The original documents are located in Box 18, folder "November 28 - December 7, 1975 -Far East - Briefing Book - Peking - Angola - The President" of the National Security Adviser Trip Briefing Books and Cables for President Ford, 1974-1976 at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO PEKING DECEMBER 1 to 5, 1975

DECLASSERIED E.O. 12950 (as extended) SEC 3.3 State Dept Guidelines NARA, Date 6/21/10

### ANGOLA

By

CORD BECRET/XGDS



#### DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 28, 1975

### SECRET ATTACHMENT

TO: The Secretary

FROM: S/P - Winston Lord W

#### Background Information on Angola

Joe Sisco's office, with my encouragement, put together the attached background material on Angola for the President's trip to China. We have incorporated the gist of the talking points into the President's talking points on international issues (forwarded to you separately). This book, however, provides more detailed information which you may wish to draw upon in any discussions with the Chinese. If you wish to forward this book to the President (I don't believe that is necessary), we have extra copies for your use.

Attachment

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#### CHINESE INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA

In the years before Angolan independence, Peking provided modest amounts of arms, money and training to two Angolan nationalist movements -- the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) -- which are now battling the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) for control of the country. Most of China's assistance went to the FNLA, including shipments of small arms, mortars and antiaircraft weapons and training by about 100 Chinese military instructors assigned to the FNLA's camps in the Republic of Zaire.

Peking's training assistance to the FNLA stopped abruptly just before Angolan independence on 11 November of this year. China now maintains limited contact with all three groups, but apparently aids none of them. Several considerations probably entered into China's decision to disengage from the FNLA:

-- a difficulty in publicly rationalizing continued military involvement in Angola once the 13-year struggle for independence had succeeded;

-- fear that China's reputation in the Third World would be tarnished by continued support of the groups in the Angolan struggle which are also being supported by South Africa and the US; EQ. 1953 (as emended) SEC 3.3

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-- concern with appearing to be associated in African eyes with President Mobutu's effort to split the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda from the rest of Angola and perhaps establish Zairian hegemony over it (China refused Zaire's request to train Cabindan Liberation Front troops which Mobutu used in an unsuccessful bid to eject the MPLA from Cabinda earlier this month);

-- and a judgement that the Soviet commitment to support the MPLA was so strong that opposing the MPLA would be a losing cause.

A 90-ton shipment of Chinese arms destined for UNITA was impounded in Dar es Salaam on the instructions of President Nyerere. The Chinese protested only mildly to Nyerere on this matter.

China's decision to refrain from further support of the FNLA and UNITA deprives these groups of a potentially important source of arms and ammunition needed to carry on the fight against the MPLA.

Chinese propaganda has denounced Moscow's meddling in Angola, but there have been few indications that China is working actively in the Third World to pressure Moscow to scale down its arms aid to the MPLA and pull back the Cuban troops.



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#### ANGOLA TALKING POINTS

#### Introduction

In raising the issue of Angola with the Chinese, we are seeking to:

-- Encourage the Chinese to provide military assistance to FNLA and UNITA.

-- Obtain Chinese political support with a view to increasing pressures on the Soviet Union and Cuba to limit their commitment and agree to promote negotiations, encouraging the OAU to pursue a negotiated settlement in Angola, and preparing for a UN Security Council debate on Angola should the matter be raised there. Talking Points

-- We are concerned over the recent massive Soviet intervention in Angola. In our view, the Soviet Union, supported by the Cubans and East Europeans, is seeking to force a victory for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and a neutralization of the Angolan Front for National Liberation (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Once this Soviet objective is achieved, we assume Moscow intends to reinforce its presence in Angola and use that mineral and agriculturally rich country to pursue its political goals elsewhere in Central and Southern Africa.

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NARA, Date 121/10

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-- We believe stopping this Soviet power play is as much in the Chinese interest as in ours.

-- The consequences of a victory for the Soviet Union and the Soviet-backed MPLA would be serious. The governments of Zaire and Zambia, with whom both we and the Chinese enjoy good relations and both of which are experiencing internal stresses, would be vulnerable. The possibility of the Soviets pushing to upset the balance of power in strategically vital southern Africa would be greater. The demonstration effect of a Soviet success could also have adverse repercussions for both of us elsewhere in the world.

-- We seek a negotiated settlement in Angola--one that would permit UNITA and FNLA to take their place in the government. In view of our policy in support of a government of national unity, we will not recognize any Angolan faction. This stance is in line with the OAU position. We are pleased the PRC has adopted a similar policy.

-- It is our belief, however, that no settlement can be negotiated unless the military balance between UNITA and FNLA on the one hand and MPLA on the other can be maintained. We have worked in this direction, in cooperation with Zaire which is the most endangered by developments in Angola. The present military balance is fragile and substantial



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amounts of equipment will be required to keep FNLA and UNITA the in conflict. Certain types of equipment are critically needed, including such items as air defense equipment, artillery and automatic weapons.

-- The ability of the United States to provide help is limited. In a situation where the interests of many are at stake, we cannot be counted on to carry an unequal share of the burden.

-- Diplomatically, we are pursuing two tracks. First, we are trying to encourage an African solution to what is essentially an African problem. We have sent the OAU Secretary General a message supporting the OAU quest for a negotiated settlement. The Chinese might consider a similar message of support. Second, we are working to discourage the Soviets and Cubans from their present policy of near unlimited support of the MPLA. Chinese views in this regard would be valuable.

-- The Soviet Union has made a threatening diplomatic demarche to Zaire about Angola while at the same time introducing quantities of relatively sophisticated weapons into the area. Would the PRC support a Security Council discussion of Soviet involvement in Angola?

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-- We are concerned by the decision of President Nyerere of Tanzania to release approximately 1000 tons of Soviet arms for transshipment to MPLA in Angola. He had previously embargoed all arms, including about 90 tons of arms for UNITA and FNLA which the PRC had planned to transship through Tanzania. In our view Nyerere's favored treatment of the Soviet Union and MPLA should be of concern to the PRC and we urge they raise this with Nyerere.



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