THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXI • No. 1846 • November 11, 1974

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and leyislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,
domestic $29.80, foreign $37.25
Single copy 60 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for New York Times

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger by James Reston on October 5 and 6 as published in the New York Times on October 13.

Mr. Reston: You have been sounding rather pessimistic in the last few weeks. Are you worried about the state of the West?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't mean to sound pessimistic. I think that there are huge problems before us, and I'm trying to define them. I believe that the problems are soluble, but they require a major effort and, in some areas, new approaches, but I'm not pessimistic about the ability to solve them. We have—

Q. Could I interrupt there to say that in reading what you have written in the past, I have a sense of pessimism in your writings, even of tragedy. Do you regard your thought as being essentially tragic, when you look at the last two generations?

Secretary Kissinger: I think of myself as a historian more than as a statesman. As a historian, you have to be conscious of the fact that every civilization that has ever existed has ultimately collapsed.

History is a tale of efforts that failed, of aspirations that weren't realized, of wishes that were fulfilled and then turned out to be different from what one expected. So, as a historian, one has to live with a sense of the inevitability of tragedy; as a statesman, one has to act on the assumption that problems must be solved.

Each generation lives in time, and even though ultimately perhaps societies have all suffered a decline, that is of no help to any one generation, and the decline is usually traceable to a loss of creativity and inspiration and therefore avoidable.

It is probably true that, insofar as I think historically, I must look at the tragedies that have occurred. Insofar as I act, my motive force, of which I am conscious, it is to try to avoid them.

Q. Don't we have to bring this problem down to practical points, the difference between the ideals of a republic and what can be done? Is there a conflict now in America between the ideals of foreign policy that you see for the order of the world and what can actually be done in terms of public understanding and in actual votes in the Congress of the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: I think almost every nation right now has the problem of reconciling its domestic view of itself with the international problem because every nation has to live on so many levels.

Certainly in every non-Communist nation—and probably even in Communist nations—public opinion in one way or another is becoming more and more important. But what public opinion is conscious of are the day-to-day problems of life. The remoter issues, geographically and in time, do not impinge on the average citizen.

In foreign policy, the most difficult issues are those whose necessity you cannot prove when the decisions are made. You act on the basis of an assessment that in the nature of things is a guess, so that public opinion knows, usually, only when it is too late to act, when some catastrophe has become overwhelming.

The necessity of the measures one takes to avoid the catastrophe can almost never be

proved. For that reason you require a great deal, or at least a certain amount, of confidence in leadership; and that becomes difficult in all societies.

But, speaking of the United States, if one looks at the crises through which America has gone over the last decade—the assassinations, the Viet-Nam war, Watergate—it is very difficult to establish the relationship of confidence.

Then the United States also has particular problems in terms of its historical experience. We never had to face the problem of security until the end of the Second World War, so we could afford to be very idealistic and insist on the pure implementation of our maxims.

To the average countries that were less favored, the problems of foreign policy have usually appeared in a much more complicated form; that is, their morality could not be expressed in absolute terms. Their morality had to give the sense of inward security necessary to act step by step in less than perfect modes.

We are now in a similar position, and therefore there is an almost instinctive rebellion in America against the pragmatic aspect of foreign policy that is security oriented, that achieves finite objectives, that seeks to settle for the best attainable rather than for the best. In this sense, we are having domestic problems.

On the other hand, there is a strain in America which is, curiously, extremely relevant to this world. We are challenged by the huge problems—peace and war, energy, food—and we have a real belief in interdependence; it is not just a slogan.

The solution of these problems really comes quite naturally to Americans; first, because they believe that every problem is soluble; secondly, because they are at ease with redoing the world, and the old frontier mentality really does find an expression, and even the old idealism finds a way to express itself.

In what other country could a leader say, "We are going to solve energy; we're going to solve food; we're going to solve the problem of nuclear war," and be taken seriously? So I think it is true that there are strains in our domestic debate; I think it is also true that there are many positive aspects in our domestic debate that can help us reach these larger goals.

Situation in Europe Today

Q. Are you worried when you see the situation in Europe today? What's going on in Portugal, the fragility of Italy, the almost state of war between two members of the alliance, Turkey and Greece. Surely, from the point of view of Moscow, this looks like a fulfillment of their prophecy of the internal contradictions of the Western world.

Secretary Kissinger: One of the troubles of the Western societies is that they are basically satisfied with the status quo, so that when you have governments like the previous government in Portugal, or the previous government in Greece, the tendency is not to change it.

I think that's a mistaken conception. But what comes after is so uncertain—and we really lack a philosophy for how to shape a new political evolution—that one tends to leave well enough alone. In the process, the political base erodes invisibly, and then, when the changes occur suddenly, there is no real base for a democratic, liberal, humane evolution—or at least it can be put together only with great difficulty.

So, in Portugal, after 50 years of authoritarian rule, the Communist Party was the best organized, most purposeful opposition and therefore has a very large influence on Portugal's contemporary orientation.

In Greece there are also massive domestic pressures. The problem of Italy and other countries is different, in that you have there a residual vote that has never been reduced by prosperity and goes to the Communists. This shows that there is a significant percentage of the population that does not consider itself part of the system.

If you take the authoritarian parties in Italy on the left and the right, you have only about 60 percent of the spectrum to work with for a democratic policy. When that is

split you have an inherent weakness; and it will be split, because that's the nature of the democratic process.

Q. When you came to Washington in the first place after your study of history, it was said that you had a concept of how to achieve the order of the world, and yet in the last years, since you have been here, the tendency has been to say that you have not defined your concept but that actually what you have been doing is negotiating pragmatic problems and not really dealing with the concept or making clear the concept. What is that concept? First of all, is the criticism correct, and second, what is the concept that you see?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think you will find few officials who will tell you that any criticism you can make of them is correct, but I don't think the criticism is quite correct. I do not have the choice, in any position, between imposing a theoretical order or negotiating, because if you don't solve immediate problems you can never solve long-term problems.

If you act creatively you should be able to use crises to move the world toward the structural solutions that are necessary. In fact, very often the crises themselves are a symptom of the need for a structural rearrangement.

I faced a number of problems partly of perception and partly of structure. I feel it is essential that when the United States acts in foreign policy that it understand first what the American national interest is in relation to the problem. And to define that, America has to know what the world interest is, not only in relation to the specific problem but in relation to the historical evolution from which any solution of a problem starts.

So I have tried—historians will have to judge with what success—to understand the forces that are at work in this period. My associates will confirm that when we tackle a problem we spend the greatest part of our time at the beginning trying to relate it to where America and the world ought to go before we ever discuss tactics.

I think somebody would have to go through my speeches and press conferences to see to what extent I have articulated general propositions. I don't think I should be the judge of this here.

Debate Over Nature of Consultation With Europe

Q. When you made your speech at the Waldorf, I regarded it at that time as something equivalent almost to the offer of the Marshall plan. Yet we got no real response from Europe. Even when you went to London and talked about interdependence, there was no response. Now, something was wrong there. Could you define it?

Secretary Kissinger: There are always at least two aspects to any problem. One is your definition of the problem; second, how you solve it—are you doing it correctly?

I believe that the issues that I've attempted to define are serious issues. Take my Waldorf speech, the so-called year of Europe speech.[1] It came at a period when we had opened to China and opened to the Soviet Union and when we had ended the Viet-Nam war.

Until we had accomplished at least some of those objectives, I did not see how a creative period of relationship with Europe would be possible, because the disagreement with our Viet-Nam policy in Europe was too deep. The fear of nuclear confrontation was too great, as was the fear that the United States was somehow to blame for this state of hostility in the world.

So in early 1973 I thought the time was opportune to move toward a serious dialogue with Europe, and I thought it was all the more essential because I did not want success to become identified in the public consciousness only with relations with adversaries, and I felt that the old Atlantic relationship would over a period of time become so much taken for granted and so much the province of an older generation that the next generation would consider it as something not relevant to itself.

[1] For text of the address, made at New York on Apr. 23, 1973, see BULLETIN of May 14, 1973, p. 593.

I think that this perception was essentially correct. Why did it lead to this intense dialogue? One reason is that, at that particular moment, Europe was enormously absorbed with itself. Every European country, it soon became apparent, had a leadership crisis of its own and was trying to sort out its own domestic problems. Beyond that, Europe was very much occupied in forming its own identity, and it had so much difficulty in doing so that any greater conception seemed a threat to whatever autonomy they had so painfully wrested from their deliberations.

So we became involved in an abstruse theoretical debate over the nature of consultation, something that could never be written down, because you can't wave a paper at somebody and tell him he's obliged to consult if he doesn't want to consult.

Then the Middle East war occurred, and that had a tendency to emphasize national frustrations, so that the larger dialogue that I had sought took a long time to get started; but finally the end result was pretty close to what we had asked, though not completely in the spirit I had hoped to evoke. We got the documents we wanted, but we didn't get the spirit of creativity that, for example, the Marshall offer evoked.

Now, similarly, with the Pilgrim speech in London.[2] It was not received very warmly, because, again, it was looked at very much from the national point of view. Nevertheless, events have moved us inevitably in that direction. The emergency sharing program which seemed revolutionary in February has now been accepted by all the countries. Even France, I hope, will find some way of relating itself to it.

And we are now engaged in discussions which will go far beyond what we could talk about last year. In the late 1940's the mere fact that the United States was willing to commit itself was a tremendous event. Now this is probably not enough, and our aspirations have to be expressed in action rather than in debate.

[2] For text of the address, made on Dec. 12, 1973, see BULLETIN of Dec. 31, 1973, p. 777.

Need for a National Understanding

Q. On that point, when you offer, as a basis for discussion with the Europeans and the rest of the world, a sharing of oil in a crisis, do you believe that the spirit of this country will accept it? When you come down to a question of producing oil for other countries who are in worse shape than we are, is it politically possible in this country to do it?

Secretary Kissinger: There is undoubtedly a profound disillusionment in America with foreign involvement in general. We have carried the burden for a generation. In fact, if you go back to the beginning of World War II, it doesn't seem to end. Most programs have been sold to Americans with the argument that they would mean an end of exertion. Now we have to convince Americans that there will never be an end to exertion. That's a very difficult problem.

And if you look at some of our recent debates you would have to say we could fail. I don't think that those in key positions at this particular moment have any real choice. At a minimum, we have to tell the American people what we think is needed. If they do not agree, at least they will know 10 years from now, if there is a catastrophe, what happened. And then there is a chance of restoring a sense of direction. But if 10 years from now there is a catastrophe and people say, "Why didn't somebody tell us about this, and why didn't they ask us to do what they should have foreseen?", then I think our whole system may be in difficulty.

Q. That's a critical point because I don't think the country—if one may presume to think about what the country thinks—has the vaguest idea of what it is called upon to do. We are complaining about how the oil-producing nations are using their resources, and yet we have larger reserves of food in North America than the nations of the Middle East have oil resources, and yet here we are now arguing our national interests. We are against high prices for oil, but we are still a very gluttonous, wasteful country. Can that be made clear?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is fair to say that we ourselves—I say "we," those who have positions of responsibility at this moment—we ourselves are learning the magnitude of the challenges as we go along. In 1969, when I came to Washington, I remember a study on the energy problem which proceeded from the assumption that there would always be an energy surplus. It wasn't conceivable that there would be a shortage of energy.

Until 1972, we thought we had inexhaustible food surpluses, and the fact that we have to shape our policy deliberately to relate ourselves to the rest of the world did not really arise until 1973, when we did call for a world food conference.

But you are right. We have to tell the American people what they are called upon to do. That is our biggest problem. It's our biggest challenge right now. And will they support it? I hope that they will. I am, in fact, confident that they will.

Q. Can you define what those questions are that should be put to the country? What does the government want the responsible citizen to do? He hasn't had much lead from you and your colleagues and the government as to what you wish him to do.

Secretary Kissinger: I am not sure that I agree with whether he has received leadership from my colleagues and me. I think it is also fair to say that the nature of our debate for many years now has been so bitter that it's hard to put forward a conception that doesn't immediately get ripped apart by an attack on motives.

But leaving that aside, I think in foreign policy we need a national understanding of what is needed, what is meant by peace, and an understanding that we are living in a world in which peace cannot be imposed on others, which means that sometimes the outcomes must be less than perfect. I have been concerned about the détente debate because so often the issue is put in terms of—did the Soviets benefit from a particular deal? Of course, they must benefit, or they won't feel a stake in maintaining the resulting structure. So, we have to know what we mean by peace; we have to know what we mean by cooperation; and we have above all to understand these big issues which we have been discussing, like energy and food, in which our actions will crucially determine what happens in the rest of the world.

And of course what happens in the rest of the world will play back to us, so we cannot afford an isolated approach. If we try a solo effort in energy and as a result Italy collapses or Britain has a crisis, that is going to bring about so many political transformations that within a very brief period of time we would be affected in ways that even the average citizen would feel very acutely.

On food, the same is true in reverse. We there have an opportunity to demonstrate that when we talk interdependence, we are not just talking an American desire to exploit the resources of other nations. What we are saying is for our own benefit, of course. But it is also for the benefit of everybody else. Now, that requires many changes in our thinking. Of course, senior officials are always so busy with the day-to-day problems that they always seem to think one can wait for a day or a week to articulate the bigger issues.

It is also true that our people have been so preoccupied with domestic problems that it is not so easy to get attention for the longer term.

Vision of the World

Q. If we do not see this problem of interdependence, what's the vision that you have of the world? What will happen to Western civilization?

Secretary Kissinger: If we do not get a recognition of our interdependence, the Western civilization that we now have is almost certain to disintegrate, because it will first lead to a series of rivalries in which each region will try to maximize its own special advantages. That inevitably will lead to tests of strength of one sort or another. These will magnify domestic crises in many

countries, and they will then move more and more to authoritarian models.

I would expect then that we will certainly have crises which no leadership is able to deal with and probably military confrontations. But even if you don't have military confrontations, you will certainly, in my view, have systemic crises similar to those of the twenties and thirties, but under conditions when world consciousness has become global.

Q. Well, now, that is your nightmare.

Secretary Kissinger: That's right.

Q. What are your hopes? We are halfway between the end of the last world war, a little more, and the end of the century. As a historian, and not as a Secretary of State, looking back, if one can, from the end of the century to this era, how can the nations find some way of living together or going beyond the nation-state to something else?

Secretary Kissinger: Looking toward the end of the century, I would hope that Western Europe, Japan, and the United States would have found a way of not just overcoming the current economic crisis but turning it into something positive by understanding the responsibilities they share for each other's progress and for developing cooperative policies that are explicitly directed toward world interests.

This requires a degree of financial solidarity, a degree of equalizing burdens, and a degree of ability to set common goals that cannot be done on a purely national basis. This, incidentally, requires a united Europe, because with a plethora of nation-states in Europe we'll never be able to do this.

In relation to the Soviet Union and Communist China, we should have achieved a position, not of having overcome all our difficulties, but having reached a point where the solution of these difficulties by war becomes less and less conceivable and, over time, should have become inconceivable.

This means that there must be a visible and dramatic downturn in the arms race. Otherwise that race itself is going to generate so many fears that it can be maintained only by a degree of public exhortation that is inconsistent over a historic period with a policy of relaxation and maybe even with peace.

The underdeveloped nations—the now underdeveloped nations—should by then have lost their sense of inferiority and should feel not that they have to extort, but that they should participate. Thus what I said earlier about the relationship between Western Europe, the United States, and Japan should have begun to be institutionalized to embrace at least some of the key countries, and the Soviet Union and China must be related to that.

Take the food problem. I do not believe that over an indefinite future, we can solve the problem of world food reserves if the Soviet Union and Communist China do not accept obligations of their own or if they simply rely on the rest of the world's production to solve their problems on an annual basis.

Q. What should they be doing?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think—and I will speak about that at the World Food Conference—we have to develop over the next 5 to 10 years some conceptions of the reserves that should exist and the contribution that the major countries should make. Countries that will not participate should not then ask necessarily equal rights to participate in purchases of reserve stocks. But this is something that requires further study.

Q. Do you foresee in the next decade the possibility of political disarray in Europe and of enormous human tragedy in other parts of the world?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we are delicately poised right now. I genuinely think that the next decade could either be a period that in retrospect will look like one of the great periods of human creativity, or it could be the beginning of extraordinary disarray.

Q. Is it possible—and it is obviously a Scottish Calvinist point of view that the greatest hope of progress is adversity—that

we are now really up against economic, financial, and social problems of such magnitude that we are suddenly being forced, even by inflation, into a view of life that could be more hopeful?

Secretary Kissinger: While this period has more strain than, say, a decade ago, it has also infinitely more opportunities, because we really have no choice except to address our problems. Who would have thought of an international food policy or a world food conference 10 years ago, or could have been taken seriously if he had? Today, it is only a question of time until we develop it, and the real question is, will we develop it soon enough? I think we can.

Q. Is there a danger that if we do not deal with the world problems that here at home we would become so frustrated that we would retreat, not into the oldtime isolationism but into a kind of chauvinism that would make the whole question of world order really quite impossible?

Secretary Kissinger: It is a big problem. There is such a tendency in America; but at least part of our chauvinism is disappointed idealism, so it's always a question of whether one can evoke the idealism.

Foreign Policy Decisionmaking

Q. The charge is made, I think, that you have been so personal in the way in which you've dealt with the Department of State that you've not organized it; you've not put this great machine to work but actually you've replaced it with yourself.

Secretary Kissinger: One has to ask oneself: What is it that needs to be done in the Department of State? For a variety of reasons, one could make a case for the proposition that since Dean Acheson, the Department of State has really not been used as an institution. There has been a succession of Secretaries of State, many of them outstanding individuals, who have tended to operate as Presidential advisers.

When I came in, I deliberately set myself the task of trying to turn the Department of State into an institution that can serve succeeding Presidents and succeeding Secretaries of State. Now, in my judgment, this can work only if a number of requirements are met.

First, the work done in the Department of State has to be so outstanding that the issue of who is the principal adviser to the President does not arise as a bureaucratic problem, because if the work is of the requisite quality then inevitably the Department of State will be the organization for decisionmaking.

The second problem has been to put into the key positions younger, more forward-looking, and more creative people. That part of it, I believe, has been substantially accomplished.

The third problem is: How does the Department think of itself? What do the officers think their mission is? And this is where the difficulty has arisen. It exists on several levels. In calmer periods of American history the rewards, the incentives, the emphasis was on negotiating, not analysis. Therefore, the organization of the Department of State is more geared to producing cables and day-to-day tactical decisions than it is to getting a grip on national policy.

Now, I have attempted to get at the conceptual problem first and not to bother reorganizing the operational part particularly. I think the Policy Planning Staff is in a more central position in the Department of State today than it has been at any time since George Kennan. I believe the quality of its work is outstanding. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which in the past was a sort of adjunct to policymaking, has been given new vitality.

In the Bureaus—in the geographic Bureaus—the relationship between a more conceptual approach and a more operational approach has not yet been fully balanced. One of the results of having more power flow to the State Department has been that the Assistant Secretaries have spent so much more time with me—at least, those that I've worked with—that they have not had as much time to give to leading their Bureaus.

So, paradoxically, what some of the lower level people complain about is the result of the greater involvement of the middle and upper echelons.

Now, I have had over the last two months a series of meetings. I have a small group that is dealing explicitly with the problem of how the Foreign Service and the Department of State can be turned into intellectual leaders of American foreign policy—not bureaucratic operators, but intellectual and conceptual leaders.

It is too early to tell what the legacy will be. I feel very strongly that, partly based on my study of history, individual tours de force by Secretaries of State can be counterproductive if they don't leave a tradition behind, and the reason I have always admired Dean Acheson so much is because I believe he left a legacy of thought and of organization.

Q. How do you rate the use of diplomatic appointments to this theme of superiority?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, if you look at the diplomatic appointments that have been made since I became Secretary of State, in all the key departmental positions, I think we have outstanding personnel. In the overseas positions, we have reduced the number of political appointees and, quite frankly, have been quite resistant to purely political appointees in key posts, maybe a little less resistant in more peripheral appointments.

Q. Is there anything to the charge that trying to be Secretary of State and head of the National Security Council (NSC) is doing too much?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, all of these positions have to be seen also in relation to the history from which they evolve. I was head of the NSC staff for five years before I became Secretary of State. I think the two positions are really complementary. The basic responsibility of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is to make sure that the President receives the fairest possible statement of his alternatives. It is against the national interest, and it is against, for that matter, a correct perception of the self-interest of the Assistant to load the dice.

I generally open an NSC meeting by presenting the options. The other heads of department or heads of agencies are there. If I loaded the definition of the options, they would in a short time know I was cheating. I don't believe the NSC job takes too much time. I do believe the two jobs complement each other. But of course every President must organize the decisionmaking process so that he is comfortable with it.

Contrary to what has been written, I never expressed to the President any particular view as to how he should organize himself. I never talked to the transition team, and I have always understood that the ultimate decision has to be the President's. He has to live with his decisions, and he has to live with the way these decisions are made.

Implementing Policies

Q. Always there has been a problem between defining policy and then seeing that the policy is actually carried out down through the departments. I gather this is still a problem?

Secretary Kissinger: The problem, I believe, is that the difference between great policy and mediocre policy or substantial policy and average policy is usually an accumulation of nuances. The intellectual debate tends to be put in absolutes, but I believe, in fact, it is nuances that count.

Now, how you fine-tune a big bureaucracy to be responsive to little shifts and to understand the psychological intangibles on which major decisions often depend is very hard.

In addition, the key men in any government are there because they usually are men of strong will. Obviously, they believe in what they are proposing. If a decision goes against them, they may believe they haven't heard it right, or that the President didn't understand them correctly. Or they may subconsciously try to interpret it as close to their convictions as they can. I don't say this critically; it is unavoidable.

Thus, how you can have enough control to

make sure that there is coherence in the actions, this is the big problem. But basically we have not done too badly in implementing decisions. I think in many respects—in at least the key areas of policymaking—we really haven't had too much to think of in getting it implemented.

Q. I don't know how many years ago it was that Governor Rockefeller made Godkin lectures at Harvard. I always suspected you had something to do with it. He talked then about new concepts of confederation in the West. Now, one hears nothing about those concepts. Why is this?

Secretary Kissinger: Because we have reached the paradoxical position that at the moment when the need for cooperative action is greatest, the national and regional sense of identity has also grown. Thus any attempt to institutionalize a new structure within, for example, a confederal framework would meet resistance out of proportion to what it could achieve.

Indeed, some of the efforts that were made last year tended in the direction of what Governor Rockefeller was talking about in 1961 without using those words. They were resisted for the reason that they seemed to be too formal and an intrusion into the sense of identity of others. Nevertheless, while the organization or the institution of a confederation may be more than the traffic will bear, the need for cooperative action is absolutely imperative.

Soviet Union and China

Q. When I was in Europe just a few weeks ago, the question was raised there about your concept of China and of the Soviet Union. The question was raised whether in your mind you have not actually chosen one over the other and in the process were playing one up against the other. Could you clarify that?

Secretary Kissinger: When one analyzes foreign policy, there is always the temptation to look at the day-to-day tactics and not at the underlying reality. Any attempt to play off the Soviet Union and Communist China against each other would have a high risk that, at least for tactical reasons, they would combine against us. The rivalry and tensions between the Soviet Union and Communist China were not created by the United States. In fact, we didn't believe in their reality for much too long a time. They cannot be exploited by the United States. They can only be noted by the United States.

The correct policy for the United States is to take account of what exists and to conduct a policy of meticulous honesty with both of them so that neither believes we are trying to use one against the other. In the course of events, it may happen that one may feel that it is gaining benefit against the other as a result of dealing with us, but that cannot be our aim or purpose.

We have meticulously avoided forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union that could be construed as directed against China. We have never signed agreements whose chief purpose could be seen as directed against China, and conversely we have never participated with China in declarations that could be seen as aimed at the Soviet Union. We have developed our bilateral relationships with both and left them to sort out their relationships with each other. In fact, we have rarely talked to either of them about the other.

New International Structure

Q. When you leave this office, what is it you want to have achieved at the end of your service?

Secretary Kissinger: It used to be that the overwhelming concern of any President or Secretary of State had to be to make a contribution to peace in the traditional sense; that is to say, to reduce tensions among nations or regions. That remains, of course, an essential preoccupation. History has, I think, placed me in a key position at a time when we are moving from the relics of the postwar period toward a new international structure.

The administration did not invent that

structure. It did have, however, an opportunity to contribute to it—an opportunity that did not exist 10 years earlier and that may not exist 10 years later. Now, the difference between that structure and the previous period is that there are more factors to consider and that it has to be built not on the sense of the preeminence of two power centers, but on the sense of participation of those who are part of the global environment.

This has required a change in the American perception of the nature of foreign policy. What is described as excessive pragmatism is really a rather conscious attempt to try to educate myself, my generation, and my associates, insofar as I can contribute to living with the world as it is now emerging. Pragmatism unrelated to a purpose becomes totally self-destructive.

In addition, I would like to leave at least the beginning of a perception of a structure that goes beyond these centers of power and moves toward a global conception. There is no question in my mind that by the end of the century this will be the dominant reality of our time. I believe we have to move toward it now.

Q. Can you define it?

Secretary Kissinger: Before I go to that, let me say one other thing that I have been very much concerned with. However long I stay, it will be but a temporary episode. To succeed in these objectives, I will have to leave behind a public understanding and, above all, an intellectual understanding in the State Department that can carry on not only the detailed policies but an overall understanding of where America fits into the global scheme of things. I intend to give increasing attention to this problem.

Q. One of your close friends once said to me, "Kissinger has a weakness for becoming melancholy and leaving the job." What is your perception of how long you wish to stay in this job?

Secretary Kissinger: I may have a predilection for becoming melancholy, but there are very few jobs I believed in that I have actually left. Jean Monnet once said that he isn't interested whether a man is ambitious; the question is whether he is ambitious to do something or ambitious to be something. I think the same is true of vanity or many other qualities that can be ascribed to people in key positions.

I'd like to leave at a moment when it is still clear that my ambition and my vanity are geared toward doing something and when holding onto the job does not become the central preoccupation or the chief focus of public debate. Now, when that is depends on many factors—obviously, on the confidence of the President, about which I have no problem; the degree of public support; the degree of congressional support.

I have felt very strongly that foreign policy must be a national effort and that while of course disagreements are inevitable, I'd rather them to cut across party lines, just as I hope the support would cut across party lines.

Now, if debate becomes too partisan, then I would have to look at the situation again, and I do not believe anyone is indispensable or should develop a policy that makes him indispensable, because that would contradict the whole perception of what I—

Resumption of Foreign Policy Debate

Q. There has been a lot of talk on the Hill, since they cut your foreign aid bill and one or two other things, that the support you had on the Hill and in the country has been eroded recently. Is that true, in your judgment?

Secretary Kissinger: Support in the country, I cannot judge. Whenever I appear in public, I seem to draw large crowds, but I am no expert on public support.

As to support on the Hill, I think one has to distinguish the very unusual situation that existed before President Nixon's resignation with what could reasonably be expected. Before President Nixon's resignation there was such a sense of horror at the disintegration of authority domestically that everybody had an interest in demonstrating that there was

no debate on our foreign policy. There was a desire to preserve one island of authority in this general disintegration.

Therefore, I probably had an unusually favorable situation on the Hill that no one could expect to preserve in normal circumstances.

So I would think what has happened now, after President Nixon's resignation, is the opening of foreign policy to normal partisan debate. Probably in the excitement the pendulum is swinging a bit too far and there are intrusions in day-to-day tactical decisions which Congress really isn't best equipped to handle. But I think the pendulum will swing back—not to where it was before, and that wasn't healthy, anyway—but to a normal kind of political debate.

Q. You mentioned Jean Monnet, and he once said to me, not in recent years, in prior discussions about the CIA: "A democratic country as open as America can never really run a secret service, and if it tries to do so, in the end probably its losses are really greater than its gains." What do you think of that?

Secretary Kissinger: I think an intelligence organization is essential for a great power. I don't think there is much dispute about the part of the intelligence organization that collects information, analyzes it, and tries to interpret the world to political leaders.

The debates arise where the intelligence organization is operational and attempts to affect political events in other parts of the world. In this case there is a serious problem, because there is a gray area between the exercise of diplomacy and the use of force. Admittedly, you may create political realities—or political realities may come about—of great magnitude.

There is no question that insofar as covert operations are conducted they should be carefully controlled, first of all within the executive branch, to make certain there is no alternative and that they meet political goals and, secondly, to the degree possible, by Congress. How to do this, I think, requires careful study.

A View of America

Q. I'm more interested in the rising generation than I am in the contemporary problem, and for that reason I wanted to ask you this: A colleague of mine went to see Willy Brandt and asked, "What does the young generation in Germany now think of America?" And Brandt replied, "The magic is gone." And when he was asked what he meant by that, it was that we have used power, he thought, in a way that did not comport to our ideals, particularly in Viet-Nam, but there was something beyond that, a kind of sense that we were engaged in a kind of disintegration. He mentioned the drug culture in America as being profoundly worrisome and that somehow we had lost our ideals in the way in which we approach the world.

Secretary Kissinger: I was told last year that the public opinion polls in Germany in the second half of the year dramatically changed from showing a declining image of the United States to increasingly favoring the United States. The explanation I was given was the end of the Viet-Nam war and the decisive handling of the Middle East crisis.

The Germans, the younger Germans, again saw the United States as a nation that could solve problems—and that is one of the elements of the American appeal.

America has gone through many changes, dramatic changes, in the last decade. We even began to develop a new isolationism. The old isolationism was based on the proposition that we were too good for this world; the new isolationism was based on the proposition that we're not good enough for it.

When one looks at the process of growing up, it is largely a process of learning one's limits, that one is not immortal, that one cannot achieve everything; and then to draw from that realization the strength to set great goals nevertheless. Now, I think that as a country we've gone through this. We were immature in the sense that we thought the definition of goals was almost the equivalent of their realization.

Then we went to the opposite extreme, and I think from this point of view the Kennedy period is likely to be seen as the end of an era, rather than as the beginning of one: the last great flowering of the naive version of American idealism. And I don't say this as a criticism.

I think now that the drug culture, the student rebellion, are in that sense behind us. Of course, we still have the drug culture, but as problems that threaten the spirit of America, I think they either are behind us or could be behind us if we can now do what any adult has to do in his life. When you get to the recognition of your limits, then the question becomes whether you transcend them or wallow in them. That is a choice that is up to us.

Q. From the period from Roosevelt through the Kennedy period, the central theme of this country was that we could do anything in the world, and then we ran into some disappointments and seemed to go into a phase of self-doubt in which we began to wonder whether we could do anything effectively. Now, do we have the self-confidence and the essential trust in one another and in our institutions to support the kind of foreign policy you want?

Secretary Kissinger: I have to say this is the big question I ask myself. In some strange way, I think the American people have come through these recent crises in rather good shape. I would not have thought you could have assassinations, the Viet-Nam war, Watergate and all that went with it, and still have basic confidence in government.

Among the intellectual and political leadership groups, I'm not so sure. But even there, as I said earlier, during the Watergate period there was support for foreign policy. There is still a remarkable sense of national cohesion, so I am basically optimistic. But above all, I don't think we have any choice except to try, and in this respect the American idealistic tradition gives the United States a resource that exists in no other country in the world.

In this country, even with all the isolationism, when you talk about a sense of responsibility, you touch the core of people; you can mention very few other countries of the world where it could be even a plausible argument.

Q. At one point the West was bound together by certain religious ideals, certain moral ideals. What is it that binds the free world together today, if anything?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, what binds us together on an unsatisfactory level is industrial civilization, which imposes common realities and necessities on all of us. We are also tied together by an approach to politics in which ultimately the fulfillment of human needs plays a central role. Now, the definition of what those needs are can be disputed, but that it does play a crucial role is clear. Indeed, much of the political turmoil in the industrialized world is caused by the uncertainty as to precisely what those deeper needs are.

We are tied together, too, by a perception of politics in which various groups and the individual play a crucial role. And the combination of industrial necessity plus the fact that a complicated society cannot be run by direction and must have a certain amount of consensus will in time begin to permeate even totalitarian regimes.

Western Hemisphere Dialogue

Q. Do you see the possibility of a closer regional understanding and even structural development of regionalism within the hemisphere in the foreseeable future?

Secretary Kissinger: Since I've become Secretary of State, I've spent a considerable amount of time on Western Hemisphere relationships. If it is true that the relations between industrialized and developing nations are essential features of our period, then in the Western Hemisphere, where we are dealing with countries of similar traditions and, indeed, similar history—this is where a beginning must be made. If we cannot solve it creatively here, it is hard to know how we can be creative about it elsewhere.

How formal that structure can be, I don't

know. I have found two things: One is that the mere act of dialogue in the Western Hemisphere has had an emotional response; and secondly, I have been struck in my meetings—I've now attended three Foreign Ministers meetings in the Western Hemisphere—by the fact that if one read the records without the mood of the meetings, one would find in them a litany of criticism of the United States. But if one actually was at the meetings, one had the sense that this was a family quarrel; that in some intangible way, one was talking as a member of the family.

So I think that in the Western Hemisphere we have the possibilities of a creative phase, provided the United States can shed its traditional predominance and recognize that the decisions that emerge must be genuinely felt by our friends in the Western Hemisphere to be theirs.

Need for Sacrifice

Q. Is it reasonable for the American people to go on assuming, in a hungry world where raw materials are increasingly scarce, that our standard of living each year can go on going up, or do we have to face new responsibilities and even some sacrifices in this country in order to bring about some kind of world order?

Secretary Kissinger: Now, here I'm talking off the top of my head. I would think, if we look ahead to the year 2000 and beyond, we have to be prepared to face a world quite different from what we have now. We see it already in energy. I believe that the day of the 400-horsepower engine is over, whether it's this year or five years from now. You're going to see different types of automobiles, and that affects our style of life.

We will have to develop a global food policy. We cannot deal with issues like this week's grain sale to the Soviet Union on a crash basis every few months. To do so will affect our whole perception of the relationship of agriculture to our society and our foreign policy.

Q. When you talk about cooperation between the Communists and the capitalist world, where do you see this leading? To the domination of one over the other, or to a combination of the two, or what?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that any attempt at domination in a nuclear age is going to involve risks that are catastrophic and would not be tolerated. If we remain strong enough to prevent the imposition of Communist hegemony, then I believe that transformations of the Communist societies are inevitable. I believe that the imposition of state control of the kind that communism demands is totally incompatible with the requirements of human organization at this moment.

The pressure of this realization on Communist systems is going to bring about a transformation apart from any conscious policy the United States pursues, so long as there is not a constant foreign danger that can be invoked to impose regimentation.

What inherent reason is there that keeps the Communist societies in Eastern Europe from achieving the standard of living of those of Western Europe? The resources are about the same; the industrial organization is there. I think the reason is inherent in the type of society that has been created, and that, I believe, must inevitably change.

Looking Back

Q. Looking back over these almost six years, is there anything in the conduct of our foreign policy that you regret, that you would like to change?

Secretary Kissinger: I'm quite convinced that I'll be much more reflective a year or two after I leave here than I can be today. What I regret is that so much of the time had to be spent on the Viet-Nam war. If we could have got that behind us more rapidly, we could have brought the more positive side of our foreign policy to fruition at a time when attitudes were less rigidly formed.

The real tragedy was Watergate, because I believe that at the beginning of President Nixon's second term we had before us—due to changing conditions—a period of potential creativity. We contributed some of that

potential, but some of it was inherent in the objective situation.

Instead, we had to spend almost all of our energy in preserving what existed, rather than building on the foundations that had been laid. Even the year of Europe could have gone differently in a different environment. But you never know what opportunities may have been lost.

Those are my big regrets. There are many tactical things I would in retrospect perhaps do differently, but I think it's premature to speculate on those.

Now, what problems I leave to my successor depends, of course, at what time I leave, and I don't want to have this sound as a valedictory. If I resigned today, he would have the Middle East problem in mid-solution.

I think we are now at a point where the framework of the structure exists, if we can put it together. We have the raw material, we have the elements, we've identified them, I hope, correctly. We are at the beginning of building a consciousness of the global community that must come after us.

Q. Can you see a settlement of the Middle East thing in, say, before we get to the bicentennial, or the end of this administration?

Secretary Kissinger: Before we get to the bicentennial, I think we can make considerable progress, at least to a point where one can see the settlement emerging. But it could also go very badly. That is yet a delicate point.

Role of Intellectuals

Q. You once said to me that you were relying very heavily—even when you were in the middle of your service in Washington this time—on concepts and intellectual support you had got from your colleagues in Cambridge way back in '59, and that you felt a lack of this as time went on. Is that still true?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is true. As I look back, for example, at the area of strategic arms limitation, most of the creative thought with which I am familiar dates back to the late fifties and was then introduced into the government first in the Kennedy administration and then, I hope, in ours.

Two things are lacking now: One, the same sense of relationship toward the government that intellectuals had then; now they volunteer less and participate less. Secondly, there is a lack of relevant intellectual work.

Intellectuals are now divided into essentially three groups—those that reject the government totally, those that work on pure, abstract intellectual models which are impossible to make relevant, and a third group that's too close to power and that sees its service to the government as residing primarily in day-to-day tactics. No outsider can be very helpful on the day-to-day business, because he doesn't know enough of the current situation to really make a contribution.

The best service intellectuals can render is, first, to ask important questions—and that's a difficult problem—and second, to provide a middle-term perspective. But for that they need to have some compassion for the problems of the policymaker, just as he needs an understanding of their needs. I feel the lack, and I hope that now that our domestic climate is somewhat better we can restore mutual confidence.

Q. Was it not a great mistake to wipe out the Office of the Science Adviser, who was bringing in objective thought? I felt that lack of it, for example, on the whole question of oil and other raw materials.

Secretary Kissinger: I think it's a pity. I hope that some focal point is created which will look upon the intellectual community as its constituency, and that they will be listened to.

Q. Just one last point: I take it that you are saying that you don't want this to be interpreted as a swan song?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

The Testing of American Commitment

Address by Secretary Kissinger [1]

I am for several reasons deeply honored to address this gathering—first, because of the many distinguished men who have spoken from this podium in years past; second, because I know and admire the humanitarian work which this dinner helps support; and most important, because we pay tribute tonight to a man who represented the best of America and embodied human qualities which are an inspiration to us still.

Al Smith's America was an optimistic country—a land that never doubted its ability to solve the problems before it, regardless of magnitude. We were a people confident in the worth of our moral values and the decency of our purposes.

Al Smith epitomized the irrepressible spirit of his time and his country. He never flinched from a battle, but he never let the battle consume him. His compassion and his dreams sustained him because he knew that all great achievements begin as ideals.

Our America, regrettably perhaps, has lost some of that innocence. We have learned that we are not omnipotent, and now we face the true test of maturity: Having learned our limits, are we prepared to marshal our strengths? Or will we shrink in frustration from our new challenges? It is a crucial question, for the world needs our optimism, our faith, and our creativity as never before.

Cardinal Cooke [Terence Cardinal Cooke, Archbishop of New York], in his gracious letter of invitation, asked that I share with you my "vision of a better and more peaceful world."

It is not an easy task. For what is peace? Through most of our history Americans thought of peace as a static condition—a world living in the absence of war unless evil men intruded their darker designs. Secure behind two oceans, we left to others the day-to-day decisions that, over time, spelled war or peace, security or fear for less favored nations. We were spared the agony of reconciling the ideal with the practical, of making do with limited means and contingent ends.

But two World Wars and an era of involvement and conflict should now have taught us that peace is a process, not a condition. We have learned we must express moral values in steadfastness of purpose even while necessity imposes compromise. We now know that we are on a journey that has no terminal point, whose engine is reality, and whose beacon is a better life for future generations. And we have come to realize that if we are ever to have true peace there can be no end to our own exertions.

—Ours is a pluralistic world. It must find peace in conciliation rather than in the domination of any group or country. This is the kind of world we have always seen as reflecting our national ideals as well as our highest hopes.

—Ours is a world in which the needs of ordinary people cry out for economic and social progress, for self-respect, dignity, and justice. These were objectives to which Americans responded even in the most isolationist of times. They are our objectives still. Food

[1] Made before the annual dinner of the Alfred E. Smith Memorial Foundation at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 16 (as delivered).

aid and public health, scientific and technical cooperation, are fields in which international efforts have been sustained by our contribution. They now become not an exercise in charity but the cement of global community.

—It is, above all, a world of turmoil and change, a world much in need of a self-confident America that understands that without its leadership there can be no stability, no permanent improvement in the human condition, and no lasting peace. The irony of our time is that the simple faith of Al Smith's provincial America is precisely what the world desperately needs today.

In the past few years we have achieved important goals. We have ended our involvement in a divisive war; we have resolved the perennial postwar crisis over Berlin; we have begun hopeful efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East; we have bridged two decades of hostility with the world's most populous nation; we have taken major steps to diminish the danger of nuclear war and to build a more durable political relationship with our most powerful adversary; we have sought a more mature and equal partnership with our allies.

We have emerged from—and perhaps put behind us—a postwar structure of rigid East-West military and ideological confrontation.

But now—indeed, partly because of our success—we experience the birth pangs of a new order. We face a new dimension of challenges, more pervasive and complex, with perils at once more subtle and profound. A new world is emerging—a world whose security, well-being, and moral fulfillment demand interdependence; a world whose peoples are interlinked by technology and global communications, by the common danger of nuclear war, and by the worldwide thrusts of human needs; a world in which traditional structures and tenets of diplomacy are being overwhelmed.

At the midway point between the end of the Second World War and the end of this century, we find ourselves also midway between the nation-state from which we began and the global community which we must fashion if we are ever to live in a lasting peace.

We face a new and fundamental crisis of the international system:

—Inflation is a global phenomenon infecting all societies and clearly beyond the power of any national government to control alone.

—The threat of global famine and mass starvation is an affront to our values and an intolerable threat to our hopes for a better world.

—The abrupt rise of energy costs, and the ensuing threats of monetary crisis and economic stagnation, threaten to undermine the economic system that nourished the world's well-being for over 30 years.

All these problems are dealt with in a clearly inadequate framework. National solutions continue to be pursued when, manifestly, their very futility is the crisis we face.

Inflation eats away the well-being of nations on the verge of development and of whole classes at the margin of society. Economic stagnation, or recession, will feed the frustration of groups whose expectations for a share in the prosperity they see around them are suddenly and cruelly rebuffed. Starvation will shatter the hopes of developing nations for progress. Thus the economic crisis threatens to magnify the discontent and ungovernability of all societies.

Only cooperative international solutions are equal to the challenge. With respect to energy, consumers must be prepared to share and conserve and provide mutual financial assistance; consumers and producers together must shape a mutually beneficial long-term relationship; there must be a determined and lasting commitment in each country to the conservation and discipline President Ford proposed to the nation a week ago.

The threat of mass starvation, in particular, requires a major commitment. Cardinal Cooke's eloquent appeal for assistance to the drought-ridden Sahel, which he has just visited, deserves our strong support. And at next month's World Food Conference in

Rome, the United States plans to launch a new long-term international program of action. To do less would violate moral imperatives as well as practical necessities.

Nor is the current crisis purely economic. After nearly 30 years without general war, the world has become dangerously tolerant of accelerating nuclear proliferation and the purposeless expansion of strategic arsenals. Festering political conflicts, whether in the Middle East or Cyprus or Indochina, ultimately could pose the same threat to general peace as did the more dramatic great-power confrontation of a decade ago.

Thus the requirements of peace and progress demand of all nations a new and unprecedented sense of responsibility to the international system.

The issues confronting America today are not, in their deepest sense, issues of economics, technology, or diplomacy. They are a challenge to our preconceptions, a test of our foresight, our will, and our strength of purpose. Dogmas left over from the 19th century—of national autonomy or economic determinism—do not even address, let alone resolve, the international issues of the last quarter of the 20th century. The fact is that all nations—East and West, aligned and nonaligned—are part of one global system and dependent on it for their peace, their well-being, and the achievement of their own national objectives. If that system fails through accident or design, no nation or bloc is spared the penalty.

Your Eminence, ladies and gentlemen: A great responsibility rests upon us here in America. For many years our country has carried a disproportionate share of the burden of maintaining the peace, of feeding the hungry, and giving hope to the world's dispossessed. It has been a heavy burden—which we did not seek and which we have often been tempted to put down. But we have not done so, nor can we afford to do so now, for it is the generations who follow us who would pay the price for our abdication.

For more than a decade we have been torn by war and then by constitutional crisis. We have been enervated by our exertions and perhaps even more by self-doubt. But now the war is over and the crisis resolved. It is time we made peace with ourselves.

The bitterness that has characterized the national debate for most of a decade no longer has reason or place. Governments by their very nature must make difficult choices and judgments when facts are not clear and when trends are uncertain. This is difficult in the best of circumstances. It may grow dangerously erratic in a pervasive climate of distrust and conflict. Debate in a democratic society should find its ultimate limit in a general recognition that we are all engaged in a common enterprise. Let us never forget that at home a society thrives not on its internal victories but on its reconciliations.

A year ago your speaker ended with these words:

> My own great hope is that all of us may do honor to the memory of Alfred E. Smith by loving this country as deeply as he did, and by serving her as faithfully.

That speaker was President Ford. These phrases are especially meaningful to someone for whom America was a haven and not something to be taken for granted.

This country is summoned once again to leadership, to helping the world find its way from a time of fear into a new era of hope. With our old idealism and our new maturity, let us disprove the impression that men and nations are losing control over their destinies. Americans still believe that problems are soluble if we try. We still believe it is right to seek to undo what is wrong with the world. And we still seek the excitement of new frontiers rather than shrinking from their uncertainty.

So we return to our starting point. Our "vision of a better and more peaceful world" must begin with a vision of ourselves. And in that context let us remember the jaunty little man from the sidewalks of New York who was not for nothing called the Happy Warrior. In him America proved that man achieves nobility not by his beginnings but by his ends.

President Costa Gomes of Portugal Visits Washington

Joint U.S.-Portuguese Communique [1]

At the invitation of President Ford, His Excellency Francisco da Costa Gomes, President of the Republic of Portugal, visited Washington on October 18. President Costa Gomes, who was accompanied by the Foreign Minister, Dr. Mario Soares, had meetings with President Ford and with Secretary of State Kissinger and was the guest of honor at a luncheon given by Secretary Kissinger.

President Costa Gomes outlined the achievements of the Portuguese Government in light of recent events in restoring civil and political liberties to Portugal and in creating the basis for a return to democracy. He reported on the negotiations which had led to the independence of Guinea-Bissau and explained his government's plans for the granting of self-determination and independence to the remaining overseas territories. He reaffirmed his government's commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty and its desire to develop even closer ties to the United States.

President Ford expressed his admiration for the statesmanship shown by Portuguese leaders in undertaking to restore democracy to Portugal by holding free elections soon and in making possible the enjoyment of the right of self-determination and independence by the peoples of Portugal's overseas territories. He noted with pleasure President Costa Gomes' reaffirmation of Portugal's commitment to NATO and expressed his confidence that ties between the United States and Portugal will become ever closer.

The two Presidents agreed that, as these developments proceed, it would be in our mutual interest to intensify the cooperation between the two countries to embrace new activities in a broad range of areas, such as education, health, energy, agriculture, transportation and communications, among others. They agreed that this expansion of their cooperation could begin with technical talks in the fields of agriculture, public health, education and financial and economic matters, as requested by the Portuguese authorities.

They also agreed that the two countries should continue and intensify negotiations relating to cooperation in the Azores.

[1] Issued on Oct. 18 (text from White House press release).

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council Meets at Moscow

Following is a statement made by Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon before the second board meeting of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council at Moscow on October 15.

Department of the Treasury press release dated October 15

Much has happened since the first meeting of the joint board last February in Washington. There have been unprecedented events in the political life of my country.

Many things have not changed however; high among these is the desire of the United States to further the development of peaceful, fruitful relations with the Soviet Union. As President Ford told the Congress shortly after taking office:

> To the Soviet Union, I pledge continuity in our commitment to the course of the past three years. . . . there can be no alternative to a positive and peaceful relationship between our nations.

We are here today to discuss economic and trade relations between our countries. Nowhere is there more concrete evidence of the progress we are making than in this field.

Our bilateral trade is rapidly approaching the three-year goal of $2–$3 billion trade turnover which was set at the 1973 summit. In 1973 alone, U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade turnover was $1.4 billion. Although total trade is down somewhat this year after the exceptionally large agricultural shipments of 1973, U.S. sales of machinery and equipment products have risen sharply, and U.S.S.R. exports to the United States have shown a very substantial increase.

Seventeen American firms now have received permission to open accredited offices in Moscow. Export-Import Bank loans for the Soviet Union have increased to $470 million. Impressive contracts have been signed in the last nine months for the Kama River truck plant, the Moscow Trade Center, the fertilizer project, and equipment for gas pipeline development.

The U.S. commercial office opened for business in Moscow last spring. In addition to smaller exhibits staged in its display area, my government recently sponsored U.S. firms' participation in two major Soviet trade shows (health and plastics manufacturing equipment) and organized a successful solo exhibition of American machine tools in Sokolniki Park.

Our two governments are pledged to continue this momentum. In the long-term agreement signed in June, both formally agreed to facilitate economic, industrial, and technical cooperation and exchange information on economic trends.

Progress has also been made in resolving the policy problems which could inhibit further growth. Soon after entering the White House, President Ford emphasized to Congress the importance he attached to granting most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union. I look forward to early resolution of the trade reform bill which I believe will bring about satisfactory export-import legislation. This will clear the impediments on the path of an expanding trade relationship.

The U.S. Government will continue to help clear away obstacles to improvement in our economic and commercial relations. In the final analysis, however, the action responsibility for each U.S.-Soviet commercial transaction rests with the private sector of our economy. It is for this reason that we encouraged the formation of the Trade and Economic Council, which brings together officials from your ministries and trading organizations and top management representatives from our firms—it is these people who are doing the actual work of expanding trade.

As we all know, the Council was formed as the result of a protocol entered into in June of 1973 by Minister [of Foreign Trade N.S.] Patolichev and my predecessor, Secretary [George P.] Shultz. It's important, however, to remember that while the Council is the creation of the two governments, on the U.S. side it has been adopted by the private sector—our business community. As an honorary director of the Council, I am pleased to note that the child of these two governments is healthy and growing at a rapid pace, and I am pleased with the care and upbringing it is being given by the U.S. Government. I voice our appreciation for the support and help given the Council since its inception by the Soviet Government.

While the role of the Council is to foster and promote the growth of the U.S.-Soviet trade and economic relationship, and while I am confident that the U.S. Congress will approve legislation so necessary to the normalization of this relationship, I also envisage that out of this improved relationship will emerge a larger joint economic role for our two countries.

Given the extraordinary global economic interrelationship of all countries, there is a greater-than-ever need for responsibility and cooperation between nations. It is hard to conceive of a solution fair to all countries, large and small, in any area of major interest without the full and close cooperation of the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Since February, the Council has developed into a fully functioning organization. Binational staffs are now at work on some 60 major projects in New York and Moscow. The Council has found excellent office space in Manhattan, and yesterday we dedicated the attractive offices on the Shevchenko Embankment. The Subcommittee on Science and Technology concluded a productive first meeting a few days ago in New York.

This is an excellent beginning, but is only a beginning, and I am confident that it foreshadows even greater accomplishments in the future as the Council realizes its full potential in the development of fruitful economic relations between our countries.

As an honorary director of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, I com-

mend my fellow directors and the Council staff for the progress you have made so far. I wish you well in your deliberations at this meeting, and I urge you to work diligently to create an economic fabric between our two countries of so many strands so closely interwoven that not only is there no visible seam, but also that it is so strong as to be virtually unbreakable.

So while we work to intermesh and synchronize our different economic systems, we also work to prepare and strengthen ourselves for jointly addressing in harmony the problems of creating a better world for all countries and all people.

U.S.S.R. Agrees To Limit Purchases of U.S. Grain in Current Crop Year

Department of the Treasury Announcement

Department of the Treasury press release dated October 19

Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon announced on October 19 conclusion of an agreement with the Soviet Union on purchases of U.S. grains during the current crop year.

The Soviet Union agreed to limit its total grain purchases from the United States this crop year to 2.2 million tons, including 1 million tons of corn and 1.2 million tons of wheat.

An additional 1 million tons of grain contracted for earlier in October can be delivered from other exporting countries. The Soviet purchasing agency for grains will make the necessary purchase arrangements with U.S. export firms.

The Soviet Union also agreed to make no further purchases in the U.S. market this crop year, which ends next summer. Further, the Soviet Union agreed to work with the United States toward development of a supply/demand data system for grains.

The agreement followed talks in Moscow by Secretary Simon with Minister of Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev. Secretary Simon was in the Soviet Union October 12–15 for the opening of the Moscow office of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council.

The grain talks were scheduled following the Soviets' buying activity in the United States earlier in October. At that time, the Soviet Union placed orders with two U.S. export firms for the purchase of 3.2 million tons of U.S. grain, including 2.3 million tons of corn and 900,000 tons of wheat for delivery during the 1974/75 crop year, which ends next summer. Following talks with President Ford on October 5, the presidents of the two export firms agreed to hold these sales in abeyance until after Secretary Simon's visit to Moscow.

This year's Soviet purchases of U.S. grain will be small compared with purchases during the past two years. The Soviet Union bought 17 million tons of U.S. grain during 1972 and 7 million tons in 1973. The smaller purchases in 1974 are in line with smaller export availabilities of U.S. grain as a result of the disappointing corn harvest this year. The United States has harvested a record wheat crop, but the corn crop is expected to be down 16 percent from last year's record harvest. Total U.S. feed grain production is expected to be down 18 percent.

In his talks with Soviet officials, Secretary Simon emphasized that the United States wants to continue developing its agricultural trade with the Soviet Union. The Soviets advised Secretary Simon that the Soviet Union will have an adequate harvest this year but that imports are needed for specialized livestock production units.

Secretary Simon reviewed with Soviet officials the type of grain data that the United States receives from other countries that purchase U.S. grain. The Soviets agreed to work toward the development of a data exchange system on grain between the two governments.

The World Population Conference: An Assessment

Address by Philander P. Claxton, Jr.
Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters [1]

It will be a decade or more before the accomplishments of the World Population Conference can be fully judged. We have enough perspective now, however, to see the conference whole and to assess it generally. By any reasonable standard it was a remarkable success.

Although the results were not ideal and there were disappointments, it carried out the purposes for which it was established by the Economic and Social Council four years ago.

Even before the conference itself, preparations for it and the stimulation of World Population Year 1974 had caused many countries to review their own population and family planning policies. Several had moved toward more affirmative positions. Brazil, for example, the largest country without an affirmative national policy, had determined, and announced at Bucharest, a policy embracing recognition of the right of couples to determine the number and spacing of their children and the obligation of the government to make the necessary means available.

The fact that the world conference on this difficult and delicate subject was held at all was an outstanding achievement. It was all the more so because 137 nations attended—one of the largest U.N. conferences ever held—including all members of the United Nations or its specialized agencies except South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and North Viet-Nam. They debated vigorously for two weeks, in a plenary, three committees of the whole, and a working group, and went away in good spirits with a sense of accomplishment.

The intense debate, too often burdened by polemics and ideologies, was nevertheless an important educational process which made all those attending more aware of the deeply held beliefs of others.

The adoption by acclamation (only one delegation reserving) of an excellent World Population Plan of Action, after a hundred-plus amendments—47 by votes—was, as the U.S. delegation said in its closing statement, an achievement of great magnitude.[2] We declared this achievement should not be considered as a victory or a defeat for any faction, nation, or group of nations, but as a triumph for the process of international cooperation under the United Nations.

The plan of action was agreed to only after intensive debate and negotiation. The debate began with a concerted five-pronged attack by Algeria, supported by a few African countries; Argentina, supported by three or four Latin American countries; an Eastern European group of eight Socialist countries; the People's Republic of China; and the Holy See.

The attack was directed primarily toward the conceptual basis of the draft plan of action presented by the Secretariat of the

[1] Made before a conference for nongovernmental organizations on "Bucharest and the Future" at the Department of State on Oct. 10 (text from press release 400). Mr. Claxton was a member of the U.S. delegation to the World Population Conference at Bucharest Aug. 19–30.

[2] For U.S. statements and an unofficial text of the plan of action, see BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1974, p. 429.

United Nations rather than toward its operative provisions.[3] The major thrust of the attack was to assert the importance (or even the precondition) of social and economic development for the reduction of high fertility and to reduce the emphasis in the draft on population/family planning programs.

The equilibrium attained by these differing emphases is illustrated by the last four sentences of paragraph 1 of the plan:

> The explicit aim of the World Population Plan of Action is to help co-ordinate population trends and the trends of economic and social development. The basis for an effective solution of population problems is, above all, socio-economic transformation. A population policy may have a certain success if it constitutes an integral part of socio-economic development; its contribution to the solution of world development problems is hence only partial, as is the case with the other sectoral strategies. Consequently, the Plan of Action must be considered as an important component of the system of international strategies and as an instrument of the international community for the promotion of economic development, quality of life, human rights and fundamental freedom.

At the same time the working group retained the language of the draft plan explaining the interrelation between population variables and development variables:

> Population and development are interrelated: Population variables influence development variables and are also influenced by them; the formulation of a World Population Plan of Action reflects the international community's awareness of the importance of population trends for socio-economic development, and the socio-economic nature of the recommendations contained in this Plan of Action reflects its awareness of the crucial role that development plays in affecting population trends. (Par. 14(c).)

A new sentence was added to paragraph 2 concerning the relation of population policies to development:

> Policies whose aim is to affect population trends must not be considered substitutes for socio-economic development policies but integrated with those policies to facilitate the solution of certain problems facing developing and developed countries and promote a more balanced and rational development.

It has always been the view of the United States that population programs should be considered only a part, but an essential part, of economic and social development. It was and is our view that the importance of social and economic strategies and programs had been dealt with at length in earlier U.N. documents and did not need repetition in the Population Plan of Action.

From our point of view, the introduction of language desired by these proponents did not change or weaken the plan of action, except to make it somewhat more diffuse. From the point of view of the many developing countries seeking these changes, their accomplishment quite properly gave them an important sense of identification with the final document. This is right and good.

The same group of countries, particularly some of the Latin Americans, also opposed all concepts of quantitative goals or time frames for reduction of birth rates or population growth rates. One of the key provisions of the draft plan (par. 27(b)) urged all countries to:

> Make available, to all persons who so desire, if possible by the end of the Second United Nations Development Decade, but not later than 1985, the necessary information and education about family planning and the means to practise family planning . . .

The working group adopted an Argentine amendment deleting the reference to 1980 and 1985 and changing the text to recommend that all countries:

> Encourage appropriate education concerning responsible parenthood and make available to persons who so desire advice and means of achieving it. (Par. 29(b).)

The same group of countries also opposed paragraph 35 of the draft plan, which says that:

> Countries which have a very high birth-rate may consider taking action . . . to reduce these rates by about 5 to 10 per 1,000 before 1985.

A compromise was reached for a substitute that restored the concept of quantitative goals and a time frame in less precise but broader terms:

> In the light of the principles of this Plan of Ac-

[3] For text of the draft plan of action, see U.N. doc. E/CONF. 60/7.

tion, countries which consider their birth rates detrimental to their national purposes are invited to consider setting quantitative goals and implementing policies that may lead to the attainment of such goals by 1985. Nothing herein should interfere with the sovereignty of any government to adopt or not to adopt such quantitative goals. (Par. 37.)

The countries members of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) had agreed at the consultative meeting on the draft plan of action held in Bangkok in May 1974 to propose amendments to the plan to strengthen the goals proposed in it. These amendments called for developed countries to aim for replacement levels of fertility by 1985 and stationary populations as soon thereafter as practicable and for developing countries to seek to attain replacement levels of fertility in two or three decades—all nations to attempt to attain replacement levels by 2000. The intensity of the attack on the concept of goals made it impossible to press for these ECAFE amendments.

The attention of the press was naturally drawn to the controversy over these issues. The less dramatic but fundamental substance of the plan of action as actually adopted received little attention; yet it constituted the real substance of the conference and its accomplishments.

The final plan is somewhat less urgent in tone than the draft submitted by the Secretariat but, in several ways, more complete and with greater potential. It contains 109 paragraphs, many with several subparagraphs. The sweeping scope and thoroughness of the plan can be fully appreciated only by a careful reading and rereading. However, the following highlights illustrate its character.

That the "explicit aim of the World Population Plan of Action is to help co-ordinate population trends and the trends of economic and social development" has already been noted. The "primary aim" of the plan of action is also asserted to be:

> . . . to expand and deepen the capacities of countries to deal effectively with their national and subnational population problems and to promote an appropriate international response to their needs by increasing international activity in research, the exchange of information, and the provision of assistance on request. (Par. 15.)

The plan of action lays down several important principles, some for the first time in a U.N. document:

1. Among the first-time statements is the assertion that the sovereign right of each nation to set its own population policies is "to be exercised . . . taking into account universal solidarity in order to improve the quality of life of the peoples of the world." (Par. 14.) This new provision opens the way toward increasing responsibility by nations toward other nations in establishing their national population policies.

2. There is recognized for the first time in a single declarative sentence that:

> All couples and individuals have the basic human right to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and means to do so. (Par. 14(f).)

3. Also for the first time, a U.N. document links the responsibility of childbearers to the community:

> The responsibility of couples and individuals in the exercise of this right takes into account the needs of their living and future children, and their responsibilities towards the community. (Par. 14(f) continued.)

It is now possible to build on this newly stated principle as the right of couples first recognized in the Tehran Human Rights Proclamation of 1968 has been built on.[4]

4. A sweeping declaration of the right of women is included:

> Women have the right to complete integration in the development process particularly by means of an equal participation in educational, social, economic, cultural and political life. In addition the necessary measures should be taken to facilitate this integration with family responsibilities which should be fully shared by both partners. (Par. 14(h).)

5. A new statement of principles was added on resources and environment:

> In the democratic formulation of national popula-

[4] For text of the Proclamation of Tehran, adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights on May 13, 1968, see BULLETIN of Sept. 2, 1968, p. 258.

tion goals and policies, consideration must be given, together with other economic and social factors, to the supplies and characteristics of natural resources and to the quality of the environment and particularly to all aspects of food supply including productivity of rural areas; the demand for vital resources increases with growing population and with growing *per capita* consumption; attention must be directed to the just distribution of resources and to the minimization of wasteful aspects of their use throughout the world. (Par. 14(j).)

6. The need for international action is accepted:

The growing interdependence among countries makes international action increasingly important to the solution of development and population problems. (Par. 14(k).)

The plan of action includes recommendations for: population goals and policies, population growth, mortality and morbidity, reproduction, family formation and the status of women, population distribution and internal migration, international migration, population structure, socioeconomic policies, data collection and analysis, research, development and evolution of population policies, the role of national governments and of international cooperation, and monitoring, review, and appraisal.

A score of these recommendations are the most important:

1. Governments should integrate population measures and programs into comprehensive social and economic plans and programs and their integration should be reflected in the goals, instrumentalities, and organizations for planning within the countries. A unit dealing with population aspects should be created and placed at a high level of the national administrative structure. (Par. 95.)

2. Countries which consider their population growth hampers attainment of their goals should consider adopting population policies—through a low level of birth and death rates. (Pars. 17–18.)

3. Developed countries are urged to develop appropriate policies in population, consumption, and investment, bearing in mind the need for fundamental improvement in international equity. (Par. 14(j).)

4. Highest priority should be given to reduction in mortality and morbidity, and increase of life expectancy and programs for this purpose should reach rural areas and underprivileged groups. (Pars. 20–25.)

5. Countries should encourage appropriate education concerning responsible parenthood and make available to persons who so desire advice and means of achieving it. (Par. 29 (b).)

6. Family planning and related services should aim not only at prevention of unwanted pregnancies but also at elimination of involuntary sterility or subfecundity to enable couples to achieve their desired number of children. (Par. 29(c).)

7. Adequately trained auxiliary personnel, rural extension, home economics, and social workers, and nongovernment channels should be used to help provide family planning services and advice. (Par. 29(e).)

8. Governments with family planning programs should consider coordinating them with health and other services designed to raise the quality of life. (Par. 30.)

9. Countries wishing to affect fertility levels should give priority to development programs and health and education strategies which have a decisive effect upon demographic trends, including fertility; international cooperation should give priority to assisting such national efforts. (Par. 31.) Such programs may include reduction in infant and child mortality, increased education, particularly for females, improvement in the status of women, land reform, and support in old age. (Par. 32.)

10. Countries which consider their birth rates detrimental to their national purposes are invited to set quantitative goals and implement policies to achieve them by 1985. (Par. 37.)

11. Because the family is the basic unit of society, governments should assist families as far as possible through legislation and services. (Par. 39.)

12. Governments should insure full participation of women in the educational, economic, social, and political life of their countries on an equal basis with men—a new provision added at Bucharest. (Par. 41.)

13. A series of recommendations is made to stabilize migration within countries, particularly policies to reduce the undesirable consequences of excessively rapid urbanization and to develop opportunities in rural areas and small towns, recognizing the right of individuals to move freely within their national boundaries. (Pars. 44–50.)

14. Agreements should be concluded to regulate the international migration of workers and to assure nondiscriminatory treatment and social services for these workers and their families; also other measures to decrease the "brain drain" from developing countries. (Pars. 51–62.)

15. To assure needed information concerning population trends, population censuses should be taken at regular intervals and information concerning births and deaths made available at least annually. (Pars. 72–77.)

16. Research should be intensified to develop knowledge concerning the social, economic, and political interrelationships with population trends; effective means of reducing infant and childhood mortality; methods for integrating population goals into national plans, means of improving the motivation of people, analysis of population policies in relation to socioeconomic development, laws, and institutions; methods of fertility regulation to meet the varied requirements of individuals and communities, including methods requiring no medical supervision; the interrelations of health, nutrition, and reproductive biology; and methods for improving the administration, delivery, and utilization of social services, including family planning services. (Pars. 78–80.)

17. Training of management in population dynamics and administration on an interdisciplinary basis should be provided for medical, paramedical, traditional health personnel; program administrators; senior government officials; labor, community, and social leaders. Education and information programs should be undertaken to bring population information to all areas of countries. (Pars. 81–93.)

18. An important role of governments is to determine and assess the population problems and needs of their countries in the light of their political, social, cultural, religious, and economic conditions; such an undertaking should be carried out systematically and periodically so as to provide informed, rational, and dynamic decisionmaking in matters of population and development. (Par. 98.)

19. International, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental agencies and national governments should increase their assistance in the population field on request. (Par. 100.)

20. The plan of action should be closely coordinated with the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, reviewed in depth at five-year intervals, and modified as appropriate. (Pars. 107–109.)

The plan of action deals obliquely with projections of population growth and concepts of goals. It notes in paragraph 16 that the U.N. medium projections for population growth, which has been essentially the best estimate of demographers for the most likely growth of the world's population, would result in little change in population growth rates in the next decade. It then introduces the concept of the U.N. low projection and recognizes that:

> According to the United Nations low variant projections, it is estimated that as a result of social and economic development and population policies as reported by countries in the Second United Nations Inquiry on Population and Development, population growth rates in the developing countries as a whole may decline from the present level of 2.4 per cent per annum to about 2 per cent by 1985; and below 0.7 per cent per annum in the developed countries. In this case the worldwide rate of population growth would decline from 2 per cent to about 1.7 per cent.

These projected reductions are said in paragraph 36 to be "consistent with declines in the birth rate of the developing countries as a whole from the present level of 38 per thousand to 30 per thousand by 1985." The plan points out that to achieve these levels of fertility by 1985 would, of course, "require substantial national efforts, by those countries concerned, in the field of socio-economic development and population policies . . . ."

These statements are followed by paragraph 37, already referred to, which invites interested countries to consider setting quantitative goals and implementing policies to attain such goals by 1985.

If efforts to slow population growth along the lines of the low projection can be successfully continued, the reduction in the world's population in the year 2000, compared to the medium projection, would be approximately 500 million. By the year 2050 it would be approximately 2 billion. At the point when a stationary population would be reached, about a hundred years from now, the difference would be nearly 3 billion.

The World Population Plan of Action, despite its wordiness and often hesitant tone, contains all the necessary provisions for effective family planning programs and population growth control programs at national and international levels. It lacks only plain statements of quantitative goals with time frames for their accomplishment. These can be added by individual national action and by development in future U.N. documents.

The basis for suitable goals exists in paragraphs 16, 36, 37, and 107, referred to above. The concept of the U.N. low-variant projection used in these paragraphs is close to the goals proposed by the United States and other ECAFE nations already mentioned. The dangerous situation evidenced by the current food situation and projections for the future make it essential to press for the realization of these goals.

This assessment, directed at the amendment and adoption of the World Population Plan of Action, does not do justice to the accomplishments of the three committees of the whole, on Population Change and Economic and Social Development; Population, Resources and Environment; and Population and the Family. Each of these considered the interrelation of population factors and their particular subject matter and adopted relevant resolutions of a positive content. These are extensive and important in their own right and deserve a separate, detailed assessment.

The U.S. delegation to the conference gave four undertakings of considerable future importance. From the U.S. point of view we should consider these also as part of the action agenda coming out of the conference. We said:

> First, we will carry out the provision of the World Population Plan of Action to the best of our ability. Especially we will continue our effort to assure the availability of family planning services to all our people.
>
> Second, we will undertake a collaborative effort with other interested donor countries and U.N. agencies—especially the World Health Organization (WHO), the U.N. Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF)—to assist poorer countries to develop low-cost basic preventive and curative health services, including maternal and child health and family planning services, reaching out into remote rural areas. We have already begun to use our communications satellites for medical consultation and diagnosis. If desired, we could extend these new techniques to family planning organizations and administration.
>
> Third, we will join with other interested countries in a further collaborative effort of national research in human reproduction and fertility control covering biomedical and socioeconomic factors.
>
> Fourth, (we) will be glad to join other countries in order to seek increased funds for assistance to bilateral and multilateral health and population programs in developing countries that desire our help and our voluntary contributions to the U.N. Fund for Population Activities. If other donor countries—especially the newly wealthy countries—indicate an interest in providing a steady increase in such funds over the next 10 years, (we) will bring that message home from this conference, and given some evidence of world interest, it is quite possible our Congress will respond favorably.

The World Population Conference has provided nations, international bodies, private organizations, and individuals with an impressive and valuable agenda for action. It is now in the hands of all of us to make its potential a reality.

President Ford Vetoes Two Versions of Bill Restricting Aid to Turkey

Following are statements by President Ford issued October 1 and 8, his remarks of October 14 upon signing a message to the House of Representatives returning H.J. Res. 1131 without his approval, the text of that message, his statement issued October 15 following the House vote sustaining the veto, the text of a message to the House on October 17 returning H.J. Res. 1163 without his approval, and his statement issued October 18 concerning H.J. Res. 1167, which he signed into law on October 17.

STATEMENT ISSUED OCTOBER 1

White House press release dated October 1

Last night the Eagleton amendment [1] to the continuing resolution authority was passed by the Senate. Today the continuing resolution itself will be brought to a Senate vote.

It is my conviction that approval of the continuing resolution containing the Eagleton amendment or similar language would destroy any hope for the success of the initiatives the United States has already taken or may take in the future to contribute to a just settlement of the Cyprus dispute. This view is shared by Secretary of State Kissinger, who is now in New York where he is making a major effort in his talks with Greek and Turkish representatives to bring about progress.

If the Eagleton amendment or similar language is adopted by the Congress, the United States will have lost its negotiating flexibility and influence. It thus hurts the very countries and objectives it purports to help.

It is my intention, therefore, to withhold my consent to any continuing resolution which reaches my desk containing language such as that found in the Eagleton amendment. I can, however, accept and, indeed, endorse the language relating to military assistance to Turkey contained in the continuing resolution as reported to the full Senate by the Senate Appropriations Committee.[2]

I deeply appreciate the constructive efforts of the Democratic and Republican leadership in both the Senate and House of Representatives in their support for an amendment which would assist the diplomatic efforts of Secretary Kissinger in seeking an equitable solution to the Cyprus question. I hope a majority of the Senate will respond to this bipartisan leadership effort.

STATEMENT ISSUED OCTOBER 8

White House press release dated October 8

Yesterday the House of Representatives, once again acting against the almost unanimous advice of its leadership, amended the continuing resolution granting funds for our foreign aid programs. The amendment requires an immediate cessation of all U.S. military assistance to Turkey and is, in my view, a misguided and extremely harmful measure.

Instead of encouraging the parties involved in the Cyprus dispute to return to the negotiating table, this amendment, if passed by the Senate, will mean the indefinite postponement of meaningful negotiations. Instead of strengthening America's ability to persuade the parties to resolve the dispute, it will lessen our influence on all the parties concerned. And it will imperil our relationships with our Turkish friends and weaken us in the crucial eastern Mediterranean.

But most tragic of all, a cutoff of arms to Turkey will not help Greece or the Greek Cypriot people, who have suffered so much over the course of the last several months. We recognize that we are far from a settlement consistent with Greece's honor and dignity. We are prepared to exert our efforts in that direction. But reckless acts that prevent progress toward a Cyprus settlement harm Greeks, for it is the Greek Government and the Greek Cypriots who have the most to gain from a compromise settlement. And it

[1] *Cong. Rec.*, Sept. 30, 1974, p. S17733.

[2] S. Rept. 1174, 93d Cong., 2d sess.

is they who have the most to lose from continued deadlock.

Thus I call upon the Senate to accept the original conference report language on Turkish arms aid [3] and to return the bill to the House of Representatives once again. And I ask the House of Representatives to reconsider its hasty act and, working with the Senate, pass a bill that will best serve the interests of peace.

REMARKS UPON SIGNING VETO MESSAGE, OCTOBER 14

White House press release dated October 14

Today, in the interest of preserving the ability of the United States to assist the Governments of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus dispute, I am returning to the Congress without my approval the continuing resolution which the Congress has amended to cut off military aid to Turkey.

In so doing, I want to clear the air of a number of misunderstandings concerning the U.S. position toward the Cyprus crisis.

Since the outbreak of the crisis, our objectives have been to establish a cease-fire, to provide humanitarian aid to the refugees, to assist the parties toward a negotiation and a settlement, and to strengthen and to improve our historically friendly ties with Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus.

I have discussed these goals with the bipartisan leadership of the Congress and have received their unanimous and vigorous support. Our ability to pursue these goals depends, however, on being able to maintain a constructive relationship with the parties involved. The cutoff of assistance to Turkey is destructive of that relationship.

Further, it in no way helps the Greek people or the people of Cyprus, who have suffered so much in the past months. In fact, by dashing hopes for negotiations, it prolongs their suffering.

We recognize clearly the need to insure that the honor and integrity of the Greek people be maintained. We seek a settlement which insures that fundamental requirement. U.S. friendship with Greece has been established through generations of cooperation and mutual respect based on shared values and common goals. I intend firmly to carry on and strengthen that relationship.

I cannot, however, carry out this pledge if my ability to act in the current crisis is undercut by restrictions imposed by the Congress. We all seek a peaceful resolution of this problem. We all seek justice for the people of Cyprus. We all seek to maintain the strength and cooperation in our relationship that is a cornerstone to Western security in the Mediterranean.

It is for these reasons that I return this resolution to the Congress and ask that it thoughtfully reconsider its position.

I pledge to continue working closely in partnership with the Congress to enable the United States to play a useful role in helping the parties toward a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus dispute.

I am now signing my veto message, which will be delivered today to the Congress.

Thank you very much.

MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OCTOBER 14

White House press release dated October 14

To the House of Representatives:

At the beginning of my Administration I pledged to work closely and cooperatively with the Congress. I believe I have kept that promise. I have appeared before two joint sessions of the Congress, I have met frequently with the leadership of both Houses, and I have agreed to appear personally before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives—a step no other President has undertaken in more than a century.

These actions are an earnest of my commitment to a new partnership between the legislative and executive branches of our government. They reflect my deep belief that the antagonisms that have too long divided our

[3] H. Rept. 1424, 93d Cong., 2d sess.

nation must be resolved, that hopes for partisan advantage must be put aside, and that we must get on with the business of doing the best we can for our country.

The cooperation I have received from the leadership of the Congress—Democratic and Republican alike—has been truly remarkable. The leaders have advised me and I have listened; I have explained my problems to them and they have responded with understanding and support. For this I am deeply grateful.

It is, therefore, with deep regret that I am returning today without my approval the recently passed Continuing Resolution, H.J. Res. 1131, granting funds for the operation of several departments and agencies and for the temporary continuation of our foreign aid programs. I take this step with great reluctance, but in the belief that I have no other choice.

The Continuing Resolution the Congress has passed and sent to me for signature contains an amendment requiring an immediate cut-off of all military assistance to Turkey. That amendment was passed despite my own public objection to it, and in the face of the unanimous opposition of the bipartisan leadership of both Houses of Congress. It is an act which is harmful even to those it purports to help.

The United States is making every effort to play a useful role in assisting the parties to a resolution of the Cyprus dispute. The Continuing Resolution as amended is entirely destructive of those efforts. Instead of encouraging the parties involved in the Cyprus dispute to return to the negotiating table, an arms cut-off to Turkey could mean the indefinite postponement of meaningful negotiations. Instead of strengthening America's ability to persuade the parties to resolve the dispute, it would lessen our influence on all the parties concerned. It would as well imperil our relationships with our Turkish ally and weaken us in the crucial Eastern Mediterranean. It directly jeopardizes the NATO alliance.

Most tragic of all, an arms cut-off would not help Greece or the Greek Cypriot people who have suffered so tragically over the past several months. We recognize that we are still far from a settlement consistent with the honor and dignity of Greece, and are prepared to exert our influence to that end. But reckless acts that prevent progress toward a Cyprus settlement harm Greece, for it is the Greek government and the Greek Cypriots who have the most to gain from a compromise settlement. And it is they who have the most to lose from continued deadlock.

It is for these reasons that I am vetoing the bill sent to me. I do so because, should this measure become law, it would be impossible for the United States to continue to play any meaningful role in assisting the parties to resolve the Cyprus dispute. We would inevitably be forced to withdraw from the negotiations because the Congress would have taken from us the tools we need to affect the outcome.

My choice, then, is unavoidable; my responsibility clear. I ask that the Congress reconsider its action and send to me a bill that we can all support, a bill that provides the flexibility needed to carry forward the foreign policy of the United States.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *October 14, 1974.*

STATEMENT ISSUED OCTOBER 15

White House press release dated October 15

I am deeply gratified by the House vote sustaining my veto of the continuing resolution. This wise and responsive action will serve the cause of peace on Cyprus while maintaining the strength of our vital security relationships in the eastern Mediterranean.

I want to thank the congressional leadership for its understanding and support. I look forward to working in partnership with the Congress to enhance the ability of the United States to assist the parties in negotiating a peaceful and lasting resolution of the Cyprus dispute and in responding generously to the humanitarian relief needs of the Cypriot people. At the same time, I ask

Congress for prompt action to provide continued funding, without encumbering restrictions, for the operation of several departments and agencies.

MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OCTOBER 17

White House press release dated October 17

To the House of Representatives:

I greatly regret that for the second time I must return without my approval the Continuing Resolution granting funds for the operation of several departments and agencies and for the temporary continuation of our foreign aid programs, H.J. Res. 1163.

My previous veto message and my public statements on this matter have clearly expressed our objectives with respect to the resolution of the Cyprus dispute as well as the dangers posed by legislative restrictions destroying our ability to assist the parties involved. The Congress, despite the best efforts of the bipartisan leaders of both Houses, has for the second time refused to recognize the realities of the situation.

While the language of this new bill is different, its effect is similar to the earlier Continuing Resolution which required my veto on October 14. I need not reiterate the extensive comments which I made at that time and which again compel a veto. The provisions of this bill as they would apply to Turkey would do nothing to bring an end to the suffering of the Cypriot people, would do nothing to encourage the two sides to resolve the dispute peacefully, and would bring a further deterioration of the posture of the NATO alliance in the crucial Eastern Mediterranean. It is for these reasons and those previously stated that I must reluctantly veto the bill before me.

In addition, I am compelled to point out again that should this measure become law, the United States would have lost the ability to play a useful role in this dispute and would in effect have to withdraw from the negotiations. Should the Congress force such an action, it must do so in the clear knowledge that it assumes full responsibility for the situation which would then prevail.

I ask that the Congress not choose that path but that it reconsider its action and provide a bill which will permit the continued execution of United States foreign policy in a constructive and responsible manner.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *October 17, 1974.*

STATEMENT ISSUED OCTOBER 18

White House press release dated October 18

I have signed, with serious reservations, the continuing resolution (H.J. Res. 1167) providing necessary funds after a three-week delay for the operation of several departments and agencies and for the temporary continuation of our foreign aid programs.

Despite two vetoes of similar versions of this bill and my public statements concerning the damage to our diplomacy that would result from its restrictions on military aid to Turkey, Congress has nevertheless persisted by clear majorities in a course which I consider ill advised and dangerous.

The restrictions imposed in this bill on our military assistance to Turkey create serious problems.[1] Without substantial benefit to any

[1] H.J. Res. 1167 (Public Law 93–448, approved Oct. 17) includes the following section:

"SEC. 6. None of the funds herein made available shall be obligated or expended for military assistance, or for sales of defense articles and services (whether for cash or by credit, guaranty, or any other means) or for the transportation of any military equipment or supplies to Turkey until and unless the President certifies to the Congress that the Government of Turkey is in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and any agreement entered into under such Acts, and that substantial progress toward agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus: *Provided*, That the President is authorized to suspend the provisions of this section and said acts if he determines that such suspension will further negotiations for a peaceful solution on the Cyprus conflict. Any such suspension shall be effective only until December 10, 1974, and only if, during that time, Turkey shall observe the ceasefire and shall neither increase its forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any U.S. supplied implements of war."

other country, these restrictions threaten our relations with a country which is a close ally, which is the eastern anchor of an alliance vital to the security of the United States, and which plays a fundamental role in the strategic interests of the United States in the eastern Mediterranean area. It is for these reasons—the national security interests of the United States—that we have been providing military assistance to Turkey.

The problem created by these legislative restrictions with respect to our relations with Turkey are not compensated for in any way by benefits to Greece or the Greek Cypriots. Contrary to the intentions of the supporters of these restrictions, this bill can only hinder progress toward a settlement of the Cypriot dispute, which is so much in the interest of both Greece and the people of Cyprus.

As a result of my vetoes of two earlier versions of this continuing resolution, the Congress has eased the most troublesome of the earlier restrictions. Nevertheless, the risks created by the remaining ones fail to provide compensating benefits. I will, of course, do my best to accomplish the goals which we had set before the Congress took this action. Whatever we can still do to assist in resolving the Cyprus dispute will be done. But if we fail despite our best efforts, those in the Congress who overrode the congressional leadership must bear the full responsibility for that failure.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1974. Report, together with minority views, to accompany S. 1988. S. Rept. 93–1079. August 8, 1974. 54 pp.

Hungarian Claims. Report to accompany H.R. 13261. S. Rept. 93–1095. August 15, 1974. 12 pp.

Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974. Report to accompany S. 3917. S. Rept. 93–1097. August 15, 1974. 47 pp.

International Nuclear Agreement Congressional Review Act. Conference report to accompany S. 3698. H. Rept. 93–1299. August 19, 1974. 4 pp.

Progress Toward Independence of Portuguese Africa

Following is a statement made in Committee IV (Trusteeship) of the U.N. General Assembly on October 11 by U.S. Representative Barbara M. White.

USUN press release 131 dated October 11

I would like to express my government's deep satisfaction with the progress of the process of decolonization in Portuguese-speaking Africa during the past five months —satisfaction that the peoples of these areas are now assuming the full rights and responsibilities of self-government, which are their due, and satisfaction that the provisional government in Portugal has had the wisdom to accept the need for change as well as the courage to implement it.

We are gratified that Portugal's new policy already has borne fruit with Guinea-Bissau's entry into the community of states and membership in this organization. It is our hope that the evolution toward independence in Mozambique will be peaceful and that next year Mozambique, too, will take its seat in this body. We also commend the leaders of Guinea-Bissau and FRELIMO [Liberation Front of Mozambique] for the sense of realism and compromise they have shown in their negotiations with Portugal. We wish them well now as they go about the task of establishing new governmental institutions and policies to execute the will of their peoples.

The existence of several liberation movements in Angola makes the problem of decolonization in that territory more complicated than it was in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. We hope that the movements may resolve their differences expeditiously so that decolonization can proceed and the establishment of the structures of a new self-governing Angola can begin.

Other African governments and leaders have been of invaluable assistance in helping to arrange the negotiations concerning Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. So has the dis-

tinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations, through his timely and statesmanlike good offices. By helping to eliminate persistent sources of tensions, they have served not only Africa but the world. These countries and leaders deserve our hearty thanks for their past efforts and encouragement for the future.

It is indeed to the future that we should look today. The United States hopes to see the process of decolonization continue to a peaceful conclusion with the peoples of the remaining non-self-governing territories in Africa determining their own future. This will best serve the interests of the peoples themselves, of Africa, and of the world. We will do what we can to encourage progress toward this end.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

Agreement amending and extending the international coffee agreement, 1968. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London April 14, 1973. Entered into force October 1, 1973. TIAS 7809.
Notification that constitutional procedures completed: Japan, September 26, 1974.

Copyright

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright convention, as revised, concerning the application of that convention to works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright convention, as revised, concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.
Ratification deposited: Norway, August 13, 1974.

Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.[1]
Acceptance deposited: Cyprus, October 3, 1974.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.[1]
Ratification deposited: Denmark (not applicable to Faroe Islands), October 23, 1974.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 16, 1972.[1]
Ratification deposited: Australia, August 22, 1974.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Dacca October 4, 1974. Entered into force October 4, 1974.

Turkey

Agreement relating to payment to the United States of the net proceeds from the sale of defense articles by Turkey. Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara October 9 and 10, 1974. Entered into force October 10, 1974, effective July 1, 1974.

United Kingdom

Agreement amending the agreement of February 15, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4425, 6619), relating to the establishment and operation of a ballistic missile early warning station at Fylingdales Moor. Effected by exchange of notes at London October 3, 1974. Entered into force October 3, 1974.

[1] Not in force.

Name Index

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: October 21–27

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to October 21 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 400 of October 10.

No.	Date	Subject
*432	10/21	American education delegation visits U.S.S.R.
*433	10/22	Rescheduling of meeting, Study Group on Matrimonial Matters, Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law.
*434	10/23	Joffrey Ballet to tour Soviet Union, Nov. 16–Dec. 14.
†435	10/23	Kissinger: arrival, Moscow.
†436	10/24	Kissinger, Gromyko: exchange of toasts.
*437	10/25	Delegation of Soviet youth to study U.S. elections, Oct. 25–Nov. 7.
†438	10/25	Advisory Committee for Foreign Service Institute, Dec. 2.
†439	10/25	Study Group on Agency, Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, Chicago, Nov. 21.
*440	10/25	Transportation officials to tour U.S.
†441	10/27	Kissinger: departure, Moscow.
†442	10/27	U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint communique.
†443	10/27	Kissinger: arrival, New Delhi.
†444	10/27	Kissinger, Chavan: exchange of toasts, New Delhi.

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.