

**The original documents are located in Box 21, folder “October 19-23, 1975 - People's Republic of China - Briefing Book for China - Bilateral Issues (2)” of Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.**

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US PRESS REPRESENTATION AND VISITSISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

You may wish to raise this subject again, if only to be able to tell the US press after the visit that you have done so.

TALKING POINTS

-- We have previously discussed US press interest in stationing representatives in Peking, and they have again asked me to mention the matter.

-- (If raised) In previous discussions, there has been mention of a possible problem arising from the presence of Taiwan press representatives in Washington. However, I understand this situation exists in some other capitals where New China News Agency representatives are stationed, such as London or Paris.

-- (Optional) If you have a problem of selecting from among the various American media, you could start with one or both of the news services (AP and UPI).

-- We were pleased that you invited the American editors to visit China, but our press hopes you can meet more of their requests for individual visits.

ANALYSIS/BACKGROUND

There is no indication that the PRC has changed its position since Chou En-lai told you in November 1973 that the presence of Taiwan journalists in Washington prevents a reciprocal exchange of correspondents. PRC and Taiwan journalists manage to coexist in a number of countries, however, so that the Chinese could move on this issue when they believe it is in their interest. For the moment, their position is probably intended as a deliberate reminder to us (and the US press) of the disadvantages of less than full normalization.

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The two US wire services, the larger newspapers, the weekly news magazines and the TV networks are still interested in stationing correspondents in Peking, although the intensity of this interest seems to have waned, perhaps because they have come to recognize the inherent limits on reportorial opportunities there.

NCNA correspondents stationed at the United Nations have had relatively free access to the US (subject to the same travel controls as PRC diplomats there). However, except for articles relating to exchange groups, NCNA does not carry non-UN stories with a US dateline. Presumably, the NCNA UN correspondents file background materials on US developments.

In general, the Chinese undoubtedly view Western newsmen stationed in Peking as a mixed blessing. The reporting of these journalists is often critical and occasionally scathing, and efforts to intimidate at least two of them in 1974 failed to have any noticeable effect. By contrast, the stories by visiting Western newsmen tend to be more positive. For these reasons, the Chinese may feel they have relatively little to gain from agreeing to permanent US press representation in Peking.

A delegation of the American Society of Newspaper Editors visited China in early summer and some sports-writers and a film crew accompanied the US track and field team in May. However, individual visas have remained very scarce.

Department of State  
October 1975

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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

## BRIEFING PAPER

REUNIFICATION OF FAMILIES

If the Chinese agree, language on reuniting families could appropriately be included in the Joint Communique for the President's visit. You could broach the idea in general terms if you sense that the Chinese might be receptive to demonstrating some momentum in our bilateral relationship.

TALKING POINTS

-- We have noted the positive attitude that your Government has taken toward the question of reuniting families in your dealings with several countries (e.g., Canada and Australia).

-- This is an important question for the sizeable community of persons of Chinese descent in the United States, many of whom have family members in the PRC who would like to obtain exit permits to join them in the United States. Some of these persons in the US may also wish to join relatives in China at some point.

-- If we could reach an understanding in principle on the question of facilitating family reunification, appropriate language could be included in the Joint Communique for the President's trip.

ANALYSIS/BACKGROUND

An understanding with the PRC on the question of reuniting families would be welcomed by the American-Chinese community and could prove helpful in resolving problems associated with the 1974 Trade Act, which links our authority to extend MFN to other countries to their emigration practices. Moreover, although the problem is not yet acute, there will be growing pressures on us to intercede with the PRC to permit persons in China to join their close relatives in the US.

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The PRC has reached understandings with both Canada and Australia on the question of facilitating the reunification of families. The Canadian agreement, which was concluded in 1973 following Prime Minister Trudeau's visit to the PRC, took the form of an exchange of notes incorporating an understanding on procedures whereby a Canadian official in Hong Kong could visit the PRC periodically to complete Canadian visa procedures for prospective emigrants. After a slow start, the agreement has facilitated the flow of Chinese emigrants to Canada.

In the Australian case, the Joint Communique issued in connection with Prime Minister Whitlam's 1973 visit to the PRC included a statement that an "understanding in principle" had been arrived at on travel from China to Australia by persons with relatives there. Efforts to transform this understanding into an actual agreement have broken down over the differing approaches of the two sides.

Despite the arrangements with other countries, the PRC may be unwilling to reach an agreement with us for at least two reasons: They may want to wait until diplomatic relations are established before concluding such agreements, and they may be concerned that some will think that they are yielding to the provisions on emigration in the 1974 Trade Act. However, if the Chinese want to demonstrate concrete forward movement in our relationship, this move is an option.

Given the complexities of American immigration law, any agreement in principle with the PRC on family reunification could prove difficult to implement in practice. Nevertheless, we consider the problems surmountable unless the Chinese are deliberately obstructionist, and we would hope that suitably formulated language could minimize the difficulties.

In both the Canadian and Australian cases, the understandings have provided only for a one-way flow of persons out of China to join their relatives abroad. This presumably reflected a Chinese preference, since neither Canada nor Australia would place any obstacles in the way of persons wishing to return to China.

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Should the Chinese continue to prefer one-way language, sample Communique language might be along the following lines:

"In recognition of their mutual desire to promote the reunification of families, the two Sides agreed to facilitate, in accordance with their respective laws and regulations, travel from China to the United States by persons wishing to join members of their families living in the United States."

On the other hand, should a reciprocal understanding be preferred, the language could be modified to read as follows:

"In recognition of their mutual desire to promote the reunification of families, the two Sides agreed to facilitate, in accordance with their respective laws and regulations, travel by persons resident in one country who wish to join members of their families living in the other."

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AMERICANS MISSING IN THE VICINITY OF CHINA  
AND RECOVERY OF REMAINS

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

This is still an important issue in the Administration's relations with Congress and the public, and we suggest you raise it in the context of the President's trip.

TALKING POINTS

-- There is another area in which a small gesture could have a beneficial impact.

-- The American public responded favorably to our announcement in December 1973 that your government had agreed to provide us with any additional information turned up by your continuing investigations with respect to American servicemen missing in the vicinity of China.

-- It would be most useful if we could again say something helpful on this subject in connection with the President's trip. Any information concerning these men, and especially the return of any remains that can be located, would be welcomed by their families.

Optional

-- Officially, I am restricting my proposal to the question of Americans missing in the vicinity of China. On a personal basis, however, I also wish to inform you that the President is being formally asked by Members of Congress to seek your help with respect to our MIA's in Indochina.

-- We are prepared to pursue this directly with the parties involved. The fact remains, however, that our communications with them are not always productive.

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ANALYSIS/BACKGROUND

We are under pressure, especially from the families of the missing men, to obtain more information concerning Americans missing in the vicinity of China. The Chinese have not been forthcoming on detailed information. They must have some additional information, since the New China News Agency reported at least some of the incidents involving the missing men shortly after they occurred. There is strong evidence, including material in PRC publications, that one Navy man died in a plane crash on PRC soil, and the Chinese themselves announced that two American civilians were killed in a plane crash dating back to 1952. Despite this, the Chinese have thus far not admitted the presence of any remains in China.

With respect to our servicemen missing in Southeast Asia, the Chinese have taken the consistent position that they will not become involved, on the grounds that this is a matter that we should handle directly with the countries involved. Nevertheless, both Congress and the families involved are bringing pressure to bear to use the Chinese as a channel to obtain more information concerning these men. A resolution has recently been introduced in the Senate calling on the President to ask the Chinese about these men during his trip. Although we see no possibility that the Chinese would be prepared to retreat from their earlier position, not mentioning the matter to the Chinese would make us vulnerable to criticism.

Department of State  
October 1975

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**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**  
**BRIEFING PAPER**

JAMMING OF THE VOICE OF AMERICA

ISSUES AND TALKING POINTS

While not of major intrinsic significance, a Chinese decision to cease jamming Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts could be seen as a positive gesture in US-PRC relations. You may wish to raise the subject in this context.

TALKING POINTS

-- We note that you continue to jam Voice of America broadcasts in the Chinese language, and that we are the only country whose broadcasts are now subject to such jamming by the PRC. Moreover, the PRC is the only country which currently jams VOA broadcasts.

-- As you may have noted, we try to avoid offensive material in VOA broadcasts.

-- A decision on your part to stop jamming VOA would be a useful visible sign of progress in our relationship.

ANALYSIS/BACKGROUND

We do not know how the Chinese would react to a suggestion that they stop jamming VOA, but we see no disadvantage in mentioning it.

The PRC systematically jams VOA Chinese-language broadcasts to the China mainland (VOA English-language broadcasts are not affected). Peking does not currently jam the broadcasts of any other country, including Taiwan and the Soviet Union. We can only speculate that this anti-VOA jamming program, which began in 1956, has been running on its own momentum, since the Chinese apparently do not take other countries' broadcasts seriously enough to jam them.

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Chinese jamming of VOA has been uninterrupted since its inception. The Soviets began jamming VOA about the same time, occasionally suspended it during the 1960's, and stopped completely in September 1973. Bulgaria was the last Communist country (except the PRC) to suspend its jamming of VOA, and did so in September 1974.

If the Chinese agreed to stop the jamming, we would not suggest including the point in the communique. Instead, the change could become public by other means.

Department of State  
October 1975

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**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**  
**BRIEFING PAPER**

**U.S.-PRC BILATERAL RELATIONS: AN OVERVIEW**

**BACKGROUND PAPER**

Although the day-to-day bilateral relationship has developed moderately well over the last few years, there are some significant problems, asymmetries, and limitations. How we handle these matters will help to set the pattern of the future; our dealings with the Chinese are already in the process of becoming institutionalized at a time when our political relations are still not fully normalized. Over time, this could make it more difficult to handle both political and practical problems with the Chinese in a manner that gives substance to the principles of "equality and mutual benefit." These problems result from a number of factors:

-- The Chinese want some aspects of the relationship to reflect the fact that our relations are not fully normalized.

-- Our society is open, theirs is closed. This gives them far more ways to manipulate the relationship and control its content and pace. In general, Americans--whether the USG or other--propose, and they dispose.

-- There is a certain arrogant prickliness in the Chinese "style" and in their tactics: a tendency to escalate matters to a non-negotiable point of "principle," a refusal to concede that our freedom of action is limited by the nature of our society and our laws, and an insistence that a foreign mission in Peking has few "inalienable" rights.

There is no way we can bring about a sudden and meaningful change in this situation, partly because some of the asymmetries are either inherent or are not unique to the U.S.-PRC relationship. Some of the specific problems can be handled only on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, we are concerned that

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the problems resulting from these Chinese attitudes and tactics can over time impact on our overall relationship in at least two ways:

-- The more the Chinese come to feel that it is they who can call the shots in our day-to-day bilateral dealings, the more likely they are to believe that they can benefit from a roughly similar approach in our overall relationship.

-- While it is healthy that the post-Nixon visit euphoria in this country about China is wearing off, there is a growing risk that some important opinion-makers--the press, scholars, businessmen and some members of Congress--will increasingly ask, "What will we gain from normalization of relations?"

We are not suggesting that you tackle this problem frontally or in a major way in Peking, but you may find it appropriate at some point to let the Chinese know in general terms that we are concerned by the general problem as well as by its specific manifestations. We would like the Chinese to recognize that while we do not expect precise reciprocity, we do feel that they should be more willing to take into account our legitimate concerns on a wide range of practical matters instead of insisting arbitrarily on doing things the Chinese way. We have recommended elsewhere that you also mention our concern about the Chinese tendency to inject a political element into the exchange program.

#### Examples of Problems and Asymmetries

The following is intended to illustrate the problems and the asymmetries.

-- The Chinese have complete access to American society, whether through contacts with Americans, travel or distribution of materials. We have never rejected a PRCLC travel request; USLO's requests are turned down with some frequency. VOA broadcasts are the only foreign broadcasts which the Chinese jam, and the PRC is the only country which jams VOA. (There is a separate briefing paper on VOA jamming.)

-- Refusing to concede that we cannot control all matters as easily as they do, they have charged us with "connivance" when we have mentioned the risk of attach-

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ment of Chinese aircraft, when we alerted PRCLLO about a demonstration, and when we said we had no way to close the Office of Tibet. They also do not hesitate to charge us with violating the spirit or principles of the Shanghai Communique.

-- The PRC has put its blessing on the U.S.-China People's Friendship Association, which is partly controlled behind the scenes by a pro-Maoist revolutionary group in the U.S. The easiest way for many Americans to get to China is to join one of the tour groups sponsored by the Association; by not charging the Association for all of the in-China expenses of these groups, the Chinese indirectly subsidize the Association. Teng Hsiao-p'ing several days ago received William Hinton, one of the Association's leaders.

-- PRCLLO has expanded to a staff of over 80. Even allowing for the Chinese practice of assigning support staff such as cooks and chauffeurs to their Liaison Office, this represents a substantial imbalance over the 28 staff members we have assigned to USLO. While the Chinese have not said that we could not expand, their failure to provide more office space has the effect of putting a ceiling on USLO staffing.

-- Access to USLO is strictly controlled by the PLA guards. That they would exercise such control over Chinese is understandable, but they have also prevented or delayed Americans, as well as third country nationals, from entering the USLO compound. A recent flagrant example occurred when they refused to admit, for over half an hour, one of our officers from Hong Kong who was in Peking for consultations, despite the personal intervention of George Bush.

-- The PRC has refused to let us have access to Chinese who have a claim to American citizenship, and the Foreign Ministry recently informed us that we would not be permitted to interview the few Chinese who want a visa to visit relatives in the U.S. and who have been successful in obtaining a PRC exit permit.

-- We promptly agree to requests by PRCLLO officers for appointments; similar requests by USLO officers for appointments to discuss specific matters are occasionally rejected and more frequently granted only after a delay.

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-- The Chinese continue to refuse some of our requests for visas for officers in Hong Kong to visit the PRC for such purposes as participating with USLO officers in assisting American businessmen at the Canton fair, for official consultations with USLO, or to escort one of the agreed exchange delegations.

-- As mentioned above, the Chinese have in several instances injected a political element into the exchange program; having created an issue, they often refuse to help find a solution.

-- The Chinese are not willing to discuss meaningful reciprocity in the exchange program. They select what they want from our list, and insist that we take everything from their list. They will not discuss in advance the details of the visit by an American delegation, but they frequently specify in detail what a Chinese delegation wants to do.

-- On a different level from the above examples, the Chinese feel free to criticize the U.S. on its world role and on the nature of American society, but would probably take offense if we responded in kind.

Certainly we do not want to let this part of our relationship deteriorate to a tit-for-tat situation (although the Chinese, at times, seem quite prepared to go this route). Nevertheless, depending on the outcome of your visit (and that of the President), we may wish to employ some of the levers which are available to us. We believe that a policy of firmness when our position is justified is essential if we are to make our day-to-day relationship come close to one of "equality and mutual benefit."

Department of State  
October 1975

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## JOINT COMMUNIQUE

President Richard Nixon of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai of the People's Republic of China from February 21 to February 28, 1972. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Nixon, U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers, assistant to the President Dr. Henry Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Nixon met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung of the Communist Party of China on February 21. The two leaders had a serious and frank exchange of views on Sino-U.S. relations and world affairs.

During the visit, extensive, earnest and frank discussions were held between President Nixon and Premier Chou En-lai on the normalization of relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, as well as on other matters of interest to both sides. In addition, Secretary of State William Rogers and Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei held talks in the same spirit.

President Nixon and his party visited Peking and viewed cultural, industrial and agricultural sites, and they also toured Hangchow and Shanghai where, continuing discussions with Chinese leaders, they viewed similar places of interest.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States of America found it beneficial to have this opportunity, after so many years without contact, to present candidly to one another their views on a variety of issues. They reviewed the international situation in which important changes and great upheavals are taking place and expounded their respective positions and attitudes.

The U.S. side stated: Peace in Asia and peace in the world requires efforts both to reduce immediate tensions and to eliminate the basic causes of conflict. The United States will work for a just and secure peace: just, because it fulfills the aspirations of peoples and nations for freedom and progress; secure, because it removes the danger of foreign aggression. The United States supports individual freedom and social progress for all the peoples of the world, free of outside pressure or intervention. The United States believes that the effort to reduce tensions is served by improving communication between countries that have different ideologies so as to lessen the risks of confrontation



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through accident, miscalculation or misunderstanding. Countries should treat each other with mutual respect and be willing to compete peacefully, letting performance be the ultimate judge. No country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitude for the common good.

The United States stressed that the peoples of Indochina should be allowed to determine their destiny without outside intervention; its constant primary objective has been a negotiated solution; the eight-point proposal put forward by the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States on January 27, 1972 represents a basis for the attainment of that objective; in the absence of a negotiated settlement the United States envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for each country of Indochina.

The United States will maintain its close ties with and support for the Republic of Korea; the United States will support efforts of the Republic of Korea to seek a relaxation of tension and increased communication in the Korean peninsula.

The United States places the highest value on its friendly relations with Japan; it will continue to develop the existing close bonds.

Consistent with the United Nations Security Council resolution of December 21, 1971, the United States favors the continuation of the ceasefire between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.

The Chinese side stated: Wherever there is oppression, there is resistance. Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution--this has become the irresistible trend of history. All nations, big or small, should be equal; big nations should not bully the small and strong nations should not bully the weak. China will never be a superpower and it opposes hegemony and power politics of any kind.



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The Chinese side stated that it firmly supports the struggles of all the oppressed people and nations for freedom and liberation and that the people of all countries have the right to choose their social systems according to their own wishes and the right to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own countries and oppose foreign aggression, interference, control and subversion. All foreign troops should be withdrawn to their own countries.

The Chinese side expressed its firm support to the peoples of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia in their efforts for the attainment of their goal and its firm support to the seven-point proposal of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Viet-Nam and the elaboration of February this year on the two key problems in the proposal, and to the joint declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indochinese Peoples.

It firmly supports the eight-point program for the peaceful unification of Korea put forward by the Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on April 12, 1971, and the stand for the abolition of the "U.N. Commission for the unification and Rehabilitation of Korea".

It firmly opposes the revival and outward expansion of Japanese militarism and firmly supports the Japanese people's desire to build an independent, democratic, peaceful and neutral Japan.

It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should, in accordance with the United Nations resolutions on the India-Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination.

There are essential differences between China and the United States in their social systems and foreign policies. However, the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states,



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non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. International disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. The United States and the People's Republic of China are prepared to apply these principles to their mutual relations.

With these principles of international relations in mind the two sides stated that:

--Progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interests of all countries;

--Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict;

--Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony; and

--Neither is prepared to negotiate on behalf of any third party or to enter into agreements or understandings with the other directed at other states.

Both sides are of the view that it would be against the interests of the peoples of the world for any major country to collude with another against other countries, or for major countries to divide up the world into spheres of interest.

The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the Government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China which has long been returned to the motherland; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all U.S. forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan", "one China, two governments", "two Chinas", an "independent Taiwan" or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined".





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The U.S. side declared: the United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installation from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

The two sides agreed that it is desirable to broaden the understanding between the two peoples. To this end, they discussed specific areas in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism, in which people-to-people contacts and exchanges would be mutually beneficial. Each side undertakes to facilitate the further development of such contacts and exchanges.

Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.

The two sides agreed that they will stay in contact through various channels, including the sending of a senior U.S. representative to Peking from time to time for concrete consultations to further the normalization of relations between the two countries and continue to exchange views on issues of common interest.

The two sides expressed the hope that the gains achieved during this visit would open up new prospects for the relations between the two countries. They believe that the normalization of relations between the two countries is not only in the interest of the Chinese and American peoples but also contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world.

President Nixon, Mrs. Nixon and the American party expressed their appreciation for the gracious hospitality shown them by the Government and people of the People's Republic of China.

February 28, 1972



February 22, 1973

THE WHITE HOUSE

COMMUNIQUE

UNITED STATES-PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the U.S. President for National Security Affairs, visited the People's Republic of China from February 15 to February 19, 1973. He was accompanied by Herbert G. Klein, Alfred Le S. Jenkins, Richard T. Kennedy, John H. Holdridge, Winston Lord, Jonathan T. Howe, Richard Solomon, and Peter W. Rodman.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung received Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger and members of his party held wide-ranging conversations with Premier Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, and other Chinese officials. Mr. Jenkins held parallel talks on technical subjects with Assistant Foreign Minister Chang Wen-chin. All these talks were conducted in an unconstrained atmosphere and were earnest, frank and constructive.

The two sides reviewed the development of relations between the two countries in the year that has passed since President Nixon's visit to the People's Republic of China and other issues of mutual concern. They reaffirmed the principles of the Joint Communiqué issued at Shanghai in February 1972 and their joint commitment to bring about a normalization of relations. They held that the progress that has been made during this period is beneficial to the people of their two countries.

The two sides agreed that the time was appropriate for accelerating the normalization of relations. To this end, they undertook to broaden their contacts in all fields. They agreed on a concrete program of expanding trade as well as scientific, cultural and other exchanges.



Communique, Contd.

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To facilitate this process and to improve communications, it was agreed that in the near future each side will establish a liaison office in the capital of the other. Details will be worked out through existing channels.

The two sides agreed that normalization of relations between the United States and the People's Republic of China will contribute to the relaxation of tension in Asia and in the world.

Dr. Kissinger and his party expressed their deep appreciation for the warm hospitality extended to them.



COMMUNIQUE  
of  
NOVEMBER 14, 1973

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, visited the People's Republic of China from November 10 to November 14, 1973. He was accompanied by Robert Ingersoll, Robert McCloskey, Arthur Hummel, Winston Lord, Oscar Armstrong, Jonathan Howe and Richard Solomon.

Chairman Mao Tse-tung received Secretary Kissinger. They held a wide-ranging and far-sighted conversation in a friendly atmosphere. Secretary Kissinger conveyed greetings from President Nixon, and Chairman Mao Tse-tung sent his greetings to the President.

Secretary Kissinger and members of his party held frank and serious talks with Premier Chou En-lai, Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, Assistant Foreign Minister Wang Hai-jung, Director Lin Ping, Director Peng Hua, Tsien Ta-yung, Ting Yuan-hung and others.

Officials of the two sides conducted counterpart talks on bilateral issues of mutual concern and made good progress.

The two sides reviewed international developments since Dr. Kissinger's visit to the People's Republic of China in February, 1973. They noted that international relationships are in a period of intense change. They reaffirmed that they are committed to the principles established in the Shanghai Communique and that disputes between states should be settled without resorting to the use or threat of force, on the basis of the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. In particular, they reiterated that neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or any other part of the world and that each is opposed to efforts by any other country or group of countries to establish such hegemony.



The two sides agreed that in present circumstances it is of particular importance to maintain frequent contact at authoritative levels in order to exchange views and, while not negotiating on behalf of third parties, to engage concrete consultations on issues of mutual concern.

Both sides reviewed progress made during 1973 in their bilateral relations. The U.S. side reaffirmed: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China; the United States Government does not challenge that position. The Chinese side reiterated that the normalization of relations between China and the United States can be realized only on the basis of confirming the principle of one China.

Both sides noted with satisfaction that the Liaison Offices in Peking and Washington are functioning smoothly. Both sides agreed that the scope of the functions of the Liaison Offices should continue to be expanded.

Exchanges have deepened understanding and friendship between the two peoples. The two sides studied the question of enlarging the exchanges between the two countries and agreed upon a number of new exchanges for the coming year.

Trade between the two countries has developed rapidly during the past year. The two sides held that it is in the interest of both countries to take measures to create conditions for further development of trade on the basis of equality and mutual benefit.

The two sides stated that they would continue their efforts to promote the normalization of relations between China and the United States on the basis of the Shanghai Communique.

Secretary Kissinger and his party expressed their gratitude for the warm hospitality extended to them by the Government of the People's Republic of China.



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Office of the White House Press Secretary

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JOINT U. S. -PRC COMMUNIQUE

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, U. S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, visited the People's Republic of China from November 25 through November 29, 1974. The U. S. and Chinese sides held frank, wide-ranging and mutually beneficial talks. They reaffirmed their unchanged commitment to the principles of the Shanghai Communique. The two Governments agreed that President Gerald R. Ford would visit the People's Republic of China in 1975.



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BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES



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PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINAGeorge Bush, Chief, U.S. Liaison Office


Mr. George Bush assumed his position as Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, People's Republic of China, on October 21, 1974. He succeeds David E. K. Bruce.

Born in Milton, Massachusetts June 12, 1924, he was graduated from Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts in 1942; he received his B.A. in Economics from Yale University in 1948.

At the age of 18, he was commissioned as an ensign in the U.S. Navy, and for a time, was reportedly the youngest pilot in the Naval Air Service. He served for three years during World War II as a carrier pilot with the Third and Fifth Fleets in the Pacific. While attached to the light aircraft carrier USS San Jacinto, he was shot down in combat and later rescued by a U.S. submarine, winning the Distinguished Flying Cross. He was discharged with the rank of lieutenant, junior grade, in 1945.

Mr. Bush became active in oil field supply and development enterprises in Texas in 1948. He was co-founder and served as director of Zapata Petroleum Corporation from 1953-59, later became president of Zapata Offshore Company, Houston, Texas from 1956-64, and served as chairman of the Board from 1964-66.

Mr. Bush became active in the Republican Party in Houston in 1959. In 1966, he ran for the U.S. House of Representatives and was elected to the 90th Congress. He served on the Ways and Means Committee, and in 1968 he was re-elected to Congress. In addition, he served as a delegate to the Republican National Convention.



In the Congress, Mr. Bush promoted legislation concerned with urban affairs, revenue sharing, pollution, bilingual education and setting priorities in federal spending. He was Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations -- from 1971 to 1973. As Ambassador, he was a member of the President's Cabinet and a regular participant in all Cabinet meetings.

He headed the United States delegation to the 26th and 27th sessions of the U.N. General Assembly, and twice was chief U.S. Representative at annual meetings of the U.N. Economic and Social Council in Geneva.

Mr. Bush was elected National Chairman of the Republican Party and assumed the duties of the office during 1973 and 1974.

He is married to the former Barbara Pierce of Rye, New York, and they have four sons, George, John, Neil and Marvin, and a daughter, Dorothy.

Department of State  
October 1975

