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(Part 2 of 2)

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ANNEX A - NSSM 204

US POLICY TOWARD AUSTRALIA  
Political Situation and Prospects

1. An era in Australian foreign policy dominated by the primacy of the American alliance and by doctrines of forward defense is now perceptibly moving toward an end. Although a close relationship with the United States is still taken for granted, attitudes toward the nature of the relationship are changing.

2. The Labor Party, taking office late in 1972 after 23 years of Liberal/Country rule, acted quickly to put into effect a number of long-held foreign policy views, especially on the Vietnam question. This, together with the prime minister's delight in uninhibited self-expression, was largely responsible for some of the more anti-American statements of the Whitlam government's early days. The responsibilities of office, combined with the narrow margin by which it rules, have since moderated Labor's tone. (Whitlam has a five-seat majority in the House of Representatives, which forms the Government, but lacks a majority in the Senate which must approve legislation and which can over a period of time force new elections.) Nevertheless, its foreign policy positions have a different philosophic underpinning from those of the conservatives; socialist and pacifist attitudes play an important part, particularly in the thinking of Labor leftists. Labor pacifism, moreover, finds the present world climate a particularly congenial one for attacks on "cold-war" thinking. Detente, it is argued, necessitates reexamination of many of the policies and arrangements of the past.

3. Arguments that the cold-war era has ended and that policies must be adjusted correspondingly strike a responsive note among Australians. Even more do appeals to nationalist self-assertion; for at least the last generation, Australians have worried about the need for a firmer national identity. However, although Australians are increasingly sensitive to implications of US domination, they are not anti-American. To the contrary, most Australians want relations with the United States and with Americans to remain close and friendly and, indeed, tend to assume that this will be the case. Thus, in the May 1974 elections, where foreign policy was not an issue,



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the Labor Party felt the need, in the face of Liberal/Country criticisms, to demonstrate that it was on good terms with the United States.

4. Neither the evident growth of nationalist sentiments nor the efforts of Labor leftists have yet succeeded in making the presence of US defense-related installations a major political issue. The installations are located in remote areas and there is little visible evidence of the American defense presence. On the conservative side -- and even in Labor's ranks -- there are many who hold to the notion that the bases represent a desirable Australian contribution to a partnership indispensable to their country's security. Opponents of the presence argue that Australia's safety lies in disentangling itself from super-power concerns and that, as long as the bases remain, Australia could become a nuclear target.

5. Whitlam himself would prefer to see the eventual departure of the US installations. He seems to understand their importance, however, and agrees that they should remain for the time being. A strong proponent of detente policy, Whitlam will want to avoid any action that he recognizes would make progress in that field more difficult for the United States. He apparently hopes that technological developments will rapidly obviate the US need for installations on Australian soil. Meanwhile, he has said that he would honor existing agreements. Within the Labor Party, Whitlam and his supporters have defended the continued presence of US installations.

6. A minority faction within the Labor Party continues to argue for an early withdrawal of US defense facilities from Australia. The recent election of the major spokesman for this faction, Jim Cairns, to the position of Deputy Prime Minister and the elevation of other leftists within the party hierarchy gives them greater opportunities to push their positions in public and to influence government policy. A danger also exists that one or more of these men might leak security or defense information in order to embarrass both Whitlam and the Australian-American alliance. Their continued agitation could give Whitlam serious political problems as he seeks to balance their demands against those of the moderate Labor majority and of the conservative opposition.

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7. Despite some rhetorical excesses, the Whitlam government's foreign policy behavior has been more in accord with US policy than otherwise. It has reaffirmed the ANZUS relationship; its own view of SEATO's future and that of the United States have come into closer accord; and, in renegotiating the understanding governing the naval communications station at Northwest Cape, it was responsive to US requirements as well as to what it regarded as the pressures of Australian public opinion. Nevertheless, on a number of issues Whitlam has parted company with the United States, notably in abstaining on the Cambodian representation issue in the United Nations and in moving rapidly toward the establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea. In addition, Whitlam was bitterly critical of the Vietnam Christmas bombing and publicly questioned the necessity for the US world-wide military alert during the Near East crisis.

8. Although his constituency will expect him to focus on domestic issues, Whitlam, who prides himself on his abilities in foreign policy, will continue to be active in that area and to seek general Australian acceptance of the Labor Party's foreign policy ideas. He will try for a closer relationship between Australia and Asian countries and for an Asian policy independent of that of the United States. Although further attempts to assume leadership would be rebuffed by Asian leaders, Asian countries will probably welcome Australian cooperation. Australia will continue to support regional efforts and to provide some technical and economic assistance to its neighbors. Some of Whitlam's policies in Asia as well as those in international organizations may be at variance with the positions which would have been preferred by the United States. Australia can be expected to differ with the United States on such subjects as the zone of peace for the Indian Ocean, the upgrading of the facility at Diego Garcia, and Indochina issues. Australia's efforts to limit foreign exploitation of its resources may also come into conflict with American interests.

9. Given Whitlam's record during the first eighteen months and events since the recent election, we can expect that he will continue to cooperate with the United States on security matters, accepting existing facilities, at least until the expiration of the present agreements. However, we can expect pressure for more overt manifestations of Australian equal participation. Labor leftists,



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using their new positions of power, will continue to criticize the Australian-American alliance and attack intelligence activities. They will call for an early abrogation of existing agreements, and a withdrawal of all US security facilities from Australia. While they will probably not succeed, their efforts will tend to disturb the US-Australian relationship. Over the longer run, their efforts could undermine general Australian acceptance of the American presence.

10. The basic conservatism of the Australian public still serves as a brake on Labor foreign policy. Most Australian voters still highly value the American relationship and rely on the ANZUS tie as important to Australian security. If, in the popular view, Labor seems to be blatantly adopting exotic, irresponsible, anti-American postures, this could create serious difficulties for Labor and might be used by the opposition as a political issue to force national elections.

11. The opposition Liberal Party and its coalition partner the Country Party continue to take public positions more in defense of the traditional relationship with the United States. The conservative coalition is not likely to return to power any time soon but, if it does, it would immediately reaffirm the Australian commitment to mutual defense arrangements. Even within the Liberal party, however, there is support for a more nationalistic foreign policy; its return to power would not end all pressures on ties with the United States, or the presence of US facilities.

12. Over the longer run, we can expect heightened national self-assertiveness, a growing disinclination to accept the idea that American and Australian interests are identical, and -- at least in a period of continued detente -- strong tendencies to discount the prospect of any military threat to Australia itself. Whether these trends will become so strong as to make a continued major American defense presence untenable is an open question. Much will depend on the course of international events -- a Sino-Soviet rapprochement or a rearmed Japan could change Australian attitudes drastically. The impact of personalities and the exact order in which decisions need to be taken may be crucial factors. Our own reactions to greater Australian assertiveness may also play a crucial role with respect to public support for the American relationship.

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US POLICY TOWARD AUSTRALIA

ANNEX B: ECONOMIC SITUATION

1. The Australian Domestic Economy

Since the end of the Second World War, the Australian economy has developed steadily, and has adjusted well to changing world conditions. Industrialization has accompanied the importation of over two million immigrants, and serious exploitation of Australia's vast mineral resources began in the 1960's. Internationally, Australia has broadened its former economic focus on the UK to include the rest of the world, notably Japan and the US.

Recovering from a 1971-72 slow-down, the Australian economy in 1974 has continued vigorous performance. GNP for 1973 was \$63 billion, reflecting a real growth of 4% over 1972. GNP per capita is \$4,864 which places it sixth in the world. Demand, particularly consumer demand, continues at a high level, and industrial production has been pushing close to the limits of capacity for approximately the past 18 months. At the same time unemployment is low and government spending continues to increase.

All of these factors have contributed to a serious inflation problem, which is one of the most vexing problems facing GOA policy-makers. Australian voters rejected national wage and price controls last year. In 1973, the consumer price index rose 13.2%, and with continued high consumer demand, and industrial expansion, plus additional demands on the wage front, double-digit inflation will be difficult to beat down.

2. Australian Foreign Trade

Australian export earnings consistently account for 15% of its total GNP (by comparison, US exports account for 4%). Generally, Australia's exports are in heavy demand, her trade has been in substantial surplus, and her foreign exchange reserves were near an all time high early in 1974. While demand for mineral exports continues at a high level, some concern has developed over a softening of the world wool market and a world-wide glut of meat supplies. These



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two commodities alone account for 25 to 30% of total exports. At the same time, import volume has remained high while import prices have increased. Balance of trade surpluses have thus recently fallen sharply from previously record levels.

Australia's most important exports are wool (16% of total exports), meat (13%), iron ore (6%), cereals (6%), coal (4%), and sugar (4%). These few agricultural and primary products account for half of total exports.

Australia is approximately 70% self-sufficient in oil. During the recent oil shortages, initial Australian complacency over its position in the world energy situation faded somewhat, particularly as possible shortages in lubricants, furnace oil, and bunker fuel (with potentially serious effects on exports) began to appear. Australians share the general concern over the world-wide effects of an energy shortage, particularly since Australia is especially vulnerable to secondary effects. Australia's dependence on shipping and trade, and its heavy reliance on the health of the US and Japanese economies means that the outlook for the rest of the industrialized world will be reflected in Australia. The oil scare has spurred GOA interest in Australia's vast coal reserves, and may encourage the GOA to promote further oil exploration within Australia.

The US is Australia's most important source of imports. Australia has consistently had a slight trade deficit with the US, and devaluation of the US dollar against the Australian dollar and against the currencies of other trading partners has markedly improved the price competitiveness of US products in the Australian market. Since December 1971, there have been four revaluations of the Australian dollar vis-a-vis the US dollar (a total revaluation of 25% over this period). In 1973 the total US exports to Australia were \$1.5 billion (21% of total Australian imports) but Australia has dropped from tenth to thirteenth as a market for US products. The main US exports to Australia are machinery and transportation equipment (45%), manufactures and instruments (10%), and chemicals and plastics (7%).

The US ranks second as an export market for Australian products; and in 1973 total US imports from Australia amounted to over \$1 billion. Imports consist primarily of meat (45% of imports from Australia), chemicals and chemical compounds (11%), metal ores (8%), fish and fish products (6%), sugar (5%), and non-ferrous metals (5%).



Perhaps of greater interest is the fact that we purchase 40% to 55% of total Australian meat exports, 40% to 50% of its chemicals, about 50% of its fish exports, 10% to 15% of sugar, and 9% of non-ferrous metals.

The US is significantly dependent on Australia for certain minerals. During the period 1969-72, Australia supplied 57% of US alumina imports, 21% of lead, 10% of zinc, 92% of rutile (used in titanium production), and 53% of rare earths (used in steel processing). NSSM 197 examines the problem of critical imported minerals.

The trilateral relationship among the US, Australia, and Japan is a significant aspect of the Asian economic picture. Australia has maintained a trade deficit with the US, but has had a large trade surplus with the Japan. Australia has provided significant portions of Japanese imports of certain commodities: iron ore (47%), bauxite (58%), coal (37%), wool (77%), sugar (26%), and high percentages of certain rare metals. Japan turns raw materials into finished products, a large portion of which is exported to the rest of the world including the US. Japan and the US together supply 39% of Australian imports, and buy 43% of Australian exports.

Australia has traditionally had relatively high trade barriers but has recently engaged in a comprehensive review of trade policy, and there are promising signs of liberalization. In August 1973 Australia unilaterally reduced import tariffs across the board by 25%. This was primarily an anti-inflation measure encouraged by a substantial trade surplus, and favored by a number of GOA officials who wish to liberalize trade. Recently, there have been disturbing protectionist mutterings from both Labor and from the Opposition, which may put a damper on these trends toward freer trading relations.

Australia's great mineral wealth has inspired some Australians to advocate that their government follow a policy of "resources diplomacy." This concept remains poorly defined, but would obviously include steps aimed at conservation of finite resources, particularly mineral resources, and at insuring suitably high prices for those commodities in world markets. PM Whitlam publicly aired the idea of cooperation between iron-ore producing countries during a Mexico City visit in 1973, but has so far avoided explicit reference to producer's cartels, and other spokesmen have gone out of their way to deny any intention to



engage in cartel activity.

Australia attended a February 1974 meeting of bauxite producers in Conakry, and apparently had significant input into the agreement to establish an International Bauxite Association. The GOA has, however, subsequently attempted to assure us that Australia does not intend to take part in any attempt to "gang up" on consuming countries, that Australia only intends to obtain a fair price for its minerals. In addition to iron ore and bauxite, tungsten and copper have also been mentioned in this context. PM Whitlam has a personal interest in this subject, but there has been some conflict in GOA policy-making between desires, on the one hand, to offer something more than lip service to third-world causes and to insure a fair return for its exports, and on the other hand, to maintain Australia's reputation as a reliable supplier of essential raw materials, especially to Japan.

### 3. Australian Investment Policy

Foreign investment has traditionally been very important in the Australian economic picture. Not only has it been a necessary component of resources development, but it has constituted an important element in the Australian balance of payments picture, with capital inflows from direct investment tending to offset deficits in the trade account, allowing Australians to take a more critical look at foreign investment.

A number of factors mold current Australian attitudes toward foreign investment. Australia has been a large importer of foreign capital; but Australians do relatively little foreign investing, and almost none in the US. Large foreign investment in her industries has contributed to her present prosperity and at the same time to a large measure of foreign ownership in certain industries. Foreign investment in mineral extraction particularly has resulted in large export surpluses. Reduced to its simplest form, the Australian dilemma is how to increase control over the goose without diminishing its output of eggs.

Current features of GOA investment policy include the following:

a. A procedure to screen "take-overs" of local firms by foreign-owned companies, initiated under the previous conservative government, and recently extended by Parliament in its interim form. Definitive legislation is still pending.



b. Prime Minister Whitlam's repeated statements that the present level of foreign equity in the resources field is a maximum, and Minerals and Energy Minister Connor's statements that the present level would gradually be reduced (by an undisclosed amount).

c. An announced "100% Australian" goal for ownership in the energy industries.

d. Legislation proposed to extend the essence of banking system controls to the rapidly growing non-bank financial sector, coupled with the announcement that no additional foreign participation was desired in this field as a matter of principle.

e. A variable deposit requirement which requires 25% of long-term foreign borrowing to be sterilized in a non-interest bearing account (this was not aimed at investment per se, but investment is one of the major areas in which its impact is felt).

Complicating these attitudes foreign investment per se has been a growing sentiment against multinational corporations (MNCs). Although suspicion of MNCs and their role in the Australian economy began in the late 60's and early 70's, it has accelerated with the advent of the Labor government, and has been an important factor in attitudes toward US corporations.

There are important inter-relationships between foreign investment policy and other aspects of the economic picture. Now that trade surpluses are being reduced, there may be yet another re-examination of the importance of foreign capital inflows to the total balance of payments picture, and opinion may swing somewhat in the direction of greater encouragement to this investment. The relationship to inflation control measures is also significant. The variable deposit requirement has always been primarily a measure to reduce liquidity and resulting inflationary pressures; foreign investment considerations have been secondary. Recently, with concern that anti-inflation measures might be working too well, this deposit requirement was reduced from 33 1/3% to 25%.

US direct investment in Australia is of the same order as that of the UK, and is estimated at about \$5 billion since 1948. This is more than in all other East Asian countries combined, including Japan. It is exceeded only by US investment in Canada, Great Britain and West Germany.



Australian re-examination of its past wide-open welcome to foreign investors has produced uncertainty and hesitation on the part of investors in the industrial, mining and finance sectors. This uncertainty is reflected in investment figures for 1973, which reflect a drop in overall investment inflows from A\$1,499 million in 1972 to A\$415 million in 1973. And for perhaps the first time since World War II, US direct and portfolio investment in Australia shifted from a \$393 million inflow in 1972 to a net outflow in 1973.

#### 4. Personalities and Power in Australian Economic Policy Making

Whitlam early established his involvement in economic affairs, particularly in the international context. Influence over economic policy has always been diffuse, however, and is possibly even more so after the latest Labor Party Caucus, which resulted in new prominence for Jim Cairns and Rex Connor. Treasurer Frank Crean maintains a firm grip on his portfolio, which institutionally gives him great leverage over international monetary affairs and trade of strategic materials. All four men are distrustful of big business, and even more deeply suspicious of the multinational corporation.

Cairns' elevation to the Deputy PM position is on the face of it the most troubling development. He retains his Ministry of Overseas Trade, and his voice will undoubtedly carry much further than before on economic matters. A Marxist by persuasion, he has also taken the lead in trying to establish trade links with communist countries and with the third world. Cairns gladly acknowledges that he wants to see greater GOA control of Australian industry, but he appears to be a patient man. In public appearances since the May election, he has been impressive and moderate. In a June speech, he explicitly recognized the continuing importance to Australia of foreign technology and foreign capital.

Minister of Minerals and Energy Connor has been elevated to the number three position in the Labor Party pecking order. Possibly the most abrasive member of the cabinet, he has long been a vocal advocate of "buying back the farm" and "resources diplomacy." It is his ministry which is primarily responsible for making good on Australian owner-



ship goals in the energy and minerals industries. The Australian Industrial Development Corporation, the National Pipeline Authority, and the National Petroleum and Minerals Authority (for which legislation is now pending) are all institutions which Connor has promoted. How these new organizations operate will have a major influence over future foreign investment in Australia.



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US POLICY TOWARD AUSTRALIA



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NSC 4 letter 1/15/14

By dal NARA, Date 4/15/14

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


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
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4. Department of State/Bureau of Intelligence and Research

INR releases to Australia, on a Departmental approved basis, selected research studies world-wide in scope, which carry no restrictive controls. However, due to decreased production of studies and frequent use of non-releasable information, the volume of documents releases is small.



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MR # 11-016-#4

NSC Letter 11/15/14

By dal NARA, Date 4/15/14

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US POLICY TOWARD AUSTRALIA

ANNEX G: NASA ACTIVITIES

1. General

NASA's activities in Australia pertain principally to the operation of tracking facilities. The Australian Department of Manufacturing Industry (previously the Department of Supply) in conjunction with other related Australian Governmental agencies, works on NASA's behalf to build, maintain, and operate the six tracking stations in the country which track, command, and receive data from earth satellites and deep space probes. The Department also operates and maintains a related central communications center for NASA.

NASA sounding rockets have been launched by the Department of Supply's Weapons Research Establishment at the Joint Projects Range, Woomera.

All NASA's tracking and data acquisition facilities involved are covered under the Tracking Stations Agreement (space vehicle tracking and communications facilities), TIAS 6866, effective February 26, 1970, signed March 25, 1970 (known as the NASA Agreement). The program of cooperation set forth in agreement shall, subject to the availability of funds, remain in force until February 26, 1980, and may be further extended by agreement of the two governments. The agreement contains no termination provisions.

A separate agreement of September 18, 1974 (Space Research Program, TIAS 7713) covered the launching in 1973 of up to seven Aerobee rockets.

Attached is a list of the principal NASA facilities and projects in Australia.

2. Importance of Facilities

The tracking stations are very important to NASA. The Australian facilities provide vital support to current and firmly planned space missions costing on the order of \$2 billion. It is imperative that continuous radio contact be

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maintained with the deep space probes, and facilities at this longitude are required. The Orroral Valley location is such that it provides vital coverage to Earth orbiting spacecraft, and this facility is one of the most important in the Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network.

3. Alternatives for Placement Elsewhere

The tracking and data acquisition facilities in Australia are permanent installations and represent a NASA investment of about \$70,000,000. If NASA were forced to discontinue operations in Australia it is possible that other locations could be found on that longitude which would be satisfactory from a technical point of view. However, once a new site was selected, and host government approval obtained, relocation of the facilities would require at least five years and, because of the inflation during recent years, the expenditure of much more than the original investment. In short, it is neither feasible nor desirable to move the NASA Tracking and Data Acquisition operations out of their present locations in Australia, without a significant adverse impact on many NASA programs.

4. Benefits to the US and Australian Governments as a Result of these Facilities

The benefits to the US Government deriving from the T&DA facilities in Australia are almost exclusively benefits to the US space program. The facilities are vital to the success of this program.

The benefits to the Australian Government are somewhat more difficult to state but are nevertheless substantial:

a. Economic - NASA has spent about \$200,000,000 in Australia during the past 13 years for labor, supplies and communications. As of June 30, 1974, 483 Australians were directly employed in the operation of the facilities.

b. Technological - These benefits come from the personnel training and from advanced services procured in Australia. NASA has utilized very sophisticated equipment in its stations and has trained many hundreds of people in its theory, operation and maintenance. The NASA requirement for reliable and modern communications has assisted Australia to make rapid progress in developing its communication systems, especially satellite communications.



c. Scientific - Australia has been closely associated with the US space program because of the tracking stations, and has realized many direct and indirect benefits as a result, including use of the antenna dishes for radio astronomy, etc.

5. Relationship of NASA facilities to National Security Interests

The NASA tracking stations in Australia are there specifically and solely for use in the civilian space program, and there is no connection with the Department of Defense activities. Occasionally, with permission of the Australian Government, tracking support has been provided at the Carnarvon facility to DOD launches, but this support is minor and will cease when the Carnarvon facility is closed in December, 1974.

6. Aerobee Launch Pads

In addition to the tracking stations, NASA has had constructed two Aerobee launch pads for Aerobee sounding rockets at Woomera, for use in campaigns conducted in 1970 and 1973. At present these are the only facilities available which will enable land recovery of sounding rocket payloads in the southern hemisphere. This fact has been very important for scientists studying southern hemisphere phenomena. Australia (University of Adelaide) contributed one payload to the 1970 campaign. Scientific data from these activities is made available to Australia.



MAJOR NASA FACILITIES AND PROJECTS IN AUSTRALIA

1. NASA Facilities: Tracking and Data Acquisition

These support NASA spacecraft in earth orbit, on and around the moon, and in deep space.

- |     |   |  |
|-----|---|--|
| (1) | STDN Honeysuckle Creek Deep Tracking Station near Canberra                          | supports deep space missions                       |
| (2) | STDN Orroral Valley Tracking Station near Canberra                                  | supports spacecraft in earth orbit and on the moon |
| (3) | STDN Carnarvon Tracking Station, West Australia (will be closed at the end of 1974) | earth orbiting spacecraft support                  |
| (4) | NASCOM Canberra Communications Space Switching Center                               | supports all facilities                            |
| (5) | DSN Tidbinbilla Deep Space Communications Complex, near Canberra                    | supports deep space missions                       |
| (6) | Baker-Nunn Camera Station (moved from Woomera to Orroral Valley)                    | earth orbiting support                             |

2. NASA Supported Facilities

|                                  |  |
|----------------------------------|--|
| Aerobee Launch Facility, Woomera | launch pads for Aerobee sounding rockets |
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3. NASA Related Activities


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| Lunar Laser Ranging Facility, Orroral Valley | NASA equipment loaned to the Australian Mapping Agency for use in world-wide long range study of the moon |
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|--|---|
| Apollo Range Instrumented Aircraft (ARIA), Darwin, Perth, Townsville and Cocos Islands | Provides monitoring of space vehicle events (No NASA requirements for ARIA support until July, 1975) (Operated by USAF and US contractor) |
|--|---|



Key to abbreviations:

- STDN: Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network operated  
by NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center
- DSN: Deep Space Network operated by the Jet Propulsion  
Laboratory of Cal Tech for NASA
- NASCOM: NASA Communications Network operated by Goddard  
Space Flight Center





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 7, 1974

MEMORANDUM

TO: All EA Country and Office Directors

FROM: EA - John J. Helble *JH*

SUBJECT: Briefing of Assistant Secretary-Designate Habib

Assistant Secretary-designate Habib is presently scheduled to return to Washington August 25. At that time we should have available for him briefing books for the purpose of a) acquainting him with the current and long-range problems confronting EA, and, b) preparing him for his confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Thus, with heavy heart it is my duty to advise you of the following needs of this office and the deadlines for your submissions:

1. Bureau Issues. Each office should prepare one paper, not to exceed five pages in length, describing the several major issues with which it is currently contending, including a description of our interests in the problem and the state of play in our efforts to deal with it. Examples of such issues would be Laurel-Langley negotiations, Souvanna, the PGNU and Pathet Lao intransigence on Emmet Kay and propaganda, aid to Indonesia, Indian Ocean reconnaissance flights from U Tapao, ROC representation in IFI's, etc. For offices dealing with more than one country, e.g., IMS, TB, etc., separate papers on each country should be prepared.

A second paper, not to exceed three pages in length, should identify longer range issues and US objectives in the respective countries. The orientation of this paper should focus on the next five-year period. Where appropriate, objectives identified in the PARAs may be helpful. However, you may choose to inject some creative thinking, identifying such inputs as your own thinking if they diverge materially from existing official planning.



The Korea Desk is exempt from the "Current Issues" requirement. EA/K may exercise its option to contribute a piece on longer range issues/planning. RA may wish to consider, for example, longer range thinking on such issues as security assistance, narcotics traffic control in EA, etc. EA/EX and EA/P are not required to address longer range issues, but may do so if you wish. In EA/EX's contribution on current problems, attachments showing Bureau and country staffing patterns and, as appropriate, budgetary allocations should be included.

All papers should be cleared with the respective Deputy Assistant Secretary (if available).

2. Confirmation Hearing. No date has yet been established for Ambassador Habib's confirmation hearing. It is entirely possible that the hearing may occur within a couple days of his return. At the same time, it may be delayed several weeks. (We understand the Senate has the possibility of some other business to attend to in September.) It is anticipated that the SFRC will not expect Ambassador Habib to be fully briefed on all issues in EA. At the same time, it is probable that the Committee will focus rather intensively on Korea, and probably Viet-Nam--given Ambassador Habib's service in that area. Nevertheless, Ambassador Habib should be prepared to deal with some of the more obvious questions related to other areas. EA/K and EA/VN are requested to develop, in coordination with EA/P and Burt Levin, a full set of Q's and A's that may be relevant to the hearing. Department statements, including prepared statements by such Department witnesses on the Hill as Mr. Hummel (Fraser-Nix Subcommittee Hearings on Human Rights), Ambassador Martin's statements to the SFRC and HFAC Nix Subcommittee, the Secretary's June 3 statement in connection with the aid bill hearings, Mr. Ingersoll's June letter to Doc Morgan on human rights, etc. should be attached. Other desks are requested to address only those questions pertaining to their respective areas which they believe the Committee most likely to pose.

3. Oral Briefings. Ambassador Habib has indicated his desire to receive from the respective Bureau offices oral briefings upon his return. These briefings should be conducted in the same general manner in which Mr. Ingersoll was briefed last November-December, i.e.,



Ambassador Habib will visit the respective offices for the briefings. The Country Director may choose to lead off with a general statement of the organization of the office and the issues presently being confronted, and then ask each of the respective officers to elaborate on their respective problem areas. The essential point is full participation of all of the officers. The sessions will probably average about one hour. It is our hope that these oral briefings can commence almost immediately after Ambassador Habib's arrival, i.e., on or about August 28, but for the time being we will not establish a schedule. I will advise you later in this regard.

The deadline for submission of papers called for under items 1 and 2 will be Wednesday, August 21. Format for both the Current Issues and Longer Range Issues papers should follow the style of the attached example. Margins should be 1-1/4 inch on both sides. Classification should be placed on top and bottom of each page. Page numbers should be typed at top right hand corner. Papers should be submitted in an original and one copy, showing drafting officer and appropriate clearances.

Attachment:

Sample



Clearance: EA - Mr. Hummel

EA:JHhelble/sb

CLASSIFICATION

LAOS

Current Issues  
(Long Range Issues)

Souvanna and the PGNU. .....  
.....  
.....



Drafted by: EA:JJHelble/sb  
x22146:8/7/74

Clearances:

CLASSIFICATION



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

GSS SENSITIVE - EA  
S/S 7414670

August 8, 1974

~~TOP SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/NODIS

To: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger  
Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs

From: Arthur W. Hummel, Jr. *AH*  
Acting Chairman, Interdepartmental Group  
for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Review of U.S. Policy Toward Australia

Attached are a correction sheet for page 21 of the Interdepartmental Group's response to NSSM-204, and a corrected Annex F to the response. The response was transmitted to you under my memo of August 5, 1974.

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**E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 1.3**

MR # 11-016-#4

NSP Letter 1/15/14

By dal NARA Date 4/15/14

Attachments:

1. Correction to Page 21
2. Corrected Annex F



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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

August 8, 1974

MEMORANDUM

TO: ADDRESSEES  
FROM: Executive Secretariat, Department of State  
SUBJECT: NSSM 204

Please replace Annex F in your present NSSM 204 package with the attached Annex F.

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**E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3**

MR # 11-016, #4

NSC Letter 1/15/14

By dal NARA, Date 4/15/14



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ANNEX F  
3 Aug 74

ANNEX F

The General Defense Relationships

Sub-Annexes

- I - U.S. Military Facilities in Australia
- II - Military Exercises with GOA
- III - U.S. Service-to-Service Relationships
- IV - Foreign Military Sales
- V - Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)
- VI - Defense Mapping Agency
- VII - List of U.S.- Australian Operating Rights and Facilities Agreements

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E.O. 13626 (as amended) SEC 3.3

MR # 11-016 #4

NSE Lester 1/15/14

By dal NARA Date 4/15/14

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NSSM-204

SUB-ANNEX I TO ANNEX F

US MILITARY FACILITIES IN AUSTRALIA



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SUB-ANNEX I TO ANNEX F

US MILITARY FACILITIES IN AUSTRALIA

1. The Department of Defense has five important military installations and five supporting installations in Australia. Of the five important military installations, the Defense Support Program is jointly manned and operated, one of two Atomic Energy Detection Stations has been transferred to the Australians for operation and manning and the other offered for transfer. The US Navy Communication Station is currently in negotiations for joint manning and operation. Details on each installation are contained in the following discussion.

2. Defense Support Program at Woomera, Australia: Cover name - Joint Defense Space Communications Station. The 5th Defense Space Communications Squadron, located at Woomera, has a unit strength of 36 USAF officers and 191 airmen, as well as 23 Australian military. There are also 28 USAF Communications Service personnel at the site. The installations is the Overseas Ground Station for the Defense Support Program (DSP), our satellite early warning system deployed in synchronous equatorial orbit over the Indian Ocean. This installation is the only ground station link to missile warning and nuclear event detection satellites observing Soviet and PRC ICBM and FOBS launch sites and nuclear test

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MR# 11-016 #4

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By dal NARA Date 4/15/14

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areas. It is feasible to relocate the site to Guam or any other Pacific Ocean territory friendly to US presence, but only with substantial degradation of its security from hostile electronic interference by ship-borne equipment. The total loss of the Australian site for an extended period of time would seriously degrade US warning capability against Soviet (or PRC) ICBM/SLBMs. Twenty to 24 months would be required to fully establish a similar facility at another location. It would be possible, but expensive, to provide an interim capability within approximately 6 months by converting the satellite tracking facility on Guam to use by the 5th DSC Squadron and by reallocating priorities on some communications channels that are already being used by DOD priority 1-1 missions. Full relocation would cost approximately \$20 million.

3. Atomic Energy Detection System Stations, Alice Springs and Amberley. In the past, the Air Force Technical Applications Center (AFTAC), Patrick AFB, Florida, operated and maintained two Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS) Stations in Australia.

[REDACTED] AFTAC Detachment 421 at Alice Springs is a seismic station established to obtain data on underground nuclear events in Eurasia. The unit strength is one officer and 14 airmen. AFTAC Detachment 436 at Amberley RAF



Base, Brisbane, which was inactivated as a USAF installation on 15 July 1974 was an acoustic station designed to obtain data on atmospheric nuclear events in the Pacific Ocean area. The unit strength was one officer and 13 airmen. It is not feasible to relocate the Alice Springs Station due to its particular geographical location relative to the Eurasian land mass. Negotiations are being conducted between US and Australian officials to contract operation of the Alice Springs station with the Australian Bureau of Mineral Resources. Although no final agreement has been reached, the Australians have indicated their intention to proceed. Data from the station will continue to be provided to the USAF. The outright loss of facility would degrade US capability to detect USSR/PRC underground nuclear detonations. The Amberley Station would have been to be closed earlier with all other stations of the same technique worldwide were it not for the political necessity of its continued operation because of Labor Party public statements regarding its value to Australia. The equipment can also be used for research unrelated to atomic energy. On 15 July 1974, the Amberley Station was transferred as USAF excess property to Australian National University to be operated by them with some USAF assistance for a limited time. USAF still has access to resultant data.



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4. The Joint Defense Space Research Station (ESD Det 11). Because of special classifications of this activity, it is covered in an enclosure.

5. U.S. Naval Communications Station, Harold E. Holt, Northwest Cape. This station (unit strength - 8 ) provides Very Low Frequency (VLF) communications support to submarines operating in the Western Pacific, South China Seas and the Indian Ocean. Its primary purpose is as a strategic command and control relay station to SSBNs on patrol. The station also provides backup communication support for major surface ships operating in the Indian Ocean. The other VLF transmitting facilities available in the Pacific are located in Japan; Hawaii and state of Washington. None of these VLF sites, however, are capable of providing necessary coverage in the South China Seas or the Indian Ocean. Additionally, VLF communications support is provided to Australian and British naval units operating in the Indian Ocean and adjacent waters. Negotiations are currently underway for Joint Management and Operation of the facility. Although it is technically feasible to relocate this facility, acquisition costs indicate that it would be impractical from a fiscal standpoint. The present investment in this facility is \$161.6 million in terms of 1974 dollars. The immediate loss of the Northwest Cape facilities would

a. Seriously degrade the Fleet Commander's prime requirement of maintaining the best possible and most reliable communications to PACFLT SSBNs.




b. Reduce the flexibility of the operational Commander in structuring SSBN operational area. This will be particularly pertinent when TRIDENT is deployed.

c. Significantly reduce the communication broadcast support capability for SSN/SSBN operations in South China Sea and Indian Ocean area.

There are currently no plans or programs to provide alternate VLF communication facilities to obtain coverage in the Indian Ocean. Construction of a new station elsewhere would require at least 3 years or more at a cost of approximately \$250 million.

6. The five Support/Administrative Facilities listed below would be affected to the degree that the important military installations they support would be affected by relocation or Joint Manning and Operation agreements.



a. USAF Postal and Courier Service, Alice Springs -  
Postal/courier support 1

b. Canberra Facilities -

(1) CINCPAC Rep/USAF Liaison Office -  
Coordinates joint matters, senior military representative in Australia 13



|  |    |
|--|----|
| (2) Defense Attache Office -                       |    |
| Normal Attache functions                           | 12 |
| (3) Foreign Military Sales -                       |    |
| FMS assistance under Defense Attache               | 3  |
| (4) DOD Procurement Information Office -           |    |
| Provides procurement info to GOA and GNZ           | 3  |
| (5) US Standardization Group -                     |    |
| Represents US and DOD in standardization matters   | 3  |
| (6) Defense Advanced Research Projects Office -    |    |
| Directs DARPA field activities                     | 2  |
| (7) US State Sending Office - Administers SOFA     | 3  |
| c. Detachment, USAF Military Airlift Support Wing, |    |
| Richmond - Provides support to MAC aircraft        | 5  |
| d. USAF Postal and Courier Service, Sydney -       |    |
| Provides postal/courier support                    | 5  |
| e. USAF Postal and Courier Service, Woomera -      |    |
| Provides postal/courier support                    | 3  |



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TAB TO SUB-ANNEX I  
MAJOR US DEFENSE AND NASA ACTIVITIES IN AUSTRALIA



LEGEND

1. Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS) Station, Alice Springs
  2. Joint Defense Space Research Station, Pine Gap
  3. Atomic Energy Detection System (AEDS) Station, Amberley\*
  4. US Naval Communications Station, Northwest Cape
  5. Joint Defense Space Communications Station, Woomera
  6. Canberra: CINCPAC Representative/USAF Liaison Office, US State Sending Office, Defense Attache Office, FMS Office, DOD Procurement Information Office, US Standardization Group, and Defense Advanced Research Projects Office
  7. Detachment, USAF Military Airlift Support Wing, Richmond
- 
- A. NASA Tracking Station, Carnarvon
  - B. NASA, Canberra area: Honeysuckle Creek Tracking Station, Orrorall Valley Tracking Station and Baker-Nunn Camera Station, Tidbinbilla Deep Space Communications Station, Deakin Communications Switching Center
  - C. Bickley Observatory, Perth
  - D. Aerobee Launch Facility, Woomera
- Australian Naval Base, Cockburn Sound  
\* Transferred to Australian National University, 15 July 1974



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7

Tab to

NSSM-204

SUB-ANNEX II TO ANNEX F

MILITARY EXERCISES WITH GOA



SUB-ANNEX II TO ANNEX F

MILITARY EXERCISES WITH GOA

1. (U) Explanatory Background: US and Australian forces participate in various significant and routine military exercises. These combined exercises are most frequently multi-national (rather than bilateral) in character, and may include forces from New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the Philippines, and/or other allies. Combined military exercises provide among other things important opportunities for allies to benefit from their respective experience and technology, as well as to develop the ability of their forces to operate together efficiently.

2. (S/S) Importance to US: US participation in combined exercises with Australia accomplishes the following:

a. Demonstrates the traditional defense cooperation between the two countries, with indirect indication of potential support in a crisis involving SEATO or ANZUS.

b. Fosters the impression that the US intends to remain a Pacific power.

c. Provides greater dimension to available training areas in the Western Pacific, which otherwise are in relative short supply.

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d. Develops a basis for support of US forces in potential conflict which could be of extreme importance. (In addition to land bases and some commonality of equipment, supplies, and doctrine, Australia also guards a sea lane of communication alternative to the Strait of Malacca route to the Persian Gulf.)

3. ~~(S)~~ Importance to GOA:

a. The conduct of military exercises with the US is of great significance to Australian forces in that it provides them professional opportunities to train personnel and test equipment and doctrine that otherwise would be limited.

b. Prime Minister Whitlam has indicated that Australia would continue to conduct military exercises with US forces. He has thus given reassurance to many Australians that traditional alliances will not be lightly discarded, notwithstanding other diplomatic moves (such as recognition of North Korea) made toward demonstrating Australian independence.

4. ~~(S)~~ Summary Conclusions:

a. Impact if relationship ceased:

(1) On US--The impact of discontinuing military exercises with Australia would be unfavorable for the US in view of animosities, distrust, etc. which could



be fostered by such an action. In addition, it could have even greater unfavorable impacts upon other US military relationships with Australia, e.g., those dealing with military facilities/activities.

(2) On GOA--The discontinuance of military exercises with the US would have greater political ramifications than military ones. However, depending upon the degree of threat envisioned by Australian leaders (which is not presumed to be great at this time), cessation of relationship with the US could result in a significantly greater percentage of Australian GNP expenditure for its armed forces.

b. Specific US Options:

(1) Cooperating in the conduct of military exercises with Australia to a degree greater than in the past.

(2) Continuing to authorize planning for military exercises while curtailing actual approval of military exercises with Australia to a degree commensurate with desired political objectives.

(3) Discontinuing the conduct of military exercises with Australia:




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(a) With the exception of those conducted within the framework of:

1. SEATO

2. ANZUS

(b) Without exception while continuing to participate in SEATO exercises in which Australian forces do not participate.



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SUB-ANNEX III TO ANNEX F

US SERVICE TO SERVICE RELATIONSHIPS



SUB-ANNEX III TO ANNEX F

US SERVICE TO SERVICE RELATIONSHIPS

1. US Air Force

(U) a. Type: USAF-Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF)

Airmen-to-Airmen Talks

(U) Explanatory Background: High level talks among the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF), RAAF, and USAF started in 1962, and have, until last year, been an annual occurrence. The RAAF did not participate in the 1973 talks, requesting a delay until May 1974. However, the annual talks will tentatively resume this year with the USAF contingent, probably headed by General Jones, traveling to Australia and New Zealand in November 1974. The purpose of the talks is to provide a high-level forum for the exchange of information on problems of mutual interest and to promote close cooperation between the respective air forces.

(S/S) Importance to US and GOA: If a deterioration in American-Australian relations prevents the continuation of that portion of the talks, the capability of the two air forces to conduct future combined operations will be somewhat degraded. Also, if

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MR # 11-016: #4

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By dal NARA Date 4/15/14



the RAAF-USAF talks were discontinued, it is unlikely that a high-level USAF team would visit New Zealand biannually, thereby jeopardizing the continuation of that part of the program.

(U) b. Type: USAF Exchange Officer Program

(U) Explanatory Background: In September 1953, the USAF and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) agreed to a mutual exchange of officers. At present, 19 officers from each Service are involved in the program. The nine rated positions involve such weapon systems as the F-111, C-130, Mirage and helicopters. The 10 nonrated officers serve as communications, logistics, maintenance, intelligence, and safety staff officers, as well as a flight surgeon. The USAF has decided to gradually reduce the size of this program to 8 rated and 8 nonrated by 1978.

(S) Importance to US and GOA: The program is very valuable to both countries as a means of influencing potential future leaders of the air forces and affording air force officers an opportunity to gain first-hand knowledge concerning the doctrine, policies, and operations of foreign air forces.



If the relationship ceased, both air forces would be less able to coordinate activities in the event of a future contingency involving the combined forces of the two countries.

(U) c. Type: USAF Liaison Officer (USAFLO)

~~(S)~~ Explanatory Background: The position was established in February 1964 to provide liaison for proposed loan of B-47s to the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) pending receipt of 24 F-111s. The officer (O-6) is assigned to PACAF with duty in Canberra. When the B-47 loan did not materialize, the Terms of Reference were changed to reflect duties related to F-111 deliveries and associated F-4E lease arrangements. Presently, the USAFLO performs the following additional functions:

- (1) Provides liaison, point of contact, and support for US foreign military activities involving training, operational agreements, equipment, or supply matters for Joint Defense Space Communications Station (JDSCS);
- (2) Provides liaison, point of contact, and support for US foreign classified military operations, projects and systems for the JDSCS program;



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(3) Arranges participation by foreign nationals in US military training programs and for US military personnel in foreign training programs for the JDSCS and USAF/RAAF Exchange Officer Programs;

(4) Provides personnel and administrative support and supervision over the USAF/RAAF Exchange Officer Program which consists of 21 USAF officers and 58 dependents;

(5) Operates the VT-29 aircraft in support of a full spectrum of activities involving USAFLO/ CINCPACREP and the American Embassy;

(S/S) Importance to US and GOA: The USAF Liaison Officer provides a point of contact with the US Embassy and the Government of Australia for USAF activities in Australia.

2. US Army

a. Types of Programs

Current programs consist of exchanging personnel between several Service schools both as instructors and as students; conducting regular interchanges via correspondence and periodic meetings on the standardization of military equipment and tactics as well as on areas of basic and applied research; [REDACTED] and finally in the semi-annual exchange of infantry platoons between the Australian Army and the US 25th Division. All Army programs with Australia (excluding unit training) involve a total of 19 persons.



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b. Impact of Termination

These programs are considered desirable because they are designed to maintain contact with a valued ally, to promote the use of US materiel and tactics and to enrich our intelligence collection. To Australia, these activities represent a source of valuable advanced technology, access to a sophisticated reservoir of intelligence data and, finally, an important opportunity for cross-fertilization of ideas and experiences between the two armies.

However, while highly desirable in many instances, these programs if terminated would have no significant effect on the strategic posture or national security of the US. While Australia would stand to lose considerably more from their termination, such would not effect that country's security. The main effect of any termination would be in the political sphere insofar as the traditional friendship between Australia and the US would be undermined.

3. US Navy

a. The USN-RAN have a personnel exchange program consisting of 17 officers and 11 enlisted. The RAN personnel fill authorized USN billets and the reverse is true of USN personnel. US Navy ships visit Australian ports and joint USN-RAN naval exercises are conducted on a periodic basis. There is formal USN school training conducted in CONUS for RAN. This is paid for by GOA. In FY 75 RAN has programmed \$500K for formal CONUS training. In addition, \$272K has been programmed for missile destroyer update training. Another area of USN-RAN interface is in Foreign Military Sales (FMS). In FY 74 a total of \$8.6M in FMS was offered to RAN. An Australian team interested in negotiating the purchase of



two patrol frigates and eight P-3 patrol aircraft is expected in August 74. All of these exchanges and interfaces are very important to the US because they: permit access to Australian ports which are strategically located in regards the Indian Ocean; enhance the ability of the two navies to operate together now and in the future should contingencies so dictate; have a favorable gold flow impact; and increases the opportunity to influence GOA to buy American. The GOA attaches importance to above exchanges and interfaces because: provides visible evidence of the ANZUS treaty commitments; provides only training base for US equipment being operated by RAN; and ties the RAN-USN closer together. The relationships described above are not of sufficient political sensitivity to warrant termination.

b. In September 1973 US Navy - Royal Australian Navy discussions concerning subjects of mutual interest were held in Canberra. The next discussions are scheduled to be held in September 1974 in Hawaii. Hopefully, these discussions will become an annual event. Additionally, there are two multilateral periodic meetings in which both the USN and RAN participate. One is the Australia, Canada, United Kingdom and United States Communication Board. This board meets bi-annually. There are ad hoc working group meetings on a more frequent basis. The



other multilateral meeting is the annual anti-submarine warfare school meeting involving the same countries. The importance of the above meetings to all countries is that it provides for: an exchange of ideans; a forum for discussions of mutual problems; development of closer working relationship in the areas of communication and ASW; and a manifestation of the alliances developed among the participants. Any decision to terminate US participation would of necessity involve the other countries.

4. US Marine Corps

a. US Service-to-Service Relationships

(U) Type: School training at the Command and Staff level.

~~(C)~~ Explanatory Background: The Australian armed forces sends one officer to the Marine Corps Command and Staff course on an annual basis. The Marine Corps,



In turn, is sending one LtCol to the Australian Joint Service Staff College course which convenes in January 1975.

~~(S)~~ Importance to US: This exchange allows for US influence, although small, in the Australian Armed Forces; particularly in the development of equipment, doctrine and techniques.

~~(S)~~ Importance to GOA: This exchange provides a forum for expressing GOA defense views to intermediate grade officers of the USMC by an officer of equivalent rank.

~~(S)~~ Summary Conclusions.

Impact if relationship ceased

(1) The impact on the US and Australia would essentially be negative if cross training at military professional schools were to terminate. It would close one avenue of establishing friendship/rapport between the armed forces and, in particular, terminate US influence, in establishing doctrine and techniques in the Australian armed forces that are compatible with those of the US.



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SUB-ANNEX IV TO ANNEX F

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES



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SUB-ANNEX IV TO ANNEX F  
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

PAST SALES - GOA has bought just over \$1 billion worth of U.S. Defense equipment since 1950. Major items purchased were F-111C, A-4, C-130, P-2 and P-3 aircraft, (including lease of F-4 aircraft), UH-1D, 1D, 1H and CH-47 helicopters, Redeye and Tartar missiles, rifles, APCs, trucks, light destroyers (DDL), and torpedoes (MK-46).

PROSPECTIVE SALES - Major prospective purchases by the GOA through 1978 include: 53 M-60 tanks (\$40 million), 8 Long Range Maritime Patrol Aircraft (\$150 million), 2 Patrol Frigates (\$220 million), Light Destroyer Program (\$400 million), and the MIRAGE III Aircraft replacement program (\$425 million).

Explanatory Background:

~~(S)~~ At present, the Whitlam Government is operating on an estimate that there is no identifiable security threat to Australia for ten to fifteen years. This has meant that GOA reduced the defense budget for FY 1974 and has postponed numerous procurement decisions. Since the mid-1950's, the GOA has attached growing importance to standardization of Australia's military equipment with the U.S. Since the late 1960's, growing emphasis has also been placed on the role and importance of Australian industrial participation in defense production - hence the importance GOA attaches to the quality of "offset proposals" in the selection from competing equipments. DOD has a general offset arrangement with GOA under which we undertake to provide a U.S. industry/Government offset target of 25% of the value of major Australian defense purchases from the U.S.

Importance to U.S.:

- (S/S) 1) Positive BOP and trade flow
- 2) Increased U.S. employment
- 3) Valuable intangible benefits flowing from follow-on logistics and training arrangements when U.S. equipment is purchased.



Importance to GOA:

- (S/S) 1) To acquire major weapons systems from U.S. results in logistics, maintenance, and training simplicity

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By del NARA Date 4/15/14

## Importance to GOA (continued):

- (S/S) 1) since all three U.S. Services operate under standard DOD MIL system.
- 2) For GOA to purchase major systems from various Free World countries introduces problems of non-commonality, larger inventory needs, much larger and more diverse training requirements, language and "basic-approach" problems, etc.

## Summary Conclusions:


## -- Impact if relationship ceased heretofore

On U.S. -- Weakening of close defense ties with resultant strain on ANZUS Treaty relationship. Very possibly, an adverse effect on U.S. military, space, and similar installations now performing valuable functions on Australian territory.

On GOA -- A probable lowering of Australian defense capabilities leading to possible future power instability in the South Pacific area. Potential unravelling of ANZUS Common Commitments.

## -- Specific U.S. options

- 1) Attempt to maintain status-quo by ignoring present USG/GOA differences and "ride out" the problem until climate changes. No change on FMS policy toward Australia.
- 2) Institute policy of approving only selected military articles and training for sale to Australia. Decisions would, in this option, be based always on joint State/Defense analysis on a case-by-case basis.
- 3) Discontinue all new sales initiatives with Australia, maintaining only follow-on support and training for systems already in Australian inventory.



Prepared by: Paul Gorman  
 DSAA/TS  
 9 July 1974  
 x75547

NSSM-204

SUB-ANNEX V TO ANNEX F

DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (ARPA)

- Project JINDALEE
- Project BOOLEE
- Project HI STAR SOUTH
- Project SMALL ARMS AND SENSORS



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ARPA INPUT IN RESPONSE TO NSSM 204

(U) Type: ARPA (RDT&E)

(U) Project Title: Project JINDALEE

(S) Explanatory Background: This project is a cooperative US/GOA research and development program for the design, fabrication, installation and test of an over-the-horizon radar (OTHR) in Australia. The objectives are to broaden the data base in the relevant technologies, evaluate OTHR techniques and optimize modes of operation. The US (ARPA) will assist the Australian DOD by technical consultation and provision of critical radar components. The Australian DOD will assume responsibility for complete system assembly and test and operation. No US personnel resident in Australia are contemplated. The technical consultation will be on a sporadic basis primarily in the US. The Australian DOD will staff the program with 17 professionals and 13 sub-professionals over the 4-year program. The program cost estimate (Australian dollars) over the years FY74-78 is \$3.4M. The cost of US support is estimated at \$300-400K (US dollars) of this total. The Cooperative Research and Development Project Arrangement is in coordination and should be ready for signing by the end of July 1974.

(S/S) Importance to the US: Complement US experience in OTHR in the Northern Hemisphere with knowledge of ionospheric effects on performance in the Southern Hemisphere and the Equatorial Zone. Future potential surveillance of Indian Ocean area.

(S/S) Importance to GOA: Access to US technology in OTHR as well as some hardware components furnished by the US. Potential value of OTHR technology as an element of Australian air defense for detection of low flying aircraft and/or surface ships.

(S/S) Summary Conclusions:

Impact if relationship ceased:

On US: Loss of Southern Hemisphere test data; loss of possible future wide area Indian Ocean surveillance.

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By dal NARA, Date 4/15/14

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~~SENSITIVE~~

(S/S)

On GOA: Primary loss would be access to US technology and consultant support. Project success may be jeopardized.

Specific US Options: Aircraft or satellite surveillance of Indian Ocean is feasible if required.

Prepared by:

Mr James C. Goodwyn  
ARPA/Strategic Technology Office  
1400 Wilson Blvd  
Arlington, Va 22209  
Tel: OX 4-3686  
10 July 1974

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SENSITIVE

(U) Type: ARPA (RDT&E)

(U) Project Title: Boolee

~~(S)~~ Explanatory Background: The purpose of the program is to loan some existing ARPA owned hardware to the Australians to investigate the utility of very large aperture acoustic towed arrays in the Indian Ocean and entrances to the various straits through Indonesia. The joint agreement for the program was signed 20 July 1973 by the Director, ARPA, and Australian Defense Science Attache. The US will loan to GOA a towed array, winch and cabling and associated array-electronics. The GOA will supply all processing and recording equipment, ship support, data reduction and analysis and provide data to the US. Presently, the program is on schedule, with the US to supply the array and associated hardware by September 1974. Modifications by the Australians of their ship and procurement by the Australians of processing equipment is underway. Approximately five man-months of manpower consisting of US contractor personnel will be utilized to familiarize the Australians with the equipment. An additional two-three people will be involved on a one-two week period to develop joint test plans and review data obtained. The Australians will supply twenty to thirty people full-time for two years on the project. Total US program expense is approximately \$800K, the majority of which has been spent. Anticipated GOA hardware procurement is around \$300K plus manpower, ship time and computer resources.

~~(S/S)~~ Importance to US: Quite useful--but not critical. The data obtained from the joint program will assist in the utility assessment of large surveillance arrays in this area. The costs to obtain this information unilaterally is several million dollars.

~~(S/S)~~ Importance to GOA: Loan of this equipment allows the GOA to gain several years of development time and experience in large aperture arrays. The GOA appears to be extremely interested in carrying out this joint venture as evidenced by their relatively large commitment of people and resources for the project.

~~(S/S)~~ Summary Conclusions:

Impact if relationship ceased:

On US: Little technical impact. The US can unilaterally obtain the desired data within the time frame desired, at substantial additional costs. The equipment is in demand in the US and by other nations.

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(S/S)

On GOA: Will seriously set back the GOA towed array program. With the momentum already built up in the program, however, it is believed that GOA would procure the equipment and proceed essentially along the lines already outlined.

Specific US Options:

1. Continue as planned.
2. Cancel agreement and notify Australia that no equipment will be sent. This requires action prior to August 1975.
3. Cancel the agreement, but allow the GOA to purchase similar equipment in the US (at a cost of approximately \$800-\$1000K US).



Prepared by:

Mr Kent Kresa  
Director, Tactical Technology  
Office  
ARPA  
1400 Wilson Blvd  
Arlington, Va 22209  
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10 July 1974

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SENSITIVE

(U) Type: ARPA (RDT&E)

(U) Project Title: HI STAR SOUTH

(C) Explanatory Background: Three sounding rockets will be fired from the Woomera Range carrying long wavelength infrared instrumentation to study stellar sources unique to the southern skies. The background data will be used to determine performance limitations of optical sensors of interest to ballistic defense or space surveillance missions. A draft diplomatic note has now been informally agreed upon. The section of the draft arrangement between Australian Department of Manufacturing Industry and ARPA dealing with indemnity is being reviewed by OSD/ISA, and OSD Legal Counsel. Revisions to this section were submitted by Australia on 19 June 1974. This is the only section of the arrangement requiring further discussion. ARPA is a Third Party user of the Australian British Woomera Range. GOA is not a partner in HI STAR SOUTH. All GOA range expenses (\$135K) are being reimbursed by ARPA. Total program funding is \$485K. Twenty-five US civilian personnel will be in Australia for six weeks.

(S/S) Importance to US: This data is needed by USAF to design a space-based augmentation sensor for SPACETRACK. Data will increase confidence in clutter control features of system design.

(S/S) Importance to GOA: None

(S/S) Summary Conclusions:

Impact if relationship ceased:

On US: HI STAR SOUTH may be cancelled if not completed at this time. Lack of data will slightly increase the technical risk in SPACETRACK Augmentation Effort of USAF.

On GOA: Unknown.

Specific US Options:

- (S/S) . Withdraw hardware already in Australia and terminate the program with approximately \$50K termination cost.
- (S/S) . Negotiate with Brazil for use of Natal, conduct experiments in FY76.



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(U) Type: ARPA (RDT&E)

(U) Project Title: Small Arms and Sensors

(U) Explanation Background:

Purpose: To provide environmental and independent assessment of ARPA prototype items of interest to Australians.

Arrangement signed: 11 July 1973.

Status: 1 Long Wave Infrared (LWIR) Weapon Sight, 1 Seismic Intrusion Detection System (SINDIS), 1 Infrared (IR) Intrusion Detector Scanner and 5 IR Pocketscopes shipped to Australia 2d Qtr FY74. 2 Multi-flechette weapons plus 100 rounds of ammunition to be shipped November 1974.

Duration: Australian tests 1 March - 31 December 1974.

US Role: Provide hardware and technical support for training Australians in use and maintenance of hardware.

Australian Role: Develop test plans and conduct tests. Provide ARPA copies of tests plans, test reports and results.

Personnel involved: US - 1 technician for 30 days. GOA - 1 infantry battalion plus unknown number of test and laboratory personnel.

|          |              |             |
|----------|--------------|-------------|
| Funding: | Sensors:     | \$ 79K      |
|          | Pocketscopes | 50K         |
|          | Weapons      | <u>159K</u> |
|          | Total        | \$288K      |

(S/S) Importance to US: Useful but not critical. Program will provide environmental testing in desert and jungle of interest to US.

(S/S) Importance to GOA: Useful but not critical. Will assist GOA in selection of future GOA Army equipment.

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(S/S) Summary Conclusions:

Impact if relationship ceased:

On US: As sensor testing is underway in Australia, the withdrawal of hardware at this time would be of extreme embarrassment to the US.

On GOA: From a military standpoint, Australian test and plans may have to be modified.

Specific US Options:

- Allow completion of sensor tests.
- Cancel planned shipment of weapons (now planned for November 1974).



Prepared by:

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10 July 1974

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NSSM-204

SUB-ANNEX VI TO ANNEX F

DEFENSE-MAPPING-AGENCY



MR # 11-016 #4

NSC (letter) 1/15/14

By das NARA Date 4/15/14


SUB-ANNEX VI TO ANNEX F 20 July 1974

DEFENSE MAPPING AGENCY

Principal Activities


A. (FOUO) Mapping, Charting, and Geodesy Arrangements: Under a 1973 agreement, DMA cooperates actively with Australia in the production and exchange of maps and geodetic data. In conjunction with informal arrangements with the UK, Australia provides significant mapping and geodetic data covering certain areas of East Asia.

B.



C. (FOUO) Geociever Loan. In April 1974, DMA loaned the Director of Military Survey, Australia, two Geocievers to assist Australia in their 1974 field survey program in Indonesia, in return for the geodetic data generated in Indonesia. A DMA technician is with the Australian survey teams to provide technical assistance and for equipment maintenance. The Geocievers will be returned to DMA in October 1974.

D. (U) U.S.-Australia Engineer Officer Exchange. DMA has accepted an Australian proposal for an engineer officer exchange. The Australian officer will be assigned to the DMA Topographic Center for 2 years to study advanced U.S. cartographic techniques. Due to limited personnel resources, DMA is unable to send an officer to Australia at this time but may do so later.



**ENTIRE PAGE REDACTED**



NSSM-204

SUB-ANNEX VII TO ANNEX F

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LIST OF US-AUSTRALIAN OPERATING RIGHTS AND FACILITIES AGREEMENTS



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ANNEX F  
SUB-ANNEX VII

SUB-ANNEX VII TO ANNEX F  
LIST OF US-AUSTRALIAN OPERATING RIGHTS AND FACILITIES AGREEMENTS

| <u>Area</u>  | <u>TIAS#/</u><br><u>Other</u><br><u>Ref</u> | <u>Date</u>                           | <u>Duration</u>                       | <u>Particulars</u>   |
|--|---|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|
| <u>A. AFTAC Facilities</u>   |   |                                       |                                       |  |
| 1. <del>(S)</del> Establishment of Seismic Installation (Project Clear Sky)                | Canberra A-548 of 6/3/55                    | 7/6/54,<br>9/28/54<br>6/2/55<br>Notes | 6/2/65, renewable by mutual agreement | Permits USAF to establish seismic station in Alice Springs area, with maximum of 20 USAF personnel.  |
| 2. <del>(S)</del> Extension of Alice Springs Seismic Station Agreement                     | Canberra A-740 of 6/4/65                    | 6/2/65<br>Note                        | 9/2/65                                | Interim extension of 6/2/55 agreement.   |
| 3. <del>(S)</del> Extension of Alice Springs Seismic Station (Project Clear Sky) Agreement | Canberra A-146 of 9/3/65                    | 9/2/65<br>Notes                       | 9/2/75                                | Ten year extension of original agreement effected by notes of 6/2/55.  |
| 4. <del>(S)</del> Nuclear Test Detection Facilities near Perth                             | Canberra A-53 of 10/19/61                   | 8/7 and 10/11/61<br>Notes             | --                                    | Optical and electromagnetic; informal agreement.   |
| 5. (U) Aerospace Disturbances Research Program   | 5510  | 1/3/64<br>Notes                       | --                                    | USAF may establish and operate installation on RAAF Base at Pearce to study aerospace disturbances and effect on radiocommunications; GOA to receive data results. |

**DECLASSIFIED w/ portions exempted**  
**E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3**

MR # 11-014-#4

NSC letter 11/5/14

By dlw NARA, Date 4/15/14

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12 JULY 1974

LIST OF US-AUSTRALIAN OPERATIONAL RIGHTS AND FACILITIES AGREEMENTS

| <u>Area</u>  | <u>TIAS#/Other Ref</u> | <u>Date</u>         | <u>Duration</u>  | <u>Particulars</u>   |
|--|------------------------|---------------------|--|--|
| 6. (U) Aerospace Disturbance Research Program - Extension                                    | 5801                   | 4/12/65<br>Notes    | --   | Authorizes additional facilities at RAAF Base Pearce, and new facility at RAAF Base at Amberley, Queensland.                                   |
| <u>B. Space Research Facility (Pine Gap)</u>   |                        |                     |  |  |
| (U) Joint Defense Space Research Facility (Pine Gap)   | 6162                   | 12/9/66<br>Signed   | 12/9/76 +; after 12/9/75 either party may terminate after one year notice.                         | USG and GOA "shall establish, maintain and operate.....a facility for general defense research in the space field"; SOFA and other provisions. |
| <u>C. Space Communications (Woomera)</u>   |                        |                     |  |  |
| 1. (U) Joint Defense Space Communications Station (Woomera)                                  | 6788                   | 11/10/69<br>Signed  | 10 years + until terminated; after 9 years, either party may terminate upon 1 year advance notice. | USG and GOA "shall cooperate in establishing, maintaining and operating ....."; SOFA and other provisions.                                     |
| 2. <del>(S)</del> Classified Under-standing on Purposes and Use of TIAS 6788                 | --                     | 11/10/69<br>Letters | --   | Exchange between Amb. Rice and Minister for External Affairs Freeth.   |
| 3. <del>(S)</del> Interpretation of Art. V of TIAS 6788 re Redundant Communications Channels | --                     | 11/10/69<br>Notes   | --   |  |



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12 July 1974

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LIST OF US-AUSTRALIAN OPERATIONAL RIGHTS AND FACILITIES AGREEMENTS

| Area  | TIAS#/<br>Other<br>Ref | Date                                  | Duration   | Particulars   |
|---|------------------------|---------------------------------------|--|---|
| 4. (U) Interpretation of Art. VI of TIAS 6788 re Use of Australian Resources  | --                     | 11/10/69<br>Notes                     | --   |   |
| 5. <del>(S)</del> Implementing Arrangement pursuant to Art. II of TIAS 6788, with Supplement No. 2 of 4/19/71 (FOUO) re Security and Supplement No. 3 of 3/4/71 (FOUO) re Joint Manning | --                     | 12/4/69                               | Same as TIAS 6788  | Detailed operating conditions and procedures, between USAF and ADOD.                    |
| 6. (U) JDCS at Woomera - Operation of US Military Post Office   | --                     | 8/20/70                               | --   | In accordance with Art. XIII of TIAS 6788.  |
| <u>D. Naval Communications Station</u>  |                        |                                       |  |   |
| <u>(NWC)</u>  |                        |                                       |  |   |
| 1. (U) US Naval Communications Station  | 5377                   | 5/9/63<br>Signed<br>(EIF:<br>6/28/63) | 6/28/88+<br>until<br>180-day notice<br>of termination<br>by either party | Permits US Navy Communications Station at North West Cape for "defense communications". |
| 2. (U) Agreed Minutes of Interpretation to TIAS 5377  | --                     | 5/9/73                                | --   | Interprets Arts. 4, 7, 9, 10, and 11 of TIAS 5377.                                      |



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LIST OF US-AUSTRALIAN OPERATING RIGHTS AND FACILITIES AGREEMENTS

| <u>Area</u>   | <u>TIAS#/<br/>Other<br/>Ref</u> | <u>Date</u>  | <u>Duration</u>  | <u>Particulars</u>  |
|---|---------------------------------|--|--|---|
| 3. (FOUO) Interpretation of Art. 3 of TIAS 5377 ('Battle-Barwick Exchange') | --                              | 5/7/63<br>Letters  | Superseded by US-<br>GOA Joint State-<br>ment of 1/10/74 | Consultation does not mean control.   |
| 4. (U) MWC - Interim Memo of Understanding                                  | --                              | 3/29/63<br>Signed<br>(refers<br>to<br>letters<br>of 2/8,<br>2/15, 3/5,<br>& 3/29/63) | --   | Guidelines re importation and purchase<br>of materials for construction of MWC. |
| 5. (U) MWC - Memo of Agree-<br>ment re road construction                    | --                              | 5/27/63<br>Signed  | --   | GOA to build road and US Navy to pay.   |
| 6. (U) MWC - Road Construction<br>Agreement                                 | --                              | 12/16/64<br>Signed   | --   | Conditions and agreement to construct<br>roads.                                 |
| 7. (U) MWC - Technical Arrange-<br>ment for Radio Link                      | --                              | 12/31/65<br>& 1/11/66<br>Signed  | --   | Provides for telecommunication link<br>between MWC and Perth.                   |
| 8. (U) MWC - Use of Australian<br>goods in Commissary                       | --                              | 3/8 &<br>3/23/66<br>Notes  | --   | GOA request for maximum use of<br>Australian goods.                             |
| 9. (U) MWC - Sewerage Services<br>Agreement                                 | --                              | 3/28/66<br>Signed  | --   | Provision and payment for sewerage<br>to Exmouth lots.                          |



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LIST OF US-AUSTRALIAN OPERATING RIGHTS AND FACILITIES AGREEMENTS

| <u>Area</u>   | <u>TIAS#/Other Ref</u> | <u>Date</u>                | <u>Duration</u>  | <u>Particulars</u>   |
|---|------------------------|----------------------------|--|--|
| 10. (U) NWC - Water Supply Services                                     | --                     | 3/28/66<br>Signed          | --   | Provision and payment for water to Exmouth lots.                                     |
| 11. (U) NWC - Exmouth School Arrangements                               | --                     | 6/13/66                    | Same as TIAS 5377                                      | GOA to provide schooling; US to pay.   |
| 12. (U) NWC - Electricity Services Agreement                            | --                     | 10/25/66<br>Signed         | --   | Supply and payment of electricity for Exmouth.                                       |
| 13. (U) USN-ADOD Technical Arrangement re NWC Commissaries              | --                     | 10/27 & 28/66<br>Signed    | Indefinite; can be reviewed at any time                | Conditions re opening and operation of commissary.                                   |
| 14. (U) Land Use Arrangements for North West Cape                       | --                     | 2/3/67<br>Signed           | As long as TIAS 5377 remains in force                  | Pursuant to Arts. 2 and 15 of 9 May 63 Agreement; conditions for use of land.        |
| 15. (U) NWC - Telephone Service Agreement                               | --                     | 8/17/67<br>Signed          | Until terminated at option of Navy by 30-day notice    | Provision and payment for telephone communications services to NWC Perth Detachment. |
| 16. (U) NWC - Telephone Service Agreement                               | --                     | 8/18/67<br>Signed          | Until terminated at option of US Navy by 30-day notice | Provision and payment for telephone services to NWC.                                 |
| 17. (C) NWC - Technical Arrangements for RAN & RN use of VLF Facilities | --                     | 5/18/67 & 2/1/68<br>Signed | Review upon request by either party                    | Details of sharing arrangements; pursuant to Arts. 4, 14, & 15 of TIAS 5377.         |



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12 July 1974

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LIST OF US-AUSTRALIAN OPERATIONAL RIGHTS AND FACILITIES AGREEMENTS

| <u>Area</u>  | <u>TIAS#/Other Ref</u>  | <u>Date</u>       | <u>Duration</u>  | <u>Particulars</u>  |
|--|-------------------------|-------------------|--|---|
| 18. (U) Amendment to US Naval Communications Station Agreement (TIAS 5377)                   | 6527                    | 7/12/68<br>Notes  | --   | Re Art. 15 of TIAS 5377, GOA Dept. of Navy named GOA cooperating agency.  |
| 19. (U) MWC - Agreement for Extension of Roads in Exmouth Townsite                           | --                      | 5/14/69<br>Signed | --   | GOA to construct roads and USN to pay.  |
| 20. (U) MWC - Lease for Exmouth Housing Lands  | --                      | 5/20/69<br>Signed | 6/13/73 subject to renewal for 5-year periods at US option, but not beyond 6/30/88 | US agrees to construct at least 70 family quarters, and at end of lease must demolish and restore land if GOA doesn't want to purchase. |
| 21. (U) MWC - Exmouth School Addition Agreement  | --                      | 6/17/69           | --   | Shared costs.   |
| 22. (U) Joint Statement re MWC   | --                      | 1/10/74           | ---  | Joint statement by SecDef Schlesinger and DefMin Barnard re converting MWC to joint operations.   |
| <u>E. SOFA</u>   |                         |                   |  |   |
| 1. (U) Status of US Forces in Australia, plus Agreed Minutes of Interpretation Signed 5/9/63 | 5349                    | 5/9/63<br>Signed  | 5/9/88 + until 180-day notice by either party                                      | Full SOFA; protocol calling for negotiations on Reciprocal SOFA.  |
| 2. (LOU) Interpretation of SOFA Art. 1 (re TIAS 5349)  | Canberra A-23 of 7/9/65 | 7/6/65<br>Notes   | --   | Includes in SOFA US military on duty status in Australia.   |



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12 July 1974 •

LIST OF US-AUSTRALIAN OPERATIONAL RIGHTS AND FACILITIES AGREEMENTS

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| <u>Area</u>  | <u>TIAS#/Other Ref</u> | <u>Date</u>                           | <u>Duration</u>   | <u>Particulars</u>  |
|--|------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|---|
| <u>F. Atomic Information Exchange</u>  |                        |                                       |   |   |
| 1. (U) Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information for Mutual Defense Purposes      | 3881                   | 7/12/57<br>(Effective 8/14/57)        | Until terminated by mutual agreement of both Governments. | Provisions for exchange of atomic information.  |
| 2. <del>(S)</del> Annex I to TIAS 3881   | --                     | 8/14/57                               | --  | Specific categories of information to be exchanged.   |
| 3. <del>(S)</del> Annex II to TIAS 3881  | --                     | 8/14/57                               | --  | Personnel and physical security rules and regulations.  |
| 4. (U) Administrative Arrangements re Cooperation on Atomic Information Exchange | --                     | 1/5/61<br>(Effective)                 | --  | Unsigned paper.   |
| <u>G. Maps and Mapping</u>   |                        |                                       |   |   |
| 1. (U) Cooperative Mapping Agreement   | --                     | 3/6 & 4/4/47<br>concurrents by letter | Until terminated by notification by either party          | Engagements re aerial photography and ground controls re certain Pacific islands; use of Australian facilities; exchange of data. |
| 2. (U) Map Exchange Agreement  | --                     | 1/15 & 4/24/59<br>Signed              | --  | Exchange of maps as produced between Army Map Service and Mitchell Library of NSW, Australia. (Lists maps)                        |



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| <u>Area</u>  | <u>TIAS#/<br/>Other<br/>Ref</u> | <u>Date</u>                  | <u>Duration</u>   | <u>Particulars</u>  |
|--|---------------------------------|------------------------------|---|---|
| 3. (U) Memorandum on Mapping, Charting and Geodesy Arrangements              | --                              | 8/29/73                      | Until terminated by 1-year notice by either party         | Mutual agreement for production and exchange of maps and geodetic data; detailed annexes of exchange items.   |
| H. <u>TRANET Station</u>   |                                 |                              |   |   |
| (U) Tracking Stations; Transit Navigational Satellite Program                | 4779                            | 6/5/61<br>Notes              | Until terminated by either Government upon 6-month notice | Permits establishment of passive (Doppler) tracking station at Smithfield, South Australia; basic SOFA provisions; provides for cooperative operations and data exchange; now operated by GOA, with data provided to USG (DMA has admin. responsibility). |
| I. <u>Miscellaneous</u>  |                                 |                              |   |   |
| 1. (U) Cooperative Airlift Support Agreement                                 | --                              | 1/17 & 1/22/66<br>Signed     | Until 30-day notice                                       | USAF-RAAF Agreement for reciprocal use of cargo flights.  |
| 2. (U) USAF-RAAF Operational Cooperation                                     | --                              | Jan & Feb 66<br>To be Signed | --  | Working procedures under 1/22/66 agreements.  |
| 3. (U) Agreement for USG to Establish a Weather Station on Nauru Island      | 4001                            | 2/19 & 25/58<br>Notes        | --  | Calls for joint US-Australian operations; contains basic SOFA provisions.   |
| 4. (U) Project SPARTA - US-UK-Australia Arrangement for Re-entry Experiments | 5984                            | 3/30/66<br>Signed            | 3/30/69 + until 3-mo. notice.                             | An ARPA project; for firing and observation of re-entry vehicles from Woomera test range.   |

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LIST OF US-AUSTRALIAN OPERATING RIGHTS AND FACILITIES AGREEMENTS

| Area  | TIAS#/<br>Other<br>Ref | Date              | Duration  | Particulars   |
|---|------------------------|-------------------|---|---|
| 5. (U) Rest & Recreation Program                              | --                     | 7/14/67<br>Note   | Actual program was terminated circa 1972          | Establishes R&R program in Australia-- under SOFA.                |
| 6. <del>(C)</del> MOU re Cooperative Research and Development | --                     | 6/20 &<br>7/23/68 | --  | Broad covering agreement signed by SecDef and MOD.                |
| 7. (U) Disposal of USG Excess Property in Australia           | 7750                   | 11/9/73<br>Notes  | Until terminated by 30-day notice by either party | Provides for USG removal, GOA purchase, or GOA sale in Australia. |



NSSM 204



DECLASSIFIED  
EO. 12958 (as amended) SEC 8.3

MRS 11-017-#5

NSC Ltr. 11/3/11

By del. NARA, Date 2/7/11

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

July 1, 1974

National Security Study Memorandum 204

MEMORANDUM FOR

The Acting Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Toward Australia

The President has directed a review of U.S. policy toward Australia in the light of recent changes in the Labor Government. The study should examine the impact of these changes on basic U.S. objectives toward Australia, particularly in the political-security area. It should define and evaluate policy options for giving effect to the resulting objectives.

In particular, the study should deal with the following issues:

- The implications of changes in the Australian Government for future relations between Australia and the United States.
- The prospects for keeping U.S. defense installations in Australia, and the policy options for trying to prolong their existence there.
- The alternatives for relocating essential existing U.S. security functions outside of Australia, and the impact on our alliance relationship of doing so.
- The prospects for locating additional U.S. defense installations in Australia, and the policy options for trying to do so.
- The risks involved in continued sharing of intelligence with Australia, the alternative means for reducing these risks, and the impact on our alliance with Australia of curtailing or ending such intelligence sharing.


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--The prospects for growing divergence between Australia and U. S. policy in Asia and elsewhere, and the alternative means for minimizing the potential damage of such divergences to our alliance relationship.

The study should be prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for East Asia, and should be submitted no later than July 15, 1974, for consideration by the Senior Review Group.

  
Henry A. Kissinger

cc: The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff