

The original documents are located in Box 1, folder “November-December 1975 – People’s Republic of China - SCOTO” of National Security Adviser’s Trip Cables of Brent Scowcroft at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.



Gerald R. Ford Library

1000 Beal Avenue, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-2114

www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov

Withdrawal Sheet for Documents Declassified in Part

This folder contains a document or documents declassified in part under the Remote Archive Capture (RAC) program.

Procedures for Initiating a Mandatory Declassification Review (MDR) Request

The still classified portions of these RAC documents are eligible for MDR. To file a request follow these steps:

1. Obtain the Presidential Libraries Mandatory Review Request Form (NA Form 14020).
2. Complete Sections I, II, and III of NA Form 14020.
3. In Section III, for each document requested, simply provide the Executive Standard Document Number (ESDN) in the Document Subject/Title or Correspondents column. The ESDN will be printed on the top and bottom of the document, and written on the declassification authority stamp, and will follow this format:

NLF-NSC_ILCC-5-2-4-3

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

November 29, 1975

SCO TO 002

TO: BILL HYLAND
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*
REF: *Tosco 5*

1. DPQ exercise sounds fine.
2. There is no problem with Rumsfeld seeing Peres. Don and Henry, however, agreed that Don would invite someone from State to sit in.
3. We should not repeat not make the Nixon letter to Heath on the Concorde available to the House Committee. It would be helpful to do so, but as a matter of principle, I don't see how we can. We have refused other Presidential correspondence on the grounds of confidentiality and I do not believe we should undercut our position by providing this letter.
4. I will respond to the remainder of TOSCO 5 later.
5. Warm regards.



DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958 (Executive Order) 12958
 12958 (a) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) (92) (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100) (101) (102) (103) (104) (105) (106) (107) (108) (109) (110) (111) (112) (113) (114) (115) (116) (117) (118) (119) (120) (121) (122) (123) (124) (125) (126) (127) (128) (129) (130) (131) (132) (133) (134) (135) (136) (137) (138) (139) (140) (141) (142) (143) (144) (145) (146) (147) (148) (149) (150) (151) (152) (153) (154) (155) (156) (157) (158) (159) (160) (161) (162) (163) (164) (165) (166) (167) (168) (169) (170) (171) (172) (173) (174) (175) (176) (177) (178) (179) (180) (181) (182) (183) (184) (185) (186) (187) (188) (189) (190) (191) (192) (193) (194) (195) (196) (197) (198) (199) (200) (201) (202) (203) (204) (205) (206) (207) (208) (209) (210) (211) (212) (213) (214) (215) (216) (217) (218) (219) (220) (221) (222) (223) (224) (225) (226) (227) (228) (229) (230) (231) (232) (233) (234) (235) (236) (237) (238) (239) (240) (241) (242) (243) (244) (245) (246) (247) (248) (249) (250) (251) (252) (253) (254) (255) (256) (257) (258) (259) (260) (261) (262) (263) (264) (265) (266) (267) (268) (269) (270) (271) (272) (273) (274) (275) (276) (277) (278) (279) (280) (281) (282) (283) (284) (285) (286) (287) (288) (289) (290) (291) (292) (293) (294) (295) (296) (297) (298) (299) (300) (301) (302) (303) (304) (305) (306) (307) (308) (309) (310) (311) (312) (313) (314) (315) (316) (317) (318) (319) (320) (321) (322) (323) (324) (325) (326) (327) (328) (329) (330) (331) (332) (333) (334) (335) (336) (337) (338) (339) (340) (341) (342) (343) (344) (345) (346) (347) (348) (349) (350) (351) (352) (353) (354) (355) (356) (357) (358) (359) (360) (361) (362) (363) (364) (365) (366) (367) (368) (369) (370) (371) (372) (373) (374) (375) (376) (377) (378) (379) (380) (381) (382) (383) (384) (385) (386) (387) (388) (389) (390) (391) (392) (393) (394) (395) (396) (397) (398) (399) (400) (401) (402) (403) (404) (405) (406) (407) (408) (409) (410) (411) (412) (413) (414) (415) (416) (417) (418) (419) (420) (421) (422) (423) (424) (425) (426) (427) (428) (429) (430) (431) (432) (433) (434) (435) (436) (437) (438) (439) (440) (441) (442) (443) (444) (445) (446) (447) (448) (449) (450) (451) (452) (453) (454) (455) (456) (457) (458) (459) (460) (461) (462) (463) (464) (465) (466) (467) (468) (469) (470) (471) (472) (473) (474) (475) (476) (477) (478) (479) (480) (481) (482) (483) (484) (485) (486) (487) (488) (489) (490) (491) (492) (493) (494) (495) (496) (497) (498) (499) (500) (501) (502) (503) (504) (505) (506) (507) (508) (509) (510) (511) (512) (513) (514) (515) (516) (517) (518) (519) (520) (521) (522) (523) (524) (525) (526) (527) (528) (529) (530) (531) (532) (533) (534) (535) (536) (537) (538) (539) (540) (541) (542) (543) (544) (545) (546) (547) (548) (549) (550) (551) (552) (553) (554) (555) (556) (557) (558) (559) (560) (561) (562) (563) (564) (565) (566) (567) (568) (569) (570) (571) (572) (573) (574) (575) (576) (577) (578) (579) (580) (581) (582) (583) (584) (585) (586) (587) (588) (589) (590) (591) (592) (593) (594) (595) (596) (597) (598) (599) (600) (601) (602) (603) (604) (605) (606) (607) (608) (609) (610) (611) (612) (613) (614) (615) (616) (617) (618) (619) (620) (621) (622) (623) (624) (625) (626) (627) (628) (629) (630) (631) (632) (633) (634) (635) (636) (637) (638) (639) (640) (641) (642) (643) (644) (645) (646) (647) (648) (649) (650) (651) (652) (653) (654) (655) (656) (657) (658) (659) (660) (661) (662) (663) (664) (665) (666) (667) (668) (669) (670) (671) (672) (673) (674) (675) (676) (677) (678) (679) (680) (681) (682) (683) (684) (685) (686) (687) (688) (689) (690) (691) (692) (693) (694) (695) (696) (697) (698) (699) (700) (701) (702) (703) (704) (705) (706) (707) (708) (709) (710) (711) (712) (713) (714) (715) (716) (717) (718) (719) (720) (721) (722) (723) (724) (725) (726) (727) (728) (729) (730) (731) (732) (733) (734) (735) (736) (737) (738) (739) (740) (741) (742) (743) (744) (745) (746) (747) (748) (749) (750) (751) (752) (753) (754) (755) (756) (757) (758) (759) (760) (761) (762) (763) (764) (765) (766) (767) (768) (769) (770) (771) (772) (773) (774) (775) (776) (777) (778) (779) (780) (781) (782) (783) (784) (785) (786) (787) (788) (789) (790) (791) (792) (793) (794) (795) (796) (797) (798) (799) (800) (801) (802) (803) (804) (805) (806) (807) (808) (809) (810) (811) (812) (813) (814) (815) (816) (817) (818) (819) (820) (821) (822) (823) (824) (825) (826) (827) (828) (829) (830) (831) (832) (833) (834) (835) (836) (837) (838) (839) (840) (841) (842) (843) (844) (845) (846) (847) (848) (849) (850) (851) (852) (853) (854) (855) (856) (857) (858) (859) (860) (861) (862) (863) (864) (865) (866) (867) (868) (869) (870) (871) (872) (873) (874) (875) (876) (877) (878) (879) (880) (881) (882) (883) (884) (885) (886) (887) (888) (889) (890) (891) (892) (893) (894) (895) (896) (897) (898) (899) (900) (901) (902) (903) (904) (905) (906) (907) (908) (909) (910) (911) (912) (913) (914) (915) (916) (917) (918) (919) (920) (921) (922) (923) (924) (925) (926) (927) (928) (929) (930) (931) (932) (933) (934) (935) (936) (937) (938) (939) (940) (941) (942) (943) (944) (945) (946) (947) (948) (949) (950) (951) (952) (953) (954) (955) (956) (957) (958) (959) (960) (961) (962) (963) (964) (965) (966) (967) (968) (969) (970) (971) (972) (973) (974) (975) (976) (977) (978) (979) (980) (981) (982) (983) (984) (985) (986) (987) (988) (989) (990) (991) (992) (993) (994) (995) (996) (997) (998) (999) (1000)

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

3a

~~SECRET~~

VZCZCSAM017
OO WTE
DE WTE1 #0017 3350359
ZNY SSSSS
O 010410Z DEC 75
FM BRENT SCOWCROFT
TO BILL HYLAND - WHITE HOUSE
ZEM
~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

NOVEMBER 30, 1975

SCOTO - 3

TO: BILL HYLAND - WHITE HOUSE
THRU: SITUATION ROOM - WHITE HOUSE
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

WITH REGARD TO TOSCO-8, I AM NOT IN FAVOR OF SENDING SUCH A MESSAGE TO BROSELETTE. AGRICULTURE IS ONE OF THE MOST SENSITIVE POINTS WITH THE FRENCH AND I DO NOT BELIEVE WE SHOULD GET THE WHITE HOUSE INVOLVED AT THIS POINT. KISSINGER AGREES.

WITH RESPECT TO THE AIR DEFENSE EXERCISE WITH TAIWAN (TOSCO-5), I DO NOT HAVE WITH ME ANY OF THE DETAILS. FOR EXAMPLE, WHAT DO WE LOSE BY DELAYING THE AIR DEFENSE PORTION UNTIL LATE JANUARY. UNLESS THERE ARE SUBSTANTIAL DIFFICULTIES CREATED, I WOULD BE INCLINED TO POSTPONE.

WITH RESPECT TO A DIRECTOR FOR THE SINAI SUPPORT MISSION, WHY DON'T YOU ALL COME UP WITH AN ALTERNATIVE RECOMMENDATION IN THE EVENT WILLIAMS DECLINES. YOU CAN SEND US YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS IN ORDER OF PRIORITY.

WARM REGARDS.

150
#0017

DECLASSIFIED

BY SP-10/10/00/0000

REASON: E.O. 13526, 13527, 13528

DATE: 1/31/11

NNNNMEI

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

SCOTO-3

November 30, 1975

TO: BILL HYLAND - WHITE HOUSE
THRU: SITUATION ROOM - WHITE HOUSE
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT


With regard to TOSCO-8, I am not in favor of sending such a message to Broselette. Agriculture is one of the most sensitive points with the French and I do not believe we should get the White House involved ^{at this point,} ~~in this matter.~~ Kissinger agrees.

With respect to the air defense exercise with Taiwan (TOSCO-5), I do not have with me any of the details. For example, what do we lose by delaying the air defense portion until late January. Unless there are substantial difficulties created, I would be inclined to postpone.

With respect to a Director for the Sinai Support Mission, why don't you all come up with an alternative recommendation in the event Williams declines⁵. You can send us ^{your} ~~his~~ recommendations in order of priority.

Warm regards.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 (CONTINUING) SEC 1.3
NSA/MSP, CNSA, CIA, DOD, G-2, G-6, G-7, G-8, G-9, G-10, G-11, G-12, G-13, G-14, G-15, G-16, G-17, G-18, G-19, G-20, G-21, G-22, G-23, G-24, G-25, G-26, G-27, G-28, G-29, G-30, G-31, G-32, G-33, G-34, G-35, G-36, G-37, G-38, G-39, G-40, G-41, G-42, G-43, G-44, G-45, G-46, G-47, G-48, G-49, G-50, G-51, G-52, G-53, G-54, G-55, G-56, G-57, G-58, G-59, G-60, G-61, G-62, G-63, G-64, G-65, G-66, G-67, G-68, G-69, G-70, G-71, G-72, G-73, G-74, G-75, G-76, G-77, G-78, G-79, G-80, G-81, G-82, G-83, G-84, G-85, G-86, G-87, G-88, G-89, G-90, G-91, G-92, G-93, G-94, G-95, G-96, G-97, G-98, G-99, G-100
HR 1/31/11



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

EYES ONLY

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

SCO TO 5

December 3, 1975

TO: WILLIAM HYLAND

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

How are we coming in obtaining the additional funds for Angola?

Warm regards.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SECTION 1.4, GPO:23
FRO MUMD, GPO:23, GPO:23, GPO:23
By HR DATE 1/31/11



~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SCO TO 6

TO: WILLIAM HYLAND, SITUATION ROOM
DELIVER OPENING OF BUSINESS

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

REF: TO SCO 45

1. HAK has read Zumwalt's latest contribution. He recalls that a package was put together for him when the issue of the 70 missiles first came up a while ago. The package included the minutes of a VP meeting where HAK discussed it; Gerry Smith's testimony to Jackson; a memo to the agencies on the line to take in testimony; and HAK's press conferences in 1974 when the issue came up. The upshot of it is that Zumwalt doesn't know what he's talking about.
2. Ask Bud to track this down so HAK can look it over when he returns and possibly answer Zumwalt.
3. Separate item: HAK wants Sonnenfeldt to have a look at Vice President's detente speech.
4. Warm regards.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958-2
1980 Memorandum, CONFIDENTIAL
By HR DATE 1/31/11

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

7

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

TOSCO-- 7

December 3, 1975

FOR: BILL HYLAND, WHITE HOUSE
THRU: SITUATION ROOM
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

HAK would like your judgment about the effect of delaying an announcement of his Soviet trip until December 12. He wants your views as to the effect on the Soviets and also with regard to the internal bureaucraties in the VP community.

He would also like your judgment regarding a delay of the trip itself to somewhere around the 8 or 9 of January. The purpose would be to provide more elbow room for arriving at a position without a sense of operating under pressure against a time limit. In other words, is the advantage to be gained by relieving the time pressure worth a delay until early January? Please weigh the exchange of letters which led to the establishment of the dates in considering the merits of delay. Please consult with Sonnenfeldt on both these questions and reply by return cable.



HAK also would like developed a chronology of the SALT Verification issues, including all the VP meetings, memoranda to the President, *and from* to the Soviets, and so forth.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526, 13527, 13528
1/31/11
HR

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~ EYES ONLY

In the news summary for December 3, there is a report that Zumwalt said that ". . . in June of 1974, Kissinger, as head of the NSC, ordered Defense Secretary Schlesinger not to send President Nixon information about Soviet violations. " Would you please check this out. I think it is pure hogwash.

In amplification of para 3 above, would you develop for each possible violation, when it was first reported, what was done bureaucratically about it, and what was done diplomatically. Sonnenfeldt should be able to help you on this task as well.

Warm regards.



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~
~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/

December 4, 1975

SCO TO 8

TO: WILLIAM HYLAND

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

1. You should talk to Murray Marder and Bob Kleiman to point out the absurdities in the SALT Verification debate.
2. You should also call Dobrynin to ask for a postponement of the announcement until December 12, ^{ing} point out frankly to him what the situation is, — that HAK is meeting with Rumsfeld on the 11th and that we need to sort out our own position before an announcement is made.
3. Your arguments about delaying the trip are persuasive.
4. Warm regards.



DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958
 1/31/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 4, 1975

SCO TO 9

TO: THE VICE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

1. Many thanks for your thoughtful message on the occasion of my retirement.

2. Your very kind words have touched me deeply.

But it is you yourself who ^{have} ~~has~~ set the standard for us all in loyalty, patriotism, and dedication. My association with you is one of the most treasured aspects of my entire government service.

Warm regards



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12812 (EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE)
1/31/11
LLR

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

December 4, 1975

SCO TO 10

TO: BILL HYLAND

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

1. The President has approved action items 7944 -- Reports

to Congress on Assistance to Greece, Progress on Cyprus and

Turkish Opium and 6172 -- Release to NATO of the United States

Reply to the 1975 NATO Defense Planning Questionnaire.

5X1



3. Warm regards.

Presidential Library Review of NSC Equities is Required

DECLASSIFIED, with previous exempt

AUTHORITY RA m F-TB-BS-1-1-1 9/10/04

BY kg *NSC guidelines* NLF DATE 3/10/09



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

December 4, 1975

SCO TO 11

TO: SECRETARY RUMSFELD

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*



1. I agree with you that it would be prudent to have an NSC meeting prior to HAK's visit to Moscow. It would also be appropriate to have a VP meeting in preparation for the NSC meeting.

2. As I see it, the VP meeting should take place in Brussels. All of the principals will either be in Brussels on the 11th or will be represented there, except Colby. I would anticipate that VP meeting would resolve the issues or put them in the proper framework for decision by the President at an NSC meeting. In the event a further VP meeting were necessary, it could, of course, take place in Washington. I would, therefore, recommend that you plan to stay in Brussels through the morning of 11 December and that we schedule a formal VP meeting at that time. We can set a precise date of the NSC meeting following the VP meeting. In the event HAK does not return to Washington during that period, he could be represented at the NSC meeting by Sonnenfeldt.

DECLASSIFIED

EO 13526, 13526-2, 13526-3
1/31/11

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

3. If you wish the President's meeting with the JCS to be budget-oriented, I see no reason that cannot be arranged. I will reconfirm with Jim Lynn/the formal budget session with the President and, unless I hear further from you, will schedule the President's meeting with the JCS prior to that.

4. Would appreciate your concurrence or views on the above SALT meeting schedule ASAP in order that HAK can firm his own schedule.

5. Warm regards.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SCOTO-13

December 5, 1975

TO: BUD McFARLANE - WHITE HOUSE
THRU SITUATION ROOM
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT (30)

I have just received the package from you containing a letter from Bill Broomfield about U.S. assurances that we would not pressure Israel for a Golan disengagement.

Sisco informs me that Atherton and Oakley have developed precise language for responding to such queries. You should have Oakley draft a response using the ^{approved} ~~above~~ language.

Warm regards.



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (Executive Order) 12958
12958 (a) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) (92) (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100)
by HR JUNE 2008 1/31/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

VZCZCSAM025
OO WTE
DE WT1 #0025 3390250
ZNY CCCCC
O 050259Z DEC 75
FM BRENT SCOWCROFT
TO BUD MCFARLANE - WHITE HOUSE
ZEM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECEMBER 5, 1975

SCOTON-1B

TO: BUD MCFARLANE - WHITE HOUSE
THRU: SITUATION ROOM
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE PACKAGE FROM YOU CONTAINING A LETTER FROM BILL BROOMFIELD ABOUT U.S. ASSURANCES THAT WE WOULD NOT PRESSURE ISRAEL FOR A GOLAN DISENGAGEMENT.

SISCO INFORMS ME THAT ATHERTON AND OAKLEY HAVE DEVELOPED PRECISE LANGUAGE FOR RESPONDING TO SUCH QUERIES. YOU SHOULD HAVE OAKLEY DRAFT A RESPONSE USING THE APPROVED LANGUAGE.

WARM REGARDS.

100
#0025



DECLASSIFIED
ON 10/20/2010 BY SP-6
113/11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NNNNV

~~SECRET~~

SCOTO-14

December 5, 1975

TO: BILL HYLAND - WHITE HOUSE

THRU: SITUATION ROOM

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

Ref TOSCO 80, HAK would like the action taken care of by Rush orally with Brossolette. He does not wish it to be coming directly from him as proposed in your message.

Ref TOSCO 82, my only concern is what is meant by "access to 40 Committee minutes." It makes no sense to have them drop a request for some Executive ^{privilege} ~~privilege~~ documents only at the price of providing other documents of the same category.

While he is at the moment strenuously objecting, HAK may be testifying on Tuesday on the Uranium Enrichment Bill. Will you please have Dave Elliott work with his State counterparts and develop a package for his use if he decides to testify.

Warm regards.



~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 (a) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40)
BY HR DATE 1/31/11

16
VZCZCSAM028
OO WTE
DE WTE1 #0028 3390412
ZNY SSSSS
O 050420Z DEC 75
FM BRENT SCOWCROFT
TO BILL HYLAND - WHITE HOUSE
ZEM

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECEMBER 5, 1975

SCOTO-14

TO: BILL HYLAND - WHITE HOUSE
THRU: SITUATION ROOM
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REF TOSCO 80. HAK WOULD LIKE THE ACTION TAKEN CARE OF BY RUSH ORALLY WITH BROSSOLETTE. HE DOES NOT WISH IT TO BE COMING DIRECTLY FROM HIM AS PROPOSED IN YOUR MESSAGE.

REF TOSCO 82. MY ONLY CONCERN IS WHAT IS MEANT BY "ACCESS TO 40 COMMITTEE MINUTES." IT MAKES NO SENSE TO HAVE THEM DROP A REQUEST FOR SOME EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE DOCUMENTS ONLY AT THE PRICE OF PROVIDING OTHER DOCUMENTS OF THE SAME CATEGORY.

WHILE HE IS AT THE MOMENT STRENUOUSLY OBJECTING, HAK MAY BE TESTIFYING ON TUESDAY ON THE URANIUM ENRICHMENT BILL. WILL YOU PLEASE HAVE DAVE ELLIOTT WORK WITH HIS STATE COUNTERPARTS AND DEVELOP A PACKAGE FOR HIS USE IF HE DECIDES TO TESTIFY.

WARM REGARDS.

100
#0028

DECLASSIFIED

EO 1.155 (a) (2) (C) (1) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) (xiv) (xv) (xvi) (xvii) (xviii) (xix) (xx) (xxi) (xxii) (xxiii) (xxiv) (xxv) (xxvi) (xxvii) (xxviii) (xxix) (xxx)

8000 (a) (1) (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix) (x) (xi) (xii) (xiii) (xiv) (xv) (xvi) (xvii) (xviii) (xix) (xx) (xxi) (xxii) (xxiii) (xxiv) (xxv) (xxvi) (xxvii) (xxviii) (xxix) (xxx)

1/31/11

~~SECRET~~



NNNN

SECRET/SENSITIVE

FLASH

SCOTO-15

December 5, 1975

TO: BILL HYLAND - WHITE HOUSE

THRU: THE SITUATION ROOM

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

HAK has reviewed your SALT paper. He thinks it is a good paper but it is essential that options be developed which can be considered by the VP. He asks that such options be provided us by opening of business tomorrow (December 6), our time, in order that he and I can discuss them before we split up in Manila.

Warm regards.



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 (previously) 61003
NSG Memo, COMINT, (NSA Sup), Guidelines
by HR STPA 845 1/3/11

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET/SENSITIVE

FLASH

TOSCO-16
SCOTO -

December 5, 1975

TO: BILL HYLAND - WHITE HOUSE
THRU: SITUATION ROOM
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

HAK now satisfied with options in your SALT paper. Disregard
SCOTO-15.

Would you check to see whether SecDef or the JCS^{*evr*} sent a paper
to the President claiming SALT violations by the USSR.



SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
EO 12958 (EXEMPTED) GPO:G
NFO Memorandum, State Dept. Collection
HR 13111

~~SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

VZCZCSAM030
ZZ WTE
DE WIEGQ #0030 3390615
ZNY SSSSS
O 050630Z DEC 75
FM BRENT SCOWCROFT
TO BILL HYLAND - WHITE HOUSE
ZEM

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

DECEMBER 5, 1975

FLASH

SCOTO-16

TO: BILL HYLAND - WHITE HOUSE
THRU: SITUATION ROOM
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

HAX NOW SATISFIED WIT OPIONS IN YOUR SALT PAPER. DISREGARD
SCOTO-15.

WOULD YOU CHECK TO SEE WHETHER SECDEF OR THE JCS EVER SENT A
PAPER TO THE PRESIDENT CLAIMING SALT VIOLATIONS BY THE USSR.

075
#0030

DECLASSIFIED

EO 1.1555 (unclassified) 02023

1103 (Mans. OMB) 1/31/11

By HR JMW/205 1/31/11



NNNNRG

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

SCOTO-17

December 5, 1975

TO: BILL HYLAND - WHITE HOUSE

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 

Ref SCOTO-8, did you get in touch with Dobrynin and has he responded on the delay of the announcement to the 12th.

Warm regards.



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526 (EXEMPTED) SEC 1.5
1200 Main, GAITHERSBURG, MD 20878
By HR / 1/3/11

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~

VZCZCSAM031
OO WTE
DE WTE1 #0031 3390635
ZNY SSSSS
O 050640Z DEC 75
FM BRENT SCOWCROFT
TO BILL HYLAND - WHITE HOUSE
ZEM

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

DECEMBER 5, 1975



JNR

SCOTO-17

TO: BILL HYLAND - WHITE HOUSE
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

REF SCOTO-8, DID YOU GET IN TOUCH WITH DOBRYNIN AND HAS HE RESPONDED ON THE DELAY OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE 12TH.

WARM REGARDS.

060
#0031

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652 (EXCEPT) GPO 83
FROM (Name, SSN, etc.) Dept. Collection
By NR Date 4/3/11

~~SECRET~~

NNNN

NEG MATE NOT AT THIS TIME

TO: BUD MCFARLANE, SITUATION ROOM

SCO TO

23
18

FROM: PETER RODMAN *PR*

REF: TOSCO 84

1. The General suggests you show Jack Marsh in answer to his query, the State traffic on subject of MIA's. Our report to Washington was SECTO 23067 on December 4. State replied by TOSEC 230218 (State 286512) on December 5.

2. As you will see, the Pentagon is handling the matter directly with the families, but this will bring Jack up to speed.

3. Show him also HAK's press conference in Peking (December 5) on the subject.

4. Warm regards



TOD

051300Z

VZCZCTSC004
OO WTE0
DE WTE14 0004 3391240
OO//UU/OOB
O 051240Z DEC 75
FM PETER RODMAN//SCOTO 18//
TO BUD MCFARLANE, SITUATION ROOM
BT

REF: TOSCO 84

1. THE GENERAL SUGGESTS YOU SHOW JACK MARSH IN ANSWER TO HIS QUERY, THE STATE TRAFFIC ON SUBJECT OF MIA'S. OUR REPORT TO WASHINGTON WAS SECTO 230218 (STATE 286512) ON DECEMBER 5.
 2. AS YOU WILL SEE, THE PENTAGON IS HANDLING THE MATTER DIRECTLY WITH THE FAMILIES, BUT THIS WILL BRING JACK UP TO SPEED.
 3. SHOW HIM ALSO HAK'S PRESS CONFERENCE IN PEKING (DECEMBER 5) ON THE SUBJECT.
 4. WARM REGARDS.
- BT
0004

NNNN



CONFIDENTIAL

26

VZCZCTSC005
OO WTE
DE WTE14 0005 3391405
ZNY CCCCC
O 051403Z DEC 75
FM PETER RODMAN/DJAKARTA//SCOTO 19//
TO KATHY TROIA//SITUATION ROOM
BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SCOTO19

Top: 0514322

DECEMBER 5, 1975
TO: KATHY TROIA, SIT ROOM
FROM: PETER RODMAN, DJAKARTA

1. THREE SHORT-ORDER RESEARCH PROJECTS HAVE BEEN REQUESTED WHICH CALL FOR HIGH-GRADE TALENT.

(A) ONE IS TO PULL TOGETHER AGAIN THE COMPILATIONS WE DID BEFORE (ON TRIPS IN MAY AND JULY) OF WHITE HOUSE-INSPIRED PRESS LEAKS AGAINST OUR FRIEND. PLUS ANY OTHERS. (I HAVE IN MIND THE NEWSWEEK PERISCOPE ITEM LAST WEEK AND STORY THIS WEEK, PLUS INSPIRED STORIES AT THE TIME OF THE RESHUFFLE.)

(B) LOOK THROUGH THE SCOWCROFT FILE OF HIS NOTES OF HAK MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT FORD SINCE THE BEGINNING TO SEE WHEN HAK DISCUSSED SOVIET SALT COMPLIANCE PROBLEMS WITH THE PRESIDENT. THE ISSUE FIRST CAME UP LAST FALL AND WINTER, I BELIEVE. (NOT ALL THE EARLIER NOTES HAVE BEEN TYPED UP, I'M AFRAID. SOME FROM THE EARLY PERIOD MAY BE IN MY SMALL SAFE, UNEDITED. IF YOU FIND ANYTHING THAT LOOKS LIKE IT IS ON THE SUBJECT, I CAN EDIT IT WHEN I GET BACK.)

(C) HAK, READING OTIS PIKE (IN TOSCO 72, PAGE 7) MENTIONED A VP MEETING IN 1972 WHERE THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE SO-CALLED "SECRET" SALT AGREEMENT WAS FULLY DISCUSSED. THIS IS PROBABLY ALREADY COVERED BY REQUESTS LEVIED IN SCOTO 6 AND 7. ASK BILL AND BUD.

2. WHATEVER YOU CAN COME UP WITH BY THE TIME WE GET BACK WILL BE APPRECIATED.

3. HOT REGARDS.

BT
0005



NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 11652 (Executive Order) 12958

12958 (Formerly EO 11652, 11652) Dept. of Justice
by NR JWA, Date 1/31/11

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

27

TSC006
ZZ WIE
DE WIE14 0006 3391715
Z 051715Z DEC 75
FM BRENT SCOWCROFT / SCOTO 2011
TO BILL HYLAND-THE WHITE HOUSE
ZEM

TOD: 051739Z

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE

REFS: TOSCO 66, SCOTO 11, TOSCO 79

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD
IN REPLY TO HIS MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 4 (TOSCO 79):

TO: SECRETARY RUMSFELD
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

I HAVE DISCUSSED THE SITUATION WITH HENRY, AND THIS IS THE
PROBLEM WE FACE. HIS SCHEDULE, AS HE EXPLAINED AT THE
VERIFICATION PANEL MEETING TWO WEEKS AGO, HAS BEEN LOCKED
IN FOR SOME TIME BY A SERIES OF INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES
WHICH HE IS OBLIGATED TO ATTEND AND WHICH COULD NOT BE
RESCHEDULED. THE CONSUMER-PRODUCER MEETING IS NOW FIRM,
AND THERE IS THEREFORE NO WAY HE CAN GET BACK TO WASHINGTON
BETWEEN THE NATO MEETING AND MOSCOW.

THEREFORE, I THINK THE MOST CONVENIENT SOLUTION IS TO TAKK
ADVANTAGE OF YOUR PRESENCE IN EUROPE TO HAVE A VP MEETING
THERE.

THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE I CAN SEE IS TO HAVE IT IN WASHINGTON
ON THE 9TH, IF YOU ARE WILLING TO CHANGE YOUR TRIP.

ANOTHER OPTION IS TO POSTPONE THE MOSCOW TRIP, WHICH I
ADVISE STRONGLY AGAINST. THE PRESIDENT PROPOSED THOSE
DATES IN A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO BREZHNEV IN EARLY NOVEMBER
AND BREZHNEV ACCEPTED. WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO COMPLETE THE
PREPARATORY WORK BY THEN WITHOUT DIFFICULTY, AND THE
SOVIETS WOULD HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS RESCHEDULING THE
MEETINGS IN JANUARY. THEIR TIME IS ALWAYS FULLY OCCUPIED
FOR SEVERAL WEEKS PRIOR TO A PARTY CONGRESS.

WE ALL AGREE THAT A VP IS NECESSARY. THIS WILL ENSURE
PROPER ELABORATION OF OPTIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE
NSC. SO I HOPE YOU COULD MANAGE TO STAY OVER IN BRUSSELS
ONE EXTRA DAY AS YOU SAID WOULD BE POSSIBLE IN YOUR
MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 3. THIS IS REALLY THE ONLY CONVENIENT
SOLUTION, IN MY OPINION.



PLEASE LET ME KNOW BY ABOUT NOON TOMORROW OUR TIME (END OF
THE DAY YOUR TIME) WHAT YOUR JUDGEMENT IS.

BEST REGARDS

0460
0006

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 1.3
1980 Manual, Chapter 1, 1.4.2, 1.4.3
HR 1980, 1.4.2, 1.4.3

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

OPENING OF BUSINESS

SCOTC 21

December 6, 1975

TO: WILLIAM HYLAND

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

1. HAK would like to know whether the Kamchatka radar is in fact a SALT violation, and if so, what are the issues involved. I have given him my recollection of the agreement with respect to test range radars, but I am not sure how accurate I may have been. It is also my impression that the radar is point^{ed} into the Soviet Union, not toward the United States.

2. Warm regards

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526 (Declassified) 08033
 1200 Memo, OASD, 12/11/11, 08033
 by UR 12/11/11



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032838

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME Brent Scowcroft

RECEIVER'S NAME William Hyland

DESCRIPTION Re: SALT

CREATION DATE 12/06/1975

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000002

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT

BOX NUMBER 1

FOLDER TITLE November-December 1975 - People's
Republic of China - SCOTO

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/11/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 032839

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME Brent Scowcroft

RECEIVER'S NAME William Hyland

DESCRIPTION Re: SALT

CREATION DATE 12/06/1975

VOLUME 1 page

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 036000002

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. TRIP CABLES
OF BRENT SCOWCROFT

BOX NUMBER 1

FOLDER TITLE November-December 1975 - People's
Republic of China - SCOTO

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/11/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST CCG

December 6, 1975

~~SECRET~~

SCO TO 21

TO: SECRETARY RUMSFELD

FROM: BRENT SCUWCROFT

1. I have explained the entire SALT scheduling problem to the President.

2. He wants to think about the situation before making a decision but in any event he wants you to keep to your present plan to depart for Brussels the morning of 7 December.

3. Warm regards.



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (EXEMPTED) CRO 2.3

FBI/DOJ, OIG, DHS, DOD, CIA, NSA, State, Defense

By HR (1000) (1000) 1/31/11

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

314

TOSCO 97

~~SECRET~~

OK

(W)

5 December 1975

TO: BRENT SCOWCROFT, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

VIA: WHITE HOUSE CHANNELS

FROM: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD

REF: SECDEF MESSAGES 3 AND 4 DEC (TOSCO 66 and TOSCO 79)

1. As mentioned in my previous messages, I believe that beyond the obvious importance of the substance, the deliberative process and perceptions of that process are of considerable importance by themselves. That is why it is exceedingly important to have a VP meeting and NSC meeting in Washington with all the principals in attendance. Unless there is some aspect of it of which I am unaware, I cannot see why the selection of a particular day for a visit to Moscow should be allowed to affect adversely either the process or perceptions of it. Accordingly, one obvious alternative would be to check with the Soviets to see if a delay of two or three days in HAK's meeting could be arranged. The only other alternative would be for me to delay my departure for NATO. Since you will arrive in Washington early on 8 December and the DPC begins on the ninth, I could delay my departure until early evening of the eighth to permit a VP meeting beforehand. However, I plan to leave for Brussels in the A.M. of 7 December for bilateral meetings on the eighth. Further, HAK would still have to return for the NSC if we are to avoid the problems mentioned in referenced messages.

2. Please let me have your thoughts.



DECLASSIFIED

AUTHORITY DoD Directive 5200.30

BY WJ NARA, DATE 1/31/11

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

XESCO TO 23

December 7, 1975

TO: MR. HYLAND

FROM: PETER RODMAN *fine*

REF: TO SCO 02

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO EAGLEBURGER

SUBJECT: Mrs. Graham and Mrs. Hsiao

1. So far as can be determined, this subject did not come up at all during Secretary's conversations in PRC.
2. Warm regards.



DECLASSIFIED
 BY HJR DATE 1/31/11

~~SECRET~~ / SENSITIVE

SCO TO 24

December 7, 1975

TO: SECRETARY RUMSFELD

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

1. Reference your last cable suggesting a Brussels meeting at 7:00 p.m. on the 10th, HAK asked me to relay to you that he will not repeat not be able to arrive that early.
2. The President has scheduled a leadership meeting for the morning of the 10th and wants HAK present for a debrief of the trip. He therefore does not anticipate being able to arrive Brussels until around midnight.
3. He is now ^{reviewing} ~~revising~~ his entire schedule and will be in touch with you directly as soon as he has it sorted out.
4. Warm regards.



DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 13526 (EXCEPTED) GPO 03
 1988 1/31/11
 by HR 1000, 000 1/31/11

~~SECRET~~
~~SENSITIVE~~

34

VZCZCSAM046
OO WTE
DE WTE1 #0046 3410735
ZNY SSSSS
O 070750Z DEC 75
FM BRENT SCOWCROFT
TO SECRETARY RUMSFELD
ZEM
~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

DECEMBER 7, 1975

SCOTO 24

TO: SECRETARY RUMSFELD
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

1. REFERENCE YOUR LAST CABLE SUGGESTING A BRUSSELS MEETING AT 7:00 P.M. ON THE 10TH, HAK ASKED ME TO RELAY TO YOU THAT HE WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BE ABLE TO ARRIVE THAT EARLY.
2. THE PRESIDENT HAS SCHEDULED A LEADERSHIP MEETING FOR THE MORNING OF THE 10TH AND WANTS HAK PRESENT FOR A DEBRIEF OF THE TRIP. HE THEREFORE DOES NOT ANTICIPATE BEING ABLE TO ARRIVE BRUSSELS UNTIL AROUND MIDNIGHT.
3. HE IS NOW REVIEWING HIS ENTIRE SCHEDULE AND WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU DIRECTLY AS SOON AS HE HAS IT SORTED OUT.
4. WARM REGARDS.

100
#0046



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 (2) (1) (2) (3)
DATE 1/31/11 BY 113111

NNNN

~~SECRET~~