The original documents are located in Box 21, folder "October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic of China - Cables - Taipei" of Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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
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
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EYES ONLY - DIRECT LDS Department of State TELSGD! -3 OCT 752 15 52 STATES OF -SECRET NOn661 PAGE 01 STATE 235894 48 ORIGIN NODS-00 INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R DRAFTED BY EASWHELEYSTEEN, JR. SAVN APPROVED BY EASWHELEYSTEEN, JR. S/P - MR. LORU 5 - MR. BARBIAN 5/5 -MP. ORTIZ NSC - MR. SOLOMON 112856 0 031519Z QCT 75 ZFF4 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO ANEMBASSY TAIPEI IMMEDIATE SECRET STATE 235894 DECLASSIFIED EO. 12958 (as smended) SEC 3.3 NODIS State Dapt GL 8/2/10 E.O. 116521 GOS TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.) SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S TRIP TO PEKING FOR AMBASSADOR 1. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED AS OF OCTOBER 4 TO INFORM PREMIER CHIANG CONFIDENTIALLY THAT THE SECRETARY WILL VISIT PEKING OCTOBER 19 THROUGH 23, BRIEF PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT TO THIS EFFECT WILL BE ISSUED 12 NOON, WASHINGTON TIME, OCTOBER 6. 2. YOU SHOULD NOT EPECULATE ABOUT OUTCOME OF VISIT, WHICH WILL BE PREPARATORY TO THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP LATER THIS YEAR. AS HE HAVE INFORMED THE ROC PREVIOUSLY, THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP WAS AGREED TO BY BOTH SIDES WITHOUT CONDITIONS ON PRIOR UNDERSTANDING AS TO ITS DUTCOME. KISSINGER SECRET EYES ONLY-DIRE NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETA



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TELEGRAM

P R 092344Z OCT 75 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY TAIPEI PRIORITY INFO USLO PEKING AMCONSUL HONG KONG AMEMBASSY TOKYO

CONFIDENTIAL STATE 241599

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, OTRA, CH, US, TW

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S TRIP TO PEKING

REF: (A) TAIPEI 6583; (B) STATE 237722

IF LOCAL PRESS ASKS QUESTION SIMILAR TO THAT POSED BY JAPANESE CORRESPONDENT RE DEGREE TO WHICH GROC WILL BE KEPT INFORMED ABOUT US/PRC DISCUSSIONS, YOU SHOULD STATE THAT YOU PRESUME WE WILL FOLLOW SAME PROCEDURES AS IN PAST. KISSINGER

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3 State Dapt Guidelines By MR NARA, Dato 8/2/10

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F.O. 11652: N/A TAGS: PFOR, US, CH, TW SUBJECT: PRESS REACTION TO THE UPCOMING SECRETARIAL AND PRESIDENTIAL VISITS TO PEKING

1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: IN THE LAST TWO WEEKS THE UPCOMING VISITS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND PRESIDENT FORD TO PEKING HAVE BECOME THE SOURCE OF INCREASING LOCAL EDITORIAL COMMENT. SO FAR THERE IS NO SINGLE OVER-RIDING THEME: DISCUSSIONS RANGE FROM SPECULATION ON WHY THE PRC WANTS THE VISITS TO TAKE PLACE AS WELL AS ON LIKELY RESULTS OF THE VISITS, TO "GUIDANCE"FOR THE SECRETARY AND PRESIDENT, TO WARNINGS OF THE ADVERSE RESULTS OF REACHING ANY AGREEMENT WITH THE PRC. DESPITE THE LACK OF A COMMON THEME, ALMOST ALL EDITORIALS AGREE THAT WHILE THE VISITS WILL TAKE PLACE, NOTHING SIGNIFICANT WILL RESULT FROM THEM. END SUMMARY.

2. SEVERAL RECENT EDITORIALS HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE FORD VISIT IS MUCH MORE IMPORTANT TO PEKING THAN TO THE U.S.

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ACCORDING TO A SEPTEMBER 27 TA HUA WAN PAO EDITORIAL, PEKING IS "MAKING AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO SOLICIT A VISIT BY PRESIDENT FORD."

3. A RELATED VIEW EXPRESSED IN SEVERAL EDITORIALS IS THAT THE FORD VISIT WAS POSTPONED SEVERAL TIMES BECAUSE THE PRC HAD SET "CERTAIN CONDITIONS", ACCORDING TO THIS VIEW, THAT THE FORD VISIT WILL NOW TAKE PLACE INDICATES THAT THE PRC HAS DROPPED ITS CONDITIONS. A LIEN HO PAO OCTOBER 4 EDITORIAL SUGGESTS THREE REASONS FOR THE PRC'S CHANGE IN ATTITUDE: (A) THE PRC IS WORRIED BECAUSE US/USSR RELATIONS ARE "GROWING CLOSER"; (B) THE SITUATION ON THE MAINLAND IS UNSTABLE AND THE PRC HOPES THE FORD VISIT WILL HELP STABILIZE THE SITUATION; AND (C) THE PRC HOPES THAT FORD WILL ASSIST IT IN MEETING A FOOD SHORTAGE AND ALSO NEEDS CAPITAL TO DEVELOP WEAPONS IN ITS STAND AGAINST THE USSR. THE EDITORIAL CONCLUDES THAT THE FORD VISIT WILL BE OF GREAT HELP TO THE PRC, AND "REMINDS" THE PRESIDENT THAT "THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO NEED TO GIVE ANY GIFTS" TO THE PRC.

A. WITH REGARD TO THE LIKELY OUTCOME OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, A TAIWAN SHIH PAO EDITORIAL OF OCTOBER 8 OBSERVED: "WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT FORD'S PEKING VISIT MAY NOT LEAD TO ANY CHANGE IN US CHINA POLICY, BUT FORD'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY ADVISERS ARE DIVIDED IN THEIR VIEWS ON CHINA POLICY, POLITICAL ADVISERS HOPE THE US WILL CONTINUE TO WITHDRAW ITS FORCES FROM THE ROC IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. ON THE CONTRARY. MILITARY ADVISERS STRONGLY ADVOCATE THAT US FORCES SHOULD REMAIN IN THE ROC. THEY THINK THAT TAIWAN IS AN IMPORTANT ISLAND FORMING PART OF THE CHAIN OF DEFENSE EXTENDING FROM THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH TAIWAN, JAPAN, AND TO KOREA. IT IS GRATIFYING THAT ALTHOUGH FORD'S POLITICAL ADVISERS RECOMMEND A WITHDRAWAL OF US FORCES FROM TAIWAN, THEY STILE THINK THAT TAIWAN ... IS OF GREAT VALUE IN CHECKING THE USSR. AND THE PRC AND THAT THE US CANNOT AFFORD TO FORSAKE TAIWAN COMPLETELY."

5. A SEPTEMBER 26 MIN TSU WAN PAO SPECIAL ARTICLE SUGGESTED THREE POSSIBLE LINES OF DEVELOPMENT FOR FUTURE US/PRC



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RELATIONS: (A) MAINTENANCE OF THE STATUS QUO; (B) THE "JACKSON POLICY" (E.E., US EMBASSY IN PEKING, US LIAISON OFFICE IN TAIPEI, ABROGATION OF THE MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY, MAINTENANCE OF A HIGH DEGREE OF SUBSTANTIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND THE ROC); OR (C) ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND THE PRC AT THE EXPENSE OF THE ROC. ALL THREE LINES OF DEVELOPMENT "APPEAR EASY BUT THERE WOULD BE DIFFICULTIES IN CARRYING OUT ANY OF THEM."

6 THE ARTICLE ADDS THAT THE OVERALL SITUATION IS NOT ABSOLUTELY FAVORABLE TO THE ROC; NONETHELESS "IT IS GENERALLY BELIEVED THAT UNDER THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, FORD MAY NOT ESTABLISH FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE PRC" ON THIS TRIP. KISSINGER "WILL DEFINITELY REVIEW THE STRENGTHENING OF US/PRC SUBSTANTIVE RELATIONS --FROM TRADE TO CULTURAL EXCHANGES. DISCUSSION OF CERTAIN POLITICAL PROBLEMS WILL ALSO BE UNDERTAKEN. BUT HE WILL LET FORD REACH ANY AGREEMENT."

7. AN OCTOBER 8 LIEN HO PAO SPECIAL ARTICLE COMMENTED THAT STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS PRIVATELY EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT IT IS "UNLIKELY THAT PRESIDENT FORD WILL ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH PEKING OR MAKE EXCESSIVE CONCESSIONS ON THE ISSUE OF US/ROC RELATIONS DURING HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO PEKING. THEY ALSO POINTED OUT THAT SOMETHING CONCRETE WILL DERIVE FROM THE TRIP BUT REFUSED TO ELABORATE. THEY DID NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF REACHING AGREEMENT ON FROZEN ASSETS SD AS TO ENABLE THE PRC TO ENJOY MFN STATUS. AND THEY DID NOT DENY THAT THE US HAS BEEN CONSIDERING SALE OF PRECISION ELECTRONIC COMPUTERS AND OTHER NON-MILITARY BUT HIGHLY TECHNICAL MATERIALS TO PEKING." UNGER





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8. AN OCTOBER 8 CHINA NEWS EDITORIAL ENTITLED "COUNSEL FOR KISSINGER" OBSERVED THAT THE PURPOSE OF KISSINGER'S TRIP IS TO DISCUSS "THE STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE US AND THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS, DISCUSSION OF TRADE, CULTURAL EXCHANGES, AND SIMILAR MATTERS IS PERIPHERAL. THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS CARE ABOUT JUST ONE THING: THE DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY TIES BETWEEN THE US AND THE ROC. PEIPING WANTS TAIWAN. BUT THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS CANNOT EVEN TRY TO GET TAIWAN UNTIL THE US IS DUT OF THE PICTURE." NOTING THAT KISSINGER HAS MADE NO PROPOSALS TO THE ROC. THE EDITORIAL CONCLUDES THAT HE IS NOT GOING TO PEKING "WITH ANY DEFINITE PROPOSALS IN MIND, HIS MISSION IS EXPLORATORY, HE IS TRYING TO FIND OUT WHETHER THE US CAN GET MORE -- SUCH AS TRADE AND ENTRY TO THE MAINLAND --WITHOUT PAYING THE PRICE OF ADJUSTMENT IN THE ROC RELATIONSHIP."

9. KISSINGER WILL BE TOLD, THE EDITORIAL CONTINUES, THAT "FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE WASHINGTON -PEIPING RELATIONSHIP REQUIRES THE US TO GET OUT OF TAIWAN. HOWEVER, THIS TIME



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THE CHINESE MAY....SET A TRAP FOR KISSINGER.... (WHICH) WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF A UNILATERAL CHINESE COMMUNIST PLEDGE NOT TO EMPLOY MILITARY FORCE IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT. SUCH A PROMISE WOULD BE AS WORTHLESS AS THOSE MADE AT PARIS, ONCE THE US WERE GONE FROM THIS AREA, THE ONLY OBSTACLE TO CHINESE COMMUNIST AGGRESSION WOULD BE THE MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE ROC.... (KISSINGER) MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO MAKE THE TRAGIC MISTAKE OF PUTTING CREDENCE IN ANY PLEDGE OR PROMISE MADE BY THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS IN CONNECTION WITH TAIWAN. THE ROC, OUR FRIENDS IN THE US AND PRESIDENT FORD HIMSELF SHOULD INVOLVE THEMSELVES IN SEEING THAT DR. KISSINGER VISITS PEKING WITH FIRM INSTRUCTIONS TO LOOK AND LISTEN AND COMMIT HIMSELF TO ABSOLUTELY NOTHING. KISSINGER THE REALIST MUST IN THE END FACE TWO BASIC REALITIES. FIRST THE US CANNOT HAVE ITS DEAL WITH PEPING EXCEPT AT THE EXPENSE OF THE ROC. SECOND, THE COST OF ANY SUCH DEAL WOULD BE A WAR IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT WHICH THE US DOES NOT WANT BUT IN WHICH IT WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BECOME INVOLVED."

10. COMMENT: THE TENOR OF MOST OF THE EDITORIALS AND ARTICLES CITED ABOVE SUGGESTS THAT AT LEAST FOR THE PRESENT, THE NEWS MEDIA ARE NOT UNDULY CONCERNED BY THE UPCOMING VISITS TO THE PRC OF SECRETARY KISSINGER AND PRESIDENT FORD. WHILE THEY QUESTION THE VALUE OF THESE TRIPS, MOST EXPRESS CONFIDENCE THAT THE VISITS WILL HAVE NO SUBSTANTIAL IMPACT ON US/ROC RELATIONS. UNGER

