.

In early April, the three Senators agreed to an approach in which I would attempt to obtain clarifications of Soviet domestic practices from Soviet leaders. These explanations could then be transmitted to them in the form of a letter behind which our government would stand.

My point of departure was statements by General Secretary Brezhnev during his visit to the United States in 1973 to both our executive and Members of Congress to the effect that Soviet domestic law and practice placed no obstacles in the way of emigration. In conversations with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva in April, in Cyprus in May, and in Moscow in July, we sought to clarify Soviet emigration practices and Soviet intentions with respect to them. It was in these discussions that information was obtained which subsequently formed the basis of the correspondence with Senator Jackson, with which you are familiar.

In particular, we were assured that Soviet law and practice placed no unreasonable impediments in the way of persons wishing to apply for emigration; that all who wished to emigrate would be permitted to do so except for those holding security clearances; that there would be no harassment or punishment of those who applied for emigration; that there would be no discriminatory criteria applied to applicants for emigration; and that the so-called emigration tax, which was suspended in 1973, would remain suspended.

It was consistently made clear to us that Soviet explanations applied to the definition of criteria and did not represent a commitment as to numbers. If any number was used in regard to Soviet emigration this would be wholly our responsibility; that is, the Soviet Government could not be held accountable for or bound by any such figure. This point has been consistently made clear to Members of Congress with whom we have dealt.

Finally, the discussions with Soviet leaders indicated that we would have an opportunity to raise informally with Soviet authorities any indication we might have that emigration was in fact being interfered with or that applicants for emigration were being subjected to harassment or punitive action.

The points I have just cited have always been the basis for my contacts with Senators Jackson, Javits, and Ribicoff. I may add that these points have been reiterated to us by Soviet leaders on several occasions, including in President Ford's initial contacts with Soviet representatives and most recently at Vladivostok.

All these clarifications were conveyed to the three Senators and eventually led to the drafting of the exchange of correspondence published by Senator Jackson on October 18. The process took much time, however, because of the administration's concern that there be no misleading inference—specifically that there be no claim to commitments either in form or substance which in fact had not been made.

Within a week of being sworn in, President Ford took a direct and personal interest in settling the issues yet outstanding. He met or had direct contact with the three Senators (as well as with you, Mr. Chairman) on several occasions. He discussed the subject with leading Soviet officials. These contacts and conversations eventually resulted in the drafting of two letters, one from me to Senator Jackson and one from the Senator to me. The first of these letters contains the sum total of the assurances which the administration felt in a position to make on the basis of discussions with Soviet representatives. The second letter contained certain interpretations and elaborations by Senator Jackson which were never stated to us by Soviet officials. They will, however, as my letter to Senator Jackson indicated, be among the considerations which the President will apply in judging Soviet performance when he makes his determina-

tion on whether to continue the measures provided for in the trade bill; i.e., extension of governmental credit facilities and of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment. We recognize of course that these same points may be applied by the Congress in reaching its own decisions under the procedures to be provided in the trade bill.

With the exchange of correspondence agreed, it became possible to work out a set of procedures—which, I understand, has now been offered as Senate amendment 2000—whereby the President will be authorized to waive the provisions of the original Jackson-Vanik amendment and to proceed with the granting of MFN and Eximbank [Export-Import Bank] facilities for at least an initial period of 18 months. These procedures will also provide for means whereby the initial grants can be continued for additional one-year periods.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, I believe a satisfactory compromise was achieved on an unprecedented and extraordinarily sensitive set of issues. I cannot give you any assurance concerning the precise emigration rate that may result, assuming that the trade bill is passed and MFN is extended to the U.S.S.R. As I noted earlier, it is difficult to know fully the the causes of past changes in Soviet emigration rates. However, I do believe that we have every right to expect, as my letter to Senator Jackson said, that the emigration rate will correspond to the number of applicants and that there will be no interference with applications. If some of the current estimates about potential applicants are correct, this should lead to an increase in emigration.

I believe it is now essential to let the provisions and understandings of the compromise proceed in practice. I am convinced that additional public commentary, or continued claims that this or that protagonist has won, can only jeopardize the results we all seek. We should not delude ourselves that the commercial measures to be authorized by the trade bill will lead a powerful state like the Soviet Union to be indifferent to constant and demonstrative efforts to picture it as yielding in the face of external pressure; nor can we expect extended debates of domestic Soviet practices by responsible U.S. public figures and officials to remain indefinitely without reaction. We should keep in mind that the ultimate victims of such claims will be those whom all of us are trying to help.

Therefore I respectfully ask that your questions take account of the sensitivity of the issues. There will be ample opportunity to test in practice what has been set down on paper and to debate these matters again when the time for stocktaking foreseen in the legislation comes. With this caveat, I shall of course answer your questions to the best of my ability.

As I indicated to this committee in March, we seek improved relations with the Soviet Union because in the nuclear age we and the Soviets have an overriding obligation to reduce the likelihood of confrontation. We have profound differences with the Soviet Union, and it is these very differences which compel any responsible administration to make a major effort to create a more constructive relationship. In pursuing this policy, we are mindful that the benefits must be mutual and that our national security must be protected. With respect to title IV of the trade reform bill, we believe we are now in a position to meet these vital concerns adequately while at the same time bringing important economic and political benefits to the United States.

Generalized Tariff Preferences

I would be remiss if I did not also take this opportunity to comment briefly on another part of the trade bill which has important foreign policy implications.

You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that I wrote to you in September to express my strong support for title V of the Trade Reform Act because I consider the prompt implementation of a meaningful system of generalized preferences important to U.S. relations with developing countries. I am gratified that this committee has agreed to endorse the concept of generalized tariff preferences. I have, however, serious questions

about the decision of your committee to exclude automatically certain categories of developing countries from the benefits of these preferences.

The concerns which these amendments reflect are, I believe, shared by all in both the executive and legislative branches of our government. I am not opposed to having these concerns put on the record.

However, these amendments, as we understand them, would result in the automatic denial of preferences to a number of important developing countries. Such automaticity could work to our disadvantage. For example, would it be in our interest to exclude all members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, including those which did not participate in last year's oil embargo?

Moreover, many of the countries affected—including those who can play a role in helping prevent renewed conflict in the Middle East—are just those with which we are now actively engaged in efforts to strengthen our relations and to work out mutually acceptable solutions to difficult economic and political problems.

With respect to the automatic denial of preferences to countries expropriating U.S. property, the Congress recognized last year that inflexible sanctions are not effective in promoting the interests of American citizens or businesses abroad and modified the Hickenlooper amendment to authorize the President to waive its sanctions when required for our national interest. The same authority should be provided in the Trade Act.

This committee has made several changes in title V which we consider to be distinct improvements. At the same time, I believe that title V, as passed by the House, contains ample authority to provide or to deny generalized preferences to any country whenever it is in the overall interest of the United States to do so. I can assure you that the administration will keep Congress fully informed in advance of the basis for any decisions on beneficiary status. I am confident that you and your committee will give serious consideration to the problems I have raised.

The trade bill is one of the most important measures to come before the Congress in many years. It is essential to our hopes for a more stable, more prosperous world. This Congress in the time remaining to it thus has an opportunity to contribute to the construction of a safer and more peaceful world.

Senate Asked To Approve Agreement on International Epizootics Office

Message From President Ford [1]

To the Senate of the United States:

To receive the advice and consent of the Senate to accession, I transmit herewith the International Agreement for the Creation at Paris of an International Office of Epizootics, originated in Paris on January 25, 1924.

In the nearly fifty years of its existence, the International Office of Epizootics (OIE) has become the most important organization in international control of animal diseases. Its current 79-nation membership includes most major developed countries other than the United States. The OIE provides timely warnings to its members of animal disease outbreaks, a form of exchange of technical information, and other valuable services. In these times of increased concern about food availability at home and abroad, the United States is obliged to help protect that supply. The cost of participation in OIE is small when weighed against its potential benefits. Also the United States can make its scientific and managerial experience in disease control available through OIE in an effective way to underline our international interest in food supply.

I, therefore, recommend that the Senate grant early and favorable consideration to the Agreement and give its advice and consent to accession.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *December 2, 1974.*

[1] Transmitted on Dec. 2 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. M, 93d Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the agreement and the report of the Department of State.

U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel-Syria Sector Extended

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative John Scali on November 29, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

USUN press release 181 dated November 29

Since there are no additional members who wish to speak, I should like to express the views of the United States on the subject before us.

The establishment of UNDOF six months ago, like that of UNEF [U.N. Emergency Force] before it, marked a major step forward on the path to a lasting Middle East peace. That this road was long and difficult, that it would try men's patience and test their good will, no one doubted then or doubts now. Nevertheless what this Council did in establishing the two Middle East peacekeeping forces was no small thing. The U.N. peacekeeping provides a deterrent to renewed war after four tragic devastating conflicts. It offers time for passions to cool and for prudence and reason to prevail. In short, it offers to those who would grasp it an opportunity to move ahead toward peace.

By extending UNDOF's mandate today, the Security Council has demonstrated anew its awareness of the critical role this Force plays in helping to preserve the disengagement between Syrian and Israeli forces. My government at this time wishes to pledge anew that we will continue the search for a just and enduring peace through negotiations under Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

My government warmly welcomes the Council's action today in extending the mandate of UNDOF. The resolution we have adopted with no dissenting votes assures the continuing operation of UNDOF for another six months under the same mandate in accordance with the recommendation which the Secretary General has made in his lucid and comprehensive report of November 27.

I have spoken already of the patience and good will that are so indispensable to peace in the Middle East. These qualities were sorely needed in the recent negotiations leading to agreement on the extension of UNDOF. My government is pleased to have been of assistance in this effort. May I take this opportunity, on behalf of my government, to pay a sincere tribute to the Governments of Syria and Israel for their determination to overcome all obstacles in the cause of peace and justice for their peoples.

I take special pleasure in extending my government's deep appreciation to the Secretary General for his continuing efforts and to his Headquarters staff. Their dedicated, tireless efforts have kept UNDOF operating efficiently. Our congratulations go also to the interim Force commander, to the officers and men of UNDOF, and to the UNTSO [United Nations Truce Supervision Organization] Military Observers assigned to UNDOF for the exemplary manner in which they have performed their duties. I have spoken on a number of occasions of our admiration for these men and of our appreciation for the hardships and sacrifice which they must endure. Some of these soldiers have given their lives so that other men, women, and children in the Middle East might live. We mourn in particular at this time the brave men who have died on the UNDOF front, and we ask the delegations of Canada and Austria to convey our sincere condolences to their bereaved families.

The Secretary General in his report and many members of this Council in their statements have emphasized the importance of moving toward settlement of the underlying problems of the Middle East conflict. My government shares this sense of urgency. In the months ahead we shall be bending every effort to advance step by step along the road

that leads to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION [1]

The Security Council,

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/11563),

Having noted the efforts made to establish a durable and just peace in the Middle East area and the developments in the situation in the area,

Expressing concern over the prevailing state of tension in the area,

Reaffirming that the two agreements on disengagement of forces are only a step towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973),

Decides:

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months;

(c) That the Secretary-General will submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

U.S. Gives Views on Guidelines for U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

Following is a statement made in the Special Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Joseph M. Segel on November 19.

USUN press release 173 dated November 19

I am pleased to present the views of the U.S. delegation to this committee as it considers the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.[2] Developments in the past year have, we believe, confirmed the importance of the special committee's work as well as the necessity to continue the effort to agree upon guidelines for the conduct of future peacekeeping operations under the authority of the Security Council.

Secretary of State Kissinger, in addressing the 28th General Assembly, noted that "The time has come to agree on peacekeeping guidelines so that this organization can act swiftly, confidently, and effectively in future crises." Since then, the United Nations has had to deal urgently with two crises, in the Middle East and in Cyprus, requiring the launching of one new operation and the reinforcement of another.

The practical experience of these peacekeeping operations and the recognition of the need for guidelines to facilitate future peacekeeping operations have affected the work of the special committee and, in particular, its working group. We are encouraged by the working group's accomplishment in drafting alternative paragraphs which reflect the range of views on particular questions and present concrete language on which the next series of discussions can focus. It is certain that substantially more work will be necessary, but the issues have become more clearly defined and significant progress has thus been made.

One of the fundamental questions facing the special committee is the degree of generality, or of detail, to be reflected in such guidelines. My government continues to believe that the ability of the Security Council to operate flexibly during crises enhances its capability to meet the problems unique to each operation. The establishment and functioning of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East demonstrates that detailed peacekeeping guidelines, agreed in advance, are not required to mount a successful operation. The U.N. Force in Cyprus, modified to meet new conditions, has provided similar lessons. These two operations, tailored as they are to conditions in each area, underscore the importance of not losing flexibility.

Clearly, the central purpose to be served by agreed guidelines is to outline the division of responsibilities between the principal U.N. organs involved in peacekeeping, especially the Security Council and the Secretary General. If peacekeeping operations are to be

[1] U.N. doc. S/RES/363 (1974); adopted by the Council on Nov. 29 by a vote of 13 to 0, with the People's Republic of China and Iraq not participating in the vote.

[2] U.N. doc. A/9827.

launched promptly and managed effectively, it is essential that general responsibilities be appropriately delineated. But it is also essential to provide for the practical and efficient resolution of rapidly changing daily operating problems.

The Security Council has primary responsibility under the charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. In this connection, it is responsible for authorizing peacekeeping operations and bears the ultimate responsibility for the direction of each operation. We believe that in exercising this general responsibility the Security Council should, in the formula proposed for article 1 of the draft guidelines, "determine the purpose and mandate of a peace-keeping force, its approximate size, the duration of its existence and manner of its termination, and such other matters as it considered necessary in establishing the purpose and terms of the mandate."

In order to accommodate views that envisage broader immediate responsibilities for the Security Council, the United States is now prepared to include among the Council's responsibilities approval of the peacekeeping force commander and of the composition of the force. In both cases, the Secretary General would make the initial recommendations. Mr. Chairman, these are significant concessions. We hope—indeed we expect—that they will be reciprocated in the same spirit of accommodation.

Once the operation is underway, the Security Council might best exercise its continuing responsibilities by such measures as requiring regular reports from the Secretary General on the conduct of the operation and reviewing periodically the work of the peacekeeping force. If a need to do so is perceived, the Security Council might also establish an advisory or consultative committee, perhaps under article 29 of the charter, to assist in its work.

Within the overall mandate established by the Security Council, we believe the Secretary General should be assured sufficient discretion to enable him and the force commander responsible to him to effectively carry out their responsibilities in directing the actual activities of the force, without day-to-day intervention by the Security Council. The Secretary General's responsibilities should certainly include taking decisions on administrative and logistical questions, since his primary concern is to see that the operations authorized by the Security Council are managed properly and efficiently.

In this connection, the Secretary General must have at his disposal integrated and efficient military units. While due regard should be paid to achieving adequate geographic representation in the composition of the force, we believe that more attention should be paid to creating a force that can successfully carry out its mission. The composition of the force should thus take into consideration the nature of the dispute, where the force will serve, and the views of the host countries. It is therefore necessary that both the Security Council and the Secretary General maintain sufficient freedom of action concerning the selection and composition of the force's components to insure that the highest possible professional standards may be achieved.

The guidelines might constructively include provisions enabling the Secretary General to make standby arrangements for future peacekeeping operations, including model agreements with hosts and troop contributors, a continuing inventory of troop offers, facilities, or services that member nations would make available, and a roster of potential commanders.

Mr. Chairman, it cannot be denied that differences, some fundamental but others less difficult, still exist over the nature and scope of peacekeeping guidelines. The United States continues to believe that the work underway to reconcile these differences is significant and that an agreed set of general principles can be developed by the special committee. We do not exclude the possibility that some differences will not be fully resolved in the negotiations to establish initial

guidelines. However, if not, they can be left to ad hoc resolution by the Security Council, as problems arise and as we have done to date, with the hope that later agreement will permit us to further improve the guidelines. Moreover, we believe the guidelines should remain flexible enough so that they may evolve as we gain experience.

We remain open to constructive dialogue on this effort. Moreover, we have expressed our willingness to reach a compromise on outstanding issues that would on the one hand accommodate diverse views and on the other provide the most positive background for the effective discharge of this organization's peacekeeping responsibilities. We all know that these responsibilities are central to the purposes and ideals of the United Nations, and we must for that reason recommit ourselves to the task entrusted to the special committee. After nine years of work, while the end is not yet in sight we must persevere to a successful conclusion of our collective efforts. It will have to be done sooner or later. Let us grasp every opportunity to complete this vital task sooner rather than later.

United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 10017.

Economic and Social Council

Statistical Commission:

International trade reconciliation study. Report of the Secretary General. E/CN.3/454. June 5, 1974. 81 pp.

Statistics of the developing countries in the Second United Nations Development Decade. International technical assistance in statistics, 1975–79. Report of the Secretary General. E/CN.3/446. June 6, 1974. 61 pp.

Statistics of the environment. Report of the Secretary General. E/CN.3/452. June 14, 1974. 32 pp.

Program objectives: implementation and prospects. Regional conferences of statisticians and similar bodies. Report by the Secretary General. E/CN.3/466. June 24, 1974. 19 pp.

Statistics of the distribution of income, consumption, and accumulation; draft guidelines for the developing countries. Report of the Secretary General. E/CN.3/462. July 5, 1974. 59 pp.

Collective economic security. Report of the Secretary General. E/5529. June 6, 1974. 15 pp.

World Food Conference. Report of the Preparatory Committee on its second session. E/5533. June 11, 1974. 38 pp.

World Population Conference background papers:

Population policies and programs. Prepared by the U.N. Secretariat. E/CONF.60/CBP/21. June 20, 1974. 53 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

Amended constitution of the International Rice Commission. Approved at the 11th session of the FAO Conference, Rome, November 23, 1961. Entered into force November 23, 1961. TIAS 5204.
Acceptance deposited: Kenya, November 4, 1974.

Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.[1]
Accession deposited: Lesotho, November 4, 1974.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893), to allocate frequency bands for space radiocommunication purposes. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963. Entered into force January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603.
Notification of approval: Cuba, September 30, 1974.

Partial revision of the radio regulations, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), on space telecommunications, with annexes. Done at Geneva July 17, 1971. Entered into force January 1, 1973. TIAS 7435.
Notification of approval: Pakistan, September 7, 1974.[2]

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and

[1] Not in force.

[2] Confirmed reservations made in final protocol.

final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.[3]

Notification of approval: Hungary, September 30, 1974.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.[3]

Notification of approval: Hungary, September 30, 1974.

International telecommunications convention, with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973.[1]

Ratification deposited: Singapore, September 16, 1974.

Trade

Declaration on the provisional accession of the Philippines to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade done at Geneva August 9, 1973. Entered into force September 9, 1973. TIAS 7839.

Acceptances: Australia, October 9, 1974; Pakistan, October 16, 1974.

Ratification deposited: Austria, September 24, 1974.

BILATERAL

Iran

Joint communique concerning U.S.-Iran relations and establishment of a Joint Commission for cooperation in various fields. Issued at Tehran November 2, 1974. Entered into force November 2, 1974.

Italy

Agreement extending the agreement of April 30 and June 12, 1969 (TIAS 6809), regarding the launching of NASA satellites from the San Marco Range. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome November 25 and 26, 1974. Entered into force November 26, 1974.

Jamaica

Agreement relating to the provision of helicopters and related assistance to Jamaica in connection with a program to interdict the illicit narcotics traffic between Jamaica and the United States (Operation Buccaneer). Effected by exchange of notes at Kingston August 9 and 21 and September 23, 1974. Entered into force September 23, 1974.

Tunisia

Agreement relating to a program of grants of military equipment and materiel to Tunisia. Effected by exchange of notes at Tunis September 12 and October 25, 1974. Entered into force October 25, 1974, effective July 1, 1974.

[1] Not in force.

[3] Not in force for the United States.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on December 2 confirmed the following nominations:

Theodore R. Britton, Jr., to be Ambassador to Barbados and to serve concurrently as Ambassador to the State of Grenada.

Frank C. Carlucci to be Ambassador to Portugal.

Charles W. Robinson to be Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 9–15

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to December 9 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 502 of November 15, 516 of December 3, and 518 of December 7.

No.	Date	Subject
†519	12/10	Kissinger: Churchill centenary dinner, Dec. 7.
*520	12/11	Kissinger, Esenbel: exchange of remarks, Brussels.
*521	12/11	Kissinger, Bitsios: exchange of remarks, Brussels.
*522	12/11	Kissinger, Van der Stoel: remarks to press, Brussels.
*523	12/12	Kissinger, Esenbel: remarks to press, Brussels, Dec. 11.
†524	12/12	U.S.-Spain cooperation talks: communique.
*525	12/12	Kissinger, Dr. J. H. Van Roijen: remarks upon Secretary Kissinger's receipt of the Wateler Peace Prize, Brussels, Dec. 11.
*526	12/13	Watson receives Replogle Award.
†527	12/13	Economic and technical assistance to Portugal.
*528	12/13	Kissinger, Esenbel: remarks to press, Brussels, Dec. 12.
*529	12/13	Kissinger, Callaghan: remarks to press, Brussels.
†530	12/13	Kissinger: news conference, Brussels.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

Name Index