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PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO PEKING
DECEMBER 1 to 5, 1975

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

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GENERAL SCOWCROFT

DECLASSIFIED
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By NA NARA, Date 6/23/10





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO PEKING

December 1-5, 1975

INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

INDEX

Talking Points

Background Papers

Soviet Union

Europe

Middle East

South Asia

Persian Gulf

Indochina

Southeast Asia

Japan

Korea

Mongolia

Africa

Multilateral Issues

Arms Control







5

SOVIET UNION





7

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

THE SOVIET UNION

The Problem

Your scope paper already provides you with a detailed treatment of the central issue in Sino-American relations--the Soviet Union. This paper recaptures the basic themes of that paper and the lines that should emerge in your talks in Peking.

Chinese criticism--both public and private--of our detente policies toward the Soviet Union has reached a point where it is beginning to suggest to various audiences that Sino/American relations are stalemated or even deteriorating. The impression of a growing Sino/American quarrel over these issues is unhelpful in our strategy of dealing with the USSR and, if carried too far, could undercut domestic support for improving relations with Peking. Even though you cannot realistically expect to change the Chinese view, it is essential that you forcefully counter Chinese charges that we are allowing ourselves to become militarily weak, that we lack realism in our understanding of the Soviets, or that we can be diverted from careful pursuit of our detente with the Soviet Union. Your basic theme should be that we have the same strategic perspective as the Chinese but must pursue different tactics. Neither side should presume to instruct the other on its policies.

Background

Mutual concern about the dangers of Soviet expansionism has been a centerpiece of our discussions with the Chinese. From the start in 1971, the Chinese have exhibited considerable criticism and suspicion of our Soviet policies, but we did not find this surprising in light of Chinese strategic interests and their virulent

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XGDS-3

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State Dept Guidelines ; *state review 9/18/03*

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hostility toward the Russians. In public, moreover, they tended to mute the extent of their disagreement with us, and in private they adopted a reasonable tone of criticism. In fact, the most constructive phase of our new relationship with Peking was 1971-73, which coincided with the period of our most active effort to achieve detente with the Soviets. Although other important factors were involved, the shift to a far more critical and vocal PRC stance began after our troubles over Watergate, Congressional restraints, and Indochina.

Hardened Chinese Line. The Chinese now characterize our policy toward the Russians as naive appeasement of a powerful and aggressive Soviet Union. They believe that the US/Soviet military balance is shifting perceptibly in favor of the Soviets, that the process is already well under way, and that we are wittingly and unwittingly aiding and abetting it by our military and economic decisions. They seem convinced that if we persist with our "strategic passivity," the growth of Soviet strength will lead to military adventurism and a new world war.

In essence the Chinese want us to pull ourselves together, increase our defense efforts, and drop our search for reduced tensions in favor of a more confrontational "containment" of the Soviet Union. Such a shift would of course have the immediate advantage to the Chinese of diverting some of the Soviet military threat from China to the West along with the longer term benefit of hampering the growth of Soviet power. The Chinese always disguise their direct concern about this question of focus, arguing that the Soviets are feinting toward the East while actually directing their forces toward the West; even Soviet forces on the Chinese border are sometimes described as primarily directed against US forces in East Asia and Japan. They also assert that they can cope

with any Soviet threat to China and that they neither need nor want anyone's help. Yet it is obvious from almost all conversations with them that the Chinese fear the evolution of detente will permit the Soviets to direct even more of their aggressive attention toward China. In the case of arms control, for example, the Chinese charge that our agreements with the USSR have emboldened Soviet policy against China.

We are uncertain why the Chinese have chosen to raise the tempo of their quarrel with us over detente at a time when they remain anxious about the Soviet military threat and almost paranoically concerned about Soviet political inroads in many parts of the world. Without doubt they feel less constrained about criticizing us in the absence of movement on SALT and other US/Soviet dealings. Within limits, moreover, they probably discount the utility, in balance of power terms, of a United States which they see beset by internal preoccupations and uncertainties. The Chinese may well be reacting to their disappointed hopes of progress in normalization of relations and concern that US/Soviet agreements are not simply tactical moves by the US. They may believe we attach so much importance to our relationship with China that we will do everything possible to maintain it, regardless of what the Chinese say. Leadership changes in China have also contributed to a more dogmatic quality in Chinese policies. Age may have intensified Mao's tendency to generalize about the sweep of history with a certain detachment from mundane aspects of reality, while Chou En-lai's illness has removed the one man with sufficient sophistication and stature to implement Mao's edicts in ways that did not cause excessive damage. Whatever the precise motivation--and there is probably a mixture of factors--the Chinese are now attacking our policies in public as well as in private discussions.

Sino/Soviet Relations. While the hardened Chinese line on detente and the cooler atmosphere in US/PRC relations during the past year reflects obvious Chinese disappointment over our steadiness and weight as a world power, the change does not signify a PRC intention to abandon its US connection or change its policy toward the Soviet Union. Sino/Soviet rivalry has, if anything, intensified. Polemics have escalated.

Fears of US/USSR collusion are less pronounced in Peking's propaganda than the concern that the West is not sufficiently far-sighted and resolute in the face of Soviet carrot-and-stick tactics. The Chinese are fearful that the Soviets will become a significant foreign influence in Indochina, indeed in Asia generally. They have attacked the Helsinki Agreement in the most vigorous terms, claiming that it lulls the West to sleep and legitimizes the Soviet presence in Central Europe; they also see it as a forerunner to an Asian security scheme directed against Peking. They give considerable weight to Moscow's ability to maneuver in Western Europe through the "revisionist" Communist parties. And they see serious unraveling of NATO's southern flank in Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and Italy, plus the uncertainties in Spain. The Chinese fear the erosion of Europe as an effective counterweight to the Soviets and they want us to strengthen the resolve of the Europeans to resist Soviet blandishments and threats.

As long as Chairman Mao exercises influence in Peking, we believe his highly personal distrust of the Russians will constitute an effective barrier to any flexibility in the PRC's orientation to Moscow. Over time, the situation may change. The PRC's stress on the need to combat revisionism and to denounce traitorous "capitulationism" suggests that there are voices in Peking (which we believe are centered in the military) arguing for a diminution of Sino/Soviet tensions.

The Soviets expect no early improvement in their relations with the Chinese. The border talks remain stalled, and the Chinese continue to hold the crew of a Soviet helicopter which strayed into their territory in 1974. Moscow has increased the intensity of its anti-Maoist propaganda and cast its Asian policy in increasingly anti-Maoist terms, implying to other bloc leaders and European Communist parties that fighting Maoism is more important than fighting imperialism. Paralleling this rhetorical attention, Moscow continues to upgrade its military deployments along the Chinese frontier, and the Russians conducted two very large land and naval exercises during 1975 which were obviously targeted on the PRC.

Chinese Position

The essentials of the Chinese view are as follows:

-- The United States correctly recognized in the early 1970's that it was in its own national interest to find common ground with China in opposing Soviet expansionism. Profound differences of philosophic view and policy should not be permitted to obscure this shared perception of danger. This was reflected in the Shanghai Communique, especially the anti-hegemony clause, which is still the best charter for US/PRC behavior.

-- The United States should build up its military strength; refuse help to the USSR in overcoming its weakness in food and technology; strengthen and mobilize Europe against Soviet encroachment; consolidate relations with Japan; "use two hands" in the Middle East (i.e., reduce Soviet/Arab collaboration by displaying less partiality for Israel); and concentrate its strength on key fronts rather than becoming bogged down in quagmires, such as Indochina and Korea. The US should stop trying to "catch ten fleas with ten fingers."

-- The United States gives higher priority to its relations with the USSR than those with the PRC. Indeed it has stood on Chinese shoulders to get to Moscow (i.e. used our China opening as leverage on the Russians).

-- The United States has confused tactics and strategy. Flexibility may have some limited advantages for the United States as a tactic but if the tactics of detente become a strategy, the United States and Western Europe will be the losers and the process will lead to world war. Detente creates illusions which lead to appeasement of an aggressive Soviet Union, much the way the United Kingdom and France under Chamberlain and Daladier appeased Hitler at Munich. The ultimate victims of this appeasement will be the West because the Soviet Union is only feinting in the East toward China, while preparing to strike against Europe, US forces in Asia, and Japan.

-- There is a storm coming and US maneuvering, while it may delay its arrival, cannot stop it. The best way to deal with Moscow is not through agreements but by making preparations.

-- China is not trying to divert the Soviets toward the West and recognizes that it would be involved in a world war. But the Russians know they don't have enough forces to subdue the 800 million people of China. It would take two decades if they should try. Regardless of US policy, China can handle any Soviet threat; it follows a policy of self-reliance. It fears nothing under heaven or on earth. Nuclear weapons will not be as important as an aroused population armed with "millet and rifles."

-- The United States is in the process of endangering world security by its policies toward the Soviet Union. In conventional weapons, the Soviet Union has long exceeded the combined forces of the United States and Western Europe. The

United States has now reached agreements which allow the Soviets to increase their strategic nuclear forces to a point matching those of the United States. Overall military superiority has therefore shifted to the USSR.

-- A new kind of isolationism seems to be developing in the United States along with muddle-headedness in Europe. The United States and Europe are openly assisting their most dangerous adversary. The United States has sold large amounts of grain, permitting the Russians to build their strategic reserves. Along with Europe it has provided the USSR with modern technology and helped finance the sales by massive credits.

US Position

You should explain why we seek better bilateral relations with the Soviets and international equilibrium, while we simultaneously maintain the world's most powerful military forces and remain ready to counter Soviet expansionism. You should emphasize that we pursue these policies because we consider them in our national interest. We recognize that the Chinese have disagreements with us because of what they consider their national interest. We in turn are in a different situation than China and have to follow policies we think are in our national interest. We don't lecture China on its policies; it should not presume to lecture us on ours. We should agree to disagree on tactics and do so in ways that do not undermine our common strategic objective, i.e., opposition to Soviet hegemony.

-- We are engaged in a serious effort with the Soviet Union to improve our bilateral relations and stabilize the international system because we consider such developments to be in our national interest. Tactically, we also pursue these policies because a serious effort to relax tensions enables us to mobilize public support for

a strong military capability and for firmer measures when we find it necessary to resist Soviet expansionism. We will resist hegemony; but we will also avoid needless confrontations and pursue detente in ways that do not threaten the security of third countries.

-- We have no illusions about the Soviet Union and recognize the substantial growth of Soviet power as well as the worldwide danger of Soviet efforts to achieve hegemony. We have always resisted such Soviet efforts in the past, e.g. Berlin, Jordan and Cuba in 1970; the Indian subcontinent crisis in 1971; and the Middle East alert in 1973. And we are active now in such areas as the Middle East, Angola, and Portugal, even though others (e.g. China) do not help us and sometimes criticize us. We will remain militarily and politically strong to act forcefully in the future. And we will continue to place the highest emphasis on our alliances with NATO and Japan.

-- We recognize Soviet hostility to China. We will not permit the USSR to dictate our policies toward China nor will we make any moves with Moscow that could be turned against China. Secretary Kissinger has kept China meticulously informed about our dealings with Moscow.

-- We share a common perception with China about the danger of hegemony. We understand that China disagrees with our policies of detente. But we are convinced it is in the mutual US-Chinese national interest to convey an impression internationally of two states cooperating with each other within certain limits rather than of two powers seeking to use each other. Regrettably some of the publicity surrounding recent contacts has given the impression that our quarrel far exceeds our agreement. This only benefits the USSR.

-- We inevitably have many dealings with the Soviet Union because it is a superpower. But in terms of strategy we are trying to contain Soviet expansion and share parallel interests with Peking. We do not use China to get to Moscow.

-- It is not fundamentally important whether Soviet power is initially directed against the West or the East. Global defense requires an integrated concept; if the Soviets were able to successfully attack the United States and Europe, China would subsequently face a far greater threat, and the reverse is also true. The essential thing is to maintain world equilibrium to prevent a Soviet attack in the West or the East.

-- We would certainly defend Europe, and use nuclear weapons if necessary, in response to a Soviet attack.

-- China underestimates US power and the resilience of the American people. Even though Soviet military power has increased relatively because of technology and an earlier US decision not to build up our power, the fact is that the US retains impressive military superiority.

-- We are continuing the SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union. If we complete the agreement, the main accomplishment will be the setting of definite limits on overall Soviet strategic weapons levels and on their MIRVs. It will give us a surer basis on which to plan for our own forces, and could be a base line for mutual reductions thereafter.

-- In this process, the Soviets have made major concessions. They accepted the principle of equality in aggregate levels of strategic weapons. They also set aside their demands that US forward based forces (e.g. in Europe and on carriers) and the nuclear weapons of our Allies be taken into account.

SECRET/NODIS

-10-

-- There remain two serious unresolved problems: cruise missiles and the Soviet Backfire aircraft. The US cruise missile programs represent a technological breakthrough which the Soviets seek to block off entirely; we wish to protect potentially useful technological options, but can accept some numerical limitations. The Backfire has the capability to reach US territory on one-way missions, and on two-way missions as well with suitable refueling and basing capability. But its strategic impact is minor as an addition to Soviet MIRV forces, so there may be some possibility of accommodation.

-- However SALT turns out, our strategic position is secure and it will remain so. We are determined to take all necessary measures to maintain force effectiveness both in fact and in the perceptions of our friends and enemies. Our very strong defense budget illustrates this. Our MIRVed weapons carry many thousands of warheads; our new ballistic missile submarine program will assure even greater survivability, reliability and accuracy; and we are adding thousands of missiles to our bomber force. These are forces of the highest technical sophistication and their effectiveness cannot be significantly offset by any combination of foreseeable Soviet programs. We hold a sizeable lead in these categories over the USSR. True, the Soviet force is also powerful. But we remain capable of negating, through retaliation, any military advantage the Soviets could hope to achieve through an attack at any conventional or nuclear level of force.

-- Our people have been through confused times, but there is demonstrable support for defense, and the great majority of our people reject withdrawal from the world. The Chinese should not mistake a temporary mood in Washington for the real mood of the American people around the country.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

-11-

-- We do not assist Soviet capabilities for aggression. Our long-term grain agreement with the USSR gives us an assured market for our grain surpluses and prevents Moscow from manipulating the international grain market to their advantage. No government credits are involved, and the Soviets are forced to draw down their gold and hard currency reserves to pay for what they are getting.

-- Under US trade legislation, no new Export-Import Bank credits can be extended to the Soviet Union pending a resolution of the emigration question and even then a \$300 million ceiling is imposed for a four-year period. Although Exim credits extended previously amount to \$469 million, only \$130 million have been drawn upon. The Soviets are looking for commercial credits, but so far have not met with great success.

-- Our controls on technology transfer effectively prevent the Soviets from gaining strategic advantage from trade with us, and we will continue to administer these controls vigilantly. For example, we have just refused permission to sell an IBM computer to Intourist.

Department of State
November 1975

SECRET/NODIS

8

EUROPE





10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

EUROPE

The Problem

The Chinese view of Western Europe is largely a function of their overriding concern about the Soviet Union and the West's policy of detente. Peking favors a close US relationship with Western Europe. At the same time, the Chinese believe that European softness and disarray, as well as our policies, are weakening the area's will to resist the Soviets. Reasoning probably will not persuade the Chinese since their assessment has become dogma. Nevertheless, explanation of our European policy is important in order to underline the strategic importance we attach to the region and the steps we are in fact taking to shore up allied cohesion.

Background

In recent years, the Chinese view of Western Europe has evolved in a more pragmatic direction as they reassessed their position in the light of their changing perception of the Soviet Union. Until about the time of President Nixon's visit to China, the Chinese line was that there could be no unity or security in Western Europe unless the area freed itself from the influence of the two superpowers, the US and the USSR. They criticized NATO, and seemed to favor the De Gaulle concept of each country standing on its own feet. Then the line began to change, with more references in their press--usually by replaying foreign press reports--to the idea of Western European unity and the role the US plays in European security. In the Party Congress of August 1973, Chou En-lai first voiced the proposition, which has now become a constant refrain, that the Soviets are feinting to the East but will strike in the West. Since then, they have more openly advocated Western European unity, increased military preparedness, and close ties between Western Europe and the US.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
XGDS-3

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The Chinese now maintain that Western Europe is the focal point of the Soviet threat, but that the countries of the area neither understand, nor take adequate steps to combat, the Soviet menace. The Chinese desire to encourage East-West confrontation in Europe, in order to keep the Soviets from giving undivided attention to their adversary in Peking, is a major element in their foreign policy outlook. On the other hand, their inability to exert any significant influence on developments in Europe probably leads to a sense of frustration. Peking has diplomatic relations with most of the countries, and the European Community--to which it recently accredited an Ambassador --is China's second largest trading partner. However, this provides the Chinese with little leverage. Moreover, they consider the Communist parties in Western Europe to be tools of Moscow, and therefore have no effective party channels into the area.

Given this lack of meaningful influence, the Chinese resort to lecturing Western Europeans--and the US--about the fallacy of detente. This was a major theme during FRG Chancellor Schmidt's visit to the PRC October 29 - November 2, when the Chinese strongly criticized detente in general and US policy towards the Soviets in particular. A similar, if perhaps less strident, line was used with former British Prime Minister Heath and FRG opposition leader Strauss when they visited the PRC earlier this year. (The Chinese gave both the treatment usually accorded chiefs of state, including a meeting with Mao, as if to demonstrate Chinese liking for their conservative viewpoints.) The Chinese look for opportunities to press their views on West Europeans: Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing visited Paris earlier this year; the French Foreign Minister is in China this November and the British Foreign Minister has been invited to visit China sometime soon.

In his UNGA speech September 26, Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua reiterated the basic Chinese position on Europe: that the Soviets are feinting East while attacking West, that detente is a facade

which will not stave off the inevitable world war, and that CSCE was really a "European Insecurity Conference." In private conversations with Western Europeans, the Chinese support Western European unity and strength, including NATO, and a close relationship with the US. (Inconsistently, they also sometimes revert in their public statements to the line that Western Europe should be more independent of the US. In their ideological view of the world, Western Europe is the "second world," over which the two superpowers are contending for domination.)

Peking's generalized concern about Western Europe's will and ability to resist the Soviets has been heightened by some recent developments: the situation in Portugal, the Turkey-Greece-Cyprus problem, the increased influence of the Italian Communist Party, the Helsinki CSCE conference which they view as a Soviet victory, and possibly the succession era in Spain.

Many of the PRC's views support US interests: the importance of Western European unity and strength and of continued close ties with the US, including NATO. However, the vehemence with which the Chinese challenge Western Europe's policy towards the Soviets, while disclaiming concern over potential Soviet pressures on the PRC, tends to reduce what effectiveness their admonitions might have on Western Europeans.

Chinese Position

In your talks in Peking, the Chinese will probably discuss Western Europe in the same terms as during Secretary Kissinger's visit. Both Chairman Mao and Vice Premier Teng laid great emphasis on Europe during the Secretary's talks. After the Soviet Union (and because of it), Europe is currently the major Chinese preoccupation. The main points were:

- Europe is too soft and disunited. It is being deluded into a false sense of complacency about the Soviets. It should be stronger, more unified, more alert to Soviet designs.

- The U.S., by its policy towards the Soviets, is helping to pull the wool over the eyes of Europe. Moscow is feinting in the East while preparing to attack the West.
- The Western Europeans fear war, and hope to obtain a period of peace by following the appeasement policies of the 1930's that led to Munich and then to World War II. The British and French (Chamberlain and Daladier) hoped that those policies would redirect the menace of Hitler towards the Soviet Union, but Hitler first attacked the West. (In using this historical analogy, the Chinese are clearly saying that the West is trying to direct the Soviet threat towards China.)
- The Helsinki Conference was a European Insecurity Conference, since it was an attempt to appease the Soviets and since it creates further illusions about the Soviets in Western Europe.
- Many Europeans, in talking with the Chinese, have been very apprehensive as to whether the US would come to their assistance if the Soviets attacked. (We know of no responsible Western European leaders who have said this to the Chinese. Indeed, per our suggestion, Schmidt reaffirmed to the Chinese European confidence in us.) And many Americans doubt we would use nuclear weapons or allow Americans to die to defend Europe.
- The situation in Portugal will go through many changes and will involve many trials of strength. The Chinese have rejected Portugese requests to establish diplomatic relations, and they want to avoid any actions which would strengthen the pro-Soviet forces in Portugal.

- There are "contradictions" between the Spanish Communist Party and Moscow, and in post-Franco Spain, the Communist Party will have less influence in the military than in Portugal.
- With respect to Italy, the Chinese do not think that a "historic compromise" (Communist participation in the government) can succeed. Yet they assert they do not worry whether the Communist Party comes to power (presumably because they believe it could not remain in power).
- The Chinese favor the reunification of Germany. West Germany should dominate because of its greater size.
- The Chinese are concerned about Soviet intentions towards Yugoslavia in the post-Tito period and hopeful the US and Western Europe will help the Yugoslavs resist any Soviet pressures.

U.S. Position

Your overall aim in discussing Europe should be to move the Chinese towards accepting that U.S. policy in Europe is realistic and effective, that we have no illusions about the Soviets, and that we are working closely with our allies to keep up NATO's political and military defenses. The Chinese concern about Europe provides you an opportunity to underline that US policy towards Western Europe serves Chinese interests as well as our own.

Our ties with Europe (and Japan) remain the cornerstone of our foreign policy. Our relations with Western Europe are stronger than they have been for some years. The NATO summit last May underscored the mutual commitment of the Allies to one another's security. The recent economic summit has strengthened the prospects for economic and political cooperation. You and Secretary Kissinger have spent a great deal of time with European leaders.

We recognize that there are certain weaknesses in Western Europe: a tendency by some leaders to place too much credence in Soviet goodwill, a reluctance to bear the burden of proper military defense and other pandering to domestic pressures, the problems of NATO's southern flank. But we do not share the PRC's bleak assessment that Western Europe, following the lead of the US, has adopted a policy of appeasement that not only provides the Soviet Union with opportunities to expand its influence but also increases the likelihood of a Soviet attack.

Most key Western European leaders share with the US a realistic view of relations with Moscow. It is important to make a genuine effort to reduce tensions and lessen the possibility of conflict. At the same time, the essential precondition for detente is a strong defense, and NATO continues to provide this precondition. Moreover, the policy of detente is necessary to maintain public support for defense and for a hard-headed appraisal of the Soviet Union.

In any event, the US will certainly defend Europe if it is attacked, and we will use nuclear weapons if necessary. This is in the strong US national interest.

While some Western European countries have cut defense budgets, the NATO defense effort has resulted in an improved conventional defense capability, linked to theater and strategic nuclear deterrent forces. Any progress in MBFR will be limited in terms of numbers. It would not mean that the relative fighting capability of conventional forces remaining would be reduced. On the contrary, the Allies are determined to improve that combat capability. In any event, the US will maintain substantial forces in Europe.

The Helsinki Conference was not a Soviet victory. The West gave away nothing of substance; the borders had already been fixed by post-war conferences and Germany's Ostpolitik. CSCE has not resulted in the public euphoria some had feared. In fact, the Soviets, who long pressed for CSCE, may be wondering if they miscalculated, since they are now on the defensive with regard to implementing the CSCE provisions.

Regarding the situation in certain countries:

- The situation in Portugal is still in flux. However, compared to some months ago, the pro-Soviet elements have lost ground. We are continuing to work with our European friends to strengthen the moderate forces.
- Franco's death will result in a new situation in Spain, but we hope it will not lead to a drastic upheaval such as occurred in Portugal. We are negotiating a base agreement, and are establishing economic and cultural committees so that we will have channels of contact in various fields in the post-Franco period.
- Congress has authorized the resumption of military aid to Turkey, and we are continuing our efforts to find a solution to the Turkey-Greece-Cyprus problem.
- We are doing everything we can to strengthen the Christian Democrats in Italy and keep the Communist Party out of the government.
- We do not oppose German reunification, but this is not feasible in the near term.
- We have been working particularly with independent-minded East European countries like Romania, Poland and Yugoslavia. You purposely visited this area during your CSCE trip. We are concerned about what will happen in Yugoslavia when Tito dies. We are beginning to sell Yugoslavia some military equipment, and are making contingency plans in case of Soviet intervention.

We welcome closer Chinese-Europe ties and Chinese support for European unity and a continuing US role in Europe. We would also welcome reasonable

SECRET/NODIS

- 8 -

Chinese warnings to Western European leaders about the need to have a realistic view of the Soviet Union. However, we believe that the current Chinese line is so obviously self-serving that it loses most of its impact, and that their voicing to Western Europeans of strong criticism of the U.S., if it has any effect, tends to undermine Western European confidence in the US as a reliable partner in the effort to oppose Soviet expansionism.

Department of State
November 1975

SECRET/NODIS



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MIDDLE EAST





DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

MIDDLE EAST

The Problem

The basic Chinese position on the Arab-Israeli conflict is to support the Arabs. Although our positions differ, there is common ground in that the overriding objective of Chinese policy in the Middle East is to see the reduction of the Soviet position there. The Chinese view is that the United States ought to "use two hands" in the Middle East--not only one hand to help Israel but also the other hand to help the Arabs, especially Egypt whose strong stance against the USSR appeals to China. They have strongly encouraged our efforts in the region (both mediation and new links with the Arabs), though they think we are still too partial to Israel. The main purpose of your conversations on this subject, therefore, will be to tell the Chinese that we are committed to continuing the negotiating process and that our relationship with Israel--as well as with the Arabs--is an essential ingredient in our making progress on the Arab-Israeli problem and thus reducing Soviet influence.

Background

The PRC has tended to regard the Near East primarily as an area of struggle between two imperialist superpowers, the Soviet Union and the US. Peking is aware of its relative lack of economic and military assets with which to compete and, therefore, it largely restricts its political activities to encouraging the Arabs to keep up the struggle against Israel while avoiding subservience to either the US or the USSR. Since Peking regards Moscow as the more immediate threat to its security, it has favored developments that weaken Moscow's position in various parts of Asia, including the Middle East. Hence, the resurgence of US influence

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
XGDS-2

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3
State Dept Guidelines

state review 9/18/03

By W NARA, Date 6/23/10

SECRET/NODIS

- 2 -

in the Arab world following the 1973 war--at the expense of the Soviet Union--pleased the PRC. Indeed they have encouraged us from the very outset of our efforts.

Peking's line with the Arabs since the 1973 war has stressed Arab unity, especially in the face of perceived Soviet efforts designed to "split" Arab ranks over the question of cooperation with US peace efforts. In April, after the suspension of the Sinai talks, the PRC's Foreign Ministry instructed its missions abroad that the USSR's campaign to sabotage unilateral US peace efforts was a major cause of the breakdown of negotiations. Teng Hsiao-p'ing told former British Prime Minister Heath in September that the US had the upper hand in the Middle East at the moment, but he warned that the Soviets were planning a counter-attack.

Recently, the Chinese have been working hard to improve relations with Iraq and the Palestinians so as to dilute Soviet influence. Peking has apparently not wished to risk undercutting its efforts to court Arab militants by giving too visible signs of support for US peace initiatives.

The Chinese representative at the UN attacked the Sinai Agreement and blamed the "no war, no peace" situation in the area on the US and the USSR. He criticized us both, though the Soviets were treated as the worse villain: "In fact, while the United States has no intention of bringing about a thorough settlement of the Middle East question, the Soviet Union is still less inclined to do so". Within the Chinese government, however, the Agreement is seen as a US achievement which has weakened and angered the Soviets and put the issue of peace or war in the region firmly in US hands.

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Chinese Position

During the Secretary's last visit in Peking, the Chinese did not pursue this subject at any length. If it comes up during your visit, they will presumably repeat the line that they have taken before--that we should pursue a "two-handed" policy. They will welcome our better ties with various Arab states but may question the level of our support for Israel. They would be interested in your future intentions in the area. They will probably content themselves with a general discussion of this issue.

US Position

Our interest is to get across the following points:

The best way to prevent Soviet predominance in the Middle East is to achieve an Arab-Israeli settlement. One of the main purposes of the strategy we have followed over the last two years has been to maintain control over the diplomacy in the Middle East and thereby to help the moderate Arabs consolidate the reorientation of their policy away from exclusive dependence on the USSR. We are committed to continuing that strategy.

An important shift is taking place in American opinion. As a result of the strategy we have pursued, support is growing for an effort to achieve an overall settlement. But we must move gradually because domestic support is essential to success. We intend to move as soon as our elections are over, but the next months will be actively used in preparing the way for negotiations.

For us to pursue our strategy requires us to maintain a close relationship with Israel, as well as with the Arabs. We are committed to Israel's survival. But we also must retain a close relationship in order to have a basis for urging Israel to cooperate with us in the peace-making effort. Sadat and Asad seem to accept this.

SECRET/NODIS

-4-

We also recognize that the issues of concern to the Palestinians must be drawn into the negotiating process if there is to be a durable peace. However, it is impossible to start a negotiation between two parties who do not recognize each other's right to exist and who do not accept the objective of negotiating peace with each other. Evolution of thinking both in Israel and among the Palestinians on this issue is essential. On the Palestinian side, our interest lies in seeing those who are willing to negotiate increase in strength.

Department of State
November 1975

SECRET/NODIS





DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

SOUTH ASIA

The Problem

There are no significant near-term policy differences between the US and the PRC regarding South Asia, although we do not share China's deep hostility towards India. We both have close ties to Pakistan, and both try to strengthen Pakistan's security. We both wish to ensure that India's position of regional primacy does not turn toward regional hegemony. And we both are concerned by India's relationship with the Soviet Union.

Since the area is important to both the US and the PRC, it should be covered briefly in your discussions with the Chinese. Also, the Pakistanis are concerned about their security (Prime Minister Bhutto has written to you about this) and they will expect their big-power friends, the PRC and the US, to discuss those concerns.

Your primary objectives should be: to reinforce our mutuality of interests in the area, including resistance to any increase in Soviet influence; to elicit Chinese views regarding what our two countries can do to reassure and strengthen Pakistan; and to convey our concern for regional stability, including normalization of Indo-Pakistani relations.

Background

The situation in South Asia is more unsettled than at any time since 1971.

-- Mrs. Gandhi's constitutional coup of last June has raised major questions as to the directions in which India will go. (Pakistani fears that India plans to attack Pakistan have been heightened by concern that Mrs. Gandhi might embark on a foreign "adventure" to strengthen her domestic position. We have seen no evidence to support this, however.)

-- The Simla Process of reconciliation between India and Pakistan is at a standstill with few prospects for forward motion.

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

XGDS-3

State Dept Guidelines; still re: CW 9/18/03

By MM NARA, Date 6/23/10

-- The succession of coups in Bangladesh has plunged that country into chaos and raised the real possibility of Indian intervention. (India showed in 1971 that it was not willing to tolerate instability in this critical region.)

-- Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan, strained ever since Daoud's return to power, have deteriorated further, following a series of uprisings in July which the Afghans believe were supported by Pakistan.

-- Bhutto's own domestic political position has come under considerable pressure in the past several months, not only from parties based in the tribal areas (where Afghanistan is involved) but also in the Punjab heartland where important elements of his ruling party have split off.

Although all of these problems are containable, they raise serious concern on the part of the Pakistanis, Chinese and ourselves about the future shape of the subcontinent. You will probably want to discuss the following three issues in light of our previous exchanges on the subject and Pakistan's attempts to engage both of its great-power friends on its behalf.

Pakistan's Security. Bhutto has repeatedly set forth his concern (most recently in letters to you on June 13 and August 17) that the Soviet Union, acting through India and Afghanistan was putting increasing pressure on his country. Pakistani Foreign Minister Aziz Ahmed told the Secretary in May that Pakistan has asked the Chinese what they would do if Pakistan were attacked by India acting with Soviet support. The Chinese response, as described to the Secretary by Aziz Ahmed on September 30 in New York, was positive and reflected Peking's close ties to Islamabad, but fell short of giving concrete assurances.

The Secretary has indicated to the Pakistanis that we would discuss with the Chinese our mutual concern for Pakistan's security. Such a discussion would not only be welcomed by the Chinese but would

also form the basis of a letter to Bhutto which would be very helpful in reassuring him that we take Pakistan's security concerns seriously.

Bangladesh. Following the overthrow of Sheikh Mujib last August 15, both Pakistan and China established diplomatic relations with Bangladesh, though neither has yet set up a diplomatic mission in Dacca. The death of Mujib alarmed the Indians, and Delhi probably considered intervention when a counter-coup staged on November 3 failed and a military-dominated government was established in Dacca amid strong anti-Indian popular demonstrations. For the time being, Delhi has adopted a wait-and-see attitude hoping that the situation will stabilize. The Indians appear to recognize the enormous problems military intervention would create for them, but they have also made it clear that they will intervene in certain circumstances, especially if internal disorder provokes an outflow of Hindu refugees. India would also be alarmed if Bangladesh appeared to draw close to China.

Sino-Indian Relations. We see little prospect of an improvement in Sino-Indian relations in the near term. Neither side is likely to take any initiative under present circumstances, especially after the recent border clash in which four Indian soldiers were killed. (Each country blames the other, but both seem prepared to view it as an isolated incident rather than as a portent of intensified military activity. It is unclear why the incident occurred after nearly a decade of calm along the border.) The Indians, with whom we are attempting to develop better relations, would be extremely sensitive to any public statements touching on the Subcontinent, and the Indian Government has specifically made representations against including any reference to the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir in any statements resulting from your visit. (The Chinese made a unilateral reference to it in the Shanghai Communique.)

Chinese Position

In South Asia the US, USSR and China are directly and actively involved. The Chinese therefore view our actions in that region as a test case of how the

triangular relationship can be manipulated to their advantage. They have pinned their hopes on Pakistan as a counter to the strong Soviet position in India and expect us to work in parallel with them. Beyond this, they are hostile to India as such and would like to see a polarized situation develop in which we are aligned with them and Pakistan against the Indians and Soviets. Pakistan of course shares their objectives.

Pakistan's Security. During Secretary Kissinger's visit to Peking, there was a brief discussion of South Asia with Vice Premier Teng. The Chinese noted that they were providing some military assistance to Pakistan, but said that the US was better able to provide the type of military items Pakistan needs. They would like to see us follow up on last February's lifting of the arms embargo by making major sales and providing credits to Pakistan.

Sino-Pakistani fears about Indian intentions and Soviet machinations are mutually reinforcing, though Chinese readiness and ability to support Pakistan in the event of hostilities remain limited. Peking recognizes its limitations, and considers USG political, economic and military support for Pakistan as complementary to its own efforts and essential to limiting the further spread of Soviet influence. The Chinese would join us in a general expression of concern for Pakistani security, but would not provide the sort of specific or binding guarantees which the Pakistanis seek.

Sino-India Relations and Bangladesh. During the Secretary's visit the Chinese indicated that they are in no hurry to improve relations with India and predicted that the time will come when the Indians will "rebel" against the Soviet Union. They made no substantive comments on Bangladesh. However, they would expect us to take a very stern line with the Indians should Delhi intervene in Bangladesh, and they probably view Bangladesh primarily in terms of its anti-Indian potential.

US Position

Our policy towards the subcontinent is designed to promote stability and develop an atmosphere in which we can have useful relationships with all of the regional states. Although we are in competition with the Soviets, we wish to avoid polarization in the region. We accept India's leading role as long as India does not become a tool of the Soviet Union and does not undermine the independence of its neighbors. Our traditional ties to Pakistan, reinforced by our desire to demonstrate to the Chinese and others that we are a reliable friend, lend particular urgency to our support for Pakistan's well being and independence.

Pakistan's Security. You have assured Prime Minister Bhutto that our efforts to lessen tensions among the major powers will in no way reduce the resolve of the United States to oppose attempts to undermine the security of friends and allies in any part of the world, including South Asia. The US considers the integrity of Pakistan indispensable to regional stability and important to our own interests in Asia and the Middle East. However, we still see a resolution of Indo-Pakistani differences as the best guarantee of Pakistan's security and of regional stability.

We have taken positive steps to help Pakistan through the lifting of the arms embargo and by our continuing high levels of economic assistance. In the months ahead, we expect to reach agreements on deliveries of equipment to meet many of Pakistan's priority defense needs, including TOW anti-tank missiles, air-to-air missiles and the components of an air defense system. We have not at this time authorized the sale of combat aircraft because of our desire to avoid stimulating an arms race on the subcontinent as well as to avoid arousing Congressional opposition to our sales of less controversial equipment.

Under current guidelines, we cannot provide credits to Pakistan for arms sales, though our economic assistance, which remains at a high level, has the effect of freeing some foreign exchange for arms purchases. We

have, however, urged the Iranians and the Saudis to provide Pakistan with financial assistance for the purchase of arms.

We know that the Chinese share our concern for Pakistan's national security and we would welcome Chinese views on this matter.

India. The US interest in better relations with India reflects a desire to offset Soviet influence. However, this will not be at the expense of our friendship for Pakistan. Given Indian attitudes, we do not anticipate a dramatic change in our ties. We have used our influence in both New Delhi and Islamabad to encourage a normalization of relations which we think contributes to Pakistan's long-range security.

Bangladesh. During the recent disturbances in Bangladesh, we weighed in with the Indian Government to urge restraint. At the same time we have encouraged the Bangladesh Government to reassure the Indians directly that they intend to maintain good relations with India. We do not believe that hostility towards India is a feasible policy for Bangladesh. We will continue to provide generous amounts of economic and food aid to Bangladesh, which we hope will contribute to the strengthening of its economy and of its independence as a state. However, recent events illustrate the basic instability in Bangladesh, which is something the government and people of Bangladesh will have to solve over time.

We would be interested in China's assessment of the situation in Bangladesh.

Department of State
November 1975