

**The original documents are located in Box 36, folder “Post Election Report - November, 1992 (3)” of the Frederick T. Steeper Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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## 1992 VOTER TURNOUT

### Turnout Rates

Nationwide, reported turnout in the 1992 presidential election was a remarkable 77%, according to the BQ/MSI post-election study. While voter turnout did rise substantially it did not approach the 77% reported in our post-election study. According to the non-partisan Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, 104 million Americans, representing 55% of the voting-age population, cast ballots in this year's presidential election. Comparing 1988 to 1992, the turnout rate rose four percentage points.

This year's reported turnout showed a slight ideological skew, with Republicans going to the polls in greater numbers (81%) than did Democrats (76%). Voters with extreme ideological positions, both Republican and Democrat, had higher turnout than their more moderate counterparts. When ideology alone is considered, strong conservatives (89%) bested strong liberals (81%), and weak conservatives (77%) outvoted weak liberals (71%). Straight "moderates" had the lowest turnout (67%).

Turnout had a pronounced age component. Older voters turned out in exceptionally strong numbers (89% of seniors, 85% of those aged 40-64), and this dropped only slightly (to 76%) among those aged 25-39. But for voters under 25, reported turnout averaged only 54%.

Men and women had nearly identical turnout rates overall, and this pattern held up for both genders up to the age of 64. The real divergence came at the other end of the generational spectrum; 95% of men over 65 voted compared to 85% of women.

Church-goers -- both Catholic (89%) and Protestant (84%) -- had stronger reported turnouts than those with less consistent religious practices (72% and 78%, respectively). Furthermore, Evangelical and Fundamentalist Christians also had an above-average turnout rate (80%). In addition, those who are married voted much more consistently (84%) than either singles (67%) or other unmarrieds (71%).

Blacks (62%) and lower end voters (59%) had some of the weakest turnout rates nationwide. By contrast, high income (89%) and members of the intelligentsia (88%) turned out in big numbers.

## Non-Voters

The President lost this race *in spite of* high turnout among groups usually central to the Republican coalition. This year, those groups did not stay home --- they defected from the Republican Party. Higher turnout would have likely benefitted Clinton (and Ross Perot). Nearly half (45%) of non-voters would have gone with Clinton had they voted, while only 25% would have voted for the President.

Significantly, nearly one-quarter (24%) of non-voters say they would have voted for Ross Perot --- only one percent fewer than would have voted for the President (25%). Note that this figure is higher than the 19% Perot garnered from *actual* voters. The higher Perot vote among non-voters is a function of the overall younger age of non-voters.

Among non-voters, Democrats remained much more loyal to Clinton (71%) than Republicans were to the President (61%). Core Democrats would have given overwhelming support to Clinton (80%), while only 43% of the GOP Center-Right base would have stayed with the President.

Non-voters tended to be liberal and moderate in their ideological orientation. Both strong (62%) and weak (51%) liberal non-voters would have voted for Clinton in numbers significantly above the national average.

Men (28%) and women (29%) non-voters would have supported the President in relatively equal numbers --- but both of these figures are well below his national average. However, the greatest gender disparity comes in preferences for other candidates. Nearly half of all non-voting women (49%) would have gone with Clinton; only 25% of non-voting men would have. By contrast a full 42% of non-voting men would have lined up behind Ross Perot; only 17% of non-voting women would have done so.

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS  
November 9-17, 1992

	N	DID R VOTE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION?	
		Voter	Non-Voter
TOTAL.....	1100	77%	23%
VOTETYPE			
Behavioral Republican..	268	87%	13%
Ticket-Splitter.....	418	82%	18%
Behavioral Democrat....	299	85%	15%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION			
Strong Republican.....	164	87%	13%
Weak Republican.....	153	84%	16%
Lean Republican.....	162	72%	28%
Independent.....	87	66%	34%
Lean Democratic.....	193	73%	27%
Weak Democratic.....	155	71%	29%
Strong Democratic.....	184	83%	17%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION			
Republican.....	478	81%	19%
Independent.....	87	66%	34%
Democratic.....	533	76%	24%
IDEOLOGY			
Strong Conservative....	110	89%	11%
Weak Conservative.....	541	77%	23%
Moderate.....	79	67%	33%
Weak Liberal.....	148	71%	29%
Strong Liberal.....	223	81%	19%
IDEOLOGY/PARTY			
Consrv Republican.....	370	82%	18%
Mod/Lib Republican.....	108	75%	25%
Independent.....	87	66%	34%
Mod/Consrv Democrat....	280	73%	27%
Lib Democrat.....	252	78%	22%
GOP CENTER-RIGHT BASE			
Center-Right Base.....	578	81%	19%
Else.....	522	73%	27%
CORE DEMOCRATS			
Core Democratic.....	245	76%	24%
Else.....	855	77%	23%

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS  
November 9-17, 1992

	N	DID R VOTE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION?	
		Voter	Non-Voter
<b>GENDER*</b>			
Men.....	448	80%	20%
Women.....	460	79%	21%
<b>AGE*</b>			
18-24.....	106	54%	46%
25-39.....	299	76%	24%
40-64.....	332	85%	15%
65+.....	165	89%	11%
<b>GENDER/AGE*</b>			
Men, 18-39.....	213	71%	29%
Men, 40-64.....	163	86%	14%
Men, 65+.....	71	95%	5%
Women, 18-39.....	193	70%	30%
Women, 40-64.....	169	84%	16%
Women, 65+.....	94	85%	15%
<b>STATUS GROUPS</b>			
High Income.....	311	89%	11%
Intelligentsia.....	88	88%	12%
Middle Class.....	327	77%	23%
Lower End.....	133	59%	41%
Hispanics.....	53	66%	34%
Jews.....	22	84%	16%
Blacks.....	117	62%	38%
<b>GENDER/STATUS</b>			
Men, High Income.....	176	88%	12%
Men, Intelligentsia....	41	93%	7%
Men, Middle Class.....	166	76%	24%
Men, Lower End.....	49	54%	46%
Men, Minorities.....	80	59%	41%
Women, High Income.....	135	91%	9%
Women, Intelligentsia..	47	83%	17%
Women, Middle Class....	161	78%	22%
Women, Lower End.....	83	61%	39%
Women, Minorities.....	112	71%	29%
<b>WORKING WOMEN*</b>			
Working Women.....	242	80%	20%
Non-Working Women.....	218	77%	23%
Else.....	640	76%	24%
<b>MARITAL STATUS*</b>			
Married.....	593	84%	16%
Single.....	188	67%	33%
Else.....	319	71%	29%

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS  
November 9-17, 1992

	N	DID R VOTE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION?	
		Voter	Non-Voter
GENDER/MARITAL STATUS*			
Men, Married.....	303	85%	15%
Men, Single.....	112	67%	33%
Men, Other.....	33	77%	23%
Women, Married.....	290	82%	18%
Women, Single.....	77	67%	33%
Women, Other.....	94	78%	22%
CULTURAL GROUPS			
Northern Protestants...	299	82%	18%
Northern Catholics.....	137	78%	22%
Northern Union.....	155	86%	14%
Southern Whites.....	291	74%	26%
Minorities.....	192	66%	34%
CHURCH ATTENDANCE*			
Protestants, Regular...	252	84%	16%
Protestants, Non-.....	348	78%	22%
Catholics, Regular.....	97	89%	11%
Catholics, Non-.....	140	72%	28%
Seculars.....	38	74%	26%
EVANG./FUND. CHRISTIANS			
Evan./Fund. Christians.	439	80%	20%
Other Protestant.....	271	76%	24%
Else.....	390	75%	25%
POLITICAL REGIONS			
New England.....	64	78%	22%
Mid-Atlantic.....	158	73%	27%
Border South.....	91	68%	32%
Deep South.....	287	73%	27%
East North Central.....	86	89%	11%
West North Central.....	202	81%	19%
Mountains.....	58	81%	19%
Pacific.....	153	79%	21%

\* excludes Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS  
November 9-17, 1992

	N	PREFERENCES OF NON-VOTERS			
		Bush	Clinton	Perot	Else
TOTAL.....	252	25%	45%	24%	6%
VOTETYPE					
Behavioral Republican..	34	56%	20%	24%	
Ticket-Splitter.....	76	23%	41%	32%	5%
Behavioral Democrat...	46	8%	67%	17%	8%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION					
Strong Republican.....	22	95%	5%		
Weak Republican.....	24	54%	30%	16%	
Lean Republican.....	46	49%	9%	39%	3%
Independent.....	29	9%	25%	53%	14%
Lean Democratic.....	53	7%	57%	31%	6%
Weak Democratic.....	45	4%	80%	12%	4%
Strong Democratic.....	32		82%	8%	9%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION					
Republican.....	92	61%	14%	24%	1%
Independent.....	29	9%	25%	53%	14%
Democratic.....	130	4%	71%	19%	6%
IDEOLOGY					
Strong Conservative...	12	39%	37%	24%	
Weak Conservative.....	127	31%	39%	25%	5%
Moderate.....	26	21%	36%	28%	15%
Weak Liberal.....	44	19%	51%	24%	7%
Strong Liberal.....	43	15%	62%	21%	3%
IDEOLOGY/PARTY					
Consrv Republican.....	65	64%	18%	18%	
Mod/Lib Republican....	27	53%	4%	38%	5%
Independent.....	29	9%	25%	53%	14%
Mod/Consrv Democrat...	76	3%	65%	24%	8%
Lib Democrat.....	54	5%	80%	10%	4%
GOP CENTER-RIGHT BASE					
Center-Right Base.....	110	43%	29%	23%	5%
Else.....	142	12%	57%	25%	6%
CORE DEMOCRATS					
Core Democratic.....	59		80%	11%	9%
Else.....	193	33%	34%	28%	5%

**MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS**  
November 9-17, 1992

	N	PREFERENCES OF NON-VOTERS			
		Bush	Clinton	Perot	Else
<b>GENDER*</b>					
Men.....	89	28%	25%	42%	4%
Women.....	98	29%	49%	17%	4%
<b>AGE*</b>					
18-24.....	49	26%	31%	38%	5%
25-39.....	71	27%	33%	37%	2%
40-64.....	49	35%	45%	14%	5%
65+.....	18	21%	55%	17%	6%
<b>GENDER/AGE*</b>					
Men, 18-39.....	62	31%	19%	49%	2%
Men, 40-64.....	22	27%	39%	23%	11%
Men, 65+.....	4		50%	50%	
Women, 18-39.....	57	23%	47%	24%	5%
Women, 40-64.....	27	43%	51%	7%	
Women, 65+.....	14	27%	57%	8%	8%
<b>STATUS GROUPS</b>					
High Income.....	33	32%	23%	39%	5%
Intelligentsia.....	11	30%	35%	35%	
Middle Class.....	75	32%	33%	32%	4%
Lower End.....	55	22%	52%	23%	4%
Hispanics.....	18	41%	37%	12%	10%
Jews.....	4	54%	46%		
Blacks.....	44	3%	75%	11%	10%
<b>GENDER/STATUS</b>					
Men, High Income.....	21	26%	18%	47%	8%
Men, Intelligentsia...	3	42%		58%	
Men, Middle Class.....	39	31%	14%	51%	5%
Men, Lower End.....	23	23%	50%	27%	
Men, Minorities.....	33	19%	57%	14%	10%
Women, High Income....	12	42%	32%	26%	
Women, Intelligentsia.	8	25%	49%	27%	
Women, Middle Class...	36	33%	54%	11%	2%
Women, Lower End.....	32	20%	54%	20%	6%
Women, Minorities.....	33	13%	69%	8%	9%
<b>WORKING WOMEN*</b>					
Working Women.....	47	29%	45%	26%	
Non-Working Women.....	50	29%	54%	9%	8%
Else.....	154	23%	41%	29%	6%
<b>MARITAL STATUS*</b>					
Married.....	96	35%	37%	23%	5%
Single.....	62	22%	29%	43%	5%
Else.....	94	18%	62%	13%	7%

**MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS**  
November 9-17, 1992

	N	PREFERENCES OF NON-VOTERS			
		Bush	Clinton	Perot	Else
GENDER/MARITAL STATUS*					
Men, Married.....	44	35%	24%	35%	6%
Men, Single.....	37	25%	17%	54%	3%
Men, Other.....	8		74%	26%	
Women, Married.....	52	34%	48%	14%	4%
Women, Single.....	25	17%	47%	27%	8%
Women, Other.....	21	30%	55%	14%	
CULTURAL GROUPS					
Northern Protestants..	54	33%	37%	24%	5%
Northern Catholics....	30	28%	34%	38%	
Northern Union.....	22	18%	50%	33%	
Southern Whites.....	74	31%	38%	27%	4%
Minorities.....	66	16%	63%	11%	10%
CHURCH ATTENDANCE*					
Protestants, Regular..	41	44%	35%	13%	7%
Protestants, Non-.....	76	28%	40%	29%	3%
Catholics, Regular....	11	28%	56%	17%	
Catholics, Non-.....	40	22%	30%	48%	
Seculars.....	10		37%	41%	22%
EVANG./FUND. CHRISTIANS					
Evan./Fund. Christians	90	28%	46%	22%	4%
Other Protestant.....	66	28%	48%	15%	9%
Else.....	97	21%	41%	33%	5%
POLITICAL REGIONS					
New England.....	14	15%	70%	9%	6%
Mid-Atlantic.....	42	22%	47%	23%	8%
Border South.....	29	27%	42%	25%	7%
Deep South.....	76	23%	52%	22%	3%
East North Central....	10	44%	45%		11%
West North Central....	38	21%	42%	36%	
Mountains.....	11	43%	7%	33%	16%
Pacific.....	32	31%	30%	29%	10%

\* excludes Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews

# State-by-State Tally

Candidate State	Clinton (D)		Bush (R)		Perot (I)		Electoral Votes		
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%	Clinton	Bush	Perot
Alabama	686,571	41	798,439	48	180,514	11		9	
Alaska	63,498	32	81,875	41	55,085	27		3	
Arizona	525,031	37	548,148	39	341,148	24		8	
Arkansas	498,548	54	333,909	36	98,215	11	6		
California	4,815,039	47	3,341,726	32	2,147,409	21	54		
Colorado	626,207	40	557,706	36	362,813	23	8		
Connecticut	680,276	42	575,778	36	347,638	22	8		
Delaware	125,997	44	102,436	36	59,061	21	3		
District of Columbia	186,301	86	19,813	9	9,284	4	3		
Florida	2,051,845	39	2,137,752	41	1,041,607	20		25	
Georgia	1,005,889	44	989,804	43	307,857	13	13		
Hawaii	178,893	49	136,430	37	52,863	14	4		
Idaho	136,249	29	201,787	43	129,897	28		4	
Illinois	2,379,510	48	1,718,190	35	832,484	17	22		
Indiana	829,176	37	970,457	43	448,431	20		12	
Iowa	583,669	44	503,077	38	251,795	19	7		
Kansas	386,832	34	444,599	39	310,458	27		6	
Kentucky	664,246	45	616,517	42	203,682	14	8		
Louisiana	815,305	46	729,880	42	210,604	12	9		
Maine	261,859	39	207,122	31	205,076	30	4		
Maryland	941,979	50	671,609	36	271,198	14	10		
Massachusetts	1,315,016	48	804,534	29	630,440	23	12		
Michigan	1,858,275	44	1,587,105	37	820,855	19	18		
Minnesota	998,552	44	737,649	32	552,705	24	10		
Mississippi	392,929	41	481,583	50	84,496	9		7	
Missouri	1,053,040	44	811,057	34	518,250	22	11		
Montana	153,899	38	143,702	36	106,869	26	3		
Nebraska	214,064	30	339,108	47	172,043	24		5	
Nevada	185,401	38	171,378	35	129,532	27	4		
New Hampshire	207,264	39	199,623	38	120,029	23	4		
New Jersey	1,366,609	43	1,309,724	41	505,698	16	15		
New Mexico	259,500	46	212,393	38	91,539	16	5		
New York	3,246,787	50	2,241,283	34	1,029,038	16	33		
North Carolina	1,103,716	43	1,122,608	44	353,845	14		14	
North Dakota	98,927	32	135,498	44	70,806	23		3	
Ohio	1,965,204	40	1,876,445	39	1,024,598	21	21		
Oklahoma	473,066	34	592,929	43	319,377	23		8	
Oregon	525,123	43	394,356	32	307,833	25	7		
Pennsylvania	2,224,897	45	1,778,221	36	896,877	18	23		
Rhode Island	198,924	48	121,916	29	94,757	23	4		
South Carolina	476,626	40	573,231	48	138,140	12		8	
South Dakota	124,861	37	136,671	41	73,297	22		3	
Tennessee	933,520	47	840,899	43	199,787	10	11		
Texas	2,279,269	37	2,460,334	40	1,349,947	22		32	
Utah	182,850	26	320,559	46	202,605	29		5	
Vermont	125,803	46	85,512	31	61,510	23	3		
Virginia	1,034,781	41	1,147,226	45	344,852	14		13	
Washington	855,710	44	609,912	31	470,239	24	11		
West Virginia	326,936	49	239,103	36	106,367	16	5		
Wisconsin	1,035,943	41	926,245	37	542,660	22	11		
Wyoming	67,863	34	79,558	40	51,209	26		3	
<b>Total</b>	<b>43,728,275</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>38,167,416</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>19,237,247</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>370</b>	<b>168</b>	<b>0</b>

# NATIONAL PRESIDENT

TOTAL # of RESPONDENTS - 15232

EXIT POLL HORIZONTAL %'s for ALL VOTERS

ALL CLIN BUSH PERO

DEM CHANGE  
FROM '88PRES

ALL RESPONDENTS	43	38	19	
SEX				
MALE	47	41	38	21
FEMALE	53	45	37	17
WHITE				
MEN	48	37	40	22
WOMEN	52	41	41	19
RACE				
WHITE	87	39	40	20
BLACK	8	83	10	7
HISP	2	61	25	14
ASIAN	1	31	55	15
OTHER	1	57	25	18
AGE				
18-29	21	43	34	22
30-44	36	41	38	21
45-59	23	41	40	19
60+	20	50	38	12

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# NATIONAL PRESIDENT

TOTAL # of RESPONDENTS - 15232

EXIT POLL VERTICAL %'s for ALL VOTERS

ALL CLIN BUSH PERO

ALL RESP(Horizontal)	43	38	19	
SEX				
MALE	47	45	47	52
FEMALE	53	55	53	48
WHITE				
MEN	48	46	47	52
WOMEN	52	54	53	48
RACE				
WHITE	87	79	94	94
BLACK	8	16	2	3
HISP	2	3	2	2
ASIAN	1	1	1	1
OTHER	1	1	1	1
AGE				
18-29	21	21	19	24
30-44	36	34	36	39
45-59	23	22	24	23
60+	20	23	21	13

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**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** Fred Steeper  
**FROM:** Daron Shaw  
**DATE:** Thursday, November 12, 1992  
**SUBJECT:** Analysis of State Rankings

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I have compared the explanatory power of models ranking the states' Republican potential based on polling data versus using a theoretical ranking based on past elections for the 1992 presidential election. Multivariate regression analysis shows that the theoretical model explains more of the variance than do rank-orders from poll results in the summer and early fall. However, the poll results from election eve are the best predictor of relative Republican potential.


	Beta	Standard Error	Significance of T-Stat
Ranking Using Nov. 3, 1992 Poll Data	0.50	0.12	0.00
Ranking Combining Theoretical and Final Poll Data	0.32	0.17	0.07
Theoretical Rank Order	0.08	0.09	0.39
Ranking Using July 6, 1992 Poll Data	0.05	0.08	0.49
Ranking Using Sept. 20, 1992 Poll Data	0.06	0.10	0.60
Adjusted R-Squared	0.89		
Standard Error	4.86		

Simplified

# 1996 RANK-ORDER OF STATES BY REPUBLICAN POTENTIAL FOR DIFFERENT ELECTION TYPES

Strictly Party	Mostly Party	Equal Mix (party/Ideology)	Mostly Ideology	Strictly Ideology
Utah	Utah	Mississippi	Alabama	Alabama
Nebraska	Nebraska	Alabama	Mississippi	Mississippi
Idaho	Idaho	Utah	Utah	Georgia
Wyoming	Wyoming	Nebraska	Nebraska	South Carolina
Arizona	Arizona	Idaho	Idaho	Louisiana
Kansas	Kansas	Oklahoma	Oklahoma	Florida
North Dakota	Oklahoma	Arizona	Arizona	Idaho
Alaska	North Dakota	Wyoming	Wyoming	Oklahoma
Oklahoma	Alaska	Kansas	Kansas	Utah
New Hampshire	New Hampshire	Florida	Florida	Nebraska
South Dakota	Colorado	South Carolina	South Carolina	Arizona
Colorado	Indiana	North Dakota	North Dakota	North Carolina
Vermont	South Dakota	Virginia	Virginia	Arkansas
Indiana	Nevada	Indiana	Indiana	Virginia
Nevada	Mississippi	Nevada	Louisiana	Kansas
Montana	Florida	Colorado	Nevada	Wyoming
Iowa	Virginia	New Hampshire	Colorado	Tennessee
Maine	Vermont	Louisiana	New Hampshire	Indiana
Virginia	Montana	Alaska	Alaska	Nevada
Washington	Alabama	Tennessee	Tennessee	North Dakota
Ohio	Iowa	North Carolina	North Carolina	Texas
New Mexico	New Mexico	Montana	Montana	New Mexico
California	Ohio	South Dakota	Georgia	Colorado
Oregon	South Carolina	New Mexico	New Mexico	New Hampshire
New Jersey	Washington	Texas	South Dakota	Montana
Florida	Texas	Vermont	Texas	Kentucky
Michigan	Maine	Georgia	Vermont	Missouri
Illinois	California	Iowa	Arkansas	Illinois
Texas	New Jersey	Ohio	Iowa	Delaware
Wisconsin	Tennessee	Arkansas	Ohio	New Jersey
Connecticut	Illinois	New Jersey	New Jersey	Alaska
Kentucky	Kentucky	Washington	Washington	Maryland
Missouri	Oregon	California	California	West Virginia
Pennsylvania	North Carolina	Kentucky	Kentucky	Ohio
Hawaii	Missouri	Illinois	Illinois	California
Tennessee	Michigan	Missouri	Missouri	Washington
Delaware	Connecticut	Maine	Maine	Pennsylvania
New York	Pennsylvania	Delaware	Delaware	South Dakota
North Carolina	Wisconsin	Pennsylvania	Pennsylvania	Vermont
Maryland	Louisiana	Michigan	Connecticut	Iowa
South Carolina	Delaware	Connecticut	Oregon	Connecticut
Minnesota	Hawaii	Oregon	Michigan	Maine
West Virginia	New York	Wisconsin	Maryland	New York
Mississippi	Maryland	Maryland	Wisconsin	Wisconsin
Louisiana	Arkansas	West Virginia	West Virginia	Michigan
Arkansas	West Virginia	New York	New York	Oregon
Massachusetts	Minnesota	Hawaii	Hawaii	Minnesota
Alabama	Georgia	Minnesota	Minnesota	Hawaii
Rhode Island	Massachusetts	Rhode Island	Rhode Island	Rhode Island
Georgia	Rhode Island	Massachusetts	Massachusetts	Massachusetts
D.C.	D.C.	D.C.	D.C.	D.C.

# **Relationship Between Personal Income and the Vote for President: 1960-1992**



Source: Dept of Commerce; America Votes '92; Congressional Quarterly  
November, 1992

(Y)

December 2, 1992

**Memorandum to Rich Bond, Bob Tester**

**From:** David Hansen

**Re:** Abortion and the Vote for President

*CC: streepm*

**The President's position on abortion cost him a net of one percentage point in total vote support.**

**This is caculated by...**

- 1) Ignoring the 22% of the electorate who make up the hardest core of Democrats and who would contribute virtually nothing to a winning coalition for the President.
- 2) From the remaining 78%, look at the voters who said that Bush's position on abortion "was very much on their minds" when they voted - they make up 33% of the total electorate.
- 3) Among these voters who had the President's position on abortion very much on their minds when they went into the polls on election day were supporters of the President who said that his opposition to abortion made them more likcly to vote for him. They total 11% of the overall electorate. *something missing?*
- 4) Among these voters who had Bush's abortion stand on their mind were those who both said that his opposition to it made them less likely to vote for him and had in fact voted for Clinton or Perot. They total 12% of the overall electorate.
- ✓ 5) Netted out then, among the voters for whom he had a chance to win votes ~~from~~ and who had abortion very much on their minds when then went to polls, President Bush won one less point from those who were more likely to vote for him because of his opposition to abortion than his opponents won from those who were less likely to vote for Bush because of his abortion position.

Here are the details of the percentage calculations:

Step	Description
1) 78%	the share of electorate not strong Democrats or not blacks or Jews who are at least non-Republicans
2) $78\% \times 42\% = 33\%$	one-third of the electorate remain when looking at the 42% who say that Bush's abortion position was very much on their minds when they went to the polls
3) $33\% \times 34\% = 11\%$	Just over a third of this pool of voters said both that Bush's opposition to abortion made them more likely to vote for him, and that they did vote for him.
4) $33\% \times 36\% = 12\%$	Again, over a third of the abortion-voting Bush target voters said that Bush's opposition made them less likely to vote him, and that they had voted for Clinton or Perot.
5) $11\% - 12\% = 1\%$	The President's opposition to abortion won him 11 percentage points overall and cost him 12 for a net loss of one point.

Clinton won 9 points of the anti-Bush abortion vote while Perot won 3 points.

This analysis takes into account voters for whom the President's abortion stand could actually make a difference in their vote. It is not confounded by voters who claim that abortion was their motivation for voting against Bush even though their Democrat orientation is so strong that Bush's abortion position is actually irrelevant to their vote. In this sense it will differ from the media's exit poll analyses (and thus from conventional wisdom) since the survey does not screen for this effect.

This analysis will also differ from the exit poll reports on abortion voting because it has a more direct and unambiguous method of selecting voters that had abortion as an issue on their minds when they went to the polls. The media's exit polls determine abortion-issue voting by looking at voters who chose abortion as the one or two most important from a small list of issues. By doing this, the exit poll's identification of an abortion issue voter becomes a function of the issues offered on the list or the number of other issues on the list the voter felt were important. It is not purely a function of whether the issue was important or not to the voter.

see note

VRs exit poll had 13% who said abortion was important to their vote and Bush won among these voters - 54% to 38%. You need to include this finding in the memo.

Finally, this analysis differs from the exit poll survey in the way it directly measures the direction of abortion voting -- it asks voters whether Bush's opposition to abortion made them more likely or less likely to vote for him. The exit polling did not make measure directly the effect of Bush's position and an analysis would have to depend on inferences from crosstabs of the vote by abortion attitude -- "Clinton won with voters who thought that abortion should be legal in most cases, therefore abortion cost Bush votes." Such inferential analysis cannot prevent intercorrelated effects from obscuring the true motivations of voters. Did Clinton win with voters who thought that abortion should be legal in most cases because of Bush's position on abortion, or because such voters are overwhelmingly Democrat?

see prior  
note

The 1992 Post-Election study asked voters three questions about their abortion attitudes:

A direct measure of issue importance...

*Here are some things people have told us were on their minds when they were deciding on how to vote. Some are reservations people had about the candidate they eventually voted for. We'd like to know if you shared any these thoughts. So, for each one, please tell me if it was something that was VERY MUCH on your mind, PARTLY on your mind, just SLIGHTLY on your mind or NOT AT ALL on your mind in deciding how to vote this year for President...Bush's position on abortion?<sup>1</sup>*

Very much	42%
Partly	15
Slightly	15
Not at all on mind	27
Don't Know/Refused	1

Overall, this issue ranked 13th of 33 tested in the post election study. Its 42% "very much on mind" placed it 10 points behind the most important rated issue, "Bush would not do anything differently" (52% said this was very much on their mind when they voted). It was 29 points more important than the lowest rank issue "Stories about Clinton's extra-marital affairs" (13% said this issue was very on their mind).

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<sup>1</sup>From the RNC's 1992 Post-Election Study, question Q62, page 15.

Among women, however, this issue ranked *second*, and was very much on the mind of 50% of them when they went to the polls. The greater interest in the abortion issue on the part of women is interpreted by conventional wisdom to mean that they are more likely to vote pro-choice than men. However, this is not borne out when the abortion voting analysis described above is run on women only. The President again loses votes among women when everything is netted out, but the loss, at about three-quarters of one percent, is the same proportion as that found for both men and women abortion issue voters.

**A question to measure the direction of abortion issue voting...**

*Did George Bush's opposition to abortion make you more likely or less likely to vote for him? Would that be much (more/less) likely or just somewhat (more/less) likely?<sup>2</sup>*

Much more likely . . . . .	20%
Somewhat more likely . . . . .	8
No difference (volunteered) . . . . .	29
Somewhat less likely . . . . .	18
Much less likely . . . . .	25
Don't know/Refused . . . . .	1

***Collapsed***

More likely . . . . .	27%
Less likely . . . . .	43

One-fifth of the Perot vote may be out of reach of Clinton as he tries to woo them because of his position on abortion. Though they did not vote for the President, 22% of Perot voters said that Bush's opposition to abortion made them more likely to for Bush.

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<sup>2</sup>RNC's Post-Election Study, question Q109, page 21.

And a question asking of voters' abortion issue self-labeling...

*In the debate over abortion policy, do you consider yourself pro life, pro-choice, or somewhere in between? Would that be strongly (pro-life/pro-choice) or just somewhat (pro-life/pro-choice)?<sup>3</sup>*

Strongly pro-life . . . . .	19%
Somewhat pro-life . . . . .	5
In between . . . . .	33
Somewhat pro-choice . . . . .	7
Strongly pro-choice . . . . .	35
Don't know/refused . . . . .	1

*Collapsed*

Pro-life . . . . .	23%
pro-choice . . . . .	43

People may be trending away from seeing themselves as pro-life: 24% called themselves strongly pro-life, and 29% were pro-life overall in an RNC survey of March, 1990.

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<sup>3</sup>RNC's Post-Election Study, question Q120, page 24.

▲ Wayne

33 44 17

day	29	31	31	62
few	34	39	19	<u>29</u>
after	25	45	24	91
During	23	49	23	
at	25	49	19	
de light	41	47	8	
Before light	47	44	5	

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historical by culture?

January 4, 1992

## 1992 POST ELECTION STUDY

## I. COUNTY VOTE ANALYSIS

## A. General Observations

1. Clinton held Democratic coalition
  - a. Clinton's vote share showed slight variation from Dukakis' in '88
  - b. Clinton ended with smaller vote share than Dukakis had in '88
2. Bush suffered an electoral collapse
  - a. Vote share dropped 15 points from 53% to 38%
  - b. Vote share declined consistently across most counties
  - c. Usually Republican suburban vote defected from the Republicans -- going either to Clinton or to Perot.
3. Perot vote came largely from the Reagan coalition
4. Clinton was a significant beneficiary of Perot's presence
5. Any comparison to previous elections is affected by the 10 percent increase in voter turnout.

## B. Major Population Centers

1. Clinton received large majorities in large Northern urban centers, especially those with sizable minority populations.
2. Unlike other recent Democratic nominees, Clinton won a number of traditionally Republican population centers in the Sun Belt and West, where Perot made strong inroads.

## C. Suburbia

1. Suburban vote defected from the Republicans -- going either to Clinton or to Perot.
2. Even where Bush won, his vote tended to be off significantly from 1988, with a large falloff in high growth exurbs.

## D. Rural America

1. Clinton won several counties in Republican rural America, not just in his native South but elsewhere.
2. Bush suffered in rural Republican counties of the Midwest and West as well as in Yankee New England.
3. Significant drop in the Democratic presidential vote in the farm country of the Upper Midwest.
4. In all areas of major-party decline, Perot emerged as a viable vehicle of protest.

## E. Blacks and Minorities

1. Minority voters, especially blacks, were again a reliable source of Democratic votes.
  - a. Black support for Clinton was accompanied by higher turnout.
  - b. In many black-majority counties, Clinton drew a higher percentage of the vote Dukakis in '88's two-way contest.
  - c. Perot's support was weak among black voters.

**F. Industry Specific Regions**

1. Helped by the weak economy, Clinton ran well in blue-collar America and retirement communities.
2. Clinton encountered some resistance among working class voters, consistently drawing a lower share of the vote in these traditional Democratic strongholds than Dukakis had in 1988.
3. Perot was a factor virtually everywhere outside Appalachia and the Deep South.

**G. Economic Recovery and the Vote**

1. Clinton did not do well in the Upper Midwest, where economic conditions were improved.
2. Clinton carried Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin with vote shares some 9 to 11 points below Dukakis'.
2. In this area, Perot appears to have taken more from Clinton than from President Bush.
3. As the economy continues to recover in other areas of the country, the Upper Midwest may provide an early forewarning of the challenges Clinton and the Democrats will face upcoming elections.

## PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

# Republicans Suffer a Knockout That Leaves Clinton Standing

*County vote sampling shows Democrats ran in place, but Bush's lost votes swayed election outcome*

In politics, as in boxing, experts are bound to debate: Did the dethroned champion fight poorly and lose, or was he bested by a truly superior challenger whose time had come?

But in examining the 1992 election, it is hard to escape this conclusion: It was less Bill Clinton's remarkable victory than President Bush's stunning loss.

A review of the results in key counties nationwide clearly shows that, when faced with the strongest third-party challenge in 80 years, the Democrats held their own, while the Republicans suffered an electoral collapse of near-record proportions.

How one reads these results has far-reaching implications, affecting both the interpretation of Clinton's mandate and his chances for re-election.

For Republicans, sorting out what happened in 1992 is a key to deciding legislative strategy now and recapturing the White House in the future.

Bush not only failed to sustain the legendary Ronald Reagan coalition of 1980 and 1984, he failed to hold together the lesser coalition on which he had won the White House in 1988.

Bush's vote share — 53 percent when he won the presidency four years ago — dropped 15 percentage points. It was the worst falloff in history for any president seeking re-election, with the exceptions of Herbert Hoover in 1932 and William Howard Taft in 1912 (who, like Bush, lost in a three-way contest).

Clinton was in many respects a flawed candidate. But he won because he demonstrated enough political skill and mainstream appeal to remain an acceptable alternative to Bush. He might not have taken full advantage of

*By Rhodes Cook*



R. MICHAEL JENKINS

Historians will wonder: Did Bill Clinton win the White House or did George Bush lose it?

Bush's collapse, but he took enough advantage of it to win.

The best evidence for this reading of the election can be seen in a county-by-county analysis of the results. (*Charts, p. 3814-19*)

Election-Day exit polls found that supporters of independent Ross Perot would have divided about evenly between Bush and Clinton if Perot had not been on the ballot (with a substantial minority indicating that they would not have voted at all).

This evidence has been widely cited to suggest that Clinton would have won with about 53 percent had the election been a two-candidate affair. But a look at the actual returns suggests that the Perot vote had a more one-sided impact.

In county after county, Bush suffered a consistent and substantial decline in his percentage share of the vote from 1988 to 1992. By contrast,

the Democratic percentage showed only a slight change up or down.

Only rarely could Clinton attribute his victory to a surge in the Democrats' share of the vote. Rather, it came from a dramatic drop in Republican support, accompanied by a large vote for independent Ross Perot. These numbers suggest the Perot vote was carved almost exclusively out of Bush's hide.

Clinton even trailed some of his party's recent nominees in Democratic blue-collar strongholds throughout the country. He compensated for this by improving on recent Democratic performance in traditional Republican areas of the Sun Belt and suburbia and by carrying handily the unusually strong youth vote (reversing a GOP trend among the young that dated from 1980). But on balance, he wound up with slightly less of the vote, in percentage terms, than Michael S. Dukakis received in 1988.

Consider the following examples:

- In that quintessential hotbed of suburban Sun Belt Republicanism, Orange County, Calif., Bush's vote fell from 68 percent in 1988 to 44 percent this year — a drop of 24 points. Clinton ran 1 point better than Dukakis did four years ago in Orange County (getting 32 percent). Perot drew 24 percent of the vote.

- In that stronghold of blue-collar Reagan Democrats, Macomb County, Mich., Bush's vote dropped 18 points (from 60 percent to 42 percent). Clinton ran 1 point worse than Dukakis (drawing 38 percent). Perot grabbed 20 percent of the vote.

- In that bastion of Republican retirees, Pinellas County (St. Petersburg), Fla., Bush's vote fell 21 points (from 58 percent to 37 percent). Perot drew 24 percent. Clinton's percentage was 3

*star holding 88 Dem vote in 3-way race a victory*

*Bad mirage*

*'88 hide not '92 hide*

points below Dukakis' in 1988, yet his 39 percent share was enough to carry Pinellas, making him the first Democrat to do so since 1964.

• In Centre County, Pa., home of Pennsylvania State University, a rather conservative academic institution where Bush campaigned this fall, the president's vote fell 16 points (from 56 percent to 40 percent). Perot polled 18 percent.

The Democratic percentage slid 1 point from 1988, yet as in Pinellas, Clinton's 42 percent share was still enough to move the county into the Democratic column for the first time since 1964.

• In Lee County (Dixon), Ill., part of the Republican heartland and Reagan's boyhood home, Bush's vote plummeted 23 points (from 66 percent to 43 percent). Clinton ran 2 points better than Dukakis (reaching 36 percent). Perot drew 21 percent of the vote.

• Even in Kennebunkport, Maine, where the Bushes have a vacation home, Bush's vote percentage dropped 25 points from 1988 (from 73 percent to 48 percent). Clinton ran 7 points better than Dukakis (getting 34 percent). Perot received 17 percent of the Kennebunkport vote.

### Limits of Evidence

It cannot be concluded from this examination of the results that Bush would have won if he had had a one-on-one shot at Clinton.

Neither can it be said that Clinton would have greatly expanded his 5-point margin of victory if Perot had not been in the race.

Moreover, while the vast majority of ballots in 1992 were cast by the same people who voted in 1988, any comparison is affected by the 10 percent higher turnout in 1992.

And, by its nature, an analysis of the actual votes deals with the surface of the political ocean; polling can plumb the shifting currents that lie beneath.

Yet even with all these caveats, it seems reasonable to conclude that Clinton was at least a significant beneficiary of Perot's presence in the race and on the ballot.

Just as Democrat Woodrow Wilson was elected in 1912 with 42 percent of the vote because the Republican vote was split between Taft and former President Theodore Roosevelt, Clinton was able to win with 43 percent this year because many voters who had backed Reagan and Bush in the

1980s moved to Perot in 1992.

For the Democrats, this halfway step was almost as good as a vote for Clinton. It enabled the Arkansas governor to win, with a plurality of the vote, in places where recent Democratic presidential nominees have rarely been competitive in traditional two-way contests.

### Making Inroads

With Perot's help, Clinton made deep inroads into strongholds of mod-



R. MICHAEL JENKINS

Many who voted Republican in 1988 switched to independent candidate Ross Perot in 1992.

erate, white-collar Republicanism — suburbs, high-tech areas, retirement communities and Sun Belt population centers from Miami to San Diego.

Democratic nominees regularly win urban centers in the Sun Belt that have large minority populations, such as Fulton County (Atlanta), Ga., and Orleans Parish (New Orleans), La. Dukakis also won Los Angeles County, Calif., in 1988.

But Clinton went far beyond that. He brought Shelby County (Memphis), Tenn., into the Democratic column for the first time since 1980; Dade County (Miami), Fla., and Clark County (Las Vegas), Nev., for the first time since 1976; Jefferson County (Louisville), Ky., and Bernalillo County (Albuquerque), N.M., for the first time since 1964.

The epitome of this phenomenon was San Diego County, Calif., which voted Democratic for the first time since Franklin D. Roosevelt made his last run for president in 1944.

Equally impressive was Clinton's appeal in usually Republican suburbs from Nassau County, N.Y., to San

Bernardino County, Calif. Clinton's ability to compete in the GOP's suburban base enabled him to win seven of the 10 most-populous states (losing North Carolina, Florida and Texas).

Typical was the vote in Pennsylvania, a state Bush had won by 105,000 votes in 1988 by piling up a lead twice that large in Philadelphia's four suburban counties (Bucks, Chester, Delaware and Montgomery).

This year, Clinton won all of these counties but Chester, enabling him to storm to victory statewide by nearly 450,000 votes.

### What Happened?

Former Republican state Chairman Earl Baker, now a state senator from Chester County, ticks off several reasons — none of which has much to do with Clinton.

There were organizational problems, Baker said, beginning with factional strife in Montgomery County (where the once-model Republican Party apparatus was, in effect, without a leader).

On top of that, Baker said, "the Bush campaign in this state was terrible," suffering from field organization so minimal that local headquarters had trouble getting basic campaign material.

Baker said Bush lost votes among Republican women in upscale suburban enclaves with his anti-abortion rights stance.

And the economic slowdown "affected everyone." The Reagan coalition "didn't hold together this time largely because of the economy," Baker said. People in the suburbs were willing to forgive Bush a lot of things but not the perception that he lacked a plan to deal with the economy. "We lost an edge among Republicans."

It was evident that Bush's Pennsylvania campaign was in deep trouble, Baker said, when the president made two trips to Delaware County late in the campaign.

The heavily Republican county should have been Bush's from the start, and his eleventh-hour visits there were a clear indication that his opportunities elsewhere in Pennsylvania were "crimped severely."

### A Question of Loyalty

The suburban edge was one that Republicans could not afford to lose in Pennsylvania, or elsewhere, as Democrats rolled up their usual one-sided margins in large cities, especially those

## The Election of 1912



In 1912, third-party candidate Theodore Roosevelt drew votes from Republican incumbent William Howard Taft and permitted Democrat Woodrow Wilson to win the White House with 42 percent of the popular vote.

with sizable black populations.

In Philadelphia, Baltimore, New York and Washington; as well as Cook County (Chicago), Ill.; Wayne County (Detroit), Mich.; Fulton Co., Ga.; and Orleans Parish, La., nearly complete but unofficial returns showed Clinton with a higher percentage of the vote in this year's three-way race than Dukakis drew in 1988's two-way contest.

That was also true in rural black-majority counties across the South. For example, in Macon County, Ala., site of Tuskegee University, Dukakis got 82 percent of the vote. Nearly complete but unofficial returns this year showed Clinton with 84 percent.

And black support for Clinton was accompanied by higher turnout. Dukakis garnered 6,351 votes in Macon County in 1988; Clinton drew 7,253 votes this year — an increase of 14 percent. Dukakis collected 159,407 votes in majority-black Washington; Clinton got 192,619 — a 21 percent increase.

Clinton's relationship with blacks throughout the campaign was publicly ambivalent. On one hand, blacks had been a cornerstone of Clinton's winning coalitions in Arkansas, and he had courted black leaders across the country while campaigning easily in black neighborhoods. But from time to time throughout the year, he also was at odds with Jesse Jackson, leaving many blacks with the impression that he wanted to keep some distance

from them in order to win white votes.

The black support for Clinton on Nov. 3, says Ronald W. Walters, the chairman of the political science department at Howard University, "was more an anti-Bush than a pro-Clinton vote."

Walters believes that Clinton also benefited from the black turnout generated by a host of appealing black candidates in certain states, such as Illinois (where Carol Moseley Braun won a Senate seat) and Georgia (where three black candidates were elected to Congress).

Walters also noted how a certain scent of victory had hung around Clinton during the fall. "It's one thing to tell people to turn out when there is no hope" of victory, Walters said. "It's another thing when the polls show that the situation can change if you turn out and vote."

### Pockets of Resistance

Other elements of the traditional Democratic coalition were more reserved in their support for Clinton.

Clinton won most blue-collar industrial centers, even swinging into the Democratic column the county that includes the fabled political barometer of Peoria, Ill. The Democratic nominee had not "played in Peoria" since 1964.

Yet unlike the majority-black counties, working-class counties loaded with Reagan Democrats were

less supportive of Clinton than they had been of Dukakis. The Democratic presidential vote percentage was down at least 10 points from 1988 in an array of blue-collar locales, including Fall River, Mass.; Mahoning County (Youngstown), Ohio; Jefferson County (Beaumont), Texas; and Kenosha County, Wis.

Blue-collar workers usually prefer a more strident New Deal-style message than the one Clinton delivered, which seemed styled more for independents and moderate Republicans. In the primaries, these elements of the Democratic base had often preferred the economics propounded by Sen. Tom Harkin of Iowa or former California Gov. Edmund G. "Jerry" Brown Jr.

And blue-collar Democrats often wear conservative social values on their sleeves, reflected in a community life that in many places is centered on ethnic lodges and veterans' organizations such as the American Legion. This is not Clinton's milieu.

At the same time, the 1992 Democratic vote share was higher in blue-collar strongholds where the economy was particularly beleaguered. A case in point is the mill town of Manchester, N.H., the largest city in a state that was probably jolted more severely by the recession than any other in the country.

Manchester had given Reagan 70 percent of its vote in 1984 and Bush 65

percent in 1988. But it voted for Clinton this year. Yet even here, the accent was not on Clinton's own positives.

"It doesn't surprise me at all that Manchester and the rest of the state went for Clinton," says Joe McQuaid, the editor in chief of the Manchester Union Leader. "He couldn't be any worse on the economy than Bush."

### The GOP Heartland

That line of thinking also was apparent in the Republican heartland, although in Russell County, Kan., it was Perot who emerged as the prime alternative to Bush.

Russell County boasts a diversified economy. It grows wheat, but it is also a notable oil-producing center. And it has benefited from economic projects steered its way by a native son, Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole.

Yet the county was economically devastated in the late 1980s by the farm crisis and the collapse in oil prices. According to Allan D. Evans, publisher of the Russell Daily News, the town lost two savings and loans and a bank (the largest between Sanna, Kan., and Denver).

This was bad news for Bush. "Leaders always get blamed if things go bad," Evans said. "There was a lot of disappointment, even among Republicans here, with Bush in his performance."

In this environment, interest in Perot mushroomed among usually Republican-voting small-businessmen, farmers and oil men. They liked the fact, says Evans, that Perot sounded like "a populist," and Kansas, he said,

is a populist state.

"They liked his ideas," Evans said. "They thought he was what we needed."

Dole campaigned several times in Russell, boosting the entire Republican ticket, including Bush. Evans' paper endorsed the president. "As a Republican, I felt I had to go with Bush," Evans said, although "I knew I was going down with the ship when I did."

In the end, Russell County backed the president, but by the narrowest of margins. It was 36 percent for Bush, 34 percent for Perot and 30 percent for Clinton. That was far different from the result the last time a Republican president was seeking re-election. In 1984, Reagan swept the county with 77 percent of the vote.

### Signs of a Countertrend

Neither the closeness of the vote in Russell County nor the Bush-Perot-Clinton order of finish was that unusual for rural America.

Clinton ran much better than recent Democratic nominees in rural portions of his native South, as well as the Dixie-oriented portions of states such as Illinois, Indiana, Missouri and Ohio. But in much of the rest of small-town America, his share of the vote was even lower than Dukakis' share four years ago.

The falloff was particularly severe in the Upper Midwest, where there were signs of a Republican countertrend. Clinton carried Iowa, Minnesota and Wisconsin with a vote percentage from 9 to 11 points below Dukakis'. In Iowa alone, 13 counties that did not vote for Bush in 1988, did in 1992.

Veteran political writer David Yepsen of the Des Moines Register offered several reasons for the countertrend.

For one, he said, the 1988 vote was an aberration. Iowa is not nearly as Democratic a state as it seemed four years ago when only the District of Columbia and Rhode Island gave Dukakis a higher percentage of the vote.

Second, Clinton did not cultivate the state the way Dukakis had. With Harkin in the race for the Democratic nomination this year, Clinton skipped the Iowa caucuses and subsequently was not nearly as well-known across the state as Dukakis (who ran respectably in the Iowa caucuses of 1988).

Third, Perot appeared to take more votes from Clinton than from Bush in Iowa. This seems to be borne out not only by poll numbers but by a quick look at the returns. Here, in contrast to the nation as a whole, the Democratic percentage of the statewide vote fell farther (11 points) than the Republican percentage (6 points), with Perot drawing 19 percent.

Fourth, economic conditions in Iowa had improved since 1988. "We went through the meat grinder," Yepsen said. "Now it's the coasts' turn."

In a sense, that is why Iowa may provide an early look at the challenge that Clinton and his fellow Democrats could face in future elections.

"Go back to Politics 101," Yepsen said. "People favor the Democrats in hard times. When times get better they tend to vote Republican. Democrats [here] can't rely anymore on the economic misery message." ■

## A Methodology

The following charts reflect a sampling of 1992 presidential returns from across the country divided into different categories of voting groups.

In every case, the locale is listed on the left, followed by the percentage of the three-way vote received by Republican President Bush, Democrat Bill Clinton and independent Ross Perot (with the winner's percentage in **boldface**), based on nearly complete but unofficial returns compiled by The Associated Press.

An asterisk (\*) indicates that Bush won the particular county, city or town in 1988 but that Clinton carried it this year.

Following this year's vote percentages is the name of the 1988 winner and his percentage of the total vote, based on official 1988 returns. The last two columns show the increase or decrease in the Democratic and Republican presidential vote from 1988 to 1992, measured by percentage points. Clinton, for instance, received 43 percent of the nationwide vote compared with 46 percent for Democrat Michael S. Dukakis in 1988. Bush drew 38 percent this year compared with 53 percent in 1988. The combined Bush, Clinton and Perot percentages do not always add to 100 percent due to rounding.

	Bush	Clinton	Perot	1988 Winner	Change, 1988-92	
					Democratic	Republican
National Vote	38%	<b>43%</b>	19%	Bush (53%)	-3%	-15%



## Population Centers

Like other recent Democratic nominees, Bill Clinton rolled up sizable majorities in many of the large Frost Belt urban centers, especially those with large minority populations.

Unlike other recent Democratic nominees, Clinton won a number of traditionally Republican population centers in the Sun Belt and West, where Ross Perot often ran well.

### Frost Belt Urban Centers

	Bush	Clinton	Perot	1988 Winner	Change, 1988-92	
					Democratic	Republican
Washington, D.C.	9%	86%	4%	Dukakis (83%)	+3%	-5%
Cook Co. (Chicago)	29	58	13	Dukakis (56)	+2	-15
Marion Co. (Indianapolis)	44	38	18	Bush (59)	-3	-15
Baltimore	17	76	7	Dukakis (74)	+2	-8
Boston	23	63	14	Dukakis (65)	-2	-10
Wayne Co. (Detroit)	27	61	12	Dukakis (60)	+1	-12
Hennepin Co. (Minneapolis)	31	48	21	Dukakis (54)	-6	-13
St. Louis	17	70	13	Dukakis (72)	-2	-10
New York	24	69	7	Dukakis (66)	+3	-9
Cuyahoga Co. (Cleveland)	29	53	18	Dukakis (59)	-6	-11
Franklin Co. (Columbus), Ohio	42	40	18	Bush (60)	+1	-18
Allegheny Co. (Pittsburgh)	30	53	17	Dukakis (60)	-7	-9
Philadelphia	21	69	10	Dukakis (67)	+2	-11
Milwaukee Co., Wis.	33	51	16	Dukakis (61)	-10	-5

### Sun Belt Urban Centers

Jefferson Co. (Birmingham), Ala.	51%	42	8	Bush (58%)	0%	-7%
Dade Co. (Miami)	43	47 *	10	Bush (55)	+3	-12
Orange Co. (Orlando), Fla.	46	35	19	Bush (68)	+4	-22
Fulton Co. (Atlanta)	33	57	9	Dukakis (56)	+1	-10
Jefferson Co. (Louisville), Ky.	38	49 *	13	Bush (52)	+1	-14
Orleans Parish (New Orleans)	26	68	5	Dukakis (64)	+4	-9
Hinds Co. (Jackson), Miss.	48	46	6	Bush (56)	+3	-8
Mecklenburg Co. (Charlotte), N.C.	43	43	14	Bush (59)	+3	-16
Oklahoma Co. (Oklahoma City), Okla.	49	29	22	Bush (64)	-7	-15
Shelby Co. (Memphis), Tenn.	42	52 *	6	Bush (51)	+4	-9
Dallas Co., Texas	39	35	26	Bush (58)	-6	-19
Harris Co. (Houston)	41	40	19	Bush (57)	-2	-16

### Far West Urban Centers

Maricopa Co. (Phoenix), Ariz.	41%	33%	26%	Bush (65%)	-1%	-24%
San Francisco	18	73	9	Dukakis (73)	0	-8
Los Angeles Co., Calif.	29	53	18	Dukakis (52)	+1	-18
San Diego Co., Calif.	35	38 *	26	Bush (60)	0	-25
Denver	26	57	17	Dukakis (61)	-4	-11
Honolulu Co., Hawaii	39	47	14	Dukakis (53)	-6	-7
Clark Co. (Las Vegas)	33	42 *	25	Bush (56)	+1	-23
Bernalillo Co. (Albuquerque), N.M.	39	46 *	16	Bush (54)	+1	-15
Multnomah Co. (Portland), Ore.	23	56	21	Dukakis (62)	-6	-13
Salt Lake Co. (Salt Lake City)	38	32	30	Bush (59)	-7	-21
King Co. (Seattle)	27	52	22	Dukakis (54)	-2	-18



## The Suburbs

One of the major reasons why Arkansas Gov. Bill Clinton won the election was that the usually Republican suburban vote defected from the GOP — going either to Clinton or to Ross Perot.

Among the major suburban counties that landed in the Democratic column for the first time since 1964 were the counties of Riverside, San Bernardino and Ventura in California; Baltimore County, Md.; St. Louis County,

Mo.; Nassau and Westchester counties in New York; and Bucks, Delaware and Montgomery counties in Pennsylvania.

Even where President Bush won, his vote tended to be off significantly from 1988, with an especially large falloff in high-growth exurbs.

Perot tended to make his best showing in the newer suburbs.

### Democratic-Oriented Suburbs

	Bush	Clinton	Perot	1988 Winner	Change, 1988-92	
					Democratic	Republican
Adams Co., Colo.	30%	44%	26%	Dukakis (53%)	-9%	-16%
Marin Co., Calif.	23	59	18	Dukakis (59)	0	-17
Montgomery Co., Md.	33	55	12	Dukakis (52)	+3	-15
Prince George's Co., Md.	24	66	9	Dukakis (60)	+6	-15
Brookline, Mass.	18	72	10	Dukakis (73)	-1	-8
Anoka Co., Minn.	31	42	27	Dukakis (55)	-13	-13
Arlington Co., Va.	32	58	10	Dukakis (54)	+4	-13

### Republican-Oriented Suburbs

Orange Co., Calif.	44%	32%	24%	Bush (68%)	+1%	-24%
Jefferson Co., Colo.	37	36	26	Bush (56)	-6	-19
Darien, Conn.	59	27	14	Bush (73)	+1	-14
Du Page Co., Ill.	48	31	21	Bush (69)	+1	-21
Johnson Co., Kan.	44	31	25	Bush (63)	-5	-19
Jefferson Parish, La.	54	35	11	Bush (67)	+3	-13
Macomb Co., Mich.	43	38	20	Bush (60)	-1	-17
Oakland Co., Mich.	44	39	17	Bush (61)	+1	-17
Rankin Co., Miss.	68	23	10	Bush (78)	+2	-10
St. Louis Co., Mo.	35	44 *	20	Bush (55)	-1	-20
Bergen Co., N.J.	44	42	13	Bush (58)	+1	-14
Nassau Co., N.Y.	41	47 *	13	Bush (57)	+5	-16
Washington Co., Ore.	34	41 *	25	Bush (52)	-5	-18
Lexington Co., S.C.	61	27	13	Bush (78)	+6	-17
Montgomery Co., Pa.	40	43 *	17	Bush (60)	+4	-20
Collin Co., Texas	47	19	34	Bush (74)	-6	-27
Fairfax Co., Va.	44	42	14	Bush (61)	+4	-17
Waukesha Co., Wis.	51	28	21	Bush (61)	-11	-10

### High-Growth Exurbs

San Bernardino Co., Calif.	37%	39% *	23%	Bush (60%)	+1%	-23%
Gwinnett Co., Ga.	54	29	16	Bush (76)	+5	-22
McHenry Co., Ill.	47	28	25	Bush (70)	-1	-23
Derry, N.H.	39	33	28	Bush (67)	+2	-28
Hunterdon Co., N.J.	47	29	24	Bush (69)	-1	-22
Prince William Co., Va.	48	36	16	Bush (67)	+4	-19



Bill Clinton won several counties in usually Republican rural America, not just in his native South but elsewhere. Bush suffered particularly in rural Republican counties of the Midwest and West as well as in Yankee New England.

Yet there was also a significant drop in the Democratic presidential vote in the farm country of the Upper Midwest. In all these areas of major-party decline, Perot emerged as a viable vehicle of protest.

### Yankee Republican

	Bush	Clinton	Perot	1988 Winner	Change, 1988-92	
					Democratic	Republican
Litchfield, Conn.	41%	35%	24%	Bush (59%)	-4%	-18%
Rockland, Maine	35	33	32	Bush (60)	-6	-25
Marblehead, Mass.	38	52 *	10	Bush (51)	+4	-13
Lancaster, N.H.	47	35	18	Bush (71)	+6	-24
St. Johnsbury, Vt.	37	38 *	25	Bush (62)	+1	-25

### Republican Farm/Ranch

Madison Co., Idaho	64%	10%	27%	Bush (85%)	-4%	-21%
Lee Co. (Dixon), Ill.	43	36	21	Bush (66)	+2	-23
Sioux Co., Iowa	73	15	12	Bush (77)	-7	-4
Russell Co., Kan.	36	30	34	Bush (61)	-7	-25
Gasconade Co., Mo.	43	31	26	Bush (72)	+3	-29
Arthur Co., Neb.	56	7	37	Bush (78)	-15	-22
Auglaize Co., Ohio	52	25	24	Bush (73)	-1	-21
Malheur Co., Ore.	50	24	25	Bush (67)	-7	-17
Snyder Co., Pa.	55	23	21	Bush (77)	0	-22
Green Lake Co., Wis.	41	29	30	Bush (63)	-7	-22

### Mountain Republican (Ozark and Appalachian)

Benton Co., Ark.	49%	37%	14%	Bush (71%)	+9%	-22%
Jackson Co., Ky.	75	17	8	Bush (85)	+2	-10
Garrett Co., Md.	54	26	19	Bush (72)	-2	-18
Mitchell Co., N.C.	63	25	13	Bush (77)	+2	-14
Fulton Co., Pa.	51	32	17	Bush (66)	-1	-15
Johnson Co., Tenn.	57	32	10	Bush (73)	+6	-16
Rockingham Co., Va.	61	25	14	Bush (73)	-1	-12
Grant Co., W.Va.	64	23	12	Bush (78)	+1	-14

### Rural Southern White

Geneva Co., Ala.	49%	37%	14%	Bush (67%)	+5%	-18%
Holmes Co., Fla.	49	28	23	Bush (72)	0	-23
Todd Co., Ky.	40	45 *	15	Bush (58)	+4	-18
Plaquemines Parish, La.	45	40	15	Bush (59)	+1	-14
Neshoba Co., Miss.	61	31	8	Bush (68)	-1	-7
Harnett Co., N.C.	47	41	13	Bush (57)	-2	-10
Hughes Co., Okla.	28	52	21	Dukakis (61)	-9	-10
Perry Co., Tenn.	24	65	11	Dukakis (58)	+7	-17
Panola Co., Texas	37	42 *	20	Bush (53)	-5	-16

### Rural Midwestern Democrat

Carroll Co., Iowa	36%	40%	23%	Dukakis (59)%	-19%	-4%
Big Stone Co., Minn.	31	47	22	Dukakis (58)	-11	-11
Charles Mix Co., S.D.	38	40	22	Dukakis (53)	-13	-9
Pepin Co., Wis.	31	47	22	Dukakis (59)	-12	-9



## Minorities

Minority voters, especially blacks, were again a reliable source of Democratic votes. In many black-majority counties, Bill Clinton drew a higher percentage of the vote in

this year's three-way race than Michael S. Dukakis did in 1988's two-way contest. Ross Perot's support was especially weak among black voters.

### Rural Black Majority

	Bush	Clinton	Perot	1988 Winner	Change, 1988-92	
					Democratic	Republican
Macon Co., Ala.	13%	84%	3%	Dukakis (82%)	+2%	-4%
Lee Co., Ark.	26	68	6	Dukakis (80)	+8	-13
Hancock Co., Ga.	15	79	6	Dukakis (75)	+4	-9
Jefferson Co., Miss.	16	80	4	Dukakis (79)	+1	-5
Charles City Co., Va.	24	67	8	Dukakis (68)	-1	-7

### Hispanic Majority

Santa Cruz Co., Ariz.	38%	44% *	18%	Bush (50%)	-5%	-12%
Imperial Co., Calif.	39	44 *	17	Bush (55)	0	-16
Costilla Co., Colo.	21	68	11	Dukakis (71)	-3	-8
Mora Co., N.M.	28	64	8	Dukakis (63)	+1	-8
Starr Co., Texas	13	83	4	Dukakis (85)	-2	-2

### Indian Majority

Apache Co., Ariz.	26%	63%	11%	Dukakis (62%)	+1%	-11%
Big Horn Co., Mont.	32	49	19	Dukakis (56)	-7	-11
McKinley Co., N.M.	30	61	8	Dukakis (62)	-1	-7
Shannon Co., S.D.	14	78	8	Dukakis (82)	-4	-3
San Juan Co., Utah	50	36	14	Bush (62)	-1	-12



## Personal Connections

Bill Clinton not only believes "in a place called Hope," he carried it — as well as the counties containing Hot Springs, Fayetteville, Little Rock and other spots important in his Arkansas upbringing. President Bush was not so fortunate. His birthplace of Milton, Mass., defected to Clinton, and his vote was down sharply from 1988 in

Kennebunkport, Maine; Greenwich, Conn., and Midland County, Texas — all places he has called home.

Ross Perot finished third in the Texas counties that contain his birthplace of Texarkana and his present home of Dallas. The GOP won the home county of Vice President Dan Quayle; the Democrats won that of Sen. Al Gore.

	Bush	Clinton	Perot	1988 Winner	Change, 1988-92	
					Democratic	Republican
<b>Clinton</b>						
Hempstead Co. (Hope), Ark.	27%	62% *	12%	Bush (50%)	+13%	-23%
Garland Co. (Hot Springs), Ark.	37	54 *	10	Bush (61)	+18	-24
Washington Co., (Fayetteville — Univ. of Ark.), Ark.	43	46 *	11	Bush (64)	+12	-21
Pulaski Co. (Little Rock), Ark.	35	59 *	6	Bush (55)	+15	-20
<b>Bush</b>						
Milton, Mass.	36	44 *	19	Bush (51)	-4	-15
Greenwich, Conn.	49	37	14	Bush (66)	+4	-17
Midland Co., Texas	59	22	19	Bush (78)	0	-19
Kennebunkport, Maine	48	34	17	Bush (73)	+7	-25
<b>Perot</b>						
Bowie Co. (Texarkana), Ark.	39	39 *	22	Bush (55)	-5	-16
<b>Quayle and Gore</b>						
Huntington Co., Ind.	57	24	18	Bush (75)	-1	-18
Smith Co. (Carthage), Tenn.	21	72	7	Dukakis (54)	+18	-25

## The Cultural Elite

From the world of academe to artists' colonies, Bill Clinton dominated the vote of the nation's cultural elite.

Democrats usually roll up large majorities in liberal resorts such as Aspen, Colo., and communities that host prestigious private colleges such as Cambridge, Mass. But Clinton also won several Republican-oriented counties with large state universities that Bush had

carried in 1988.

Ross Perot did not run particularly well in the environs of Eastern elite private colleges or in other college towns with a liberal reputation, such as Charlottesville, Va. He ran better in locales with less-liberal state universities. He also exceeded his national average in some of the high-tech communities and artists' colonies of the West.

### Academic Influence

#### Private Colleges

	Bush	Clinton	Perot	1988 Winner	Change, 1988-92	
					Democratic	Republican
Amherst, Mass. (Amherst)	14%	73%	12%	Dukakis (74%)	-1%	-10%
Cambridge, Mass. (Harvard, MIT)	14	75	10	Dukakis (77)	-2	-7
Hanover, N.H. (Dartmouth)	26	63	11	Dukakis (59)	+4	-14
Tompkins Co., N.Y. (Cornell)	28	55	16	Dukakis (58)	-3	-13
Middlebury, Vt. (Middlebury)	27	57	16	Dukakis (57)	0	-15

#### Public Universities (Original Establishment)

Alachua Co., Fla. (Univ. of Florida)	30%	50% *	20%	Bush (50%)	+1%	-20%
Champaign Co., Ill. (Univ. of Illinois)	36	46 *	18	Bush (52)	-1	-16
Johnson Co., Iowa (Univ. of Iowa)	27	56	17	Dukakis (64)	-8	-8
Washtenaw Co., Mich. (Univ. of Michigan)	30	54	16	Dukakis (52)	+2	-17
Boone Co., Mo. (Univ. of Missouri)	34	45	21	Dukakis (51)	-6	-14
Charlottesville, Va. (Univ. of Virginia)	32	59	9	Dukakis (56)	+3	-11
Dane Co., Wis. (Univ. of Wisconsin)	30	55	15	Dukakis (60)	-5	-9

#### Public Universities (Land Grant Colleges)

Riley Co., Kan. (Kansas State)	39%	37%	25%	Bush (56%)	-6%	-17%
Oktibbeha Co., Miss. (Mississippi State)	49	44	7	Bush (58)	+2	-9
Benton Co., Ore. (Oregon State)	30	48	22	Dukakis (54)	-6	-14
Centre Co., Pa. (Penn State)	40	42 *	18	Bush (56)	-1	-16

### High-Tech Areas

Santa Clara Co., (Silicon Valley) Calif.	28%	50%	22%	Dukakis (51%)	-1%	-19%
Boulder Co., Colo.	27	51	22	Dukakis (53)	-2	-18
Los Alamos, N.M.	41	37	22	Bush (65)	+5	-24
Orange Co. (Research Triangle), N.C.	29	59	12	Dukakis (60)	-1	-10
Anderson Co. (Oak Ridge), Tenn.	41	48 *	11	Bush (61)	+9	-20

### Artists' Colonies

Mendocino Co., Calif.	22%	51%	27%	Dukakis (55%)	-4%	-20%
Pitkin Co. (Aspen), Colo.	23	52	26	Dukakis (54)	-2	-21
Provincetown, Mass.	11	75	14	Dukakis (76)	-1	-11
Taos Co., N.M.	20	66	13	Dukakis (68)	-2	-11



Helped by the sluggish economy, Bill Clinton ran well in blue-collar America and retirement communities. Yet he encountered some resistance among working-class voters, consistently drawing a lower share of the

vote in these traditional Democratic strongholds than Dukakis had in 1988.

Ross Perot was a factor virtually everywhere outside Appalachia and the Deep South.

### Smaller Industrial

	Bush	Clinton	Perot	1988 Winner	Change, 1988-92	
					Democratic	Republican
Etowah Co. (Gadsden), Ala.	41%	49% *	10%	Bush (50%)	-1%	-9%
Pueblo Co., Colo.	29	54	18	Dukakis (62)	-8	-9
Waterbury, Conn.	36	41 *	23	Bush (51)	-5	-15
Peoria Co., Ill.	38	47 *	15	Bush (51)	-1	-13
Calcasieu Parish (Lake Charles), La.	36	49	16	Dukakis (53)	-4	-10
Lowell, Mass.	27	45	28	Dukakis (53)	-8	-18
Genesee Co. (Flint), Mich.	24	53	23	Dukakis (59)	-6	-16
Manchester, N.H.	40	41 *	19	Bush (65)	+7	-25
Rowan Co. (Salisbury), N.C.	50	34	17	Bush (66)	0	-16
Mahoning Co. (Youngstown), Ohio	25	52	23	Dukakis (63)	-11	-11
Luzerne Co. (Wilkes-Barre), Pa.	39	45 *	17	Bush (50)	-5	-11
Kenosha Co., Wis.	32	45	23	Dukakis (58)	-13	-10

### Mining Heritage

Greenlee Co., Ariz.	37%	43%	20%	Dukakis (52%)	-9%	-9%
Shoshone Co., Idaho	22	49	29	Dukakis (60)	-11	-16
Pike Co., Ky.	29	62	9	Dukakis (62)	0	-9
Gogebic Co., Mich.	31	52	17	Dukakis (59)	-7	-9
Deer Lodge Co. Mont.	16	61	23	Dukakis (72)	-11	-10
Belmont Co., Ohio	26	56	18	Dukakis (61)	-5	-12
Carbon Co., Utah	24	53	24	Dukakis (64)	-11	-11
McDowell Co., W.Va.	20	73	7	Dukakis (74)	-1	-5

### Fishing/Logging

Columbia Co., Ore.	27%	43%	29%	Dukakis (57%)	-14%	-14%
Pacific Co., Wash.	24	50	25	Dukakis (61)	-11	-14

### Oilpatch

Lafayette Parish, La.	46%	41%	13%	Bush (59%)	+2%	-13%
Washington Co. (Bartlesville), Okla.	48	28	24	Bush (67)	-4	-19
Ector Co. (Odessa), Texas	51	31	19	Bush (68)	-1	-17

### Military Influence/Aerospace

Madison Co. (Huntsville), Ala.	47%	37%	16%	Bush (67%)	+5%	-20%
El Paso Co. (Colorado Springs), Colo.	52	28	21	Bush (70)	-1	-18
Groton, Conn.	32	42 *	26	Bush (53)	-4	-21
Brevard Co. (Cape Canaveral), Fla.	43	31	25	Bush (70)	+2	-27
Escambia Co. (Pensacola), Fla.	49	32	19	Bush (68)	+1	-19
Hardin Co. Ky. (Fort Knox)	48	37	16	Bush (64)	+2	-16
Bell Co. Texas (Fort Hood)	46	34	20	Bush (62)	-3	-16
Virginia Beach, Va.	50	32	18	Bush (69)	+2	-19

### Resort/Retirement

Baxter Co., (Mountain Home), Ark.	36%	45% *	19%	Bush (63%)	+10%	-27%
Palm Beach Co., Fla.	35	46 *	19	Bush (56)	+2	-21
Pinellas Co. (St. Petersburg), Fla.	37	39 *	24	Bush (58)	-3	-21
Blaine Co. (Sun Valley), Idaho	28	36 *	36	Bush (54)	-7	-26
Moore Co. (Pinehurst), N.C.	47	36	17	Bush (65)	+2	-18
Beaufort Co. (Hilton Head), S.C.	47	37	16	Bush (65)	+2	-18
San Juan Co., Wash.	26	48	26	Dukakis (52)	-4	-20
Teton Co. (Jackson), Wyo.	38	34	28	Bush (61)	-3	-23

# Market Strategies

Frederick T. Steeper

## MEMORANDUM

TO: Post Election Analysis Participants  
FROM: Fred  
DATE: November 13, 1992  
SUBJECT: Tasks for Post Election Analysis

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- I. State results
  - A. Color maps (Blunt)
    - 1. Winners
    - 2. Perot vote
    - 3. Bush margin
  - B. Electoral strategy analysis (Shaw)
  - C. State survey accuracy (Hansen)
- II. County Results in Key States (Pew)
- III. Media Analysis (Hansen)
  - A. Print
  - B. Television news
- IV. Trip Analysis (Hansen)
- V. Exit Polls (Goulet)
  - A. National
  - B. States
- VI. Pre-election Survey Summary
- VII. Pre-election Focus Group Summary
  - A. Early focus groups

- B. Advertising focus groups
- C. Debate focus groups (Pew)
- D. Major speech focus groups: SOTU, Acceptance, Economic Club

VIII. Post Election Survey (Goulet, Shaw)

## POST-ELECTION ANALYSIS

*x = done*

### I. Standard Questions

- CLH 1. Question Results
- CB/CLH 2. Track (Q1): trend lines (1972-1992, 1988-1992)
- CLH 3. Job Performance (Q2): standard graphs
- ? 4. Most Important Problem (Q3): before and after the election
- X DRS 5. Candidate Thermometer Ratings (Q4-Q8): association w/ vote, before and after election

### II. Analysis of the Vote

- X DRS 1. THE VOTE (Q29): by standard subgroups
- X DRS 2. Analysis of who Bush could have got
  - a. voters who did NOT say they'd never vote Bush (Q48)
  - b. Clinton voters who said they were somewhat/very close to voting Bush (Q41)
  - c. Perot voters who said they were somewhat/very close to voting Bush (Q45)
  - d. screen out those who said they did not have a second choice (Q38, Q44)
  - e. create variable and run by standard subgroups
- X DRS 3. The Perot Vote
  - a. Bush voters who considered defecting (Q33, Q34)
  - b. Clinton voters who considered defecting (Q39, Q40)
  - c. For Perot, or Against Bush/Clinton (Q43)
  - d. Second Choice (Q44)
  - e. Who would they never vote for (Q48)
- ? 4. The Campaign and the Vote
  - a. what campaign events were most important (combine Q22, Q24)
  - b. who did they help (combine Q23, Q25)
  - c. evaluation of the effectiveness of getting the message out (Q26-Q28)  
(compare "Nothing/DK/NA" responses for each candidate on the message question)
- ? 5. Participation  
(Tables done)
  - a. Percent of Non-Voters (Q12)
  - b. why they didn't vote (Q13)
  - c. previous voting history (Q14)
  - d. non-voter preferences (Q15)
    - i. run "voter/non-voter" by standard subgroups  
(focus on turnout among conservatives, other elements of '88 coalition)
    - ii. screen for non-voters, run preferences by a few large subgroups
- X CTP 6. Congressional Voting and Coattails
  - a. straight-ticket voting (Q20)
  - b. Congressional Voting (Q21)

### III. Issues

- X DRS 1. The Economy
  - a. most important issue (Q3)
  - b. economy v. a battery of other issues (Q51, Q52)
  - c. candidate handling (Q88)

- d. perception of a plan: Bush (Q103-Q105), Clinton (Q106-Q108)  
(crosstab perception of a plan by the vote)
- e. does the economy overwhelm all else?

DRS/? 2. Other Issues

- x a. Arms for Hostages (Q53, Q54)
- x b. Character (Q57, Q58, Q59, Q64, Q95, Q93, Q97)
- x c. Arkansas Record (Q60)
- x d. Taxes/Spending (Q63, Q65, Q80, Q83, Q90)
- x e. Change (Q56, Q75, Q76, Q79, Q66, Q61, Q72, Q77, Q102)
- x f. Getting Things Done (Q67, Q68, Q78, Q81, Q101)
- g. International Crises/ Foreign Affairs (Q73, Q74, Q92, Q99)
- h. Bush "out of touch/uncaring" (Q97, Q95)
- i. the Vice-Presidency (Q69, Q70, Q110, Q7, Q8)
- j. Hillary (q71)
- k. Perot (Q84, Q85)
- l. GOP Convention too right-wing (Q82)
- m. Abortion (Q62, Q109)

DJH IV. Retrospective Evaluations and the Vote

1. Country, 4 years ago v. today (Q111)
2. Personally, 4 years ago v. today (Q112)
3. Country's economy 1 year ago v. today (Q113)
4. Personal economy 1 year ago v. today (Q114)
5. Recession? (Q115)

? V. Risk and the Vote

1. Riskiness of candidates (Q49)
2. Why do you consider Bush/Clinton risky? (Q50a, Q50b)

x DRS VI. The Political Parties

1. Thermometer Ratings of the Parties (Q9, Q10)
2. Which party do you have more confidence in to solve problems? (Q11)
3. Party Issue Handling (Q121-Q126)
4. The Republican Coalition: 1992 and Beyond
  - a. create fiscal conservatism variable (Q115W-Z)\*  
(factor and correlate responses; construct a single measure)
  - b. create social conservatism scale (Q116-Q119)\*\*  
(sum and divide by 4)
  - c. run the two new variables by the vote to see where Bush was hurt
  - d. run the variables by each other to get a feel for strains in the GOP
  - e. run the variables by subgroups to determine who could be a Republican

\* Conservative responses are as follows: Q115W=1, Q115X=2, Q115Y=1, Q115Z=2

\*\* Conservative responses are as follows: Q116=10, Q117=10, Q118=0, Q119=0

## VII. Miscellaneous

- DRS/CLH  
GG
1. Up-date Republican Presidential Coalition table for 1992
  2. compare exit polls to survey data to determine who voted for who

## **BUSH/QUAYLE 1992 FOCUS GROUP RESEARCH**

### **I. FOCUS GROUPS**

- A. Towson, Maryland  
Birmingham, Alabama  
Irvine, California  
  
January 9–15, 1992
- B. Towson, Maryland  
Atlanta, Georgia  
  
February 20, 1992
- C. Warren, Michigan  
Van Nuys, California  
Charlotte, North Carolina  
  
April 25–29, 1992
- D. Fresno and Riverside, California  
  
June 3–4, 1992
- E. Paramus, New Jersey  
Columbus, Ohio  
  
June 10–11, 1992
- F. Tulsa, Oklahoma  
Dayton, Ohio  
  
June 24–25, 1992
- G. Stamford, Connecticut  
  
July 14, 1992
- H. Atlanta, Georgia  
  
August 6, 1992
- I. Towson, Maryland  
  
August 12, 1992

J. Farmington Hills, Michigan

August 15, 1992

K. Cleveland, Ohio

August 29, 1992

L. Farmington Hills, Michigan

September 12, 1992

M. Cleveland, Ohio

September 19, 1992

N. Milwaukee, Wisconsin

October 3, 1992

## II. **PERCEPTION ANALYZER FOCUS GROUPS**

A. State of the Union Address  
Chicago, Illinois

January 28, 1992

B. Advertising Test  
Perrysburg, Ohio

July 8, 1992

C. Advertising Test  
Farmington Hills, Michigan

July 28, 1992

D. Republican Convention Acceptance Speech  
Chicago, Illinois

August 20, 1992

E. Detroit Economic Club Speech  
Teanick, New Jersey

September 24, 1992

F. Presidential Debate  
Perrysberg, Ohio

October 11, 1992

G. Vice-Presidential Debate  
Southfield, Michigan

October 13, 1992

H. Presidential Debate  
St. Louis, Missouri

October 15, 1992

I. Presidential Debate  
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

October 19, 1992

<b>Most Important Problem Over Time<sup>1</sup></b> <b>(1948-1992)</b>			
<b>Year</b>	<b>Most Important Problem</b>	<b>Second Most Important Problem</b>	<b>Third Most Important Problem</b>
1948	Inflation	Marshall Plan	Soviets
1952	Korean War	Gov't corruption	Inflation
1956	Threat of war	Civil Rights	Cost of living
1960	Missile gap	Foreign problems	Economic problems
1964	Racial problems	Foreign problems	Unemployment
1968	Vietnam	Race relations	Crime
1972	Vietnam	Inflation	Drugs
1976	Cost of living	Unemployment	Crime
1980	Foreign problems	Cost of living	Energy problems
1984	Threat of war	Unemployment	Gov't spending
1988	Federal deficit	Economic problems	Drugs
1992	Unemployment	Economic problems	Federal deficit

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<sup>1</sup>Source Gallup Poll, 1948 to 1988, MSI/Post-Election Poll 1992.

**CAMPAIGN VISITS TO CITIES BY PRESIDENTIAL/VICE-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES**  
(September 01-November 03, 1992)

	Bush	Quayle	Clinton	Gore	Total
Washington, D.C.	17	20	1	9	47
Columbus	3	3	2	4	12
Detroit	5	1	3	1	10
Chicago	2	2	3	2	9
Little Rock	0	0	7	2	9
Atlanta	2	1	1	4	8
St. Louis	4	1	3	0	8
Denver	1	1	2	3	7
Kansas City	1	1	3	2	7
Milwaukee	1	2			
Houston	3	1			
Albuquerque	2	0			
Springfield	2	2			
Louisville	2	0			
New York City	1	0			
Baton Rouge	1	0			
Billings	1	2			
Carthage	0	0			
Cincinnati	1	0			
Grand Rapids	2	0			
Los Angeles	0	2			
New Orleans	1	0			
Toledo	1	1			
Wausau	0	2			
Akron	1	0			
Arlington	1	0	1	1	3
Columbia	0	0	1	2	3
Dayton	0	1	1	1	3
East Lansing	1	0	2	0	3
Fayetteville	0	1	1	1	3
Fort Worth	1	1	1	0	3
Lexington	0	1	0	2	3
Macon	0	1	1	1	3
Madison	1	0	1	1	3
Miami	1	1	1	0	3
Nashville	2	0	0	1	3
Oshkosh	2	0	0	1	3
Philadelphia	0	1	2	0	3
Pittsburgh	0	0	1	2	3
Racine	1	1	0	1	3

nothing from  
this section

1 last  
weekend  
wanted

# CAMPAIGN VISITS TO CITIES BY PRESIDENTIAL/VICE-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

(September 01-November 03, 1992)

	Bush	Quayle	Clinton	Gore	Total
Washington, D.C.	17	20	1	9	47
Columbus	3	3	2	4	12
Detroit	5	1	3	1	10
Chicago	2	2	3	2	9
Little Rock	0	0	7	2	9
Atlanta	2	1	1 (last week) wanted	4	8
St. Louis	4	1	3	0	8
Denver	1	1	2	3	7
Kansas City	1	1	3	2	7
Milwaukee	1	2	3	1	7
Houston	3	1	1	1	6
Albuquerque	2	0	2	2	6
Springfield	2	2	1	1	6
Louisville	2	0	2	1	5
New York City	1	0	1	3	5
Baton Rouge	1	0	1	2	4
Billings	1	2	1	0	4
Carthage	0	0	0	4	4
Cincinnati	1	0	1	2	4
Grand Rapids	2	0	1	1	4
Los Angeles	0	2	1	1	4
New Orleans	1	0	1	2	4
Toledo	1	1	2	0	4
Wausau	0	2	0	2	3
Akron	1	0	1	1	3
Arlington	1	0	1	1	3
Columbia	0	0	1	2	3
Dayton	0	1	1	1	3
East Lansing	1	0	2	0	3
Fayetteville	0	1	1	1	3
Fort Worth	1	1	1	0	3
Lexington	0	1	0	2	3
Macon	0	1	1	1	3
Madison	1	0	1	1	3
Miami	1	1	1	0	3
Nashville	2	0	0	1	3
Oshkosh	2	0	0	1	3
Philadelphia	0	1	2	0	3
Pittsburgh	0	0	1	2	3
Racine	1	1	0	1	3

	Bush	Quayle	Clinton	Gore	Total
Salt Lake City	1	1	1	0	3
Seattle	0	0	1	2	3
Augusta	0	1	1	0	2
Baltimore	0	0	0	2	2
Boston	1	0	1	0	2
Bowling Green	1	1	0	0	2
Burlington	2	0	0	0	2
Charlotte	0	0	2	0	2
Daytona Beach	0	0	1	1	2
Des Moines	1	0	1	0	2
East Rutherford	0	0	2	0	2
Eugene	0	0	2	0	2
Fort Lauderdale	2	0	0	0	2
Gainesville	1	0	1	0	2
Green Bay	0	0	1	1	2
Greensboro	1	0	1	0	2
Hartford	0	0	1	1	2
Indianapolis	0	1	0	1	2
Jacksonville	0	0	1	1	2
Las Vegas	0	1	1	0	2
Manchester	0	0	1	1	2
Mc Allen	0	0	1	1	2
Middletown	1	0	0	1	2
Newark	1	0	0	1	2
Omaha	0	1	0	1	2
Owenboro	0	1	0	1	2
Paducah	1	0	1	0	2
Pensacola	0	1	0	1	2
Portland	0	0	2	0	2
Richmond	1	0	1	0	2
San Diego	1	1	0	0	2
Savannah	0	1	0	1	2
Shreveport	1	0	0	1	2
Sioux Falls	1	1	0	0	2
Tulsa	1	1	0	0	2
Vladistav	0	0	1	1	2
Warren	1	0	1	0	2
Wilmington	0	1	1	0	2
Winston-Salem	0	0	1	1	2
Ypsilanti	0	0	2	0	2

# CAMPAIGN VISITS TO CITIES BY PRESIDENTIAL/VICE-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES

(September 01-November 03, 1992)

	Bush	Quayle	Clinton	Gore	Total
Akron	1	0	1	1	3
Alamogordo	0	1	0	0	1
Albany	0	1	0	0	1
Albuquerque	2	0	2	2	6
Alcoa	1	0	0	0	1
Ann Arbor	0	0	1	0	1
Arlington	1	0	1	1	3
Asheville	1	0	0	0	1
Athens	0	0	0	1	1
Atlanta	2	1	1	4	8
Auburn	0	1	0	0	1
Augusta	0	1	1	0	2
Baltic	0	0	1	0	1
Baltimore	0	0	0	2	2
Bangor	0	0	0	1	1
Basking	1	0	0	0	1
Baton Rouge	1	0	1	2	4
Beaumont	0	0	0	1	1
Billings	1	2	1	0	4
Birmingham	0	0	0	1	1
Bloomington	0	1	0	0	1
Blountsville	1	0	0	0	1
Boise	0	1	0	0	1
Boston	1	0	1	0	2
Bowling Green	1	1	0	0	2
Bozman	0	1	0	0	1
Brownsville	0	0	0	1	1
Burlington	2	0	0	0	2
Camp David	2	0	0	0	2
Cape Canaveral	0	1	0	0	1
Cape Girard	0	1	0	0	1
Carthage	0	0	0	4	4
Casper	0	1	0	0	1
Cedar Rapids	0	1	0	0	1
Charlotte	0	0	2	0	2
Chantanooga	0	1	0	0	1
Cheyenne	1	0	0	0	1
Chicago	2	2	3	2	9
Chippewa Falls	1	0	0	0	1
Cincinnati	1	0	1	2	4

	Bush	Quayle	Clinton	Gore	Total
Clarksville	1	0	0	0	1
Clearwater	1	0	0	0	1
Cleveland	0	0	1	0	1
Clinton	0	0	1	0	1
College Park	0	0	0	1	1
Collville	1	0	0	0	1
Columbia	0	0	1	2	3
Columbus	3	3	2	4	12
Cornelia	1	0	0	0	1
Costa Mesa	0	0	1	0	1
Dallas	1	0	0	0	1
Dalton	0	0	0	1	1
Darby	1	0	0	0	1
Darlington	0	1	0	0	1
Dayton	0	1	1	1	3
Daytona Beach	0	0	1	1	2
Decatur	0	0	1	0	1
Denver	1	1	2	3	7
Des Moines	1	0	1	0	2
Detroit	5	1	3	1	10
Dover	1	0	0	0	1
East Haven	0	0	1	0	1
East Lansing	1	0	2	0	3
East Rutherford	0	0	2	0	2
Edison	1	0	0	0	1
El Paso	0	0	0	1	1
Englewood	1	0	0	0	1
Enid	1	0	0	0	1
Eugene	0	0	2	0	2
Fairfield	1	0	0	0	1
Falls Church	0	0	1	0	1
Farmington	0	1	0	0	1
Fayetteville	0	1	1	1	3
Flint	0	0	1	0	1
Florence	0	0	1	0	1
Fond du Lac	1	0	0	0	1
Fort Lauderdale	2	0	0	0	2
Fort Wayne	0	0	1	0	1
Fort Worth	1	1	1	0	3
Frederic	1	0	0	0	1

	Bush	Quayle	Clinton	Gore	Total
Little Rock	0	0	7	2	9
London	1	0	0	0	1
Long Island	0	0	0	1	1
Longview	1	0	0	0	1
Los Angeles	0	2	1	1	4
Louisville	2	0	2	1	5
Macon	0	1	1	1	3
Madison	1	0	1	1	3
Manchester	0	0	1	1	2
Marie	1	0	0	0	1
Marquette	0	0	0	1	1
Marysville	1	0	0	0	1
Maurice	1	0	0	0	1
McAllen	0	0	1	1	2
Medford	1	0	0	0	1
Melborn	0	0	0	1	1
Memphis	1	0	0	0	1
Miami	1	1	1	0	3
Middleburg	0	0	1	0	1
Middletown	1	0	0	1	2
Milwaukee	1	2	3	1	7
Montgomery	1	0	0	0	1
Morganstown	0	0	0	1	1
Morgantown	0	0	0	1	1
Morristown	0	0	1	0	1
Nashville	2	0	0	1	3
New Castle	0	0	0	1	1
New Orleans	1	0	1	2	4
New York	1	0	1	3	5
Newark	1	0	0	1	2
Newport	0	1	0	0	1
Norcross	1	0	0	0	1
Norristown	1	0	0	0	1
Oklahoma City	0	1	0	0	1
Omaha	0	1	0	1	2
Orlando	1	0	0	0	1
Oshkosh	2	0	0	1	3
Owenboro	0	1	0	1	2
Oxford	0	0	0	1	1
Paducah	1	0	1	0	2

	Bush	Quayle	Clinton	Gore	Total
Painesville	1	0	0	0	1
Palo Alto	0	1	0	0	1
Pensacola	0	1	0	1	2
Philadelphia	0	1	2	0	3
Phoenix	0	1	0	0	1
Pittsburgh	0	0	1	2	3
Plymouth	1	0	0	0	1
Portland	0	0	2	0	2
Portland	0	0	1	0	1
Pueblo	0	0	1	0	1
Racine	1	1	0	1	3
Rahway	0	0	1	0	1
Raleigh	0	0	0	1	1
Richland	0	0	0	1	1
Richmond	1	0	1	0	2
Ridgewood	1	0	0	0	1
Rockford	0	1	0	0	1
Rockville	0	0	1	0	1
Rocky Mountain	0	1	0	0	1
Romulus	0	0	1	0	1
Saint Louis	4	1	3	0	8
Salt Lake City	1	1	1	0	3
San Antonio	1	0	0	0	1
San Diego	1	1	0	0	2
San Francisco	0	0	1	0	1
San Jose	0	0	1	0	1
Sarasota	0	1	0	0	1
Savannah	0	1	0	1	2
Schaumburg	1	0	0	0	1
Scranton	0	0	0	1	1
Seacaucus	1	0	0	0	1
Seattle	0	0	1	2	3
Shallowater	1	0	0	0	1
Sherman	1	0	0	0	1
Shreveport	1	0	0	1	2
Sioux City	0	1	0	0	1
Sioux Falls	1	1	0	0	2
Somerset	1	0	0	0	1
South Bend	0	0	1	0	1

	Bush	Quayle	Clinton	Gore	Total
Southgate	1	0	0	0	1
Spartansburg	1	0	0	0	1
Spokane	1	0	0	0	1
Springfield	0	0	1	0	1
Springfield	2	2	1	1	6
State College	1	0	0	0	1
Stevens	1	0	0	0	1
Strongsville	1	0	0	0	1
Sussex	1	0	0	0	1
Tacoma	0	1	0	0	1
Tallahassee	0	0	0	1	1
Tampa	0	0	0	1	1
Thomasville	1	0	0	0	1
Toledo	1	1	2	0	4
Trenton	1	0	0	0	1
Tucson	0	1	0	0	1
Tulsa	1	1	0	0	2
Tyler	0	1	0	0	1
Upland	0	1	0	0	1
Vineland	1	0	0	0	1
Virginia	1	0	0	0	1
Vladistav	0	0	1	1	2
Warren	1	0	1	0	2
Wausau	0	2	0	2	4
Washington, D.C.	17	20	1	9	47
Waterloo	0	0	0	1	1
Westchester	0	1	0	0	1
Williams	0	0	1	0	1
Wilmington	0	1	1	0	2
Winston-Salem	0	0	1	1	2
Wixom	1	0	0	0	1
Yorba Linda	1	0	0	0	1
Ypsilanti	0	0	2	0	2

# **EFFECT OF ROSS PEROT'S ABSENCE FROM PRESIDENTIAL RACE**

	<b>Second Choice of Perot Voters</b>			
	<b>Bush</b>	<b>Clinton</b>	<b>Other</b>	<b>No Vote</b>
Nation	37%	38	6	14
Arizona	43%	35	5	15
California	31%	39	8	16
Colorado	36%	38	6	18
Connecticut	32%	44	6	15
Florida	37%	33	6	20
Georgia	42%	40	4	9
Indiana	43%	35	5	15
Kentucky	30%	47	5	12
Louisiana	36%	40	4	19
Michigan	36%	43	4	15
Minnesota	37%	41	7	12
Missouri	37%	40	3	15
North Carolina	39%	38	2	18
New Hampshire	36%	33	11	13
New Jersey	42%	34	6	14
New York	35%	43	6	13
Ohio	41%	32	4	19
Oregon	21%	46	7	20
Pennsylvania	34%	38	7	18
Tennessee	57%	30	7	4
Texas	47%	33	5	11
Washington	34%	45	5	12
Wisconsin	31%	39	7	15

Republican Presidential Percent in Major Counties of Key States  
(percent of major party totals)

	1992		1988	1984	1980	1976
	Target	Rep. %*	Rep. %	Rep. %	Rep. %	Rep. %
Colorado	50	NA	54	64	64	56
Denver	38	NA	38	49	51	49
Jefferson	53	NA	58	70	70	62
Arapahoe	56	NA	61	73	73	65
El Paso	59	NA	71	76	71	61
Florida	50	51	61	65	59	47
Dade	46	48	56	59	56	41
Pinellas	44	50	58	65	57	51
Broward	51	39	50	57	61	48
Palm Beach	49	44	56	62	61	50
Georgia	50	NA	60	60	42	33
Fulton	42	NA	43	43	35	32
Cobb	67	NA	73	77	57	43
DeKalb	50	NA	49	58	48	44
Illinois	50	43	51	57	54	51
Cook	42	35	44	49	61	47
Dupage	59	59	70	76	73	71
Lake	53	54	64	69	67	61
Will	55	50	60	64	62	55
Indiana	50	53	60	62	60	54
Marion	53	53	59	59	57	55
Allen	56	56	66	66	64	61
Lake	46 <sup>0</sup>	37	43	45	49	43
Kentucky	50	NA	56	60	51	46
Jefferson	50	NA	52	58	50	51
Fayette	54	NA	60	64	54	56
Kenton	59	NA	67	70	59	54
Louisiana	50	48	55	61	53	47
Jefferson	61	60	68	75	66	57
Orleans	36	29	36	42	41	43
E. Baton Rouge	52	54	59	63	55	51

\* calculated with 50% of Perot vote added to Bush vote

Republican Presidential Percent in Major Counties of Key States  
(percent of major party totals)

	1992		1988 Rep. %	1984 Rep. %	1980 Rep. %	1976 Rep. %
	Target	Rep. %*				
Missouri	50	45	52	60	54	48
St. Louis	53	46	55	64	58	56
Jackson	42	39	42	50	44	44
St. Louis City	29	24	27	35	31	33
Greene	59	53	60	67	59	53
Nevada	50	49	61	67	70	52
Clark	46	45	58	64	67	49
Washoe	54	51	62	69	73	57
Carson City	55	53	66	71	75	58
New Hampshire	50	49	63	69	67	56
Hillsborough	54	51	66	71	68	54
Rockingham	51	51	64	69	68	55
Merrimack	45	48	61	67	66	60
Grafton	52	47	62	68	68	62
New Jersey	50	49	57	61	57	51
Bergen	53	51	59	63	62	57
Essex	38	37	42	44	45	43
Union	50	48	55	60	57	53
Middlesex	49	46	55	60	56	48
New York	50	41	48	54	51	48
Nassau	57	47	57	62	62	52
Suffolk	59	33	61	66	63	54
Queens	41	51	40	47	48	39
Westchester	54	46	54	59	60	55
North Carolina	50	50	58	62	51	44
Mecklenburg	53	51	60	63	51	49
Guilford	50	48	57	61	54	49
Wake	48	50	57	62	50	50
Forsyth	51	52	59	62	52	50

\* calculated with 50% of Perot vote added to Bush vote

Republican Presidential Percent in Major Counties of Key States  
(percent of major party totals)

	1992		1988	1984	1980	1976
	Target	Rep. %*	Rep. %	Rep. %	Rep. %	Rep. %
Ohio	50	49	56	60	56	50
Cuyahoga	29	38	41	44	45	42
Hamilton	48	56	62	64	62	61
Franklin	42	51	61	66	58	57
Montgomery	40	49	58	59	49	49
Pennsylvania	50	45	51	54	54	49
Allegheny	42	39	40	43	48	48
Philadelphia	35	26	33	35	37	33
Montgomery	64	48	61	65	65	58
Delaware	61	49	61	62	62	56
Texas	50	NA	56	64	57	48
Harris	51	NA	58	62	60	53
Dallas	55	NA	59	67	62	57
Tarrant	54	NA	62	67	59	50
Bexar	49	NA	53	60	54	45
Wisconsin	50	48	48	55	53	49
Milwaukee	42	41	39	43	43	43
Waukesha	62	62	61	66	63	60
Dane	40	37	40	44	40	44

1. Lost - Big problem Dr. Glenna  
Dunn

Wrong track 75-80%

Recession question 80%

Plan 538/35%

POTUS - flip if econ come back  
How

2. Research good

- 11 National surveys

- 54 focus groups / Tracy

- 11 PR sessions (debates - 96)

- 7,000 tracking interviews

- 56 statewide

✓ no catastrophes - Charlotte

✓ surveys accurate

✓ great reactions

3. Freed to strategize

split { ✓ campaign

✓ White House 9 people Baker

- arrived, bribe

- Baker make a difference

From Research: Positive

- ✓ Trade (f.p. expertise)
- ✓ Crises judgement
- ✓ reduction in spending over Clinton's investment: line item veto  
BBA
- ✓ "Sue each other less can for each other more"
- ✓ "This gov't is too big and spends too much"
- [didn't work] ✓ Agenda/Plan

From Research: Negative

- ✓ moral character  
"draft dodging, pot smoking philanderer"
- ✓ Arkansas record  
child welfare

Finances - good 2 million/profitable

Perot  
PEROT -  
was all 3 debts

# Market Strategies

Frederick T. Steeper

## 1. Dealt bad hand

Wrong track 75-80%

recession 90%

Plan 50%/35%

POWUS f.p. if can come back

neglected country for f.p.

expected to in 81

expected con turn-  
around

July 7.28  
unempl.

rebelled  
to vote

## 2. Research good

- 11 national surveys
- 54 focus groups
- 11 PA sessions
- 7,000 tracking interviews
- 56 statewides

✓ No catastrophes (Charlotte) car  
crash

✓ Surveys accurate

✓ Great verbatims

\$2 million / profitable

losing - ~~bad~~ for business  
no boost for

- neutral / not negative

# Market Strategies

Frederick T. Steeper

## 3. Freed to do strategy

2 groups

split { Campaign  
White House - 9 people / Baker / me  
problems  
Baker helped fix  
arrival / Briefcase

## From Research: Positive

Trade - (f.g. expertise)

Crises judgment

Reduce spending over Clinton's investment  
line item veto / BBA

"Sue each other less care for each other  
more"

"This govt is too big & spends too much"

Had a plan - resisted

# Market Strategies

Frederick T. Steeper

## Research: Negative

Mind character - "draft dodging, pot smoking, philanderer"

Arkansas record - child welfare

## Perit

had it in April + May

right man right time

successful bus - correct deficit

rescued employees - cared

billimaire - not corrupted

## ***Media Coverage of the 1992 Presidential Campaign***

### **Overall Trends**

- Media coverage of the President was positive overall in only three of 27 weeks of monitoring. On average, coverage was a full six points less favorable than Clinton's.
- Bush's most favorable and Clinton's least favorable *print* news coverage was during the week of the Republican National Convention. This was the only week that television coverage differed significantly from print coverage, and unfortunately, television news coverage of the President was somewhat unfavorable.

While television's interpretation of the Convention itself was more negative than the print media's, this accounted for only a part of the overall unfavorable television coverage during that week. Television used the occasion of the Convention to review the performance of the President in office in several issue areas and many of these reports were very unfavorable.

- Print coverage of the President during Houston was nearly as positive as Clinton's was during New York. However, there were important differences in the quality of coverage before and after the conventions.

The Clinton campaign capitalized better on the favorable publicity generated by its convention than did Bush's campaign. The coverage the week prior to New York was as favorable toward Clinton as during the New York convention itself. The two weeks following New York were the most favorable for Clinton of the remaining campaign save for the week of the debates.

In contrast, coverage of the President was nine points less favorable during the week leading up to Houston than Clinton's was heading into New York. In the two weeks following their respective conventions Bush's coverage was eleven and ten points less favorable than Clinton's.

- The communications strategies of the White House and the Bush-Quayle campaign were found wanting in several important periods:

Print coverage of Clinton was actually more favorable than what won by the President during the week of the Yeltsin summit. Based on the quality of press coverage, the Sister Souljah flap better communicated positive news about Clinton than what an agreement over significant arms reductions with a new world leader did for Bush.

The reporting of televised presidential debates is probably subjected to more intense, head-to-head 'spinning' by the campaigns than any other single political event. Unfortunately for President Bush, debate week coverage was 15 points less unfavorable for him than for Clinton. In effect, Clinton came close to holding a second Democratic convention for himself based on the margin of favorable coverage he won during the debates.

### **Issue Agenda Management**

- The media agenda presented the Bush campaign a difficult but still winnable communications situation at the end of the convention period. The President was at small disadvantages to Clinton in the favorability of coverage in the most reported-on issues and appeared to be in position to turn some issues, including traditional values, the deficit, and most importantly, economic policies, into winners for him. Unfortunately his campaign was unable to improve on the situation and by the first full week in October the President had fallen behind Clinton in coverage favorability in all of the most salient issues.

### **Economics and Op-ed Articles**

- In what was likely the communications channel we monitored that would be most influenceable by our campaign and White House communications strategies, articles placed in newspapers' op-ed sections, the Clinton campaign gave us a lesson in how to "win" an issue. Prior to release of Clinton's economic plan in June, the average favorability of op-ed coverage of Clinton and his economics was 44, twelve points better than in op-ed pieces about Bush and his economic policies (which averaged 32 rating).

In the nine weeks following the release of his plan, op-ed economics coverage of Clinton averaged 55 points on our scale. During the same period, op-ed coverage of President Bush was essentially unchanged at 33.

### **Presidential Travel and Favorability of Media News Coverage**

- There was no communications advantage won from owning the Rose Garden in the 1992 campaign. The net favorability of print media coverage of the President was 11 points less favorable on the days he was not traveling than it was when he was campaigning outside of Washington.

- On seven days in September when President Bush was at the White House but on the Clinton was on the road, print media coverage was *twenty-four points* less favorable overall than on days when both candidates were on the road.

### **Background on the Print Media Monitoring Program**

The print media monitoring program 'clipped' through electronic search and retrieval methods newspaper articles which make substantive mention of George Bush, Bill Clinton, or Ross Perot. A sampling of these articles, which included opinion pieces, letters, and editorials along with news reporting, were coded on a zero-to-one-hundred scale for their favorability of coverage toward the presidential candidates. Articles favorable toward a candidate were rated 51 or greater, those unfavorable 49 or less, and neutral articles were rated 50.

A media consulting firm was hired to manage the weekly data collection and coding for the program. Trained, professional coders analyzed the content of the selected articles, and using criteria developed in conjunction with the campaign, rated the articles' favorability. Each coders' work was periodically verified against the others', as well as against test articles, to ensure proper application of the coding schedule.


A total of 12,070 articles from 44 newspapers in 19 key states were coded during the campaign.

### **Background on the Electronic Media Monitoring Program**

Beginning in August, each evening's news shows of the three networks and a half-hour segment of "Headline News" were reviewed by BQ '92 staff. All reports were coded for their favorability of coverage toward the candidates. As with the print monitor, reports were coded on a zero-to-one-hundred scale with those favorable rated 51 or greater, those unfavorable 49 or less, and neutral reports rated 50. Approximately 750 television news reports and anchor commentary were coded.

# National Trend of Weekly Print Media Ratings for Presidential Candidates May 1 - October 31, 1992

Average Favorability



Source: BQ '92 Strategic Information  
Prepared: November 2, 1992

# Media Issue Agenda and Comparative Quality of Bush Coverage July 6 through August 30

Bush Coverage Index\*

10

0

-10

-20

0

5

10

15

20

25

Percent of Article Volume

Eastern Europe

Iraq/Hussein

Traditional Values

Deficit

Abortion

Economic Policies

Unemployment

Education


Recession

Health Care

Bush Coverage Index is Bush average favorability  
minus Clinton average favorability  
December, 1998

# Media Issue Agenda and Comparative Quality of Bush Coverage Week of October 5-11, 1992

Bush Coverage Index\*



Bush Coverage Index is Bush average favorability  
minus Clinton average favorability  
December, 1990

# Presidential Travel and Favorability of Media News Coverage September, 1992

Bush Coverage Index\*

5

0

-5

-10

-15

-20

-25

-30

Bush\* Coverage Index is Bush average favorability  
minus Clinton average favorability  
December, 1992

Traveling

Not Traveling

Clinton on Road

Traveling

Not Traveling

Clinton on Road

Print

TV

-4

-15


-28

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
# Control of State House




Market Strategies, Inc.

Switched to  
Retained by  
No election, held by

GOP DEM IND



Nonpartisan  
Divided Control



# Control of State Senate

