

The original documents are located in Box 36, folder “ Post Election Report - November, 1992 (1)” of the Frederick T. Steeper Papers at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.



**U.S. NATIONAL POST ELECTION
REPORT**

November 1992

1000 Town Center
Suite 1600
Southfield, MI 48075
(313) 350-3020
FAX (313) 350-3023

14099 Farmington Road
Livonia, MI 48154
(313) 261-9550
FAX (313) 261-9557

111 SW Fifth Avenue
Suite 1850
Portland, OR 97204
(503) 225-0112
FAX (503) 225-8400

108 N. Main Street
Suite 311
South Bend, IN 46601
(219) 233-3453
FAX (219) 287-1165

5064 Roswell Road
D-101
Atlanta, GA 30342
(404) 255-0943
FAX (404) 255-0944

Prepared for:

Republican National Committee

Prepared by:

Market Strategies, Inc.

CONFIDENTIAL

P92557

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION 1 1992 Post Election Summary

Electoral Vote Strategy	1
Voting Behavior in 1992	2
National Trial Heat Chronology	3
Presidential Subgroup Voting	5
The Economy and the Vote	6
Perot	7
Policy Mandate	8
Ideology and Values	8
Campaign Events and Issues	9
Singular State Results	9
Conclusions	9
Republican Party Future	9
Graph: National Three-Way Trial Heats Likely Voters	11
Table: National Three-Way General Election Trial Ballots	13

SECTION 2 State Election Results

Map: 1992 Presidential Election Result	1
Map: 1992 Bush-Clinton Margin	2
Map: 1992 Perot Vote	3
State Results:	
Alphabetical by State	4
Rank-Ordered by Bush Vote	5
Rank-Ordered by Clinton Vote	6
Rank-Ordered by Perot Vote	7
Rank-Ordered by Bush Margin Over Clinton	8
Actual State-By-State Results	9
Preliminary Turnout Estimates	10
Effect of Ross Perot on Statewide Results	11

SECTION 3 Electoral Vote Analysis

Electoral Vote Analysis	1
Analysis of States' Rank-Order by Republican Potential	2
Second Choice of Perot Voters	4
1992 Republican Presidential Vote	5

SECTION 4 Post-Election Survey Analysis

Analysis of the Vote 1
Time of Voting Decision 8a
Who We Could Have Gotten 9
The Perot Vote 17
The Economy and the Vote 24
Voting Themes and Considerations 36
The Political Parties 49

SECTION 5 Selected Analysis Memos

Economics and the Vote -- Economic Conditions 1
Perceptions of the Republican Convention 5
Abortion and the Vote for President 8
The Republican Party After the 1992 Election 12

SECTION 6 U.S. National Post-Election Survey Question Results

SECTION 7 U.S. National Post-Election Open-End Tables

Volunteered Responses for Voting for a Candidate 1
Volunteered Responses About the Themes and Messages of Each Campaign 5
Volunteered Responses of the Risk Involved Electing Each Candidate 8
Volunteered Responses About Information Flow 11
Volunteered National Problems 15

SECTION 8 1992 Exit Poll Analysis

Background and Methodology 1
Descriptive Analysis of VRS Exit Poll Results 2
Party 2
Past Presidential Voting 3
Region 4
Cultural Groups 4
Race 6
Gender 7
Age 10
Marital Status/Children 11
Pocketbook Issues 11
The Question of Abortion 14
Questions of Character 15
Candidate Qualities 16
View of 1992 Campaign 17
Issues Facing the Electorate 17
The Perot Factor 18
Clinton's Mandate 20

Congressional Balloting	21
VRS Exit Poll Demographic Profile	22
Reasons Why Voters Voted as They Did	25
Demographic Profile of Bush Voters	27
Portrait of the Electorate	28

SECTION 9 Presidential and Vice-Presidential Debates--Perception Analyzer Report

Methodology	1
Sample Description	2
Overview	3
First Presidential Debate	4
Vice-Presidential Debate	9
Second Presidential Debate	14
Third Presidential Debate	20

SECTION 10 1992 Voter Turnout

Turnout Rates	1
Non-Voters	2

1992 POST ELECTION SUMMARY

I. ELECTORAL VOTE STRATEGY

A. General Observations

1. Bush did well in the South against a Southern Democrat ticket
2. States we correctly targeted at the end: Tennessee, Kentucky, and Wisconsin
3. States we correctly dropped: California and Illinois
4. States we targeted too long: Illinois and Pennsylvania
5. States which fell unusually low in the final rank order of states for Bush compared to our last expectations: Nevada, Colorado, New Mexico, Michigan, Vermont, and Delaware
6. "A" states where we took a drubbing: Michigan
7. States that returned closer to their Republican historical support compared to last predictions: New Hampshire, South Dakota, and Louisiana

Arizona, Wyoming

B. Election Eve Estimates Compared to Actual Results

1. Expected as part of Bush's best (most likely) 270 ev's but were not: Delaware, Michigan, and New Mexico
2. Not expected to be part of Bush's best 270 ev's but were: Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Louisiana

C. Early September and October Targeting Compared to Actual Results

1. Expected as part of Bush's best 270 ev's but were not: Maine, Michigan, and New Mexico
2. Not expected to be part of Bush's best 270 ev's but were: Tennessee, Wisconsin, and Kentucky

D. Original Targeting Against a Southern Democrat (May, 1991) Compared to Actual Results

1. Expected as part of Bush's best 270 ev's but were not: Missouri, Connecticut, California, and New Mexico
2. Not expected to be part of Bush's best 270 ev's but were: North Carolina, Mississippi, Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Wisconsin

E. Electoral Effect of Perot

1. Cost Bush the states of Georgia, Montana, and Nevada (20 electoral votes)
2. Still would have lost: Bush 192 ev's to Clinton 346 ev's
3. Perot voters split evenly between Bush and Clinton as their second choice in the pre-election tracking surveys except for the Mountain and Southern states where Bush was the second choice of 60% of the Perot voters. Re-computing the state results based on this regional formula gives Bush the aforementioned 20 additional electoral votes if Perot had not been in the race.

172
366

Ohio

II. VOTING BEHAVIOR IN 1992

A. Less straight ticket voting in 1992 (24%) compared to 1988 (34%) and 1984 (36%)¹

B. More last minute decisions in 1992 than in 1988 and 1984. ("When finally make up your mind...?")¹

	'92	'88	'84
1. Election day	12%	6%	3%
2. Few days before	12	7	5
3. Sept./Oct	47	36	26
4. Before Sept.	29	51	66

C. Time of Final Decision and Candidate Preference

1. Election day deciders divided equally among the three candidates. Those who decided in the few days before went slightly to Clinton over Bush, 39% to 34%, with Perot taking 19%.
2. The race was still up for grabs in the last days. Twenty percent of Clinton's voters did not finally decide in his favor until the last few days or on election day.
3. The debates were most important to Perot followed by Clinton. Forty-two percent of the Perot voters decided during or immediately after the debates compared to 31% of the Clinton voters and 21% of the Bush voters.
4. Perot's voters also were the most reluctant. Thirty-six percent (36%) did not bite the third party bullet until the last few days or on election day (compared to 23% of Bush's voters and 20% of Clinton's voters).
5. Clinton solidified the greatest number of his supporters in October. Forty-two percent of his supporters "finally" decided in his favor just before, during, and just after the four debates.
6. While a 40% plurality of Bush's voters decided before September, it is expected that the incumbent's supporters would be the earliest deciders.

D. Who Was Most Available to Bush?

1. Nine percent of the voters were still close to voting for Bush in the last month but didn't.
2. They were frequently weak Republicans and moderates who leaned conservative.
3. They were slightly younger and more upscale than other voters.
4. The economy and their appraisal that Clinton had an economic plan and Bush didn't kept them from voting for Bush.

III. Turnout

A. General Remarks

1. Non-voters were more likely to support Perot than were voters. Perot was the leader among non-voting men.
2. Non-voters preferred Clinton over Bush by a wider margin than did voters.
3. Republican and conservative groups voted at higher rates than Democratic and liberal groups.

B. Voting Preference of Non-voters

1. Perot's vote was higher with non-voters (24%) than with voters (19%).
2. Clinton was favored by a wider margin with non-voters, 45% Clinton to 25% Bush.

C. Subgroup Turnout

1. Center-right eligible voters were more likely to vote (81%) than the rest of the population (73%).
2. Age continues to have the strongest correlation to turnout among the standard demographic variables: 18-24 (54% voted), 25-39 (76% voted), 40-64 (85% voted), 65+ (89% voted)

IV. NATIONAL TRIAL HEAT CHRONOLOGY²

A. General Remarks

1. Clinton maintains average ten to thirteen point lead from September 1 through October 21. Polls outside this range prove to be "outliers."
2. Key dates
 - a. June 11: Perot peak. Leads Bush 36% to 32% with Clinton at 25%. Downward trend for Perot begins after June 11.
 - b. July 13: Clinton passes Perot on first day of Democratic convention. Bush flat at 31%, Clinton at 29% and Perot at 28%.

- c. July 17: Clinton has 25 point lead in aftermath of Democratic convention and Perot dropping out - Clinton 56%, Bush 31%.
- 21 d. August 16: Clinton has 21 point lead on eve of Republican convention, Clinton 56%, Bush 35%.
- 11 e. August 27: Republican Convention bounce leaves Clinton ahead by 11%, Clinton 51%, Bush 40%.
- f. October 10: On eve of first debate its Clinton 48%, Bush 36%, Perot 9%. There have been no significant changes in Clinton's margin over Bush since the Republican convention. Perot's re-entry actually causes him to drop from the mid-teens in September to under 10% by the first debate.
- Wed g. October 21: The debates serve as Perot's convention. He receives a bounce from them. After the four debates Perot climbs to 17%, Bush falls to 30% and Clinton has 45%. Perot is trending up and Bush down. Third place finish for Bush is an outside possibility.

B. The Final Week

1. The data
 - a. On October 30 (Friday before the election) the national polls are trending to a 39% tie between Bush and Clinton by November 3. Trend in favor of Bush begins October 21.
 - b. Weinberger memo covered on evening news, October 30th, stops the trend to Bush. November 3rd analysis of seven national polls over final three days shows Clinton 47%, Bush 38%, and Perot 15%.
2. Normal closing in every presidential election?
 - a. Closings in 1968, 1976, 1988
 - b. But no closing in 1964, 1972, 1984
 - c. Through October 21 (after the debates) all national surveys indicated a Clinton landslide as in '64, '72, and '84.

C. Chronology of Analysis of National Polls

1. May 1: Perot passes Clinton for second place behind Bush
2. May 22: Bush still ahead, but Perot trend projects him into the lead. Clinton continues to slip deeper into third place.
3. Late May: Perot passes Bush
4. June 15: Perot ahead of Bush with projected lead of 39% to 30%; Clinton at 25%.
5. June 17: First national poll suggests Perot surge is over
6. June 23: A national poll puts Bush ahead of Perot
7. June 30: New trend lines computed, Perot peaked on June 11 leading

- Bush 36% to 32%, Clinton at 25%. Perot now falling.
8. July 10: new trend has Bush flat at 32% with Perot going down and Clinton gaining.
 9. July 13: Clinton passes Perot as Democratic Convention begins
 10. July 16: Clinton passes Bush in three-way race before convention ends; Perot dropping rapidly on date he withdraws
 11. July 17: Clinton bounces to a 25 point lead, 56% to 31%, in two-way race.
 12. August 16: Clinton lead slowly declines to 21 points, 56% to 35% on eve of Republican convention.
 13. August 27: Analysis of Republican Convention bounce estimates Clinton ahead by 11%, Clinton 51%, Bush 40%.
 14. September 9: Clinton lead remains at 51% to 40% on eve of Economic Club speech by Bush.
 15. September 21: Analysis of national polls after the Economic Club speech shows no significant change, Clinton ahead 52% to 40%. Nothing working.
 16. September 27: Clinton appears to have slightly larger lead, 52% to 39%.
 17. October 1: Re-computation of trend lines shows a flat 50% to 39% two way race when Perot rejoins the race. No significant two-way trends since Republican convention.
 18. October 7: First analysis of the renewed three-way race shows decline in Perot vote with speculation of his reentry and, then, with his announcement. Clinton margin over Bush stays at 11 points, 47% to 36% as both benefit equally from Perot decline to 10%.
 19. October 10: On eve of first debate its Clinton 48%, Bush 36%, Perot 9%.
 20. October 21: After the dust settles from the four debates Perot climbs to 17%, Bush falls to 30% and Clinton has 45%. Perot and Bush trending toward a tie for second place.
 21. On October 30 (Friday before the election) the national polls are trending to a 39% tie between Bush and Clinton by November 3. Trend in favor of Bush begins October 21.
 22. Weinberger memo covered on evening news, October 30th, stops the trend to Bush. November 3rd analysis of seven national polls over final three days shows Clinton 47%, Bush 38%, and Perot 15%.

V. PRESIDENTIAL SUBGROUP VOTING

A. Major historical groups

1. Clinton wins big among northern union households: 55% to 24% in VRS exit polls, 56% to 29% in RNC Post Election Survey. They represent the most dramatic return to Democratic voting.
2. Clinton gets 80%+ of minority voters in VRS exit poll; 91% of blacks in RNC Post Election Survey.
3. Bush wins among Northern white Protestants (+8%) and Southern

4. whites (+13%). Perot takes 22% of the former and 15% of the latter.
Catholics are close in VRS exit poll (Clinton 44%, Bush 36%).

B. Race

1. Democrats still lost the white vote (41% Bush, 39% Clinton). Haven't won it since 1964.

C. Gender

1. Clinton only managed a tie with Bush with white women (after all is said and done about gender, Anita Hill, abortion, et al)
 - a. Democrats have not carried white women since and including 1976 (since we have exit poll data on white women)³
 - b. No significant difference by gender when controlling for partisanship₃
2. Republican vote down more with white men
3. [See Exit Poll Analysis and Post Election Survey Analysis for more subgroup results]

VI. FACTORS IN THE ELECTION

A. Voter Motivations - Pluses

1. Bush's foreign policy experience
2. Bush's better "crises judgment"

B. Voter Motivations - Minuses

1. "Time for a change"
2. America first⁴
3. The economy
4. Bush's perceived neglect of the country in 1991

C. Tactical Factors

1. Campaigning against Buchanan
2. Perot threat in May and June
3. Hostility of press

D. The Voters' Top Five Considerations in the Election¹

1. "Bush would not do anything differently than he did in his first term."
2. "Clinton representing more certain change than Bush."
3. "That Bush had had his chance to fix the economy."
4. "Perot being the only candidate to talk straight about the deficit and the national debt."
5. "That Clinton would get the economy moving again."

E. Risk

1. Clinton won despite the fact that more voters thought there was "more risk" in electing him than in electing Bush. However, a sizeable 38% (compared to 46% choosing Clinton) thought Bush was the riskier choice.
2. Voters thought Clinton was the riskier choice mostly because of his lack of experience. Voters thought Bush was the riskier choice because they thought he would not help the economy and he had done little about it in his first four years. The dissatisfaction with Bush over the economy cut greatly into the potential advantage he might have had on this dimension.⁵
3. Fourteen percent of Clinton's voters voted for him even though they thought he was the riskier choice (compared to 2% of Bush's voters seeing Bush as the riskier choice).

VII. THE ECONOMY AND THE VOTE

A. Historical Patterns: Real Disposable Income

1. Only +0.9% growth from September, 1991 to September, 1992
2. Needed minimum of +1.5% growth to retain White House
3. Over whole Bush term growth was negative: -0.7%. Worst performance for any presidential term since 1948. However, Hansen analysis concludes that whole term growth is not significant; it is the last 12 months that counts.

B. Post Election Survey Results

1. The economy was the top issue for 51% of the voters. Far back, was "character" as the next highest at 10%.
2. Clinton won two-to-one with voters concerned most with the economy.
3. Bush ended the election with only 35% believing he had an economic plan to which he was personally committed. This result remained below 40% from early September through the election. In contrast, 70% of the voters said Clinton had an economic plan he was personally committed to. (Clinton had averaged 55% before the election, so the post election result probably includes an artificial increase from his winning.) These perceptions were powerfully correlated to the vote.

VIII. PEROT

A. What he represented in April and May

1. Perot preferred candidate to handle economy and budget deficit over both Bush and Clinton.
2. Most confidence in Perot to "bring needed changes" and "get things done" over both Bush and Clinton.

B. Sources of support

1. His spring support followed classic bell shape curves by party identifications and ideology - highest support near the middles and tailing off equally at each end. Equal Democratic, Republican, liberal, and conservative defections to Perot. Appeals most to non-partisans and non-ideologues.
2. In the election, Republicans gave higher support to Perot than did Democrats. However, liberals and conservatives were about equal in their support of Perot.
3. Perot voters tended to vote Republican in the congressional elections, 51% to 36%, which closely reflected their partisan identification profile of 54% Republican to 39% Democratic (including leaners).
4. Greater support from men
5. Younger, upscale, and secular
6. Perot was a credible candidate for 37% of the voters in the last month. Almost 20% considered voting for him in October but didn't.
7. Perot was a credible candidate for 50% of the voters sometime during the year.

C. Effect on the race

1. Mainly hurt Bush by taking spotlight away from Bush messages rather than taking voters away from Bush. Perot did this especially in the debates. He, also, did it in the day-to-day campaign and the paid advertising. Bush was playing catch-up and, therefore, needed message persuasion more than Clinton. Perot got in the way.
2. Perot voters split evenly between Bush and Clinton as their second choice.

IX. POLICY MANDATE?

A. Voters preferred several of the specific solutions of Bush's domestic agenda over Clinton's.

1. To help the economy, a 75% to 18% majority thought "tax incentives to help small business" would be more effective than "targeted federal spending to help selected industries."⁶
2. To help the economy, a 67% to 28% majority thought "cutting

- government spending, lowering the deficit, and reducing federal regulations and red tape" would be more effective than "the federal government investing more money in transportation, communications, environmental technology, and rebuilding the nation's urban areas."⁶
3. To help the economy, a 56% to 38% majority thought "opening new international markets to American goods" would be more effective than "limiting foreign imports into our country." (While Clinton did not advocate restrictionism, it was Bush who emphasized the importance of trade to the domestic economy.)⁶
 4. On health care, a 75% to 18% majority thought "new tax deductions for health insurance and medical bills and letting small business group together so they can afford the kind of health insurance large companies offer" would be more effective than "placing a seven percent payroll tax on small business that do not offer health insurance to pay for a government sponsored health care program for their employees" (the "play or pay" proposal from which Clinton ultimately backed off).⁶

X. IDEOLOGY AND VALUES

A. General Observations

1. Liberalism of Democrats and conservatism of Republicans arguably a liability for both parties.
 - a. Majority of Americans consider themselves moderates
2. Liberalism of Democrats more a liability than the conservatism of the Republicans.
 - a. More people still consider themselves conservative than liberal
 - b. ~~Forty two~~ percent of the ~~1992~~ voters ~~were~~ white fundamentalist or evangelical Protestants. 35

B. Voters still prefer the Republican agenda of less government, lower taxes, and traditional values (even "family values")

1. In VRS exit polls a 55% to 36% majority said they would rather have "government cost less in taxes but provide fewer services" than have "government provide more services but cost more in taxes."
2. In VRS exit polls a 65% to 21% majority said they would prefer government "encourage traditional family values" than "encourage tolerance of nontraditional families."

XI. CAMPAIGN EVENTS AND ISSUES

A. Republican convention

1. Hansen quantification says Republican convention cost Bush two percentage points from winnable voters alienated by the convention.¹
2. "Bounce" of 5 points for Bush compared to average of 6% to 7% from prior conventions. Reduced Clinton's lead from ~~20~~ points to 11 points.

1 1/2 - 2 *Round votes*
most went to
Perot

B. Abortion

1. Bush won 55% to 36% among the 12% of the voters who said abortion was an important issue to them.³
2. Hansen analysis says abortion issue cost Bush a net of one point (11% to him versus 12% away from him.)¹

non one dim, very much, small likely less likely

XII. SINGULAR STATE RESULTS

A. California

1. June poll indicates that Bush probably must concede the state
2. Bush in third place, Perot the leader in June. Only 47% maximum available to Bush.
3. Perceptions very negative: 36% approve/61% disapprove of Bush job performance

9 cl 3 Perot

XIII. CONCLUSIONS

A. Mistakes

1. Should not have given-up on change theme for Bush
2. Did not make the case that Clinton's policies would make things worse.

XIV. REPUBLICAN PARTY FUTURE

A. Post Election Standing

1. Some slippage
2. Increase in negative on both parties (Perot effect)
3. (See Hansen analysis)

B. Cultural Groups: Party Identifications⁷

1. Maintained pluralities with Northern Protestants and Southern whites
2. Lost ground with Catholics and union members

C. Issue Handling¹

1. Republicans still lead on foreign policy
2. Democrats are ahead on health care, education, the budget deficit, and the economy.
3. The two parties are tied on taxes.

D. Other Observations

1. White fundamentalist or evangelical Protestants are 35% of the adult population and close to 50% of Republican identifiers. The Party needs to continue to appeal to this very large group of voters.

ENDNOTES

1.RNC Post Election Survey (Market Strategies, Inc.)

2.Based on a time series analysis of available public and private national surveys.

3.VRS 1992 Exit Poll


4.America first attitude seen in first wave of BQ/RNC national surveys and focus groups. Also, seen in Public Interest Project national survey (December, 1991 Alan Kay) - voters cut 8 foreign policy/national security items the most out of 20 budget spending categories.

5.See summary tables for volunteered responses in the RNC Post Election Survey.

6.BQ/RNC National Survey (September 26-28, 1992) done by Market Strategies, Inc.


7.Based on October tracking interviews.

National Three-Way Trial Heats with Likely Voters



BQ Strategic Information: November 3, 1992
 Trends are of results since GOP convention

National Three-Way Trial Heats with Likely Voters



BQ Strategic Information: October 30, 1992

Actual: Bush ● Clinton * Perot △
 Trend: ———·····- - - -


1992 National Three-way General Election Trial Ballots

Field Dates	Bush pct	Clinton pct	Perot pct	Und pct	Margin	N	Pop	Source/Vendor
11/02-11/02	38	44	17	1	-6	1615	LV	Harris Poll
11/01-11/02	37	44	14	5	-7	1589	LV	USA Today/CNN/Gallup
10/31-11/02	37	45	15	3	-8	.	LV	CBS/NYT
11/01-11/01	36	44	15	5	-8	.	LV	NBC/WSJ
11/01-11/01	32	43	19	6	-11	335	LV	BQ (MSI)
10/31-11/01	37	44	16	3	-7	.	LV	ABC News
10/30-11/01	37	43	16	4	-6	1675	LV	Harris Poll
10/30-10/31	36	43	15	6	-7	1600	LV	USA Today/CNN/Gallup
10/29-10/30	38	41	18	3	-3	900	LV	ABC News
10/29-10/30	35	43	16	6	-8	.	LV	CBS/NYT
10/28-10/29	40	41	14	5	-1	1600	LV	USA Today/CNN/Gallup
10/28-10/29	39	41	14	6	-2	808	LV	Newsweek (Gallup)
10/27-10/29	39	39	17	5	.	517	LV	BQ (MSI)
10/27-10/29	35	45	15	5	-10	1353	LV	CBS/NYT
10/27-10/28	37	43	13	7	-6	1158	LV	NBC/WSJ
10/27-10/28	35	44	16	5	-9	903	LV	ABC News
10/26-10/27	38	40	16	6	-2	1217	LV	USA Today/CNN/Gallup
10/23-10/27	34	44	19	3	-10	1837	LV	Wash Post
10/25-10/26	34	41	21	4	-7	898	LV	ABC News
10/24-10/26	34	44	18	4	-10	1126	LV	L.A. Times
10/23-10/26	35	40	18	7	-5	563	LV	BQ (MSI)
10/24-10/25	34	43	17	6	-9	800	LV	USA Today/CNN/Gallup
10/22-10/24	34	44	17	5	-10	1130	LV	ABC News
10/20-10/23	37	42	17	4	-5	1369	LV	CBS/NYT
10/20-10/22	37	40	19	4	-3	891	LV	Time/CNN (YCS)
10/20-10/22	32	46	18	4	-14	1021	LV	Harris Poll
10/19-10/22	34	42	20	4	-8	1078	LV	Wash Post
10/19-10/22	32	41	20	7	-9	1473	LV	BQ (MSI)
10/20-10/21	32	43	17	8	-11	909	LV	ABC News
10/18-10/19	30	46	15	9	-16	900	LV	ABC News
10/11-10/18	34	45	14	7	-11	1929	LV	BQ (MSI)
10/15-10/17	31	49	12	8	-18	1310	LV	ABC News
10/13-10/14	37	44	11	8	-7	896	LV	ABC News
10/11-10/12	34	46	11	9	-12	900	LV	ABC News
10/09-10/10	35	49	6	10	-14	900	LV	ABC News
10/03-10/10	34	49	8	9	-15	937	LV	BQ (MSI)
10/05-10/08	36	48	6	10	-12	900	LV	ABC News
10/02-10/04	41	46	9	4	-5	934	LV	CBS/NYT
10/02-10/04	35	48	9	8	-13	799	LV	ABC/Post
10/02-10/04	36	53	9	2	-17	1015	LV	Harris Poll
09/23-09/27	35	44	9	12	-9	1861	LV	CBS/NYT
09/23-09/27	39	44	14	3	-5	616	LV	ABC/Post
09/22-09/24	32	43	17	8	-11	848	LV	Time/CNN (YCS)
09/21-09/23	32	45	20	4	-13	900	LV	ABC News
09/16-09/20	31	50	12	7	-19	637	LV	ABC/Post
09/09-09/13	35	42	13	10	-7	1006	LV	CBS/NYT

Pop(ulation): LV=Likely Voters
RV=Registered Voters
Ad=Adults

03 Nov 92

1992 Presidential Election Result




T

 Bush State
168 EV's



 Clinton State
370 EV's

Market Strategies, Inc.

1992 Bush-Clinton Margin



1992 Perot Vote



November 13, 1992

Alphabetical by State

State	Elec Votes	Clinton %	Bush %	Perot %	Bush Over Clinton	Cumulative Elec Votes
Alabama	9	41	48	11	7	9
Alaska	3	32	41	27	9	12
Arizona	8	37	39	24	2	20
Arkansas	6	54	36	11	-18	26
California	54	47	32	21	-15	80
Colorado	8	40	36	23	-4	88
Connecticut	8	42	36	22	-6	96
Delaware	3	44	36	21	-8	99
DC	3	86	9	4	-77	102
Florida	25	39	41	20	2	127
Georgia	13	44	43	13	-1	140
Hawaii	4	49	37	14	-12	144
Idaho	4	29	43	28	14	148
Illinois	22	48	35	17	-13	170
Indiana	12	37	43	20	6	182
Iowa	7	44	38	19	-6	189
Kansas	6	34	39	27	5	195
Kentucky	8	45	42	14	-3	203
Louisiana	9	46	42	12	-4	212
Maine	4	39	31	30	-8	216
Maryland	10	50	36	14	-14	226
Massachusetts	12	48	29	23	-19	238
Michigan	18	44	37	19	-7	256
Minnesota	10	44	32	24	-12	266
Mississippi	7	41	50	9	9	273
Missouri	11	44	34	22	-10	284
Montana	3	38	36	26	-2	287
Nebraska	5	30	47	24	17	292
Nevada	4	38	35	27	-3	296
New Hampshire	4	39	38	23	-1	300
New Jersey	15	43	41	16	-2	315
New Mexico	5	46	38	16	-8	320
New York	33	50	34	16	-16	353
North Carolina	14	43	44	14	1	367
North Dakota	3	32	44	23	12	370
Ohio	21	40	39	21	-1	391
Oklahoma	8	34	43	23	9	399
Oregon	7	43	32	25	-11	406
Pennsylvania	23	45	36	18	-9	429
Rhode Island	4	48	29	23	-19	433
South Carolina	8	40	48	12	8	441
South Dakota	3	37	41	22	4	444
Tennessee	11	47	43	10	-4	455
Texas	32	37	40	22	3	487
Utah	5	26	46	29	20	492
Vermont	3	46	31	23	-15	495
Virginia	13	41	45	14	4	508
Washington	11	44	31	24	-13	519
West Virginia	5	49	36	16	-13	524
Wisconsin	11	41	37	22	-4	535
Wyoming	3	34	40	26	6	538

November 13, 1992

Rank-Ordered by Bush Vote

State	Elec Votes	Clinton %	Bush %	Perot %	Bush Over Clinton	Cumulative Elec Votes
Mississippi	7	41	50	9	9	7
South Carolina	8	40	48	12	8	15
Alabama	9	41	48	11	7	24
Nebraska	5	30	47	24	17	29
Utah	5	26	46	29	20	34
Virginia	13	41	45	14	4	47
North Dakota	3	32	44	23	12	50
North Carolina	14	43	44	14	1	64
Idaho	4	29	43	28	14	68
Indiana	12	37	43	20	6	80
Georgia	13	44	43	13	-1	93
Tennessee	11	47	43	10	-4	104
Oklahoma	8	34	43	23	9	112
Kentucky	8	45	42	14	-3	120
Louisiana	9	46	42	12	-4	129
Florida	25	39	41	20	2	154
New Jersey	15	43	41	16	-2	169
South Dakota	3	37	41	22	4	172
Alaska	3	32	41	27	9	175
Texas	32	37	40	22	3	207
Wyoming	3	34	40	26	6	210
Kansas	6	34	39	27	5	216
Arizona	8	37	39	24	2	224
Ohio	21	40	39	21	-1	245
New Mexico	5	46	38	16	-8	250
New Hampshire	4	39	38	23	-1	254
Iowa	7	44	38	19	-6	261
Hawaii	4	49	37	14	-12	265
Michigan	18	44	37	19	-7	283
Wisconsin	11	41	37	22	-4	294
Colorado	8	40	36	23	-4	302
Pennsylvania	23	45	36	18	-9	325
Arkansas	6	54	36	11	-18	331
Delaware	3	44	36	21	-8	334
Montana	3	38	36	26	-2	337
West Virginia	5	49	36	16	-13	342
Maryland	10	50	36	14	-14	352
Connecticut	8	42	36	22	-6	360
Illinois	22	48	35	17	-13	382
Nevada	4	38	35	27	-3	386
Missouri	11	44	34	22	-10	397
New York	33	50	34	16	-16	430
California	54	47	32	21	-15	484
Minnesota	10	44	32	24	-12	494
Oregon	7	43	32	25	-11	501
Maine	4	39	31	30	-8	505
Vermont	3	46	31	23	-15	508
Washington	11	44	31	24	-13	519
Rhode Island	4	48	29	23	-19	523
Massachusetts	12	48	29	23	-19	535
DC	3	86	9	4	-77	538

November 13, 1992

Rank-Ordered by Clinton Vote

State	Elec Votes	Clinton %	Bush %	Perot %	Bush Over Clinton	Cumulative Elec Votes
DC	3	86	9	4	-77	3
Arkansas	6	54	36	11	-18	9
New York	33	50	34	16	-16	42
Maryland	10	50	36	14	-14	52
Hawaii	4	49	37	14	-12	56
West Virginia	5	49	36	16	-13	61
Massachusetts	12	48	29	23	-19	73
Rhode Island	4	48	29	23	-19	77
Illinois	22	48	35	17	-13	99
California	54	47	32	21	-15	153
Tennessee	11	47	43	10	-4	164
Vermont	3	46	31	23	-15	167
Louisiana	9	46	42	12	-4	176
New Mexico	5	46	38	16	-8	181
Pennsylvania	23	45	36	18	-9	204
Kentucky	8	45	42	14	-3	212
Delaware	3	44	36	21	-8	215
Michigan	18	44	37	19	-7	233
Iowa	7	44	38	19	-6	240
Georgia	13	44	43	13	-1	253
Washington	11	44	31	24	-13	264
Missouri	11	44	34	22	-10	275
Minnesota	10	44	32	24	-12	285
North Carolina	14	43	44	14	1	299
New Jersey	15	43	41	16	-2	314
Oregon	7	43	32	25	-11	321
Connecticut	8	42	36	22	-6	329
Virginia	13	41	45	14	4	342
Wisconsin	11	41	37	22	-4	353
Alabama	9	41	48	11	7	362
Mississippi	7	41	50	9	9	369
South Carolina	8	40	48	12	8	377
Colorado	8	40	36	23	-4	385
Ohio	21	40	39	21	-1	406
Florida	25	39	41	20	2	431
Maine	4	39	31	30	-8	435
New Hampshire	4	39	38	23	-1	439
Nevada	4	38	35	27	-3	443
Montana	3	38	36	26	-2	446
Indiana	12	37	43	20	6	458
Texas	32	37	40	22	3	490
Arizona	8	37	39	24	2	498
South Dakota	3	37	41	22	4	501
Wyoming	3	34	40	26	6	504
Oklahoma	8	34	43	23	9	512
Kansas	6	34	39	27	5	518
North Dakota	3	32	44	23	12	521
Alaska	3	32	41	27	9	524
Nebraska	5	30	47	24	17	529
Idaho	4	29	43	28	14	533
Utah	5	26	46	29	20	538

Rank-Ordered by Perot Vote

State	Elec Votes	Clinton %	Bush %	Perot %	Bush Over Clinton	Cumulative Elec Votes
Maine	4	39	31	30	-8	4
Utah	5	26	46	29	20	9
Idaho	4	29	43	28	14	13
Alaska	3	32	41	27	9	16
Nevada	4	38	35	27	-3	20
Kansas	6	34	39	27	5	26
Wyoming	3	34	40	26	6	29
Montana	3	38	36	26	-2	32
Oregon	7	43	32	25	-11	39
Minnesota	10	44	32	24	-12	49
Arizona	8	37	39	24	2	57
Nebraska	5	30	47	24	17	62
Washington	11	44	31	24	-13	73
Colorado	8	40	36	23	-4	81
Massachusetts	12	48	29	23	-19	93
New Hampshire	4	39	38	23	-1	97
Rhode Island	4	48	29	23	-19	101
North Dakota	3	32	44	23	12	104
Oklahoma	8	34	43	23	9	112
Vermont	3	46	31	23	-15	115
Wisconsin	11	41	37	22	-4	126
Texas	32	37	40	22	3	158
South Dakota	3	37	41	22	4	161
Missouri	11	44	34	22	-10	172
Connecticut	8	42	36	22	-6	180
Delaware	3	44	36	21	-8	183
Ohio	21	40	39	21	-1	204
California	54	47	32	21	-15	258
Florida	25	39	41	20	2	283
Indiana	12	37	43	20	6	295
Michigan	18	44	37	19	-7	313
Iowa	7	44	38	19	-6	320
Pennsylvania	23	45	36	18	-9	343
Illinois	22	48	35	17	-13	365
New York	33	50	34	16	-16	398
New Mexico	5	46	38	16	-8	403
West Virginia	5	49	36	16	-13	408
New Jersey	15	43	41	16	-2	423
Maryland	10	50	36	14	-14	433
Kentucky	8	45	42	14	-3	441
Hawaii	4	49	37	14	-12	445
North Carolina	14	43	44	14	1	459
Virginia	13	41	45	14	4	472
Georgia	13	44	43	13	-1	485
South Carolina	8	40	48	12	8	493
Louisiana	9	46	42	12	-4	502
Arkansas	6	54	36	11	-18	508
Alabama	9	41	48	11	7	517
Tennessee	11	47	43	10	-4	528
Mississippi	7	41	50	9	9	535
DC	3	86	9	4	-77	538

November 13, 1992

Rank-Ordered by Bush Margin Over Clinton

State	Elec Votes	Clinton %	Bush %	Perot %	Bush Over Clinton	Cumulative Elec Votes
Utah	5	26	46	29	20	5
Nebraska	5	30	47	24	17	10
Idaho	4	29	43	28	14	14
North Dakota	3	32	44	23	12	17
Mississippi	7	41	50	9	9	24
Alaska	3	32	41	27	9	27
Oklahoma	8	34	43	23	9	35
South Carolina	8	40	48	12	8	43
Alabama	9	41	48	11	7	52
Indiana	12	37	43	20	6	64
Wyoming	3	34	40	26	6	67
Kansas	6	34	39	27	5	73
Virginia	13	41	45	14	4	86
South Dakota	3	37	41	22	4	89
Texas	32	37	40	22	3	121
Florida	25	39	41	20	2	146
Arizona	8	37	39	24	2	154
North Carolina	14	43	44	14	1	168
Georgia	13	44	43	13	-1	181
New Hampshire	4	39	38	23	-1	185
Ohio	21	40	39	21	-1	206
Montana	3	38	36	26	-2	209
New Jersey	15	43	41	16	-2	224
Nevada	4	38	35	27	-3	228
Kentucky	8	45	42	14	-3	236
Louisiana	9	46	42	12	-4	245
Wisconsin	11	41	37	22	-4	256
Colorado	8	40	36	23	-4	264
Tennessee	11	47	43	10	-4	275
Connecticut	8	42	36	22	-6	283
Iowa	7	44	38	19	-6	290
Michigan	18	44	37	19	-7	308
Maine	4	39	31	30	-8	312
New Mexico	5	46	38	16	-8	317
Delaware	3	44	36	21	-8	320
Pennsylvania	23	45	36	18	-9	343
Missouri	11	44	34	22	-10	354
Oregon	7	43	32	25	-11	361
Minnesota	10	44	32	24	-12	371
Hawaii	4	49	37	14	-12	375
West Virginia	5	49	36	16	-13	380
Illinois	22	48	35	17	-13	402
Washington	11	44	31	24	-13	413
Maryland	10	50	36	14	-14	423
California	54	47	32	21	-15	477
Vermont	3	46	31	23	-15	480
New York	33	50	34	16	-16	513
Arkansas	6	54	36	11	-18	519
Rhode Island	4	48	29	23	-19	523
Massachusetts	12	48	29	23	-19	535
DC	3	86	9	4	-77	538

STATE-BY-STATE TALLY

Candidate State	Clinton (D)		Bush (R)		Perot (I)		Electoral Votes			
	Votes	%	Votes	%	Votes	%	Clinton	Bush	Perot	
Alabama	686571	41	798439	48	180514	11			9	
Alaska	63498	32	81875	41	55085	27			3	
Arizona	525031	37	548148	39	341148	24			8	
Arkansas	498548	54	333909	36	98215	11	6			
California	4815039	47	3341726	32	2147409	21	54			
Colorado	626207	40	557706	36	362813	23	8			
Connecticut	680276	42	575778	36	347638	22	8			
Delaware	125997	44	102436	36	59061	21	3			
District of Columbia	186301	86	19813	9	9284	4	3			
Florida	2051845	39	2137752	41	1041607	20			25	
Georgia	1005889	44	989804	43	307857	13	13			
Hawaii	178893	49	136430	37	52863	14	4			
Idaho	136249	29	201787	43	129897	28			4	
Illinois	2379510	48	1718190	35	832484	17	22			
Indiana	829176	37	970457	43	448431	20			12	
Iowa	583669	44	503077	38	251795	19	7			
Kansas	386832	34	444599	39	310458	27			6	
Kentucky	664246	45	616517	42	203682	14	8			
Louisiana	815305	46	729880	42	210604	12	9			
Maine	261859	39	207122	31	205076	30	4			
Maryland	941979	50	671609	36	271198	14	10			
Massachusetts	1315016	48	804534	29	630440	23	12			
Michigan	1858275	44	1587105	37	820855	19	18			
Minnesota	998552	44	737649	32	552705	24	10			
Mississippi	392929	41	481583	50	84496	9			7	
Missouri	1053040	44	811057	34	518250	22	11			
Montana	153899	38	143702	36	106869	26	3			
Nebraska	214064	30	339108	47	172043	24			5	
Nevada	185401	38	171378	35	129532	27	4			
New Hampshire	207264	39	199623	38	120029	23	4			
New Jersey	1366609	43	1309724	41	505698	16	15			
New Mexico	259500	46	212393	38	91539	16	5			
New York	3246787	50	2241283	34	1029038	16	33			
North Carolina	1103716	43	1122608	44	353845	14			14	
North Dakota	98927	32	135498	44	70806	23			3	
Ohio	1965204	40	1876445	39	1024598	21	21			
Oklahoma	473066	34	592929	43	319978	23			8	
Oregon	525123	43	394356	32	307860	25	7			
Pennsylvania	2224897	45	1778221	36	896177	18	23			
Rhode Island	198924	48	121916	29	94787	23	4			
South Carolina	476626	40	573231	48	138140	12			8	
South Dakota	124861	37	136671	41	73297	22			3	
Tennessee	933520	47	840899	43	199787	10	11			
Texas	2279269	37	2460334	40	1349947	22			32	
Utah	182850	26	320559	46	202605	29			5	
Vermont	125803	46	85512	31	61510	23	3			
Virginia	1034781	41	1147226	45	344852	14			13	
Washington	855710	44	609912	31	470239	24	11			
West Virginia	326936	49	239103	36	106367	16	5			
Wisconsin	1035943	41	926245	37	542660	22	11			
Wyoming	67863	34	79558	40	51209	26			3	
Total	43728275	43	38167416	38	19237247	19	370	168	0	9

PRELIMINARY TURNOUT ESTIMATES

Rank	State	Turnout
1	Maine	73%
2	Minnesota	71%
3	Montana	70%
4	Wisconsin	70%
5	Utah	68%
6	Idaho	68%
7	Hawaii	67%
8	South Dakota	65%
9	North Dakota	64%
10	Vermont	64%
11	Connecticut	64%
12	Colorado	64%
13	Missouri	64%
14	New Hampshire	62%
15	Nebraska	62%
16	Kansas	62%
17	Michigan	62%
18	Wyoming	61%
19	Iowa	61%
20	Massachusetts	61%
21	Ohio	60%
22	Oregon	59%
23	Oklahoma	59%
24	Nevada	59%
25	Louisiana	58%
26	Delaware	56%
27	Indiana	55%
28	Alabama	55%
29	Alaska	54%
30	Washington	54%
31	Arizona	54%
32	Rhode Island	54%
33	New Jersey	54%
34	Kentucky	54%
35	Pennsylvania	53%
36	Arkansas	53%
37	Maryland	53%
38	Virginia	52%
39	Tennessee	52%
40	Illinois	52%
41	Florida	52%
42	New Mexico	51%
43	North Carolina	51%
44	Mississippi	51%
45	Texas	50%
46	West Virginia	49%
47	New York	48%
48	California	48%
49	Georgia	48%
50	South Carolina	46%
51	D.C.	43%

Note: Turnout figures are derived from statewide election returns (listed in *USA Today*) and the total voting age populations for each state for 1992 (listed in the *U.S. Statistical Abstract*).

EFFECT OF ROSS PEROT'S ABSENCE FROM PRESIDENTIAL RACE

	Second Choice of Perot Voters			
	Bush	Clinton	Other	No Vote
Nation	37%	38	6	14
Arizona	43%	35	5	15
California	31%	39	8	16
Colorado	36%	38	6	18
Connecticut	32%	44	6	15
Florida	37%	33	6	20
Georgia	42%	40	4	9
Indiana	43%	35	5	15
Kentucky	30%	47	5	12
Louisiana	36%	40	4	19
Michigan	36%	43	4	15
Minnesota	37%	41	7	12
Missouri	37%	40	3	15
North Carolina	39%	38	2	18
New Hampshire	36%	33	11	13
New Jersey	42%	34	6	14
New York	35%	43	6	13
Ohio	41%	32	4	19
Oregon	21%	46	7	20
Pennsylvania	34%	38	7	18
Tennessee	57%	30	7	4
Texas	47%	33	5	11
Washington	34%	45	5	12
Wisconsin	31%	39	7	15

The 1992 VRS exit poll asked voters in several states what they would have done had Perot not been in the race. Nationwide, this second choice vote split evenly between Bush (37%) and Clinton (38%); 6% would have chosen other third-party candidates and 14% said they would have stayed home. The table above outlines how this vote was distributed in the states where the question was asked. In those states where one candidate carried the popular vote and the other candidate carried the Perot second choice vote, we proportionally reassigned Perot's actual vote totals to Bush and Clinton. Clinton would have held Georgia, New Jersey, and Tennessee --- but the President would have pulled within 2,900 votes in New Hampshire. Only in Ohio did the Perot second choice vote boost Bush over the top. Had Perot not been in the race, the President would have defeated Clinton by 3,455 votes in the Buckeye state --- for a total of 21 electoral votes. It should be noted that we do not have exit poll data available on this question for all states, and the new vote margins in New Hampshire and Ohio are within the poll's margin of error.

EFFECT OF ROSS PEROT'S ABSENCE FROM PRESIDENTIAL RACE

	Second Choice of Perot Voters			
	Bush	Clinton	Other	No Vote
Nation	37%	38	6	14
Arizona	43%	35	5	15
California	31%	39	8	16
Colorado	36%	38	6	18
Connecticut	32%	44	6	15
Florida	37%	33	6	20
Georgia	42%	40	4	9
Indiana	43%	35	5	15
Kentucky	30%	47	5	12
Louisiana	36%	40	4	19
Michigan	36%	43	4	15
Minnesota	37%	41	7	12
Missouri	37%	40	3	15
North Carolina	39%	38	2	18
New Hampshire	36%	33	11	13
New Jersey	42%	34	6	14
New York	35%	43	6	13
Ohio	41%	32	4	19
Oregon	21%	46	7	20
Pennsylvania	34%	38	7	18
Tennessee	57%	30	7	4
Texas	47%	33	5	11
Washington	34%	45	5	12
Wisconsin	31%	39	7	15

The 1992 VRS exit poll asked voters in several states what they would have done had Perot not been in the race. Nationwide, this second choice vote split evenly between Bush (37%) and Clinton (38%); 6% would have chosen other third-party candidates and 14% said they would have stayed home. The table above outlines how this vote was distributed in the states where the question was asked. In those states where one candidate carried the popular vote and the other candidate carried the Perot second choice vote, we proportionally reassigned Perot's actual vote totals to Bush and Clinton. Clinton would have held Georgia, New Jersey, and Tennessee --- but the President would have pulled within 2,900 votes in New Hampshire. Only in Ohio did the Perot second choice vote boost Bush over the top. Had Perot not been in the race, the President would have defeated Clinton by 3,455 votes in the Buckeye state --- for a total of 21 electoral votes. It should be noted that we do not have exit poll data available on this question for all states, and the new vote margins in New Hampshire and Ohio are within the poll's margin of error.

Notes

ELECTORAL VOTE ANALYSIS

We compared the explanatory power of models ranking the states' Republican potential based on polling data versus using a theoretical ranking based on past elections for the 1992 presidential election. Correlation analysis shows that the theoretical model is more associated with the final rank-order than are rank-orders from poll results in the summer and early fall. However, the poll results from election eve are the most highly associated with the actual outcome.

State Rank-Order Models	Correlation with Actual Rank-Order
Ranking Combining Theoretical and Final Poll Data	0.931
Ranking Using Nov. 3, 1992 Poll Data	0.923
Theoretical Rank Order	0.732
Ranking Using July 6, 1992 Poll Data	0.724
Ranking Using Sept. 20, 1992 Poll Data	0.718

Note: Correlation scores are etas from a comparison of the rank-orders of states.

ANALYSIS OF STATES' RANK-ORDER BY REPUBLICAN POTENTIAL

Original Ranking and EV's (May, 1991)	Cum. EV's	Final Ranking and Poll Margin (Nov. 03, 1992)	Cum. EV's	Actual Ranking by Margin	Cum. EV's
1 Utah (5)	5	1 Utah (+17)	5	1 Utah (+20)	5
2 Idaho (4)	9	2 Nebraska (+9)	10	2 Nebraska (+17)	10
3 Nebraska (5)	14	3 Wyoming (+3) ↓	13	3 Idaho (+14)	14
4 Wyoming (3)	17	4 Idaho (+14)	17	4 N. Dakota (+12)	17
5 Nevada (4)	21	5 N. Dakota (+5)	20	5 Mississippi (+9) ↑	24
6 N. Dakota (3)	24	6 Arizona (-4) ↓	28	6 Alaska (+9)	27
7 N. Hampshire (4)	28	7 Nevada (-3) ↓	32	7 Oklahoma (+9)	35
8 Arizona (8)	36	8 Kansas (+2)	38	8 S. Carolina (+8)	43
9 Alaska (3)	39	9 Indiana (+4)	50	9 Alabama (+7)	52
10 Oklahoma (8)	47	10 S. Carolina (+5)	58	10 Wyoming (+6) ↓	55
11 Kansas (6)	53	11 Alaska (-4)	61	11 Indiana (+6)	67
12 S. Dakota (3)	56	12 Florida (+5)	86	12 Kansas (+5)	73
13 Colorado (8)	64	13 Virginia (+5)	99	13 Virginia (+5)	86
14 Florida (25)	89	14 Oklahoma (+6)	107	14 S. Dakota (+4) ↑	89
15 Montana (3)	92	15 Mississippi (+4) ↑	114	15 Texas (+3)	121
16 Indiana (12)	104	16 Alabama (+8)	123	16 Florida (+2)	146
17 Texas (32)	136	17 Texas (+0)	155	17 Arizona (+1) ↓	154
18 New Mexico (5)	141	18 N. Carolina (-4)	169	18 N. Carolina (+1)	168
19 Virginia (13)	154	19 Montana (-5)	172	19 Georgia (-1) ↑	181
20 New Jersey (15)	169	20 Colorado (-7) ↓	180	20 N. Hampshire (-1) ↑	185
21 California (54)	223	21 S. Dakota (-1) ↑	183	21 Ohio (-1)	206
22 Connecticut (8)	231	22 Ohio (-3)	204	22 New Jersey (-2)	221
23 S. Carolina (8)	239	23 New Mexico (-11) ↓	209	23 Montana (-2)	224
24 Ohio (21)	260	24 Michigan (-16) ↓	227	24 Nevada (-3) ↓	228
25 Louisiana (9)	269	25 Georgia (+4) ↑	240	25 Kentucky (-3)	236
26 Missouri (11)	280	26 New Jersey (-9)	255	26 Wisconsin (-4) ↑	247
27 N. Carolina (14)	294	27 Kentucky (-8)	263	27 Colorado (-4) ↓	255
28 Mississippi (7)	301	28 Delaware (-5) ↓	266	28 Louisiana (-4) ↑	264
29 Michigan (18)	319	29 New Hampshire (-7) ↑	270	29 Tennessee (-4)	275
30 Maine (4)	323	30 Maine (-8)	274	30 Connecticut (-6)	283
31 Washington (11)	334	31 Connecticut (-10)	282	31 Iowa (-6)	290
32 Alabama (9)	343	32 Tennessee (-7)	293	32 Michigan (-7) ↓	308
33 Arkansas (6)	349	33 Wisconsin (-3) ↑	304	33 Maine (-8)	312
34 Kentucky (8)	357	34 Iowa (-7)	311	34 New Mexico (-8) ↓	317
35 Vermont (3)	360	35 Vermont (-7) ↓	314	35 Delaware (-8) ↓	320
36 Delaware (3)	363	36 Missouri (-15)	325	36 Pennsylvania (-9)	343
37 Oregon (7)	370	37 Louisiana (-14) ↑	334	37 Missouri (-10)	354
38 Illinois (22)	392	38 Pennsylvania (-15)	357	38 Oregon (-11)	361
39 Iowa (7)	399	39 Washington (-23)	368	39 Hawaii (-12)	365
40 Tennessee (11)	410	40 Maryland (-14)	378	40 Minnesota (-12)	375
41 Pennsylvania (23)	433	41 Illinois (-12)	400	41 Washington (-13)	386
42 Wisconsin (11)	444	42 California (-15)	454	42 Illinois (-13)	408
43 New York (33)	477	43 Oregon (-15)	461	43 W. Virginia (-13)	413
44 Hawaii (4)	481	44 New York (-20)	494	44 Maryland (-14)	423
45 W. Virginia (5)	486	45 Hawaii (-14)	498	45 California (-15)	477
46 Georgia (13)	499	46 W. Virginia (-14)	503	46 Vermont (-15) ↓	480
47 Maryland (10)	509	47 Mass. (-21)	515	47 New York (-16)	513
48 Mass. (12)	521	48 Minnesota (-16)	525	48 Arkansas (-18)	519
49 Minnesota (10)	531	49 Rhode Isl. (-21)	529	49 Rhode Isl. (-19)	523
50 Rhode Isl. (4)	535	50 Arkansas (-21)	535	50 Mass. (-19)	535
51 D.C. (3)	538	51 D.C. (-54)	538	51 D.C. (-77)	538

November 15, 1992

5 1st
1770700

ANALYSIS OF STATES' RANK ORDER BY REPUBLICAN POTENTIAL

States and EV's	May, 1991 (Original Ranking)	Sept. 04, 1992	Oct. 08, 1992	Nov. 03, 1992	Actual Ranking
Utah (5)	1	1	1	1	1
Idaho (4)	2	4	4	4	3
Nebraska (5)	3	2	2	2	2
Wyoming (3)	4	3	3	3	10 +7
Nevada (4)	5	8	7	7	24 +17
North Dakota (3)	6	5	5	5	4
New Hampshire (4)	7	6	12	29	20 -9
Arizona (8)	8	7	6	6	17 +11
Alaska (3)	9	20	11	11	6
Oklahoma (8)	10	15	15	14	7 -7
Kansas (6)	11	9	8	8	12
South Dakota (3)	12	22	22	21	14 -7
Colorado (8)	13	13	21	20	27 +7
Florida (25)	14	12	13	12	16
Montana (3)	15	21	20	19	23
Indiana (12)	16	10	9	9	11
Texas (32)	17	18	18	17	15
New Mexico (5)	18	25	25	23	34 +11
Virginia (13)	19	14	14	13	13
New Jersey (15)	20	29	29	26	22
California (54)	21	42	42	42	45
Connecticut (8)	22	30	32	31	30
South Carolina (8)	23	11	10	10	8
Ohio (21)	24	23	23	22	21
Louisiana (9)	25	24	24	37	28 -9
Missouri (11)	26	32	29	36	37
North Carolina (14)	27	19	19	18	18
Mississippi (7)	28	16	16	15	5 -10
Michigan (18)	29	26	26	24	32 +8
Maine (4)	30	27	27	30	33
Washington (11)	31	33	37	39	41
Alabama (9)	32	17	17	16	9 -7
Arkansas (6)	33	50	50	50	48
Kentucky (8)	34	31	30	27	25
Vermont (3)	35	34	35	35	46 +11
Delaware (3)	36	35	31	28	35 +7
Oregon (7)	37	43	43	43	38
Illinois (22)	38	41	41	41	42
Iowa (7)	39	36	39	34	31
Tennessee (11)	40	39	34	32	29
Pennsylvania (23)	41	37	38	38	36
Wisconsin (11)	42	38	36	33	26 -7
New York (33)	43	44	44	44	47
Hawaii (4)	44	45	45	45	39 -6
West Virginia (5)	45	46	46	46	44
Georgia (13)	46	28	28	25	19 -6
Maryland (10)	47	40	40	40	43
Massachusetts (12)	48	47	47	47	50
Minnesota (10)	49	48	48	48	40
Rhode Island (4)	50	49	49	49	49
District of Columbia (3)	51	51	51	51	51

November 15, 1992

SECOND CHOICE OF PEROT VOTERS

Perot had a detrimental effect on the President in Southern and Mountain States. In these states, about 50% of Perot voters said the President was their second choice, compared to around 38% who chose Clinton. This means that 3 out of 5 Perot voters with a second preference favored the President. The effect was a siphoning off of 2-3 points from the President in the Mountain States, and 1-2 points in the South.

In all but one of the other regions, Perot voters broke evenly when asked their second choice. The outlying case in all of this is the West North Central region; the President seems to have gained because of Perot's presence, though the finding may be a function of the small number of cases of Perot voters (N=76).

In the attached table, the states are rank-ordered by Republican Presidential vote correcting for Perot. Perot voters are allocated evenly, except in the Southern and Mountain States where 60% go to the President and 40% to Clinton. The net impact of Perot on the President was -20 electoral votes. He probably cost us the states of Montana, Nevada, and Georgia. However, Perot's presence did not cost the President the battleground states of Ohio, New Jersey, and Louisiana.

SECOND CHOICE OF PEROT VOTERS BY POLITICAL REGION

(Data are from October 3-November 1, 1992 BQ/MSI National Tracking Survey)

	Bush	Clinton	None	Other/ DK/ Ref	N
Political Region					
New England	44%	41	10	6	69
Mid-Atlantic	41%	41	12	6	102
East North-Central	39%	44	17	--	159
West North-Central	39%	51	7	3	76
South	50% ✓	39	9	2	286
Mountains	48% ✓	36	9	8	55
Pacific	39%	44	11	7	151
Total	44%	42	11	4	899

1992 REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL VOTE

(correcting for Perot)

State	Bush Percentage	3-Way Winner	2-Way Winner	EV's	Cum. EV's
Nebraska	61	Bush	Bush	5	5
Utah	59	Bush	Bush	5	10
Idaho	58	Bush	Bush	4	14
North Dakota	58	Bush	Bush	3	17
Oklahoma	57	Bush	Bush	8	25
Wyoming	56	Bush	Bush	3	28
Alaska	56	Bush	Bush	3	31
South Carolina	55	Bush	Bush	8	39
Mississippi	55	Bush	Bush	7	46
Alabama	55	Bush	Bush	9	55
Indiana	55	Bush	Bush	12	67
Kansas	55	Bush	Bush	6	73
South Dakota	54	Bush	Bush	3	76
Florida	53	Bush	Bush	25	101
Virginia	53	Bush	Bush	13	114
Texas	53	Bush	Bush	32	146
Arizona	52	Bush	Bush	8	154
New Hampshire	52	Bush	Bush	4	158
Georgia	51	Bush	Clinton	13	171
North Carolina	51	Bush	Bush	14	185
Montana	50	Bush	Clinton	3	188
Nevada	50	Bush	Clinton	4	192
Ohio	49	Clinton	Clinton	21	213
New Jersey	49	Clinton	Clinton	15	228
Kentucky	49	Clinton	Clinton	8	236
Louisiana	48	Clinton	Clinton	9	245
Colorado	48	Clinton	Clinton	8	253
Wisconsin	48	Clinton	Clinton	11	264
Michigan	47	Clinton	Clinton	18	282
Connecticut	47	Clinton	Clinton	8	290
Maine	46	Clinton	Clinton	4	294
Tennessee	46	Clinton	Clinton	11	305
New Mexico	45	Clinton	Clinton	5	310
Pennsylvania	45	Clinton	Clinton	23	333
Iowa	45	Clinton	Clinton	7	340
Missouri	45	Clinton	Clinton	11	351
Delaware	43	Clinton	Clinton	3	354
California	43	Clinton	Clinton	54	408
Hawaii	43	Clinton	Clinton	4	412
Illinois	43	Clinton	Clinton	22	434
Oregon	42	Clinton	Clinton	7	441
Minnesota	42	Clinton	Clinton	10	451
Washington	41	Clinton	Clinton	11	462
Maryland	41	Clinton	Clinton	10	472
West Virginia	41	Clinton	Clinton	5	477
Vermont	40	Clinton	Clinton	3	480
New York	40	Clinton	Clinton	33	513
Arkansas	39	Clinton	Clinton	6	519
Rhode Island	38	Clinton	Clinton	4	523
Massachusetts	38	Clinton	Clinton	12	535
District of Columbia	10	Clinton	Clinton	3	538

Notes

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Post-Election Survey Analysis

Analysis of the Vote 1

Time of Voting Decision 8a

Who We Could Have Gotten 9

The Perot Vote 17

The Economy and the Vote 24

Voting Themes and Considerations 36

The Political Parties 49

ANALYSIS OF THE VOTE

General Findings

The self-reported vote in the national post-election survey (among those who voted for one of the three major candidates) breaks down as follows:

	Survey	Actual
Bush	36%	37%
Clinton	46	43
Perot	18	19
Other	1	1

With respect to the actual vote, the survey shows a 1 percentage point drop for the President, a 1 point drop for Ross Perot, and a 3 point increase for Bill Clinton. This movement is actually minimal, given the expected post-election inflation of the winner's vote.

Demographic Particulars

Among the basic political groups, the President does not do as well among Republicans as Clinton does among Democrats. The President carries behavioral Republicans by 67 points, while Clinton carries behavioral Democrats by 84 points. Similarly, Clinton takes liberals by 52 points, while the President's margin among conservatives is 31 points.

Exacerbating Clinton's advantage among partisans is his strength with swing groups. Clinton beats the President by 10 points with ticket-splitters, by 20 points with independents, and by 57 points with moderates. One of the more significant numbers of the election is "8"; that is the percent of the self-reported vote the President received from moderate/conservative Democrats.

Among demographic and social groups, several specific results warrant mention. First, gender and age influence candidate preferences. Among white voters, the President wins a plurality among men (42% to 38%) and those under 40 years of age (44% to 35%). Conversely, Clinton wins with white women (45% to 38%) and those 40 and over (47% to 36%). This age result is in marked contrast with exit polls which show the President doing very poorly among younger voters and tying with white women. Even taking into account our elimination of minority voters, the discrepancy remains pronounced. This finding is, however, consistent with pre-election tracking data which showed the President winning a plurality of younger white voters in the days before the election.

The President's apparent strength with younger voters is almost entirely a function of his support among young white men, where he holds a 47% to 31% advantage over Clinton. However, his poor showing among seniors holds across gender. In one of the focal groups for the reelection effort, the President ends up carrying white males between the age of 40 and 64 by a single point (40% to 39% for Clinton).

The President carries a plurality only among the high income segment of the status groups. Clinton garners more support among all other groups, though the margin is slim for the middle class (2 points).

Among non-minorities, marital and working status also influenced the vote--especially among women--though previous analyses reveal marital status to be the more powerful force. White working women and singles support Clinton over the President by 11 and 12 points, respectively. Among white non-working women, the President still trails Clinton by 2 points, while white married voters favor the President by 5 points.

The President manages to hold on to some core constituencies in Northern Protestants, Southern whites, and church-attenders, but by margins too slim to overcome Clinton's enormous advantages with minorities, Northern union members, Northern Catholics, and non-church attending Protestants.

SUBGROUP VOTING IN THE 1992 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

	Bush	Clinton	Perot	Bush Margin
White Southerners ¹	49%	36	15	+13
White Northerners ¹	43%	35	22	+ 8
Catholics ²	36%	44	20	- 8
Union Households ¹	29%	56	14	-27
Jews ²	12%	78	10	-66
Blacks ²	10%	83	7	-73
White Men ²	41%	37	22	+ 4
White Women ²	41%	41	18	0

¹RNC (MSI) Post Election Survey.

²VRS Exit Poll.

**REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTIAL VOTE OF PARTY COALITION GROUPS
1952-1992¹**

NEW DEAL GROUPS ²	ELECTION YEAR											
	1952-1956	1960	1964	1968a ³	1968b ³	1972	1976	1980	1984	1988	1992a	1992b
White Northern Protestants	77	79	51	75	76	77	64	66	76	70	43	65
Catholics	61	19	27	41	45	67	48	57	65	54	36	56
Northern Union Households	50	37	18	51	57	60	41	43	48	46	29	43
White Southerners	50	53	42	65	75	78	57	60	69	66	49	64
Hispanics ⁴	--	--	--	47	60	48	27	37	44	33	25	39
Jews ⁴	25	11	11	7	16	31	29	35	31	30	12	22
Blacks ⁴	28	29	1	3	3	13	5	13	11	10	10	17
Total Republican Vote	55%	49%	39%	44%	57%	61%	49%	51%	59%	54%	38%	57%

¹Source: NES/RNC Surveys.

²Groups are mutually exclusive.

³1968a/1992a presents the Republican vote only, 1968b/1992b presents the Republican vote and the Wallace/Perot vote of the group.

⁴1952-1976 NES Surveys. 1980-1992 exit polls.

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE			MARGIN	TARGET	Diff. from Target
		Bush	Clin- ton	Perot			
TOTAL.....	801	36%	46%	18%	-10	42	-6
VOTETYPE							
Behavioral Republican	225	75%	8%	17%	67	64	11
Ticket-Splitter.....	312	33%	43%	25%	-10	43	-10
Behavioral Democrat..	249	3%	87%	9%	-84	21	-18
PARTY IDENTIFICATION							
Strong Republican....	137	84%	4%	12%	80	71	13
Weak Republican.....	120	62%	15%	22%	47	64	-2
Lean Republican.....	108	57%	11%	32%✓	46	59	-2
Independent.....	47	30%	50%	21%	-20	40	-10
Lean Democratic.....	135	7%	73%	20%	-66	24	-17
Weak Democratic.....	102	11%	70%	19%	-59	28	-16
Strong Democratic....	152	1%	93%	7%	-92	14	-13
PARTY IDENTIFICATION							
Republican.....	365	69%	10%	21%	59	65	4
Independent.....	47	30%	50%	21%	-20	40	-10
Democratic.....	390	6%	80%	14%	-74	21	-15
IDEOLOGY							
Strong Conservative..	90	70%	18%	12%	53	56	15
Weak Conservative....	386	44%	34%	22%	10	48	-4
Moderate.....	49	16%	73%	11%	-57	30	-14
Weak Liberal.....	101	12%	68%	20%	-56	29	-18
Strong Liberal.....	176	19%	69%	12%	-50	34	-15
IDEOLOGY/PARTY							
Consrv Republican....	288	72%	7%	20%	65	65	7
Mod/Lib Republican...	77	56%	20%	24%	36	63	-7
Independent.....	47	30%	50%	21%	-20	40	-10
Mod/Consrv Democrat..	193	8%	75%	17%	-68	21	-14
Lib Democrat.....	196	3%	84%	12%	-81	21	-17
GOP CENTER-RIGHT BASE							
Center-Right Base....	438	54%	27%	20%	27	52	2
Else.....	363	14%	70%	16%	-56	30	-16
CORE DEMOCRATS							
Core Democratic.....	183	1%	92%	7%	-91	14	-13
Else.....	618	46%	33%	21%	13	50	-4

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS

November 9-17, 1992

	N	THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE			MARGIN	TARGET	Diff. from Target
		Bush	Clin-ton	Perot			
GENDER*							
Men.....	345	42%	38%	21%	4	47	-6
Women.....	335	38%	45%	17%	-7	43	-5
AGE*							
18-24.....	55	36%	35%	29%	1	46	-10
25-39.....	219	46%	34%	20%	12	48	-2
40-64.....	266	37%	44%	19%	-6	44	-6
65+.....	135	35%	51%	14%	-17	43	-8
GENDER/AGE*							
Men, 18-39.....	147	47%	31%	23%	16	51	-4
Men, 40-64.....	134	40%	39%	22%	1	45	-6
Men, 65+.....	63	33%	53%	14%	-19	45	-11
Women, 18-39.....	128	41%	39%	20%	2	44	-3
Women, 40-64.....	132	35%	49%	16%	-14	42	-7
Women, 65+.....	72	36%	50%	14%	-14	42	-6
STATUS GROUPS							
High Income.....	264	42%	38%	20%	5	48	-6
Intelligentsia.....	74	36%	49%	15%	-13	47	-11
Middle Class.....	237	38%	40%	21%	-2	43	-5
Lower End.....	75	31%	54%	15%	-22	39	-8
Hispanics.....	34	35%	41%	24%	-6	44	-9
Jews.....	17	17%	72%	11%	-55	28	-11
Blacks.....	69	4%	91%	5%	-88	15	-11
GENDER/STATUS							
Men, High Income.....	147	43%	32%	26%	11	50	-7
Men, Intelligentsia..	38	42%	42%	16%	0	50	-8
Men, Middle Class....	124	41%	39%	19%	2	46	-5
Men, Lower End.....	26	35%	58%	8%	-23	38	-4
Men, Minorities.....	47	25%	62%	14%	-37	29	-5
Women, High Income...	117	42%	45%	13%	-3	45	-4
Women, Intelligentsia	36	30%	56%	14%	-26	44	-14
Women, Middle Class..	113	35%	41%	23%	-6	40	-5
Women, Lower End.....	49	30%	51%	19%	-22	40	-10
Women, Minorities....	74	8%	82%	10%	-75	22	-14
WORKING WOMEN							
Working Women*.....	180	37%	49%	14%	-12	43	-6
Non-Working Women*...	156	39%	40%	21%	-2	43	-5
Else.....	466	35%	47%	18%	-13	42	-7
MARITAL STATUS*							
Married.....	466	42%	37%	20%	5	46	-4
Single.....	120	37%	47%	16%	-11	45	-8
Else.....	215	21%	66%	13%	-44	32	-10

exit

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE			MARGIN	TARGET	Diff. from Target
		Bush	Clin-ton	Perot			
GENDER/MARITAL STATUS*							
Men, Married.....	247	45%	33%	22%	12	48✓	-3
Men, Single.....	73	30%	51%	18%	-21	44	-14
Men, Other.....	24	37%	46%	17%	-9	49✓	-12
Women, Married.....	218	39%	42%✓	19%	-3	44	-5
Women, Single.....	47	47%	41%✓	13%	6	46	0
Women, Other.....	70	27%	57%✓	15%	-30	37	-10
CULTURAL GROUPS							
Northern Protestants.	230	43%	35%	22%	8	49	-7
Northern Catholics...	100	27%	46%	27%	-18	42	-15
Northern Union.....	124	29%	56%	14%	-27	38	-9
Southern Whites.....	208	49%	36%	15%	13	47	2
Minorities.....	120	14%	74%	11%	-60	25	-10
CHURCH ATTENDANCE*							
Protestants, Regular.	198	55%	31%	14%	24	52	3
Protestants, Non-....	258	36%	44%	20%	-9	44	-8
Catholics, Regular...	80	34%	49%	16%	-15	41	-6
Catholics, Non-....	95	25%	45%	30%	-20	40	-15
Seculars.....	27	30%	56%	14%	-26	43	-14
EVANG./FUND. CHRISTIANS							
Evan./Fund. Prots*...	334	44%	38%	18%	7	46	-1
Other Protestant*....	189	32%	53%	15%	-20	41	-9
Else.....	278	28%	52%	20%	-25	39	-11
POLITICAL REGIONS							
New England.....	49	34%	40%	27%	-6	44	-11
Mid-Atlantic.....	104	32%	51%	17%	-19	40	-8
Border South.....	58	40%	48%	12%	-8	39	1
Deep South.....	202	46%	40%	14%	6	44	1
East North Central...	71	20%	61%	19%	-41	40	-20
West North Central...	156	31%	50%	18%	-19	40	-9
Mountains.....	42	42%	37%	22%	5	44	-3
Pacific.....	120	35%	44%	21%	-9	44	-9

not
trading
w
VPS

* excludes Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTER PROFILE
November 9-17, 1992

	TOTAL	THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE		
		Bush	Clinton	Perot
TOTAL.....	801	36%	46	18
VOTETYPE				
Behavioral Republican..	29%	61%	5%	28%
Ticket-Splitter.....	40%	36%	36%	55%
Behavioral Democrat....	32%	3%	59%	17%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION				
Strong Republican.....	17%	40%	2%	11%
Weak Republican.....	15%	26%	5%	19%
Lean Republican.....	13%	22%	3%	24%
Independent.....	6%	5%	6%	7%
Lean Democratic.....	17%	3%	27%	19%
Weak Democratic.....	13%	4%	19%	13%
Strong Democratic.....	19%	0%	38%	7%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION				
Republican.....	46%	88%	10%	54%
Independent.....	6%	5%	6%	7%
Democratic.....	49%	8%	84%	39%
IDEOLOGY				
Strong Conservative....	11%	22%	4%	8%
Weak Conservative.....	48%	59%	35%	59%
Moderate.....	6%	3%	10%	4%
Weak Liberal.....	13%	4%	18%	14%
Strong Liberal.....	22%	12%	33%	15%
IDEOLOGY/PARTY				
Consrv Republican.....	36%	73%	6%	41%
Mod/Lib Republican....	10%	15%	4%	13%
Independent.....	6%	5%	6%	7%
Mod/Consrv Democrat....	24%	5%	39%	23%
Lib Democrat.....	25%	2%	45%	17%
GOP CENTER-RIGHT BASE				
Center-Right Base.....	55%	82%	31%	60%
Else.....	45%	18%	69%	40%
CORE DEMOCRATS				
Core Democratic.....	23%	1%	45%	9%
Else.....	77%	99%	55%	91%

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTER PROFILE
November 9-17, 1992

	TOTAL	THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE		
		Bush	Clinton	Perot
GENDER*				
Men.....	51%	53%	46%	55%
Women.....	49%	47%	54%	45%
AGE*				
18-24.....	8%	7%	7%	12%
25-39.....	32%	38%	27%	34%
40-64.....	39%	37%	42%	39%
65+.....	20%	18%	25%	15%
GENDER/AGE*				
Men, 18-39.....	22%	26%	16%	26%
Men, 40-64.....	20%	20%	19%	23%
Men, 65+.....	9%	8%	12%	7%
Women, 18-39.....	19%	20%	18%	20%
Women, 40-64.....	20%	17%	23%	17%
Women, 65+.....	11%	10%	13%	8%
STATUS GROUPS				
High Income.....	34%	41%	28%	38%
Intelligentsia.....	10%	10%	10%	8%
Middle Class.....	31%	34%	26%	36%
Lower End.....	10%	9%	11%	8%
Hispanics.....	4%	4%	4%	6%
Jews.....	2%	1%	3%	1%
Blacks.....	9%	1%	18%	2%
GENDER/STATUS				
Men, High Income.....	19%	23%	13%	27%
Men, Intelligentsia....	5%	6%	4%	4%
Men, Middle Class.....	16%	19%	14%	17%
Men, Lower End.....	3%	3%	4%	1%
Men, Minorities.....	6%	4%	8%	5%
Women, High Income.....	15%	18%	15%	11%
Women, Intelligentsia..	5%	4%	6%	4%
Women, Middle Class....	15%	15%	13%	19%
Women, Lower End.....	6%	5%	7%	7%
Women, Minorities.....	10%	2%	17%	5%
WORKING WOMEN				
Working Women*.....	22%	23%	24%	18%
Non-Working Women*....	19%	21%	17%	23%
Else.....	58%	56%	59%	59%
MARITAL STATUS*				
Married.....	58%	69%	47%	66%
Single.....	15%	15%	15%	14%
Else.....	27%	16%	38%	20%

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTER PROFILE
November 9-17, 1992

	TOTAL	THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE		
		Bush	Clinton	Perot
GENDER/MARITAL STATUS*				
Men, Married.....	36%	42%	29%	41%
Men, Single.....	11%	8%	13%	10%
Men, Other.....	4%	3%	4%	3%
Women, Married.....	32%	32%	33%	32%
Women, Single.....	7%	8%	7%	5%
Women, Other.....	10%	7%	14%	8%
CHURCH ATTENDANCE*				
Protestants, Regular...	30%	42%	22%	22%
Protestants, Non-.....	39%	35%	42%	41%
Catholics, Regular.....	12%	11%	14%	10%
Catholics, Non-.....	14%	9%	16%	23%
Seculars.....	4%	3%	6%	3%
EVANG./FUND. CHRISTIANS				
Evan./Fund. Prots*.....	42%	52%	34%	42%
Other Protestant*.....	24%	21%	27%	20%
Else.....	35%	27%	39%	38%
CULTURAL GROUPS				
Northern Protestants...	29%	35%	23%	36%
Northern Catholics.....	13%	10%	13%	19%
Northern Union.....	16%	13%	19%	13%
Southern Whites.....	27%	36%	21%	23%
Minorities.....	15%	6%	25%	10%
POLITICAL REGIONS				
New England.....	6%	6%	5%	9%
Mid-Atlantic.....	13%	11%	14%	13%
Border South.....	7%	8%	8%	5%
Deep South.....	25%	32%	22%	20%
East North Central.....	9%	5%	12%	10%
West North Central.....	19%	17%	21%	20%
Mountains.....	5%	6%	4%	6%
Pacific.....	15%	15%	14%	18%

* excludes Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews

TIME OF VOTING DECISION

When would you say you finally made up your mind about how you were going to vote for President.

	<u>1992</u>	<u>1988</u>	<u>1984</u>	
Election day	12%	6%	3%	
Few days before	12	7	5	
Sept./Oct.	47	36	26	
Before Sept.	29	51	66	
		<u>Bush Voter</u>	<u>Clinton Voter</u>	<u>Perot Voter</u>
On election day		11%	9%	23%
A few days before the election		12	11	13
After the debates		12	16	23
During the debates		9	15	19
Just before the debates, in early October		7	11	11
In September		9	8	3
Before September		40	29	8
Don't know		--	1	--
Refused/NA		--	*	--

WHO WE COULD HAVE GOTTEN

A Brief Explanation

Several questions are included in the U.S. post-election national that allow us to identify those voters who could have been persuaded to vote for the President over the course of the campaign. There are four questions of relevance in this regard: (1) a question that asks which of the candidates you would NEVER vote for, (2) a question asking who is your SECOND choice in the election, and (3-4) a question-- asked of both Perot and Clinton voters-- asking if you came close to voting for the President in the last month.

In creating a "potential voter" variable, we are interested in those voters who say they were at least "somewhat close" to voting for the President in the last month. Excluded are those voters who say they would never vote for the President, as well as those who say they had no second choice for President.

The Expansion Vote

Nine percent of the electorate falls into the range of voters who could have voted for the President. Fifty-five percent of this Expansion Vote comes from Clinton and 45% comes from Perot. From a different perspective, 32% of Perot's vote was attainable, compared to 15% of Clinton's vote. A complete swing of all of the Expansion Vote to the President leaves the ballot as follows:

Bush	46%
Clinton	41%
Perot	14%

Politically, these voters are ticket-splitters (59%) and weak/leaning Republicans (45%). In terms of ideology, they tend to be weak conservatives (59%).

Demographically, the key segment appears to be up-scale 25-39 year olds: "yuppies". Only 24% of the Expansion Voters are from the lower end or minority status groups. Thirty-six percent are high income voters. This segment is slightly more male than female (51% male), though not enough to be of significance. Expansion voters are disproportionately non-attenders of church (69%), and Catholic non-attenders are especially common (23%).

The Expansion Voters are most common in the East North Central, Pacific and Southern States, where they are 12%, 11%, and 10% of the respective populations.

It is not too far-fetched to hypothesize that this is a group whose natural proclivity to vote for the President is overwhelmed by negative appraisals of his first term in general, and his handling of the economy in particular. This speculation is borne out in the data:

Percent of Expansion Voters Who Believe. . .	
Bush has no economic plan	43%
Clinton has no economic plan	16%
The Country is better off than four years ago	18%
Respondent is better off than four years ago	36%
The Economy has improved in the last year	13%
The Economy is in a recession	82%

Given this fact, the Expansion Vote would have been attainable only by convincing them that Clinton would be worse for the economy than four more years of the President. In this context, the key number in the above table is the second entry. Clinton clearly convinced these voters that he had *some sort of plan for the economy*. This gave him a powerful advantage over the President.

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	Could Bush Have Gotten R?	
		attainable	else
TOTAL.....	1100	9%	91%
VOTETYPE			
Behavioral Republican.....	268	7%	93%
Ticket-Splitter.....	418	14%	86%
Behavioral Democrat....	299	7%	93%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION			
Strong Republican.....	164	3%	97%
Weak Republican.....	153	17%	83%
Lean Republican.....	162	12%	88%
Independent.....	87	7%	93%
Lean Democratic.....	193	9%	91%
Weak Democratic.....	155	9%	91%
Strong Democratic.....	184	7%	93%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION			
Republican.....	478	11%	89%
Independent.....	87	7%	93%
Democratic.....	533	8%	92%
IDEOLOGY			
Strong Conservative...	110	4%	96%
Weak Conservative.....	541	11%	89%
Moderate.....	79	5%	95%
Weak Liberal.....	148	8%	92%
Strong Liberal.....	223	10%	90%
IDEOLOGY/PARTY			
Consrv Republican.....	370	10%	90%
Mod/Lib Republican....	108	13%	87%
Independent.....	87	7%	93%
Mod/Consrv Democrat...	280	9%	91%
Lib Democrat.....	252	8%	92%
GOP CENTER-RIGHT BASE			
Center-Right Base.....	578	9%	91%
Else.....	522	9%	91%
CORE DEMOCRATS			
Core Democratic.....	245	7%	93%
Else.....	855	10%	90%

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	Could Bush Have Gotten R?	
		attainable	else
GENDER*			
Men.....	448	9%	91%
Women.....	460	9%	91%
AGE*			
18-24.....	106	8%	92%
25-39.....	299	10%	90%
40-64.....	332	9%	91%
65+.....	165	8%	92%
GENDER/AGE*			
Men, 18-39.....	213	9%	91%
Men, 40-64.....	163	10%	90%
Men, 65+.....	71	9%	91%
Women, 18-39.....	193	10%	90%
Women, 40-64.....	169	8%	92%
Women, 65+.....	94	6%	94%
STATUS GROUPS			
High Income.....	311	12%	88%
Intelligentsia.....	88	13%	87%
Middle Class.....	327	9%	91%
Lower End.....	133	5%	95%
Hispanics.....	53	15%	85%
Jews.....	22	4%	96%
Blacks.....	117	8%	92%
GENDER/STATUS			
Men, High Income.....	176	14%	86%
Men, Intelligentsia...	41	13%	87%
Men, Middle Class.....	166	7%	93%
Men, Lower End.....	49	2%	98%
Men, Minorities.....	80	8%	92%
Women, High Income....	135	9%	91%
Women, Intelligentsia.	47	12%	88%
Women, Middle Class...	161	10%	90%
Women, Lower End.....	83	6%	94%
Women, Minorities.....	112	11%	89%
WORKING WOMEN			
Working Women*.....	242	9%	91%
Non-Working Women*....	218	9%	91%
Else.....	640	9%	91%
MARITAL STATUS*			
Married.....	593	9%	91%
Single.....	188	7%	93%
Else.....	319	10%	90%

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	Could Bush Have Gotten R?	
		attainable	else
GENDER/MARITAL STATUS*			
Men, Married.....	303	10%	90%
Men, Single.....	112	6%	94%
Men, Other.....	33	18%	82%
Women, Married.....	290	9%	91%
Women, Single.....	77	8%	92%
Women, Other.....	94	10%	90%
CULTURAL GROUPS			
Northern Protestants..	299	7%	93%
Northern Catholics....	137	14%	86%
Northern Union.....	155	10%	90%
Southern Whites.....	291	9%	91%
Minorities.....	192	9%	91%
CHURCH ATTENDANCE*			
Protestants, Regular..	252	7%	93%
Protestants, Non-.....	348	10%	90%
Catholics, Regular....	97	9%	91%
Catholics, Non-.....	140	13%	87%
Seculars.....	38	5%	95%
EVANG./FUND. CHRISTIANS			
Evan./Fund Christians*	439	8%	92%
Other Protestant*.....	271	8%	92%
Else.....	390	11%	89%
POLITICAL REGIONS			
New England.....	64	7%	93%
Mid-Atlantic.....	158	9%	91%
Border South.....	91	6%	94%
Deep South.....	287	10%	90%
East North Central....	86	12%	88%
West North Central....	202	8%	92%
Mountains.....	58	6%	94%
Pacific.....	153	11%	89%

* excludes Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTER PROFILE
November 9-17, 1992

	TOTAL	Could Bush Have Gotten R?	
		attainable	else
TOTAL.....	1100	9%	91
VOTETYPE			
Behavioral Republican..	27%	19%	28%
Ticket-Splitter.....	42%	59%	41%
Behavioral Democrat....	30%	22%	31%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION			
Strong Republican.....	15%	5%	16%
Weak Republican.....	14%	26%	13%
Lean Republican.....	15%	19%	14%
Independent.....	8%	6%	8%
Lean Democratic.....	18%	17%	18%
Weak Democratic.....	14%	14%	14%
Strong Democratic.....	17%	13%	17%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION			
Republican.....	44%	50%	43%
Independent.....	8%	6%	8%
Democratic.....	49%	44%	49%
IDEOLOGY			
Strong Conservative....	10%	4%	11%
Weak Conservative.....	49%	59%	48%
Moderate.....	7%	4%	7%
Weak Liberal.....	13%	12%	14%
Strong Liberal.....	20%	22%	20%
IDEOLOGY/PARTY			
Consrv Republican.....	34%	36%	33%
Mod/Lib Republican.....	10%	13%	9%
Independent.....	8%	6%	8%
Mod/Consrv Democrat....	26%	24%	26%
Lib Democrat.....	23%	19%	23%
GOP CENTER-RIGHT BASE			
Center-Right Base.....	53%	54%	52%
Else.....	47%	46%	48%
CORE DEMOCRATS			
Core Democratic.....	22%	17%	23%
Else.....	78%	83%	77%

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTER PROFILE
November 9-17, 1992

	TOTAL	Could Bush Have Gotten R?	
		attainable	else
GENDER*			
Men.....	49%	51%	49%
Women.....	51%	49%	51%
AGE*			
18-24.....	12%	11%	12%
25-39.....	33%	38%	33%
40-64.....	37%	37%	37%
65+.....	18%	15%	19%
GENDER/AGE*			
Men, 18-39.....	24%	24%	23%
Men, 40-64.....	18%	20%	18%
Men, 65+.....	8%	8%	8%
Women, 18-39.....	21%	24%	21%
Women, 40-64.....	19%	17%	19%
Women, 65+.....	10%	7%	11%
STATUS GROUPS			
High Income.....	30%	36%	29%
Intelligentsia.....	8%	11%	8%
Middle Class.....	31%	28%	31%
Lower End.....	13%	6%	13%
Hispanics.....	5%	8%	5%
Jews.....	2%	1%	2%
Blacks.....	11%	9%	11%
GENDER/STATUS			
Men, High Income.....	17%	24%	16%
Men, Intelligentsia....	4%	5%	4%
Men, Middle Class.....	16%	12%	16%
Men, Lower End.....	5%	1%	5%
Men, Minorities.....	8%	6%	8%
Women, High Income.....	13%	12%	13%
Women, Intelligentsia..	4%	6%	4%
Women, Middle Class....	15%	16%	15%
Women, Lower End.....	8%	5%	8%
Women, Minorities.....	11%	12%	11%
WORKING WOMEN			
Working Women*.....	22%	21%	22%
Non-Working Women*.....	20%	19%	20%
Else.....	58%	60%	58%
MARITAL STATUS*			
Married.....	54%	54%	54%
Single.....	17%	13%	18%
Else.....	29%	33%	29%

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTER PROFILE
November 9-17, 1992

	TOTAL	Could Bush Have Gotten R?	
		attainable	else
GENDER/MARITAL STATUS*			
Men, Married.....	33%	36%	33%
Men, Single.....	12%	8%	13%
Men, Other.....	4%	7%	3%
Women, Married.....	32%	31%	32%
Women, Single.....	8%	7%	9%
Women, Other.....	10%	11%	10%
CHURCH ATTENDANCE*			
Protestants, Regular...	29%	20%	30%
Protestants, Non-.....	40%	44%	39%
Catholics, Regular.....	11%	11%	11%
Catholics, Non-.....	16%	23%	15%
Seculars.....	4%	2%	5%
EVANG./FUND. CHRISTIANS			
Evan./Fund. Christians*	40%	36%	40%
Other Protestant*.....	25%	23%	25%
Else.....	35%	41%	35%
CULTURAL GROUPS			
Northern Protestants...	28%	22%	28%
Northern Catholics.....	13%	20%	12%
Northern Union.....	14%	16%	14%
Southern Whites.....	27%	25%	27%
Minorities.....	18%	18%	18%
POLITICAL REGIONS			
New England.....	6%	4%	6%
Mid-Atlantic.....	14%	15%	14%
Border South.....	8%	5%	9%
Deep South.....	26%	29%	26%
East North Central.....	8%	10%	8%
West North Central.....	18%	16%	19%
Mountains.....	5%	3%	6%
Pacific.....	14%	17%	14%

* excludes Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews

THE PEROT VOTE

Who Were They?

For the most part, Perot voters match the profile developed prior to the election. Having said this, it is also true that the Perot movement draws even more heavily from the Republican ranks than we had anticipated.

Key elements of the Perot coalition include weak conservatives (59% of Perotistas), ticket-splitters (55% of Perot's vote say they split their tickets), and Republican identifiers (54% of his vote). In terms of their politics, Perot's supporters turn out to look a lot like people who would-- all things being equal-- vote for the Republican candidate. Only 17% of Perot's coalition call themselves behavioral Democrats, a much smaller percentage than the 32% of 1992 voters who call themselves behavioral Democrats and the 28% of Perot voters who call themselves behavioral Republicans.

Demographically, Perot draws disproportionately from white men (who constitute 55% of Perot's total support). He does well with younger voters, though he has double-digit support among all age segments. However, the backbone of Perot's coalition is high income white men (27% of all Perot voters) and middle class whites (36%). In a lot of ways, Perot's coalition looks a lot like the President's *if the President did not have a base among southern whites*.

Regionally, Perot registers in the twenties in the New England, Mountain, and Pacific States, while he more than holds his own in other regions. His is clearly a national movement.

Why Did They Support Perot?

Although Perot's support is often characterized as having its roots in a disaffection for "politics as usual", his supporters overwhelmingly say their votes were FOR Perot and not AGAINST THE OTHER TWO. Seventy percent claim to have cast a positive vote for Perot on November 3, while 29% say they voted against the President, or Clinton, or both. This latter number translates to under 5% saying they cast a pure protest vote. Discontent may have opened the door for an insurgent candidacy, but it was Ross Perot's particular articulation of that discontent that caught the imagination of the electorate. His vote was at least as personal-- and probably a great deal more-- than either the President's or Clinton's.

What Was Perot's Ceiling of Support?

In addition to the 18% of the electorate in our survey that voted for Perot, 11% said they thought they would vote for him after he re-entered the race (over half of this 11% are Clinton voters). This suggests he could have gone to 29%, dropping Clinton to 40% and the President to 31%.

From another perspective, 9% of the voting public say they were "very close" to voting for Perot in the last month of the campaign. If they had followed through on this impulse, Perot would have received 27%, with Clinton getting 40% and the President 33%. An additional 11% of the electorate say they were "somewhat close" to casting their ballot for Perot, which means that he is a credible candidate to 37%.

Perot's limitations may have been self-imposed; had he not dropped out in July he could have been even more formidable. Twenty-seven percent of voters said they thought they would vote for him before he dropped out. When coupled with the eighteen percent that actually voted for him, Perot could have conceivably have gotten 45%, with Clinton reduced to 29% and the President to 26%. This, of course overlooks the obvious fact that Perot was probably about to drop in the polls (due to an aggressive media) prior to his withdrawal.

Who Did Perot Hurt?

As with almost all of the pre-election data, the numbers here indicate that Perot's impact is relatively even. The President is the second choice of 46% of Perot voters, while Clinton is the number two pick of 45%. On a different dimension, 36% of Perot voters say they would never vote for the President and 36% say they would never vote for Clinton.

For 1992 the bottom line is that Perot voters are generally Republican, though for the presidential race this is balanced by the existence of quite a few Democrats and anti-Bush Republicans in the coalition. Therefore, Perot's net effect was to subtract the same number of Republican votes from the President as Democratic and anti-Bush votes from Clinton. Perot probably did more damage to the President than to Clinton because of the state-by-state particulars and because of the "chicken little" tone of his message; however, this is not noticeable in the national data.

Beyond 1992, Perot is unquestionably more of a threat to Republican presidential challengers. He appeals to a Republican constituency, and his rhetoric tends to steal away-- or at least neutralize-- the traditionally Republican issues of controlling spending and the deficit. Whereas in 1992, Perot took discontented voters from Clinton, and Republican voters from the President, in 1996 he will be taking both from the Republican challenger. The only benefit from a Perot candidacy would be the addition of a formidable voice to articulate an anti-Clinton agenda.

THERMOMETER RATINGS OF THE CANDIDATES

Findings

For the presidential candidates, the favorability ratings imperfectly reflect voting patterns. The average rating for Bill Clinton is 58 (on a 100-point scale), which is 6 points higher than the mean marks of 52 for both the President and Ross Perot.

All of the candidates appear to have received a post-election boost in popularity. Clinton's present favorability is 6 points higher than it was in the October 21-22, 1992 U.S. National Survey. Perot's marks have climbed 4 points since the October study. The President's favorability is also 5 points higher than it was before the election. In the President's case, the natural surge may have been magnified by his conciliatory concession speech and accommodating actions toward enacting a smooth transition, both of which have been well-received by the media.

The general rise in favorability towards the candidates has watered down the relationship between candidate favorability and the vote. In the October survey, the correlation between the President's favorability and the vote was .703; in the post-election survey it is .646. For Clinton the pre-election correlation was .714, while the post-election is .655.

Regression analyses tell us that feelings toward the President were more associated with the vote than were feelings toward any of the other candidates. However, feelings toward Clinton, Perot, and the Vice-President were significantly related to the vote. Moreover, feelings toward Clinton were almost as important as were feelings toward the President. In total, the thermometer ratings of all the candidates account for 61% of the variance in the vote.

Some Specifics

The President's favorability remains highest among behavioral Republicans (72), though he has improved his standing among ticket-splitters to an average of 54 since the election. His standing is highest in the Southern States, where his mean score is 57; it is lowest in the Mid-Atlantic States, where his average favorability is 47. Race, gender, and age appear to be associated with favorability towards the President, as one of his best groups is white men who are under 40 (where his average favorability mark is 60), while one of his worst groups is white women who are over 40 (average score: 46).

Clinton's favorability is soaring among behavioral Democrats, who are undoubtedly impressed by his ability to break the Republican lock on the presidency. His average favorability rating among his party is 79. He is doing well with ticket-splitters (59), but has yet to impress behavioral Republicans (34). Clinton's favorability is especially high among white seniors (with whom his average rating is 64) and Northern union members (62).

Perot continues to be viewed favorably by ticket-splitters, while partisans are less enthusiastic. His favorability score among the former group is 55, while among Democrats he scores a 50 and among Republicans a 49. As with the President, Perot is viewed most warmly by young white men, and least warmly by older white women. Among 18-39 year old white males, his mean rating is 60. With 40-64 year old white females it is 46. This suggests that Perot hindered the President's vote within these segments.

Among the two main vice-presidential contenders, the Vice-President's average favorability score is 43, compared to 56 for Al Gore. The Vice-President is viewed most favorably by behavioral Republicans and in the Southern States (average favorability marks are 62 and 47, respectively). His scores among traditionally Republican groups are not nearly high enough to offset his low marks among independent and Democratic groups: the Vice-President averages a 43 mark with ticket-splitters and a 25 with behavioral Democrats.

An interesting aspect of the Vice-President's favorability is that it is not highly associated with the vote. The correlation is 0.025, and indicates that many Republicans are cool towards the Vice-President but voted for the Republican ticket anyway.

Gore rates just behind Clinton in terms of public favorability. He pulls down a 56 among those polled. Gore's rating is built on above average marks (for a Democrat) with ticket-splitters (58), and solid scores from behavioral Democrats (71). Gore also does quite well with white male seniors (65) and members of the intelligentsia (61). On the negative side, he is not viewed too warmly by young men (49 rating with white males under 40).

Association Between Candidate Favorability Ratings and Their Vote		
	Regression Coefficient	T-Stat
Presidential Candidate		
Bush	0.51	9.7*
Clinton	0.47	8.9*
Perot	0.42	7.6*
Vice-Presidential Candidate		
Quayle	0.29	4.6*
Gore	0.17	1.7

*Indicates less than a 0.01 chance the relationship is due to random error.

Notes: Adjusted R-Squared for a simultaneous equation is 0.64. The coefficients for Bush, Clinton, and Quayle are significant.

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: FAVORABILITY RATINGS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	Bush	Clinton	Perot	Quayle	Gore
TOTAL.....	1100	52	58	52	43	56
VOTETYPE						
Behavioral Republican	268	72	34	49	62	37
Ticket-Splitter.....	418	54	59	55	43	58
Behavioral Democrat..	299	33	79	50	25	71
PARTY IDENTIFICATION						
Strong Republican....	164	77	33	46	66	38
Weak Republican.....	153	68	47	53	56	49
Lean Republican.....	162	64	41	58	51	43
Independent.....	87	47	51	58	41	48
Lean Democratic.....	193	40	70	52	29	65
Weak Democratic.....	155	43	71	53	34	65
Strong Democratic....	184	28	85	47	24	74
PARTY IDENTIFICATION						
Republican.....	478	70	40	52	58	43
Independent.....	87	47	51	58	41	48
Democratic.....	533	37	75	51	29	68
IDEOLOGY						
Strong Conservative..	110	65	33	46	60	36
Weak Conservative....	541	57	53	53	47	51
Moderate.....	79	46	72	56	40	68
Weak Liberal.....	148	41	67	50	31	64
Strong Liberal.....	223	43	71	53	32	67
IDEOLOGY/PARTY						
Consrv Republican....	370	71	37	51	60	41
Mod/Lib Republican...	108	65	52	56	49	51
Independent.....	87	47	51	58	41	48
Mod/Consrv Democrat..	280	40	74	52	32	65
Lib Democrat.....	252	34	77	50	26	72
GOP CENTER-RIGHT BASE						
Center-Right Base....	578	61	48	52	51	49
Else.....	522	42	70	52	33	63
CORE DEMOCRATS						
Core Democratic.....	245	31	81	47	26	71
Else.....	855	58	51	53	47	51

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: FAVORABILITY RATINGS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	Bush	Clinton	Perot	Quayle	Gore
GENDER*						
Men.....	448	55	55	56	46	53
Women.....	460	53	57	50	43	56
AGE*						
18-24.....	106	53	55	60	43	53
25-39.....	299	57	52	56	47	50
40-64.....	332	51	56	49	41	55
65+.....	165	56	64	50	47	64
GENDER/AGE*						
Men, 18-39.....	213	57	52	60	49	49
Men, 40-64.....	163	52	55	52	41	53
Men, 65+.....	71	57	64	52	47	65
Women, 18-39.....	193	55	54	53	43	53
Women, 40-64.....	169	50	56	46	41	57
Women, 65+.....	94	56	65	48	46	63
STATUS GROUPS						
High Income.....	311	58	53	53	47	53
Intelligentsia.....	88	52	60	50	44	61
Middle Class.....	327	55	56	55	45	53
Lower End.....	133	46	58	48	36	57
Hispanics.....	53	57	51	56	42	54
Jews.....	22	37	70	48	27	65
Blacks.....	117	35	77	46	31	64
GENDER/STATUS						
Men, High Income.....	176	58	54	57	50	52
Men, Intelligentsia..	41	53	55	50	43	56
Men, Middle Class....	166	56	54	59	46	52
Men, Lower End.....	49	46	59	48	35	59
Men, Minorities.....	80	47	66	54	37	60
Women, High Income...	135	58	53	48	43	56
Women, Intelligentsia	47	52	64	50	44	66
Women, Middle Class..	161	53	57	50	44	54
Women, Lower End.....	83	46	58	49	38	56
Women, Minorities....	112	37	71	45	30	63
WORKING WOMEN						
Working Women*.....	242	52	56	51	41	56
Non-Working Women*...	218	55	57	48	45	56
Else.....	640	51	59	54	42	56
MARITAL STATUS*						
Married.....	593	57	54	53	47	54
Single.....	188	51	57	54	40	55
Else.....	319	44	66	48	35	60

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: FAVORABILITY RATINGS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	Bush	Clinton	Perot	Quayle	Gore
GENDER/MARITAL STATUS*						
Men, Married.....	303	57	53	55	48	52
Men, Single.....	112	50	60	60	41	56
Men, Other.....	33	57	56	53	42	50
Women, Married.....	290	56	55	52	46	55
Women, Single.....	77	52	52	45	39	54
Women, Other.....	94	46	64	46	37	61
CULTURAL GROUPS						
Northern Protestants.	299	55	53	53	47	51
Northern Catholics...	137	52	59	55	41	57
Northern Union.....	155	47	62	54	36	59
Southern Whites.....	291	60	53	50	49	54
Minorities.....	192	41	69	49	33	62
CHURCH ATTENDANCE*						
Protestants, Regular.	252	63	48	49	55	50
Protestants, Non-....	348	52	59	53	40	57
Catholics, Regular...	97	55	58	52	47	57
Catholics, Non-....	140	51	58	58	38	55
Seculars.....	38	41	61	56	39	59
EVANG./FUND. CHRISTIANS						
Evan./Fund. Prots*...	439	56	55	51	46	54
Other Protestant*....	271	50	60	51	41	57
Else.....	390	49	61	54	39	57
POLITICAL REGIONS						
New England.....	64	50	60	51	39	58
Mid-Atlantic.....	158	47	59	51	36	56
Border South.....	91	52	57	49	45	57
Deep South.....	287	58	57	50	47	55
East North Central...	86	47	62	55	42	59
West North Central...	202	51	60	55	42	56
Mountains.....	58	55	48	51	48	46
Pacific.....	153	50	57	54	41	56

* excludes Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews

THE ECONOMY AND THE VOTE

Is the Economy the Whole Story in 1992?

In a word, almost. The economy is clearly the most important problem in the minds of a vast majority of Americans. Moreover, it tends to overwhelm all other issue opinions and heavily influences perceptions of, and support for, the presidential candidates. The President's loss, therefore, has its origins in the recession.

However, not all of the variance can be accounted for with economic explanations. On the whole, economic models of the vote seriously underestimated the size of Clinton's victory. Clinton was able to link economic distress with a broader denunciation of the President as a leader who had neglected domestic problems. This was a powerful critique for most Americans, and--once articulated--it was fairly easy to convince a plurality of voters that the Clinton package of domestic spending programs and reforms constitute a plan for economic change.

The Salience of the Economy

The preeminence of the economy as the issue in this campaign is beyond question. When asked to name the most important problem facing the country, the economy and jobs are consistently the electorate's top choice.

On a different question voters are asked to choose which of the following issues is most important to them: health care, education, crime/drugs, taxes/spending/the deficit, or character. They are then asked if this issue is more important than the economy. Forty-seven percent choose the economy over their "other" most important issue; 32% stay with their previous issue choice.

If one combines the responses to these two close-ended questions, 51% choose the economy, while character is the second most common choice of a mere 10%. Character is a prominent runner-up among strong conservatives and other staunchly Republican groups, but is much less important among groups supporting Clinton or Perot. The deficit is the top issue to about one out of every six Perot voters, but falls flat elsewhere. Health care is a relatively important issue to lower status voters, while education is more important to younger voters. However, the economy is the top issue among every demographic and political group.

The Candidates, the Economy, and the Vote

Much of Bill Clinton's electoral advantage is based on the perception that he would do a better job handling the economy than the President. Thirty-two percent of voters say that the President would do the best job handling the economy, while 56% opt for Bill Clinton and 6% choose Ross Perot. Fifty-three percent of the variance in the vote can be explained by responses to this single question. Even this impressive number is low, since much of the unexplained variance is associated with Perot's vote.

If one digs a bit deeper, Clinton's advantage on the most salient issue of the election (and, by extension, his margin at the polls) stems from the belief of most voters that he has a plan to fix the economy, whereas the President does not. Eighty-two percent of the voting public says that Bill Clinton has a plan for the economy. Only 46% believe that the President has a plan. The correlation between thinking a candidate has an economic plan and voting for him in this election is about 0.50 (an association whose chance probability is less than 0.01). The following table shows the relationship in a simpler form:

	Total	Presidential Vote		
		Bush	Clinton	Perot
Total	848	36%	46	18
Bush Plan for the Economy				
personally committed to plan	35%	72%	11	17
not committed to plan	12	15%	61	24
no plan/dk	54	16%	66	17
Clinton Plan for the Economy				
personally committed to plan	70%	27%	59	15
not committed to plan	12	54%	19	27
no plan/dk	18	62%	14	24

Clinton's advantage is also manifest by the higher percentage of people who say they know the important parts of his economic plan well. Fifty-two percent of those asked say they know the Clinton plan very/somewhat well. Only 33% say this about the President's plan. In terms of the vote, statistical analyses indicate that in depth knowledge about a candidate's plan is much less important than the belief that he has a plan.

The point, though, is that Bill Clinton referred to his proposals and talked about the economy enough to convince over half of the electorate that has a coherent plan addressing the country's most serious problem. This gave him a tremendous advantage over the President, who never overcame the credibility problem he developed on this issue at the outset of the recession.

The President's credibility problems on the economy and their salience in the election are also evident in the battery of survey questions asking voters to say how heavily certain reservations about the candidates weighed on their minds prior to the election. Sixty-seven percent were at least partly mindful of the fact that the President "had his chance to fix the economy". Sixty-seven percent also say that the possibility Clinton could get the economy moving again was partly/very much on their minds. Only more vague considerations regarding change--which unquestionably have their well-springs in concern over the economy-- were more important to voters.

	Total	Bush	Clinton	Perot
Most Important Issue (excluding the economy)				
Health Care	17%	25%	66	9
Education	14	28%	63	10
Crime/Drugs	5	28%	53	19
Taxes/Spending/Deficit	39	33%	40	26
Character	13	79%	10	12
Most Important Issue (including the economy)¹				
Economy	51%	27%	54	20
Health Care	6	31%	69	--
Education	7	37%	52	11
Taxes/Spending/Deficit	9	51%	18	31
Character	10	86%	4	10

¹Crime/drugs: too few cases for analysis.

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	WHICH ISSUE IS MOST IMPORTANT TO R?						
		Econ/ Jobs	Health Care	Educ	crime/ drugs	taxes/ spndg/ defct	chrctr	else
TOTAL.....	848	55%	6%	7%	1%	9%	10%	13%
THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE								
Bush.....	287	42%	5%	7%	1%	13%	23%	9%
Clinton.....	371	65%	8%	8%	1%	3%	1%	14%
Perot.....	143	61%		4%	1%	16%	6%	12%
VOTETYPE								
Behav. Republican..	234	44%	5%	5%	2%	14%	20%	11%
Ticket-Splitter....	342	56%	5%	6%	1%	10%	8%	14%
Behav. Democrat....	253	65%	7%	9%	1%	3%	2%	12%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION								
Strong Republican..	142	42%	5%	6%	1%	10%	25%	9%
Weak Republican....	128	54%	2%	3%		20%	14%	6%
Lean Republican....	116	46%	5%	7%	3%	11%	15%	14%
Independent.....	58	40%	13%	5%		8%	5%	29%
Lean Democratic....	141	67%	6%	9%	1%	7%	2%	10%
Weak Democratic....	110	66%	5%	7%	1%	5%	4%	13%
Strong Democratic..	152	63%	8%	9%	1%	2%	1%	16%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION								
Republican.....	387	47%	4%	6%	1%	14%	18%	10%
Independent.....	58	40%	13%	5%		8%	5%	29%
Democratic.....	403	65%	6%	8%	1%	4%	2%	13%
IDEOLOGY								
Strong Conservative	98	34%	3%	8%	2%	12%	27%	14%
Weak Conservative..	414	55%	5%	6%	0%	11%	11%	12%
Moderate.....	52	52%	11%	5%	2%	6%		24%
Weak Liberal.....	104	65%	5%	7%	2%	4%	4%	14%
Strong Liberal.....	180	62%	9%	8%	1%	7%	5%	8%
IDEOLOGY/PARTY								
Consrv Republican..	305	44%	3%	6%	1%	14%	21%	10%
Mod/Lib Republican.	81	60%	7%	5%	2%	12%	6%	7%
Independent.....	58	40%	13%	5%		8%	5%	29%
Mod/Consrv Democrat	205	65%	6%	7%	0%	6%	1%	15%
Lib Democrat.....	198	65%	7%	9%	1%	3%	3%	11%
GOP CENTER-RIGHT BASE								
Center-Right Base..	468	50%	4%	5%	1%	11%	15%	13%
Else.....	380	61%	8%	8%	1%	6%	4%	12%
CORE DEMOCRATS								
Core Democratic....	187	63%	7%	9%	1%	2%	2%	15%
Else.....	662	53%	5%	6%	1%	11%	12%	12%

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	WHICH ISSUE IS MOST IMPORTANT TO R?						
		Econ/ Jobs	Health Care	Educ	crime/ drugs	taxes/ spndg/ defct	chrctr	else
GENDER*								
Men.....	360	52%	5%	6%	1%	14%	10%	12%
Women.....	362	59%	6%	6%	1%	7%	10%	11%
AGE*								
18-24.....	57	58%		9%		14%	16%	4%
25-39.....	229	54%	5%	8%	1%	10%	11%	10%
40-64.....	283	54%	7%	4%	1%	11%	11%	11%
65+.....	147	57%	5%	5%	1%	8%	4%	20%
GENDER/AGE*								
Men, 18-39.....	150	55%	4%	7%	1%	13%	10%	10%
Men, 40-64.....	141	50%	7%	3%	1%	16%	11%	13%
Men, 65+.....	67	49%	6%	8%	2%	11%	7%	17%
Women, 18-39.....	135	55%	4%	10%	1%	9%	14%	8%
Women, 40-64.....	143	59%	8%	5%	2%	6%	11%	8%
Women, 65+.....	80	64%	4%	3%		5%	2%	22%
STATUS GROUPS								
High Income.....	278	53%	5%	6%	1%	13%	14%	8%
Intelligentsia.....	77	58%	2%	12%		14%	10%	5%
Middle Class.....	251	56%	6%	6%	1%	7%	10%	14%
Lower End.....	78	61%	8%	4%	2%	4%		21%
Hispanics.....	35	44%	12%	6%		3%	19%	17%
Jews.....	18	59%		5%		5%	12%	19%
Blacks.....	73	57%	6%	14%	1%		2%	19%
GENDER/STATUS								
Men, High Income...	155	51%	5%	4%	2%	19%	11%	9%
Men, Intelligentsia	38	50%		14%		18%	16%	3%
Men, Middle Class..	126	52%	7%	7%	1%	9%	10%	15%
Men, Lower End.....	27	60%	15%					25%
Men, Minorities....	47	57%	8%	8%		2%	13%	13%
Women, High Income.	123	56%	6%	8%		6%	17%	6%
Women, Intelligents	39	65%	3%	10%		10%	5%	7%
Women, Middle Class	125	60%	6%	4%	1%	6%	10%	12%
Women, Lower End...	51	61%	5%	6%	3%	6%		18%
Women, Minorities..	80	52%	6%	12%	1%	1%	5%	21%
WORKING WOMEN								
Working Women*.....	194	57%	7%	9%	1%	7%	12%	7%
Non-Working Women*.	168	60%	4%	3%	1%	7%	9%	16%
Else.....	486	53%	6%	7%	1%	11%	9%	14%
MARITAL STATUS*								
Married.....	497	53%	6%	5%	1%	10%	11%	13%
Single.....	126	56%	2%	10%		13%	12%	7%
Else.....	225	59%	7%	9%	1%	4%	5%	15%

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	WHICH ISSUE IS MOST IMPORTANT TO R?						
		Econ/ Jobs	Health Care	Educ	crime/ drugs	taxes/ spndg/ defct	chrctr	else
GENDER/MARITAL STATUS*								
Men, Married.....	259	49%	7%	4%	2%	14%	11%	13%
Men, Single.....	75	61%	1%	8%		14%	6%	9%
Men, Other.....	26	58%	8%	8%		12%	4%	12%
Women, Married.....	238	58%	5%	6%	1%	6%	11%	13%
Women, Single.....	51	49%	3%	11%		11%	20%	5%
Women, Other.....	73	67%	8%	5%	2%	7%		10%
CULTURAL GROUPS								
Northern Prots.....	245	54%	4%	5%	1%	11%	10%	14%
Northern Catholics..	107	62%	5%	4%	2%	9%	6%	12%
Northern Union.....	133	65%	6%	7%	1%	8%	5%	10%
Southern Whites....	217	48%	8%	7%	1%	10%	15%	10%
Minorities.....	126	54%	7%	11%	1%	2%	8%	18%
CHURCH ATTENDANCE*								
Protestants, Reg..	211	47%	7%	6%	1%	9%	20%	10%
Protestants, Non-..	272	59%	5%	6%	1%	11%	6%	13%
Catholics, Regular..	87	59%	6%	4%	2%	7%	8%	14%
Catholics, Non-...	101	66%	4%	6%	1%	8%	4%	11%
Seculars.....	28	54%	7%	12%		17%	4%	6%
EVANG. /FUND. CHRISTIANS								
Evan./Fund. Prots*..	350	56%	5%	6%	2%	9%	13%	10%
Other Protestant*..	205	53%	6%	8%		9%	10%	15%
Else.....	293	56%	6%	7%	1%	9%	6%	14%
POLITICAL REGIONS								
New England.....	50	53%	6%	5%	4%	13%	8%	10%
Mid-Atlantic.....	116	61%	5%	4%		7%	7%	18%
Border South.....	62	51%	10%	8%	2%	9%	9%	11%
Deep South.....	211	47%	7%	9%	0%	9%	16%	11%
East North Central..	76	57%	9%	6%		9%	7%	13%
West North Central..	164	64%	6%	6%	1%	8%	5%	10%
Mountains.....	47	52%		6%	2%	12%	12%	15%
Pacific.....	121	55%	3%	6%	1%	10%	10%	14%

* excludes Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	Did Bush Have an Economic Plan?		
		personally committed to plan	not committed to plan	no plan
TOTAL.....	848	35%	12%	54%
THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE				
Bush.....	287	71%	5%	24%
Clinton.....	371	8%	15%	77%
Perot.....	143	33%	15%	52%
VOTETYPE				
Behavioral Republican..	234	66%	6%	28%
Ticket-Splitter.....	342	31%	15%	54%
Behavioral Democrat....	253	10%	12%	78%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION				
Strong Republican.....	142	71%	3%	26%
Weak Republican.....	128	60%	9%	31%
Lean Republican.....	116	51%	11%	38%
Independent.....	58	28%	11%	61%
Lean Democratic.....	141	9%	17%	74%
Weak Democratic.....	110	18%	19%	63%
Strong Democratic.....	152	6%	12%	82%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION				
Republican.....	387	61%	7%	31%
Independent.....	58	28%	11%	61%
Democratic.....	403	10%	15%	74%
IDEOLOGY				
Strong Conservative....	98	58%	5%	37%
Weak Conservative.....	414	40%	10%	50%
Moderate.....	52	22%	8%	70%
Weak Liberal.....	104	14%	14%	72%
Strong Liberal.....	180	25%	18%	57%
IDEOLOGY/PARTY				
Consrv Republican.....	305	65%	6%	30%
Mod/Lib Republican.....	81	48%	14%	38%
Independent.....	58	28%	11%	61%
Mod/Consrv Democrat....	205	9%	13%	78%
Lib Democrat.....	198	12%	18%	70%
GOP CENTER-RIGHT BASE				
Center-Right Base.....	468	49%	8%	44%
Else.....	380	17%	17%	66%
CORE DEMOCRATS				
Core Democratic.....	187	6%	15%	79%
Else.....	662	43%	11%	46%

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	Did Bush Have an Economic Plan?		
		personally committed to plan	not committed to plan	no plan
GENDER*				
Men.....	360	42%	10%	48%
Women.....	362	35%	11%	53%
AGE*				
18-24.....	57	40%	18%	42%
25-39.....	229	47%	12%	40%
40-64.....	283	33%	10%	57%
65+.....	147	34%	8%	58%
GENDER/AGE*				
Men, 18-39.....	150	52%	12%	36%
Men, 40-64.....	141	35%	8%	57%
Men, 65+.....	67	36%	11%	54%
Women, 18-39.....	135	39%	15%	46%
Women, 40-64.....	143	32%	11%	57%
Women, 65+.....	80	33%	6%	61%
STATUS GROUPS				
High Income.....	278	43%	10%	47%
Intelligentsia.....	77	38%	7%	55%
Middle Class.....	251	36%	15%	49%
Lower End.....	78	28%	7%	65%
Hispanics.....	35	31%	20%	49%
Jews.....	18	10%	10%	80%
Blacks.....	73	3%	16%	81%
GENDER/STATUS				
Men, High Income.....	155	48%	9%	43%
Men, Intelligentsia....	38	49%	8%	43%
Men, Middle Class.....	126	37%	14%	49%
Men, Lower End.....	27	27%	7%	66%
Men, Minorities.....	47	14%	19%	67%
Women, High Income.....	123	37%	12%	51%
Women, Intelligentsia..	39	28%	5%	67%
Women, Middle Class....	125	35%	16%	49%
Women, Lower End.....	51	29%	7%	64%
Women, Minorities.....	80	11%	15%	75%
WORKING WOMEN				
Working Women*.....	194	33%	13%	54%
Non-Working Women*....	168	37%	10%	53%
Else.....	486	34%	12%	54%
MARITAL STATUS*				
Married.....	497	40%	11%	49%
Single.....	126	39%	12%	49%
Else.....	225	21%	13%	66%

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	Did Bush Have an Economic Plan?		
		personally committed to plan	not committed to plan	no plan
GENDER/MARITAL STATUS*				
Men, Married.....	259	43%	9%	48%
Men, Single.....	75	34%	16%	49%
Men, Other.....	26	56%	7%	37%
Women, Married.....	238	37%	13%	51%
Women, Single.....	51	45%	7%	48%
Women, Other.....	73	24%	10%	66%
CULTURAL GROUPS				
Northern Protestants...	245	42%	9%	49%
Northern Catholics.....	107	32%	14%	54%
Northern Union.....	133	31%	9%	60%
Southern Whites.....	217	45%	12%	43%
Minorities.....	126	12%	16%	72%
CHURCH ATTENDANCE*				
Protestants, Regular...	211	51%	6%	42%
Protestants, Non-.....	272	35%	12%	53%
Catholics, Regular.....	87	31%	16%	53%
Catholics, Non-.....	101	28%	13%	59%
Seculars.....	28	30%	8%	62%
EVANG./FUND. CHRISTIANS				
Evan./Fund. Christians*	350	40%	11%	49%
Other Protestant*.....	205	35%	8%	56%
Else.....	293	28%	14%	58%
POLITICAL REGIONS				
New England.....	50	38%	8%	53%
Mid-Atlantic.....	116	30%	11%	58%
Border South.....	62	32%	17%	51%
Deep South.....	211	41%	10%	49%
East North Central.....	76	27%	13%	60%
West North Central.....	164	30%	9%	61%
Mountains.....	47	50%	14%	36%
Pacific.....	121	33%	14%	53%

* excludes Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	Did Clinton Have an Economic Plan?		
		personally committed to plan	not committed to plan	no plan
TOTAL.....	848	70%	12%	18%
THE PRESIDENTIAL VOTE				
Bush.....	287	53%	18%	29%
Clinton.....	371	90%	5%	5%
Perot.....	143	59%	18%	23%
VOTETYPE				
Behavioral Republican..	234	50%	18%	33%
Ticket-Splitter.....	342	70%	13%	17%
Behavioral Democrat....	253	91%	4%	4%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION				
Strong Republican.....	142	54%	16%	30%
Weak Republican.....	128	61%	15%	25%
Lean Republican.....	116	53%	18%	29%
Independent.....	58	59%	19%	22%
Lean Democratic.....	141	85%	8%	8%
Weak Democratic.....	110	82%	7%	11%
Strong Democratic.....	152	90%	7%	4%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION				
Republican.....	387	56%	16%	28%
Independent.....	58	59%	19%	22%
Democratic.....	403	86%	7%	7%
IDEOLOGY				
Strong Conservative....	98	52%	11%	36%
Weak Conservative.....	414	63%	15%	22%
Moderate.....	52	82%	11%	7%
Weak Liberal.....	104	84%	8%	8%
Strong Liberal.....	180	85%	8%	7%
IDEOLOGY/PARTY				
Consrv Republican.....	305	53%	15%	31%
Mod/Lib Republican.....	81	67%	19%	14%
Independent.....	58	59%	19%	22%
Mod/Consrv Democrat....	205	80%	10%	10%
Lib Democrat.....	198	92%	4%	4%
GOP CENTER-RIGHT BASE				
Center-Right Base.....	468	61%	15%	25%
Else.....	380	82%	9%	9%
CORE DEMOCRATS				
Core Democratic.....	187	87%	7%	6%
Else.....	662	66%	14%	21%

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	Did Clinton Have an Economic Plan?		
		personally committed to plan	not committed to plan	no plan
GENDER*				
Men.....	360	67%	10%	22%
Women.....	362	73%	14%	14%
AGE*				
18-24.....	57	72%	16%	12%
25-39.....	229	68%	16%	16%
40-64.....	283	69%	9%	22%
65+.....	147	75%	8%	16%
GENDER/AGE*				
Men, 18-39.....	150	70%	14%	17%
Men, 40-64.....	141	64%	7%	29%
Men, 65+.....	67	68%	9%	23%
Women, 18-39.....	135	67%	19%	14%
Women, 40-64.....	143	74%	12%	14%
Women, 65+.....	80	81%	7%	11%
STATUS GROUPS				
High Income.....	278	72%	10%	19%
Intelligentsia.....	77	84%	9%	8%
Middle Class.....	251	66%	15%	19%
Lower End.....	78	70%	11%	20%
Hispanics.....	35	58%	24%	18%
Jews.....	18	79%		21%
Blacks.....	73	76%	12%	12%
GENDER/STATUS				
Men, High Income.....	155	67%	9%	24%
Men, Intelligentsia....	38	82%	5%	13%
Men, Middle Class.....	126	64%	13%	22%
Men, Lower End.....	27	67%	11%	22%
Men, Minorities.....	47	66%	17%	17%
Women, High Income.....	123	78%	11%	11%
Women, Intelligentsia..	39	86%	12%	2%
Women, Middle Class....	125	67%	16%	16%
Women, Lower End.....	51	71%	11%	18%
Women, Minorities.....	80	75%	11%	14%
WORKING WOMEN				
Working Women*.....	194	77%	14%	10%
Non-Working Women*....	168	68%	14%	18%
Else.....	486	69%	11%	21%
MARITAL STATUS*				
Married.....	497	69%	12%	19%
Single.....	126	74%	11%	15%
Else.....	225	71%	12%	16%

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: VOTE ANALYSIS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	Did Clinton Have an Economic Plan?		
		personally committed to plan	not committed to plan	no plan
GENDER/MARITAL STATUS*				
Men, Married.....	259	66%	10%	24%
Men, Single.....	75	78%	10%	12%
Men, Other.....	26	51%	8%	41%
Women, Married.....	238	72%	15%	13%
Women, Single.....	51	68%	12%	20%
Women, Other.....	73	79%	12%	10%
CULTURAL GROUPS				
Northern Protestants...	245	69%	12%	19%
Northern Catholics.....	107	73%	11%	17%
Northern Union.....	133	79%	10%	11%
Southern Whites.....	217	64%	14%	22%
Minorities.....	126	71%	13%	15%
CHURCH ATTENDANCE*				
Protestants, Regular...	211	67%	13%	20%
Protestants, Non-.....	272	71%	13%	16%
Catholics, Regular.....	87	73%	11%	15%
Catholics, Non-.....	101	70%	11%	19%
Seculars.....	28	77%	3%	20%
EVANG./FUND. CHRISTIANS				
Evan./Fund. Christians*	350	68%	15%	17%
Other Protestant*.....	205	70%	11%	19%
Else.....	293	73%	9%	18%
POLITICAL REGIONS				
New England.....	50	69%	10%	21%
Mid-Atlantic.....	116	65%	13%	22%
Border South.....	62	61%	11%	28%
Deep South.....	211	65%	15%	20%
East North Central.....	76	83%	7%	10%
West North Central.....	164	74%	13%	13%
Mountains.....	47	75%	13%	12%
Pacific.....	121	76%	8%	15%

* excludes Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews

VOTING THEMES AND CONSIDERATIONS

Change

Clinton's "change" theme was the most powerful one in the 1992 election. When voters went to the polls, they were certain of one thing: they wanted something different. In many ways, the electorate embraced the philosophy of change for change's sake.

The electorate is unhappy with the status-quo. And in many respects, this unhappiness makes it impossible for the President to compete evenly in any debate about solutions because all of his proposals are discounted on the basis of previous "failure". Out of 33 potential concerns, the concern that troubled people most was that the President would not do anything differently than he did in the first term. Fifty-two percent of voters say that this was very much on their minds as they made their voting choice. An additional 18% say it was partly on their minds. More to the point, 67% are at least partly mindful of the concern that the President had his chance to fix the economy and 63% are similarly mindful that trickle-down economics would continue under the President.

On the other hand, Clinton is the embodiment of change almost irrespective of his plans. When they made up their minds on a candidate, 70% of those surveyed were at least partly mindful of the argument that Clinton represent more certain change than does the President. Only 15% said this factor was not at all on their minds. This factor ranked second out of 33 in terms of weighing on the minds of voters. And if the case for Clinton's dominance of the change issue needed further evidence, when asked which candidate can bring needed change in the country only 22% say the President while 63% choose Clinton.

As mentioned earlier, the public does not appear to be overly concerned about the nature of the change Clinton represents. Fifty-one percent were at least partly mindful of the notion that while things need improving, Clinton might make them worse; however, only one out of three voters were very much mindful of this concern, and almost half were either slightly or not at all mindful. This doubt ranks 21 out of 33.

It is not the case that Clinton convinced the electorate that his ideas are superior to those of the President. It IS the case that the electorate is not happy with the condition of the country and Clinton was a more logical choice to bring about change than was the President.

The Authenticity of Change

To the extent that people are concerned about the character of change, they are somewhat impressed with the kind of departure from the past that Clinton represents. Sixty-one percent are at least partly mindful of the idea that Clinton represents a new generation of leadership. Only 43%, though, are similarly mindful of Clinton being a new kind of Democrat. And only 36% say they were very or partly mindful of Clinton's independence from minority groups when they reached a voting choice. Once again, the idea of change is more important than actually developing a unique approach.

Getting Things Done

This issue has two components: (1) the perception that the President did not address the major economic and social problems that emerged over the past four years, and (2) the notion that Clinton can undo the personal and institutional gridlock in Washington, D.C.. The latter component may be prior to the first one, but it seems to be at least as important.

That voters perceive Clinton as better able to get things done is no surprise. Fifty-five percent choose him as the candidate who can get things done, compared to 27% picking the President and 6% Perot. The question is: Does this perception depend entirely on the notion that the President has not done a good job, or is some of it based on the belief that Clinton has some qualities that will allow him to do better than the President?

The data indicate that Clinton has established some credibility beyond merely being an alternative to the President. Sixty-seven percent of the respondents say that they were at least partly mindful of the possibility that Clinton would get the economy moving again when they made their voting decision. This is the 5th most influential factor on a list of 33 possible concerns facing voters during the campaign. Sixty-five percent were similarly mindful of the prospect that Clinton and a Democratic Congress might get more done, with this issue ranking 8.

This is not to say that voters thought the President was getting things done, nor is it plausible that the perception of inaction did not hurt him. The concern that the President would not take care of problems at home ranks 6th on the list of considerations. Sixty-four percent say it was partly or very much on their minds when they decided who to vote for.

Fewer voters say the increased likelihood of gridlock between the executive and the legislative branches under a Republican administration weighed heavily on their decision. The concern ranks 20th. However, 59% do admit that this was at least a partial consideration.

Character

Doubts about Bill Clinton's character did weigh on the minds of voters in the election. However, the issue did not effect many voters outside of the President's electoral base.

In relative terms, the bundle of character issues were much less important than retrospective evaluations of the President and more specific economic concerns. Out of 33 considerations, various measures of concerns about Clinton's character ranked 26, 28, 29, and 33 in terms of their effect on the voting decision.

General concerns about Clinton's moral integrity were very much on the minds of 25% of the electorate. However, 54% say that such concerns were either slightly or not at all on their minds. Stories about Clinton evading the draft and protesting the Vietnam War while in England also failed to deeply influence many voters. Of these issues 23% and 22%, respectively, say that they were very much on their minds, while 62% and 64% say they were only slightly or not at all on their minds. The least impressive of all character concerns was Clinton's alleged infidelities; 75% say the issue was slightly or not at all on their minds and only 13% claim the concern was very much on their minds. Only die-hard Republicans responded to this issue.

To the extent that character was an issue, the President had command of the moral high ground. Fifty-four percent of respondents rated the President as the best candidate to uphold traditional American values, with Clinton getting 30% and Perot 3%. Fifty-four percent choose the President as the candidate of the highest moral character, compared to 22% choosing Clinton and 4% Perot. Similarly, 42% say the President is the most honest and trustworthy of the candidates, compared to Clinton's 33% and Perot's 4%.

The problem with the character issue from the Republican perspective is not that the President had lost credibility by breaking his "no new tax" pledge or being involved in arms for hostages. The problem is that character was not especially salient in this election due to (a) the preeminence of the economy as an issue, and (b) the widespread belief that *all politicians are somewhat tainted*.

Taxes and Spending

Most voters were concerned about increased taxes and government spending when they went to the polls. The problem, from the President's perspective, is that both candidates were thought of as "tax and spend" candidates. Moreover, data throughout the campaign show that the economic problems have bred a willingness to endure a certain asceticism *if that is the price of the government's doing something to end the recession*.

Fifty-nine percent express at least partial mindfulness that Clinton might raise taxes. However, this doubt is 16 out of a list of 33 concerns. It is a concern that is pronounced among all political and demographic groups, but other concerns are even more widespread.

Fifty-nine percent are also partly or very mindful of Clinton and the Democratic Congress spending too much. This doubt ranks 14th; not inconsequential, but not nearly as impressive as the concerns about the "standing pat" or about the economy.

The idea that the country might not be able to afford Clinton's programs was at least partly on the minds of 57% when they made their choice for president. This ranks 18 out of 33 concerns. As with the tax issue, concerns about the spending issue are fairly broad.

Republicans, though, are much more concerned than Democrats. Perot voters, as well as independents generally, look more like Republicans than Democrats on the issue.

It is obvious that the President did not have much of an advantage on the tax issue. Indeed, the data suggest he had no advantage at all. When asked which candidate would do the best job handling taxes, 44% choose the President and 44% choose Clinton. Respondents from the East and Mid-West States, and seniors are the least likely to see the President as better able to handle taxes.

Did the President lose the tax issue when he broke his 1988 campaign pledge of "no new taxes"? There is really no way to make a direct argument from these data. It is true that the negative effect of that action on the President's vote was minimal. Forty-eight percent said they were at least partly mindful of it when they decided who to vote for, but this concern ranks 23 out of 33. Even for Clinton voters it was only 13th, while for Perot voters it was 21st. In addition, previous surveys have shown that most voters think that the next president will have to raise their taxes. It is probably the case that voters would have considered any "no tax" pledge by the President skeptically even if he had kept his 1988 promise.

Arms Sales

Although the allegations that the President knew about a deal trading arms for hostages did not top the list of voters' concerns, very few respondents said it was not at all on their minds.

Fifty-five percent of those sampled say stories that the President knew more about the Iranian arms sales than he said he did weighed partly or very much on their minds when they decided how to vote. Out of 33 possible concerns, this doubt ranks 19.

The issue played best with Democrats and traditionally Democratic groups such as union members and minorities. Among Clinton voters, the Saddam consideration ranks 11th and the arms for hostages 10th. Women were more likely than men to say they thought about allegations prior to settling on a candidate. Republicans were much less troubled by the issue. The arms for hostages story appears to have hurt the President with Perot voters. Thirty-seven percent say the issue was very much on their minds when they decided who to vote for.

The pre-Gulf War relationship between the United States with Iraq was not among the top concerns either. Fifty percent of the electorate was partly or very much mindful of the stories that the President was helping Saddam Hussein before Iraq invaded Kuwait. This ranks 22 on the list of concerns.

Again, the arms sales issue is most important to those who are already predisposed to support the Democratic candidate. As with the arms for hostages issue, the stories about the President and Iraq also resonated with Perot voters, 36% of who say they issue was very much on their minds when they reached their voting decision.

These issues were not driving the preferences of a majority of the electorate, but they made it much more difficult for the President to coax Perot supporters to vote Republican.

The Arkansas Record

Clinton's record as governor of Arkansas never proved to be a powerful issue with the electorate. The post-election survey data corroborate what we learned in the focus groups; people are interested, but other issues are more important. Clinton's failures in Arkansas were rarely articulated for the electorate, and when they were many discounted the criticisms as election year politicking.

Fifty percent say that Arkansas' low economic, education, and environmental ranking weighed partly or very heavily on their minds when they made their voting decision. That means 50% were not particularly concerned about Clinton's past experience. The issue ranks 24 out of 33 and is well behind the change and economic concerns.

Interestingly, concern with Clinton's Arkansas record is highest among younger voters, Republicans, Bush voters, and Perot voters, where it ranks 8th. The lack of effect the issue had with senior voters is remarkable (61% say the concern was only slightly or not at all on their minds). The concern among Perot voters (68% say the issue was at least partly on their minds) is ironic considering Perot's statement in the third presidential debate that Clinton's Arkansas experience was "irrelevant".

Concerns or reservations voters had on their mind when they were deciding on how to vote. (Ranked ordered by those saying the item was "Very Much" on one's mind)		
Bush Voters	Clinton Voters	Perot Voters
Bush better able to handle int'l crisis than Clinton	Bush would not do anything differently than he did in 1st term	Perot the only one to talk straight on deficit and national debt
Bush better able to handle foreign policy than Clinton	Clinton would get the economy moving again	Bush would not do anything differently than he did in 1st term
Clinton and Dem. Congress spend too much	Clinton representing more certain change than Bush	Bush had his chance to fix the economy
Country not able to afford Clinton's spending programs	Bush had his chance to fix the economy	Bush would not take care of problems here at home
Clinton would raise taxes	Bush would not take care of problems here at home	Clinton would raise taxes
Clinton might make things worse	Clinton represents a new generation of leadership	Country not able to afford Clinton's spending program
Doubts about Clinton's integrity and moral character	Al Gore being a better choice for Vice President than Dan Quayle	Clinton and Dem. Congress spend too much
Low ranking of Arkansas	Trickle-down economics continuing under Bush	Trickle-down economics continuing under Bush
Perot doesn't have right temperament for the job of Pres.	Clinton and a Democratic Congress would get more done	Low ranking of Arkansas
Clinton's evasion of the draft	Quayle becoming President if something happened to Bush	Bush better able to handle int'l crisis than Clinton
Clinton leading protests against Vietnam War while in England	Stories that Bush knew more on Iranian arm sales than he said	Clinton might make things worse
Bush's position on abortion	Perot doesn't have right temperament for the job of Pres.	Bush better able to handle foreign policy than Clinton
Perot the only one to talk straight on deficit and national debt	Stories that Bush was helping Saddam Hussein before Iraq invaded Kuwait	There would be more gridlock with Congress under Bush
Hillary Clinton would have too much influence in administration	Bush breaking the "no new taxes" pledge he made in 1988	Stories that Bush knew more on Iranian arm sales than he said
Clinton representing more certain change than Bush	There would be more gridlock with Congress under Bush	Stories that Bush was helping Saddam Hussein before Iraq invaded Kuwait
The stories about Clinton's extramarital affairs	Bush's position on abortion	Bush's position on abortion
Clinton and a Democratic Congress would get more done	The GOP Convention showing GOP as too right-wing	Clinton representing more certain change than Bush

Concerns or reservations voters had on their mind when they were deciding on how to vote. (Ranked ordered by those saying the item was "Very Much" on one's mind)		
Bush Voters	Clinton Voters	Perot Voters
There would be more gridlock with Congress under Bush	Perot the only one to talk straight on deficit and national debt	Quayle becoming President if something happened to Bush
Clinton represents a new generation of leadership	Clinton's a new kind of Democrat	Bush breaking the "no new taxes" pledge he made in 1988
Clinton would get the economy moving again	Clinton was more independent of minority groups than past Democratic presidential candidates	Al Gore being a better choice for Vice President than Dan Quayle
Clinton's a new kind of Democrat	Perot's charges on 60 Minutes that the Bush campaign was planning "dirty tricks" against his family	Doubts about Clinton's integrity and moral character
Al Gore being a better choice for Vice President than Dan Quayle	Bush better able to handle foreign policy than Clinton	Clinton would get the economy moving again
Bush would not do anything differently than he did in 1st term	Bush better able to handle int'l crisis than Clinton	Clinton's evasion of the draft
Quayle becoming President if something happened to Bush	Clinton would raise taxes	Clinton represents a new generation of leadership
Trickle-down economics continuing under Bush	Clinton and Dem. Congress spend too much	Clinton and a Democratic Congress would get more done
Bush had his chance to fix the economy	Low ranking of Arkansas	Clinton leading protests against Vietnam War while in England
Clinton was more independent of minority groups than past Democratic presidential candidates	Country not able to afford Clinton's spending program	Perot's charges on 60 Minutes that the Bush campaign was planning "dirty tricks" against his family
Bush would not take care of problems here at home	Clinton might make things worse	The GOP Convention showing GOP as too right-wing
Bush breaking the "no new taxes" pledge he made in 1988	Doubts about Clinton's integrity and moral character	Clinton was more independent of minority groups than past Democratic presidential candidates
Stories that Bush knew more on Iranian arm sales than he said	Hillary Clinton would have too much influence in administration	The stories about Clinton's extramarital affairs
The GOP Convention showing GOP as too right-wing	Clinton's evasion of the draft	Hillary Clinton would have too much influence in administration
Stories that Bush was helping Saddam Hussein before Iraq invaded Kuwait	Clinton leading protests against Vietnam War while in England	Clinton's a new kind of Democrat
Perot's charges on 60 Minutes that the Bush campaign was planning "dirty tricks" against his family	The stories about Clinton's extramarital affairs	Perot doesn't have right temperament for the job of Pres.

Analysis of Bush Voters

Here are some things people have told us were on their minds when they were deciding on how to vote. Some are reservations people had about the candidate they eventually voted for. We'd like to know if you shared any of these thoughts. So, for each one, please tell me if it was something that was VERY MUCH on your mind, PARTLY on your mind, just SLIGHTLY on your mind or NOT AT ALL on your mind in deciding on how to vote this year for President?

Items were randomized. Rank ordered on very much and partly on your mind.	Very Much Mind	Part. Mind	Just Slig. Mind	Not at all Mind	DK/ Ref.	Collapsed	
						Very/ Part. Mind	Just/ Not Mind
Q73. That Bush would better handle an international crises than Clinton.	83%	11	3	3	*	94%	6
Q80. That Clinton and a Democratic Congress would spend too much.	73%	16	5	6	--	89%	11
Q74. That Bush would better handle foreign policy than Clinton.	76%	12	5	7	--	88%	12
Q65. The country may not be able to afford Clinton's spending programs.	69%	17	8	6	*	86%	14
Q66. While things need improving in the country, Clinton might make things worse.	65%	21	10	4	*	86%	14
Q63. That Clinton would raise your taxes.	68%	15	11	5	*	84%	14
Q64. Doubts about Clinton's integrity and moral character.	48%	23	14	1	*	71%	28
Q60. The low ranking of Arkansas on its economy, education, and environmental protection during Clinton's years as Governor.	47%	23	14	16	*	70%	30
Q84. Perot not having the right temperament for the job of President.	46%	20	14	20	--	67%	33
Q57. The stories about Clinton's evasion of the draft.	45%	20	18	17	*	65%	34
Q59. The stories about Clinton leading protests against the Vietnam War while in England.	45%	17	16	22	*	62%	38
Q85. Perot being the only candidate to talk straight about the deficit and the national debt.	36%	24	17	23	--	61%	39
Q62. Bush's position on abortion.	43%	15	14	29	*	57%	43
Q56. Clinton representing more certain change than Bush.	30%	23	20	27	*	53%	46
Q71. Hillary Clinton would have TOO MUCH influence in a Clinton administration.	34%	16	17	33	*	50%	50
Q68. There would be more gridlock with Congress under Bush.	22%	28	27	22	*	50%	49
Q81. That Clinton and a Democratic Congress would get more done.	23%	21	24	31	*	44%	55
Q72. That Clinton represented a new generation of leadership.	16%	26	22	35	1	41%	57

Items were randomized. Rank ordered on very much and partly on your mind.						<u>Collapsed</u>	
	<u>Very Much Mind</u>	<u>Part. Mind</u>	<u>Just Slig. Mind</u>	<u>Not at all Mind</u>	<u>DK/ Ref.</u>	<u>Very/ Part. Mind</u>	<u>Just/ Not Mind</u>
Q78. That Clinton would get the economy moving again.	16%	24	27	32	1	41%	59
Q58. The stories about Clinton's extra-marital affairs.	25%	14	24	35	*	40%	59
Q75. Bush would not do anything differently than he did in his first term.	15%	23	28	33	*	38%	61
Q77. That Bush had had his chance to fix the economy.	12%	26	28	33	*	38%	61
Q76. Trickle-down economics continuing under Bush.	13%	23	32	31	2	36%	63
Q69. Dan Quayle becoming President if something happened to George Bush.	15%	20	23	42	*	35%	65
Q61. Clinton saying he was a new kind of Democrat.	16%	18	20	44	2	34%	64
Q67. Bush would not take care of problems here at home.	10%	22	31	36	*	33%	67
Q70. Al Gore being a better choice for Vice President than Dan Quayle.	16%	16	18	50	*	32%	68
Q79. That Clinton was more independent of minority groups than past Democratic candidates for President.	11%	17	25	45	3	28%	69
Q83. Bush breaking the "no new taxes" pledge he made in 1988.	10%	18	27	44	*	28%	71
Q53. The stories that President Bush knew more about the Iranian arms sales than he said he did.	9%	18	30	41	1	28%	71
Q82. The Republican Convention showing the Republican Party was TOO right-wing.	9%	16	25	48	2	25%	73
Q54. The stories that President Bush was helping Saddam Hussein before Iraq invaded Kuwait.	9%	15	27	48	1	24%	75
Q55. Ross Perot's charges on 60 Minutes that the Bush campaign was planning "dirty tricks" against his family.	9%	10	18	63	*	19%	80

Analysis of Clinton Voters

Here are some things people have told us were on their minds when they were deciding on how to vote. Some are reservations people had about the candidate they eventually voted for. We'd like to know if you shared any of these thoughts. So, for each one, please tell me if it was something that was VERY MUCH on your mind, PARTLY on your mind, just SLIGHTLY on your mind or NOT AT ALL on your mind in deciding on how to vote this year for President?

Items were randomized. Rank order on very much and partly on your mind.	Very Much Mind	Part. Mind	Just Slig. Mind	Not at all Mind	DK/ Ref.	Collapsed	
						Very/ Part. Mind	Just/ Not Mind
Q56. Clinton representing more certain change than Bush.	75%	15	6	4	--	92%	8
Q75. Bush would not do anything differently than he did in his first term.	77%	14	4	4	*	91%	8
Q78. That Clinton would get the economy moving again.	75%	17	5	3	*	90%	10
Q81. That Clinton and a Democratic Congress would get more done.	69%	20	7	4	*	89%	11
Q77. That Bush had had his chance to fix the economy.	72%	16	8	4	*	88%	12
Q67. Bush would not take care of problems here at home.	70%	15	8	6	--	85%	15
Q72. That Clinton represented a new generation of leadership.	68%	17	8	7	--	85%	15
Q76. Trickle-down economics continuing under Bush.	65%	16	12	7	*	81%	18
Q70. Al Gore being a better choice for Vice President than Dan Quayle.	67%	11	8	13	1	78%	21
Q53. The stories that President Bush knew more about the Iranian arms sales than he said he did.	56%	19	11	14	*	75%	24
Q69. Dan Quayle becoming President if something happened to George Bush.	62%	9	10	18	1	71%	28
Q54. The stories that President Bush was helping Saddam Hussein before Iraq invaded Kuwait.	45%	23	14	17	1	68%	32
Q68. There would be more gridlock with Congress under Bush.	44%	22	20	13	1	67%	32
Q84. Perot not having the right temperament for the job of President.	50%	16	13	19	1	66%	33
Q83. Bush breaking the "no new taxes" pledge he made in 1988.	45%	18	19	17	*	63%	37
Q62. Bush's position on abortion.	43%	16	17	24	1	59%	41
Q85. Perot being the only candidate to talk straight about the deficit and the national debt.	38%	21	20	19	2	59%	39
Q61. Clinton saying he was a new kind of Democrat.	33%	24	18	23	2	57%	42
Q82. The Republican Convention showing the Republican Party was TOO right-wing.	40%	12	18	26	3	53%	44

Items were randomized. Rank orderd on very much and partly on your mind.	<u>Very Much Mind</u>	<u>Part. Mind</u>	<u>Just Slig. Mind</u>	<u>Not at all Mind</u>	<u>DK/ Ref.</u>	<u>Collapsed</u>	
						<u>Very/ Part. Mind</u>	<u>Just/ Not Mind</u>
Q79. That Clinton was more independent of minority groups than past Democratic candidates for President.	21%	23	26	29	2	44%	54
Q74. That Bush would better handle foreign policy than Clinton.	17%	25	27	30	2	42%	57
Q73. That Bush would better handle an international crises than Clinton.	15%	24	26	33	1	39%	60
Q63. That Clinton would raise your taxes.	12%	22	32	32	2	35%	64
Q55. Ross Perot's charges on 60 Minutes that the Bush campaign was planning "dirty tricks" against his family.	18%	16	23	41	1	34%	65
Q80. That Clinton and a Democratic Congress would spend too much.	10%	20	33	36	1	30%	70
Q65. The country may not be able to afford Clinton's spending programs.	7%	21	36	33	1	28%	71
Q60. The low ranking of Arkansas on its economy, education, and environmental protection during Clinton's years as Governor.	8%	17	34	40	1	25%	74
Q66. While things need improving in the country, Clinton might make things worse.	7%	14	28	51	*	21%	79
Q57. The stories about Clinton's evasion of the draft.	3%	11	26	59	1	15%	85
Q59. The stories about Clinton leading protests against the Vietnam War while in England.	3%	10	23	63	1	13%	86
Q64. Doubts about Clinton's integrity and moral character.	4%	9	26	60	*	13%	86
Q71. Hillary Clinton would have TOO MUCH influence in a Clinton administration.	4%	8	23	64	*	12%	87
Q58. The stories about Clinton's extra-marital affairs.	1%	8	23	67	*	9%	91

Analysis of Perot Voters

Here are some things people have told us were on their minds when they were deciding on how to vote. Some are reservations people had about the candidate they eventually voted for. We'd like to know if you shared any of these thoughts. So, for each one, please tell me if it was something that was VERY MUCH on your mind, PARTLY on your mind, just SLIGHTLY on your mind or NOT AT ALL on your mind in deciding on how to vote this year for President?

Items were randomized. Rank ordered on very much and partly on your mind.	Very Much Mind	Part. Mind	Just Slig. Mind	Not at all Mind	DK/ Ref.	Collapsed	
						Very/ Part. Mind	Just/ Not Mind
Q85. Perot being the only candidate to talk straight about the deficit and the national debt.	95%	3	2	1	--	97%	3
Q75. Bush would not do anything differently than he did in his first term.	67%	13	8	11	*	81%	19
Q67. Bush would not take care of problems here at home.	53%	25	11	11	1	77%	22
Q77. That Bush had had his chance to fix the economy.	54%	23	12	11	--	76%	24
Q65. The country may not be able to afford Clinton's spending programs.	52%	21	36	35	1	73%	26
Q80. That Clinton and a Democratic Congress would spend too much.	52%	19	15	13	--	72%	28
Q73. That Bush would better handle an international crises than Clinton.	45%	26	17	11	1	71%	28
Q60. The low ranking of Arkansas on its economy, education, and environmental protection during Clinton's years as Governor.	49%	19	17	14	--	69%	31
Q63. That Clinton would raise your taxes.	53%	16	17	14	--	68%	32
Q76. Trickle-down economics continuing under Bush.	50%	18	17	14	1	68%	31
Q74. That Bush would better handle foreign policy than Clinton.	40%	26	20	14	1	66%	34
Q66. While things need improving in the country, Clinton might make things worse.	41%	22	21	15	1	63%	36
Q53. The stories that President Bush knew more about the Iranian arms sales than he said he did.	37%	25	14	23	*	62%	37
Q56. Clinton representing more certain change than Bush.	34%	28	22	15	1	61%	37
Q54. The stories that President Bush was helping Saddam Hussein before Iraq invaded Kuwait.	36%	25	18	20	1	60%	39
Q78. That Clinton would get the economy moving again.	29%	29	20	21	1	58%	41
Q68. There would be more gridlock with Congress under Bush.	38%	19	23	18	2	57%	41
Q81. That Clinton and a Democratic Congress would get more done.	24%	30	28	17	1	54%	45

Items were randomized. Rank ordered on very much and partly on your mind.	<u>Very Much Mind</u>	<u>Part. Mind</u>	<u>Just Slig. Mind</u>	<u>Not at all Mind</u>	<u>DK/ Ref.</u>	<u>Collapsed</u>	
						<u>Very/ Part. Mind</u>	<u>Just/ Not Mind</u>
Q62. Bush's position on abortion.	35%	17	15	24	1	52%	46
Q69. Dan Quayle becoming President if something happened to George Bush.	34%	16	16	33	1	50%	49
Q83. Bush breaking the "no new taxes" pledge he made in 1988.	31%	20	23	26	*	50%	49
Q70. Al Gore being a better choice for Vice President than Dan Quayle.	31%	19	21	28	1	50%	49
Q64. Doubts about Clinton's integrity and moral character.	31%	17	28	24	--	48%	52
Q72. That Clinton represented a new generation of leadership.	25%	22	30	22	1	47%	52
Q57. The stories about Clinton's evasion of the draft.	28%	15	25	30	1	44%	55
Q59. The stories about Clinton leading protests against the Vietnam War while in England.	24%	17	23	35	1	41%	59
Q82. The Republican Convention showing the Republican Party was TOO right-wing.	20%	19	21	34	6	39%	55
Q55. Ross Perot's charges on 60 Minutes that the Bush campaign was planning "dirty tricks" against his family.	22%	16	30	33	--	38%	62
Q79. That Clinton was more independent of minority groups than past Democratic candidates for President.	19%	16	22	38	5	35%	60
Q58. The stories about Clinton's extra-marital affairs.	18%	13	23	45	--	31%	69
Q61. Clinton saying he was a new kind of Democrat.	16%	15	30	38	1	31%	68
Q71. Hillary Clinton would have TOO MUCH influence in a Clinton administration.	17%	13	23	46	1	30%	70
Q84. Perot not having the right temperament for the job of President.	12%	18	25	44	1	30%	69

THE POLITICAL PARTIES

A Brief Overview

In spite of Bill Clinton's presidential victory and continued Democratic dominance of the Congress, there has not been a major increase in the Democrats' party identification advantage. In the 1992 BQ/MSI tracking surveys conducted throughout October, Democrats held a 3-to-7 point advantage over Republicans in self-identified party identification. According to the last internal tracking poll conducted November 1, Democrats held a 49%-to-42% advantage over Republicans. This 7-point difference is almost identical to the 48% to 42% Democratic margin that existed on the eve of the 1988 election.

Moreover, future Republican prospects are actually quite good. Among young voters, the GOP is more than competitive with the Democrats. Fifty-four percent of white respondents between 18 and 24 years of age call themselves Republicans, while 42% identify themselves as Democrats.

The party coalitions remain stable in 1992. The Republican Party saw an increase in the proportion of WASPs in its ranks and lost some Catholics, but otherwise appears to be much the same party it was in 1988. The Democrats also lost some Catholic identifiers--suggesting their are not enough Catholics in the total sample--while blacks and Northern union members increased their percentages.

Although no one would characterize the 1992 election as a "critical" or "realigning" election, two major developments make 1992 an important year for the parties. First, the Democrats managed to rescind the Republican Party's "ownership" of the economy and taxes. Second, a major fissure emerged between social and fiscal conservatives in the Republican coalition. The loss of certain issues is troublesome, but could be temporary. The development of a party rift is more problematic.

Perceptions of the Parties

Respondents generally feel more favorable towards the Democrats than towards the Republicans. Forty-six percent of the public feels warmly towards the Democratic Party while only 29% feels cold. The average 0-100 rating of the Democrats is 55. Conversely, people are split on their feelings towards the GOP: 37% feel warmly and 35% feel coldly, with the mean score being 49. These ratings are in line with previous thermometer scores of the Democrats, but evidence a slip in the popularity of the Republican Party (it is the first time the party has been rated under 50 during the President's term).

The Democrats also enjoy a 12 percentage point "confidence" margin over the Republicans. Forty-six percent of the electorate has more confidence in the programs and policies of the Democratic Party, compared to 34% preferring the Republicans. The eradication and reversal of the Republican "confidence" advantage of the 1980s and early 1990s is clearly a product of negative reaction towards the Bush Administration because of the close tie between party confidence and presidential approval.

Since partisans almost always have more confidence in their own party, demographic and political swing groups tend to drive marginal advantages on the question. This is clearly the case in this instance. The Democratic margin among ticket-splitters is 15 points. Among the middle class it is 7 points. Among non-church going Protestants it is 8 points.

Issues and the Parties

According to the public, the Republican Party is better than the Democrats only on the issue of foreign policy. On the economy, the budget deficit, education, and health care, the Democratic Party is deemed better by a majority of people. The Democrats tie the Republicans on the question of which party can best handle taxes.

During most of the President's term, foreign policy and taxes were clearly Republican issues, while the budget deficit, the economy, and education were issues on which the GOP was competitive. The 1992 election has given these last three issues to the Democrats until 1994, at which point they will become performance issues. The Republican game plan for the next two years needs to focus on making taxes and the budget deficit center pieces of the GOP's issue agenda. The economy tends to be an issue parties "lease" rather than "own", and will naturally come to us if the doldrums continue.

Foreign policy cannot be forgotten as an issue. As president, Clinton will involve the Democratic Party much more deeply in foreign policy issues. The GOP can take advantage of not only policy mistakes, but also any extraneous involvement anywhere. Clinton must pay the price for his "America First" rhetoric.

The Republican Coalition and the Future

More troubling than the temporary party popularity and issue handling setbacks of 1992 is the strain between different elements of the GOP. At the Republican Convention, many moderates in the party expressed consternation at the "intolerance" of the platform and speeches. Then, during the campaign, complaints could be heard from the far-right about the Republican ticket "backing off" on social issues. The substantial amount of finger pointing and blame placing between conservatives and moderates over the President's defeat suggests the deeper tensions within the party.

From a variety of issue questions in the post-election survey, it is possible to identify social conservatives and fiscal conservatives. Both social and fiscal conservatives voted for the President over Bill Clinton. However, social conservatives did not support the President at nearly the levels one might have expected. Indeed, the President's support among fiscal

conservatives, even with Perot as an option, exceeded his support among social conservatives. The President carried fiscal conservatives by 30 percentage points, but carried social conservatives by only 17 points.

Other data also suggest the possibility for future tension. Thirty-five percent of voters are social conservatives and 39% are fiscal conservatives. Only 18% are both. Ambivalence is more common than consistency on these dimensions; 40% of the voting public is conservative on one dimension but not on the other. Reconciliation, even if it occurs simply as opposition to Clinton, must take place for the Party to be successful in 1996.

SOCIAL GROUP PROFILE OF THE PARTY COALITIONS: 1952-1992

	1952-1960	1962-1970	1976	1980	1982	1984	1986	1988	1992
Republican Party Identifiers									
WASPs	56%	51%	51%	43%	39%	34%	33%	33%	36%
Catholics	10	10	14	16	15	16	18	16	12
Northern Union	18	13	11	14	12	10	11	13	12
White Southerners	11	23	21	24	29	34	34	32	32
Hispanics	*	*	*	*	1	*	1	2	6
Jews	1	1	1	*	1	2	2	1	2
Blacks	5	2	2	3	3	2	2	3	1
Democratic Party Identifiers									
WASPs	19%	20%	17%	17%	17%	19%	18%	21%	21%
Catholics	13	16	19	16	18	23	17	15	13
Northern Union	22	19	18	18	16	13	15	15	17
White Southerners	31	25	23	23	28	20	21	20	22
Hispanics	*	*	*	*	3	*	5	5	4
Jews	5	4	4	6	4	5	4	6	3
Blacks	10	16	18	21	15	20	18	18	21

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: PARTY FAVORABILITY
November 9-17, 1992

	N	Republican Party	Democratic Party
TOTAL.....	1100	49	55
VOTETYPE			
Behavioral Republican..	268	70	34
Ticket-Splitter.....	418	50	56
Behavioral Democrat....	299	30	76
PARTY IDENTIFICATION			
Strong Republican.....	164	76	33
Weak Republican.....	153	65	44
Lean Republican.....	162	61	38
Independent.....	87	45	49
Lean Democratic.....	193	39	62
Weak Democratic.....	155	38	69
Strong Democratic.....	184	25	83
PARTY IDENTIFICATION			
Republican.....	478	67	38
Independent.....	87	45	49
Democratic.....	533	34	71
IDEOLOGY			
Strong Conservative....	110	63	33
Weak Conservative.....	541	54	52
Moderate.....	79	43	64
Weak Liberal.....	148	40	65
Strong Liberal.....	223	41	64
IDEOLOGY/PARTY			
Consrv Republican.....	370	68	36
Mod/Lib Republican.....	108	64	47
Independent.....	87	45	49
Mod/Consrv Democrat....	280	36	71
Lib Democrat.....	252	32	71
GOP CENTER-RIGHT BASE			
Center-Right Base.....	578	58	46
Else.....	522	40	65
CORE DEMOCRATS			
Core Democratic.....	245	29	79
Else.....	855	55	48

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: PARTY FAVORABILITY
November 9-17, 1992

	N	Republican Party	Democratic Party
GENDER*			
Men.....	448	54	51
Women.....	460	49	55
AGE*			
18-24.....	106	53	54
25-39.....	299	54	49
40-64.....	332	49	53
65+.....	165	51	60
GENDER/AGE*			
Men, 18-39.....	213	56	49
Men, 40-64.....	163	50	50
Men, 65+.....	71	54	60
Women, 18-39.....	193	51	52
Women, 40-64.....	169	47	56
Women, 65+.....	94	48	59
STATUS GROUPS			
High Income.....	311	55	50
Intelligentsia.....	88	49	50
Middle Class.....	327	52	54
Lower End.....	133	43	59
Hispanics.....	53	55	52
Jews.....	22	40	60
Blacks.....	117	32	74
GENDER/STATUS			
Men, High Income.....	176	57	49
Men, Intelligentsia....	41	53	44
Men, Middle Class.....	166	54	52
Men, Lower End.....	49	44	59
Men, Minorities.....	80	43	60
Women, High Income.....	135	52	52
Women, Intelligentsia..	47	47	56
Women, Middle Class....	161	51	55
Women, Lower End.....	83	43	59
Women, Minorities.....	112	37	71
WORKING WOMEN			
Working Women*.....	242	49	55
Non-Working Women*....	218	49	55
Else.....	640	50	56
MARITAL STATUS*			
Married.....	593	53	52
Single.....	188	50	54
Else.....	319	42	63

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: PARTY FAVORABILITY
November 9-17, 1992

	N	Republican Party	Democratic Party
GENDER/MARITAL STATUS*			
Men, Married.....	303	55	50
Men, Single.....	112	51	55
Men, Other.....	33	56	49
Women, Married.....	290	51	54
Women, Single.....	77	49	51
Women, Other.....	94	43	61
CULTURAL GROUPS			
Northern Protestants...	299	52	49
Northern Catholics.....	137	49	57
Northern Union.....	155	44	58
Southern Whites.....	291	57	52
Minorities.....	192	39	67
CHURCH ATTENDANCE*			
Protestants, Regular...	252	59	45
Protestants, Non-.....	348	49	56
Catholics, Regular.....	97	52	58
Catholics, Non-.....	140	48	57
Seculars.....	38	41	49
EVANG./FUND. CHRISTIANS			
Evan./Fund. Christians*	439	54	52
Other Protestant*.....	271	45	57
Else.....	390	47	57
POLITICAL REGIONS			
New England.....	64	46	55
Mid-Atlantic.....	158	46	54
Border South.....	91	52	57
Deep South.....	287	54	55
East North Central.....	86	48	59
West North Central.....	202	47	58
Mountains.....	58	50	46
Pacific.....	153	48	53

* excludes Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: PARTY ANALYSIS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	WHICH PARTY R HAS MOST CONFIDENCE IN			
		Reps	Dems	Neither	Else
TOTAL.....	1100	34%	46%	11%	9%
1992 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE					
Bush.....	287	80%	5%	8%	8%
Clinton.....	371	3%	85%	7%	6%
Perot.....	143	36%	33%	23%	9%
VOTETYPE					
Behavioral Republican.....	268	77%	9%	9%	6%
Ticket-Splitter.....	418	29%	44%	15%	11%
Behavioral Democrat....	299	5%	85%	5%	6%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION					
Strong Republican.....	164	85%	5%	6%	4%
Weak Republican.....	153	68%	14%	9%	8%
Lean Republican.....	162	60%	13%	17%	10%
Independent.....	87	14%	29%	30%	28%
Lean Democratic.....	193	7%	65%	16%	12%
Weak Democratic.....	155	7%	82%	6%	5%
Strong Democratic.....	184	0%	95%	2%	3%
PARTY IDENTIFICATION					
Republican.....	478	71%	11%	11%	7%
Independent.....	87	14%	29%	30%	28%
Democratic.....	533	5%	80%	8%	7%
IDEOLOGY					
Strong Conservative...	110	65%	21%	8%	6%
Weak Conservative.....	541	43%	38%	10%	9%
Moderate.....	79	16%	47%	17%	21%
Weak Liberal.....	148	16%	63%	13%	8%
Strong Liberal.....	223	17%	65%	11%	7%
IDEOLOGY/PARTY					
Consrv Republican.....	370	76%	8%	10%	6%
Mod/Lib Republican....	108	53%	20%	13%	13%
Independent.....	87	14%	29%	30%	28%
Mod/Consrv Democrat...	280	6%	77%	7%	10%
Lib Democrat.....	252	4%	83%	9%	4%
GOP CENTER-RIGHT BASE					
Center-Right Base.....	578	54%	27%	11%	8%
Else.....	522	13%	67%	11%	9%
CORE DEMOCRATS					
Core Democratic.....	245	1%	90%	3%	7%
Else.....	855	44%	33%	13%	9%

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: PARTY ANALYSIS
November 9-17, 1992


	N	WHICH PARTY R HAS MOST CONFIDENCE IN			
		Reps	Dems	Neither	Else
GENDER*					
Men.....	448	42%	37%	12%	9%
Women.....	460	36%	45%	11%	8%
AGE*					
18-24.....	106	42%	41%	10%	8%
25-39.....	299	44%	35%	14%	6%
40-64.....	332	35%	42%	14%	9%
65+.....	165	34%	51%	5%	10%
GENDER/AGE*					
Men, 18-39.....	213	46%	32%	12%	9%
Men, 40-64.....	163	38%	38%	17%	7%
Men, 65+.....	71	36%	51%	3%	10%
Women, 18-39.....	193	41%	41%	14%	4%
Women, 40-64.....	169	32%	47%	11%	10%
Women, 65+.....	94	32%	52%	7%	10%
STATUS GROUPS					
High Income.....	311	47%	34%	12%	7%
Intelligentsia.....	88	35%	39%	17%	8%
Middle Class.....	327	37%	44%	11%	8%
Lower End.....	133	25%	54%	9%	11%
Hispanics.....	53	35%	41%	10%	14%
Jews.....	22	18%	69%	9%	4%
Blacks.....	117	3%	81%	4%	12%
GENDER/STATUS					
Men, High Income.....	176	52%	28%	15%	6%
Men, Intelligentsia...	41	43%	38%	14%	5%
Men, Middle Class.....	166	37%	41%	10%	11%
Men, Lower End.....	49	23%	54%	9%	15%
Men, Minorities.....	80	18%	68%	5%	9%
Women, High Income....	135	40%	43%	9%	8%
Women, Intelligentsia.	47	29%	40%	20%	11%
Women, Middle Class...	161	37%	46%	11%	6%
Women, Lower End.....	83	27%	54%	10%	9%
Women, Minorities.....	112	10%	69%	7%	13%
WORKING WOMEN					
Working Women*.....	242	34%	44%	14%	7%
Non-Working Women*....	218	38%	46%	8%	8%
Else.....	640	33%	47%	11%	9%
MARITAL STATUS*					
Married.....	593	42%	39%	12%	7%
Single.....	188	36%	44%	12%	8%
Else.....	319	19%	61%	8%	12%

MSI POST-ELECTION DATA: PARTY ANALYSIS
November 9-17, 1992

	N	WHICH PARTY R HAS MOST CONFIDENCE IN			
		Reps	Dems	Neither	Else
GENDER/MARITAL STATUS*					
Men, Married.....	303	45%	33%	13%	8%
Men, Single.....	112	34%	47%	10%	8%
Men, Other.....	33	32%	40%	11%	17%
Women, Married.....	290	39%	44%	10%	7%
Women, Single.....	77	40%	38%	15%	7%
Women, Other.....	94	25%	53%	11%	11%
CULTURAL GROUPS					
Northern Protestants..	299	42%	34%	14%	10%
Northern Catholics....	137	35%	49%	9%	7%
Northern Union.....	155	27%	54%	11%	8%
Southern Whites.....	291	45%	37%	10%	8%
Minorities.....	192	14%	68%	7%	11%
CHURCH ATTENDANCE*					
Protestants, Regular..	252	51%	31%	11%	6%
Protestants, Non-.....	348	34%	42%	13%	11%
Catholics, Regular....	97	37%	49%	7%	6%
Catholics, Non-.....	140	33%	50%	9%	8%
Seculars.....	38	22%	43%	29%	6%
EVANG./FUND. CHRISTIANS					
Evan./Fund Christians*	439	41%	40%	10%	9%
Other Protestant*.....	271	29%	47%	14%	10%
Else.....	390	31%	51%	10%	8%
POLITICAL REGIONS					
New England.....	64	39%	41%	8%	12%
Mid-Atlantic.....	158	28%	48%	11%	12%
Border South.....	91	34%	41%	13%	12%
Deep South.....	287	40%	44%	8%	8%
East North Central....	86	29%	52%	7%	12%
West North Central....	202	29%	54%	12%	5%
Mountains.....	58	43%	38%	11%	8%
Pacific.....	153	35%	41%	17%	7%


* excludes Blacks, Hispanics, and Jews

Partisanship of New Deal Groups: 1952-1992



Source: RNC, NRCC, and other National Surveys

Partisanship of New Deal Groups: 1952-1992



Source: RNC, NRCC, and other National Surveys

Notes