IMPRESSIONS OF THE NEW CHINA

JOINT REPORT

TO THE

UNITED STATES

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

BY

Majority Leader HALE BOGGS

AND

Minority Leader GEERALD R. FORD

on their Mission to the People's Republic of China,

June 23 to July 7, 1972

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IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, U.S.,
August 3, 1972.

Resolved, That there be printed as a House document the joint report of the House of Representatives by Majority Leader Hale Boggs and Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford on their mission to the People’s Republic of China from June 23, 1972, to July 7, 1972 entitled “Impressions of the New China”.

Attest:

W. Pat Jennings, Clerk.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

Hon. Carl Albert,
Speaker, House of Representatives,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Speaker: Transmitted herewith is a report of our recent journey to the People’s Republic of China.

Nearly one quarter of all mankind is Chinese. Together, our populations total more than 1 billion individuals. Yet, over nearly 25 years, we risked potentially dangerous misunderstandings as our nations became ever more isolated one from the other.

As both governments have now recognized, it is in the interest of our peoples and in the interest of international peace for us to learn to live together in peace and mutual respect.

We harbor no illusions that the path to that relationship will be easily or quickly traveled. There are many fundamental differences between our societies. Nevertheless, our visit reminded us again that people the world over share a common desire for friendship.

We hope that the observations contained in this report may be of interest to our colleagues and to the public at large and, in particular, that our journey will contribute in a small way to a normalization of U.S. relations with China.

Hale Boggs,
Majority Leader.

Gerald R. Ford,
Minority Leader.
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IMPRESSIONS OF THE NEW CHINA

(Joint Report to the United States House of Representatives by Majority Leader Hale Boggs and Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford on Their Mission to the People's Republic of China, June 23 to July 7, 1972)

INTRODUCTION

Our visit to the People's Republic of China, in behalf of the House of Representatives, was undertaken at the invitation of the quasi-governmental Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) and with the encouragement of President Nixon. It was only the third visit to China by elected American officials in nearly a quarter century, preceded only by the President in February this year and by Senators Mansfield and Scott in late April and early May.

Our mission had two principal objectives: first, to learn as much as possible about China—its leaders, its people, its economy, its international and domestic objectives for the President and the House of Representatives; second, to contribute to better relations between our two countries, an objective not only mutually advantageous to the Chinese and American peoples, but also contributory to the relaxation of tensions throughout Asia and the world.

We have reported in detail to the President both verbally and in writing. This report to our colleagues is an elaboration of our report to him.

We do not pose as experts on China, or on Sino-American relations. All that we report must be evaluated in light of the views of others in and out of government who have devoted themselves to a study of China. We recognize as well as anyone that in a mere ten days in the vastness of China, we could do little more than become aware of the enormous amount of information and understanding we lack about that land.

We are reminded of the blind men who sought to learn about an elephant, each coming away with a very different impression, and none with a complete account. In order to enhance the usefulness of our report, then, we have prepared this report jointly, assembling and comparing our recollections together as we traveled and worked together on this remarkable journey.

SUMMARY OF MAJOR IMPRESSIONS

The questions most often asked of us since our return have concerned our general impressions of China and its people.

We find the most striking first impressions an American receives today in China are these:

The people appear adequately fed, clothed and housed and therefore are relatively content. Related to this is a pervasive discipline and
motivation in pursuit of national goals of class consciousness, increased production, Marxist-Leninist (Maoist) awareness and collective effort to upgrade the quality of life.

Preoccupied with their tremendous struggle to advance since 1949, the Chinese multitudes seem oblivious to the fact that they lack in their lives the political liberty, social mobility, and individual orientation that we cherish in the United States. We did not detect, nor did we sense any real dissent.

The cities we visited—Shanghai, Peking, Shenyang, Anshan and Canton—are strikingly clean. There is virtually no litter. There are no flies. No animals or poultry run loose. Most buildings are well maintained. The virtual absence of passenger cars and the silent gliding of large numbers of bicyclists give an air of orderliness and peace to the streets. Only Canton still reminds one of the congestion and disorder of earlier days, and even there without the human distress that once engulfed the streets of Chinese cities.

Not one member of our party reported seeing even one Chinese who appeared to be suffering from hunger, or exposure, or who appeared to be socially crippled, homeless, idle, or uncared for. In city, Americans saw years ago as dirty and crowded with the hungry and the ragged, the poor and the begging, the sick and the lame, we saw bustle, cleanliness, and a disciplined purposefulness.

Despite these positive impressions, there are troubling impressions as well. Chairman Mao Tse-tung, despite rare public appearances, is ubiquitous: his presence felt everywhere. Enormous color portraits of him adorn the walls of virtually all public rooms, factories, classrooms and homes we visited. Quotations from Mao's writings—usually exhorting a disciplined purposefulness and obedience to the State—hang on walls of public buildings, factories, classrooms and homes. Only Canton still reminds one of the congestion and disorder of earlier days, and even there without the human distress that once engulfed the streets of Chinese cities.

If we are therefore persuaded that, at present, the world has little to fear from China, on the other hand, from China's point of view, the world must be something of a threatening place.

We are therefore persuaded that, at present, the world has little to fear from China. On the other hand, from China's point of view, the world must be something of a threatening place.

But time will not stand still for China. No matter how weak she may be today relative to other nations, China is a land of vast human and natural resources. If she can maintain political stability, if she can upgrade her agriculture and industry, if she can remain free from outside interference—what will China be like in another two or three short decades?

The answer is obvious. If she manages to achieve as she aspires, China in the next half century can emerge a self-sufficient power of a billion people—a nation whose agricultural output can provide for her population, whose industrial capacity can be enormous, whose military capability can be very substantial, with a people united in devotion and obedience to the State.

This last impression—of the reality of China's colonial potential—is perhaps the most vivid of our journey. As our small party traveled through that boundless land, this sense of a giant stirring, a dragon waking, gave us much to ponder.
There, in that nation where State-directed conformity produces unity of effort and purpose, and where self-indulgence and licentiousness of any kind are not tolerated, we reflected on our own country. We were troubled that, by contrast in our own nation, where people are free to live and work and choose and read and think and disagree as they please, there has been widespread division, discord and disillusionment and a pervasive permissiveness straining the fibers of our national character.

In China an American is brought to hope that we will always have the self-discipline which fired our ancestors. In our own land of liberty and abundance and power—with all the material advantages that China lacks—there have been corrosive trends that have grown as our fidelity to old virtues has waned.

In disciplined, unified China, American visitors will wonder if our self-indulgent free society will be able to compete effectively fifty years hence with this totalitarian State, possessed of a population which dwarfs our own, with equal or greater natural resources, and with total commitment to national goals.

Such are the questions that occurred to us as we made our way in the Middle Kingdom that is China.

NORMALIZING RELATIONS

Last February, the U.S. and Chinese stated that "progress toward the normalization of relations between China and the United States is in the interest of all countries," that normalization "contributes to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the world", and further, the Chinese noted that "the Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States."

In discussions of these and related points with Chinese leaders, we received the very clear impression that China remains most interested in improved State relations with the United States, just as we are with China.

We also can confirm that the Taiwan question appears to remain the "crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations." On this question, it is well to recall the United States position in the Shanghai Joint Communiqué last February as follows:

The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.

With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

Since the February Communiqués, American troop levels in Vietnam have been measurably reduced. In the same period—in fact in the very midst of our visit to China—the chiefs of state of North and South Korea met together in a promising beginning toward a relaxation of tension. Finally, there has been a state of relative calm in the Taiwan Strait during this same period. We view these as the kinds of developments which in time will allow a progressive reduction of our forces and military installations on Taiwan, and we are confident that, regardless of the political results next November, the United States will do its part to see that the process of normalizing United States-China relations can go forward.

We fully support peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves, and recognize that this goal is complicated by the fact that diplomatic relations currently exist between the United States and the Nationalist Government of General Chiang Kai-Shek but do not exist with the People's Republic of China. Here this question can be ultimately resolved we do not know, but we look forward to the day when all Chinese can be represented in Washington.

In this respect, we found that our continuing diplomatic relations with the Republic of China are for the People's Republic of China a particular barrier to normalized relations.

Chinese leaders called to our attention the fact that the war in Indochina is also an obstacle to improved relations between our countries. The Chinese position is well known. Fundamentally it is that Communist North Vietnam is a neighbor and friend whom China will not abandon. The Chinese insist that they have no territorial designs in Indochina, that they will not intervene in North Vietnamese affairs, and that they seek a neutral Indochina where no great power has hegemony.

Both of us support the systematic withdrawal and eventual end of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, and therefore we are optimistic that in reasonable time the Vietnam war will no longer obstruct the normalization of Sino-American relations.

Aside from the major questions of Taiwan and Vietnam, there are other ways in which progress toward normalized relations can proceed. These areas—trade and exchanges of visits, for example—are discussed later in our report.

INDOCHINA

We have already mentioned that the conflict in Indochina obstructs improved relations with China. In our discussions with Chinese leaders we were not surprised to find that they regard the United States as the aggressor in Vietnam or that they expressed fraternal solidarity with the North Vietnamese. The Chinese view, as it is known, is that the Vietnam conflict is a civil war whose roots are in mistaken United States foreign policy assumptions of the Dulles era.

It was also not surprising to us to hear that the Chinese will continue to give support to the North Vietnamese, although they laid considerable stress on their having not furnished combat ground troops.

The Chinese endeavored to persuade us that their challenge of domestic development is all-consuming; that they lack the ability and interest to wage external aggression; and that consequently we are mistaken if we are pursuing the conflict in Vietnam or maintaining military presence in Asia as part of a policy primarily intended to contain Chinese expansionism or subversion.
In reply to these views we reported to our hosts, and emphasized, that the American people and their leaders are in complete accord that the fighting in Vietnam should end, that American combat troops are being withdrawn and that the Vietnamese should peacefully determine their own future without outside interference.

We had extensive discussions with Premier Chou En-Lai on a number of subjects, including Indochina. At his specific request, we have reported his views on these matters to the President.

TAWAN

To the Chinese leaders, Taiwan is simply a province yet to be "liberated." Among the most common slogans we noted on public walls, banners, billboards, and even children's jerseys was the slogan: "We will certainly liberate Taiwan." In the Shanghai Communiqué the Chinese reiterated their opposition to any form of "two-China" solution to the question of Taiwan.

Thus, as we have mentioned, the issue of Taiwan remains a major obstacle to the improvement of our relations with China. Although this problem must be solved by the Chinese themselves, it poses difficulties for the United States in view of our diplomatic relations and mutual defense treaty with Taiwan.

In this matter, as in Vietnam, we believe the Chief Executive in his conduct of foreign policy should have substantial latitude necessary to help, where he can, to bring the problem to a solution. Therefore we will reserve substantial public comment on this question. Here, as in Vietnam, we trust the President will take into account the realities of the situation. We subscribe to the interest expressed by the U.S. side in the Joint Communiqué that the Chinese on each side of the Taiwan Strait will themselves settle this question.

In saying this we are not advocating "abandonment" of the Chinese on Taiwan. We simply recognize, as they do, that the situation which has existed for more than two decades has tended to create in the minds of many the inaccurate impression, to which neither the Nationalist Government nor the People's Republic of China subscribes, that there is not one China, but two.

The People's Republic of China uses such quasi-governmental organizations as the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) to advance Chinese interests where lack of diplomatic relations might otherwise be a barrier to international contact. Nevertheless, our hosts cited the Taiwan question on a number of occasions as an obstacle even to extensive people to people contact with us, and it is clear that the nature of our current relationship to Taiwan remains an obstacle to normalized Sino-U.S. relations. We therefore look forward to a resolution of this question.

SINO-SOVET RELATIONS

Throughout their histories, China and Russia have been wary friends if not outright enemies. After 1949, the United States tended to regard the Sino-Soviet relationship as an international communist conspiracy to subvert and control the world. Yet, as we look back, we can see that sharp ideological differences and growing geo-

political hostility between China and the Soviet Union reduced the likelihood of their close cooperation in such a strategy.

By 1960, Sino-Soviet relations were publicly strained. In that year, for example, the Chinese newspaper People's Daily, in a significant editorial attack on Soviet policy and leadership, ridiculed Nikita Khrushchev as a "peal-singing, table-thumping buffoon who belongs in the trash heap of history."

As early as 1960, of course, Soviet technicians and advisors resident in China to assist in industrial and agricultural development had been suddenly withdrawn. They left China with their plans, records and blueprints, leaving the Chinese understandably angry.

Today, normal State relations do exist between the U.S.S.R. and China. There is also a treaty of friendship between them. At the same time, Chinese and Soviet troops have clashed in bloody incidents along the border in Western China and over an island to which both lay claim in the Ussuri River north of Vladivostok. It is generally believed that the Soviets have more troops massed and more advanced weaponry poised along the border with China than they do in Europe. For its part, China, too, apparently has large numbers of troops deployed along the border.

To the Chinese vigilance along the border with the U.S.S.R. the Chinese must be giving serious attention to the growth of Soviet influence in India—a nation with whom China also shares a common and disputed boundary.

Finally, the Soviets have helped supply, train and arm the North Vietnamese in an obvious effort to gain influence with still another nation bordering China.

These strains in Sino-Soviet relations suggest one of many possible reasons for current Chinese willingness to seek improved relations with the United States. Surely the Chinese are under no illusions that the long-standing and fundamental differences they have with us can be suddenly wiped away. Yet it is obviously in China's interest to work for a world in which there can be relatively peaceful relations with the United States. In developing her domestic economy, it would be exceedingly disruptive for the Chinese to be required to be in a constant state of preparation against possible military interference by both the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Our conclusion that the Chinese and the Soviets are in a period of mutual tension should not be taken to mean that we have nothing to fear from possible joint Sino-Soviet designs. Obviously, for example, there is even now cooperation between the Soviet Union and China in furnishing the supplies which North Vietnam is using to wage war. Chinese railways are carrying Soviet equipment. Moreover, the Soviets are still trading with the Chinese; at Peking Airport we noticed that two new Soviet IL-62 aircraft were parked in front of the main terminal.

Our recommendation in view of heightened Sino-Soviet tension is simply that the United States should, in its self-interest, carry forward the policy of improved relations with China. At the same time, we must be aware that after nearly a quarter century of mutual isolation, the United States and China have much to learn about each other, and a long distance to travel together, before sturdy foundations of trust and good faith are laid. Therefore we must continue to remain defensively strong and alert.
U.S. PRISONERS IN CHINA

In view of the concern expressed to us by many people prior to our departure, we were particularly interested in pursuing with Chinese leaders the matter of U.S. prisoners held in China. The United States Government is aware that there are three individuals who are currently prisoners of the Chinese. They are John Downey, Major Philip Smith, U.S.A.F., and Lt. Cdr. Robert J. Flynn, U.S. Navy.

We appealed to Premier Chou En-lai and others on behalf of these men and their families, on humanitarian grounds, that they be accorded consideration with respect to treatment and release. We pointed out that favorable consideration by the Chinese would be an important indication to the American people of China's interest in normalizing relations.

Another high official with whom we met, Foreign Affairs Vice Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua, made a special point of advising us that he thought Mr. Downey's mother would like to know that he is currently in good health. We were advised that Mr. Downey's case is different from that of Major Smith and Lt. Cmdr. Flynn, the two American fliers who were forced down over Hainan Island, and that the cases will be handled separately. Other than assurances that the Chinese would take note of our appeals it was not possible to obtain any further information or assurances about these three Americans.

In the context of our discussions regarding Mr. Downey and the two fliers, we also inquired about the truth of reports circulating in the United States from time to time that other Americans, captured in Indochina or elsewhere, are being held prisoner on Chinese soil. On this point the Chinese assured us that they are not aware of any Americans held in China other than the three just mentioned. Moreover, the Chinese explained that from now on, they expect to handle the matter of prisoners on a candid and above-board basis, utilizing the channels of communications that have evolved between our countries since the President's visit. We took this to be an assurance that the United States Government is aware that there are no other Americans are held on Chinese soil as prisoners or otherwise detained against their will.

TRADE

After informal trade discussions with political leaders and officials of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), it appears to us that the Chinese side is prepared to have trade between our countries develop in some measure, but slowly. We did not find among our hosts the same high degree of enthusiasm for early and measurable increases in trade which has stimulated the development of trade with other nations. While China could finance high-cost, high-technology imports with long-term credit, we found no indication that the Chinese have significantly altered their vigorous resistance to debt financing.

These points by no means rule out an increase in Sino-American trade. As long as China believes it can accelerate technological development by trade, for example, it will use foreign exchange gained in exports to purchase sophisticated technology. It can achieve a trade balance by State planning, offsetting a trade imbalance with one nation by trade with others. While China could finance high-cost, high-technology imports with long-term credit, we found no indication that the Chinese have significantly altered their vigorous resistance to debt financing.

There appear to be a number of areas in which opportunities exist for U.S. exports to China. Obviously, these include advanced aircraft and satellite support technology—items China has already purchased. Other areas, too, coincide with China's plans for development. These include farm machinery and techniques; iron and steel production; on- and off-shore mineral, oil and gas extractive methods; chemical fertilizer production; chemical production; improved breeding stock; food processing techniques, computers, copiers, and so forth.

It is important for us to bear in mind regarding exports to China, however, that there are few items even in the category of advanced technology which China cannot obtain from other sources. Japan, Germany, France, Britain and the Soviet Union are all important Chinese trading partners. We must therefore be sufficiently competitive or Chinese business will go elsewhere. By the same token, Chinese goods which have a market in the United States are also generally available to us from other sources. These include a variety of foodstuffs, handicrafts, minerals, light manufacturers, and soft goods. We are not, therefore, trading partners essential to each other.

On the other hand, there is important political significance to increased Sino-American trade. The exchange of goods, like the exchange of people, can be a bridge to better mutual understanding and improved political relations.

Among serious obstacles to increased trade is the absence of normal State relations, yet Japan and the Federal Republics of Germany, though lacking diplomatic relations with China, have a higher volume of trade than does France which recognizes Peking. Thus, diplomatic ties with China may be a condition precedent to any dramatic increase in the range and volume of goods traded, this is not to say that some significant trade cannot occur before that event. Obviously, some trade can itself play an important part in bringing about diplomatic ties. The imminent purchase by China of Boeing aircraft is a good example of a large transaction which required official U.S.-Government participation, at least to the extent the grant of a federally issued export license was required to make the transaction possible.

Nevertheless, the Chinese seemed to be telling us that before too long, if trade relations are to improve, progress will have to be made in resolving a number of items: the conflict in Indochina; the status of our relationship to Taiwan; current tariff and non-tariff barriers; the current disagreements over frozen Chinese assets; claims of U.S. citizens for property seized by China; and U.S. policy respecting end-use and export licensing. Clearly further mutual effort must be given to the area of trade development and promotion.
We do not say that the Chinese are uninterested in pursuing trade with the United States. But it is important for us to bear in mind that the Chinese are very sensitive to the possibility of exploitation, and they are striving to be self-sufficient. In a recent speech the Chinese Vice-Minister of Trade sounded a theme which we heard repeatedly during our visit, namely that "international trade should be based on equality and mutual benefit." In view of the experience of China in matters of trade with the West over the last 150 years, this is an understandable concern.

**Law and Justice**

The legal system, an important part of any system of government, appears to be undergoing very fundamental experimentation. The legal profession itself has been abolished; petty disputes and infractions are handled by the Revolutionary Committees in the communities in which the offenses or disputes occur. Behavior control seems to be based less on a fear of physical punishment or confinement than on persuasion, psychological pressures, public shaming and such re-education devices as political study and manual labor. There may be much for us to ponder with respect to the Chinese belief in the social reducibility of wayward citizens, and their claimed rejection of confinement in the rehabilitation process. There is also, unfortunately, a definite reluctance on the part of the Chinese to permit Western visitors access to information on their legal system as it relates to crime. While this is somewhat understandable in a society which is experimenting with the whole question of law and justice, we hope the Chinese will before long permit us to share in their search for better ways to deal with antisocial behavior.

**Political Stability**

In view of the complexity of the domestic Chinese political situation, a subject which has occupied the increasing attention of Sinologists in the West, we can offer only the most general observations. Obviously, if the evident progress toward a united, productive and self-reliant China is sustained, there must be political stability, and whether such stability exists depends not only on China's relations with its international neighbors, but perhaps more importantly on her ability to govern effectively in her own domestic affairs.

As for the present, Chinese Communism appears fortunate to have among its senior leaders a man as worldly, tireless and adroit as Premier Chou En-lai. At an age when most men are relaxing in retirement, Chou seems a man of spring steel, abundant energy, high intelligence and great international sophistication. In giving credit to President Nixon for his bold initiative in opening the way for improved relations with China, we should not forget that Premier Chou and his associates were equally bold in that undertaking. The fact that a closed society which has made the United States anathema would be a party to this effort is as encouraging as it is remarkable. The Premier is certainly among the most seasoned and perceptive national leaders in the world today. The course of China's internal and external policies in the future will depend in large measure on how effective he is in transmitting his vigor and his outlook to younger leaders.

One final point is this: We have no way of calculating the political role played by the military in China today. It was not evident to us how much of a part the army has in provincial and municipal government. We were advised prior to our visit that military personnel occupy top positions in the provincial and municipal Revolutionary Committees, but we were unable to confirm this. It may be noteworthy, however, that we met only the nonmilitary Vice Chairman, but never the military Chairmen, of these Revolutionary Committees. These Vice Chairmen were also men and women of apparent energy and ability.

The Revolutionary Committees at the provincial, municipal, commune and factory levels have been the principal organs of government since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. These committees are composed of representatives of the army, party cadre and masses. The smallest unit is apparently the Neighborhood Committee, which is constituted at mass meetings. There has apparently been no national representative unit functioning since the National People's Congress last met in early 1965.

Our Chinese hosts, in discussion of current political topics involving the United States, invariably assured us that they did not want their comments to be construed as an intrusion in our internal affairs. This is subject to the interpretation that by our own questions and observations we should take care not to intrude in their internal affairs. Naturally we intended no such intrusion by our curiosity then, nor do we by this report.

Despite Mao's frequently quoted maxims to "trust the masses" and "serve the people," and despite the political forms evolved to "consult the masses," the system of government in China is a pyramid whose decisions are made at the top. Perhaps never in history have so many been ruled so completely by so few.

**Exchanges**

Among the activities which holds the most promise for developing understanding between our two countries is people-to-people contact and exchanges. The Shanghai Communique took specific note of this fact. Both sides agreed that "it is desirable to broaden the understanding between two peoples" and that each side would endeavor to "facilitate the further development of such contact and exchanges" in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports and journalism.

Our own visit, which was as graciously hosted as a visit could be, is a tribute to the sincerity of the Chinese in encouraging contact. And other Members of Congress will no doubt be pleased to know that Chinese leaders at the highest levels expressed a willingness to host other American political leaders on a bipartisan basis so long as the time and personnel are available on the Chinese side to accommodate them.

This last point highlights two interesting facts: first, the Chinese not only favor increased contact with the West, they already appear to have a very ambitious program of hosting foreign guests. This activity naturally puts a strain on their ability to supply interpreters and provide transportation, housing and other services to visitors. Second, the interest the Chinese have in encouraging visits to their country is a
measure of their confidence that, once exposed to the New China, a visitor genuinely interested in truth and objectivity will return home favorably impressed. This is not a misplaced confidence. As we have mentioned, the clean streets, the friendly and hardworking people, the rich agricultural areas and the throbbing industrial cities are testimony to the successes of the New China in welding a nation out of the chaotic post-war period.

While China favors increased people-to-people contact, she seems much more interested in hosting visitors than sending her own citizens to the United States. There are three reasons for this. First, our recognition of Taiwan troubles the Chinese to such an extent that China is reluctant to expose her citizens to possible embarrassment from criticism or ridicule by Americans or others who may question the legitimacy of their government. Second, there is a genuine fear of physical harm to Chinese citizens traveling in the United States. They have read our crime statistics. They are aware that the United Nations diplomat charged with the security of U.N. diplomats was himself mugged and robbed in New York. Finally, there may also be a reluctance on the part of the Chinese to expose their people to our way of life—political liberty, wealth, social mobility, and so forth.

The acceptance of the Chinese table tennis team in the United States has helped to dispel, we believe, the foregoing fears. Chinese leaders were unanimous in their appreciation for the warm and safe reception given their team, and we assured them that the American people will be equally courteous and enthusiastic hosts for other Chinese, whether official guests or visitors or a people-to-people basis.

Of all the areas of exchange, the Chinese appeared most interested in pursuing those in the medical field. This is an area in which the Chinese trade relations maxim of "equality and mutual benefit" has particular application. Chinese political as well as medical leaders expressed great interest in learning about American efforts in fields of cancer, heart disease, and stroke. And, of course, the Chinese are justly proud of their remarkable achievements in acupuncture anesthesia and therapy. In this area, we have much to learn from each other for the ultimate benefit of our people, and so we are optimistic that contact in this area will be active.

In the field of journalism, the Chinese have been very cooperative in hosting American journalists and were especially so in hosting the media representatives who accompanied us. Naturally, there are more journalists who are seeking visas than the Chinese have yet accommodated, but this seems to be more a function of ability to handle numbers than any policy to restrict access of the American press corps.

Our arrival in Peking, for example, was preceded by visits of journalists from The New York Times and the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, and a Washington Post journalist arrived during our mission.

The Taiwan question appears to be an obstacle to the establishment of news agencies in our respective countries, but we favor this and related steps toward improved communication, and we hope China will send more of her journalists to this country.

In the academic area, too, the Chinese seem reluctant to send students to American universities. This reluctance is related to the Taiwan question; China does not want her students exposed to har-
and Increase Production." We were also frequently advised that while the Cultural Revolution was necessary, future ideological purifications will likely take a less drastic and economically disruptive form.

Wages of factory workers and peasants are very low by American standards, but then so are prices. We saw no evidence that families in which the husbands worked were living for the necessities of life and, since many families appear to have both parents as well as some children employed, there is even the opportunity to save for such "luxury" items as radios, sewing machines, electric fans and bicycles.

Department stores and food stores appear well stocked with merchandise and busy with shoppers. The range of color and design of clothing and fabric was somewhat surprising in view of reports that the Chinese tend to dress primarily in gray or blue clothing. Most people do, in fact, dress in clothing of those colors, but children's clothing and women's blouses are beginning to show signs of color and decorations. It is of interest, though, that the decoration at least on children's clothing often serves political ends—for example, one of our party bought a jersey for a toddler which bears the popular Chinese slogan, "We Will Certainly Liberate Taiwan!"

All tillable land is used for agriculture. Crops are planted not only in areas close to the cities and, for example, up to the edge of airstrips, but also within the city limits. Only in rare instances did we see land given over to the relative wastefulness of grass.

Working conditions for factory workers are in major respects close to uniform throughout China. At both a jeep production facility in Peking and an iron and steel works in Anshan, for example, the work week is six days, forty-eight hours, three shifts. Workers generally get one hour for lunch, though in the South the lunch hour is sometimes two hours. Retirement is at age sixty for men and fifty-five for women at seventy percent of salary. A worker's wage typically ranges in eight steps from approximately eighteen to fifty-five dollars a month. Housing for workers usually consists of small three-room apartments arranged in close proximity to the plants, and workers are charged two to five dollars a month rent. Day-care and week-care nurseries are available for children of workers at nominal charge. Medical care for workers is free, and children are covered for 50% of medical costs. Women are given fifty-six days maternity leave. The only vacation time which the workers have is during the three or four national holidays, although some workers told us that they would be entitled to ten or twelve days of home leave to rejoin their families if their families resided a substantial distance away.

Working conditions for peasants working in communes are also, we were told, fairly uniform throughout China, varying only according to planting and harvest cycles. A typical day in the paddies and fields begins about six a.m. and continues to sundown with a long midday break for meals and relaxation. We visited two communes, the Red Star Commune near Peking and the August 1st Commune near Shen Yang. Each commune is divided into households, then production brigades and finally into production teams. In the August 1st Commune for example there are 4,000 households, 15 production brigades and 73 production teams. This same August 1st Commune, though its primary production is rice, has 5,000 hogs, 500 work animals, and estimated million fish, 50,000 ducks, 60 tractors, 60 rubber wheeled carts, 87 wells, and 47 pump stations. A vast system of irrigation ditches carries water and fertilizer to the rice fields.

Looking to the future of China's economy, the fundamental reality seems to be that China has an immense and growing population to feed, clothe, house and care for, and that increased production is essential simply to keep pace with population pressures. Most projections show that the population of China will reach one billion by 1980. This means that it is desirable for the pace of industrialization and production to accelerate; it means that China must have political stability; and it means that the disruptions of the Cultural Revolution must not be repeated or not recur in such a form as will bring on a paralysis of industry or agriculture.

ENVIRONMENT

Air and water pollution appeared to be as much of a concern to the Chinese as to ourselves, and they expressed interest in U.S. efforts at control and abatement.

Air pollution is an evident problem in industrialized areas such as Anshan, Shanghai, and Canton. Black smoke pours from factory chimneys with little apparent effort underway to stop it. Moreover, we understand that all cities undergo marked increase in air pollution in the winter months when the general public burns large quantities of coal for heat.

Water pollution is much less of a problem, for two reasons. First, the level of industrialization is relatively low, and therefore there is relatively little discharge of industrial waste into waterways. Second, the Chinese do not to any significant degree discharge human waste into rivers and streams—instead, human waste is collected, treated, and used as fertilizer. This latter is an excellent example of serving a two-fold purpose of keeping waterways clean and clean and, at the same time, recycling waste to meet another socially important purpose.

The absence of motor vehicles in any large numbers in Chinese cities produces another positive environmental result. Not only is air pollution potential reduced, but there is virtually no noise pollution. The
nearly silent swish of hundreds of bicycles is a far more livable sound
than the racing of hundreds of engines and the honking of hundreds
of horns. Another positive environmental effect made by the Chinese
is in the area of flood control. Extensive networks of dikes and irrigation
canals have been constructed to tame Nature and serve agricultural
objectives.

The Chinese follow another public policy worthy of our attention,
and that is their policy with respect to dogs. We read just prior to our
journey of the controversy in New York City between dog owners and
non-dog owners regarding the deposit of dog waste on public ways. In
China, dogs are simply forbidden from cities completely—we saw no
dogs at all in any city we visited. The prime reason for this is protec-
tion of the public health, but of course in China a dog is also a non-
productive consumer which the society declines to indulge.

The anti-dog policy is related in philosophy to the famous “Four
Pests” campaign instituted after 1949. This campaign was an effort
to exterminate flies, rats, mosquitoes and sparrows on the ground that
these four pests jeopardized the public health and robbed the country
of food. It is well to remember, particularly when we consider the
hardships we ourselves face in improving public sanitation, that before
1949 Chinese cities were notorious for their filth. Communicable dis-
ease was spread by rats, flies and mosquitoes, and large quantities of
crops stored wheat, rice and other foodstuffs were consumed by rats
and sparrows. Today, as we witnessed, the streets are almost spotlessly
clean, flies have almost totally disappeared, and we were assured that
creep and grain storage levels prove that rats and sparrows have almost
vanished. The campaign continues today; many of us noticed young
boys and girls who, going on about play or other business, held a fly
swatter over their shoulders, at the ready. Another example of the
pollution consciousness of Chinese, of course, are the white cloth face
masks one sees covering the nose and mouths of cyclists and pedestrians.

EDUCATION AND CULTURE

It was evident during our visit that cultural and educational life
in China continues to feel the effects of the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution which convulsed the country between 1966 and 1969.
“Struggle, criticism and transformation” is still in progress in evolv-
ing policy for the arts and schools.

We attended two cultural performances in Manchuria and Canton,
and artistic expression. The Peking Revolutionary Opera combine a few traditional elements
such as sword dances, with music that is vaguely reminiscent of

Tchaikowsky and some first-rate ballet sequences to present highly
melodramatic and patriotic stories of peasant or workers heroes and hero-
ines who are guided by Mao Tse-tung’s thought to overcome the schem-
ings of “class enemies,” “exploitive landlords,” or Japanese invaders.

On the radio we heard little traditional music, with most musical
programs restricted to excerpts from Peking Opera and a limited
number of patriotic songs usually embodying specific references to
Chairman Mao.

Foreign language bookstores contained only Marxist-Leninist ide-
ological works and we were told that literary production had ceased
during the Cultural Revolution. The classes in Chinese literature that
we observed were devoted to the study of Mao’s “Talks to the Yenan Forum” or to ancient classics.

We saw no one carrying or reading the Red Book of Quotations
from Chairman Mao, but reference was often made to the application
of Chairman Mao’s thought to the solution of practical problems. Slog-
gans or quotations from Mao writings appear on billboards, on the
front of buildings, and on special red concrete slabs erected at the en-
trances to courtyards, factories, and agricultural communes.

In a noticeable contrast to contemporary America was the obvious
de-emphasis of sex, not only because of the homogeniety of clothing
but also because the official policy views romantic attachments as an
interference and distraction from dedication to one’s work. The con-
trast with contemporary America was even more striking when we
asked a group of university students in Canton whether they had any
“special” girl friends. They replied, “We are too young for that!”
When we asked their ages, they turned out to be 21 to 23 years old.
Official policy discourages marriage before the age of 25.

What was left of organized religion seems to have been a casualty of
the Cultural Revolution’s campaign against the “Four Olds”—old
thinking, old habits, old customs, and old traditions—and we were told
that the Red Guards had raided and closed the churches after arms
were discovered in a church and evidence produced that a churchman
was a spy. When we asked to attend church services in Shanghai we
were told that no churches were functioning. We saw several closed
churches in Peking and Canton, including the former Roman Catholic
Cathedral which was said to be used as an office now. “The White
Haired Girl” contained elements linking Buddhism to the rule of land-
hords in pre-1949 China.

The Government is using education and culture to create a unified
people. To this end, while songs and dances from border areas and
ethnic minorities are presented, all instruction as well as all stage pro-
ductions are in Mandarin, even in the Cantonese-speaking areas of
southern China. At a cultural production in Canton, for example, we
were puzzled to see the Chinese characters for the words being sung on
the stage flashed on the wall until we realized that nearly everyone in
the audience was using them to understand what was being said. The
written language is common, but spoken Cantonese and Mandarin are
mutually incomprehensible. Some members of our party visited the In-
stitute of Minorities in Peking where future leaders from such border
areas as Tibet, Mongolia, and Hainan were being imbued with national
values before returning to their native areas.
Since the Cultural Revolution, during which the universities and most secondary schools ceased instruction, the Chinese educational system has been reorganized and focused on the application of learning to the problems of peasants, workers, and soldiers—and on the direct exposure of students and teachers to those problems. Schooling has also been shortened and Mao Tse-tung’s writings receive great emphasis at all levels.

The Chinese educational system begins with nurseries which are available to working mothers in the cities who have no relatives to care for their babies, from the time the children are three months old until the age of 3. The next stage is the nursery school for children from 3 to 7. We visited two such schools, one of which boarded children from six days a week at a cost of about $5 a month. Like the Children’s Palaces in Shanghai and Peking (massive playground complexes in which thousands of children participate) they use music, art, dancing and sports to emphasize patriotic themes and the thought of Mao Tse-tung. We did not visit any primary schools but were told that primary schooling lasts six years. We did visit two secondary schools (Middle Schools), one on a commune and the other in an urban industrial area. Where secondary schooling had before the Cultural Revolution been divided into two three-year sections with many students discontinuing their education at the end of what we would call junior high school, all students are expected to complete schooling which has now been shortened to three or four years. This is followed by two years of work in the factories or fields. The students in the urban secondary school we visited were older than they would normally be at that grade level, because their school was closed for two years during the Cultural Revolution. Their curriculum has been revised to include such subjects as agronomy (in an urban area), two hours a week of political studies, work in a shop attached to a nearby factory, and two months a year (one in summer and one in winter) of work in factories accompanied by their teachers. Classes are held from 8 a.m. until 4:30 p.m. six days a week so that the class time is not shortened excessively. We were particularly impressed by the level of the ninth grade English class which we observed, which was conducted entirely in that language and in which the students demonstrated a high level of proficiency. Despite the fact that Shenyang is near the Soviet Union we were told that half the students chose English as their language elective, the other half choosing Russian. All classes had a high level of political content. Art classes sketched heroes and heroines from the Revolutionary Old and music classes sang songs of the People’s Liberation Army or in praise of Mao Tse-tung.

The university we visited, Sun Yat-sen in Canton, was less impressive. The Cultural Revolution seemed to have done serious damage to higher education. All universities were closed down and professors sent to work for periods of six months to two years in factories or fields. Courses had been reduced in length from 5-6 years to 2-3 years, and small entering classes are composed of those who have spent at least two years in factories or fields or the army after Middle School, and who are recommended by their organizations. At Sun Yat-sen, only one class has been admitted since the Cultural Revolution, that one in December 1970. It is comprised of 500 students. Of that group, 90% are the children of peasants or workers and most of the rest came from the army. 20% are women. Half are members of the Communist Party and an additional 40% belong to the Communist Youth League (the Chinese equivalent to the Russian Komsomol). A new class of 800 students is about to enter and we were told that the percentage of party activists is equally high among them. The natural sciences library at the university appeared well-stocked with scientific books in English, French, German and Russian, as well as in Chinese, and a large variety of animal, bird and insect specimens were displayed in a university museum. It was a disappointment for us to be told here, however, as at other educational institutions we visited, that courses in political subjects were not in progress and therefore could not be visited.

We were told that the emphasis in instruction is placed upon self-study and group discussion, though we saw traditional style teaching being carried out. Despite press reports to the contrary, we were told that entrance examinations are being used in addition to secondary school records and recommendations, but a superficial impression was that the academic level of the university was not high. It should be noted that much of the technical education is carried out in specialized institutes which we did not see. The students received paramilitary training from the university and the army is represented here as elsewhere on a Revolutionary Committee which has run the university since the Cultural Revolution, and is supposed to include representatives of mass organizations as well. In the latter category we learned that each academic department has a worker assigned to it who is to advise the professors on the practical application of their teaching.

We interviewed a group of students in the dormitory where eight sleep in a large room on double-deck bunks and study together at a large table as we entered, they were studying “Mao’s Talks at the Yanan Forum.” They told us that they were students of Chinese literature and were preparing to be literary critics. On a typical day they arise at 6 a.m., like everyone else in China it seemed, do calisthenics and eat breakfast. This is followed by classes from 7:30 until 11:30. After the usual noon break for lunch and a nap, they resume classes from 3 until 5:30 p.m. This is followed by calisthenics and dinner, study from 7:00 until 9:30 and lights out at 10 p.m.

A new element in Chinese education since the Cultural Revolution is a rest network of May 7th Cadre Schools for the education and re-education of people in positions of responsibilities. Party, governmental, organizational, and intellectual leaders are supposed to attend these schools for periods of 1-6 months (we found at least one instance of a person who had been in such a school for three years. These schools are named for the date of the statement by Mao creating such schools at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution and are located on agricultural communes or, less often, in factories. The May 7th schools combine manual labor with the study of the works of Mao, and intensive discussion is given to the application of his thought to practical problems, in particular those facing peasants and workers. Mornings are spent in the fields and afternoons are devoted to study and discussion of Mao’s principal works especially “On Practice.”
"On Contradictions," and "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People." There is also study of extracts from the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin pictures of whom we saw in the back of classrooms while the ubiquitous picture of Mao was hung in front. Sometimes workers and peasants are interviewed or conduct class so that the "cadres" can learn about their problems. The schools operate to raise the level of political consciousness, to develop a sense of dedication to the ideals and thoughts of Mao, to prevent "elitism" among the middle level leadership and to re-educate, sometimes for rather long periods, those who appear to be inclined toward "revisionism." Here as elsewhere group pressures and psychological techniques are used which are not too far removed from those used by religious groups in the West.

It is understood that the leaders will return to those schools from time to time, but it was assumed by Chinese with whom we talked that this would not be enough to prevent the emergence of "revisionism." In the future further Cultural Revolutions but "in a different form" are seen as necessary. Whether they can be carried out without extremism and the adverse economic effects of the convulsion of 1966-69 this would not be enough to prevent the emergence of "revisionism." Here as elsewhere group pressures and psychological techniques are used which are not too far removed from those used by religious groups in the West.

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**FAMILY LIFE**

It is well known that few societies have as great a traditional reverence for family ties as the Chinese. From our observations, there are serious strains on this tradition in China today, and they are primarily the result of the work patterns of the parents.

Today in China women enjoy, if that is the correct term, an equality with men. This means that they are politically and socially equal with men. They serve as members and officers of Revolutionary Committees from the neighborhood units upward. They also work side by side with men in the farms and factories of China. Only in the heaviest work at the most demanding jobs in the iron and steel plants at Anshan were women absent. But even there, in the hot, choking, dark and noisy caverns of industry, women could be found operating heavy equipment.

In the showcase communes and factories to which we were taken, we found no household where the wife and mother did not work at some job outside the home. We therefore assume not only that this is a widespread practice, but also that the employment of both parents is a practice favored and encouraged by the State.

As a consequence of this, children are in State care facilities for the most important years of their lives. From a physical care standpoint, these facilities for infants and pre-schoolers seem highly developed. The children seemed well-clothed, happy and sturdy. And the care-taker-to-child ratio seemed generally to be a very favorable four or five children to one adult. This is possible, of course, where the labor force is very large.

Many of these facilities are designed to care for children on a weekly basis, allowing the child to be with its parents only one day a week, since there is a six-day work week throughout the country. In other cases, children are deposited with the day care center at bed time and then picked up the following evening after work. Still other facilities, for older children, are set up to occupy and train youngsters after school.

In spite of the efficiency of this approach to child care, there are obvious grave implications. First of all, parents see their children far too infrequently. We sensed a certain sadness about this even among those parents who most vigorously praised the system. Second, the children at their most impressionable years are vulnerable subjects for active political indoctrination. "As the twig is bent," the saying goes, "so grows the tree." We witnessed the political education of children not yet three years old. In song and dance and art children are taught to give unquestioning gratitude and praise to the State and its leaders, to the army, the workers and peasants.

It is true that where grandparents live at home the children are often in their care. But the direction of State policy seems to be to employ all those who are able to work, and the upbringing of the children therefore falls to the State.

**HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE**

People of all ages seemed well nourished and healthy. Most seemed to be involved in strenuous farm or city labor, but seemed to enjoy and thrive on hard work. Dental care, however, seemed deficient, and the high incidence of cigarette smoking suggested a general lack of knowledge about the potential harmful effects.

In understanding medical care and delivery the key word is relative; that is, relative to what it had been prior to 1949. With that in mind and not comparing it to Western standards, a better conception of their progress in health and medical care can be understood.

During the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, medical schools were closed and medical journals stopped printing. Since that time the concept of "Serve The People" has favored medical education and health care delivery so as to insure quantity, perhaps at the expense of quality. The main changes that have occurred are these:

- Shortened length of medical school from 6 years to 3 years; paring the curriculum from 36 courses to 15.
- Students must spend time in the communities obtaining experience and training "Barefoot Doctors."
- Students are selected for the study of medicine, after high school and 2 years of work, by their fellow commune or factory workers.
- Selection is based on their political motivation, intellect and proven willingness to work.
- As at all levels of Chinese society, periodic physical work in the commune is demanded of medical students.
- Former specialists are the backbone of the medical faculties.
- Students must be single and may not marry.
- Doctors start out at a salary of $30 per month ($14.40), and may advance through 5 levels of pay based on political motivation, quality and quantity of work.
- The entire post Cultural Revolution university program is in an experimental stage, since no class has yet graduated from this new program.
of pain circuit transmission by needle-electric stimuli seems to be the most accepted theory, and we believe it will be a widely used technique in the United States before very long.

Each factory, commune or farm has medical care readily available, albeit minimal at times. Each branch of medical training and care is a mixture of Western and traditional. In many respects this whole system resembles the concept of regional medical programs in this country.

Acupuncture, the remarkable technique for operation without anesthesia, was performed before Christ was born and we saw gold acupuncture needles dating back to 133 B.C. Its usefulness as a form of treatment remains uncertain, in the opinion of the American physician who accompanied our group. However the Chinese use it widely for therapeutic relief of headache, gall bladder disease, peptic ulcer, heart disease, deafness and a variety of other ills. We observed three major surgical operations—appendectomy, removal of an ovarian cyst and thyroid tumor—and three tooth extractions, performed using acupuncture anesthesia.

Acupuncture anesthesia, which was begun in the late 50's appears to be a highly significant medical advance. Having seen it used for thyroid, ovarian, appendicular and dental surgery, and having seen the patients talking, drinking tea, eating orange slices during the procedure, and having observed the patients hop off the operating table at the conclusion of surgery impressed even the most doubting cynic. The obvious advantages to acupuncture anesthesia are:

- Safety—no depressant anesthetics or liver toxins are needed.
- The patient is able to cooperate during surgery—i.e. talk during thyroid surgery (vocal cord), move during brain surgery and so forth.
- No recovery room time is needed—the patient has reacted at the end of surgery;
- Less training and skill are needed by the anesthetist;
- The patient is able to cooperate during surgery—i.e. talk during the operation; thereby shortening the operation;
- There appeared to be less bleeding.

A commune doctor demonstrated the acupuncture technique on the hand of our delegation physician and the hand was anesthetized within 15-20 seconds. We understand that this form of anesthesia is now being used in at least three U.S. hospitals. Precise needle placement doesn't seem to matter for the anesthetizing effect to be complete. The jamming of pain circuit transmission by needle—electric stimuli seems to be the most accepted theory, and we believe it will be a widely used technique in the United States before very long.

The hospitals themselves were clean and orderly, adequately staffed, not over crowded and properly located. By our standards their equipment was very antiquated—this observation includes operating room, X-ray, lab, wards, delivery, central supply, and so on. A surprisingly large number of the surgeons were women.

The Chinese diet, which consists of far lesser quantities of animal fats and sugar than our own, combined with the exercise the Chinese get as they bike, walk and work at manual labor on the average far more than we do every day, has helped produce a population which is lean and strong in appearance.

**ITINERARY**

**JUNE 26**

10:00 a.m.—Arrivals in Shanghai. Luncheon meeting with municipal and provincial officials.

12:00 a.m.—Departure for Peking.

4:00 p.m.—Arrival in Peking.

7:00 p.m.—Dinner hosted by the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA) and meeting with CPIFA officials.

**JUNE 27**

**Morning.**—Palace Museum and Exhibition of Excavated Historical Relics.

**Afternoon.**—(1) Meeting with Mr. Chiao Kuan-hua, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs; (2) The Central Institute for Nationalities; (3) The Summer Palace; and (4) The Peking Zoo.

**Evening.**—Sports Performances.

**JUNE 28**

**Morning.**—(1) No. 3 Hospital of Peking Medical College (acupuncture anesthesia); (2) The Red Star People's Commune.

**Afternoon.**—(1) The Peking Arts and Crafts Factory; (2) The Peking Dongfanghong Automobile Plant; (3) Meeting with representatives of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade.

**Evening.**—Meeting and Dinner with Premier Chou En-lai.

**JUNE 29**

**Morning and Afternoon.**—The Great Wall and Ting Ling Museum.

8:00 p.m.—Departure for Shenyang.

9:30 p.m.—Arrival in Shenyang Meeting with municipal and provincial officials.

**JUNE 30**

**Morning.**—Departure for Anshan—high tension live-line demonstration (on the way).

**Afternoon.**—Anshan Iron & Steel Works.

**Evening.**—Acrobatics Performances.
JULY 1
Morning.—Return to Shenyang—Rice-growing People's Commune (on the way).
Afternoon.—(1) Transformer Factory; (2) Middle school and Kindergarten; (3) School for Deaf and Mute and Kindergarten.
Evening.—Dinner with local officials.

JULY 2
8:30 a.m.—Return to Shanghai prevented due to adverse weather; aircraft diverted to Peking.

JULY 3
Morning.—Departure for Canton.
Afternoon.—Tour of Canton. Meetings with municipal and provincial officials.
Evening.—Dinner with local leaders.

JULY 4
Morning.—Sun Yat-sen University and Medical College.
Afternoon.—Workers Housing Complex, Middle School, Children's Palace.
Evening.—Cultural Performance by Canton Troupe; Fourth of July Dinner for CPIFA, hosted by Mr. Boggs and Mr. Ford.

JULY 5
Morning.—Departure for Hong Kong by rail.

HOSTS AND HOST ORGANIZATION

Our formal host in China was the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs (CPIFA). This is a quasi-governmental organization used to extend hospitality to persons, such as our party, from nations with which China does not have diplomatic relations. Premier Chou En-lai is Honorary Chairman of the CPIFA.

The gracious hospitality provided by the CPIFA included a remarkably successful effort to schedule in a very short time a wide variety of experiences in diverse places according to our interests and desires. As anyone who has had a part in arranging visits of this sort is aware, a high degree of skill and patience is essential, and our hosts never failed us. Our safety was assured with the great care of our drivers and, particularly, with the skill of our aircraft crew. Finally, of course, no account of our journey would be complete without testimony to the extraordinary cuisine whose variety and excellence greeted us three times daily.

We would like to express our warmest thanks to the CPIFA, particularly to Chang Hai-jo, President of the CPIFA; to Chou Pei-yuan, Vice President of the CPIFA; to Chou Chiu-yeh, Secretary General of the CPIFA, who accompanied us on our journey, to the CPIFA provincial and municipal representatives in the areas we visited, to our drivers, guides and guest-house staffs, and most especially to the uniformly friendly, helpful and competent young men and women who were assigned to us as interpreters. The warm feeling we developed for the people of China is in no small measure attributable to the unfailing good humor and uncommon courtesy of these individuals.

NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY DISPATCHES

The following official dispatches were released by the New China News Agency in connection with our visit:

Peking Banquet Welcomes House Leaders Boggs and Ford

(S061946 Peking NCNA International Service in English 1935 GMT 26 Jun 72 B.)
Peking, June 26, 1972 (Hsinhua).—The Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs gave a banquet here this evening for Hale Boggs, Democratic leader of the U.S. House of Representatives, and Mrs. Boggs, and Gerald Ford, Republican leader of the House, and Mrs. Ford.
Among the guests at the banquet were members of their party: William A. Brown, Freeman Cary, Bryce Marlow, Robert Hartmann, Gary Hymel, Harry Lee, Frank Meyer, Paul A. Milich, Day O. Mount, Paul Sigmund and Eugene A. Theroux.
Present were Kuo Mo-jo, Vice-Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress; Chang Hsi-jo, President of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs; Chiao Kuan-hua, Vice-Foreign Minister; and Chou Pei-yuan, Vice-President of the Institute. Before the banquet, they met Hale Boggs and Gerald Ford and their wives and the other American guests and had a friendly talk with them.
Present at the banquet and meeting were Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ju Yu-chih and Lin Chiao-chih, members of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and leading members of organizations concerned, including Chou Chiu-yeh, Yu Li-chen, Wang Ti-chen, Wang Tung, Wang Hse-tai, Hu Hung-fan, Chien Ta-tung and Ma Yu-chen.
The American guests arrived here by air this afternoon on a visit to China at the invitation of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs. They were met at the airport by Chou Pei-yuan and others.
Chou Chiu-yeh, Secretary General of the host organization, had made a special trip to Shanghai to meet the American guests and accompanied them to Peking.
During their halt in Shanghai, the American guests were greeted at the airport by Gong Kuo-chu, council member of the host organization.

Premier Chou En-lai Hosts U.S. Leaders

(Peking NCNA International Service in English 2047 GMT 28 Jun 72 B.)
Peking, June 28, 1972 (Hsinhua).—Chou En-lai, premier of the State Council, Chang Hai-jo, president of the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, and Chiao Kuan-hua, vice-chairman, this evening hosted a dinner for Hale Boggs, Democratic leader of the
U.S. House of Representatives, and Mrs. Boggs, and Gerald Ford, Republican House leader, and Mrs. Ford, and their party.

The members of their party attending the dinner were: William A. Brown, Freeman Cary, Bryce Harlow, Robert Hartmann, Gary Hymel, Harry Lee, Frank Meyer, Paul A. Miltich, Day O. Mount, Paul Sigmund, and Eugene A. Theroux.

Present at the banquet were Chou Pei-yuan, vice-president of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, and leading members and staff members of organizations concerned Chou Chiu-yeh, Wang Ti-cheng, Wang Tung, Hu Hung-fan, Ma Yu-chen, Chi Chao-chu, Tzu Chung-yun and Chao Ching-tien.

After the banquet, Premier Chou En-lai and others met the U.S. House leaders and their party.

PEKING, June 29, 1972 (Hsinhua).—Hale Boggs, Democratic leader of the U.S. House of Representatives, and Mrs. Boggs, and Gerald Ford, Republican House leader, and Mrs. Ford, and their party left here by air this evening on a visit to other parts of China in the company of Chou Chiu-yeh, secretary-general of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs.

Seeing them off at the airport were Chou Pei-yuan, vice-president of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs, and his wife Hu Yu-chih, member of the standing committee of the national people’s congress; and leading members of organizations concerned Wang Tung and Wang Hsiao-i.

BOGGS, FORD END PRC VISIT, LEAVE CANTON FOR HOME

CANTON, July 5, 1972 (Hsinhua).—Hale Boggs, Democratic leader of the U.S. House of Representatives, and Mrs. Boggs, and Gerald Ford, Republican House Leader, and Mrs. Ford, and their party left here for home by train today at the end of a visit to China.

They were seen off at the railway station by Chou Chiu-yeh, secretary general, and Shao Yun-sheng, council member, of the Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs; Kao Chao-ian, professor of Chungshan University; and leading members of Chinese organizations concerned, including Hu Hung-fan, Tsu Kuo-chi and Cheng Chien.

The U.S. guests arrived in Canton on the morning of July 3 after touring Peking, Shenyang and Anshan. They were honoured at a banquet given that evening by Wang Shou-tao, vice-chairman of the Kwangtung Provincial Revolutionary Committee.

While in Canton, the American guests visited a factory, a school and a children’s palace and went sightseeing in the city. Hale Boggs and Mrs. Boggs, and Gerald Ford and Mrs. Ford gave a reciprocal banquet yesterday evening.

Composition of the Delegation

Majority Leader Hale Boggs and Mrs. Boggs.
Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford and Mrs. Ford.
Mr. William A. Brown, Deputy Director, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Department of State.
Dr. Freeman H. Cary, Assistant Attending Physician to the Congress.
Mr. Bryce N. Harlow, Business Executive, former Counselor to the President, Aide to Mr. Ford.
Mr. Robert T. Hartmann, Legislative Assistant to Mr. Ford.
Mr. Gary G. Hymel, Administrative Assistant to Mr. Boggs.
Honorable Harry Lee, United States Magistrate, Eastern District of Louisiana, Aide to Mr. Boggs.
Mr. Frank Meyer, Administrative Assistant to Mr. Ford.
Mr. Paul A. Miltich, Press Secretary to Mr. Ford.
Mr. Day O. Mount, Administrative Officer, Department of State.
Dr. Paul Sigmund, Professor of Political Science, Princeton University, Aide to Mr. Boggs.
Eugene A. Theroux, Esq., Special Counsel to the Joint Economic Committee, Aide to Mr. Boggs.
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Congress of the United States
Office of the Minority Leader
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515
Note to researchers:

Handwritten notes and drafts of the report and transcripts for the Ford-Boggs trip to China in 1972 are available in boxes 43 and 44 of the Robert Hartmann Papers.
Dear Mr. President:

We greatly appreciate the time you gave us immediately on our return from China to present the highlights of our June 23 - July 7 journey there on behalf of the House of Representatives. During our discussion we promised you a written report, and we submit this letter as that report.

We have two attachments of possible interest:

(1) **Transcripts.** Unofficial transcripts of three formal discussions in Peking, one with Premier Chou En-lai that lasted over three hours, one with Foreign Affairs Vice Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua, the other with First Deputy Director of the Chinese Council for the Promotion of International Trade Li Hsi-ju. These transcripts, prepared from notes of our staff assistants, are virtually verbatim. Conceivably they contain nuances and observations that may serve to supplement more detailed talks with which you are familiar -- yours of last February, Senators Mansfield's and Scott's in May, and most recently Dr. Kissinger's.

(2) **Personnel Notes.** We attach a listing of people we encountered who appeared to be especially competent and forceful -- second and third echelon leaders who may rise in the Chinese hierarchy in coming years.

Let us first relate a few subjective impressions. China, we found, is utterly fascinating, and in certain respects frightening. From the day of our arrival in Shanghai on June 26 until we left 10 days later,
the official atmosphere was not only cordial and unfailingly gracious, but also seemingly forthcoming. Very few questions were obviously ducked -- most notably questions about Lin Piao, but also questions about the legal and penal system and questions about the course of U.S.-China trade.

We realize we were shown only what they wanted us to see, and nearly all places visited had been meticulously prepared for our arrival (the environs swept clean; the hosts carefully briefed on what to do and say; little children primed to undertake games and classroom activities precisely as we arrived). But, of course, we do much the same thing for foreign officials visiting our country, so we are not critical in mentioning these preparations. Actually, they suggest that the Chinese leadership goes to considerable lengths to impress foreign visitors, including Americans, favorably. That may bode well for the effort you have so well begun to clear away unnecessary barriers to improved relations between our countries.

The general population displayed exceptional interest in our party only in the cities of Shenyang and Anshan, Liaoning Province, where official American visitors have not been seen for almost a quarter-century. In Peking, Shanghai and Canton we were relatively ignored, though substantial crowds assembled in the streets as we shopped in Friendship Stores in Peking and Canton. But in the northeast, not only did the people seem genuinely interested in our comings and goings, they also displayed a very active friendliness -- spontaneously racing from fields and paddies to see our motorcade, and waving and clapping hands and smiling warmly at
us as we moved through their streets. (We were, it should be noted, follow-
ing in the wake of Premier Bandaranaike of Sri Lanka, for whom rousing welcome
demonstrations had definitely been prearranged. We never knew for sure
whether the street crowds considered our motorcade part of her entourage.)
Our unscheduled visit to a department store in downtown Shenyang one Sunday
brought out several thousand curious people eager to see us and welcome us
warmly. From this experience we deduce that future American visits to out-
lying places, in contrast to cities like Peking, Shanghai and Canton where
people are doubtless jaded, like Washingtonians, with foreign visitors, will
elicit similar favorable reactions. Of course, we do not know about the
willingness of the Chinese leaders to have U.S. officials, or any Americans,
ranging widely about the country; they did, however, consent readily to our
request to visit Shenyang, so possibly more visits to outlying regions will
be feasible in the near future.

Incidentally, in contrast with experiences both of us have had in
the Soviet Union, we did not have "the feeling we were being watched"; the
Chinese did not seem to be excessively hypercautious about movements of
our party. For instance, one of our staff took early-morning jogs for some
distance down different main streets of Peking, with never any attempt to
impede him. Naturally there was tight surveillance by security agents, but
hardly more than our Secret Service provides foreign officials in the United
States and less conspicuously. Another of our party (State Department)
attempted a stroll around the block in Shenyang but was intercepted by an
agent two-thirds of the way around and sternly directed back to the guest
house, so obviously we were under tight (protective (?)) guard there and perhaps elsewhere. But the point we make is that the Chinese technique of control strikes us as notably more subtle and less oppressive than we have experienced in the Soviet Union and Eastern European Communist States.

The Chinese did show a sensitivity to our visit to Shenyang, which suggests that they are restive over American inspection of their industrialization (and perhaps military bases) in that region. The revised itinerary timed our takeoff for Shenyang at sunset so we did not see any major seaports or any industrial complexes in Northeast China from the air. However we were permitted to photograph the iron and steel production plants we toured in Anshan, and everything else we were shown except an electrical transformer station.

Still relating general impressions, we would report that from Shenyang to Peking to Canton the people of China gave every indication of being clean and healthy, strong and industrious, disciplined and highly motivated, well-fed and well-clothed. Neither of us recalls ever seeing even one Chinese who appeared to be suffering from hunger, nor did we see much aimless wandering about, or diseased, cruelly crippled or poverty-stricken people. Most important of all, the people appeared to be happy, generally busy and purposeful as if they knew their specific tasks and were reasonably content with them. In most cases they gave an impression of regarding themselves as measurably better off than in pre-Liberation days. In reporting this
we except the intellectuals and urban youth who are shunted off to factories and communes after completing secondary education; this group in China, encompassing probably most of the best minds, seems determined to put the best face on the Cultural Revolution's educational experiment, but our impression is that (1) many still regard this diversion to factories and fields as only an experiment, and (2) we suspect most of them find it burdensome. No doubt your China experts are giving close attention to the potential of serious damage to excellence in China from Chairman Mao's attack on "elitism" in the Cultural Revolution. We think it could blight China's future, particularly as it may reduce the receptivity of the country's future leaders to technological advances so desperately needed in so many areas. When their best students are diverted to primitive regions to labor in ill-equipped machine shops and do stoop labor in rice paddies for periods ranging from six months to three years or more, intellectual commitment and keenness are likely to suffer, so the future leadership may turn out to be of lesser quality than has been the case in the past.

Having said this, one cannot refrain from observing that for many young Americans of intellectual and academic prowess, a periodic exposure to the realities of workaday life and hard manual labor might be broadening and beneficial. We believe Chairman Mao's Cultural Revolution may have swung too far in this direction, but there are some indications such as the reopening of Sun Yat-sen University in Canton, that the pendulum is swinging back.

From the beginning to the end of our travels there seemed to be a deliberate effort to insulate us from the military influence, whatever
it is, in the Chinese society. We had virtually no contact at all with the uniformed military anywhere we visited. At every stop we would be graciously received by Vice Chairman of Revolutionary Committees, whether provincial, municipal or local, but never were we received by a Chairman. We informally learned that the Chairmen are active members of the People's Liberation Army in virtually every case, so we deduce that the role of the military is powerful and perhaps dominant; but we can only report that we were shielded from it and are therefore unable to assess it for you. Of course, some of our hosts may well have been PLA officers in mufti.

Similarly, we were never able to discern the real techniques and penetration of Communist party direction and control throughout the system, or the effect this may have on the public psyche, though we sensed this influence continually, as we did the military. We make the point for this reason: how much the ostensible public mood of purposefulness and contentment in fact reflects fear -- how pervasively the party and/or military control the minds and hearts of the people -- we could not ferret out. But we do think it may be meaningful that the government apparently went to some lengths to insulate us from these influences in their society.

We mentioned that China struck us as "frightening" as well as fascinating. We got that feeling even though Chinese strength is obviously still far more potential than real, her internal problems of education, food, shelter, industrialization, agricultural mechanization and just generally catching up with modern technology are no less than staggering in scope, as Premier Chou candidly admitted to us, and therefore the assertions of Chinese
leaders that China is not expansionist are believable.

Nevertheless, some aspects of what is happening in China concerned us deeply. We refer to the all-encompassing Maoist indoctrination of the children beginning even at age 3; the disciplined behavior of the countless millions of people who comprise China; the near total subordination of all effort to the purposes of the State; and the youngsters' evident delight in the revolutionary dogma in which they are steeped all day long every school day (six days a week). We saw many boys and girls as young as six years of age ardently acting out in songs, dances and classroom work the most militant themes of revolution and military activity. How long this heavy indoctrination will linger in their hearts and minds, and to what eventual use it may be put, we do not know. But considering the totality of this teaching process, the obvious enjoyment the children of China derive from it did give us concern. We sensed that ultimately China could become vastly dangerous in the international arena, should those millions of bright-eyed children reach maturity with a deeply-implanted hostility toward other societies at the same time that China reaches a technologically advanced stage.

We were particularly impressed by the Puritanical ethic of this society. Some of the "old virtues" so important to America's rise seem to be deeply rooted in today's Chinese society. It appears to be an austere, Cotton Mather type of society -- prim and proper, not simply prudish about sex but actively hostile to any licentiousness or self-indulgence of any kind, with one and all marching and singing along the one sure road to political
salvation according to Mao’s commandments. If in our country we constantly
broadcast and sang the militant lines of "Onward Christian soldiers, march-
ing as to war" with the old-time fervor, no doubt we would give foreigners
the same impression we got of the Chinese. It is this ethic, this emotional,
near religious commitment, the intense discipline of this society, that evoke
our word "frightening." We conclude that the people of the United States
are going to have to forego a great deal of their present permissiveness and
disregard of old virtues if they are to stand up to what Maoist China may
well be two or three decades from now, assuming that China survives its
leadership crisis when Chairman Mao and other aging leaders depart.

Turning now to the topics touched upon in our discussions with Premier
Chou and Vice Minister Ch’iao, we have compressed them for you into the fol-
lowing tabulation:

1. Vietnam:
   a. Remarkably, or so it seemed to us, only once during the en-
tire trip was the blockade of North Vietnam even mentioned by
our Chinese hosts, and then only in passing by Premier Chou.
The bombing of North Vietnam was mentioned much more emphatically.
(See Chou transcript, p. 22)

b. Both Chou and Ch’iao held to the policy line that (1) they
will support North Vietnam, and (2) they will not intervene
in our current impasse with North Vietnam. While both stressed
that China has sent no troops to Vietnam, neither specifically
stated that China would not send them if asked. (See Ch’iao
transcript, p. 27)
c. Both Ch'iao and Chou insisted that the resolution of the Vietnam war will have to be political, not military.

d. Both described Vietnam as unconquerable throughout history, even by China.

e. Chou described Thieu as a U.S. "puppet."

f. Both gave full support to the tripartite, coalition government proposal for South Vietnam.

g. Chou stressed desire for neutrality on the part of all five key Southeast Asia nations.

h. Chou: "Elections in South Vietnam will not do." Said Thieu would control them with guns.

i. Both Ch'iao and Chou laid heavy emphasis on the 17th Parallel being a military line, not a political demarcation comparable to the 38th Parallel in Korea and the dividing line between East and West Germany.

2. Soviet Union:

a. Chou was extremely emphatic that the Soviets will never reduce their military effort; he seemed eager for reassurance that the balancing U.S. power will not be reduced. He repeatedly took sharp and specific exception to proposals to cut U.S. defense spending by as much as 30%. (See Chou transcript, pp. 12-14, 22, 29-31)
b. Chou in effect discounted the SALT agreements -- they fail to control quality, and anyway the Soviets will go ahead building their strength, forcing the U.S. also to increase its defense spending.

c. Yet Ch'iao explicitly said, "We approve of the SALT agreements," though he too said quality limitations are needed.

d. No big power should have predominance in Southeast Asia. Both Chou and Ch'iao stressed this.

e. Ch'iao: Our policy is still to try to improve relations with the Soviet Union because of the long common border, but quite some time will be required.

f. Throughout, we detected a profound distrust and dislike of the Soviet Union, fear of her power and possible intentions, and concern lest political efforts in the United States to cut the defense budget will make us too weak to counter Soviet designs on China.

3. Japan:

a. Keen awareness of U.S. concern over Japanese imports into the U.S.; amusement over it, really. Ch'iao chuckled that the U.S. is now a "colony" of Japan.
b. Ch'iao: Retention of U.S. troops in Japan may breed strong Japanese nationalism and resurgent rearmament; as in the case of Germany, it is "impossible to disarm an entire nation."

4. Taiwan:

a. Chou: Taiwan is still part of China; favorably recalled Shanghai Communique language on this point. He obliquely credited Senator Mansfield for this, saying he (Chou) could not have thought up this clause himself.

b. Chou: Have to settle the Vietnam war in order to get Taiwan settled.

c. Very difficult for Chinese to visit America while two-China problem continues. Washington, D. C. is "off limits" to official PRC visitors so long as Nationalist China has an Embassy here.

d. Sensitive to Judd, Anna Chennault and McIntyre.

e. A number of our group came away with the feeling that both Chou and Ch'iao are relatively relaxed about Taiwan, expecting it to go their way inevitably in due time.

5. Korea:

a. Ch'iao: This problem should have been solved by now.
b. Ch'iao: U.S. and China should both help North and South Korea to come together gradually, even though neither system can be imposed upon the other.

6. Other Foreign:

a. Chou evinced irritation over Secretary Rogers' opposition to the Philippine move to change SEATO; termed it a continuation of Dulles' policies. (See Chou transcript, p. 7)

b. Chou: Mansfield is unrealistic in calling for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe (presumably, Chou wants them held there to keep the Soviets from shifting more strength to the China border).

c. Both Chou and Ch'iao insist China has no ambition for expansion; too much to do at home.

d. Ch'iao: Urges U.S. support of Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia and the King of Laos. Says Sihanouk's only "ism" is, possibly, Buddhism.

7. Nuclear:

a. Ch'iao: On nuclear weapons, our policy is that all countries should prohibit their manufacture and destroy present stockpiles.

b. China develops nuclear weapons only for defense, with fewest possible tests.
c. We will never be the first to use nuclear weaponry; if ever used, for defense only. We await the UN answer to our proposal on this.

8. Normalization of U.S. - China relations:
   a. More Congressional contacts will help both countries:
      (1) Chou: Keep them bipartisan; easier to handle.
      (2) Ch'iao: They can write direct to the People's Institute of Foreign Affairs or go through Paris or Ottawa.
   b. We mustn't let past differences control our future relations.
   c. Public thinking on Sino-American relations is changing very rapidly and cannot be stopped (the inevitability of progress in normalization was emphasized by both Chou and Ch'iao).
   d. We must go forward step-by-step, gradually; China has much "preparatory work" to do.
   e. Much aware that normalization is now popular in America.
   f. Chou: We want to relax tensions; our systems are different but we can still find common ground as long as we both want to relax tensions.
9. Exchanges:

a. Congressional -- more are desired, but limited by shortage of interpreters and facilities (both Chou and Ch'iao were very clear on receptivity to more Congressional visits).

b. Better for U.S. citizens to visit China than for Chinese to America; the U.S. two-China policy in the way.

c. Must proceed gradually; administratively difficult to handle a heavy influx.

d. Medicine will be the best and first area to expand contacts; visits should be brief at first, both ways. Special interest in acupuncture (for U.S.), cancer, stroke and heart disease.

e. Mechanization of agriculture of interest ("great interest" expressed by Ch'iao in mechanized fruit pickers).

f. Ch'iao: We should exchange information on pollution matters. "Our people can go to your country and look at your antipollution devices and your people can come here and see what our problems are, and help each other."

g. Other exchange areas exist, but "we must advance step-by-step and are moving too rapidly."
11. Trade:

Neither Chou nor Ch’iao, nor also a top Chinese trade official, manifested any real interest in major trade initiatives. Chou ducked it; Ch’iao downplayed it; the trade official, Li Hsi-fu, a deputy director of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, was studiously diffident, linking trade to further improvement of political relations -- the least cooperative of any major Chinese official during the trip.

12. Prisoners:

a. Both Chou and Ch’iao would commit only by saying they have "noted" the question.

b. Ch’iao flatly asserted that "as far as I know" there are no other prisoners beyond those three known now to the U.S.; the way he said this persuades us there are no others known to him.

c. Ch’iao said future handling of any prisoner problems will be above-board and a new compact between U.S.-China will make this problem "much better."

d. Ch’iao: Mr. Downey is in good health.

e. The Chinese refused to accept a package that we (Ford) proffered for one of the military prisoners; they suggested that it be handled through the Hong Kong Red Cross.
is being done via the U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong; normally, the next meeting of Red Cross representatives will be held July 30.

In the interest of brevity, we tabulate a number of other general impressions, some of which may be of interest:

1. The remarkable cleanliness of cities and the countryside. There are virtually no flies, no dogs, no cats in their cities. (During our entire trip through urban and rural areas we saw four flies, one dog and two cats). As you know, this is a Mao fetish. This effort to protect the public health, this emphasis on neatness and cleanliness, is worthy of American emulation.

2. Thousands of trees planted along highways and on hillsides. Again, it would help America to do the same.

3. Acupuncture -- plainly promising for anesthesia; perhaps less so for treatment, but both are certainly deserving of American analysis. We watched three operations and 3 dental extractions in which this technique was used, and our entire group, including the physician with us, was much impressed.

4. Great artistic talents of Chinese children, bordering on phenomenal. We could not help but yearn for a comparable artistic emphasis in our own school systems.

5. Heavy stress on arts and crafts (severe ideological restraints, however, on music and literature) from childhood up; bears examination as
we press for improved quality of American life.

6. Emphasis on Chinese history but using it for revolutionary propaganda against "exploitation of the masses."

7. Defeminization of Chinese women as evident in a unisex standard of dress. Our hosts made a special effort to show Mrs. Boggs and Mrs. Ford that women played a significant leadership role in China. We saw women involved in medicine, teaching, interpreting, and, of course, working as airline stewardesses, waitresses, and sales persons in stores, farm workers, street sweepers, and, in one instance, as a member of a Municipal Revolutionary Committee. We also witnessed two attractive young women working on high voltage power lines. However, in all the serious talks the only women present were stenographers.

8. Primitive methods of agriculture but with an exciting (for us, perhaps threatening) potential for mechanization.

9. Luxuriant and exotic variety of Chinese cuisine (at least, for us). Almost total absence of non-Chinese food and drink.

10. Paucity of automobiles; plethora of bicycles. We also saw very few draught animals.

11. Vast use of people in place of machines, or animals.

12. Pervasiveness of the teachings of Mao -- the "Communist Confucius." Total lack of foreign literature.
13. The "tea custom," the stilted, rote-style briefings, the mea culpa routine of lower officials, the standard plea for criticism of their efforts.


15. The shouting of answers required of children -- military-academy-esque (characteristic of Chinese schools, we understand, throughout Asia).

16. The military organization and methodology of factories and communes.

17. Perfection since the 1949 "Liberation"; the unworthiness of all before.

18. The unanswered (and unmentioned) riddle -- what follows Mao?

19. Flat denial of Red Chinese involvement in drug traffic.

20. Taboo against petty thievery (in our case, anyway).

21. The military strut and revolutionary songs of little children.

22. Huge declamatory, red signboards exhorting against the people's own weaknesses and the common foes (including the U.S. in Shenyang and Canton).
23. The comparative quietude of Chinese cities, lacking heavy automobile traffic. Also rubber and leather sandals have replaced wooden clogs.

24. The meticulous tilling of every available inch of productive soil.

25. The hot-and-cold wash cloth custom (also worthy of American emulation, though our extensive air-conditioning makes this less attractive than in China).

26. The multiplicity of courses in Chinese meals, the grace of all-around toasting, the Gambei, the eyeball-to-eyeball clinking of glasses.

27. The translators' skills, the escorts' (required?) solicitude and courtesies, the constant honking (despite street signs banning it) in order to move us through streets teeming with people, carts and bicycles.

28. Pedicycles, hand tractors converted to passenger vehicles, old women straining with heavy carts, old men bicycling with clumsy loads, people sardined into buses. But no rickshas.

29. Hand-clapping in the streets to show friendship; the clappee clapping the clapper, shy waving back when waved to.

30. Regimented crowds in the sports arena, lockstep entries and exits of athletes, the instant silencing of the ovation to Chou
En-lai by one loudspeaker shout -- "gola." (Enough!)

31. The agelessness of the culture and its most conspicuous effluvia -- glittering palaces and tombs of breathtaking splendor for rulers centuries ago.

In sum, Mr. President, we found this trip to be the most fascinating overseas mission in all of our public service, and we are grateful for the part your Administration played in making it possible. From the enclosures you will note that throughout our discussions both of us stood firmly with your Vietnam position, and we hope that in this and other respects we contributed to the short and long-term interests of our country. We hope also that the enclosures and the foregoing discussion will be of some value to you in carrying forward your historic initiatives with the People's Republic of China.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Majority Leader

[Signature]

Minority Leader