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DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PREMIER CHOU EN-LAI OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE MAJORITY AND MINORITY LEADERS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

This is an unofficial transcript of discussions between Premier Chou En-lai and Congressmen Hale Boggs and Gerald R. Ford. The discussions began at 12:48 a.m. and concluded at 3:10 a.m. on Thursday, June 29, 1972, following a Peking Duck dinner in a banquet room of the Great Hall of the People. The dinner, hosted by Premier Chou En-lai, began at 10:50 p.m., June 28, and concluded at 12:45 a.m., June 29.

During the dinner the following toasts were offered:

Premier Chou's Toast

The Honorable Leaders of the House, Mrs. Boggs and Mrs. Ford, and our other friends of the American party. The relations between our two countries were broken off for just 22 years and now, as the two leaders of your House of Representatives have just said, the relations between our two countries have become better, and I approve of what these two gentlemen have said.

So now I would like to propose a toast to the development of this friendship between the Chinese and American people through the promotion of the normalization of the relations between China and the United States. To the friendship between the great American people and the great Chinese people, and to the health of the leaders of the two parties of the House, and of Mrs. Boggs and Mrs. Ford, and to the health of our other guests.

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Mr. Boggs' Toast

Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Vice Minister, distinguished members of the Institute, my colleagues, ladies and gentlemen. It has been an inspiring experience for Mr. Ford and me, our wives and staff members, to come to this great country and see the enormous and tremendous activity of the people of the People's Republic of China. To come here we traveled half-way around the earth. And having come I am reminded of the words that were spoken by our American poet, Archibald MacLeish, when he commented upon the pictures and the messages that had come back from the space ship which left the earth and went to the moon. Those pictures portrayed the earth as a blue, pleasant sphere. Mr. MacLeish said that all of us are brothers whether we like it or not. So I would like to think, Mr. Prime Minister, that we are indeed brothers and that together as brothers we are seeking to advance the lot of all of our people wherever they may live.

Finally, Mr. Prime Minister, having watched you in just two days and having noted your enormous energy, your complete dedication, and your capacity for hard work, I am again reminded of another American poet, this time Robert Frost who said, "For I have promises to keep, and miles to go before I sleep." I propose a toast to the health of Chairman Mao, the health of the Premier, and the friendship between the people of the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Mr. Ford's Toast

Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Vice Minister, the other Chinese friends and our friends from home. We come from a young country almost 200 years old. We come from a proud country. And when we come to a great land with the

heritage of 2,000 years or more, we can't help but be impressed with strength and the beauty and the accomplishments and the progress that has been made. It was my privilege this afternoon, Mr. Prime Minister, coming from a country that produces many, many automobiles and many, many trucks, to see in your country the young (automobile) plant that was doing beautifully because of the dedication and discipline of the people. We were privileged to see this morning the tremendous new developments in the area of medicine. We come from a country where we think our doctors are outstanding. They have saved many lives; they have prevented many diseases; they have provided many cures.

What it really means is that we can learn from your history, and even though we think we have great capabilities in medicine and in automobile production, among many others, we can learn from your people, and we are fortunate, Mr. Boggs and myself and our associates, to see the tremendous things that are being done, under your leadership and the leadership of Chairman Mao, by your people to do the things that are the best for them and the best for the world as a whole.

Many years ago, Mr. Prime Minister, when I was very young, I used to dig in the sand on the beaches of Lake Michigan. And we often used to say if we dug deeply enough we could come to China. And I suspect that many others, like Mr. Boggs on the Gulf of Mexico, had those dreams when they were young. We were not industrious enough to dig that deeply, but we are the beneficiaries of great developments in the history of mankind. And so we are here to pay tribute to the good health of Chairman Mao, and to the great Chinese people, and to you as our host, and to the growing and

hopefully broadening friendship between the Chinese people and the people of the United States.

At the conclusion of the dinner Premier Chou posed for pictures with the American guests, and the two U.S. principals and nine of their aides then retired to a meeting room of the Great Hall of the People. The discussions began at 12:48 a.m., June 29, 1972.

Present from Mr. Boggs' staff were Mr. Eugene Theroux, Dr. Paul Sigmund, Mr. Gary Hymel and Mr. Harry Lee. Present from Mr. Ford's staff were Mr. Bryce Harlow, Mr. Robert T. Hartmann, Mr. Frank Meyer and Mr. Paul Miltich. Also representing the U.S. side was Mr. William Brown of the U.S. State Department.

Also present on the Chinese side were Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua and the following Chinese officials: Professor Chou P'ei-yuan, Vice President of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Wang Tung, Deputy Director, Department of American, Western European and Australasian Affairs, Foreign Ministry, Mr. Chou Ch'iu-yeh, Secretary General, Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Hu Hung-fan, Council Member, CPIFA, Mr. Chao Chi-hua, Council Member, CPIFA. Translation for the meeting was by Mr. Chi Chao-chu, Premier Chou's interpreter who was born in the U.S. and attended Harvard. Taking notes for Premier Chou were Mr. Chao Chi-hua and Mme. Tzu Chung-yun.

Premier Chou: Well, a small ping-pong ball has brought us together. I think it is a good idea to cut the ribbon and open contacts, and these

contacts were opened with a ping-pong ball. I talked to a hippie recently about general dissatisfaction in your country. Your situation is like it is was in China 50 years ago. I am sure you will find the right road, but this is for the American people to solve. I mustn't say more or I'll be meddling in your internal affairs.

Mr. Boggs: Hippies are not limited to the United States.

Premier Chou: Yes, they are in other countries. Madame Bandaranaike has told me that there are hippies in Sri Lanka, too.

Mr. Boggs: Did she say why?

Premier Chou: I guess it is a dissatisfaction with the existing state of affairs. They are seeking truth.

Mr. Ford: Ours are becoming more a part of and are participating in the system. We have given them the vote at 18 so they are now participating.

Premier Chou: I understand you have 20 million young voters.

Mr. Boggs: Yes, they are preparing to throw us all out.

(The Premier threw back his head and roared with laughter before the English was translated).

Mr. Ford: I don't think so. Most of them will vote the pattern of their elders.

Mr. Boggs:(to Mr. Ford) You hope.

Mr. Ford: It depends on which election. I hope they will follow their elders.

Premier Chou: There are some problems, I guess, in your country. A crucial one now is probably the economy, and too many Japanese goods are involved in this question. Then, naturally speaking, there is the question of the Indo-China war -- how to extricate from it -- and you are aware that on this the views of the Chinese government and those of your President are different and we don't try to hide it. We don't cover this up and your President doesn't cover it up. This was also stressed by Senators Mansfield and Scott.

Mr. Boggs: All of us want out of Indo-China, the faster and sooner the better. The question is how.

Premier Chou: The sooner is already rather late because when President Nixon was running for office he was already mentioning this question. Actually if you want to solve it, it's as easy as turning one's hand -- as we say in China. (Here the Premier turned his hand over to illustrate. Then he digressed to discuss postwar Berlin's history). But if for various reasons and various factors this question is dragged out it may be dragged out for more than 10 years and not solved until well after the next Presidential election.

Mr. Ford: The President and Congress do want to get out of Vietnam but we don't want to get out of Asia. We want to be a stabilizing influence against the Soviet Union and possibly against Japan and others. We want

to be a helpful influence in Southeast Asia without any territorial ambitions whatever.

Premier Chou: In the strictest sense the most important countries in Southeast Asia will be the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand; and even Australia and New Zealand. As for the five first mentioned they very much hope to turn this area into a neutral area. SEATO should be changed. The Foreign Minister of the Philippines was authorized by the President of the Philippines to say to SEATO that the nature of SEATO should be changed, but Secretary Rogers did not approve of that. I have become well acquainted with Mr. Rogers. Mr. Rogers said, if this policy were to be changed, it would be a major mistake. I do not understand how Mr. Rogers could say that. Could it be that he wanted to continue Dulles' policy with SEATO?

But President Nixon had long ago repudiated the Dulles policy, as had Rogers and Kissinger. And Secretary Rogers himself said on the plane to Peking from the South that he thought the Dulles policies were outdated, and if those five countries were really to become neutral countries it would be good for their millions of people and good for the United States itself. And the fact that China has no ambitions of territorial expansion is becoming well recognized.

In coming to see for yourselves, you see that our system allows for us to continue our work. And secondly, there is so much work to do at home, how can we afford expansion -- we can't complete the work at home. As your President has said, China has only a potential of strength. It may take decades or even a century to begin to solve our problems. Even

the youngest at this meeting may never see it. Our generation cannot finish it and even the next generation may not finish it.

Let me mention something else. You know why we sent troops into Korea -- I already explained that at the table. But we did not send one single soldier to Vietnam and that war has been going on for 10 years.

In the war in Indo-China we have seen there is no simple solution. We are signatories to the Geneva accords, but it was the Vietnamese themselves who rose up against foreign aggression in Vietnam. We give only support.

And for that matter the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam has never asked for us to send our troops into Vietnam, or even volunteers. We are fraternal countries with North Vietnam and North Korea. The late Premier Ho Chi Minh I came to know in 1922 when I joined the Communist Party in France. No one here is a longer friend of mine than was Ho Chi Minh.

Ho Chi Minh took part in the Chinese Revolution in 1924-27, but he never asked us to send a single soldier to North Vietnam.

They have a very independent spirit. Ho Chi Minh himself had a very strong sense of national respect. In the time of the feudal emperors China committed aggression against Vietnam and was defeated--

(at this point, Ch'iao Kuan-hua interrupted -- or prompted -- Premier Chou briefly in Chinese).

At the beginning of the Christian era 2000 years ago a Chinese general, Ma Yuan, attacked Vietnam but we were defeated by two Vietnamese women -- two heroines.

I only learned about this part of history when I made an official visit to Hanoi, actually in 1955. Though I am myself an intellectual, my knowledge you see was so poor. Our ancient Chinese histories had nothing but bad things to say about those Minhs. (Vietnamese)

But I am a Marxist -- and faced with these historical facts I have to admit we made a mistake. I must say we were wrong in committing this aggression against Vietnam and that these two heroines were heroic in repelling Chinese aggression.

For this reason, when I was in Hanoi I laid a wreath on the tomb of these two queens.

Of course, our present generation cannot be held responsible for the acts of our ancestors. Only by acknowledging them can we be fair and continue to be a Socialist country.

But would our northern neighbor be willing to admit their ancestors committed aggression against us?

I think not.

Where was the Russian Empire in the 16th and 17th centuries? How did it come to the Far East?

How can they denounce imperialism and look upon themselves as Socialist comrades?

One cannot discuss these things with them.

Our American friends are noted for their frankness, so I speak frankly with you. The Vietnam war was created by Dulles' policies in the 1954 Geneva Conference. The question, the problem, arose in Geneva. In Korea there was an army agreement but no peace agreement.

In the Geneva Conference Dulles didn't even shake hands with me. He looked at me and I looked at him. It was a very small room.

On the final day of the conference on Korea, I asked to be heard on a small proposal. I said, "Let us at least agree to meet again at some future date." And when I made that proposal many of the Prime Ministers were about to agree with me. Anthony Eden was there, and Bedell Smith.

Spaak of Belgium agreed with this. But Mr. Eden was in the chair and in the right hand corner of the room was General Smith, and he waved his hands (Premier gestures accordingly) and said there must be no vote on this proposal. So Eden banged his gavel and said, "The conference is now adjourned."

So we had the Conference but no results.

This makes people unhappy.

Don't you think there is reason for unhappiness over this? I was young then. I was inexperienced. I was taken in.

Bedell Smith, I think, did want to make contact with me. He was under instructions not to shake hands with me, so to avoid it we met in a cafeteria.

With his right hand holding coffee and his left hand holding me by the arm, I could only hold coffee and clink a cup with him. He was so nervous. He said there would have to be a conference on Korea and the next part of the conference would have to be on Vietnam. The agreements were ready for signing when Dulles issued an announcement that the United States would not sign but would not disturb the agreements.

I don't know whether or not there is any precedent with any other international agreement -- but my international knowledge, as you see, is limited.

We all signed -- except the United States delegation (which) said it would not disturb the agreements.

The French refused to sign and the Vietnamese withdrew their forces. The case of Vietnam is different from East and West Germany and also from North and South Korea.

It was the people of Vietnam rising up against France. So it was made clear that the 17th parallel was merely a (military) demarcation line and in no sense a state boundary, as was stated in the declaration and the United States is (not?) a signatory to that agreement.

The reason for the demarcation at the 17th parallel was to induce the troops of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to move North. And it was specifically stipulated that one year after the agreements North and South Vietnam would be consulted and afterward have an election.

Recently the Prime Minister of Vietnam told me he had read Anthony Eden's memoirs, who wrote that Dulles had told him he would not disturb the agreements but the plebescite must not be carried out because Ho Chi Minh would be elected. This was mentioned also in President Eisenhower's memoirs. That is why immediately upon the completion of the Geneva Conference SEATO was created and the policy developed of drawing lines, including South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. That was the beginning. That is how the Vietnam war started.

That is the 1950's I am speaking about. In 1955 there was the treaty with Chiang Kai-shek and Dulles attended the signing. So then U.S. advisers

were sent to South Vietnam. They got rid of Bao Dai. In the 1960's Diem was no longer satisfactory so he and his brother were killed and others were put in his place. Then came the war. In the beginning it was the subjects themselves who rose up.

So we have told American friends that the war could have been ended at that time. Later on in the 1950's Chairman Mao told our Vietnamese friends that we had been taken in at Geneva. We could have been forgiven our mistake about the Geneva conference. Since the regime of South Vietnam is the result of that agreement, why can't the United States Government get rid of that government by withdrawing that agreement? But the United States says this would be disloyal to one's friends.

I don't agree at all.

General DeGaulle had the determination to withdraw 800,000 troops, and less than half a year later he withdrew 2,000,000 European civilians from Algeria and after doing that President DeGaulle remained President of France for quite a number of years. General DeGaulle's doing this caused no stain on his honor whatsoever.

What use in supporting a puppet? I might add that if people go to the polls under a gun, of course they will vote for Thieu. The Vietnam war is a test of both the Republican and Democratic parties. Of late, Americans visiting China support Senator McGovern. Just before Kissinger's arrival on the 11th I met with them. I met with them together, five families of American friends, Harrison Salisbury of the New York Times and John Fairbank of Harvard, Jerome Cohen of Harvard, Richard Dudman of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and Jeremy Stone (son of I.F. Stone).

Of these five friends, four and one-half supported McGovern. Only Professor Fairbank was half-way. The others were all supporters of McGovern.

One of these gentlemen said that if McGovern were elected he would withdraw all American troops within 60 days and then he corrected himself and said 90 days. But, as I pointed out to them, President Nixon said he would do this too. I then asked, "If it is a matter of withdrawing, why not withdraw them?" I said this would mean withdrawing the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine (and ?) advisers . . .

Mr. Ford: (interrupting) In return for the prisoners of war?

Premier Chou: (Continuing, ignoring the question) So I asked, what about the (Thieu) regime? Has Senator McGovern considered that matter? I said it makes no difference; if that doesn't change the war would continue. That's the problem. Solve that problem and the problem of Vietnam is solved.

I am by no means biased so let's put this question on the table and consider the matter. But we would never interfere in the internal affairs of Vietnam. We have a duty to give them support but never to interfere.

Looking at the Paris negotiations, the North Vietnamese may sometimes tell us about them but we have not given them any suggestions.

I asked our American friends another question about the United States-Soviet policy on the reduction of strategic arms. I said: Didn't Senator McGovern say he would reduce American defense spending by one-third -- one-third would amount to about \$30 billion. I was surprised at this. I said: Could this be possible? -- this is not a simple matter.

On the SALT agreement which was signed in Moscow, Secretary of Defense Laird said -- as you know -- that new weapons must be developed and five years hence he said we must build a new nuclear submarine. I understand that (SALT) agreement only limits numbers, as for quality and technology there is no limit.

It is also true that immediately after signing the agreement the Soviet Union began testing new weapons and Secretary Laird asked you gentlemen, while ratifying the agreement, you should also ratify a new defense budget even though this agreement on strategic arms has been signed. As the result of reducing only two ABM sites there will be a reduction of \$270 million. But if the war in Vietnam continues you will have to increase your budget by the end of this year by as much as \$3 billion to \$5 billion. So how is it possible if Senator McGovern is elected to reduce military spending by one-third?

Mr. Boggs: May I make an observation or two?

Premier Chou: Of course. I am doing this deliberately to arouse you gentlemen to state your opinions. Otherwise, what shall we do after dinner?

Mr. Boggs: Prior to World War II, the United States was almost totally disarmed both in the Pacific and the Atlantic . . . We had no real Army or Navy.

Premier Chou: That's right.

Mr. Boggs: Whether or not World War I sowed the seeds of World War II is a question. But World War II found the United States unprepared.

Premier Chou: Not only the United States -- the Soviet Union also was unprepared. It was told that the Munich Agreements would satisfy Hitler.

Mr. Boggs: But some thoughtful people in our country felt that Japan's move into China in the 1930's was the beginning of World War II. Many thought . . .

Premier Chou: I approve of that thinking.

Mr. Boggs: Many people thought then that the United States should rearm and take collective action against Japan. But they were in a small minority at that time. Then Hitler moved on and on and the League of Nations collapsed. We made little effort to rearm and finally after the fall of France we began to rearm. In fact, just six months before Pearl Harbor we kept our Army by only one vote in the House of Representatives.

Premier Chou: The Prime Minister (Anthony Eden) personally told me in 1954 that at Dunkirk all weapons had to be left behind.

Mr. Boggs: Early in 1941 the Japanese attempted to negotiate with President Roosevelt. He refused to agree to their insistence on the partition of China and for territory in Southeast Asia.

Premier Chou: Yes.

Mr. Boggs: This was a contributing factor to Pearl Harbor -- our refusal to accede to Japanese demands. So Pearl Harbor came and we were unarmed and we only then rapidly rearmed, building a large Army, Air Force and Navy. We sent troops to Europe and we fought the Japanese all over the Pacific.

Premier Chou: That was in the glorious period of President Roosevelt. But President Eisenhower did quite well in stopping the Korean war.

Mr. Boggs: Let me go on.

Premier Chou: I am always impartial. I am just trying to be bipartisan here.

Mr. Boggs: After World War II the United States disarmed again, but difficulties arose between the Allies and the Soviet Union, and we began to rearm against the Soviet Union. The American people were never given accurate information about what was happening in China. We never really knew. The basic feeling of the American people was friendship toward the Chinese people. It is probable that a mistake was made in giving support to Chiang Kai-shek and in not letting them work it out, but the trouble was really with the Soviet Union -- and people equated Chinese Communism with the Soviet Union.

Premier Chou: You are forgetting Yalta. There was no Chinese representative there. That was not good.

Mr. Boggs: Yes, but Yalta was on Russian soil, remember that.

Premier Chou: Yes, I would place primary responsibility on the Soviet Union, you only have secondary responsibility. That is why we approve of the normalization of relations on a step by step basis . . .

Mr. Boggs: I couldn't agree more.

Premier Chou: Actually there were people in the United States who knew about China but they were not listened to. Of the older men one for instance

was General Stilwell. I spent only one hour with General Stilwell -- do you realize that I spent less time with General Stilwell than I am spending with you gentlemen this evening. I had contact with General Marshall for almost one year. But I recall that General Stilwell was of the opinion that Chiang Kai-shek was unreliable. At the beginning, President Roosevelt believed General Stilwell but unfortunately he did not do so later. Also there was Edgar Snow.

Mr. Boggs: I know, I read his book.

Premier Chou: Not everything he wrote was accurate, but mostly it was accurate.

Mr. Boggs: Anyhow, my point is that a great Chinese wall developed between the United States and China. Whether rightly or wrongly, there developed in the United States the view that there was a great Communist bloc with the Soviet Union on one side and China on the other, and that they were expansionists.

Premier Chou: That was the guiding thought of Dulles. This guided both parties for a time. In 1959, Khrushchev went to the United States and there was created the "Spirit of Camp David." A year before that Khrushchev tore up his agreement with us on nuclear weapons. For ourselves, you recall, in 1959 a border dispute occurred with India over the Khyber Pass incident. In this dispute India attacked us, but TASS promulgated the view that we Chinese had attacked. This was untrue. The United States accepted this lie. The Soviets claimed we were defeated but your authorities still claimed China and the Soviet Union were a monolithic bloc.

Mr. Boggs: What you say is true -- that we did think that -- but there were a number of reasons we thought that. I think the Soviets promulgated the notion of a Communist monolith and that Moscow was its Rome -- the center of the monolith.

Premier Chou: But there were two men in Europe who didn't have that feeling. Adenauer and DeGaulle for example. So some people managed to see things clearly.

Mr. Ford: Let me point out that they had no worries. They had the United States security umbrella to protect them.

Mr. Boggs: Just a minute, Jerry. Look, Mr. Premier, I am a Democrat. I say as a Democrat that President Kennedy and President Nixon have both had great perception in looking at the world the way it is today -- not the way it was in Dulles' time. Dulles may have been wrong, but the American people thought that way. President Nixon has broken through that long built-up predisposition of American thinking which was brought about mainly by the fact that we told all the world to go to hell, but suddenly we changed completely and had an interest in all the world. President Nixon has blazed a trail which we hope will end this period of tension. I have been tremendously impressed by the fact that you have a great country and a great people with tremendous problems. I can't imagine you -- with all your problems -- trying to take over other nations. President Nixon has a new concept and I must say my own mind is dispelled of the Dulles notion and I say as a Democrat that President Nixon had a lot to do with that.

Premier Chou: I am not entirely opposed to your historical account and President Nixon and other American friends have all said that Dulles' views were wrong, that this is no longer the time of Dulles. But at the same time, of course, the thought of Dulles made the United States look at the world in that way.

Mr. Ford: I have heard President Nixon say many times in recent months that this was a unique time in the history of the world. As we look back we realize this was a period in which we and many others made mistakes. We thought we had the facts but the facts were not always clear. After World War II we were preoccupied with the Soviet Union and the policies of Communism, because we thought of Communism as a bloc that threatened us. The ideas of Dulles were based on our great military strength and were concerned only with the Soviet Union. At the present time, the military situation has drastically changed and now that relationship does not exist. We must deal with the practical circumstances.

Premier Chou: And that's why we agreed on the Shanghai Communique. If you were still carrying out the policies of Dulles we couldn't be discussing matters now. President Nixon has changed the policies of Dulles, fortunately. That is a matter of certainty. That idea was advanced by President Nixon when he ran for President. In 1968, he wrote an article for Foreign Affairs. On our side, we couldn't quite believe him -- we said that we shall see. But the first step was the Ping-Pong team. Then the way was found with the President's personal visit. We are at one in our attempt to relax tensions.

As for our differences, these were made very clear in our Joint Communique -- the first instance I believe of such a joint communique. This is a good idea. The Soviet Union would never agree to a communique of this type. They would attempt to cover up the differences. With the Soviet Union they always leave out the disagreements. But in our case we made clear our differences and your President agreed to our proposal.

We said our systems are different but can we not still find common grounds as long as we both want to relax tensions? We could.

So we wrote into the Communique the five principles of co-existence. These five principles are self-respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence. Based on the five principles of co-existence, we want to outlaw the use of force or the threat of force against each other, neither side should seek hegemony in Asia, and that improvement in relations is good for the world, and we were clear on these common points.

Well, you haven't really returned Taiwan immediately -- but you have declared that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits want one China. Taiwan is still a part of China. This was said by Senator Mansfield in a Montana University speech in 1968. He said that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. Senator Mansfield sent a copy of his speech to me, but not to take credit for the formulation in the Joint Communique. He is a very modest man. With respect to that formulation, even I could not have thought of such a clause. And now the Republican Party President says this.

Mr. Ford: The new Nixon policy in Southeast Asia, including the normalization of relations with China, is our entire Government's policy. I don't know what Secretary Rogers said recently about SEATO, but I believe that the over-all statements of President Nixon represent the views of all of our Government in this regard.

Premier Chou: I believe there are changes. If there were no changes, how could there be this contact between us now?

Mr. Ford: We covet no territory in Southeast Asia nor do our Allies but we do want a constructive presence in Southeast Asia so that no nation such as the USSR or Japan or any other country can dominate Southeast Asia.

Premier Chou: That is right. So when I say these five countries want to maintain neutrality that is the best solution. In the seven-point position put forth by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Vietnam they want to set up a coalition government for a certain time that can carry out a policy of neutrality. That is to say, at the present time the government of South Vietnam would not be like that of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam nor, I might add, are they satisfied with the puppet government of Thieu. It would be a coalition government. This is for the United States and North Vietnam to work out.

Mr. Ford: The most serious problem in the United States is the small but growing trend toward isolationism which existed in America in the 1920's and 1930's. It is not good for the United States to be isolationist -- not good for us or for you.

Premier Chou: As I see it, it is not possible; the development of history will not go backward, even though a small minority wishes isolationism.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: There is too much involvement to go back.

Premier Chou: I suggest that you read President Nixon's speech on the 6th of July last year in Kansas City in full. It was a very weighty speech. Just after World War II the United States was very powerful; in fact the most powerful nation in the world. He said that because the United States was on a smooth road, wherever they wanted troops, you sent them. Wherever they wanted money you sent money -- that is the fate of the most powerful.

But after the 1950's the Soviet Union became stronger. Then in the 1960's Western Europe became powerful and Japan also became powerful. Now I would rank the countries in order of strength as: first, the United States; second, the Soviet Union; third, Western Europe as a group; fourth, Japan; and fifth, we come to China -- probably the small finger (here Premier Chou counted on the fingers of one hand) -- only a potential power. What must we do? We must relax tensions.

Mr. Ford: But if we cut \$30 billion out of our defense budget our capability to compete internationally as a strong factor would be seriously jeopardized. And for us to become weak and not one of the strong forces would not be good for world stability. We must keep a level of strength to make sure that the situation in Europe is stable and that there is not a dominant force in Southeast Asia. Don't you agree that for us to be weak would be bad for us and bad for the world?

Premier Chou: Yes. By the way, let us take off our jackets. (Accordingly, at 2:20 a.m. everyone removed his coat and the discussion continued.)

Premier Chou: That's precisely what I have said. I want to speak frankly about why what you say is true. It is impossible to cut your defenses by one-third. Even Mr. Boggs agrees?

Mr. Boggs: I agree.

Premier Chou: So, I see you two leaders are as one on this question.

Mr. Ford: Yes.

Mr. Boggs: Yes.

Premier Chou: What is this talk about disarmament with the Soviet Union? The Soviet Union talks about disarmament but continues to arm all the time. They just don't talk about it, but all of us know it. People say there is going to be disarmament, but it is just not possible.

So, as Chairman Mao said to President Nixon, "Mr. Nixon, you are from the right -- you are from the anti-Communist world -- but I welcome you because you tell the truth, and you had the courage to contact us Communists." But I also appreciate Senator Mansfield of the Democratic Party. He is a very sincere man but some of his thinking cannot be realized. For example, how is it possible for you to withdraw all your forces from Europe when they want your forces to stay?

Mr. Boggs: Yes, but while that is true, we cannot ignore public opinion in the United States. The public may insist on a reduction of troops in Europe.

Mr. Ford: As a matter of fact, after World War II and before the Korean war the total defense appropriation in 1950 was less than \$12 billion. The total budget that year was about \$50 billion.

Premier Chou: What was President Roosevelt's budget in 1933?

Mr. Boggs: \$9 billion for the entire budget. Defense was less than \$1 billion.

Premier Chou: But now look at your budget, \$200 billion. . .

Mr. Boggs: \$206 billion, and with bonds \$435 billion.

Premier Chou: Could you have conceived of this when you were in college?

Mr. Boggs: No, and I can't even conceive of it now.

Premier Chou: Well, you can't return to the old days.

Mr. Boggs: Just let me say, Premier, that I see your nation as a strong, disciplined nation becoming stronger each day in the things that make a nation. I think the world rejoices in that happening, in your strength, in your sense of nationhood and place.

Is it possible down the road that these five nations -- United States, Soviet Union, China, Japan, and Western Europe could work together? The world would be quite a different place in which to live, wouldn't it?

Premier Chou: But it is not possible for five nations to cooperate well immediately, nor could the five forces be the same. (Premier Chou held up one hand with fingers spread.) I'll show you my hand. You see five fingers,

four going one direction and one (the thumb) in another. But if the two super-powers (he then joined the thumb and little finger) come together they leave out the other three. It is difficult. If you cut off the other three, if the other three make trouble, the hand couldn't do much. We must cooperate, only step by step.

Let us return to the Vietnam war. You are spending too much and much more than you did in the Korean war. You have even exceeded your expenditures in the second World War.

Mr. Boggs: I am a Democrat and not an expert on foreign policy. But it has been proposed that there be a cease fire and that our American forces get out within three or four months.

Premier Chou: The number of months is not the central question. The major problem there is political.

Mr. Ford: But the President called for an election . . .

Premier Chou: Those elections won't do. You will understand why if you listen to what is said in Paris. Whichever side has the most troops will win. But if you restore tranquility to Vietnam it will be difficult for others to interfere.

You're mired down.

A withdrawal of the United States Army will satisfy some people in the United States, but there will be increases in the Air Force -- some will be stationed in Thailand or so far as Guam and Okinawa. The number of aircraft carriers and destroyers of your Seventh Fleet have been substantially

increased. They now surpass the Sixth Fleet. They are conducting air raids and blockade on the coast of Vietnam. There are B-52s flying from Thailand and Guam. The dropping of bombs by the tens of thousands of tons is more than in all of World War II, but you can't put Vietnam to death this way. All the streets and alleys of North Vietnam are filled with children. You cannot kill them all; they will grow up.

Last year I made a prophecy -- you cannot cow them. We have an old saying in China: "When people are not afraid of death, how can you threaten them with death?"

Vietnam has never been conquered. With you spending so much money, the Soviet Union and Japan can more easily reach out and do their own things.

Mr. Ford: Take the five nations. Today the United States and the Soviet Union are roughly equal in military capability. For the stability of all five, we should not reduce our military capability. We must maintain our research and development to have forces available at the end of the next five years. If we stop now the disastrous effect five years later will be to produce instability.

Premier Chou: Well, of course, the Soviet Union does want to surpass you.

Mr. Boggs: We must be vigilant against them.

Mr. Ford: We're not going to let them.

Premier Chou: Good.

Mr. Boggs: But they are going to surpass us, Mr. Ford, unless we increase our budget.

Premier Chou: You'll increase the budget. As I said, I know you will not reduce the budget; you have to increase your strength. But why do you spend so much in Vietnam? What good is it for you?

Mr. Ford: We want to settle the war.

Mr. Boggs: Of course. But, Premier, how do you suggest we settle it?

Premier Chou: We, of course, can take no role in this. As for how you settle it, that is up to the Vietnamese and the United States. But you must do it politically. I said this to your President, to Rogers, to the Senators and to you gentlemen. North Vietnam wants a tripartite government -- how it is composed, we don't care. We won't interfere.

Mr. Boggs: What do you mean by tripartite? In such a government, who would be the third party?

Premier Chou: That is for you and North Vietnam to decide. For the third party you should find some neutral parties not on either side now.

Mr. Boggs: Who are you speaking about? The Viet Cong? The government of Vietnam? The North Vietnamese? Who?

Premier Chou: I am speaking of those who are on neither side now. I cannot be more specific than that.

Mr. Ford: Wouldn't that be a good government for all of Vietnam?

Premier Chou: The time is not ripe now. Conditions are not right. This was possible in 1954 but Dulles sabotaged it.

Mr. Boggs: As you know, Mr. Kissinger arrived back in Washington after we left there. We did not have direct talks with him because we crossed in our travels that day, but we have been informed that he had long conversations with you about this problem and we understand that these discussions were very constructive.

Premier Chou: I cannot say whether they were constructive or not because we are not the ones concerned -- we only make suggestions. We have to be very prudent about this matter.

Mr. Boggs: I am sure you understand that everybody wants to resolve this problem. The Democrats are making this one of the main political issues in the upcoming campaign. Of course, President Nixon wants to negate the issue and the best way to do it is to resolve it. The question is how.

Premier Chou: We Chinese want the quickest possible solution of the Indo-China problem. If it is not resolved, how can the Taiwan question be resolved?

Mr. Boggs: Let me play the devil's advocate. Suppose tomorrow the President, without conditions of any kind, just ordered all our forces out. The position of the United States and the rest of the world would be radically changed, and if we were to do the same kind of thing to you sometime, if we violate a commitment to you, our stock with you would be very low.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Are you referring to the Domino theory?

Premier Chou: Oh yes, the Domino theory. What about France after the fall of Algiers? Did France collapse?

Mr. Boggs: (A few phrases missing) we want to solve it.

Premier Chou: I don't want to say too much. It might seem I am trying to help the Democrat Party or the Republican Party. But to solve it is a political question.

Mr. Boggs: Mr. Ford (also) wants to withdraw.

Mr. Ford: But many people inside the United States believe that if the United States were to withdraw unconditionally -- if President Nixon, or some later President, should say he is withdrawing without conditions -- he could not get elected or re-elected. I don't think any candidate who promises that could be the next President of the United States.

Premier Chou: That is the reason the Vietnamese tie together the military and political questions.

Mr. Ford: It would be a mistake for the North Vietnamese to predicate anything on the next election because the American people will not support a candidate who promises withdrawal without conditions. So, the North Vietnamese should not expect this to take place.

Premier Chou: That is why I said to the five American visitors, "Is it possible for you to withdraw your forces without conditions -- without a political solution?" They couldn't answer. I also asked them if they really believed that your defense budget could be reduced by one-third. One said by 1975 or 1976.

Mr. Boggs: You are a very wise man, Mr. Premier.

Mr. Ford: These visitors do not represent American public opinion on defense matters or Vietnam. American public opinion for getting a candidate for President is much different from theirs. I believe Mr. Boggs and I are better analysts of public opinion than they are.

Premier Chou: That is certain because you are leaders of the House, but they are just observers.

Mr. Boggs: I have grave doubts about my own abilities.

Premier Chou: You are so modest. It is good to talk about this matter -- these contacts are good. We have our ideals but we also deal practically with it. We progress step by step but we have our direction and line.

Mr. Boggs: Maybe on some immediate things we could move ahead. The Senators have come and we have come here, but many colleagues in the Congress would like to come who have a great desire to learn more about your country.

Premier Chou: The best way would be for any future visitors also to come on a bipartisan basis. We are the same towards both parties. It is easier for us.

Mr. Boggs: We agree.

Premier Chou: The initiatives of the President are approved by both parties. This will go on without regard as to which party is in power. I frankly say we don't believe you can reduce your military spending. With the Soviet

Union increasing their own defenses, how can you reduce yours? Do you believe that there will be any reduction in your military budget?

Mr. Boggs: Not substantially in the foreseeable future. Mr. Premier, let me ask you a question. You don't believe the Soviet Union is going to reduce its defense budget, do you?

Premier Chou: (In English very animatedly and emphatically, before the question was translated into Chinese) Never! Never! Never!

Premier Chou: (Continuing in Chinese) Not unless they change dynasties or Lenin is resurrected. We believe they will change when the Soviet people rise up. To be fair, we have to say that you have more freedom than people in the Soviet Union at the present time. But if you say I said the people in the United States have perfect freedom then the Blacks would oppose me. Indians and the Chicanos would oppose me and the Puerto Ricans also.

Mr. Ford: But you would still get elected. (Laughter)

Premier Chou: My interpreter was born in the United States.

Mr. Ford: Mr. Premier, we have spoken about official exchanges. We believe that in science and in art and in other areas we could have more exchanges on a non-governmental basis.

Premier Chou: We also hope for this but we still have a lot of preparatory work. Things are developing too rapidly. A year ago neither you nor we expected that our position in the United Nations would be restored. We

did not expect last year that your resolution in the United Nations would be defeated and Albania's would be approved. On the very day it was voted, Kissinger was in Peking. So things came too quickly but it is certain to go on. By the way, at the United Nations the problem of documents is even greater than in our own Ministries. One needs a wheelbarrow to carry them around. Is that the way things are in the Congress?

Mr. Boggs: The situation is similar to that in Congress. By the way, Mr. Premier, what about medicine? There are many medical specialists who would like to study your techniques. This morning we went to a hospital and watched three operations performed with acupuncture anesthesia. Doctors around our country would like to spend some time here.

Premier Chou: I have already taken this up with your President. He mentioned cancer. You are also devoting lots of attention to heart diseases, also stroke. We'd like to send some specialists. I think we could have our earliest contacts in this field.

Mr. Ford: We are spending about \$2 billion a year in this area.

Premier Chou: That is beneficial.

Mr. Ford: All across the United States your people could go to these medical centers.

Premier Chou: The fact is that cancer is growing more and more and one of the reasons is pollution of air and water.

Mr. Ford: There is no concrete evidence except in the area of smoking, scientists allege this.

Mr. Boggs: There might also be exchanges of municipal officials. I represent a great port city, New Orleans. Constituents of mine in New Orleans have already contacted your Embassy in Ottawa to invite Chinese trade officials to visit our City of New Orleans. We hope this can be done. It would also be interesting for people of my city to visit a city such as Shanghai which has great similarities to our seaport city of New Orleans.

Premier Chou: How do you solve the pollution problem in New Orleans?

Mr. Boggs: It is a very serious problem, mainly the discharge of pollutant materials into the Mississippi River. Congress has passed a law banning the discharge of these chemicals in these rivers by 1976 and 1981. Water pollution is a big problem in the United States. We also dump raw sewage into the river -- a problem you have solved in China.

Premier Chou: The question of pollution is not solved. We only started paying attention to it in the last three years. Our attention to it came from what we know about Japan. Only in recent years have we come to know that it is extremely serious in Japan where petroleum spills and industry have badly polluted rivers and streams with 200 million tons (of pollutants). The coastal areas of Japan are all polluted, hurting fishing and the people. So this proves the problem is created by highly industrial areas. We must learn from you.

Mr. Ford: In Michigan and the United States generally we have made great efforts to find solutions to air and water pollution, particularly of the Great Lakes. It has leveled off now and we are beginning to eliminate some of the evils of the past, using lots of money and research and individual effort.

Premier Chou: This has been mentioned by your President in every speech so obviously it is a very serious problem. Coming generations will curse our present generation for wreaking such destruction. We waste the underground resources and then use them to hurt the health of people. That is another kind of war for winning. It is now impossible for any country to completely isolate itself.

And, of course, they (the coming generation) will not treat us well unless we are able to resolve the Indochina question. We must extricate ourselves from there. First we must respect territorial integrity and sovereignty and hence we return to the Vietnam issue which is a great burden on us.

Mr. Ford: We had a good talk with Ch'iao Kuan-hua yesterday. I suggested to him that all of us want this growing feeling of friendship to expand. One of the most humanitarian things that could be done would be any favorable consideration that you might give to Mr. Downing and the two military men you are holding. There would be a most favorable impact in the United States as a very obvious and dramatic and tangible step toward further normalization between our two countries.

Premier Chou: Dr. Kissinger mentioned this, too. We are taking note of it. We will have more contacts. But for the foreseeable future more of you will come here than there are of us going there. Of course, there is no question about two United States as there is two Chinas. So, problems still remain but I hope this question will be solved soon.

Mr. Boggs: You have been very kind and it is now 3 a.m.

Premier Chou: It is only shortly after lunch in the United States.

Mr. Ford: Mr. Boggs and I are wondering what the House of Representatives is doing without us there.

Premier Chou: But these days are not very important in Congress. You will be going back for the Democratic Convention, Mr. Boggs, and you, Mr. Ford, to the Republican on August 21.

Mr. Ford: The party that is in office always has its convention after the party that is contending.

Premier Chou: It is very interesting the Republican Party will hold its convention in San Diego.

Mr. Boggs: No, they will both be in Miami.

Premier Chou: Why is that?

Mr. Ford: The Republican Convention originally was scheduled to be held in San Diego but for various reasons it has been moved to Miami.

Premier Chou: For what reasons?

Mr. Boggs: I think it might be helpful if I answered that. It costs a lot to handle these conventions in two different cities. Moreover, there are only a few places in the country where we can accommodate so many people.

Premier Chou: How many delegates are there?

Mr. Boggs: There will be in the order of 3,000 delegates and perhaps 10,000 other people attending the Democratic Convention.

Mr. Ford: There will be fewer Republican delegates, on the order of 1,500, but we also have many people and, as Mr. Boggs said, there are only a few cities that can accommodate these numbers.

Premier Chou: Why does the Democratic Party have so many delegates?

Mr. Boggs: I don't know.

Premier Chou: You are in such an ardor about your elections, as they also are in Japan.

Mr. Ford: Mr. Premier, you should send some observers to both conventions. You wouldn't believe it. (At this point the discussions ended at 3:10 a.m., June 29, 1972).

This unofficial transcript was collated and cross-checked from the shorthand notes of Mr. Harlow and extensive longhand notes of Mr. Brown, Mr. Hartmann and Mr. Theroux and reviewed by other Americans present. The toasts at the outset were recorded on tape recorders, to which the

Chinese made no objection on any occasion except the two formal discussions with Chou and Ch'iao. It should be noted that the English translation of Premier Chou's remarks is that of his interpreter, Mr. Chi Chao-chu.

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