



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of November 15

Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger in the auditorium of the Executive Office Building on November 15.

Press release 501 dated November 15

Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford: Ladies and gentlemen, in response to your request to talk to Dr. Kissinger about the Far East trip, here is Dr. Kissinger. This is all on the record for immediate release, no live broadcast, and those are the only rules.

Secretary Kissinger: If I had known there was no live broadcast, I wouldn't have come here. [Laughter.]

Let me make a few very brief remarks about the purpose of the trip, and then I will take your questions on that or any other subject.

You will remember that a visit to Japan by the President was foreseen in a Japanese-American communique last year. It was announced to take place by the end of 1974, and it was reaffirmed on a number of occasions afterward. It will be a historic event in that it is going to be the first visit by an American President to Japan, reflecting the great importance we attach to the relationship with Japan.

In recent years, our relations with Japan have undergone a series of adjustments brought about by new conditions in the Far East, the growing strength and self-confidence of Japan, and the emergence of a pattern of equality. We consider this relationship excellent.

We believe also that the future stability of the Pacific area depends importantly on a close understanding between the United States and Japan, which is symbolized by the visit of the President and by the occa-

sion that this will give for full exchanges with Japanese leaders.

The President called in the Japanese Ambassador on the first afternoon of the day that he was sworn in as President. On that occasion, in affirming the continuity of American foreign policy, he also specifically affirmed that he would meet the commitment of his predecessor to visit Japan by the end of 1974.

So, this trip was planned as one of the first acts of President Ford, and we consider it essential for the overall design of foreign policy. While being in Japan, we expect to review with the Japanese leaders bilateral relations of Japan and the United States, which, I repeat, we consider excellent, as well as to review the international situation and in order to make certain that we understand each other as to basic principles and objectives.

The visit to Korea is a natural complement to the visit to Japan. We could not be in that area and not visit Korea without raising grave doubts that our commitment to Korea was still what it has traditionally been. The visit to Vladivostok reflects the necessity of the leaders of the two nuclear superpowers to be in frequent touch with each other, a necessity which is particularly acute after a change of administration in the United States, to enable the two leaders to have an opportunity to exchange views on the whole range of our relationships, on possible difficulties that may arise, but even more importantly, on how to give momentum to the commitment to détente that they have both expressed.

This is the basic purpose of the trip, and now I will be glad to take your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to the difficulties that may arise, before you get into

the questions on the trip I would like to ask what your assessment is of the possibility of an outbreak of warfare in the Middle East now, in view of a spate of reports yesterday and today from the area about possible preemptive Israeli attacks, the unloading of huge amounts of Soviet armaments in Syria, the visits to the Golan Heights and that. Could you give us your opinion?

Secretary Kissinger: Obviously, we have seen these reports, and we are checking into them on an urgent basis. We cannot believe that any of the parties in the Middle East would resort to war under these circumstances.

We cannot believe that any major power would deliberately encourage war in a situation as serious and as potentially explosive as that in the Middle East. The United States would certainly oppose any idea that the problems of the Middle East can be solved by military action and will use its influence with all parties to prevent this from arising. It expects that all other countries that are in a position to do so would exercise a similar restraining influence.

So, we think that these reports are probably—if they are not exaggerated as to the facts, we do not believe that military actions are imminent.

Q. Mr. Secretary, another point on your travels will be Peking this year, and it has been almost a year since you were there before. Do you expect this visit to bring further progress toward normalization of relations or anything of a substantive sort?

Secretary Kissinger: The relationships between the United States and the People's Republic of China are good, and they are progressing in the manner that has been foreseen on our previous visits, including the last one.

Every trip is within the context of promoting the normalization of relationships and to represent a step toward the normalization of relationships. I do not expect any dramatic announcements as a result of this trip, but I expect a continuation of the steady progress that has marked our previous con-

tacts and a further improvement of our relationship.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think it is inevitable that Israel is going to have to deal with Mr. [Yasir] Arafat and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] in subsequent negotiations now that a certain amount of recognition in stature has been given the organization by Rabat and by the General Assembly and, if so, under what conditions would it be possible for Israel to do this?

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, I expressed the view of the administration, which has not changed, that the proper negotiation, or the best negotiation for the future of the West Bank, was between Jordan and Israel, and the United States had used its influence to bring about such a negotiation.

As to any other parties that might negotiate, this is entirely a decision for Israel and for any of the other parties that may be involved, and it is not a matter on which the United States will give advice as to the conditions in which such negotiations may be appropriate, if indeed it is appropriate.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your appraisal of the Arab and of the Israeli reactions to the fact that more than a month elapsed before General Brown [Gen. George S. Brown, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] apologized for his remarks at Duke and he was only mildly reprimanded by the President?

Secretary Kissinger: I frankly have no view as to what the Arab or Israeli reaction to this is. It is my understanding that the President expressed his opposition to the views as expressed by General Brown, and this certainly reflects the view of the administration.

We don't consider this a subject of foreign policy decisions, because, clearly, the administration's view has been repeatedly enunciated and has been in no way affected by any remarks that were made by any military leader.

Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't the President taking a sizable risk by traveling abroad like

this at a time when there is no Vice President in place?

Secretary Kissinger: You have to remember that the President committed himself to this trip on his first day in office, at a time when it was considered inconceivable that a Vice President would not be confirmed by this time. To cancel a trip because a Vice President hasn't been confirmed would give an impression of domestic instability that would in itself be a foreign policy factor, and therefore the President decided to continue with a trip which we consider extremely important in its own right under conditions which could not be foreseen at the time the decision was made.

Middle East Tensions

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said a moment ago that you couldn't believe—or words to that effect—that any major power would deliberately encourage war in the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Q. I assume you might mean the Soviet Union. I would like to ask whether you have any information or evidence to indicate that the Soviet Union might be encouraging war?

Secretary Kissinger: We have no evidence that the Soviet Union is encouraging war, and as I have said, we are using all our influence with both parties, and we are certainly calling to the attention of all other countries the importance of restraint in the Middle East.

Q. Is the Soviet Union using its influence in a positive direction, in your opinion, sir?

Secretary Kissinger: This recent flareup has only come to our attention in the last few hours, and it isn't clear to us yet what it means. I would warn against overexaggerating the imminence of any conflict there. But we are certainly calling it to the attention of the Soviet Union.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us a more thorough view of your current appraisal of the Middle East situation as the President and you are about to depart for

a considerable period of time? Do you have any special anxiety that there will be a hiatus here during this period, when we are now at a stage of seeing considerable reports of imminent action? What is your basic view of the hazard here?

Secretary Kissinger: The President and I met with Secretary [of Defense James R.] Schlesinger this morning, and we reviewed contingencies which might arise and mechanisms of how to deal with them if they should arise. I repeat, this is a normal precaution. We do not expect the contingencies to arise. We do not believe that prior to a meeting between the General Secretary [Leonid I. Brezhnev] and the President the Soviet Union would be encouraging military action in the Middle East, and we cannot believe that any of the parties in the Middle East would be so reckless as to engage in military action.

So, while we recognize that certain military precautions have been taken by both sides, and while there is always a risk that precautions could get out of hand, we do not think a war is likely. If it should occur, we have made contingency plans for dealing with it. Communications are of course very rapid, and we would deal with it on that basis.

Q. Mr. Secretary, also on the Middle East, does the United States detect any change or moderation in the statements made by Mr. Arafat representing the Palestinians? Does that make any difference as far as the United States is concerned? And also, what are your plans on traveling to the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the speech itself, our reading of it is that it called for a state which really did not include the existence of Israel and therefore was dealing with a successor state, and we do not consider this a particularly moderate position.

With respect to my own plans, I have no plans now to go to the Middle East. This could change, but as I pointed out before, we think that this is now a period for quiet diplomacy, and I do not expect to return to the Middle East in the near future.

Q. Before, I noticed you used the past tense in referring to our preference—"was"—for negotiations between Israel and Jordan. Do you think in the current situation there is a live possibility of negotiating with Jordan?

Secretary Kissinger: It is my understanding that King Hussein has accepted the decisions of the Rabat summit to the effect that the PLO should be the principal negotiator on the West Bank, and this explains my reference to the past.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the Syrian Government indicated to you, as far as you know, its attitude toward an extension of the U.N. presence on the Golan Heights? And whether it has or hasn't, how much of any importance do you attach to its attitude toward that question that will soon be coming up?

Secretary Kissinger: The Syrian Government has not given us a formal answer as to the extension of UNDOF [United Nations Disengagement Observer Force] on the Golan Heights, and to the best of my knowledge, I do not believe that they have given a formal answer to anybody. They have, however, indicated on a number of occasions grave doubts about the extension of UNDOF, and if one were to quote the statements that they have made, one could construe them as an indication that they probably will not agree to the extension.

It is our view that failure to extend UNDOF would cast doubts on the viability of agreements that may be made in that area, and we therefore believe that the extension of UNDOF is important for the continuation of the negotiating process and especially for negotiating prospects that may exist between Syria and Israel, and the failure to extend it would undoubtedly contribute to the tension in the area.

Cooperation Among Energy Consumers

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a couple of questions about your oil speech last night. Why did you say, "In the mean-

time, we will face two great dangers. One is the threat of a new embargo."? And secondly, what kind of a response can you expect from other consuming nations when the United States itself has not yet come up with a serious program for conservation or developing alternate sources of energy?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the first question, it is obvious that the possibility of another embargo exists and the emergency program that will be agreed to next week—that has been agreed to but will be formally adopted next week—provides for precisely this contingency. We went through an embargo last year, and the possibility of an embargo cannot be ignored. Therefore, in order to enable the consuming nations to withstand political pressures, we consider this program is of the first significance.

Secondly, in my speech, which I went over carefully with the President before I gave it, we stated the goals that have to be met in order to meet the objectives that were set in the speech, the objectives being to reduce dependence on imported oil, to create a situation in which alternative sources, coupled with conservation restraints and financial solidarity, bring about a reduction in the price of oil.

And in any event, the cooperation among the consumers is essential whether or not the price of oil comes down. In fact, it is even more essential if the price of oil does not come down. The goals that I stated are the administration goals. The methods by which they are reached, whether they are done by voluntary restraints or by other measures, will be reflected in Presidential speeches to the Congress.

In any event, the United States has expressed its readiness in this speech to accept internationally binding consumption restraints, and therefore the question of whether or not we are now engaged in them is really irrelevant to the program that has been set forth which we are prepared to undertake on an international basis.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a

question about the wisdom and timing of the Far East trip, specifically with regard to visiting Prime Minister Tanaka and his problems at home. I would like—if you would, please, to address yourself to the fact that Mr. Tanaka may in fact be a lameduck Prime Minister. Also, if you would address yourself to the fact, please, that President Ford will be visiting Korea, where the government has come under severe criticism for being rather oppressive, contrary to democratic principles. And if you would, sir, please address yourself to the site of the meetingplace in the Soviet Union, which is either on or close to disputed territory with the Chinese.

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the first question, the visit to any country is to the government and not to any particular individual. We don't express any view as to what difficulties Prime Minister Tanaka may or may not be in, and therefore I don't accept the basic premise of your question. But the fact of the matter is that the major figures in Japan with whom we will be dealing have shown considerable stability in terms of their participation in the government. Therefore, we believe that whatever may happen in Japan—and we do not accept that the contingency you foresee is inevitable—that, therefore, the trip should go forward.

Secondly, it is clear that the President of the Republic of Korea is being criticized. We did not think that this outweighs the consideration that I have mentioned before, that the failure to visit Korea might be understood as a reduction in the degree of the American commitment to the security of South Korea, which could have serious international consequence.

With respect to the site of the meeting with the Soviet Union, this is a matter that has been discussed, and we have received no complaints from the Chinese side.

Q. Mr. Secretary, without disclosing your contingency plans, we have been reading about alleged NSC [National Security Council] memos and so forth, foreseeing a possi-

bility that the United States might go in this time if there was another Arab-Israeli conflict. Do you foresee any possibility?

Secretary Kissinger: Do I personally foresee any possibility?

Q. Yes, of the United States going into the Middle East war.

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I don't foresee a Middle East war. Secondly, I don't confirm that there are any NSC contingency plans for the United States to go into an Arab-Israeli war. The U.S. attitude will be what it has been in previous wars, and our attitude is basically to avoid a conflict and to bring it to the most rapid conclusion possible if there should be one. But we believe there is every possibility of avoiding a conflict now, and therefore there is no sense speculating on what we might do.

But it is clear that the U.S. intentions, unless there should be other outside intervention, would be to confine its role to what it has been.

Q. Mr. Secretary, last night in Phoenix, President Ford, in answer to a general question on Middle East policy, mentioned that Israel has been urged to make peace, to reach agreements with Egypt and "other Arab nations." He was pressed on the question of whether the PLO should be recognized, and he repeated that Israel should reach agreements with Egypt and "other Arab parties," which left the answer ambiguous. I wish you would clear it up, whether or not we regard the PLO as a nation or a party or, in the final analysis, as a negotiating partner, although I recognize what you said earlier, that it is an Israeli decision.

Secretary Kissinger: I have to repeat what I said earlier. The United States is not engaged in promoting any particular set of negotiations. I have stated what our view as to the most effective strategy has been, and we have not expressed any recommendation to any of the parties with whom they should negotiate.

Q. What are your maximum hopes for a strategic arms achievement at the Vladivostok summit?

Secretary Kissinger: The issue of strategic arms limitation is an extremely complicated one, involving many weapons systems, many technologies; and the fact is, as I have pointed out on a number of occasions, that the forces of the two sides have been designed in a different manner, with different characteristics, so that comparisons are sometimes difficult.

Therefore, it is hard to foretell any specific achievement. We believe that progress was made during my talks with General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow. We think that this progress can be continued in Vladivostok. Whether the progress will lend itself to some formal statement, or whether it will lead to being transferred to the Geneva negotiations, or whether some other method will be chosen and the exchanges will continue, can really not be predicted until there have been some further discussions building on the discussions that took place in Moscow.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in part of your speech last night, in your proposal to cut oil imports, were you just referring to Arab nations or were you also proposing to cut oil imports from Canada?

Secretary Kissinger: I was referring to cutting overall oil imports, not just from the Arab nations.

Complex Food Aid Problems

Q. Mr. Secretary, given the position of moral leadership that the United States undertook in convening the World Food Conference, why was the decision reached not to follow the advice of the U.S. delegation and provide an extra million tons of food?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, as I understand it, this was not a recommendation of the U.S. delegation, but was a recommendation of some members of the U.S. delegation.

But let me make clear what our position had been with respect to the World Food

Conference. We face two problems: the basic problem of world food shortages, which is a structural one, and the immediate emergency problem of the shortages this year that cannot be dealt with by any structural changes.

The United States believes that no matter what food aid is given this year, structural adjustments in world agriculture policies are essential. This is why we proposed the Export Planning Group of the exporting nations and why we proposed a group to promote the increase in agriculture in the underdeveloped nations, which is one of the most essential elements, and why we proposed a reserve program.

Food aid is one relatively small part of the overall problem. Now, with respect to food aid, we have stated that we will do what is humanly possible in order to give the maximum food aid. The differences in the government concern tactics and not substance.

The difference concerns the question of whether we should announce a specific target before we know what the crop reports are and produce an increase in prices in this country and contribute to the inflation or whether we should continue to operate on a quarterly basis as we have been on the basis of crop reports and in a manner that enables us to make the decisions without having the undesirable consequences that I described.

As a matter of fact, most of the decisions that have been taken in the last quarter have been at the high end of the option, and I personally expect that by the time that the year is over we will have increased not only the dollar amount but the quantity of the food aid.

But the President wanted to reserve the option of looking at it every quarter so that the difference between those members of the delegation who ask for a flat commitment and the dominant trend in the administration, including the view of the President, is really primarily a matter of how to give food aid without producing inflationary pressures in this country and therefore maybe endangering the whole food aid problem.

I personally regret that the issue of the World Food Conference, which really should deal with the structural problem of food, has

been tied up with a one-year allocation of food aid, which is not going to be decisive in dealing with the overall issue that we have described.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that there is any connection at all between the reports that we have been receiving now about mobilization in the Middle East and the fact that the President is about to embark on this trip? Can there be any linkage?

Secretary Kissinger: I consider that extremely unlikely, and I would have thought that the imminent meeting of the President with the General Secretary should have a calming effect on the situation rather than an accelerated effect.

It must be obvious to the parties concerned that anyone who wantonly starts a war under these conditions would be putting himself into a very dubious position internationally and with its relationship with the United States, and obviously this must be clear to any of the Soviet leaders, whom we do not believe are encouraging the tensions right now, and we do not believe that a conflict is imminent.

Q. It is not possible, you think, that, rightly or wrongly, that other powers might perceive that the United States in effect is in a weakened condition?

Secretary Kissinger: It would be a very serious miscalculation.

Q. May I also ask, do these reports in any way directly contradict assurances you had received, either from the Soviets or others during your Middle East travels?

Secretary Kissinger: I did not have the impression on my Middle East travel that any of the parties were planning imminent military operations.

As far as the Soviets are concerned, it seems to me to go without saying that prior to a meeting between the General Secretary and the President they should not and, in my belief, are not taking action to exacerbate the situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said you didn't have

the impression. Did you have specific assurances in the Middle East about this situation?

Secretary Kissinger: I have stated my view. Certainly all of the parties know that the United States would be opposed, strongly opposed, to the resumption of hostilities.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect any major agreements to be signed in Japan, or should we consider that trip primarily symbolic?

Secretary Kissinger: I think a trip can be substantive without major agreements being signed. In negotiations with Japan it is very important to permit the Japanese consensus-building to develop and not to expect in a three-day visit to accelerate any particular decision.

We believe that there will not be any major agreement signed, but we nevertheless believe that the trip will be highly substantive.

If I may make one other comment about all these Middle East questions. There is a tendency, if I may say so, to overreact to reports. It was the case after the Rabat summit. It seems to me to be the case today.

In our judgment, we are not in a situation of imminent conflict, and I do not think that it contributes to stability to give the impression that we are.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports recently that Egypt is now linking the re-opening of the Suez Canal to a further Israeli pullback in Sinai. Yet during the January disengagement agreement, we were told that the canal would be reopened as quickly as possible. Is there a tie-in between the two?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not received any formal communication from the Egyptians to that effect. I have seen statements in the press which allege this, or in which Egyptian officials are quoted as having said this. We would consider this inconsistent with the disengagement agreement, but it will be a moot point until the canal clearance is completed, which is not yet the case.

Q. What can you tell us about the likely degree of Japanese acceptance of the plan

you outlined last night, and would you expect something to come in Tokyo on that?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not expect that in the period of three days there will be any major decisions taken on a plan that was as embracing as the one that was put forward last night. We undoubtedly will have some discussions on that subject. I think the final decisions will have to be taken in a multi-lateral framework and not on a bilateral basis between individual countries.

I would expect that progress will be made, not necessarily next week but in the months ahead, just as progress was made, after the Pilgrims speech last year, over a six-month period, in implementing both the proposal for an agency and the proposal for an emergency sharing program.

And we believe, since there is really no realistic alternative to the major direction that has been proposed, that over a period of months some of the main elements, or many of the main elements, of the proposal will be implemented.

We are not putting it forward on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Within the framework of the general objectives, we are quite open-minded as to counter proposals. But we believe this is the direction in which the consuming nations ought to go, and we think this is the direction they will go.

President Ford's News Conference at Sigma Delta Chi Convention

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a question-and-answer session held by President Ford at a convention of the Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, at Phoenix, Ariz., on November 14.¹

Q. Peggy Roberson, the Birmingham News, Birmingham, Alabama.

Mr. President, recently we have seen horrifying pictures of starving people in the

world, and we have learned that energy and food are unbreakably linked. Are we prepared to use food as a weapon to force down energy prices so farmers can produce low-cost food to feed these people?

President Ford: We are not going to use food as a weapon. We must recognize, however, that food is just as important to the world as oil and that in order to get a better distribution of oil that is held in vast reserves by other nations and food that is produced by us to a greater extent than any other nation in the world, we must get together and cooperate to make sure that that which is available in both cases is spread throughout the world for the benefit of all people.

Dr. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, has put together the group of oil-consuming nations. We expect to work with the oil-producing nations. I believe that there can be an understanding achieved that will be to the mutual benefit of the producers in food and oil and the consumers in both.

Q. Mr. President, Norman Kempster of the Washington Star-News.

You have spoken of the danger of the Nation being without a Vice President. On Sunday you are planning a trip to Japan where some violence is threatened. What do you expect to achieve on this trip to Japan that can make it worth the risk?

President Ford: There are three very important countries that I am visiting—and I should preface that with a comment that a President has two major responsibilities, one in the field of domestic policy and the other in the field of foreign policy.

And where we have three extremely important countries, two where we have good relationships, treaties, where we are allies—Japan and South Korea—where we want to strengthen that relationship, and the third,

¹For the complete transcript of President Ford's opening remarks and questions and answers, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Nov. 18.

the Soviet Union, where we have been trying to achieve a détente and broaden it, where we are going to, hopefully, lay a broader foundation for SALT Two—when you add up the pluses, I think that there is convincing evidence that I, as President, should go to Japan, to expand our good relations with Japan; go to South Korea, a staunch and strong ally, and to work out some differences, if any, and to broaden our relations there; and to go to the Soviet Union to, hopefully, make some progress in détente, in the reduction of arms. I think it is a very worthwhile trip.

Q. Mr. President, Russ Ward of NBC News.

There has been some recent talk in the Middle East about a possible reimposition of the Arab oil embargo. Do you have contingency plans for dealing with such a move, and might those plans include a possible change in our relations over there, either with Israel or the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]?

President Ford: Our plans are aimed at trying to get the Israelis to negotiate a settlement or additional settlements with the Egyptians and the other Arab nations. Those are the plans we have which are affirmative and plans that I think, if we continue constructively, can bring about some success.

Until we have failed, and I don't think we will, in trying to get the parties to work together, I don't think it is appropriate to discuss what we will do if we don't achieve success.

Q. Are you suggesting, Mr. President, that Israel should deal directly with the PLO? It has been the Israeli objection all along against recognizing the PLO as a bona fide political organization.

President Ford: I didn't say that. I did say that the Israelis should negotiate with the Egyptian and other Arab parties. The Israelis have said they will never negotiate with the PLO. We are not a party to any

negotiations. I think we have to let the decision as to who will negotiate to be the responsibility of the parties involved.

Q. Gene McLain, KTAR Television and Radio, Phoenix.

Mr. President, you are approaching your first hundred days in office. How do you size up your pluses and minuses, your major disappointments and successes?

President Ford: I think the best things we have done—number one, nominating Nelson Rockefeller; number two, the conducting of the economic summit meetings, I think 12 all over the country, with two in Washington, and the formulation of a good, sound economic plan that meets the problems of a weakening economy and inflation.

I believe that we have laid additional groundwork for success in the Middle East. We have redirected some of our policies in the subcontinent areas. We have, in addition, enhanced the possibility of strategic arms limitation agreement number two, which I think will be enhanced by the meeting I am going to have in Vladivostok in about 12 days, hopefully to be followed by a meeting in Washington sometime in the summer of 1975.

Some of the disappointments—we had a few bad breaks. I think the Congress was dead wrong when they handicapped myself and Secretary Kissinger in the efforts that we could make in the settlement of the Cyprus question between Greece and Turkey. I think that was a terrible disappointment, and some of the things we warned about might happen, and it won't be helpful to Greece. That was a bad break.

Another was the failure on the part of the Congress to act more affirmatively on behalf of the nomination of Nelson Rockefeller. It should have been done before the campaign recess. I think the Congress also might have moved ahead more rapidly in some of the economic suggestions.

We have had some pluses, and we have had some minuses, but I believe so far we are a little ahead of the game.

Under Secretary Sisco Discusses Middle East in "Today" Interview

Following is the transcript of an interview with Under Secretary for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco by Richard Valeriani and Barbara Walters on the NBC "Today" show on November 20.

Press release 507 dated November 20

Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Sisco, you said on Monday in an interview to be published outside the country that the United States now regards the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the umbrella organization for all Palestinians. Now, that seems to go further than you've ever gone before.

Mr. Sisco: Dick, I think that was an unfortunate way to put it. Actually, what I was trying to reflect was that the Arabs consider the PLO as the umbrella organization. Now, let me make very clear that our policy is as stated by the President and the Secretary of State. We've accorded no recognition of any kind; our position remains unchanged.

I think some people have read something into that—I was really trying to state a fact as conceived by the Arabs, that the Arabs do conceive of the PLO as the umbrella organization.

Mr. Valeriani: You seem to be preparing the groundwork for bringing the PLO into the negotiations.

Mr. Sisco: No, I don't think that's the case, Dick. Again, I've got to underscore that our position remains unchanged. Let's look, for example, at the General Assembly for the moment. We had a major speech that was made by [Yasir] Arafat quite recently. I found no openings in that speech. As the Secretary of State said in his press conference last Friday, he hardly saw that as a moderate approach. There was no, for example, explicit or implicit implication of giving up terrorism as a matter of policy. The proposal for a secular state would really have the effect of negating the existence of the State of Israel as we know it. So that, I

think, in terms of that particular speech, I saw no opening.

Mr. Valeriani: But doesn't the decision by the Arab summit meeting in Rabat to allow the PLO to negotiate for all Palestinians in effect throw the negotiating process into deadlock?

Mr. Sisco: No, I don't think that we're at an impasse or at a deadlock. I'd be the first to admit that Rabat, I think, has been complicating to our effort. But, Dick, you were on this recent trip with the Secretary of State. The thing that struck me from this recent trip was that both sides were at great pains to emphasize that the doors of diplomacy remained open. Note, for example, the strong endorsement of the continuation of the Secretary's mission that came out of Cairo—likewise, in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.

I think the doors remain open, and I think that what we can expect over the coming weeks is a period of quiet diplomacy, largely within the confines of diplomatic channels; but our efforts are going to continue, and they're going to continue primarily because both sides want our efforts to continue.

Miss Walters: First of all, Mr. Sisco—perhaps on your way to our studio—in our last hour we had the chief spokesman for the PLO delegation to the United Nations in this country, who said that the Palestinian attacks would continue until the Israelis negotiated with the PLO. I'd like to ask two questions. First of all, up until recently there had been the feeling as expressed by President Sadat of Egypt that the Arabs were beginning to recognize Israel as a sovereign Jewish state and would negotiate on those terms. Then with the recognition by the United Nations of the PLO, which says they want a secular state, one isn't too sure what the prevailing Arab point of view is and whether President Sadat's statements in the past did recognize Israel's existence now and in the future. Can you give us an idea of what the prevailing Arab viewpoint is now?

Mr. Sisco: Yes, I think I can, Barbara. I

think it's important to remember that the principal Arab states that are involved in this matter have all in the past, and they have not changed their position in this regard, supported Resolution 242—the November 1967 Security Council resolution—and a subsequent resolution that calls for negotiations. I have detected, Barbara, no change in that attitude, and those two resolutions are based on the assumption of coexistence between Arab states and an Israeli state.

Miss Walters: May I ask the second question then. Over the weekend when there was a scare of a possible war, the threat of a possible war, a very imminent war between Syria and Israel, Secretary Kissinger talked with the Israeli Ambassador, talked with Arab leaders, he also talked with the Soviet Union and received some kind of assurance that put a damper on the fears of the war. Can you give us any idea of what that conversation with the Soviet leaders involved?

Mr. Sisco: Obviously, Barbara, I can't go into the details and you're right, the Secretary did undertake all of these discussions. The only thing I would say about Soviet policy, which indirectly really gets at what you've asked, is that I believe there is a mutual recognition, both in Moscow and in Washington, that there is a mutual interest that the Middle East not break out into another war. I think this is important—that both of the major powers recognize the danger of the situation.

You know, you look at the Middle East; not only do you have the differences between the Arabs and the Israelis, you have intra-Arab relationships that are important, then you've got superimposed the whole major-power complex—the interest of the major powers—and now on top of all of these, you have this very delicate relationship between producer and consumer. This is why I've often said that the Middle East today is the most complicated situation in the world. I fear and I'm concerned about this.

I would hope that—I thought that terrorism would be at an end. I find these terrorist acts deplorable; the State Department issued

a statement yesterday condemning this latest terrorist attack.¹ And these terrorist attacks have to be understood, I think, Barbara, as antipeace actions rather than actions that help negotiations or help make practical progress.

Mr. Valeriani: In that connection, Mr. Sisco, earlier in the year there seemed to be a momentum toward peace in the Middle East. Now it seems to have shifted; there seems to be a momentum toward war as exemplified by the events of last weekend. How close is it?

Mr. Sisco: Well, I'm not so sure that one can describe the present situation as a momentum toward war. Certainly there's been an increase in tension, but as long as the opportunities for diplomacy remain, as long as the people in the area feel that there is such an opportunity, then I think we've got a chance of more practical progress; and in this regard, I think the United States continues to remain key.

Mr. Valeriani: Well, you'll have a very quick opportunity to test that when the mandate for the U.N. Force on the Golan Heights comes up for renewal. Are the Syrians going to agree to a renewal?

Mr. Sisco: Well, the mandate for the U.N. Force on the Syrian front, as you say, comes up at the end of the month. The U.N. Force both on the Egyptian front as well as the Syrian front, in my judgment, is a major element of stability. Both sides have agreed to the positioning of this force, and I think it's all-important that there be an extension because it is part and parcel of the disengagement agreement itself. And I think we'll have to wait and see. My hope is that both sides will see the advantage of maintaining every element of the disengagement agreement—particularly in this very delicate and

¹ The following statement was issued by the Department's press spokesman on Nov. 19:

"Once again we have witnessed the tragic spectacle of a terrorist attack on innocent civilians (this, in reference to the attack on Beith Shean). We want to express our shock over these senseless murders."

tense period of time—and that the United Nations really serves the interest of both sides in these circumstances and is in the mutual interest of both sides.

Mr. Valeriani: Do you expect it to be renewed?

Mr. Sisco: I'm saying that this matter obviously—no one can predict with any kind of certainty—I'm saying that it's important that it be renewed, and we're certainly going to work to this end.

Mr. Valeriani: You've emphasized over and over again, Mr. Sisco, about the key role of the United States. How much pressure do you feel because of the Arabs' oil weapon?

Mr. Sisco: Well, Dick, let me say very frankly—the Middle East today has gotten much more complicated than it has been over the years. The United States, after all, has very significant overall political, economic, strategic, and financial interests in the area. I think I'd be less than candid if I didn't say that oil was a factor in the situation, of course; it's an important source for oil. The whole monetary picture is of significance.

But in this connection, I think the Secretary of State has charted the way very, very clearly in his speech that he gave recently—at my old alma mater, by the way—at the University of Chicago. I think he underscored really two things: One, we in this country must go ahead and take every measure to become as independent as possible from outside sources. In other words, to do everything possible to make Project Independence a reality. And secondly, alongside that, it's of major importance that we take the lead as we are in helping to organize the consumer nations so that they also, together with us, take the kind of parallel steps which will reduce the reliance on the outside. The Secretary feels, and I must say I feel equally strongly, that unless the consumers can organize themselves in this way then there will be difficulties and we will be subject to pressure.

Mr. Valeriani: But that's long range, Mr. Sisco. What do you do now in the short term under these pressures?

Mr. Sisco: I think that we do everything that we can in the short range; we do what we can in terms of stabilizing the monetary situation, and I think we move as rapidly as we can. As you know, we have no interest in linking this whole matter with our own efforts toward a political solution. But as far as we're concerned, we would be going ahead trying to make practical progress on a political solution whether this other factor was there or not.

Mr. Valeriani: Thank you very much.

President Ford Reports on NATO's Effect on Balance of Payments

*Message to the Congress*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with Section 812(d) of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1974 (Public Law 93-155), I am pleased to submit a report to the Congress on our further progress toward offsetting the balance of payments deficit resulting from the deployment of U.S. forces in NATO Europe.

I am now able to provide you with figures for U.S. expenditures in NATO Europe during fiscal year 1974. These figures were compiled by the Department of Commerce in consultation with the Department of Defense and the General Accounting Office. They indicate that in FY 74 the expenditures resulting from the deployment of U.S. forces in fulfillment of our NATO commitments and obligations amounted to \$1,983 million (including preliminary fourth quarter data subject to revision). Attached to this report is an appendix showing how this figure was derived and what adjustments were made to

¹ Dated Nov. 17; transmitted on Nov. 18 (text from White House press release).

conform our normal expenditure data to the letter and intent of Section 812. Minor changes in this data may occur as final quarter fiscal year 1974 figures are confirmed during the next few weeks.

As President Nixon reported to the Congress on May 16, 1974, the offset agreement concluded in April 1974 with the Federal Republic of Germany had a dollar value of approximately \$2.22 billion over fiscal years 1974 and 1975. Of that amount, the fiscal year 1974 portion, approximating \$1.1 billion, will be directly applicable toward meeting the requirements of Section 812, leaving approximately \$883 million to be offset by our other European NATO allies.

As I noted in my report of August 20, 1974, the NATO Economic Directorate, at the direction of the North Atlantic Council, has established a mechanism for identifying allied purchases of military-related items from the United States. This was an essential step to enable us to comply with the requirements of Section 812. Representatives of the Economic Directorate consulted in Washington on October 21-22 with the Departments of State, Commerce and Defense and reported that approximately \$1,050 million in purchases by allies other than the Federal Republic of Germany have been identified.

The Departments of Commerce and Defense have sought to confirm this figure by examining the U.S. balance of payments accounts and records in an effort to identify balance of payments receipts reflecting military-related sales and exports to our European NATO allies, on both a government-to-government and commercial category basis. However, this data is still incomplete and the U.S. accounting system in many cases is too aggregated to identify all of the specific

purchases and payments made by the European members of NATO. For this reason our calculation of the final offset total will take into account the information being provided through the NATO Economic Directorate by our European NATO allies. On the basis of the foregoing, I continue to expect that the requirements of Section 812 will be met.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, November 17, 1974.

APPENDIX

A. U.S. Defense Expenditures Entering the International Balance of Payments in NATO Europe During Fiscal Year 1974, (in millions of dollars):

Personal expenditures by US Military and Civilian Personnel and their Dependents	815
Payments to Foreign Nationals for direct and contract hire	561
Major Equipment purchased in NATO Europe	81
Construction	75
NATO Infrastructure System Payments	76
Petroleum Products (includes cost of crude oil imported into Europe)	137
Materials and Supplies	148
Payments to US and foreign contractors for contractual services	444
All Other Payments (net)	66
Total for Fiscal Year 1974 (preliminary)	2,403

B. Deductions Made Pursuant to Section 812 for Expenditures not Resulting From the Deployment of US Forces in Fulfillment of our NATO Commitments and Obligations (in millions of dollars):

Expenditures for US activities not related to NATO such as US strategic forces in NATO countries	279
Major equipment purchased in NATO Europe and imported into the US and unrelated to US troop deployments in Europe	81
Expenditures in NATO Europe for the afloat operations of the Sixth Fleet for US strategic purposes	60
Total for Fiscal Year 1974 (preliminary)	420

C. Expenditures Less Deductions 1,983

Secretary of the Treasury Simon Discusses Energy Proposals

Following is an address by Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon made at New York, N.Y., on November 18 before the 61st National Foreign Trade Convention, sponsored by the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc.

Department of the Treasury press release dated November 18

We meet today in serious times—times that demand plain speaking—and I intend to speak plainly and bluntly.

As all of you know, the policies of the oil cartel now pose a fundamental challenge to the economic and political structure which has served the international community for a quarter of a century. Some believe the world confronts the greatest economic crisis since the early postwar years. Yet, as President Eisenhower once observed, a crisis need not stampede men into headlong panic:

A crisis (he said) is also the sharpest goad to the creative energies of men, particularly when they recognize it as a challenge to their every resource, and move to meet it in faith, in thought, and in courage.

That was a lesson the leaders of the early postwar years had already learned, and they applied it well. Their vision and their work laid the foundations for a period of unprecedented growth and progress, not only among the industrialized nations but among the newly developing nations as well.

Today, the vision and creative energies and, indeed, the principles of those earlier years are needed once again. With consumers, we must seek a new unity of purpose and strength of common effort. With producers, we must seek to resolve our differences through mutual understanding and cooperation. And with developing nations, we must continue to provide help and assistance so that they may fulfill their dreams of ad-

vancement. This is the basis upon which the United States is moving forward today in both its trade and energy policies.

With trade deficits mounting in almost every nation outside the oil producing and exporting countries bloc, governments in many countries are increasingly tempted to restrict trade in the name of shortage, surplus, inflation, or unemployment. As we have learned once before in this century, however, beggar-thy-neighbor policies by one party are ultimately destructive for all. This is not a time for unconstrained bilateralism, for monopolistic restriction on supply, or for other administrative arrangements which distort normal patterns of trade and investment. The solutions to the problems of an interdependent world lie in more interdependence, not less. An expanding world economy with reasonably stable prices is essential to the political, social, and economic interests of all nations. This can only be achieved if conditions are established which permit foreign trade and investment to play their historical role as engines of economic progress.

Negotiations on trade and trade relations were never more appropriate or timely. In this regard, we place great importance upon enactment of the trade reform bill before the end of this year. A clean act, unencumbered by extraneous amendments, is a matter of urgent priority to the President. Only with this legislative mandate can our negotiators be effective in seeking an open and flexible world trading system, and only with the full participation of the United States can we solve common economic problems.

Previous international trade negotiations have focused on the problem of opening national markets to the exports of other countries. It is essential that the multilateral trade negotiations in Tokyo now turn to the

other side of the question—finding means to insure international access to food and raw material supplies.

This problem of gaining access to supplies has been pointedly raised, of course, by actions of the oil-exporting nations belonging to the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] bloc—first by the embargo last fall, then by a quadrupling of prices, and finally by their production cutbacks designed to maintain prices.

Before the price increase in October of last year, the average payment to producing countries for a barrel of oil—using Saudi Arabian light crude as a benchmark—was less than \$2; today it is approximately \$10. Payments to OPEC nations for oil, amounting to \$22 billion in 1973, are expected to exceed \$85 billion this year and as of this fall are running at an annual rate of about \$100 billion. This year alone the OPEC nations will have \$60 billion in earnings which they do not spend on imports of goods and services. A receipt for the OPEC group is obviously a payment for the oil importers, and a surplus for OPEC is a deficit for the rest of the world. Only by piling up debt to the OPEC nations can the importers, as a group, pay for the oil.

The costs imposed on the world economy by exorbitant oil prices are both severe and extensive. They make our battle against inflation more difficult and the inflation itself more virulent. As the world shifts resources to adapt to a new energy balance, there will also be serious frictions and unavoidable costs of structural adjustment. Reluctance to borrow year after year to finance oil purchases will cause nations to maintain lower levels of economic activity, and there will be slower economic growth. There is a clear danger that some countries might take inappropriate or disruptive actions, with the risk of retaliation and resort to competitive restrictions.

At some time, furthermore, real resources will have to be transferred to OPEC countries to pay for accumulated debt. The direct impact will not be equal for all countries—but directly or indirectly, all countries will

find their hopes for prosperity dimmed. I can think of no single change that would more improve the outlook for the world economy than a substantial decrease in the price of oil. And I can conceive of no development more essential to the preservation of our international trading system.

Why Oil Prices Must Eventually Fall

The producing nations are aware that oil is not immune to the forces of supply and demand. The sharp jump in prices has already resulted in reduced oil consumption around the world, and as the passage of time permits further adjustments, such reductions will be far greater. In the oil-importing countries of the non-Communist world, consumption is projected to decline from the 1973 level of 48 million barrels per day to about 46½ million barrels per day this year. When it became evident that consumption was declining, a number of OPEC countries cut their output, not their price. Prior to the embargo last year, OPEC spare capacity was on the order of 1½ million barrels per day. Now they have unutilized capacity of nearly 8 million barrels a day. Even during their oil embargo, excess capacity did not reach this level. Inevitably, if that excess capacity grows, there will be increasing pressures for lower prices.

In the face of high prices, consumers are also accelerating development of their own sources of energy which, in time, will cost them significantly less than the current price of OPEC oil. If the OPEC nations persist in cutting back output in order to maintain price, they will find that both their market and their income have been drastically eroded. To me, the question is not whether oil prices will fall, but when they will fall.

I know there are energy doomsayers in the world who believe that the world is about to run out of oil. Those people are dead wrong. First of all, many experts believe that in the Middle East itself, proven reserves of nearly 400 billion barrels of oil are matched by additional reserves at least equal in amount. Nor are the world's energy con-

sumers locked in an OPEC vise. The world's oil and energy resources outside the OPEC nations are even larger than inside.

Here in the United States, our oil production potential is enormous, from new sources off our shores and in the Arctic and from older sources through improved and more intensive methods of recovery. And other traditional energy sources—natural gas, coal, and nuclear power—will become increasingly important as market incentives move our potential into production. Waiting in the wings, new sources of energy will be brought forth by technological progress and economic incentives—the same process by which our energy resources have always been developed.

Realistically, some potential sources of energy will require passage of time before they result in substantial production. But the oil market itself is already in the process of being transformed. In the past year alone, 26 significant new oil discoveries have been reported. At least 30 billion barrels of oil have been added to proven reserves outside the OPEC countries—an increase of 25 percent. Proven North Sea reserves have doubled since last fall; Mexico has discovered enormous new fields; even China has announced finds that allow it to become a significant oil exporter. Oil has also been found in commercial quantities in Guatemala, the Peru-Amazon Basin, the Tierra del Fuego region of Chile and Argentina, Gabon, Zaïre, Cabinda, Angola, Tunisia, India, Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, South Vietnam, Taiwan, and Egypt. And all these discoveries have taken place in just one year.

Altogether these finds outside OPEC have an estimated production potential of 13 million barrels per day by 1980, all of which reduce OPEC's potential market. And this doesn't even include the oil which will be flowing from Alaska and our outer continental shelf.

We do have an energy crisis, but it's clearly solvable. The OPEC nations, by stringently limiting the rate at which their oil is flowing, are inevitably creating the conditions under which floods of energy from other sources will be forthcoming—and

forthcoming at prices well below current levels.

There is no justification today for the present price of oil. It bears no relationship to the costs of production. The contention by some OPEC members that the increase was required in order to keep pace with the rise in price of other commodities is just not true. A barrel of oil today buys in imports some five times what it did two decades ago and four times what it bought as recently as last September.

Let us also be clear that we are not faced with a case of producing companies rigging the markets. Profits of the oil companies have increased, but this is largely a shortrun phenomenon resulting from revaluation of inventories, profits in collateral activities such as chemicals and transportation, and other factors. Certainly the oil companies would not conspire to escalate the revenues of the OPEC countries so that the host countries would then take over their industry. Oil is now overpriced for one reason and one reason only: because a small group of countries have joined together to manipulate the price.

Securing Cooperation Among Consumer Nations

It has been our hope that these nations would recognize that their policies are in neither their own interests nor in the interests of the world. Their hopes as well as ours lie in the resumption of international trade on reasonable terms. Until now, however, our arguments have fallen on seemingly deaf ears. The United States has long recognized that logic and moderation might not prevail, and for that reason, over the past year and a half, we have been quietly but firmly laying the groundwork for a more effective response to this challenge by the major consumer nations.

A central thrust of our policy has been to achieve greater cooperation among consumer nations. In pursuit of that goal, literally hundreds of hours have been devoted to private and public diplomacy by the highest ranking officials of our government. Our record is clear:

—In April of 1973, President Nixon warned that energy was becoming a major problem and that close cooperation was needed between the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.

—In February of 1974, at our invitation, a dozen major consuming nations gathered here for the Washington Energy Conference. I submitted a detailed paper at that time on the financial and economic aspects of international oil prices and on the need for conservation and expanded production. At that conference, the international Energy Coordinating Group was established, providing essential machinery for consultation and negotiations among consuming nations.

—After extended discussions by members of that Coordinating Group, an agreement was reached in Brussels this September for an unprecedented plan to share energy resources among consumer nations during times of emergency. The Brussels agreement represents a major breakthrough, for it will provide mutual protection in time of need, and it was reached after previous attempts had failed. The Brussels meeting also produced guidelines for cooperative longrun efforts in energy conservation, production, and research and development and led to the formation of a new organization associated with the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] to carry out this program, the International Energy Agency (IEA). The Governing Board of this new Agency is holding its first meeting today.

These are all solid achievements, but now we must go further.

The New Proposals by the United States

In many meetings with senior officials of other nations over the course of the past 10 months, Secretary Kissinger and I and our senior deputies have discussed our views of the current world economic situation and listened to theirs. We have continually stressed that energy, economic, and financial problems cannot be separated and that new initiatives in one area must be linked to

new initiatives in the other areas. In the past several weeks, we have presented a comprehensive set of proposals in private talks with a limited number of major industrial countries, and the discussions that followed have been very intensive and constructive.

Recently, feeling that the agreements reached in Brussels gave us solid foundations upon which to build, President Ford directed that the United States should finally make a public presentation of its proposals. That was the basis of Dr. Kissinger's speech in Chicago last Thursday night, when he outlined the global aspects of our position, and my talk here today, in which I will present the financial aspects of our proposals in greater detail.

The essence of the U.S. position can be succinctly described:

—The price of oil itself, not its financial repercussions, is the real source of trouble in the world economy.

—To help bring about lower oil prices and to reduce the economic burden of oil imports, major consuming nations should work together to achieve significant reductions in their imports of OPEC oil.

—They should also coordinate policies and pool their technical resources to increase energy production within their own nations.

—IMF [International Monetary Fund] resources should be more fully mobilized for all its member nations.

—A major new financial mechanism should be set up in association with the OECD to provide standby financial support in case any of the participating countries find themselves in economic trouble after having made reasonable efforts on their own part.

—Consideration should also be given to setting up a special trust fund managed by the IMF to help developing nations that are suffering the most and require financing on concessional terms.

—Finally, serious preparations should be made for an eventual dialogue between a consumer group and the producer nations.

Our ideas call for a forthright, earnest effort by the world's major industrial coun-

tries to resolve the international energy crisis. To implement such a far-reaching initiative will require further weeks of diplomacy with our allies and friends. We will need the cooperation of the Congress. And we will need your support and the support of all other Americans.

Reducing Oil Imports

Let us look more closely now at these proposals. All major oil-consuming countries have adopted national programs of energy conservation to reduce oil imports. President Ford has announced a U.S. program to reduce oil imports by 1 million barrels a day below what they otherwise would have been by the end of 1975. The President has made it clear that we will meet this target and that whatever steps are necessary will be taken. The French Government announced some weeks ago that it would take actions to limit 1975 oil imports in France to a quantity costing no more than imports in 1974. Just last week, the British Government announced new taxes on gasoline in order to reduce oil imports. Other governments have adopted targets, goals, and policies differing according to national circumstances but all directed toward reducing oil imports.

These first steps toward conservation could be strengthened if the major industrial nations as a group were to place on the table their proposed conservation programs and their proposed programs for expanding energy production so that both could be internationally reviewed and discussed to determine their overall adequacy and the equity with which the effort is being shared among nations.

We believe that effective national programs of conservation could achieve a reduction in imports of the major industrial countries of the world by the end of 1975 of at least 3 million barrels a day—without unduly dampening economic activity and performance. Such a reduction in imports, were it to be agreed upon and implemented, would result in import savings at an annual rate of some \$11 billion at present price levels and would provide strong marketplace pressures to bring

down the price of oil. The impact of the efforts of each of us can be multiplied many times by the efforts of all of us.

I would be less than candid if I were to leave the impression that achieving this goal will be easy. But I would be less than honest if I were to pretend that what is easy will be effective.

Immediate efforts to reduce oil imports are essential. But equally essential are the efforts needed to promote energy conservation and production in the longer run.

Fortunately, we now have, in the new International Energy Agency, a forum for developing and coordinating new national and international policies to achieve these ends. It is no secret that administrative and policy barriers to conservation and to increased production still exist in almost all countries—including the United States. It is also no secret that international efforts to achieve these same objectives face many difficulties. But it is essential that we push ahead.

A basic requirement is to develop in the IEA a common longer term target for reducing the rate of growth of energy consumption and oil imports. Such a longer run objective will be helpful to governments as national policy decisions are made and will also serve to demonstrate to OPEC nations where their present course is leading.

We should also establish a review process within the International Energy Agency of the policies of the participating countries for developing new energy sources. Out of this process should evolve not only useful guiding principles for energy development but an increased awareness among all members of the requirements of successful policies in this field.

Another complex problem with which we must come to grips in the IEA is the so-called “downside risk” problem. Which energy resources will be developed in the future and at what rates will depend on investor estimates of the prospective price of oil. Prospective investors in energy projects can be expected to be cautious in a situation in which the price of oil could plunge as easily as it has soared. Thus we must begin to consider methods of international coopera-

tion to provide investors an appropriate degree of protection against such risks.

Finally, there remain unexploited opportunities for cooperation in energy research and development—in nuclear fusion, coal technology, the use of hydrogen, and enriched uranium—and the new International Energy Agency can usefully serve to expedite and facilitate such cooperation in these and other areas.

In all of these areas, a collective determination to move forward quickly and effectively will not only serve to reduce our dependence on oil from OPEC nations but also to accelerate the process by which the price of OPEC oil is brought down to acceptable levels.

Providing Financial Security

At the same time, countries which agree to act together in energy need to be confident that if a financial emergency arises, credit will be available to them on reasonable terms. They could be given such confidence through a new supplementary financial mechanism which the major industrial nations could themselves establish. Among them they will receive the capital represented by the OPEC surpluses. The OPEC countries do not have to be offered special guarantees, above market rates of return, or value-indexing schemes. They can place their money where they choose. All that is needed are adequate arrangements—private and public—to insure that funds are distributed among the individual oil-importing states so as to avoid unnecessarily stringent economic difficulties in particular countries.

Existing private and public facilities have been doing this job of redistribution in the past, and there is no evidence that they cannot continue to do the job. The problems of financing higher oil bills can be managed until oil prices come down—not easily, not without strains, and not without effort, but they can be managed.

Substantial volumes of OPEC funds, probably \$45 billion in the first 10 months of this year, have been invested in a variety of ways.

Nearly one-quarter of these funds have been invested directly in the U.S. market and nearly another quarter in the domestic assets of other industrial countries. The OPEC countries have also lent directly to other governments and transferred additional amounts to international institutions—for example, the International Monetary Fund's special oil facility. In addition, substantial amounts have been placed in Euro-currency markets—but the total, less than 40 percent, is not as large as many have assumed. For borrowers, all these investments represent potential sources of funds and provide a wide range of alternative financing channels.

While the international financial system has worked well, we must recognize, however, that individual countries could find themselves in economic trouble, with needed credit too scarce or too expensive to permit them to maintain open economies at appropriate levels of activity. A supplementary loan facility, established by the major industrial countries associated with the OECD, would provide the backstopping that is needed to supplement existing channels of financing. This is the financial safety net that the United States is recommending.

Certain principles would be fundamental to such a mechanism:

1. Participation should be linked with a commitment to cooperate in reducing dependence on oil imports.
2. Participants would also undertake to follow responsible adjustment policies and avoid resorting to the use of trade-restrictive measures or other beggar-thy-neighbor policies.
3. Like any insurance policy, the facility should be large enough to do the job. It must be clear that the potential for borrowing is adequate to meet the need. We recommend a facility with total commitments by all members of \$25 billion in 1975. Additional financial resources would be provided in subsequent years in case of need.
4. The facility should supplement private market channels and other channels, including the IMF and other official institutions. It should not replace them. For this reason

it should do its lending on market-related terms.

5. Decisions on the provision of financial support should be made by a weighted vote of participants and should be based on the overall economic position of the borrower, not on any single criterion such as oil import bills.

6. Whenever support is provided by the facility, all members should share the credit risk on the basis of their share of participation.

Beyond these general principles there are many details to be worked out and on which we are openminded. One question that must be answered is the manner in which the facility would obtain the funds with which to lend. An individual government could lend directly to the new facility or could permit the facility to go into the capital markets of the world and borrow funds on the basis of its guarantee.

There would appear to be a number of advantages in having funds provided to the facility through direct lending by member governments rather than guarantees. Traditionally, the loan route is more efficient and it is cheaper. Nevertheless, it may be desirable in establishing the facility to provide some flexibility on this score simply because national practices and legislative requirements vary widely. Whatever means is chosen, the United States will need to obtain additional authority from the Congress in order to proceed.

For the United States, participation might best be accomplished through the Exchange Stabilization Fund. This Fund has the authority to engage in international lending operations for the purpose of stabilizing the value of the dollar, and this would be a basic purpose of our participation in the proposed facility.

Arrangements for administration of the facility will also have to be negotiated. Our initial feeling is that it should be associated with the OECD in a manner similar to that of the new International Energy Agency and administered by its own governing board, whose members might be drawn from among

the senior finance officials of the member countries.

The question of shares will be an important issue in setting up a facility of this nature. Various factors have been mentioned that might be taken into account, such as the size of the oil import bills of the member states, the relative value of gross national product, share in international trade, or some combination of these factors. The various possibilities will have to be carefully weighed.

It may also be important to state that in our current thinking, borrowing from the facility should not be related specifically to imports of oil. "Oil deficits" become increasingly indistinguishable from "nonoil" deficits. And even the concept of balance of payments deficits is of limited utility in the world we face today. In our view, access to this facility should be based on an overall judgment of a country's needs taken in conjunction with its resources, its basic economic policies, and the actions it is taking to reduce dependence on OPEC oil.

We have been discussing the broad outlines of how such a facility might work with a number of other governments for several months. Both my personal conversations with other finance ministers and our official-level contacts give me confidence that there will be support for this general line of thinking. We now intend to urge consideration of this idea more formally in official-level discussions in Paris this week. I should note that the Secretary General of the OECD has independently developed suggestions for a supplementary funding mechanism similar in many respects to the one I have just described. His ideas, which are very welcome, will also be on the table at the meetings this week in Paris of the OECD Working Party 3 and of the Group of Ten Deputies.

We will be prepared to devote many hours and many days of hard work over the next few weeks to translate these broad outlines into an operating program. We will need to work very closely with the authorities of the IMF and the newly established Interim Committee of that body. Intensive consultations with our Congress will also be undertaken,

and I am sure that our partners in this venture will be consulting intensively with their legislatures.

What we are suggesting is in no way intended to replace the International Monetary Fund as the permanent institution providing the basic financial support for a well-functioning world economy. The IMF is in a position to provide substantial additional support to any of its members. It has over \$10 billion of currencies which are effectively available and usable, quite apart from its holdings of gold. We are prepared, in the current review of IMF quotas, to support a substantial increase in that figure. Furthermore, we are prepared to support early measures to insure effective mobilization of the resources that the IMF now has.

At the same time we are suggesting an initiative outside the IMF, in part because of the magnitude of the possible transfer requirements among the major industrial countries and in part because the terms and conditions of IMF financial operations are not appropriate to the exceptional circumstances we now face. Moreover, it would be inappropriate—even if possible—to introduce into the IMF the full range of policy issues which must be taken into account when decisions and judgments are made with respect to financial support among major industrial countries.

Meeting the Needs of Developing Nations

Of equal importance is our concern for the developing countries and the smaller industrial countries. Of course it is true that for the developing countries it is essential that the major industrial countries maintain healthy, growing economies in the face of the oil crisis. The developing countries depend on the industrial nations to take a growing volume of their exports and to continue essential concessional aid levels.

If we establish a facility which will help assure the maintenance of economic activity in the industrial countries, we are assisting the developing countries as well. Many of the developing countries have come to de-

pend on continued large capital flows to support their rapid economic growth.

By helping to assure orderly access to the major capital markets and thereby reducing the danger of undue competition for the surplus investment funds of the oil exporters, the establishment of a new financial mechanism for industrial countries would enhance the ability of many developing countries to attract the large amounts of capital they need and can productively employ. These countries will also be able to make appropriate use of the resources of the IMF.

One group of developing countries—those with the lowest per capita incomes and those seriously affected by natural disasters and other problems—will, however, still require concessional assistance. We and other developed countries have been redirecting our concessional assistance toward these countries and urging the international financial institutions to do the same. We also look to the oil exporters to provide a major part of the additional concessional funds needed by these countries because of the increase in oil prices. The additional amounts needed by these poorest countries—perhaps \$1.5 billion in 1975—is small in comparison with the oil exporters' surpluses. But although relatively modest in global terms, the sums involved bulk very large for the countries concerned because needs are this desperate.

We shall be addressing the problems of these countries on an urgent basis in the new Development Committee, where we shall keep the availabilities of funds under continual review as well as the efforts of developing countries to make maximum efforts to use available resources effectively.

One way to help these countries would be to establish a trust fund managed by the IMF and receiving contributions from OPEC states and from other sources. Perhaps the IMF itself could contribute to such a fund profits derived by the sale in the private market of some portion of its gold holdings. A trust fund of this nature which would offer credit at relatively low cost—perhaps 2 to 4 percent—and on moderately long maturities would provide funds to those most

seriously affected on terms which are not appropriate for other borrowers. We hope this suggestion will receive the urgent attention of ministers in the IMF Interim Committee and the IMF-IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] Development Committee.

Cooperation With the OPEC Nations

U.S. proposals for greater solidarity among major industrial countries in no sense stem from any desire for confrontation with the OPEC nations. We recognize and support the legitimate aspirations of these nations to accelerate their own development, establish their industrial and agricultural bases, and to improve the living standards of their peoples today and in the years to come.

We have established Joint Cooperation Commissions with the key oil producers in the Middle East to help them achieve these objectives. We have undertaken a major effort within our government to provide them the expertise we have achieved in developing the economy of our own country and to help make it adaptable to their development programs.

I personally visited a number of countries in the Middle East last July to launch this effort and intend to return soon to insure its momentum. My visit last summer was followed by meetings both here and in the Middle East of other U.S. officials, technicians, and experts with their counterparts, which have put flesh on the Commission structures that have been established.

We are prepared to continue to do what we can to accelerate the economic development of OPEC nations and to encourage the private sector of our country and other industrial countries to take an active role in this process. In the meantime, we will continue to permit these countries to invest in our markets, and I am confident they will be allowed to invest in the markets of other nations as well.

For their part the OPEC countries must recognize that their position in the world

economy has already changed dramatically. These countries will continue to have greater influence in the world even with a substantial fall in oil prices. These countries are now the major surplus countries of the world, with a surplus of a magnitude unprecedented in history. It is vital to the maintenance of a sound and equitable world economy that they accept without delay the responsibilities which have historically fallen upon major creditor countries.

I have spoken already of their responsibilities for assisting the needy of the world. They must also understand that their foreign investments can be treated no differently from the investments of others. They cannot realistically expect the rest of the world to devise a special system of guarantees for them alone. It is also incumbent upon them to shed the outmoded habits acquired when they were developing countries with limited resources. The resources of this group of countries are adequate to finance their legitimate development aspirations, even though the situation of individual OPEC countries may differ. Their excess revenues this year alone approximate six times the flow of development assistance to all developing countries last year. This new reality must be reflected in the policies of international financial institutions.

In my conversations with officials of OPEC nations and on my travels to the Middle East, I have found that there is widespread understanding in OPEC countries of the responsibilities inherent in their new international role. Certainly leaders of OPEC nations are well aware of the important stake they have in a healthy world economic system. I remain confident that a basis can be found for the industrial nations of the world to continue to work constructively with OPEC nations.

Of course, they must recognize that we continue to be strongly opposed to the actions they have taken to compel a massive temporary transfer of resources—real and financial—to them from the rest of the world. We believe they can achieve their development objectives on a more secure basis at a

substantially lower level of oil prices.

They must recognize, too, that each passing day takes us a step further away from an optimal utilization of the world's resources, as other nations revise their policies toward reliance on oil imports. Certainly, there is even now no possibility that oil-consuming countries can return to the energy practices of two years ago. But the full scope of consuming-country reaction is not yet defined, and the hope remains that reasonable men can find rational solutions.

We remain persuaded that extreme policies will in time prove very harmful to the basic economic and social aspirations of these nations and that there is a solid foundation for reaching agreement on a constructive resolution of this issue. Greater cooperation among the world's industrial countries along the lines that Secretary Kissinger and I have set forth last week and today will help establish the basis for such agreement.

In their own interest, and in the interest of the world as a whole, the time has now come when the major industrial nations must grasp the nettle. The evidence before us—of rapid inflation and economic stagnation—offers bleak encouragement for the future unless we now take decisive collective action to break the present train of events. We must act together to limit our dependence on imported oil and to promote our mutual economic and financial solidarity. Such action will inevitably be carried out through decisions and actions often appearing to be technical in nature and limited in scope. But underlying all of what we do must be a solid foundation of commitment—a political consensus that we will act together to determine our own destiny—and a mutual faith that we can do so.

We must maintain our commitment to expanding trade and foreign investment. We are too far down the road to interdependence to look back. We have it in our power to choose whether we are prisoners of a history yet to be written or the architects of a future yet to be seen. I have no doubt what our choice will be; we know what the required international response must be.

Senate Asked To Approve Convention on Protection of Diplomats

*Message From President Ford*¹

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a copy of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 14, 1973, and signed in behalf of the United States of America on December 28, 1973. The report of the Department of State with respect to the Convention is also transmitted for the information of the Senate.

The effective conduct of international relations depends in large part on the ability of diplomatic agents to travel and live freely and securely while representing the interests of their respective countries. We have witnessed in recent years an unprecedented increase in acts of violence directed against diplomatic agents and other internationally protected persons. This development has demonstrated the urgent need to take affirmative action to minimize the threats which can be directed against diplomatic agents. Although the legal obligation to protect these persons was never questioned, the mechanism for international cooperation to ensure that perpetrators of serious attacks against them are brought to justice, no matter where they may flee, was lacking.

The Convention is designed to rectify this serious situation by creating a legal mechanism whereby persons alleged to have committed serious crimes against diplomats will be prosecuted or extradited. It also sets out a framework for international cooperation in the prevention and punishment of such crimes.

¹ Transmitted on Nov. 13 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. L, 93d Cong., 2d sess., which includes the report of the Department of State and the text of the convention; for text of the convention, see BULLETIN of Jan. 28, 1974, p. 92.

This Convention is vitally important to assure continued safe and orderly conduct of the diplomatic process. I hope that all States will become Parties to this Convention. I recommend, therefore, that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to this Convention.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *November 13, 1974.*

President Ford Maintains Current Tariffs on Sugar

*Statement by President Ford*¹

I am announcing actions designed to (1) insure the continued flow of sugar into this country from abroad and (2) encourage increased production domestically at the same time. The actions I am taking will maintain duties on sugar imports at the lowest permissible rate under the Tariff Schedules of the United States.

The Sugar Act is scheduled to expire on December 31, 1974. If no action is taken, tariffs on imported sugar will rise about 1.3 cents per pound on January 1, 1975. The law provides, however, that the President can continue the current rates in force if his proclamation extending the rates includes a quota on sugar imports. I have, therefore, decided to extend the current tariff rates and will set an annual global quota of 7 million short tons for 1975.² That quantity is more than adequate to meet anticipated import requirements. At the same time, it will insure a degree of stability for our own sugar industry to operate effectively in a period of very tight supplies.

Although there is no risk we will run out of sugar, we may well experience higher prices than we would like until production catches up with demand. Users of sugar can

help ease prices by buying wisely, conserving supplies, and consuming less sugar. I urge all Americans to reduce the amount of sugar in cooking and to put in half the amount usually used to sweeten coffee or tea.

The world sugar supply has tightened markedly in recent months. For the past three crop years, world sugar production has been rising. But even so, consumption has exceeded production by a small margin. Crop setbacks this year in a number of countries will prevent production from keeping pace with the normal growth of consumption. Since sugar production this year is expected to be about the same as last, worldwide sugar supplies will continue to be tight. Because we in this country import about one-half of the sugar we consume, we are directly affected by this worldwide problem. So far this year, our foreign suppliers have shipped 10 percent more sugar to the United States than last year.

The Council on Wage and Price Stability is working with sugar-using industries to stimulate conservation in the use of sugar. The Council will also hold public hearings to examine the margins charged by sugar processors, refiners, and distributors. The purpose of these hearings will be to insure that the retail prices of sugar and sugar products are not unduly increased.

In the past, sharp increases in sugar prices have always been temporary because they stimulated offsetting production increases of sugar cane and sugar beets. I have asked Secretary [of Agriculture Earl L.] Butz to insure that all American farmers are made aware of the excellent market opportunities offered by sugar beets and sugar cane and to make sure that there are no governmental impediments to increased production.

Early season contracting between farmers and processors could be very helpful in 1975, and long-term contracting between U.S. refiners and foreign suppliers could be very beneficial as well. Our traditional foreign sugar suppliers who have benefited from our sugar program in the past are also urged to continue providing sugar to our market.

Finally, I have directed the Economic Pol-

¹ Issued on Nov. 18 (text from White House press release).

² For text of Proclamation No. 4334, see 39 *Fed. Reg.* 40739.

icy Board to monitor the sugar situation on a weekly basis and to report to me any signs of speculation or market activity in world and domestic markets that would worsen the tight supply situation we face this year.

The administration recognized the inconveniences worked on the average American citizen by the current sugar situation. It will continue to do everything it can to improve matters and to remove some of the uncertainties for the future.

U.S.-Canada Treaty on Extradition Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Ford*¹

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and Canada, signed at Washington on December 3, 1971, as amended by an exchange of notes of June 28 and July 9, 1974.

The Treaty is one of a current series of extradition treaties being negotiated by the United States and contains provisions regarding extradition for the offenses of aircraft hijacking, narcotics and conspiracy to commit listed offenses.

The Treaty will facilitate the mutual efforts of the United States and Canada in combating international crime. In addition, modernization of the extradition relations between the United States and Canada is especially important in light of the ease of travel between the two countries. I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Treaty as amended and give its advice and consent to ratification.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 12, 1974.*

¹ Transmitted on Sept. 12 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. G., 93d Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the treaty and the report of the Department of State.

Presidential Determination on Sale of 200,000 Tons of Wheat to Egypt

MEMORANDUM OF OCTOBER 31, 1974¹

[Presidential Determination No. 75-5]

Finding and Determination Concerning Egypt

Memorandum for the Secretary of State;
the Secretary of Agriculture

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, October 31, 1974.


Finding and Determination under Sections 103(d)(3) and (4) of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended—Egypt.

Pursuant to the authority vested in me under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (hereinafter "the Act"), I hereby:

(a) Find, pursuant to Section 103(d)(3) of the Act, that the making of an agreement with the Government of Egypt for the sale, under Title I of the Act, of 200 thousand metric tons of wheat is in the national interest of the United States; and

(b) Determine, pursuant to Section 103(d)(4) of the Act, that the sale to Egypt of wheat in furtherance of such an agreement is in the national interest of the United States.

This Determination shall be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.



STATEMENT OF REASONS THAT SALES UNDER TITLE I OF THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1954, AS AMENDED (PUBLIC LAW 480) TO EGYPT ARE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Egypt is central to our efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Our ultimate success will depend in part on Egyptian confidence in our intention to develop a broad and constructive bilateral relationship with that country. Continuation of a program for concessional sales of agricultural commodities to Egypt will constitute a tangible demonstration of our intended role.

In response to current Egyptian needs, it is proposed to export to that country 200 thousand metric tons of wheat financed under Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (Pub. L. 480). This amount is based on Egypt's needs for not more than one fiscal year.

¹ 39 Fed. Reg. 39431, Nov. 7, 1974.

In order to enter into an agreement with the Government of Egypt for such a sale under Title I, it is necessary that the President find and determine that such sales would be in the national interest of the United States. Section 103(d)(3) of Pub. L. 480 prohibits the sale of agricultural commodities under Title I of the Act to any nation which sells or furnishes or permits ships or aircraft under its registry to transport to or from Cuba or North Vietnam any equipment, materials, or commodities (so long as those countries are governed by Communist regimes). However, if such activities are limited to furnishing, selling, or selling and transporting to Cuba medical supplies, non-strategic agricultural or food commodities, sales agreements may be made if the President finds they are in the national interest of the United States. Section 103(d)(4) also prohibits sales of commodities under Title I to Egypt unless the President determines such sales are in the national interest of the United States.

The considerations noted above, however, make the proposed sale important to the national interest of the United States notwithstanding the prohibitions contained in Sections 103(d)(3) and (4) of Pub. L. 480.

Section 410 of Pub. L. 480 prohibits sales under Title I of Pub. L. 480 to a country in violation of Section 620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which concerns expropriation or nationalization of property of Americans without taking appropriate steps to discharge its obligations under international law. Egypt agreed to the establishment of a Joint Committee to discuss compensation of American nationals and, on July 15, Secretary Kissinger determined that such an agreement constituted appropriate steps under Section 620(e). The Committee continues active. Therefore, no waiver of that provision is required to permit this additional sale of wheat to Egypt under Title I of Pub. L. 480.

Activation of the Energy Resources Council

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

In my address to the Congress on October 8, 1974, I expressed my intention to create a new National Energy Board, under the chairmanship of the Secretary of the Interior, to develop, coordinate, and assure the implementation of Federal energy policy. Subsequent to my delivery of that address, the Congress completed action on the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 which I have just approved into law. Section 108 of that act creates in the Executive Office of the President a new Energy Resources Council which would be charged with performing functions that are essentially the same as those I

had intended to assign to the National Energy Board. Consequently, I have determined that it would serve no useful purpose to create that Board. Instead, I am now exercising the authority vested in me by section 108 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, to activate immediately the Energy Resources Council, to designate the Secretary of the Interior as its Chairman, and to designate additional officials as members thereof.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States of America by the Constitution and laws of the United States, particularly section 108 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Section 108 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 shall be effective as of the date of this order and the Energy Resources Council shall be deemed to have been activated as of that date.

Sec. 2. The Council shall consist of the Secretary of the Interior, who shall be its Chairman, the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Transportation, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, the Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration, the Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration (upon entry into office), the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, the Director of the National Science Foundation, the Executive Director of the Domestic Council, and such other members as the President may, from time to time, designate.

Sec. 3. The Energy Resources Council shall perform such functions as are assigned to it by section 108 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, shall develop a single national energy policy and program, and shall perform such other functions as may be assigned to it, from time to time, by the President.

Sec. 4. All departments and agencies shall cooperate with the Council and shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide it with such assistance and information as the Chairman of the Council may request.

Sec. 5. The Committee on Energy, the establishment of which was announced on June 14, 1974, is hereby abolished.

Sec. 6. The Council shall terminate in accordance with the provisions of section 108 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.

Richard M. Ford

THE WHITE HOUSE, October 11, 1974.

¹ No. 11814; 39 *Fed. Reg.* 36955, Oct. 16, 1974.

U.S. Calls for Worldwide Effort To Eliminate Torture and Inhuman Treatment of Prisoners

Following is a statement by Senator Charles H. Percy, U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly, made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) on October 18, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the committee on October 22 and by the Assembly on November 6.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR PERCY

USUN press release 139 dated October 18

The Charter of the United Nations reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small. This organization is thus based upon sacred ideals shared by societies throughout the world.

The protection of human rights by this organization has not been free from difficulty. While all peoples share the aspirations proclaimed in the charter, it remains nonetheless essentially within the jurisdiction of each sovereign state to find the means of fulfilling these aspirations.

The fundamental dilemma created by the inherent conflict between broad international goals and national prerogatives cannot, however, be permitted to frustrate our efforts to work together toward a more humane world.

Today, Madam Chairman, we consider a topic of central and vital importance in the struggle to safeguard human rights—the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. We have before us the draft resolution contained in A/C.3/L.2106. The United States is pleased to be a cosponsor. I would like to

express our gratitude particularly to the delegation of the Netherlands, which took the lead in developing this resolution, and to other cosponsors who helped in promoting it.

All nations rightly condemn the practice of torture. No practice is more abhorrent. An absolute debasement of the function of government takes place when the overwhelming power of government is utilized not to protect individual human beings but to coerce them into subservience.

The problem of torture is one of particular interest to my government. In his statement before the General Assembly on September 23, the Secretary of State of the United States called for a major international effort to prohibit torture.

It is indisputable, however, that this problem must be viewed not as a concern of one or several countries but of the entire family of nations. Men and women of all races and creeds have been victims of this abuse. Torture has, regrettably, been practiced at one time or another by countries in all parts of the world. Only by a worldwide effort can we hope to eliminate this universally condemned practice.

We must address ourselves to the practical steps which can be taken. Are we innovative enough to find means whereby the international community can assist its members to prevent or lessen the practice of torture and yet not encroach upon the proper domestic jurisdiction of sovereign states? We believe that practical means can be found and that the draft resolution before us can be an important and major step in our efforts.

Since all states condemn the practice of torture by government officials, this practice

must take place contrary to the intentions of the highest governmental authorities, or at least their stated intentions. Governments should therefore consider taking steps to prevent the practice before the pressures for its utilization are greatest—in times of civil strife and in the aftermath of bitter internal conflicts.

Torture is an abuse which is most likely to prevail when associated legal protections do not exist. Codes of law regarding notification of arrest, right to counsel, right to appear promptly before a judge, can be instrumental in preventing the practice of torture.

While these subjects touch upon broad and fundamental issues of human freedom, they are also areas of technical legal expertise. The experience of many nations in seeking justice under law should be examined. The merits and problems of different statutory and constitutional solutions should be studied. The help of learned jurists should be sought. Model codes can and should be developed for the use of countries that wish to improve and strengthen their systems of justice.

The task will not be an easy one. The complexities of law to be examined will be great. The questions of balance and judgment will present difficult challenges. Detailed matters of police practice will have to be reviewed.

Let me illustrate with specifics. When the experts gather they should address such practical questions as these:

- How to assure the right legal assistance immediately upon detention.

- How to provide that an arrested person must be brought before a judicial authority promptly within a specified time after detention.

- How to specify that detained persons can communicate with their families.

- How to devise regulations regarding the permissible duration and manner of interrogation.

- How to establish when it is appropriate

or necessary to conduct medical examinations, either before or after interrogation.

- How to determine what records should be kept regarding the identity of arresting officials, interrogators, details of medical examinations.

- How to provide for procedural remedies in case of complaints of abuse, such as the procedure of habeus corpus or amparo.

In addition to questions of detailed procedure of the sort I have just described, there will be thorny questions of definition. Let me again illustrate with specifics. How can the essence of "torture" or "cruel or inhuman treatment" be defined? For example, we can all understand that it is often important for police authorities to question a suspect as soon as possible after detention and that questioning may need to continue for a considerable period of time. However, should it be permissible to deprive a suspect of sleep for a prolonged period? Is this the type of matter that can or should be defined in model legislation? Should it be left up to magistrates? Many similar questions of detail will undoubtedly arise.

The United States has already begun its technical and legal studies on these issues. We will now intensify our preparatory work for the meetings of the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, which is to take place in 1975. We intend to participate constructively and creatively in fulfilling the tasks requested of this Congress by operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft resolution.

I would note that the draft resolution also involves other U.N. bodies—the Commission on Human Rights, the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, the World Health Organization, and the General Assembly itself, which is to consider this matter again at its 30th session. We believe that all of these bodies can have important roles to play in the overall effort. We must of course recognize that the task we confront will require a long and sustained effort, and it will be necessary as

we proceed to determine in which forums we can take the most practical and effective steps forward.

Our purpose is to devote the effort required—and it will be considerable—to advance the development of model codes dealing with problems such as I have outlined by using any and all of the forums which have the competence, expertise, and motivation necessary for success. We do not anticipate that this effort can realize all of its goals at once, and we therefore welcome the fact that other interested governments have taken an initiative which parallels and complements our own expressed interest and ideas. We hope to work closely with all interested governments and are therefore particularly pleased to support this resolution's recommendations to the fifth Congress—one of the places we can make an early start on the practical pursuit of this task.

I would also call attention to operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft resolution. These paragraphs request member states to furnish to the Secretary General relevant information and comments and ask the Secretary General to prepare an analytical summary. We urge that all members respond fully to this request. The work which is to proceed in the fifth United Nations Congress and in other U.N. bodies will clearly benefit greatly if it is based on broad and detailed knowledge of practice and opinion throughout the world.

It is a sad commentary, Madam Chairman, that this committee, just a little more than 25 years after the adoption by the General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, finds it necessary to single out the problem of torture as one which today requires our attention. We share with many others feelings of dismay and outrage whenever we receive reports which seem to indicate that the practice of torture has been pursued officially. We need not, however, be discouraged if we view our work in the long perspective of history and if we recognize

the unique and practical opportunities which the United Nations and its organs afford to us.

In the past few centuries steady progress can be discerned toward the universal goal of protection of the rights of the individual person. As we all know, the world has witnessed serious and tragic lapses in the treatment of human beings over wide areas and for lengthy periods. Yet I have no doubt that, taking the world as a whole, there has been a gradual improvement over the years in the behavior of states toward their own citizenry.

From the very beginning, the United Nations has made a major contribution to the raising of standards of decency everywhere with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The goals of this declaration are noble and high. No nation can properly claim to have attained them completely. Yet none of us can afford to relax in the endless struggle to achieve them. We can take heart from the gains that have been realized in the course of time. Some of the most degrading and inhuman practices have been tempered or eliminated. The institution of slavery, for instance, has been virtually removed from the face of the earth.

I am convinced that the time has now come to take another common step upward on the ladder of civilization. It is time to intensify greatly our work to prevent the practice of torture. We must do everything we can to end this abuse.

In his statement before the General Assembly, Secretary Kissinger urged that we should never forget that all of our political endeavors are ultimately judged by one standard—to translate our actions into human concerns. He added that the United States will never be satisfied with a world where man's fears overshadow his hopes.

When we work to build barriers against the practice of torture, we work to realize one of mankind's deepest aspirations—the ability of every person to lead a life of dignity and decency. The task before us de-

mands all of the creativity, the skill, the persistence, and the good will which we can bring to bear.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹

Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in relation to detention and imprisonment

The General Assembly,

Mindful of article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

Reaffirming the rejection, in its resolution 3059 (XXVIII) of 2 November 1973, of any form of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,

Taking into account the report of the Secretary-General on the consideration given to this question by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and by the Commission on Human Rights and other bodies concerned,²

Noting with appreciation the decision of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to review annually the developments in the field of human rights of persons subjected to any form of detention or imprisonment,³

Noting also the draft principles on freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention contained in the relevant study on this matter,⁴

Recalling Economic and Social Council resolution 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957, in which, *inter alia*, the Council approved the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,⁵ and Council resolution 1794 (LIV) of 18 May 1973 concerning the preparation of an international code of police ethics, as well as General Assembly resolution 3144 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 on human rights in the administration of justice,

Considering that the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, to be held in accordance with General Assembly resolution 415 (V) of 1 December 1950,

¹ U.N. doc. A/RES/3218 (XXIX) (A/C.3/L.2106/Rev. 1); adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 6 by a vote of 125 (U.S.) to 0, with 1 abstention.

² U.N. doc. A/9767. [Footnote in original.]

³ *Ibid.*, annex I. [Footnote in original.]

⁴ See United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.65.XIV.2, para. 823. [Footnote in original.]

⁵ *First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders: report by the Secretariat* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 1956.IV.4), annex I.A. [Footnote in original.]

will take place in September 1975 at Toronto, Canada,

Convinced that, because of the increase in the number of alarming reports on torture, further and sustained efforts are necessary to protect under all circumstances the basic human right to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,

1. Requests Member States to furnish the Secretary-General in time for submission to the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders and to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session:

(a) Information relating to the legislative, administrative and judicial measures, including remedies and sanctions, aimed at safeguarding persons within their jurisdiction from being subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;

(b) Their observations and comments on articles 24 to 27 of the draft principles on freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention prepared for the Commission on Human Rights;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare an analytical summary of the information received under paragraph 1 above for submission to the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session, to the Commission on Human Rights and to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities;

3. Requests the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, under item 3 of its agenda, taking into account the consideration given to the question by the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control in pursuance of Economic and Social Council resolution 1794 (LIV), to give urgent attention to the question of the development of an international code of ethics for police and related law enforcement agencies;

4. Further requests the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, under item 4 of its agenda, to include, in the elaboration of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, rules for the protection of all persons subjected to any form of detention or imprisonment against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session;

5. Invites the World Health Organization, taking into account the various declarations on medical ethics adopted by the World Medical Association, to draft, in close co-operation with such other competent organizations, including the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, a

may be appropriate, an outline of the principles of medical ethics which may be relevant to the protection of persons subjected to any form of detention or imprisonment against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to bring the draft to the attention of the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders with a view to assisting the Congress in the implementation of the task set out in paragraph 4 above;

6. *Decides* to consider at its thirtieth session the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in relation to detention and imprisonment.

U.S. Challenges Ruling To Exclude South Africa From General Assembly

Following are statements made in the U.N. General Assembly on November 12 by U.S. Representative John Scali.

FIRST STATEMENT

USUN press release 166 dated November 12

My delegation cannot accept the argument that the vote in the Security Council on the South African issue last October 30 in any way changes the clear wording of articles 5 and 6 of the charter. Nor, in our view, does it in any way permit this or any other Assembly to deprive a member of the rights and privileges of membership.

I am deeply concerned with the criticism of my delegation's vote in the Security Council on the South African matter. I categorically reject any implication that our vote was anti-African, anti-United Nations, or was motivated by any support whatsoever for apartheid.

As I had hoped was clear from the many times my delegation has expressed this view, the U.S. Government thoroughly opposes the policy of apartheid. We support the self-determination as soon as possible of Namibia. We call on South Africa to fulfill its obligations under article 25 of the charter and to comply with Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia.

Has it been forgotten that the United States imposed its own arms embargo on South Africa before the United Nations did?

Our vote in the Security Council, Mr. President, reflected our strong belief that the continued presence in the United Nations of South Africa would best allow members to continue pressure for necessary reforms in that nation as well as changes in Namibia and Rhodesia.

As I said in my explanation of vote before the Security Council last October 30, Mr. President [Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika]:

My delegation believes that South Africa should continue to be exposed, over and over again, to the blunt expressions of the abhorrence of mankind for apartheid. South Africans could hear of this abhorrence only from afar were we to cast them from our ranks, beyond the range of our voices.

Our analysis is that expulsion would say to the most hardened racist elements in South Africa that their indifference to our words and resolutions had been justified. We think it would say to the South Africans that we have not heard, or do not wish to encourage, the new voices—the voices that augur hope of change.

We believe that the United Nations must continue its pressure upon South Africa, moving step by step until right has triumphed. It is self-defeating to fire a single last dramatic salvo with only silence to follow. History holds no example of a pariah state that reformed itself in exile. The pariah is by definition an outlaw, free of restraint. There is no record of good citizenship in the land of Nod, east of Eden, where Cain, the first pariah, was banished.

My delegation has another grave concern about the wisdom of expelling South Africa. Even if this would help thwart the ugly crime of apartheid, expulsion would set a shattering precedent which could gravely damage the U.N. structure.

Mr. President, my delegation further believes that the expulsion of South Africa would reverse the evolution of the United Nations toward ever wider membership.

These were our reasons and our only reasons. We hold them no less deeply than those who hold a different view. We respect that different view, and we expect no less in return. We also expect that the clear words of the charter will be honored. This Assembly may be master of its procedures, but not of our charter, which remains the paramount

document governing our existence as an organization based on law.

SECOND STATEMENT

USUN press release 167 dated November 12

Mr. President: My delegation regrets that we have no choice but to challenge your ruling. We did not come to this decision lightly, and we do so only because of the overriding importance of the issue, the fundamental rights of a member state under the Charter of the United Nations.

There is also an obvious conflict, Mr. President, between your ruling and the legal opinion given to this Assembly on November 11, 1970, at the 25th session. Further, there is a conflict between your ruling and the practice that the General Assembly has consistently followed in the four years since then, at the 25th, the 26th, the 27th, and the 28th sessions and at the 6th special session held in spring this year. In addition, as we all know, during this 29th session, South Africa was allowed to vote without objection after the Assembly's decision on its credentials was made.

The legal opinion given at the 25th session remains as valid today, in our view, as it was then. It affirms that under the charter the Assembly may not deprive a member of any of the rights of membership. The Assembly may be master of its rules of procedure, but no majority, no matter how large, can ignore or change the clear provisions of the charter in this way.

We consider it to be a violation of the rules of procedure and of articles 5 and 6 of the charter for the Assembly to attempt to deny a member state of the United Nations its right to participate in the Assembly, through this type of unprecedented action. Article 5 of the charter expressly lays down rules by which a member may be suspended. Article 6 of the charter specifically provides the process by which a member may be expelled. The Assembly is not empowered to deprive a member of the rights and privileges of membership other than in accordance with articles 5, 6, and 19 of the charter. In our

view, none of these circumstances applies in this case.

At the 25th session of this Assembly, the then Legal Counsel of the United Nations ruled:

Article 5 of the Charter lays down the following requirements for the suspension of a Member State from the rights and privileges of membership:

(a) Preventive or enforcement action has to be taken by the Security Council against the Member State concerned;

(b) The Security Council has to recommend to the General Assembly that the Member State concerned be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership;

(c) The General Assembly has to act affirmatively on the foregoing recommendation by a two-thirds vote, in accordance with Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter, which lists "the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership" as an "important question".

The participation in meetings of the General Assembly is quite clearly one of the important rights and privileges of membership. Suspension of this right through the rejection of credentials would not satisfy the foregoing requirements and would therefore be contrary to the Charter.

It is our view that nothing has transpired in the General Assembly or the Security Council to affect the validity of that ruling. Since the Security Council remains seized of the range of South African questions, there is all the more reason why the Assembly cannot properly seek to take action to deprive South Africa of its rights of membership. The effect of the resolution of September 30, 1974, on credentials has the same effect as resolutions of previous years.

Mr. President, your action is taken in the context of the Assembly's action on the credentials item. The policy of a government is not a legitimate consideration in this context. Those policies may rightly be examined at other times and in other contexts but not here. In the present case no one can reasonably argue with the technical propriety of the credentials of the South African delegation. South Africa is not the only member state whose government is not chosen by free elections where all adults are entitled to vote.

In our view, we must not seek to change the membership regulations to convert this

into an organization of like-minded governments. Were we to apply that criterion, we should cease to be a universal institution and would become very different indeed.

Those facts and a respect for the charter have led past Presidents of the General Assembly to rule that decisions involving the nonacceptance or rejection of South African credentials constitute an expression of international outrage at the heinous policy of apartheid. But each of those Presidents has also ruled that such decisions do not serve to deprive South Africa of its fundamental rights of membership—rights which include the right to take its seat in the General Assembly, to speak, to raise questions and make proposals, and to vote.

Mr. President, we consider that your ruling fails to take into account that law of the charter, the existing legal opinion, and the consistent series of applicable precedents. For those reasons and pursuant to rule 71, we must respectfully challenge your ruling. We request that, in accordance with rule 71, you put this challenge immediately to a vote. I request that a recorded vote be taken.¹

U.S. Discusses Cyprus Situation in U.N. General Assembly

Following is a statement made in the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative John Scali on November 1, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

USUN press release 158 dated November 1

The present state of affairs on Cyprus satisfies no one. But if the world community is to contribute constructively to the improvement of this problem, it must do more than review the past and deplore the present.

¹ The Assembly voted 91 to 22 (U.S.), with 19 abstentions, to uphold the President's ruling excluding the delegation of South Africa from the work of the General Assembly.

That is too easy. Neither can we here hope and presume to dictate the specific ingredients of a better future. What we can and should do is to help create an atmosphere where meaningful negotiation, flexibility, and compromise are possible.

The United Nations has already played an important part in achieving what progress has so far occurred. In July the Security Council achieved a cease-fire on Cyprus. It also created a framework for negotiations between all the parties and established the essential principles to guide those negotiations.

Secretary General Waldheim has been a particularly active and constructive figure in Cyprus. He has personally initiated meetings between Mr. [Glaftos] Clerides and Mr. [Rauf] Denktash. Further, the Secretary General's Special Representative, Mr. [Luis] Weckmann-Munoz, continues to participate in these meetings. The Nicosia talks have—gradually, to be sure, but nonetheless successfully—produced agreement on the exchange of prisoners. The discussions are continuing and are focusing on other pressing issues. Most important, they have laid a fragile, but for that reason all the more critical, foundation of confidence and cooperation upon which broadened discussions can be based.

The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, has responded to the most immediate and the most compelling aspects of the Cyprus tragedy. His assistance has been important in securing the release of prisoners, reuniting families, providing relief supplies, and ministering to the sick, the needy, and the helpless.

No discussion of the Cyprus situation would be complete without mention of the U.N. Force in Cyprus. These soldiers for peace have conducted themselves in a magnificent tradition to protect and assist the people of Cyprus and to maintain world peace. They personify the highest ideals of this organization. My government again would like to express its deepest gratitude to all of the nations who have provided contingents to the Force. We ask the Governments of Den-

mark, Austria, the United Kingdom, and Canada to convey our sincere condolences to the families of those men who have given their lives in the cause of peace and in the service of this organization.

The United States has worked throughout the recent Cyprus crisis within the United Nations and also directly with all of the parties. We have sought to prevent bloodshed, to stop the fighting, to maintain the peace, and to encourage progress toward a lasting settlement. Our first concern during the summer was to defuse the immediate crisis and to help the parties talk to one another again. We made strenuous attempts to prevent, and then to confine, the military activities on the island which took place in July and August. Thereafter the United States cooperated with the United Nations and with the parties most directly concerned in arranging a cease-fire which still holds today. Further, our government has actively supported efforts in Geneva, in pursuance of Security Council Resolution 353, to establish the outlines of a lasting settlement. We also vigorously encouraged discussions between the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

The United States continues to stand ready, as Secretary Kissinger recently told this Assembly, "to play an even more active role than in the past in helping the parties find a solution to the centuries-old problem of Cyprus."

My government has also responded to the real and immediate human needs of the people of Cyprus. We are contributing one-third of the \$22 million which the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that he will need before the end of this year. Overall U.S. assistance for Cyprus relief this year will amount to over \$10 million. We remain prepared to make additional contributions as they are needed. We urge the international community to continue and if possible to increase its humanitarian efforts.

The numerous and varied efforts of the United Nations and of its individual members have served, we believe, to bring the parties closer. They have helped create an atmosphere in which negotiation can move

forward. Our continuing concern is to provide assistance, to whatever degree the parties consider useful, in meeting the imperative, urgent need for peace.

The United Nations has a long history of involvement in Cyprus. Its record there is honorable and its achievement substantial. Events of the past months have once again demonstrated, however, that peacekeeping is not a substitute for peace. We have once again learned that only the parties to a dispute can truly resolve their differences.

Those who are friends of Cyprus have an obligation to do their best to encourage and to protect all genuine efforts by these parties to work out such a settlement.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ¹

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Cyprus,

Gravely concerned about the continuation of the Cyprus crisis, which constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Mindful of the need to solve this crisis without delay by peaceful means, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Having heard the statements in the debate and taking note of the report of the Special Political Committee on the question of Cyprus,²

1. *Calls upon* all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it;

2. *Urges* the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus, and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs;

3. *Considers* that the constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus concerns the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities;

4. *Commends* the contacts and negotiations taking place on an equal footing, with the good offices of the Secretary-General, between the representatives of the two communities, and calls for their continuation with a view to reaching freely a mutually acceptable political settlement, based on their fundamental and legitimate rights;

5. *Considers* that all the refugees should return to their homes in safety and calls upon the parties concerned to undertake urgent measures to that end;

¹ U.N. doc. A/RES/3212 (XXIX); adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 1 by a recorded vote of 117 (U.S.) to 0.

² U.N. doc. A/9820 [footnote in original].

6. *Expresses the hope* that, if necessary, further efforts including negotiations can take place, within the framework of the United Nations, for the purpose of implementing the provisions of the present resolution, thus ensuring to the Republic of Cyprus its fundamental right to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide United Nations humanitarian assistance to all parts of the population of Cyprus and calls upon all States to contribute to that effort;

8. *Calls upon* all parties to continue to co-operate fully with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, which may be strengthened if necessary;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to lend his good offices to the parties concerned;

10. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of the Security Council.

U.S. Reaffirms Support of Decade for Action To Combat Racism

Following is a statement made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., on October 4, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the committee on October 10 and by the Assembly on November 6.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR FERGUSON

USUN press release 127 dated October 4

As we all know, the General Assembly met in a special session on December 10 of last year to declare the period 1973-83 as the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. It was fit and proper that this meeting was held on the 25th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is equally fit and proper that this is the first item for consideration before this committee, the committee charged with primary responsibility for human and social concerns.

My delegation participated in the discussions in this committee and in the ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council] which resulted in the declaration of the Decade and the program for action. We suggested possi-

ble courses of action, some of which were accepted, others not. But at the end of the deliberations, our Representative to the last Assembly endorsed the program and promised the support of my government to the goals of the program—to eliminate all forms of racism and racial discrimination.

Our concerns in this area are real and immediate. The United States is in fact a multi-racial society. We must deal with the problems of racism here in our country on an everyday basis. Thus our adherence to the program of the United Nations, in particular those aspects involving national actions by member states, is but part of an ongoing domestic effort.

Madam Chairman, I had not intended to treat in any detail the situation in the United States. I had believed—and it is perhaps true—that most delegations were aware of our problems deriving from racism and were aware of actions taken to resolve these problems and were cognizant of the general state of progress in my country. My beliefs were shaken, however, when a few days ago a distinguished Foreign Minister asserted in this Assembly that blacks in this country existed in a condition akin to slavery. I myself am in the forefront of those recognizing the persistence of racism—institutional and otherwise—in our society. I have myself, as a lawyer and professor of law, been a part of the struggle to eliminate injustice in this country. Even now, I and many of my colleagues are concerned with excising the last vestiges of racism from our foreign policy establishment, both from the institutional sense and from the standpoint of substantive policy formulation. In this connection it should be noted that a large part of the problem lies in the attitudes of others beyond our shores. I trust, Madam Chairman, you will forgive these personal references, but I mention them only as token of the disappointment we feel when hearing assertions such as those made by the distinguished Foreign Minister.

Perhaps some instructive examples might be drawn from our past decade of the fight against racism in the United States. Just over 10 years ago we experienced the brutal

assassination of the president of the Mississippi chapter of the NAACP, who paid with his life for having the temerity to insist that blacks could exercise the constitutionally protected right to vote. Now, 10 years later, in the very region of the country which had so long engaged in every stratagem and subterfuge, and even violence, to deny blacks this basic political right of citizenship in the United States, there are today more than 500 black elected officials. These range from Congressmen to state senators and representatives, to sheriffs, to county executives and mayors.

Ten years ago in many places of public accommodation in this country, non-whites, no matter what their status or, I might add, nationality or citizenship, would have been barred from the ordinary privilege of decent lodging and food and entertainment. Now, 10 years later, no such problems exist. Ten years ago laws based on a combination of racist laws and regulations inhibited blacks from enjoyment of almost every basic right, from that of education to freedom of choice in marriage. Now, 10 years later, major efforts continue to remove these vestiges, most of which have been eliminated.

I mention these as illustrative of the fact that a decade of sustained action can in fact change the human condition. It is also illustrative, however, of the difficulty and complexity of completely eradicating this particular human disease.

Examining this past decade in the United States also reveals that a sustained struggle on all fronts benefits the entire society and not just simply those who have been the victims of racism and its evil practices. In the United States the reinvigoration of the movement for equality in all respects for women derived almost directly from the struggle of blacks for equal justice. We have also seen that others who had similarly been victimized took inspiration and courage from the demonstration that freedom will flow to those who first insist they will not live in a condition of less than equality and human dignity. In the last decade American Indians, our Latin Americans, and our Eskimos have

joined the struggle to eradicate racist stains from our social fabric.

There is another lesson taught by our last decade of experience. That lesson is simply that freedom, equality, and justice do not flow automatically from grand declarations or, in our case, from the grand clauses of our Constitution. A just society requires a constant vigilance and a constant concern and a constant action lest the virulent seeds of racism flower anew. In looking to the Decade we might draw a final lesson from our own experience. We in this country know from bitter experience that racist practices often take subtle disguises. Poverty often becomes the social mechanism by which racist exploitation persists. Class distinctions often mask racist criteria. In our own society—a society largely descended from immigrants, albeit some of our ancestors immigrated involuntarily—we found that the seemingly innocent concept of “country of origin” in our immigration laws was in fact the cover for the practice of racial exclusivity. Happily, this last vestige has been eliminated.

In spite of the progress we have made, we still face in America many serious problems which must continue to engage our best efforts. It is significant that at this stage in our development, our efforts are not directed toward hortatory declarations. Rather, we are attempting to translate words into reality—a far more difficult task, but one that is essential for all of us if this Decade is to have real meaning.

There is little doubt that internationally the evils of racism are most evident in South Africa and Rhodesia. We share with our colleagues the outrage at the continued existence of apartheid, an illegal and obnoxious violation of human rights. We disagree at points on the methods of promoting change. But I would like to emphasize that our relations with South Africa are designed not to support the present regime but to promote peaceful evolution with the goal that all South Africans can participate fully in the social, economic, and political life of their country. In our own diplomatic establish-

ment we seek to demonstrate our commitment to a racially just society. In social affairs we do not discriminate among our guests. Our visitation-to-the-U.S. program is extended to white and black South Africans. We insist that our companies wherever possible afford equal pay for equal work. On Rhodesia, I shall only note the continuing efforts of the administration to obtain the repeal of the Byrd amendment.

As I suggested, southern Africa fully deserves the concern and interest that has been expressed in this committee and in the other bodies of the United Nations. But the troubling situation there should not blind us to the evils of racism in other parts of the world or establish an exclusive target for our actions. Our goal in this Decade for Action is to seek the elimination of racism and racial discrimination throughout the world wherever it appears and whatever the form or, more positively, to promote racial harmony among all the peoples of the world. We are interdependent in our global social system no less so than in our economic system.

In connection with the international activities of my government in support of the U.N. Decade, I would be remiss if I did not make special mention of the activities of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO [U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization]. The Commission has established a working committee to organize a major conference in 1975 for the purpose of highlighting U.S. participation in the U.N. Decade. If I may inject a personal note, Mrs. Whitney Young, who, as some of you may recall, was a member of our delegation to this committee last year, will serve as co-chairman of the working committee.

Madam Chairman, I did not intend this as a comprehensive statement of all U.S. activities in this area. I did wish, however, to reaffirm my country's commitment to the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. In the discussions immediately before us, we will be faced with some specific issues—the draft resolution proposed by ECOSOC, the organization of an international conference, to name but two. I trust

that we can move swiftly to approve the ECOSOC resolution and to begin preparations for the international conference.¹

May I in closing recall the words of Secretary Kissinger delivered before the General Assembly last week: ²

... beyond peace, beyond prosperity, lie man's deepest aspirations for a life of dignity and justice. And beyond our pride, beyond our concern for the national purpose we are called upon to serve, there must be a concern for the betterment of the human condition. While we cannot, in the brief span allowed to each of us, undo the accumulated problems of centuries, we dare not do less than try.

Madam Chairman, our self-respect and the expectations of the international community demand no less than our best efforts.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ³

Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2919 (XXVII) of 15 November 1972, in which it proclaimed a Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination,

Recalling its resolution 3057 (XXVIII) of 2 November 1973, in which it reaffirmed its determination to achieve the total and unconditional elimination of racism and racial discrimination, against which the conscience and sense of justice of mankind have long been aroused and which in our time represent serious obstacles to further progress and to the strengthening of international peace and security,⁴

1. *Takes note* of Economic and Social Council resolution 1863 (LVI) of 17 May 1974;

2. *Takes note with appreciation* of the reports of the Secretary-General⁵ submitted in accordance with paragraphs 18 (f) and 18 (h) of the Programme for

¹ The draft resolution recommended by ECOSOC (Resolution 1863 (LVI)), as amended, was adopted by the committee unanimously on Oct. 10.

² For Secretary Kissinger's address before the General Assembly on Sept. 23, see BULLETIN of Oct. 14, 1974, p. 498.

³ A/RES/3223 (XXIX); (text from U.N. doc. A/9808); adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 6.

⁴ For text of Resolution 3057, which includes the Program for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, see BULLETIN of Dec. 17, 1973, p. 742.

⁵ U.N. doc. E/5474, E/5475; see also A/9666 and Add.1-5. [Footnote in original.]

the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination;

3. *Condemns* the intolerable conditions which continue to prevail in the southern part of Africa and elsewhere, including the denial of the right to self-determination and the inhumane and odious application of *apartheid* and racial discrimination;

4. *Reaffirms* its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of oppressed peoples to liberate themselves from racism, racial discrimination, *apartheid*, colonialism and alien domination;

5. *Urges* all Member States to co-operate loyally and fully in achieving the goals and objectives of the Decade by taking such actions and measures as:

(a) Implementing United Nations resolutions bearing on the elimination of racism, *apartheid*, racial discrimination and the liberation of peoples under colonial domination and alien subjugation;

(b) Signing and ratifying the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*, the International Covenants on Human Rights and all other relevant instruments;

(c) Formulating and executing plans to realize the policy measures and goals contained in the Programme for the Decade;

(d) Reviewing internal laws and regulations with a view to identifying and rescinding those which provide for, give rise to, or inspire racial discrimination or *apartheid*;

(e) Supplying the Secretary-General with comments and views as to the draft agenda and timing of the world conference referred to in paragraph 13 (a) of the Programme for the Decade, as well as in relation to the implementation of that Programme;

(f) Complying, when due, with the provisions of paragraph 18 (e) of the Programme for the Decade, whereby the Secretary-General will circulate a questionnaire, on the basis of which the Economic and Social Council will consider every two years action undertaken or contemplated by Governments in implementation of their programmes for the Decade;

6. *Requests* national sports federations of Member States to refuse systematically to participate in all sports or other activities together with the representatives of the racist régime of South Africa;

7. *Urges* all States, United Nations organs and bodies, the specialized agencies and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to ensure, *inter alia*:

(a) Immediate termination of all measures and policies, as well as military, political, economic and other activities, which enable racist régimes in the southern part of Africa to continue the repression of the African people;

(b) Full support and assistance, morally and materially, to the peoples which are victims of *apartheid*

and racial discrimination and to the liberation movements;

8. *Calls attention* to the vital importance of examining the socio-economic and colonial roots of racism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination with a view to eliminating them;

9. *Stresses* the importance of mobilizing public opinion in support, morally and materially, of the peoples which are victims of racism, *apartheid*, racial discrimination and colonial and alien domination;

10. *Commends* the active involvement of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in the implementation of the Programme for the Decade within its competence under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;

11. *Expresses the hope* that adequate resources will be made available to the Secretary-General to enable him to undertake the activities entrusted to him under the Programme for the Decade;

12. *Decides* to consider at its thirtieth session, as a matter of high priority, the question entitled "Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination".

U.S. Urges Continued Momentum in Drug Abuse Control

Following is a statement made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., on November 4.

USUN press release 159 dated November 4

The international drug abuse problem remains a persistent and sinister intruder not only upon the world stage but in the lives of millions. Other threats to the peace and happiness of innumerable human beings have come and gone, and many more are likely to appear and disappear before the particularly pernicious trade in illicit drugs is brought under adequate control by the world community.

I would hope, however, that recognition of the tenacity and persistence of the drug abuse problem will not be interpreted as grounds for despair. Rather we should perceive it as a challenge to the human community to eliminate this most dangerous

threat to the happiness and health of its members. I believe that nations acting within their borders in cooperation with each other and international institutions have the means which, if regularly applied, will eventually bring illicit drugs under control. We must maintain the momentum of our past efforts without relaxation until the tide of drug abuse subsides.

The United States intends to persevere, both domestically and in cooperation with other governments and international organizations. We intend to strengthen the bilateral programs developed over recent years, and we plan to maintain our vigorous support for the international organizations seized of the problem of drug control.

In a proclamation dated October 18, our President called upon officials at every level of government, upon educators, medical professionals, and leaders in all community activities to rededicate themselves to the total banishment of drug abuse from American life. He urged all Americans to commit themselves wholeheartedly to what he described as "this supremely important humanitarian cause."

This last year has been a significant one for international narcotics control efforts. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs held a productive special session in February, which recommended several resolutions, later adopted by ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council], which should prove valuable in strengthening the world community's ability to attack the drug problem. The research efforts of the U.N. Narcotics Laboratory have also proceeded smoothly. They show promise of providing the world community with increased knowledge upon which to base future decisions in the narcotics field.

The International Narcotics Control Board, under the direction of its new President, and with the expert assistance of its Secretary, has continued to fulfill its mandate with vigor and imagination. The information and analyses which the Board puts at the disposition of the international community are useful not only to an under-

standing of the licit traffic but also of the illicit traffic and the general supply situation.

We hope the Board will continue its achievement as its responsibilities multiply with the coming into force of the Amending Protocol to the Single Convention and of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

We wish to urge all governments to ratify these conventions and the single convention itself. With these ratifications we may then complete the international system for controlling all drugs of abuse, both natural and manmade. My own government has ratified two of these conventions and is presently considering enabling legislation which will permit the ratification of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

The U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control, under the Acting Executive Director, has continued the development of programs already underway to respond to additional requests from governments for assistance in combating drug abuse. We believe it essential that the work of the Fund be continued. We urge all members to provide it with substantial and sustained contributions to enable it to carry out its responsibilities. Although we believe there is still room for improvement in the Fund's programming, operations, and project evaluation procedures, we note with satisfaction the speed and flexibility which it displayed in responding to the request from the Government of Turkey for technical advice on control procedures.

In this context, I believe it appropriate to note that the Turkish Government, after consultations with U.N. narcotics authorities, has informed us that it has decided in principle to adopt a method of harvesting poppies called the poppy straw process, which involves the collection by the Turkish Government of the whole poppy pod rather than simply the opium gum.

While we believe it would have been preferable that the ban on poppy cultivation which had been in effect for two years had been continued, we are very heartened that the Turkish Government has decided not to produce opium but, rather, to produce in-

stead poppy straw, a product much more amenable to efficient control. With effective policing to assure that opium gum is not illegally extracted, the reflow of heroin that has so long concerned so much of the world community can be avoided.

In conclusion, I believe it fair to say that past efforts toward creating an effective international system for controlling drugs have been successful in giving us the instruments needed for the task. There is still, however, no justification for self-satisfaction that the problem is solved. Rather, the world community must utilize all available instruments with skill, imagination, and determination to achieve our common goal. We therefore urge all governments to continue their support for all organizations dedicated to the elimination of drug abuse as a serious social problem.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

The Antarctic treaty. Signed at Washington December 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 1961. TIAS 4780.

Accession deposited: German Democratic Republic, November 19, 1974.¹

Atomic Energy

Protocol suspending the agreement of July 15, 1968 (TIAS 6524), between the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Philippines, and the United States for the application of safeguards and providing for the application of safeguards pursuant to the nonproliferation treaty of July 1, 1968 (TIAS 6839). Signed at Vienna February 21, 1973. *Entered into force:* October 16, 1974.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.²

Accession deposited: United Arab Emirates, August 9, 1974.

Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes. Done at London November 2, 1973.²

Signature: Bulgaria, November 8, 1974.³

Privileges and Immunities

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. Done at New York February 13, 1946. Entered into force September 17, 1946; for the United States April 29, 1970. TIAS 6900.

Accession deposited: German Democratic Republic, October 4, 1974.⁴

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 4, 1974. Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca October 29 and November 8, 1974. Entered into force November 8, 1974.

¹ With declaration.

² Not in force.

³ Subject to approval.

⁴ With reservation.

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**Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: November 18-24**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to November 18 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 501 of November 15.

No.	Date	Subject
†503	11/19	Kissinger: news conference, Tokyo.
*504	11/19	Caribbean scholars visit U.S., Nov. 19-Dec. 9.
*505	11/19	U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Dec. 9.
*506	11/19	Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, Dec. 13.
507	11/20	Sisco: interview on "Today".
†508	11/20	Kissinger: news conference, Tokyo.
*509	11/21	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Advisory Committee, Boston, Dec. 10.
†510	11/22	U.S.-Yugoslav Scientific and Technological Cooperation Board.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.