PRESIDENT'S TALKING PAPERS
FOR HEAD TO HEAD MEETINGS
WITH VICE PREMIER TENG
HSIAO-P'ING

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12823 1/1/94
NSC Memo, 3/20/94
By [Blank] Date [Blank]
Mr. President:

At the conclusion of the discussions on the Soviet Union, you might wish to sum up by pointing out that insofar as the United States and the PRC are concerned, there are a number of realities:

1. Cooperation in times of crisis will not be enhanced by an attitude of coolness in periods of calm. Conversely, cooperation in crisis will be facilitated by concrete instances of cooperative actions which would facilitate crisis cooperation.

2. It is not enough to have common objectives in principle if the PRC in practice withdraws from the field in specific concrete cases, such as in Angola.

3. The United States is prepared to have concrete talks on cooperation. We would be interested in knowing what the Chinese side is prepared to do in this regard.

In all fields.

Henry A. Kissinger
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Talking Papers for Your Discussion with PRC Leaders

As the final element of preparatory materials for your discussions with PRC leaders, attached are two talking papers which summarize the issues we believe you should cover in the substantive meetings. You will have three substantive sessions with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing (one each morning, lasting approximately two hours) in which the full range of international and bilateral issues of mutual interest should be covered. A talking paper for your meeting with Chairman Mao, which we anticipate the Chinese may schedule on Wednesday afternoon, is provided separately in your briefing book on the Chairman.

At Tab B is the talking paper on international issues. This paper, as with the other materials assembled for your trip, was prepared in coordination between the NSC and State Department. It has been approved by Secretary Kissinger. This paper pulls together in one discursive series of points the foreign policy issues covered in detail in State’s briefing book which we believe you should incorporate into your substantive talks.

International questions should constitute the primary focus of your discussions, and we suggest that after a brief opening statement (at Tab A) in which you outline for the Chinese your overall approach to the substantive meetings, you launch into the international questions. We assume these will cover most if not all of the first day’s (Tuesday’s) talks, and perhaps part of the Wednesday session as well.
Talking points on bilateral issues are at Tab C. We suggest that you raise your views on normalization and the development of our bilateral relations during the latter part of the Wednesday morning session. This will inject into the discussions the full range of issues between ourselves and the Chinese, and will be helpful in laying the basis for your discussion with Chairman Mao (which, as noted above, we believe may be held on Wednesday afternoon).

On the basis of our past experience in dealing with the Chinese, you can assume that the Chairman will have been fully briefed on your approach to issues taken in the prior discussions with Vice Premier Teng. He will also be briefed on any informal comments you make to the Vice Premier or Foreign Minister in limousine rides, during visits to various sites, or even in non-substantive banquet table chit chat.

Finally, at Tab D is a summary schedule of the events for your four and one-half day visit to Peking. Briefing material on the historical and agricultural sites you will visit and the cultural events will be provided separately, as will be the toasts for banquets on Monday and Thursday evenings, and your remarks for the Liaison Office reception and buffet-luncheon on Wednesday.
MR. PRESIDENT:

The attached package contains talking points for your opening session (TAB A), international issues (TAB B), and bilateral issues (TAB C). You should not attempt to read these all at the first session but rather draw upon them as each issue comes up in the course of your conversations over the three days. We have indicated the relevant sections that should be used by subject matter.

HENRY A. KISSINGER
OPENING REMARKS FOR THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE SESSION

Tuesday, December 2, 1975
9:30 - 11:30 a.m.
Great Hall of the People
Peking, People's Republic of China

From: Henry A. Kissinger

[NOTE: You should be aware that the opening of each substantive session, as well as your informal welcoming session with Vice Premier Teng at the Guest House, will be covered by the traveling press pool. If the Chinese are true to form, they will drop "atmospheric" statements in the presence of the press designed to set a mood that will serve their purposes. They know that such comments will receive international attention via our media. While we obviously cannot control what Chinese leaders say in the presence of the press, you should at least keep in mind their habit of making such comments, and perhaps drop some remarks of your own in response (or at your own initiative) as you feel appropriate.]

-- Mr. Vice Premier, on behalf of my colleagues here and our entire traveling party, let me again express appreciation for the hospitable welcome you have accorded us. I know the members of the press traveling with us are also appreciative of your efforts. This is a much larger official and press delegation than you normally receive, and we appreciate your understanding and cooperation in making our stay a pleasant and productive one.

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E.O. 12352 (as amended) SEC 3.3
By: NARA Date: 12/10/71
Let me also commend your Director of Protocol, Mr. Chu (pronounced JUE), and his colleagues for the outstanding degree of cooperation they accorded our advance team last month.

-- It is a great pleasure to be back in Peking. I look forward to again visiting the Summer Palace and a number of other historical and production sites during the next few days. I noticed on the way in from the airport yesterday much activity at the site of an irrigation project. It is evident that the Chinese people are hard at work building their country.

-- The chief purpose of my visit, however, is to hold working discussions. I believe it is important that we sustain the official dialogue started in 1971 at the highest levels of our two governments. This is the best way to share our thinking on the full range of international and bilateral issues of common concern. Our two countries clearly have their differences: in philosophy; in our social systems; and in perspectives on specific issues.

Yet we share much of importance. We are both concerned with the security of our countries. For more than twenty
years, the United States and China went their different ways and even confronted each other on certain questions. Today, while we still have our differences, at least we are discussing them. We are no longer locked in confrontation. Neither of us threatens the security of the other; and what is more, we share certain critical interests, such as our opposition to hegemony. This is an important new context enabling us to resolve our areas of disagreement, and broaden areas of cooperation.

[Assuming that the press has left the conference room.]

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How should we organize our three days of talks? I think there are both international and bilateral issues to be covered. It is my suggestion that we begin with some of the international questions which, as Chairman Mao told Secretary Kissinger last month, are the really big issues. I am prepared to cover the full range of international questions including the issue of hegemony and Soviet actions in various parts of the world. Although I am aware we have our disagreements regarding
tactics on this matter, I want to understand your views better and I will discuss my approach to these problems as frankly as I can. We should also review the situation in Europe; the efforts to negotiate a settlement in the Middle East; developments in South Asia and South East Asia; and Japan and Korea.

-- While the Chairman said that the Taiwan question is a smaller issue, we recognize that this is the question that continues to obstruct full normalization, and that this is a matter of basic principle to you. I hereby reiterate our commitment to full normalization. Despite your expressions of patience on this issue, I am not complacent, for I know that it affects the overall development of our bilateral relations. We are prepared to discuss this question and certain other bilateral matters after we have covered some of the basic international questions.

-- Regarding the possibility of any public document which might be released at the end of my visit, I suggest the two Foreign Ministers get together later today on this. We are relaxed about this issue.

-- Shall we now begin with some of the international issues?
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES FOR
SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS WITH PRC LEADERS

Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday
December 2, 3, and 4, 1975
10:00 A.M. - 12:00 Noon
Great Hall of the People,
Peking, People's Republic of China

From: Henry A. Kissinger

I. PURPOSE

International issues will occupy the bulk of your
discussions with Vice Premier Teng. The focus will
be our respective approaches to the Soviet Union,
and you can expect the Vice Premier to express him­
selves rather bluntly on the following themes:

-- The West generally, and the United States in
particular, underestimate the growth of Soviet
tower and the danger of Soviet expansionism.

-- The United States is "strategically passive" and,
in the final analysis may not have the will to
oppose Soviet aggression.

-- The policies of detente endanger world security
because they lull people to sleep in the face of
a storm which is coming. The best way to deal
with Moscow is not through agreements but by
making preparations.

Even though you cannot realistically expect to change
this Chinese view, it is essential that you should
explain your approach and in the process forcefully
counter Chinese charges that we are allowing our­selves to become militarily weak, that we lack
realism in our understanding of the Soviets, or that
we can be diverted from our basic policies. You will
want to:

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3
NSC Memo, 3/30/75, State Dept. Guidelines
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-- Explain that we share much of China's strategic perspective but find it in our national interest to pursue quite different tactics. Neither the United States nor China should presume to instruct the other about its policies.

-- Emphasize that the United States will continue to play a vigorous international role, and that we are not constrained on basic security issues despite the short-term effects of Congressional actions and our post-Vietnam/post-Watergate domestic mood. (You should not, however, appear defensive about our domestic situation.)

-- Stress that our complex strategy of combining serious negotiations and basic firmness is, for us, the most effective way to constrain the Soviets and to achieve agreements which reduce the danger of war. Tactically, it also creates a public orientation in the United States which will enable us to rally public support for resistance to expansionist activities when they occur. You could review recent examples of American actions which indicate that we are both determined and capable of countering Moscow's outward pressures (e.g., Congressional support for your Middle East diplomacy, renewed aid to Turkey, our increased efforts in Portugal and Angola, and the results of the European Economic Summit Meeting.)

II. TALKING POINTS

(Note: The following talking points cover all the major international issues that you will want to raise with the Chinese during your three sessions with Vice Premier Teng. They reflect the individual issues papers in your international briefing book and pull together in one place the basic U.S. positions on all these issues as outlined in those papers. Some of the talking points have been included only for the contingency that the Chinese initiate the discussion. In any event these talking points would be drawn upon in the course of the three working sessions as the subjects arise.)
-- Let me first say a few words about our attitude toward China before we discuss other issues. In preparing for my visit, I reviewed the manner in which our relations have developed since 1971. Let me make some comments about where I believe we have come these past five years, my views on the normalization issue, and my hopes for the future.

-- President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger showed great wisdom and political judgment in deciding to abandon the old "containment and isolation" policy that our government pursued toward your country in the 1950s and '60s. I believe it will be recorded in history that the leaders of both China and the U.S. had great courage in taking some very difficult steps in 1971 that went against very deeply held political attitudes in both our countries. But the larger issue involved -- the security of the People's Republic and the United States -- was clearly worthy of these efforts.

-- In my message to Chairman Mao just after I was inaugurated, I indicated my personal commitment to the objectives and principles established by the Shanghai Communique. I fully
share the belief of my predecessor that the normalization of relations between our two countries is important for the security of each. I believe that China and the U.S. should develop a relationship of some vitality that will be reflected in our respective approaches to international issues and in our bilateral dealings.

At the same time, however, I know full well that because of our differences in philosophy, social system, and the political realities we face, there are obvious limits to the relationship we can build. But because important national interests are served by normalizing, this is an objective we must continue to pursue.

It is not true that China ranks only fifth in our order of priorities. We may not have a very active relationship with you when compared with our dealings with Europe or Japan, or even in the Soviet Union. But from a geo-political perspective our relationship with you is of the highest importance.
Several foreign leaders have told me that they think the establishment of a dialogue between our two countries in 1971 was one of the master strokes of international diplomacy of this century. So from the impact created by the Shanghai Communiqué you cannot assign such a low order of priority to our relationship. I certainly do not, and I believe to have it stagnate would be against the interests of both our countries. Moreover, I can tell you that despite two decades of confrontation there continues to exist a basic good will among the American people for the people of China.
U.S. Objectives

-- I know from my previous trip to China, from your public statements, and from the detailed reports which I have received from Secretary Kissinger, that we have some fundamental differences of philosophic view and policy.

-- I agree with you that we should not conceal our differences. We should clarify where we agree and where we disagree. The point of agreement between us is of fundamental importance to both of us. Even where we cannot bridge our differences, we should agree to disagree in ways that do not undermine our common strategic interests. And we should avoid miscalculations or misunderstandings.

-- Let me say something about the basic international objectives of the United States as I see them. Unquestionably our most fundamental objective is a durable and equitable structure for international peace.

-- Such a structure must, first of all, be based upon security. And security in turn requires both
national strength and a willingness to use it to oppose aggression and outside pressures.

Opposition to hegemony and to all forms of expansionism is an essential element of our foreign policy. This has been a central concern of our international policy since the late 40's, and something I know we fully share with you. It is in fact a cornerstone of our relationship. But while we are determined to oppose the hegemonic ambitions of others, we are determined as well to avoid needless confrontations.

A durable and equitable international system must also be founded upon a widening economic prosperity for all peoples, not only of a few powers. At the Special Session of the UN General Assembly early this fall, the United States put forward a very constructive program on the full range of issues of concern to developing countries which was designed to contribute to this process. Frankly we do not share your view that we should divide states into categories such as the superpowers or the Third World and to set them off against each other.
Finally, the international structure must accommodate the aspirations of all peoples for justice and social progress. We do not seek a sterile status quo in the world. We believe that in a world of change there must be diverse and constructive relations between states, whatever their social systems.

These then are the very broad objectives of the United States under my Administration. We pursue them because we believe they serve our national interest.

United States Strategic Interests and Policies

I am convinced we cannot achieve our international objectives unless we maintain our own national strength and cooperate actively with other states that share our opposition to expansionism. It was this common perception which brought our two countries together in a bold move which time has already demonstrated to have been farsighted and mutually beneficial.
-- From our own resources we believe it essential to maintain unsurpassed strategic forces, very large conventional forces deployed in various parts of the world, a vigorous economy which permits heavy defense expenditures as well as economic prosperity for Americans and others dependent on our trade, and finally, a domestic political consensus to play a responsible world role.

-- From you, we know we can count on your strength and vigilance in our common opposition to the dangers of expansionism. In Europe we look for close ties, political realism and a major defense contribution, since they share our concerns about the USSR. In Japan we also seek close bonds. We do not seek a major military role, but I know you agree that Japan's stability and prosperity are essential to offset dangerous shifts in the world balance of power.

-- Before I go on to discuss our policies in certain areas, especially toward the USSR, let me say that I am fully aware we have differences, including
some serious ones. This is inevitable because of our differing circumstances, differing capabilities, and differing national interests.

-- Frank discussion of our differences in private is healthy. We welcome your analysis and we are prepared to consider your suggestions. We do not believe, however, that it is helpful for either of us to give the other public advice as to how it should behave. We should give the impression of two countries cooperating within certain limits and despite differences, rather than of two countries quarreling with one another or using one another. We must not let the impression of disagreement overshadow our relations to the point that it affects our ability to cooperate on basic security issues.

Soviet Union and Detente

-- Secretary Kissinger has explained our basic strategy and tactics toward the Soviet Union. Let me also tell you directly why we are doing what we are doing.
We are following a complex strategy toward the USSR, combining realistic negotiations with basic firmness. We are convinced that this strategy is the most effective way for us to constrain the Soviets and to achieve agreements which reduce the danger of war.

We do not hide the fact that we are engaged in a serious effort with the Soviets to improve our bilateral relations and stabilize the international system. We consider such developments very much in our interest in an era when it may be difficult to contain conflicts without resort to nuclear weapons.

But tactically we also pursue this policy because a serious effort to relax tensions enables us to mobilize public support for a strong military capability and for firm measures when we find it necessary to resist Soviet expansionism.

We have no illusions about the Soviet Union. After three decades of experience, we hardly need to be cautioned about being too trustful of the Russians. We recognize that there has been a substantial
growth of Soviet power, and we will maintain strong forces to counter the worldwide aspirations of the Soviet Union. (You might mention your Boston speech.)

We have countered Soviet efforts in the past. We resisted in Berlin, Jordan and Cuba in 1970; we resisted during the crisis on the Indian subcontinent in 1971, and during the Middle East alert in 1973. We are working actively now with friends in such areas as the Middle East, Angola, and Portugal. We have done so even when there was heavy domestic criticism as regarding South Asia in 1971. Moreover, we have acted even when others have not helped us and when they have sometimes criticized us. We will remain militarily and politically strong to be able to act forcefully in the future. If necessary, we will use nuclear weapons to defend ourselves and our allies. For example, if the Soviets were to launch a massive attack in Europe, we are prepared to use nuclear weapons.

Inevitably we have many dealings with the Soviet Union because it is a superpower with global in-
Involvement. But we recognize Soviet hostility toward China and we will not permit the Russians to dictate our policies toward China; nor will we make any moves with Moscow that could be turned against China. Secretary Kissinger has kept you carefully informed about our dealings with the USSR, and we will continue to consult with you where your interests are affected.

-- The essential point is to maintain enough strength and stability to prevent a Soviet attack in either the East or the West. Strategically it makes little difference where the immediate pressures occur. If the Soviets were able to successfully attack the United States and Europe, China would subsequently face a far greater threat. The reverse is also true.

United States Resolve and Strength

-- The power, resilience, and the will of the American people are essentially intact. Even though Soviet military power has increased, the fact is that the United States maintains the most powerful military forces in the world.
The United States has the capacity and the will to remain a most decisive factor affecting international peace and prosperity. We have been through difficult times, but we have every intention of continuing to play a major world role.

Few people are more aware than I of the stresses and strains caused by our problems over Watergate and Indochina. There will be more arguments and debate, and these may sharpen because next year is an election year. However, this is a temporary phase, and a mood most prevalent in Washington. I know from my extensive contacts with the American people across the country that they want to maintain a strong defense and they want the United States to play a strong world role. China should not be misled by atmospherics and temporary phenomena to draw any other conclusion.

SALT, Grain Agreement, and Sales of Technology and Equipment

We are continuing the SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union. If we complete the round of negotiations, the main accomplishment will be the setting
of definite limits on overall Soviet strategic weapons levels and on their MIRVs.

-- In this process, the Soviets have made major concessions. They set aside their demands that U.S. forward based forces (e.g., in Europe and on carriers) and the nuclear weapons of our Allies be taken into account, thus giving us thousands of "free" weapons.

-- There remain two unresolved problems: cruise missiles and the Soviet Backfire aircraft. On cruise missile programs, we wish to protect potentially useful technological options, but can accept some numerical limitations. The Backfire has the capability to reach U.S. territory, but its strategic impact is small as an addition to Soviet MIRV forces. These are minor issues compared to the concessions that Moscow has already made.

-- However SALT turns out, our strategic deterrent is secure and it will remain so. We are determined to take all necessary measures to maintain force effectiveness both in fact and in the perceptions
of our friends and potential enemies. Our very strong defense budget illustrates this. Our MIRVed weapons carry many thousands of warheads; our new ballistic missile submarine program will assure even greater survivability, reliability and accuracy; and we are adding thousands of missiles to our bomber force.

Our forces are of the highest technical sophistication and their effectiveness cannot be significantly offset by any combination of foreseeable Soviet programs. We hold a sizable lead in these categories over the USSR. True, the Soviet force is also powerful. But our conventional forces are strong and constantly being improved at great expense. In any event, we remain capable of negating, through retaliation, any military advantage the Soviets could hope to achieve through an attack at any conventional or nuclear level of force.
In all our dealings with Moscow, we ensure that we do not assist Soviet capabilities for aggression. Our recently concluded long-term grain agreement with the USSR, for example, gives us an assured market for our grain surpluses and prevents Moscow from manipulating the international grain market to its advantage. No government credits are involved, and the Soviets are forced to draw down their gold and hard currency reserves to pay for what they are getting. They have to buy from us even in good crop years; and in bad crop years the agreement won't meet all their needs, so we would still retain leverage.

Any government credits (Export-Import Bank) to the USSR would be limited only a few hundred million dollars over the course of several years. The Soviets are looking for commercial credits, but so far have not met with great success.
-- Our controls on technology transfer effectively prevent the Soviets from gaining strategic advantage from trade with us. We will continue to administer these controls vigilantly.

-- Under these conditions we consider US/Soviet trade a net benefit to the United States. We note from your own trade with the USSR that you have reached a similar conclusion about its advantage to you.

Europe

-- Our ties with Europe -- along with our relations with Japan -- remain a cornerstone of our foreign policy. These relations are stronger and better than they have been for many years. I and Secretary Kissinger have devoted more time to allied relations over the past year than any other foreign policy issue. My recent summit meeting with the leaders of France, Germany, Britain, Italy, and Japan was not only highly useful for the practical benefits but also symbolized the closeness of our relations.

-- We welcome closer Chinese ties with Europe and China's support for European unity and US/European cooperation.
We are working closely with our European allies to keep up NATO's political and military defenses. We recognize certain weaknesses: some European leaders place too much confidence in Soviet goodwill; some are reluctant to bear the burden of a proper military defense; and some tend to give in to shortsighted domestic pressures. The problems are most difficult on NATO's southern flank.

Nevertheless, most key West European leaders have a realistic view of relations with Moscow. They look for a genuine relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union because that is in their national interests and also helps them maintain adequate public support for their defense activities.

While some Western European countries have cut defense budgets, the NATO defense effort has resulted in an improved conventional defense capability, linked to theater and strategic nuclear deterrent forces.

We will maintain substantial U.S. forces in Europe. We will certainly defend Europe if it is attacked, and we will use nuclear weapons if necessary.
will defend Europe because it is strongly in our national interest to do so.

(NOTE: Make the following points only if raised by the Chinese.)

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The Helsinki Conference was not a Soviet victory. The West was not taken in by the rhetoric of detente at Helsinki. In fact, Western leaders and Western countries exhibited a healthy degree of skepticism about the significance of Soviet agreements. Moreover, the Soviets are already on the defensive about implementing certain provisions. Certainly the West gave nothing away at the Conference since the borders of Europe were fixed long before by post-war conferences and by German diplomacy.

Situation in Certain European Countries

-- The situation in Portugal remains in flux. Compared to some months ago, the pro-Soviet elements have lost ground, but they have been particularly aggressive in the past few weeks. We remain concerned about the situation and are working with our European friends to strengthen the forces hostile to Moscow.
Franco's death has brought on a new situation in Spain. We will work to prevent it from leading to drastic upheavals which provide openings for Soviet influence as in Portugal. We are proceeding with our base agreement negotiations, and we are working vigorously to expand our contacts within Spain to maintain influence in the post-Franco period.

Congress has authorized the resumption of military aid to Turkey, which is helpful to our policy. We are continuing our efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem.

In Italy, we are doing everything we can to strengthen the Christian Democrats and keep the Communist party out of the government.

We have been working to establish better relations with Romania, Poland, and Yugoslavia, to help them maintain their independence. I purposely visited this area during my trip this past summer to Europe.