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Counselor to Reader's Digest)

BOX NUMBER C11

FOLDER TITLE Middle East and Israel, 1969-1973 -
Calendar of Documents

DATE WITHDRAWN 04/09/2007

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

open with portions exempted
NR 4/9/07

MIDDLE EAST & ISRAEL

1969 - 1970

SENSITIVE

CALENDAR &
SYNOPSIS



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MIDDLE EAST

BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS

CALENDAR OF DOCUMENTS

1969-1970

(Asterisks indicate documents of special importance)

Our Number	SecDef Control No.	Date	Document, Subject & Content
1	X-0368	21 Jan 69	NSSM-2: <u>Middle East Policy</u> . Establishes study group to prepare two papers, one outlining alternative US policy approaches to secure a Middle-East settlement; the other outlining alternative views of basic U.S. interests in the area.
2	X-0550	30 Jan 69	Kissinger memo to SecDef et al: <u>NSC Meeting 5 Feb</u> . Describes format of NSC meeting devoted to discussion Middle-East,
3		1 Feb 69	<u>Talking paper for SecDef and CJCS</u> : for NSC meeting on Middle East. Discusses six options for US policy striving for settlement of Middle-East dispute: passive policy (continuation of past policy); renewed Jarring effort; US-USSR negotiations; Four-power negotiations; settlement imposed by major powers; unilateral US effort. A separate paper deals with US interests in Middle-East and presents two differing views of what US posture should be: JCS: Arab-Israeli settlement is possible; we should continue to press Israel to withdraw from major occupied territories; ISA: Broad settlement not possible in near future; we should concentrate on a bilateral Israel-Jordan settlement; improper to urge Israel to give up Sinai to Egypt; (Note: only talking paper, not the actual policy papers, reproduced)
4	X-0650	6 Feb 69	NSSM-17: <u>Further Studies on Middle East Policy</u> . Outlines further studies: description of Arab-Israeli settlement US could support; alternative forms of US and international guarantees of a settlement and of Israeli security.

DECLASSIFIED with portions exempted

E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.6

DIA Rtv 11/21/04

MR 03-20#3 CIA Rtv 12/20/04
State Rtv 12/10/04 OOD Rtv 8/11/06

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5*	X-0821	14 Feb 69	Memo from NSCIG/NEA to Kissinger: <u>Further Studies on Middle East</u> . Forwards paper suggesting responses to NSSM-17 (X-0650). Attachment: <u>Further Studies on Middle East Policy</u> : paper presents elements of an overall settlement US could support; alternative means of guaranteeing such a settlement; two possible approaches for injecting our views of a settlement into the dialogue; the relation between two-power and four-power talks; the special question of dealing with Israel; objectives in President's European talks.
6	X-1155	5 Mar 69	ASD (DDR&E) memo to SecDef: <u>Project EGGROLL Agreement</u> (U). Brings to SecDef's attention an R&D program started in April 1967 by ARPA to assist the Israeli Ministry of Defense in the design and test of counterinfiltration systems for Israel's land borders. First phase proved mutually beneficial to US and Israelis. Foster has given go-ahead to ARPA to proceed to second phase, earlier approved by State and concurred in by ASD/ISA. This phase will test effectiveness of an airborne infra-red scanner in a "non-jungle" environment.
7	X-1359	17 Mar 69
8	X-1459	21 Mar 69	NSSM-33:.....
9	X-1869	11 Apr 69



11

X-3114

11 Jun 69

(3) Proposed memo from SecDef to President: Arms for Jordan. Reinforces views of ISA but there is no indication that this was ever sent.

(4) CJCS Memo to ASD (ISA): Jordanian Materiel Shopping List (U). Concurs with ISA reluctance to commit F-4's to Jordan; recommends certain other minor modifications; basically supports the sale, as modified.

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X-3350

18 Jun 69

This image shows a single sheet of white paper with horizontal ruling lines. The lines are evenly spaced and run across the width of the page. There is no handwriting or other markings on the paper.

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- 13 X-0853 27 Jun 69 ASD(ISA) memo to DepSecDef: Reply to a request for Status Report on Early Delivery of F-4s to Israel. Reviews background of Johnson Administration decision to sell F-4s to Israel at the rate of 4 per month. States that the decision was made in Dec 68 with delivery to start in Jan 70 (almost half the normal lead time). Subsequently the Israeli's have pressured for earlier delivery - September or even August 1968. ISA raises question of whether Israeli's will be able to maintain the planes by that time. Suggests that USG is justified in delaying delivery through the September date, but not much beyond October (risk of public knowledge of delay).
- 14 X-3852 12 Jul 69
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.....
(1) General approach: Ambassador Rabin, Dep SecDef, UnderSecState - pressure Israel by delaying delivery of F-4s.
(2) Use Mrs. Meir's visit to put pressure on her if necessary.
(3) Be prepared for public confrontation should Israel attempt to go to Congress on the matter of F-4 deliveries.
- 15 X-4622 26 Aug 69 Pursley memo to ASD(ISA): Forwards views of SecDef on ISA's memo on Delivery of F-4's to Israel. SecDef's comments:

(1) Approval granted for use of USAF crews for Sept deliveries.
(2) Prepare plans for subsequent deliveries by private means.
(3) USAF personnel should be minimum in number, wear their uniforms, and spend minimum time in Israel.
(4) SecDef disappointed to have any US armed forces involvement in this matter.

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X-4776

2 Sep 69

DIR (DR&E) memo to SecDef: Proposal for Increased Effort to Obtain Middle East Border Security Data. Discusses need for US to understand border security problems both for our use and to train allies. Suggests a positive response to an Israeli "feeler" that they might be willing to disclose the functioning and effectiveness of their border systems for more information on our newer technology. Discusses policy questions: (1) Congress would probably be wary (2) Israel might copy our devices and compete in world market (3) Possibility of technical disclosures reaching Communist countries. DDR&E suggests several options for levels of involvement (range from low-key EGGROLL efforts to full scale participation with Israeli's).

SecDef opted for continuing present low-key EGGROLL program.

Attachments:

(1) Memo for DD (SEAM) on Project EGGROLL. Discusses project and implications for future development.

(2) Chronology of Project EGGROLL/Middle East.

17*

X-4784

6 Sep 69

CJCS memo to SecDef: Arab-Israeli Military Balance. Discusses the Arab-Israeli military balance in light of a new request from Israel for additional 100 A-4 and 25 F-4's after completion of delivery of the presently approved agreement for 100 A-4 and 50 F-4 aircraft. Suggests that Arab improvements in aircraft inventories and maintenance would suggest Israel requires more high performance aircraft than they did in June 1967 to achieve air superiority.

Further suggests that a military recommendation to supply weapons to Israel - especially jet aircraft - must meet three criteria:

(1) political determination that such supply is in the overall interest of the US;

(2) military assessment by US that these weapons are required to ensure Israel's survival;

(3) military assessment that Israel always possesses sufficient conventional military capability to ensure its own survival.

Israeli request for 100 A-4's has considerable merit from a military point of view;

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military requirement for additional F-4's is not so clear. In addition, political impact of weapons deliveries as fuel to arms race should be considered. Concludes that A-4 sale has military merit but hedges on F-4's; prefers only "to consider seriously" and defer final judgement.

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|----|--------|-----------|--|
| 18 | X-4878 | 11 Sep 69 | Talking Paper for SecDef and CJCS: <u>NSC Meeting on Policy Decisions for the Middle East</u> , 11 Sep. Discusses issue of meeting: whether to reveal specific US position on a boundary settlement, on the UAR in the Soviets' talks and on the Jordan boundary without the USSR. (Note: none of the tabs attached to the Talking Paper have been reproduced.). |
| 19 | X-5182 | 29 Sep 69 | SecDef memo to Kissinger: <u>Request for NSC Study</u> . Requests a full-dress review of American policy interests in the Middle East. Attachment: ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef on same subject. |
| 20 | X-none | 20 Oct 69 | Dept of State Memorandum of Conversation: <u>Israel's Aid Requirements</u> . Discussion of Israel's financial situation and aid requirements between Israeli Minister of Finance and US Deputy Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. Relates Israel's difficult financial situation because of necessity of spending 21% of GNP for defense. This raise was necessitated by the military situation in the Middle East, and Israel saw no hope for change in this picture until 1974 or 1975. Israel requests certain concessions from USG, i.e. (1) USG to agree to roll over Israel's debt and allow a ten year grace period or (2) to restore Israel's eligibility for Aid loans or (3) assignment of the West German military offset loan to Israel. State's reply was that decision would rest with highest officials and that no commitment could be made at this time. |
| 21 | X-5408 | 8 Oct 69 | ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>CIA/INR/DIA Middle East Military Assessment</u> . Forwards copy of the assessment which was initiated by a presentation to State and Defense by the Israeli AF Chief of Staff. This presentation stressed Israeli need for A-4 and F-4 aircraft in 71-72 time frame. New US appraisal, though it does not extend appraisal beyond 1970, does not share Israeli conclusion. (Attachment not reproduced). |

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- 22 X-5611 22 Oct 69 SecDef memo to the President: Delivery of F-4 aircraft to Israel (PEACE ECHO). Describes the method of delivery of the second group of four F-4 aircraft to Israel - USAF pilots to Athens; McDonnell-Douglas civilian pilots from Athens to Israel. States that, in the future, since SecDef considers it unwise for USAF to be involved in delivering combat aircraft to a country actively engaged in hostilities with its neighbors, none of whom is at war with the US, that the remaining 42 F-4's will be delivered by civilian pilots all the way.
- 23* X-5887 27 Oct 69 ASD(ISA/Pranger) memorandum of conversation between the Israeli Ambassador to the United States (LTGEN Rabin) and DepSecDef. Basic purpose of the meeting was for Israel to press for US approval of its recent aircraft requests. Israel argument: Israel's objective was to achieve real peace with security, but that no Arab country and certainly not the Soviet Union were willing to make peace on terms acceptable to Israel or, for that matter, the US. DepSecDef agreed that Russians had little desire to want peace in Middle East but stated emphatically that his concern was at the prospect of renewed hostilities. DepSecDef make clear that, although Israel was a good ally, there were also other countries in that area who were friends and allies of the US. The US must not take a position on one side or the other -- US interests lie somewhere in between. Ambassador Rabin stated that except for Teheran and Tunisia, all other Arab regimes with which US is associated are "doomed to disappear." DepSecDef replied that this was no solution.
- Some discussion of the state of negotiations followed and DepSecDef closed the meeting by repeating that US wants to be sure on this matter and will work with the Israelis and State to see what we can do.
- 24 X-6117 6 Nov 69 NSSM-81: US Arms Transfer Policy Toward Israel. Forwards President's request for an evaluation of US Arms Transfer policies toward Israel. Study will be carried out by NSC Ad Hoc Group chaired by NSC representative and would include:
- (1) Examination of arms balance in Middle East given alternative levels of US and Soviet arms transfers over next five years.

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(2) Analyze Israel's force requirements to meet a variety of alternative defense objectives.

(3) Determine Israel's technical and economic capacity to produce its arms requirements.

(4) Formulate alternative US arms transfer policies toward Israel.

25	X-6116	6 Nov 69	NSSM 92 - <u>US Economic Assistance Policy Toward Israel</u> . Forwards the President's request for Study should examine: (1) Amount of foreign exchange needed to meet Israel's requirements in next five years. (2) Availability of foreign exchange to Israel. (3) Alternative levels of US economic assistance. (4) Alternative means of financing US economic assistance to Israel.
26	X-none	12 Nov 69	Israel Ambassador (Rabin) letter to SecDef: <u>Status of Payment for Sale of 50 F-4 Aircraft</u> . Reviews the financing of the 7 Jan 69 agreement for the sale of these aircraft to Israel. Because of Israel's serious deterioration of foreign exchange assets, Israel requests an extension of credit in the amount of \$119 million on terms described in the letter.
27	X-6275	17 Nov 69	Kissinger memo to SecDef: <u>Your Request for NSC Study</u> , suggests that the need for the sweeping study suggested by MRL obviated by ongoing series of NSC meetings and NSSM-81 (US Arms Transfer Policy toward Israel) and NSSM-82 (US Economic Assistance Policy toward Israel).
28	X-6600	6 Dec 69	DepSecDef letter to Israeli Ambassador (Rabin): <u>Status of Israeli Request for Extension of Credit</u> . A reply to Rabin's letter of 12 November (see doc. nr. 26). States that USG is not able to say at this time to what extent it can satisfy Israeli credit requirements. However, letter makes clear that to accede to Israeli request would place a heavy burden on available credit

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resources. Promises further response. Attachment: (1) ASD(ISA/Ware) memo to DepSecDef: Israeli Request for Additional FMS Credit Support for F-4/RF-4 Aircraft. Suggests a non-committal interim response to the Israeli request, pending outcome of NSSM-82 (Doc. nr. 25) and Congressional action on the FY 1970 Foreign Military Sales Credit Program.

29	X-0038	2 Jan 70	Kissinger memo to SecDef et al: <u>Further Action on Israel's Assistance Requests - NSSMs 81 and 82</u> . Relates President's desire for the composition of an Ad Hoc Group to consider US policy of future military and economic assistance to Israel. The Group will include: Under SecState, DepSecDef, DirCIA, CJCS, and be chaired by Kissinger.
30	X-0715	9 Feb 70	SecDef Mil Asst(Murphy) memo to DepSecDef: <u>Middle East</u> . Passes on a memo from ASD(ISA) that SecDef desired to comment on. SecDef's points (1) he approves line of reasoning in ASD(ISA) memo; (2) requests that DepSecDef advise Kissinger of contents of memo; (3) strongly recommends that these views be considered by the NSC. Attachment: ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Middle East</u> . Reviews the recent escalation of conflict in the Middle East and the diplomatic environment in that area. The tone of the review is that significant incidents have occurred on many fronts and that the USSR has issued a warning about further Israeli actions against the Arab States. In this setting, the impending US decision on most recent Israeli arms requests is of great significance -- appear to have been efforts to "plant" stories indicating a greater USSR buildup than actually is taking place in order to force a favorable decision on Israeli request. Memo further suggests that there has been little sense of direction to US arms policy in the area. Suggests that DepSecDef and Richardson discuss possibility of suspending all arms sales to the Middle East.
31	X-0724	9 Feb 70	DepSecDef memo to CJCS: Suggests that military options in M-E requested by Washington Special Actions Group should not be considered by that Group until they have been reviewed by OSD: suggests that no further options should be forwarded until they have been examined by OSD.

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X-0726

9 Feb 70

Kissinger memo to DepSecDef: Reviews charter of WSAG and its membership;

..... Attachment: DepSecDef memo to Kissinger and Richardson expressing concern with the trend of WSAG discussion on the Middle East.

Proposes that primary attention should be focused on the political options available in the M-E, particularly on arms embargo to the region.

33

X-0903

9 Feb 70

Memo from ASD(ISA) to DepSecDef: Situation Report on the Middle East: WSAG meeting of 9 Feb.

Meeting called to consider the Soviet promise of a "system" to the Arabs. Matter had been considered at highest levels of Soviet government. Not clear what the system is. Kissinger asked for preliminary ideas by 11 Feb on (1) possible new aid requests from Israel if Soviets deploy "system"; (2) US response to actual Soviet military involvement. Kissinger wondered if these moves of Soviets should be broached at ceasefire talks or by an actual warning - State recommended ceasefire talks.

..... This part of memo provided background for DepSecDef memo (Attachment to X-0726).

34*

X-none

25 Feb 70

Talking paper for DepSecDef and CJCS (for SRG meeting 25 Feb 70): Further Action on Israel's Assistance Requests - NSSMs 81-82. Paper states specific issue as response to Israel on its request for 25 additional F-4 and 100 additional A-4 aircraft. State has prepared a paper for

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35A

X-none

3 Mar 70' SecState memo to President: Economic and Military Assistance to Israel. Recommends coordinated public and private actions, e.g. privately convey to Israelis: (a) We are postponing for now their request for additional aircraft (b) prepared to negotiate a PL 480 program at a level above annual average of recent years; (c) grant additional military sales credits of \$119 million. As a follow-up USG will move to convince Soviets and UAR that we are offering a major opportunity to find alternatives to further military escalation.

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discussion (Tab A, not reproduced) which concludes that US should provide some additional aircraft but not all. State mentions, but does not develop possibility of limited US arms moratorium. Talking paper recommends: (1) opposition of sale of additional aircraft because of repercussions among moderate Arab nations and/or the increased risk of more direct Soviet involvement (2) if positive response to Israel is essential, support State option 1 (sale of aircraft based on attrition) US should insist on secret deal with Israel concessions (first choice: signature of NPT) (3) consider fully the option of an arms moratorium (4) possible alternative if positive response to Israel is essential, is to consider approving licensing of J-79 engine - to give Israel capability of a Mach 2 interceptor by 1972.

35

X-0982

25 Feb 70

DepSecDef memo to Kissinger: Further Action on Israel's Assistance Requests: NSSMs 81-82. Forwards copies of a Defense paper examining another alternative for discussion - a limited embargo on arms shipments and new efforts to re-open a dialogue with the so-called "radical" Arab countries. Attachment: (1) US Arms Supply Policy Toward Israel Options Paper. Attempts to draw a distinction between US real commitment to ensure Israel's survival and commitment to ensure Israeli dominance over its neighbors, suggests Israelis may be pushing toward latter goal. Paper further discusses options in three groupings: (1) Moratorium (2) Limited Response (3) Positive Response. Strongly suggests that we may be at watershed in US policy toward Middle East; thus very important that US should not be the first to escalate the arms race, and that we not let Israeli pressure force us to do so. Recommends (1) a response that includes no new "end items" (planes, tanks, etc.) unless we receive offsetting Israeli concessions; (2) that US consider a new peace initiative. Attachment: (2) ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: Further Action of Israel's Assistance Requests - NSSMs 81-82. Forwards paper commenting on State position and alternatives.

36**

X-1623

13 Mar 70

Kissinger memo to SecDef: Forwards a copy of the President's decision on Israeli Arms Request. Attachment: Presidential memo to SecState: Economic and Military Assistance to Israel. Approves the actions proposed in SecState memo of March 3 () with following

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addition: provides for review of current attrition problem with Israel in next few months with a view to amending contracts to provide add-on deliveries to take care of losses (up to 8 F-4's and 20 A-4's)(this part Secret). Memo also includes provisions for announcement and post-announcement action (e.g. call in Russian Ambassador (Dobrynin) to emphasize need for constructive Soviet response and for restraint in the shipment of arms).

37	X-1433	18 Mar 70	SecDef memo to Kissinger: <u>Economic and Military Assistance to Israel</u> . Projects concern over an aspect of SecState's 3 March memorandum - aspect of privately conveying to Israelis the US readiness to "more quickly to maintain Israel's margin of safety, should Israel's clear cut air superiority be threatened." SecDef suggests that such phrasing can be interpreted in a variety of ways -- most broadly would be that the US would be prepared to take any action required to maintain (a) Israel's air superiority and (b) Israel's "margin of safety." SecDef suggests US should not leave doubt as to meaning -- that the limits of our intent do not go beyond simply providing added hardware.
38	X-1551	23 Mar 70	Kissinger memo to SecDef: <u>Military Assistance to Israel</u> . Conveys a Presidential request for a plan of DoD actions necessary to implement that portion of the decision an Israeli aircraft requests announced 23 Mar -- to the effect that the US will provide additional as well as replacement aircraft promptly if the situation requires it.
39	X-2008	13 Apr 70	Kissinger memo to SecDef: <u>Replacement Aircraft for Israel</u> . Acknowledges receipt of SecDef's interim reply of 6 April 70; sets date of 15 May for completion of fuller study.
40	X-2041	13 Apr 70	<u>NSSM-93 -- The Arab-Israeli Military Balance</u> . Conveys the President's desire for a follow-up study to NSSM-81 (see doc. nr. X-6117) to provide: (1) Intelligence estimates of Arab and Israeli air order of battle. (2) Detailed intelligence assessment of Arab air capability. (3) Assessment of present effective Arab-Israeli military balance.

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41	None	22 Apr 70	ASD(ISA) Memo to SecDef: <u>Peace in the Middle East</u> . Forwards paper prepared for DepSecDef on above subject, attachment: ASD(ISA) paper, <u>An Approach to Peace in the Middle East Beginning with a de facto Cease-fire</u> . Recommends de facto cease-fire as first phase in a gradual move toward peace -- during de facto phase US would work through following channels (1) good offices in normal diplomacy; (2) coded projects (e.g. (3) third countries (with minimum reliance on USSR); (4) interested and reliable individuals and groups; (5) the UN. Suggests timing very important because past failures dictate necessity of proceeding cautiously.
42	X-2703	19 May 70	ASD(ISA) Memo to DepSecDef: <u>Middle East</u> . Discusses combination of urgent Israeli request for large quantity of bombs with a concession on a de facto cease-fire (Israeli indicated that they would withdraw 25-50 km into the Sinai in exchange for an Egyptian cease-fire). Suggests a meeting of State and Defense to discuss possibilities for a de facto cease-fire and request of a SNIE from the intelligence community on current world-wide Soviet intentions. Attachments: ASD(ISA) letter to Under Secretary of State: forwards papers prepared at DoD as part of NSSMs 81-82. (Of the enclosures only the index and pages 1-4 are reproduced).
43	X-none	21 May 70	Joint Talker for DepSecDef and CJCS (SRG Meeting 21 May 70): <u>Partial Response to NSSM 93</u> . Discusses State paper and NSC summary prepared for meeting (neither paper reproduced). Recommends: (1) avoidance of discussion of the military balance - since the papers for this discussion were prepared too late for serious consideration; (2) support a general policy of political competition with the Soviets in the area rather than making Israel our military proxy.
44	X-2773	21 May 70	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>The President's Meeting with the Israeli Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, on 22 May</u> . Suggests some points to make to President in advance of Eban's visit: (1) DOD agrees that US has important interests in Israel's survival and in the Arab World. (2) US recognizes the new dangers to US security attendant on Soviet buildup in UAR. (3) US feels new political initiatives are needed, particularly for a de facto cease-fire, etc.

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
(4) DOD does not support the idea of promising Eban 8 more F-4s at this time (a State recommendation) but would look favorably on some other Israeli requests.

45* X-2895 26 May 70 ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: Minutes of SRG Meeting - NSSM 93 - 21 May 1970. Forwards minutes. Attachment: Memorandum for the Record: Minutes of SRG Meeting, etc. A very frank discussion of the shape of future policy on arms supply to Israel. State position proposed earmarking additional F-4 deliveries (8 total) but the possibility of keeping this secret and telling the Arabs we aren't contemplating such a move. Defense countered with insistence that no additional aircraft should be delivered to Israel until we received concessions on initiatives that would lead to cease-fire and withdrawal. State countered that US and Israel have always agreed that the problem was not simply withdrawal, but secure boundaries. Kissinger emphasized the need for a longer term strategy suggested an NSC meeting in two weeks to present both sides.

46 X-none 28 May 70 Joint Talker for DepSecDef and CJCS: Response to NSSM-93. (SRG meeting 28 May). Issue is to consider the choice of basic political/military strategies in a State paper [Attachment (1)] and in an NSC summary of military supply policy (Tab B, not reproduced). State paper develops two political strategies: (1) abandon the Arab world for full support of Israel or (2) orchestrate political and military issues to counter Soviet designs and move both Arabs and Israelis to more conciliatory positions. Memo recommends that DOD support a third strategy represented in disengagement scenario [attachment (2)]. ISA feels that both State strategies will lead to polarization and that ISA disengagement option at least attempts to prevent polarization. Attachments: (1) State paper: Alternative United States Policy Approaches in the Middle East. (2) ISA paper: A Proposal for Peace in the Middle East.

47* X-none 2 Jun 70 Memorandum for the Record: Minutes of SRG Meeting, NSSM-93, 28 May. Discussion of the alternative strategies briefed in 28 May Dep SecDef/CJCS talker (X-none). State argued for Strategy II, with minimal assistance to Israel. Kissinger speculated that perhaps Israel will

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see all is hopeless if we don't help them in a significant way, and that this would lead to greater dangers. DepSecDef insisted that we must keep the door open to the Arabs and peace. Ramifications of increased Russian aid were discussed -- Sisco seemed to indicate US would eventually have to opt for Strategy I. Nutter suggested that all discussion indicated we must work to get a cease-fire. Sisco responded (and Kissinger seemed to agree) that we are already committed to more F-4's for Israel -- apparently since the President talked to Meir in Sep 69. Nutter suggested that if such were the case, a lot of time was being wasted on these studies. Specifics of State's Strategy II were discussed; and Kissinger noted the importance of the Soviet's understanding our resolve in the Middle East. Further action deferred to NSC meeting.

48*

X-2986

3 Jun 70

SecDef memo to Kissinger: Replacement Aircraft for Israel. Forwards the study Kissinger requested on prompt supply to Israel of replacement/additional aircraft. Notes the following additional considerations:

(1) Israel's requirements for maintaining total air supremacy are very much greater and different in kind than requirements for defending air space over Israel.

(2) Study does not take into account either the limited nature of the Arab AF's attack capability to rapidly destroy Israel's AF.

(3) Also, limitations of even Soviet ability to rapidly destroy the Israeli AF not considered. Attachments: (1) Requirements and Options on Supply of Aircraft to Israel. Discusses specifics on supply, current inventory and US production schedules. (2) ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: Replacement Aircraft for Israel. Forwards the study along with concurrence of JCS, ASD(I&L), and ASD(SA).

49*

X-3126

5 Jun 70

SecDef memo to President: Proposed US Peace Initiative in the Middle East. Suggests that increasing levels of tension in that area due to actions by Russians, Israelis, Arabs has brought about a situation in which the Israelis are pressing us for an enlarged commitment, including some 2.5 billion in arms, and firm

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action to limit Soviet role in the area -- in effect, we are being asked to guarantee the continued existence of Israel, regardless of her own actions. Central question posed is whether it is still possible or desirable to pursue a policy based on limited support of Israel while we attempt to preserve our interests and influence in the Arab world. Memo outlines a number of considerations that would allow such a policy, but it would require major new US initiatives. These initiatives include: (1) not selling additional attack aircraft to Israel; (2) must get Israeli concession, agreement to a phased and conditional withdrawal; (3) de facto cease-fire. Concludes that our interests require that we avoid nuclear war with Soviets; prevent spread of Soviet influence (expansion of US commitments to Israel, including a decision to supply additional attack aircraft, would constitute a threat to our security interests). US should undertake new initiatives to bring about a phased peace, e.g. if the Israelis cooperate, but not the Arabs, further aid to Israel can be justified; should the Arabs (specifically the UAR) be agreeable, but not Israel, the Israelis would be put on notice that an implicit guarantee of their security is dependent upon their actions being consistent with US national interests.

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X-3168

8 Jun 70

ASD(ISA/Ware) Memo to DepSecDef: SRG Meeting on NSSM-93, 8 Jun. Reports on that meeting: Basic State and Defense differences were again highlighted: State willing to issue strong message to Soviet Union that Soviet presence in Canal Zone will be very different from present position and that US would even consider direct military action against Soviets in that area. DoD would not agree;

..... On supply of aircraft: DoD position was not to supply more; the State approach was to supply a few for attrition, with more earmarked -- apparently there is the feeling that the President has already committed these aircraft.


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51	X-none	9 Jun 70
52**	X-3395	20 Jun 70	ASD(ISA) memo to DepSecDef et al: <u>Next Steps in the Middle East (NSDM-66)(C)</u> . Forwards pertinent extracts of NSDM-66. Attachments: Extract from NSDM-66: <u>Next Steps in the Middle East</u> . States that President has approved the steps recommended in June 9 memo by SecState, subject to following: (1) increases number of Phantom jets earmarked for Israel in Sept-Oct from four to five; (2) make clear to Israel that earmarked planes start to be delivered in September, unless such deliveries would seriously jeopardize any ongoing negotiations; (e) respond affirmatively and promptly to ongoing requests from Israelis for various items of logistic support. Attachment: SecState memo to President of 9 Jun 1970: <u>Next Steps in Middle East</u> : Recommends a "stop shooting, start talking American initiative" that would include (1) publicly declared cease-fire (during which UAR (USSR) and Israel would have to refrain from changing military status quo in 25-mile zone either side of Suez Canal cease-fire line); (2) negotiations on a political solution -- new approach direct to each party through Jarring; (3) military assistance for Israel -- Soviet presence has shifted military balance, though not clear how much; recommends Phantom sale (50 aircraft); affirmative response on logistic support; limit deliveries during next two months only to what has been previously committed, but inform Nasser that further deferral of additional sales is only feasible in circumstances of a cease-fire and agreement to enter discussions under Jarring on the basis of American proposal; US must reflect resolve and firmness to USSR.
53	None	22 Jun 70	NSC Staff Memo to DepSecDef et al: <u>WSAG Meeting on Middle East</u> . Forwards summary of conclusions of 22 June WSAG Meeting. Attachment: <u>Summary of Conclusions</u>
54	None	24 Jun 70 Message on Middle East from State Dept. Reports President has approved a new USA initiative on

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M-E problem. States basic aspects of plan and reports reactions, e.g., Israeli Ambassador upset at military supply aspects; Mrs. Meir's reaction strongly adverse; others waiting before making public statements.

55	X-none	2 Jul 70	MSG from US Ambassador Israel to SecState: Reports urgent night meeting with Mrs. Meir called to discuss the fact that Soviets had moved forward toward the Canal two SA-2S batteries and one SA-3 battery -- mobile batteries got two Israeli Phantoms. Meir urged US consider seriousness of this as an indication of Soviet intentions and that we give further urgent consideration to expediting additional airplanes Attachment: Handwritten memo on front of this message indicates that President desires action as soon as possible.
56	X-none	3 Jul 70	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: Israeli against SA-2 and SA-3 Missiles. Discusses Israeli requests and the responses of ISA, DIA, JCS and DDR&E. DoD consensus is to provide aid but in a low-profile way for the present. Attachment: Joint State/Defense message: <u>Israeli Requests for Equipment</u> . Provides guidance to US Embassy, Tel Aviv on Israeli requests -- DoD studying on an urgent basis; as an interim measure will be provided.
57*	X-3849	9 Jul 70	ASD(ISA) Memo to SecDef: <u>Escalation of US Involvement in Middle East</u> . Cover memo indicates at WSAG on 9 Jul DoD was charged with lack of response to Presidential orders, Nutter preparing brief paper to discuss this. Memo raises two questions: (1) Israel using to attack Egyptian sites. This could bring Israel-Russian confrontation soon. (2) our policy seems to be dictated by day-to-day events toward a direct confrontation with the Soviets and greater commitment to Israel. Bemoans fact that DoD is deluged with "urgent" Israeli military requests, and with calls from the White House for strong response. Recommends three actions: (1) SecDef see President personally and privately on this issue; (2) SecDef endorse policy of "measured response" on arms to Israel; (3) key DoD officials meet once a week on this.

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58 X-3926 16 Jul 70 SecDef memo to Sec Mil Depts, et al: Establishment of Middle East Task Group (C). Describes delicate state of Middle Eastern affairs, directs that a Middle East Task Group be formed under direction of ASD(ISA); duties - to provide continuous assessment of situation; estimate long and short-range impacts of material assistance; status of financing, etc. Attachments: ASD(ISA), DDR&E memo to SecDef: on the problem of establishing a Near East Task Group in ISA charged with assessing the increasingly unstable Near East situation and evaluating long and short-range impact of US material assistance. Recommends formation of such a group.

59 X-4009 18 Jul 70 SecDef memo to Kissinger, SecState: Israeli Arms Requests. SecDef announces that President has asked DoD to assume responsibility for the initial review of all Israeli arms requests. Sets up organization at DoD for the handling of these requests. Attachment: (1) ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: Israeli Arms Requests. Forwards draft memo for SecState and Kissinger.

60 X-4166 23 Jul 70 ASD(ISA) Memo to SecDef: Background on Current Middle East Situation: Egyptian Acceptance of US Proposals (U). Reports that Egypt has accepted SecState proposals, i.e., restoration of cease-fire until at least 1 Oct; acceptance of Security Council Resolution 242; agreement to enter into negotiations through Ambassador Jarring. Egyptian move seen as major breakthrough.

61 X-4358 29 Jul 70 Memorandum of Conversation: SecDef and Israeli Ambassador. Initial discussion of financial difficulties dealing with Israel's requests necessity of liaison with Hill, etc. Rabin expressed Israel's resolve to attack missile sites; stated that this required more and more aircraft, particularly SecDef indicated DoD was receiving problem and aware of its urgency. Rabin suggested US could make a proving ground for its equipment by providing it to Israel to use. Rabin also interested in CBU's and SHRIKE. DoD moved discussion to the possibility of cease-fire -- Israel reply that such would only aid Russians by giving them time to build up their systems.

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62	None	31 Jul 70	DASD(ISA) Memo to SecDef for record: <u>Mr. Sisco's visit to DoD 30 Jul.</u> Conveys impressions left by Sisco -- that the President has decided we must support Israel with all available means so that they can destroy all SA-2 and SA-3 sites within range on West Bank of Suez Canal. Reports that initial Israeli raid was apparently a "bust."
63	X-4401	5 Aug 70	ASD(ISA) Memo to SecDef: <u>Israeli Response to our Cease-fire Proposal.</u> Conveys Israeli response that they will not accept cease-fire unless all Russian and Egyptian missiles within <u>50 km</u> of the Suez Canal are removed. Israelis request a package of items to destroy the missiles, including CBUs. Memo states that Israeli reply is, in essence, a rejection and that, if we want a cease-fire, we will have to lean heavily on Israelis.
64*	X-4438	6 Aug 70	Kissinger Memo to SecDef et al: <u>Meeting between Israeli Ambassador Rabin and Mr. Kissinger on Aug 5 at White House.</u> Forwards information on conversation along with information provided by the Israelis, i.e., sequence of Soviet actions in Egypt since the launching of US peace initiative. Attachments: (1) Memorandum of Conversation. Rabin indicated that Israel had decided to accept US peace initiative:---though with great skepticism because of the political and even more serious military risks involved. Without President Nixon's letter (no record) to Prime Minister Meir, Israel's reply would have been negative. Israel believes that no real change will result except that USSR has taken the opportunity to take two military steps: (a) moved system of ground to air missiles 40-60 km from Canal; (b) Soviet piloted MIG-21s attempted to intercept Israeli aircraft. Rabin noted that subsequently the Israelis shot down 4 Soviet-piloted MIG's, and Soviets appear to have backed off such combat for the moment.

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or US is able to cause Soviets to redeploy to the 40 to 60 km area. Rabin emphasized that Israel would move with or without US help.

Kissinger indicated he would pass this to President but was sure that such a step would be considered contrary to the spirit of the US peace initiative.

Attachment (2): Ambassador Rabin's account of Soviet Union's Escalatory Actions. Attachment (3) Rabin's later modifications of his original statements:

(a) Israeli position with regard to near SAM sites is that we will do whatever possible directly or indirectly to remove them.

(b) Israel will accept a cease-fire the day it becomes effective.

(c) "I am in no position to say the foregoing is conditional as I stated in the earlier meeting with Dr. Kissinger."

65	X-4476	7 Aug 70	Memorandum for the Record: <u>Meeting Between Secretary of State and DepSecDef, 6 Aug 70</u> . Discussion of "Project Binge," DoD crash report on US supply of urgent Israeli demands. (SAM suppression equipment). It was agreed that such equipment would be supplied before a cease-fire.
66	X-4501	10 Aug 70	NSSM-98: <u>Further Review of Israeli Arms Requests</u> . Requests a quick study outlining principal Israeli strategies that could be supported against the Soviet and Egyptian missile defense complex west of Suez Canal.
67	None	12 Aug 70	ASD(ISA) Memo for the Record: <u>Special Review Group Meeting on the Middle East</u> . Discusses three subjects: (1) current status of military assistance for Israel; (2) economic assistance for Israel; (3) status of political initiatives. State expressed view that there was crisis of confidence between ourselves and Israel because we have leaned very heavily on them in past few weeks, suggested early agreement in principle to current Israeli request forand advance munitions. Otherwise Israel might abort Jarring mission. Defense concurred. Further discussion of support for Jarring followed.
68	None	14 Aug 70	ASD(ISA)(Pranger) memo to SecDef: <u>Meeting with Ambassador Rabin</u> . Forwards a talking paper for the meeting. Attachment: <u>Talking Points for</u>

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Meeting with Ambassador Rabin. Describes package of military assistance that US will provide Israel --
..... Emphasizes that such a package is evidence of the degree of US support for Israel. Because of uniqueness of this decision, we must ask for certain assurances: (1) equipment will not be used beyond Israel's 50 km zone of activity before the cease-fire; should the cease-fire break down; (2) CBU's under no circumstances be used against anything except a clear military target; (3) Israel will hold this agreement very closely -- should not be public knowledge during cease-fire. Stresses concern for Israel's prompt payment. Further stresses that this package is not the final answer in case the war of attrition resumes. Urges careful consideration of all alternatives before deciding on a strategy based primarily on destruction of SAM sites. On basis of VN experience it is very costly and very difficult to attempt a continuous suppression/destruction campaign against an air-defense environment as sophisticated as that of UAR.

69	X-4786	24 Aug 70	ASD(ISA) Memo for SecDef: but Rabin balked at conditions that USG attached to sale. After consultation with State, Rabin agreed to the conditions. Contractual arrangements are going smoothly and the Israelis can get delivery in the very near future if they desire to air ship.
70	X-4872	29 Aug 70	SecDef memo to Kissinger: <u>Further Input to NSSM-98</u> . States SecDef's major concern of the use to be made of NSSM-98. Suggests that it could be counterproductive in encouraging Israel to look for an acceptable military alternative -- when a peace settlement is the only long-term solution to Israel's security needs. Points out that we must consider Arab point of view as well. Concludes that NSSM-98 should be considered only as a standby US EYES ONLY document for use if the cease-fire breaks down.
71	X-5034	9 Sep 70	Kissinger memo to DepSecDef et al:

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


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72	X-5060	9 Sep 70	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Middle East Situation as of 1600 hrs 9 Sep 70.</u> Discusses DoD responses to PFLP hijacking in Jordan and difficulty in assessing the situation in the field because of uncertainty of DIA contact with Jordanian Army.
73	X-5098	9 Sep 70	CJCS memo to SecDef: <u>Middle East Plans (U).</u>
74*	X-5108	15 Sep 70	SecDef memo to President: <u>Middle East Situation.</u> Recommends bolstering the forces of moderation in both Israel and Arab states. Recommends establishing a better American negotiating posture by (1) considering re-establishing diplomatic relations with one or more of the countries that broke with us in 1967 (Algeria, UAR, and Yemen being most likely candidates), by (2) broadening our support to Hussein with military equipment and by (3) moving to improve relations with the more conciliatory groups in the Palestinian movement. Memo also proposes strengthening UN participation and re-evaluating the criteria for deciding what constitutes a critical shift in the military balance in the Middle East.
75	None	22 Sep 70	<u>Note Verbale from Israel Embassy.</u> States that GOI has received oral paper of US of 21 Sep 70; considers this authoritative and states Israel intends to operate against Syrians in Jordan by air, but if the situation should require, by ground as well. States that Israel intends to meet with representative of King Hussein for coordination. Requests confirmation of US oral paper on two counts. (1) US decision to prevent Soviet intervention and (2) since operation might lead to resumption of hostilities in Suez Canal in addition to Syrian and Jordan fronts, Israel will need further equipment and expects better treatment than it has been getting in past months.

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X-5484

3 Oct 70

DepSecDef memo to President: Follow-up Actions with Israel. A reply to a Presidential memo of 23 Sep [Attachment (1)]. Forwards for approval a second anti-SAM package for Israel. Discusses the environment in the Middle East and recommends conditions be attached to the use of this package. Environment: DoD does not believe UAR has gained any military advantage of major significance as a result of its violations since the cease-fire. Notes, however, that Israelis do not share this view and, indeed, seem committed to a SAM rollback or attack prior to resuming peace talks.

Conditions: (1) Israel regard this as an extension of the first antimissile package, with the same conditions (i.e. Israel would not unilaterally break the cease-fire or use it beyond 50 km zone across the Canal) and (2) Israel agree to resume peace talks without a total missile rollback.

Attachments: (1) Presidential memo to SecDef, SecState: Follow-up Actions with Israel. Requests actions as a follow-up to his meeting with Prime Minister Meir: requests "sympathetic" attention to requirements for (a) immediate discussion of an antimissile package and (b) longer-term requirements.

77

None

15 Oct 70

Talking Paper for DepSecDef and CJCS: Middle East Policy Options: NSSM-103. Reviews requirement of NSSM-103, an urgent review of US policy options in light of Jordanian Crisis and death of UAR President Nasser. Forwards copy of NSSM-103 (Tab A), State Dept paper (Tab B). Comments that while State paper covers immediate problems, it fails to place them in long term perspective. Suggests that at some point we must recognize that one of the greatest obstacles to peace is likely to be Israel's hardening on a "peace map," including a great deal more than border adjustments proposed by US. Comments briefly on paper by former Under Secretary Richardson (Tab C) and a paper on NSSM-103 by ISA (Tab D). Recommends: (1) support for a positive US initiative for peace; (2) oppose any further major offensive equipment sales to Israel, pending some movement on negotiation front. Note: Tabs A-D not reproduced. Attachment: NSSM-103: Future Options in the Middle East.

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


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78	X-5684	15 Oct 70	NSDM-87 - <u>Military and Financial Assistance to Israel</u> . Promulgates the President's decisions: (1) approves issue of the anti-missile package to Israel, attaches no political conditions but the same conditions on use as specified in earlier package (see doc. nr. 76).
78A	X-5720	16 Oct 70	CJCS Memo to SecDef: <u>Revised Readiness Posture for Middle East Crisis</u> (U). Describes improvement in situation in Jordan and the current US readiness posture. States that JCS plan to reduce alert requirements for US units in Europe and attaches a message that implements return to normal posture with exceptions noted. (Attachment not reproduced).
79	X-5899	27 Oct 70	CJCS Memo to SecDef: <u>Revised Readiness Posture for Middle East Crisis</u> . States that present alert status, though modified on 25 Oct, remains expensive, results in loss of training, and is potentially damaging to morale. Reemphasizes units normally in position for rapid M-E response and suggests that a return to normal readiness posture is justified. Requests concurrence on a message to implement normal readiness posture. (Message not reproduced).
30	X-6250	13 Nov 70	NSSM - 105 - <u>Addendum to NSSM-103</u> . Requests a paper on the status of US response to Israeli requests for economic assistance. Lists the Israeli requests.
81*	X-6493	30 Nov 70	ASD(ISA) Memo to SecDef: <u>Critical Stage vis-a-vis Israel-Peace Talks and Follow-on Response to the President's Memorandum of 23 Sep 70</u> . A strongly worded anti-Israel Memo expressing ISA's concern over recent M-E actions: (a) Sisco (State) and Kissinger support Israel's insistence on major new promises of financial and military aid <u>before</u> resuming peace talks (b) SecState assured Abba Eban that US will <u>not</u> pressure Israel during negotiations (c) State and Kissinger pressing for sale of a substantial number of additional F-4's and A-4's. ISA conclusion: "We are asked to commit all the carrots <u>now</u> while the prospective whip (stoppage of arms deliveries), unconvincingly held in readiness by Sisco and Kissinger, has just been waived by SecState's recent assurance to Eban."

Recommendations: (a) meet with SecState or President to urge at least postponement of a major new US aircraft sale (b) DOD should continue to recommend

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mutual demilitarization with appropriate supervision along the Canal. (Note: SecDef initialed approval of both recommendations).

82 X-6707 3 Dec 70 Talking Paper for DepSecDef and CJCS (SRG Meeting of 3 Dec 70): NSSM-103 - Response to Israeli Requests. Notes that Israel is pressing for three major US concessions:

- (1) Favorable decision on aircraft (54 F-4's, 120 A-4's) as compensation of Soviet/UAR buildup.
- (2) A US promise to drop Roger's proposals (calling for Israeli withdrawal to substantially the old borders in context of agreed peace), and to block all outside (2 power, 4 power or UN) pressure for settlement.
- (3) Assurance that US will oppose any direct Soviet intervention in event of resumption of hostilities.

In preparation for MOD Dayan's US visit, SRG is meeting to consider response to Israel's requests. Paper lists a number of reasons urging a go-slow on more aircraft - basically DOD feels Israelis do not need aircraft; that they do not yet have funds; that diversion of these aircraft will have adverse effect on US military capability. Recommendations: (a) Oppose decision to commit more aircraft to Israel (b) Limit Dayan talks to a general discussion (c) Indicate DOD's reasons for deferring aircraft sales.

83 X-6691 3 Dec 70 Dir, DDR&E Covering Brief to DepSecDef: Israeli Request for R&D information Exchange Program. Indicates net effect of such an exchange would be beneficial to the US for a number of reasons. List certain disadvantages as well (e.g. disclosure of sensitive material, Israeli development of weapons US would rather they did not have). Recommends approval of a program of selective release. Attachment: (1) Proposed letter from Dir, DDR&E to Israeli Ambassador Indicating initial specific areas for coordination and enclosing the specifics of the exchange program. Note: Covering Memo on the front of this Brief indicates DDR&E Letter has been coordinated in Defense and verbally with State.

84 X-6619 4 Dec 70 Memorandum for the Record: Military Assistance in The Middle East (SRG Meeting). Agreed that President should not give any commitment on aircraft prior

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to Jarring talks; however, the longer term Israeli requirements will be set forth in a paper to be discussed at a later meeting.
..... (DepSecDef felt other solutions could be reached) and a Jordanian Arms package followed (problem here is one of financing, not policy).

85*

X-6717

10 Dec 70

SecDef Memo to President: Visit of Israeli MOD Dayan. Recommends probing Dayan on his views on how Israel can attain security for the longer term. Suggests that Dayan may be more moderate than some of Israel's leaders who seem to focus on immediate physical security - SecDef stresses the importance of a modus-vivendi with the Arabs in the long term. Recommends no specific commitment of additional aircraft and gives reasons [reflects ISA position in 30 Nov Memo (doc. nr. 81)]. In sum, the memo stresses not letting "our best chance for real peace in the Middle East slip by because of Israeli leadership which is too concerned about immediate security advantages to take a reasonable risk for peace." Attachment: (1) ASD(ISA) Memo to SecDef: Visit of Israel's Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan. Memo from ISA forwarding a draft memo for the President including agreed-upon arguments.

86

X-6827

15 Dec 70

ASD(ISA) Memo to SecDef: Question Regarding US Assurance to UAR. Discusses UAR assertion that US had given Egypt a letter of assurance on aircraft deliveries to Israel. States that check at State confirms that no such letter was sent. However, attached is a message to Minister Bergus instructing that he provide certain verbal assurances to President Nasser, i.e. that in delivering aircraft to Israel, the US would not "go beyond the level contained in past commitments during the period in which we are pursuing our peace initiatives." Attachment: Message to Minister Bergus: New Initiatives on Political Settlement. Gives text of oral message from Secretary Rogers to Minister Bergus. Discusses other instructions, e.g. USG's view of cease-fire provisions, fact that we are asking Israel for significant concessions, including the proviso of aircraft deliveries. Includes strong closing point: this may be the last opportunity UAR will have in such matters for a long time; alternative is grim and costly fighting with no decisive advantage for either side.

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
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X-7077

30 Dec 70

(Note: SecDef's decision has not been recorded; attached memo indicates that no action was taken, see doc. nr. 88, Vol II).

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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

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TITLE Calendar of Documents

DESCRIPTION Middle East - Volume II - Background
Documents, 1971-1972

CREATION DATE 1972

VOLUME 18 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 037502747

COLLECTION TITLE MELVIN R. LAIRD PAPERS (U.S.
Representative; Secretary of Defense;
Counsellor to the President; Senior
Counselor to Reader's Digest)

BOX NUMBER C11

FOLDER TITLE Middle East and Israel, 1969-1973 -
Calendar of Documents

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MIDDLE EAST & ISRAEL

1971 - 1972

SENSITIVE

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MIDDLE EAST

Vol. II

BACKGROUND DOCUMENTS

CALENDAR OF DOCUMENTS

1971 - 1972

(Asterisks indicate documents of special importance)

Our Number	SecDef Control No.	Date	Document, Subject & Content
88	X-0043	4 Jan 71	SecDef Memo for ASD(ISA): Poses a number of questions that SecDef feels should be considered before such a request can be decided. These questions are meant to look closely at any possible decision and its ramifications. Memo also requests a recommendation for action from ISA.
89	X-0101	9 Jan 71	DepSecDef Memo to Kissinger: Providing Israel additional CBU's. Reports DoD approval of sale of 5,000 CBU's to Israel. States Israel's intention to use these on Egyptian Air defense sites along Canal and advises that similar limitations on CBU as previously are in effect. Attachment: (1) ASD (ISA) Memo to DepSecDef: <u>Israeli Proposal for Use of CBU's Along the Suez Canal</u> . Details Israeli request and intentions. Also details the conditions under which the sale should be made e.g. sale will be very closely held. DepSecDef initialed approval, provided payment within 120 days.
90	X-0178	14 Jan 71	Letter from DepSecDef to Science Advisor to the President (Dr. David): Comments on Dr. David's forwarding of proposals of the Ad Hoc OST MidEast Panel. States the proposals have been reviewed and that those which DepSecDef believe merit application of FY 71 Emergency funds have been designated. Forwards copy of these. Attachments: (1) DepSecDef Memo to SecMil Depts, et al: <u>Developments Resulting from Israeli/UAR Lessons Learned</u> . Provides funds for opportunities to improve US tactical capabilities for stand-off surveillance and attack, and to improve airborne electronic and infra-red countermeasures; (2) ASD(DDR&E) Memo to DepSecDef: suggests programs which should be funded immediately,

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MR03-2044 Note Ltr 12/10/04
CIA Ltr 12/20/04 DOD Ltr 8/10/06

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such programs were delineated in DepSecDef memo Attachment (1) above. Memo also recommends a list of developments which, if successful, would be most suitable for transfer to the Israelis.

91	X-0197	14 Jan 71	DepSecDef Memo to Kissinger: forwards copy of memo to the MilDepts (Attachment 1 to X-0178) authorizing accelerated action of a number of programs suggested in Dr. David's 28 Sep memo and other recent discussions. States that most of the projects will take more than a year, even under accelerated funding.
92	X-0097	16 Jan 71	SecDef memo to SecMil Depts: <u>Foreign Military Sales Transactions Involving the Government of Israel</u> . Amplifies and extends the previous policy of restricting replacement of material which exceeds MAP sales account availability prior to receipt of payment. However, exceptions will be considered on a case basis. Attachment: (1) ASD(C) memo to SecDef: forwards a draft memo on the problem described above.
93	X-0217	18 Jan 71	Kissinger memo to DepSecDef, et al: <u>Follow-up studies on the Middle East for the Senior Review Group</u> . States that SRG agreed on the need for papers on following subjects: (1) US options if and when Jarring negotiations deadlock (2) political and military issues raised by various schemes that have been advanced for providing international guarantees for a settlement (3) US political and military options in preventing breakdown of cease-fire (4) steps that DoD might take internally to minimize problem of lead-time in providing additional aircraft to Israel if a decision is made at some point to do so.
94	X-0313	23 Jan 71	ASD(SA) Memo to SecDef:

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95	X-0305	22 Jan 71	ASD(ISA) Memo to SecDef: Discusses and answers questions raised in SecDef's 4 Jan memo (nr. 88). Recommends approval of the request, concluding that operational importance outweighs public affairs risk. (Note: no indica- tion of SecDef action).
96	X-0304	22 Jan 71	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Providing Israel ASW Torpedoes.</u> Recommends reversing an earlier ME Task Group decision and to give Israel a limited ASW capability (Note: approved by SecDef).
97	X-none	28 Jan 71	Presidential letter to SecDef: allocates \$500 mil for military credit sales to Israel as part of Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1971.
98	X-0452	1 Feb 71	DepSecDef memo to Chairman, Senior Review Group: <u>Follow-up studies on the Middle East.</u> Forwards paper describing what DoD could do "in-house" to minimize lead time on future aircraft sales to Israel as requested by Kissinger's memo of 18 Jan (X-0217). Briefly it states that DoD's capabil- ities are limited, particularly with regard to the A-4M. Attachment: <u>A-4M and F-4E Leadtime Problems.</u>
99	X-0572	9 Feb 71	DepSecDef memo to SecAF: <u>F-4 Procurement Author- ization.</u> Authorization to procure long lead-time items for 18 F-4E aircraft to replace those diverted to Israel. Attachment: (1) ASD(ISA) memo to Dep- SecDef: <u>A-4M and F-4E Leadtime Problems.</u> Requests approval of immediate purchase of 18 A-4Ms by Israel (approved by DepSecDef) and provide authorization to AF for long lead-time items for F-4Es.

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100	X-0676	11 Feb 71	Kissinger memo to DepSecDef, et al: <u>Understanding at SRG Meeting Feb. 8.</u> Records following points of agreement: (1) Israel should now be informed that it may commence negotiations for the purchase of 18 A-4M aircraft; (2) with regard to F-4 aircraft, no decision is made for the time being; (3) State Dept will prepare a detailed scenario for an approach to Israel in support of Jarring's initiative, should we decide to try to break a negotiating deadlock by seeking a modification of Israel's position on withdrawal and borders.
101	X-0742	16 Feb 71	ASD(ISA) Memo to SecDef: <u>Israeli Request for Additional Aircraft Armaments.</u> Forwards METG recommendations on a number of Israeli requests e.g. additional C & X Band SHRIKE Missiles - SecDef followed recommendation to disapprove.
102	X-0947	25 Feb 71	Kissinger memo to DepSecDef: <u>Standoff Attack Capability Against UAR/Soviet SAMs.</u> States that the programs recently initiated to improve capability looks extremely promising. Delays acceptance of Packard offer for presentation on these programs until more information available.
103	X-1323	16 Mar 71	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Israeli Request for</u> Discusses the and recommends, after detailed consideration, that the system, all or in part, should not be provided to Israel (DepSecDef Concurs).
104	X-1407	19 Mar 71	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Israeli RF-4 Exchange Proposal.</u> A discussion of Israeli request to exchange two RF-4Es programmed for them to F-4Es. Memo recommends approval and SecDef concurs.
105	X-1855	14 Apr 71	ASD(ISA) Memorandum for the Record: <u>Senior Review Group Meeting on Middle East guarantees.</u> Discussion of current situation in Middle East, along with status of current negotiations. State view is that Israel is "stonewalling" Jarring negotiating process, refuse to agree to any notion of international guarantees. Kissinger tasks a paper on the relative merits of US involvement in an international peacekeeping force vs such a force without US involvement.
106	X-1927	19 Apr 71	Kissinger memo to DepSecDef, et al: <u>Study on Guarantees.</u> States SRG agreement on the need for



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a paper which addresses the implications and potential consequences of those arrangements for guaranteeing an Arab-Israeli settlement which seem most likely to be acceptable to the parties. Paper should examine the type of force discussed in JCS study, discuss the implications of involvement of both US and Russian troops.

107	X-1986	23 Apr 71	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Armored Personnel Carriers for Israel</u> . Discusses Israeli request for 150 new APCs; recommends approval and SecDef concurs.
108	X-2069	27 Apr 71	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Reconnaissance Systems for Israel</u> . Proposes possible solution to continued Israeli pressure for approved by SecDef.
109 *	X-2090	29 Apr 71	CJCS memo to SecDef: <u>Middle East Peacekeeping Forces</u> . Forwards study, postulated on general peace settlement with total withdrawal of Israel to approximation of pre-1967 borders. Key points of study: (1) Scenario captions consider situation which could require a UN and a US decision to participate in observer/peacekeeping operations in the Middle East. (2) Basic prerequisite for deployment of peacekeeping force is an agreement that clearly establishes demarcation lines. (3) Establishment of a UN force capable of deterring or suppressing all possible threats to peace is not feasible. (4) An observer force, described in Option 1, is the preferred type of force. It includes a total of about 12,000 air, naval, and ground personnel, but options include a 24,000 man force. (5) Any UN observer/peacekeeping force should be comprised of neutral nation forces. However, if achievement of settlement becomes dependent on Four-Power or US/USSR participation, such participation is feasible and may be necessary. (Note: actual study not reproduced).
110	X-2119	1 May 71	JCS memo to SecDef: <u>The Suez Canal (U)</u> . A JCS review of the strategic, economic, and political implications of a reopened Suez Canal. Conclusions: (1) on balance the strategic value of a reopened Canal favors the USSR; (2) relative disadvantage of an open canal should be accepted



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in the interest of promoting peace and regional stability. If, as part of reopening the Canal, Soviet presence in the UAR were reduced, this relative disadvantage to the US would tend to be offset; (3) primary significance of the Canal, at present, is its importance as an element in Middle East peace initiatives; (4) the reopening of the Canal, as part of a viable agreement between the UAR and Israel providing for equal access by all nations, would be in the best interest of the US.

111	X-2233	6 May 71	ASD(ISA) memo to DepSecDef: <u>Delivery</u> to <u>Israel</u> (Note: DepSecDef approves, but suggests that delivery be withheld while SecState is in ME.
112	X-2370	14 May 71	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Drones for Israel</u> . Requests approval of sale of 30 Navy MQM-74 drones (probable use: decoys against Egyptian missile systems). SecDef approves.
113*	X-2366	19 May 71	SecDef memo to SecState, DCIA, Kissinger: <u>Study</u> <u>on Guarantees</u> . Forwards JCS studies on Middle East Peacekeeping Forces. Calls attention to three points: (1) basic studies, though excellent, not approved by DoD and do not set forth DoD policy; (2) the studies do not pretend to give absolute answers; (3) perhaps the principal value of the study lies in its conclusions regarding the need for careful advance planning if problems are to be minimized. Attachment: (1) <u>Summary and</u> <u>Implications of JCS Study on Middle East Peace-</u> <u>keeping Forces</u> (discussed above, see X-2090); (2) ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Study on Guarantees</u> . Comments favorably on JCS study, forwards memo for SRG members.
114	X-2505	22 May 71	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: " <u>C</u> " & " <u>X</u> " Band <u>SHRIKE</u> <u>Missiles for Israel</u> . Recommends partially ful- filling Israeli's repeated requests for these missiles. DepSecDef approves sale of 20 " <u>C</u> " and 40 " <u>X</u> " Band missiles.
115	X-2473	24 May 71	SecDef (Acting) memo to CJCS: <u>The Suez Canal</u> . A reply to JCS memo X-2119 (see above). Suggests that JCS proposal that US support a diplomatic initiative to obtain a significant reduction of the

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Soviet presence in UAR for US support to reopen the Suez Canal is unlikely to succeed, in the absence of a general Arab-Israeli settlement. States reasons for this belief; goes on to suggest that the JCS paper understates the advantages to the US of a reopened canal. Concludes that he prefers not to press the JCS initiative at this time.

Attachment: ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: The Suez Canal. Suggests putting off on initiative such as that suggested by JCS.

116

X-2862

17 Jun 71

SecDef memo to Service Sec, et al: Operation of Middle East Task Group (METG). Reemphasizes role of METG. Suggests that, for the first time in many years, there is a real opportunity for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, yet we are also confronted with an increasing Soviet presence and stronger statements of belligerency by the states involved. In these circumstances, it is critically important that our military involvement be controlled by using METG to coordinate and evaluate all questions. Calls for all involved to be sure their representative on METG be of the highest quality. Attachment: ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: Functions of METG. Points up the fine way in which METG has performed. Recommends re-emphasizing their importance, particularly as some individuals seem to believe our OSD controls could be lessened because the cease-fire has not yet been broken.

117 **

X-2803

21 Jun 71

SecDef memo to the President: Middle East Arms Policy. Recommends altering USG public policy of maintaining a Middle East "Military balance" for following reasons: (1) Policy does not reflect as well as it should the two dominant military realities - the overwhelming Israeli military superiority and the fact that it is necessary to draw a distinction between Arab forces on the one hand and Arab plus Soviet forces on the other. Unrealistic to talk of giving Israel enough equipment to maintain a balance against Soviet forces which may be focused in Middle East. (2) The policy removes arms supply initiative in the Middle East from US hands. (3) The policy has not achieved USG Middle East objectives. Soviet penetration of Egypt has increased and Israeli over-confidence has made them rigid against peace negotiations. (4) The policy contradicts the heart of the USG peace initiative by committing

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us to underwriting continued occupation of Arab territory rather than encouraging withdrawal. (5) The policy associates the USG dangerously with Israeli weapons developments over which we have no control. (6) The policy does not lend itself to distinguishing between offensive and defensive capabilities. Memo recommends a new policy which assures only an appropriate Israeli capability to defend its legitimate borders against Arab attack. Delineates advantages of this policy.

Attachment: (1) ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: Middle East Arms Policy. Submits memo to President and explains rationale.

118	X-2954	21 Jun 71	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Israeli Request for Air to Air Missiles</u> . Discusses and recommends sale of 100 AIM 9D SIDEWINDER and 100 AIM 7E2 SPARROW to Israel; SecDef concurs.
119	X-3410	22 Jul 71	DepSecDef memo to Sisco (AsstSecState); provides aircraft schedules that can be used to meet Israeli requests for F-4s and A-4s. (Note: schedules not reproduced).
120	X-3778	13 Aug 71	ASD(ISA) Memo to DepSecDef: <u>Sale of PACOM Excess materiel to Israel</u> . A detailed discussion of Israeli Israeli attempts to upgrade their priority in sale of excess material. Recommends that Israel not be granted preferential priority but rather be allowed access to MIMEX system (similar position b but with DoD control). DepSecDef approves.
121	X-3827	17 Aug 71	SecState letter to SecDef: References earlier DepSecDef letter (no. 119) and requests later decision dates on aircraft supply to Israel so as leave President's options opened at this "critical juncture in our Middle East peace efforts."
122	X-3995	27 Aug 71	SecAF memo to SecDef: <u>F-4 Aircraft for Israel</u> . A discussion of the general question of F-4 aircraft provision to Israel, including the feasibility of further deferring the procurement decisions as requested by SecState (no. 121 above). Suggests a number of different options; recommends selling the additional aircraft now but in "strictest confidence." <u>Attachment:</u> (1) <u>Israeli Fighter Aircraft Inventories (Aug 71 and end CY 74)</u> .

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123	X-4172	9 Sep 71	ASD(ISA) Memo to DepSecDef: Request for Modification of a proposal earlier rejected (see nr. 103). This request is for concurrence on Israeli Recommends approval on this basis, DepSecDef concurs.
124	X-4306	24 Sep 71	SecDef letter to SecState: Response to SecState letter of 17 Aug (see nr. 121 above). States that decision time on F-4 and A-4 sales can be deferred for perhaps three months, but at increased cost and risk of press leakage. Suggests deferral beyond Jan 72 will be extremely difficult. Attachment: (1) ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Aircraft for Israel</u> . Long memo devoted to considering all aspects of the deferral request, by Sec State. SecDef followed recommendation put forward. (2) General Counsel memo to SecDef: <u>Aircraft for Israel</u> . Suggests that there is no legal bar to a deferral option, but might cause some difficulty on the Hill if not handled carefully. (3) VCNO (Navy) memo to Chrmm, METG: <u>Sustained Production of A4N Aircraft for Israel</u> .
125	X-4307	24 Sep 71	SecDef memo to SecAF: <u>F-4 Procurement Authorization</u> . Authorizes an extension on the decision time for procurement through Jan 1972.
126	X-4308	24 Sep 71	SecDef memo to SecNav: <u>A-4N Procurement Authorization</u> . Authorizes procurement of long-leadtime items with provision for deferral of decision until Jan 1972.
127	X-4383	24 Sep 71	SecDef letter to SecState: Comment on the current situation in the Middle East. Urges US action to "cool" situation in the air along the Canal that threatens the cease-fire; discusses recent Israeli pressures for arms (particularly and the necessity to remove focus from weapons supply issue. Attachment: (1) ASD(ISA) memo explaining the rationale beyond a separate letter to SecState.
128	X-4473	20 Oct 71	SecState (Acting) letter to SecDef: Acknowledges SecDef letter of 24 Sep (see nrs. 124 and 127 above); states that SecDef's reviews will receive careful consideration.
129	X-4504	5 Oct 71	ASD(ISA) memo to DepSecDef: <u>Loan of Artillery Spotting System to Israel</u> . Recommends loan of this system to Israel; DepSecDef approves.

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130 *	X-4483	6 Oct 71	SecDef Memo to Kissinger: <u>Israeli Misuse of US-Supplied Equipment</u> . Strongly worded memo concerning Israeli's misuse of and requesting an immediate explanation from Israel. Attachments: (1) SecDef Memo to SecState: <u>Israeli Misuse of US-Supplied Equipment</u> . Identical in content to one sent to Kissinger. (2) ASD(ISA) Memo to SecDef: <u>Israeli Misuse of US-Supplied Equipment</u> . Documents use of provides background, and recommendations (which SecDef approved).
131	X-4608	13 Oct 71	ASD(ISA) Memo to SecDef: <u>Israeli Misuse of US-Supplied Equipment</u> . Documents the range of actions wherein DoD can place "holds" on Israeli equipment deliveries; recommends holding up action to halt deliveries until Israelis reply. SecDef approves.
132	X-4633	15 Oct 71	SecState letter to SecDef: a reply to SecDef memo of 6 Oct (see no. 130 above). Agrees that a number of issues should be discussed with Israelis, but "is troubled" by SecDef intention to hold in abeyance equipment deliveries because of diplomatic impact this might have. Requests discussion and coordination.
133	X-4623	16 Oct 71	SecDef letter to SecState: expresses doubt that DoD is receiving all cable traffic on the Arab-Israeli situation. Cites recent articles in <u>NY Times</u> and <u>Washington Post</u> which indicate discussion of military security matters of which DoD has no knowledge. Attachment: (1) ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Withholding of Information/Consultation on Middle East</u> . Provides detailed rationale behind letter to SecState.
134	X-none	18 Oct 71	ASD(ISA) memo to SecMilDepts, et al: <u>Israeli Misuse of US-Supplied Equipment</u> . Documents Israeli misuse for close-hold information. Requests that all addressees be "extremely circumspect" in the release of equipment and/or special information to the Israelis.
135	X-4696	20 Oct 71	SecState letter to SecDef: a reply to SecDef's 16 Oct letter (see no. 133 above). Assures SecDef that appropriate "CEDAR" cables are being passed to OSD. Adds that on some aspects of situation no documents are circulated but that Asst Sec Sisco is to make certain that key DoD officials are kept informed.

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136	X-4734	22 Oct 71	SecDef letter to SecState: A reply to Sec State letter of 15 Oct (see no. 132 above). States that SecState's concern is appreciated but delineates ways in which DoD is moving to give the Israeli's the "right" signals; firm ones because of the danger of escalation inherent in such misuse. Notes the delay in any Israeli response and suggests that deliveries are not likely to be delayed long, pending clarifying Israeli response. <u>Attachment:</u> (1) ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Israeli Misuse of US Equipment</u> . Explains rationale and recommends the course of action - subsequently taken by SecDef.
137	X-4870	4 Nov 71	SecState Letter to SecDef: Another request not to interrupt flow of equipment to Israel because of likely misinterpretation by the Israelis (attributing such action as exerting political pressure).
138	X-4946	10 Nov 71	SecDef letter to SecState: A reply to SecState's letter of 20 Oct (see no. 135 above). Welcomes the reassurance that DoD has been receiving full information and cable traffic on Middle East situation. <u>Attachment:</u> (1) ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Sensitive Cable Traffic</u> . Provides the letter to SecState.
139*	X-4947	10 Nov 71	SecDef letter to SecState: A reply to SecState letter of 4 Nov (see no. 137 above). States that SecDef shares SecState's concern regarding equipment supply delay but that a fundamental issue of our whole conceptual relationship with Israelis is involved. SecDef upset that Israelis have not acknowledged any violation; lays out alternatives for action, and concludes that DoD course of action is proper at this time, even at the risk of diplomatic repercussions. <u>Attachment:</u> (1) ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: On same subject: offers alternative courses and recommends a course of action - subsequently followed by SecDef. (2) ASD(ISA) letter to Israeli Defense Attache: calls attention to the violation. (3) Israeli Defense Attache reply to ASD(ISA): does not acknowledge any violation.
140	X-none	10 Nov 71	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Israeli Misuse of US-Supplied Equipment</u> . Reports incidents that confirm that Israelis are aware of the equipment delivery hold-up. Suggests that Israelis are

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concerned and may be prepared to give the kind of assurance we would like to have.

141	X-4977	11 Nov 71	SecState memo to SecDef: Agrees completely with SecDef's position that Israel's undertakings to us must be honored, (see nr. 139 above). However, SecState allows that there are mitigating factors and suggests an alternative way in which to reinforce adherence to the central principle at issue and so close the incident. (Handwritten note indicates that this course of action was approved by SecDef).
142*	X-5030	15 Nov 71	SecDef letter to SecState: Indicates that DoD is following the course recommended by SecState in his letter of 11 Nov (see nr. 141 above). Action is being taken to lift the "hold" on equipment shipments to Israel. <u>Attachment:</u> (1) ASD(ISA) letter to Israeli Defense attache: reinforces and restates Israeli claim that her policy is to carry out the restrictions on the use of (2) ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: indicates that above letter was hand-delivered to the Israeli Defense attache and that action has been taken to release the hold on equipment supply to Israel.
143	X-5039	15 Nov 71	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Additional 175 mm Guns for Israel</u> . Recommends approval of sale of an additional twelve 175 mm guns to Israel. SecDef approves.
144	X-5223	30 Nov 71	CJCS memo to SecDef: <u>Combat Aircraft Sales to Israel</u> . Present JCS view on arms balance in Middle East. (Soviet arms supply policy has greatly improved Egyptian capabilities, but Israelis still have defensive security). Concludes that the sale and delivery of additional aircraft on the schedule requested by GOI not required at this time. Suggested a proposed delivery schedule for subsequent years with initial decision to be made no later than Jan 72.
145**	X-5211	30 Nov 71	SecDef memo to President: <u>Mrs. Meir's visit and US National Security Interests</u> . Reasserts Defense, JCS, State, and CIA conclusions of substantial Israeli military superiority and urges <u>restraint</u> on the provision of more aircraft. Suggests that Israeli's immediate aircraft request is for political, rather than military, advantage.

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Attachment: (1) ASD(ISA) memo: title as above.
Provides rationale for memo to the President.

146	X-5338	7 Dec 71	DepSecDef memo to CJCS: <u>The Arab-Israeli Military Balance</u> . Requests a complete update of the intelligence appraisal of the Middle East situation. <u>Attachment</u> : (1) ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: provides memo for JCS in response to SecDef request.
147	X-5729	27 Dec 71	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Additional CBUs for Israel</u> . A discussion of the military and political significance of providing additional CBUs to Israel. ISA recommends deferring to State's wishes to provide them in this instance, but to place lid on further sales. SecDef approves. <u>Attachments</u> : (1) Cover memo of 28 Sep from Pursley returning ISA request with additional questions. (2) ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef of 24 Sep. <u>Additional CBUs for Israel</u> (includes answers to SecDef questions).
148	X-5778	28 Dec 71	Kissinger memo to SecState: <u>Provision of Aircraft to Government of Israel</u> . Directs immediate discussions to provide Israel with F-4 and A-4 aircraft on a regular monthly schedule commencing Feb 72.
149	X-5808	30 Dec 71	ASD((SA) memo to SecDef: <u>President's Decision on Aircraft for Israel</u> . Discusses "serious" difficulties with President's directive on aircraft to Israel (see no. 148 above). <u>Attachment</u> : (1) Summary Chart: A-4/F-4 <u>Deliveries to Israel</u> .
150	X-0005	3 Jan 72	SecDef letter to SecState: Forwards a delivery schedule that, in large measure, meets Mrs. Meir's requirements. However, also forwarded are alternatives preferable to DoD and possibly acceptable to Israel -- SecDef wishes to discuss these with Israelis. <u>Attachment</u> : (1) ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: topic as above: suggests alternative deliveries.
151	X-0300	19 Jan 72	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Dayan's Visit and Aircraft for Israel</u> . A discussion of tactics on aircraft delivery schedules and diplomacy, e.g. "we may prefer to keep our F-4 birds in hand to Mr. Sisco's peace doves in the bush, but cannot afford to be accused of torpedoing present

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negotiating efforts." Recommends adding four F-4's for delivery in CY 72 for purposes of Sisco's meeting. SecDef approves.
Attachment: (1) Probable Israeli Requests.

152	X-0694	11 Feb 72	Israel Ambassador letter to SecDef: a request for further assistance in financing equipment purchases, i.e. to finance defense articles on concessionary credit terms.
153	X-0906	23 Feb 72	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Israeli Request for Additional SHRIKE missiles.</u> Recommends denial of an Israeli request -- SecDef concurs with proviso that we will look at request "later on."
154	X-0967	1 Mar 72	SecDef letter to Israeli Ambassador (Rabin): A reply to Rabin's letter of 11 Feb (see no. 152 above) stating SecDef will give Israel's request careful consideration. <u>Attachment: Backup memo from ISA on same subject.</u>
155	X-1036	3 Mar 72	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Israeli Reconnaissance Needs.</u> Documents repeated Israeli requests for increased reconnaissance capabilities. Suggests two different cameras be provided, again avoiding the addition of a new aircraft type. DepSecDef approves.
156	X-1334	20 Mar 72	SecAF memo to SecDef: <u>FMS Transactions Involving the Govt of Israel.</u> Because of F-4 diversions to Israel, SecAF notes reduction in active and reserve F-4 forces and requests exception to initiate payback procurement immediately.
157	X-1463	28 Mar 72	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Israeli Request for Tracking Radars.</u> Recommends not approving sale Sec Def concurs.
158	X-1404	29 Mar 72



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Attachment: (1) ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: same subject as above. Discusses the Israeli request, recommends approval of the sale.

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166	X-4120	12 Aug 72	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: Israel's Request for Production Assistance. Discussion of Israeli requests for production assistance, in particular, a recommendation by Under Secretary Tarr of limited approval of the aircraft munitions cases involved. Recommends concurrence with SecTarr's proposal, making clear that approval is only for prototype development. DepSecDef concurs. <u>Attachment: (1) Tarr letter to DepSecDef: recommends limited approval as above.</u>
167	X-4286	23 Aug 72	ASD(ISA) memo to DepSecDef: <u>Proposed State Letter to Rabin on Tank Production.</u> Forwards a letter proposed by State (Tarr) to Rabin approving US support for Israel's tank production program. Recommends concurrence. DepSecDef concurs. <u>Attachment: (1) Tarr letter to Ambassador Rabin: as above.</u>
168	X-4315	24 Aug 72	Tarr letter to DepSecDef: gives rationale behind the State decision to support the Israeli tank production program.
169 *	X-4102	26 Aug 72	SecDef memo to President: <u>Middle East-New Opportunities.</u> Comment on the aftermath of the Egyptian decision and recommendations including the high level communication he opened with Sadat, and we should encourage direct Egyptian-Israeli secret consultation. Attachment: (1) ASD(ISA) background memo; presents a new initiative since "Jarring is a dead duck with the Israelis and Sadat has publicly repudiated the Sisco-proximity talks formula."
170	X-4570	11 Sep 72	SecState Memo to President: <u>Israeli Aircraft Production Program.</u> A discussion of approaches to the problem of increasing Israeli requests for US production and manufacturing know-how for indigenous aircraft production by 1975. Proposes continued limited support (by granting appropriate licenses) and request to send a team to Israel to discuss their plans in detail. DoD concurs.
171	X-4640	15 Sep 72	ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef: <u>Israeli Request for Additional AIM-9D SIDEWINDER Missiles.</u> Recommends approval of sale of 100 of these missiles. DepSecDef approves.

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X-4886

ASD(ISA) memo to SecDef:

Attachment: (1) Table of contents of subject study (study not reproduced).

X-4917

SecDef letter to SecState: expresses deep concern over continued detention of Army officer in Syria. Requests that US ask for Soviet assistance in this matter.

X-4953

SecDef memo to President: Dangers in the Middle East. Concerned with Israel's mood in wake of Munich tragedy. Recommends the President's personal intervention with Mrs. Meir to avert an Israeli-initiated crisis, particularly in regard to attacks on Lebanon (the most likely course of Israeli action).

X-4989

SecDef letter to SecState: restates the content of the memorandum to the President (see no. 174 above) on Dangers in the Middle East.

X-5039

SecState letter to SecDef: a reply to SecDef letter of 6 Oct (see nr. 173 above). Assures SecDef of State's vigorous efforts on Major Barratt's behalf, but not to the extent of approaching the Soviets at this time.

X-5117

SecDef letter to SecState: expresses concern over possibility of M-E terrorists obtaining the Soviet's Strella/Grail S4-7 missile (heat-seeking, hand-held anti-air missile, known to be in Egypt and possibly Syria). Recommends initiative to Soviets to limit distribution of this missile in Middle East.

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178	X-5191	27 Oct 72	SecState letter to SecDef: reviews Middle East situation in light of SecDef memo of 13 Oct (see no. 175 above). Documents State actions to urge Israeli restraint and to support Lebanon.
179	X-5390	9 Nov 72	SecState letter to SecDef: A reply to SecDef's letter of 24 Oct on SA-7 missiles (see no. 177 above). States that issue will be raised with Soviets in near future.

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