The original documents are located in Box 5, folder “Yugoslavia - President Tito” of the National Security Adviser’s Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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Message of President Josip Broz Tito:

"Brióni, August 21, 1974

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your friendly message of August 10, 1974. I received with pleasure your assurances that you shall carry forward the policy of close relations and mutually beneficial cooperation between the United States of America and Yugoslavia, founded upon the principles established in the joint statement of President Nixon and myself in 1971, as the lasting basis of stable relations between our two countries, whose value has been confirmed in practice. I highly appreciate your intention to contribute personally to the strengthening of relations and expansion of our mutual cooperation. The development of equitable cooperation with your country constitutes a lasting interest of independent and non-aligned Yugoslavia.

I welcome your determination to exert efforts with a view to continuing the policy of detente and securing lasting peace in the world. I wish to assure you that the constructive actions of the United States of America towards strengthening conditions in which all peoples of the world would be able, on the basis of

His Excellency
Gerald R. Ford
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.
independence and equality, to make their full contribution to the settlement of international issues and to the promotion of peace and security in the world, will meet with the support of the peoples and government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as my own. The international situation continues to be inherent with many dangers, which, in my opinion, calls for investing of the greatest possible efforts by all countries towards peaceful settlement of conflicting issues in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.

My contacts with the esteemed former Presidents of the United States of America occupy an important place in the promotion of the relations between our two countries. I am firmly convinced in the usefulness of such a practice. In a desire to continue the exchange of views with you I am availing myself of this opportunity to extend with pleasure an invitation to you to visit Yugoslavia at the time most convenient to you.

On this occasion I also wish to convey to you my most sincere wishes for success in discharging your responsible functions and for your personal happiness.

Sincerely,

( Signed ) Josip Broz Tito
The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
August 22, 1974

Dear Mr. President:

It gives me personal pleasure to convey herewith the contents of the message of Josip Broz Tito, President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia addressed to you.

With kindest regards,

Tona Granfil

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
His Excellency
Gerald R. Ford
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. GEORGE S. SPRINGSTEEN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter for dispatch to President Tito

REFERENCE: S/S 7422284

The attached document is transmitted for additional processing/forwarding as may be required.

for JEANNE W. DAVIS
Staff Secretary
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 13, 1975

Dear Mr. President:

It was my pleasure on taking office, as you will recall, to send you a message stating my intention to continue the policy of expanding and further improving relations between the United States and Yugoslavia. This was in keeping with the principles of the US-Yugoslav Joint Statement of October, 1971.

I have greatly appreciated your subsequent correspondence. Secretary Kissinger has also provided me with a detailed report on the talks which he had with you and your colleagues in Belgrade on November 4. I believe that those discussions were constructive in tone. It is important that the United States and Yugoslavia maintain a continuing dialogue on issues of common interest.

In this spirit, I accept with pleasure your invitation to visit Yugoslavia. I look forward to a personal exchange of views on US-Yugoslav relations as well
as on international subjects of importance, particularly the prospects for world peace and stability. While it is too early to propose specific dates, I look forward to determining with you a mutually satisfactory time for the visit.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

His Excellency
Marshal Josip Broz Tito
President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Belgrade

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January 13, 1975

Dear Mr. President:

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I have greatly appreciated your subsequent correspondence. Secretary Kissinger has also provided me with a detailed report on the talks which he had with you and your colleagues in Belgrade on November 4. I believe that those discussions were constructive in tone. It is important that the United States and Yugoslavia maintain a continuing dialogue on issues of common interest.

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as on international subjects of importance, particularly the prospects for world peace and stability. While it is too early to propose specific dates, I look forward to determining with you a mutually satisfactory time for the visit.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

His Excellency
Marshal Josip Broz Tito
President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Belgrade
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Reply to President Tito of Yugoslavia

With the letter at Tab B, President Tito has expressed his appreciation for the message you sent him on August 10 affirming your commitment to further improving US-Yugoslav relations, and he has extended an invitation to you to visit Yugoslavia.

On September 6, Tito sent you another letter (at Tab C) setting forth in some detail Yugoslav concern over Cyprus, reviewing the diplomatic contacts his government had undertaken on this issue, and expressing the hope that the United States agreed on the need to take every step possible to resolve the crisis as soon as possible.

Our relations with Yugoslavia were subsequently complicated when Tito alleged in a September 12 speech that the CIA and NATO had engineered the Cyprus coup. I took the Yugoslav Foreign Minister to task on this point during our September meeting in New York. During my visit to Belgrade on November 4, I had frank and detailed discussions with Tito and other leading members of the Yugoslav Government, not only on the even-handed approach we are taking toward Cyprus, but also on the need to consult at the government-to-government level rather than voicing any policy disagreement in speeches and in the press. I believe this point was understood and taken well. As the result of the positive tone of these consultations with the Yugoslavs, I believe it would now be appropriate for you to reply to President Tito's letters.

A reply at this time would also be propitious because of recent events in Yugoslavia that have contributed to a more positive attitude toward the United States. In September, Tito revealed that the Soviet Union had been caught -- again -- meddling in Yugoslav internal affairs. The subversive Soviet activity, revealed at its most bungling in the "Cominformist" plot, has angered Tito, confirmed the Yugoslavs' worst fears that Titoism remains
unacceptable to the Soviets and that they will continue their attempts at undermining, and seems to have slightly inclined the Yugoslavs to probe for further expansion of relations with the West.

Judging by my talks in Belgrade and the effect of the above events, it is clear that the Yugoslavs, and Tito personally, attach great importance to your visiting Yugoslavia as soon as an acceptable schedule can be arranged. They will value your meeting personally with Tito as a fresh and clear U.S. endorsement of Yugoslav independence and non-alignment. In my opinion, such a visit will contribute positively to your foreign policy objectives not only toward Yugoslavia but also in terms of maintaining stability in East-West relations.

The reply for your signature to Tito at Tab A would note the exchange of views that has taken place over the past several months and would state the importance you attach to maintaining a continuing dialogue with Yugoslavia on issues of common interest. Your reply would also accept President Tito’s invitation to visit Yugoslavia, stating that you look forward to identifying a mutually convenient date for the visit.

Your letter has been coordinated with Paul Theis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to President Tito at Tab A.
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: A. Denis Clift

SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to President Tito

In keeping with the guidance received on December 26 (memorandum at Tab II) I have updated a letter for the President's signature to President Tito — a letter in which the President accepts Tito's invitation to visit Yugoslavia at a mutually convenient future date.

The memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab I would forward the letter for his signature. The President's reply has been coordinated with Paul Theis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER
FROM: A. Denis Clift
SUBJECT: Proposed Presidential Reply to President Tito

You have asked if it is too late to send the attached reply to President Tito.

The issue requiring attention is Tito's invitation to the President. In my opinion, the Yugoslavs expected a reply when they extended the invitation -- they would still appreciate a reply.

While the text of the proposed response at Tab A is still usable, because of the passage of time the President's reply certainly could be improved upon.

With your approval, I will draft a new reply for signature early in the new year.

APPROVE DISAPPROVE
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: A. Denis Clift

SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to President Tito

As a result of your early November discussions with President Tito, the time would now seem right for the President to reply to Tito's letters of August and September -- in which the Yugoslav President addressed US-Yugoslav relations, Cyprus, and in which he extended an invitation to the President to visit Yugoslavia.

The Department of State's memoranda on this subject and State's proposed reply to Tito are at Tab II. The memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab I would forward Tito's letter together with a proposed Presidential reply drafted here and coordinated with Paul Theis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.
MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON 5540

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Reply to President Tito of Yugoslavia

With the letter at Tab B, President Tito has expressed his appreciation for the message you sent him on August 10 affirming your commitment to further improving US-Yugoslav relations, and he has extended an invitation to you to visit Yugoslavia.

On September 6, Tito sent you another letter (at Tab C) setting forth in some detail Yugoslav concern over Cyprus, reviewing the diplomatic contacts his government had undertaken on this issue, and expressing the hope that the United States agreed on the need to take every step possible to resolve the crisis as soon as possible.

Our relations with Yugoslavia were subsequently complicated when Tito alleged in a September 12 speech that the CIA and NATO had engineered the Cyprus coup. I took the Yugoslav Foreign Minister to task on this point during our September meeting in New York. During my visit to Belgrade on November 4, I had frank and detailed discussions with Tito and other leading members of the Yugoslav Government not only on the even-handed approach we are taking toward Cyprus, but also on the need to consult at the government-to-government level rather than voice disagreement in speeches and in the press on issues where we have different positions. I believe this point was understood and taken well. As a result of the positive tone of these consultations with the Yugoslavs, I believe it would now be appropriate for you to reply to President Tito's letters.

A reply at this time would also be propitious because of recent events in Yugoslavia that have contributed to a more positive attitude toward the United States. In September, Tito revealed that the Soviet Union had been caught -- again -- meddling in Yugoslav internal affairs. The subversive Soviet activity, revealed at its most bungling in the "Cominformist" plot, has angered Tito, confirmed the Yugoslav's worst fears that Titoism remains unacceptable to the Soviets, and that they will continue their attempts to undermine, and seems to have slightly inclined the Yugoslavs to probe for further expansion of relations with the West.
Judging by my talks in Belgrade and the effect of the above events, it is clear that the Yugoslavs, and Tito personally, attach great importance to your visiting Yugoslavia as soon as an acceptable schedule can be arranged. They will value your meeting personally with Tito as a fresh and clear U.S. endorsement of Yugoslav independence and non-alignment. In my opinion, such a visit will contribute positively to your foreign policy objectives not only toward Yugoslavia but also in terms of maintaining stability in East-West relations.

The reply for your signature to Tito at Tab A would note the useful exchange of views just concluded in Belgrade and would state the importance you attach to maintaining a continuing dialogue with Yugoslavia on issues of common interest. Your reply would also accept President Tito's invitation to visit Yugoslavia, expressing the hope that it will be possible to identify a mutually acceptable date during the coming year.

Your letter has been coordinated with Paul Theis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter to President Tito at Tab A.
Dear Mr. President:

As you will recall, it was my pleasure on taking office to send you a message stating my intention to continue the policy of expanding and further improving relations between the United States and Yugoslavia, in keeping with the principles of the US-Yugoslav Joint Statement of October, 1971. I greatly appreciate your cordial reply of August 21 as well as your letter of September 6, 1974.

Secretary Kissinger has provided me with a detailed report on the talks which he had with you and your colleagues in Belgrade on November 4. I believe that those discussions, including the exchange of views on the issues relating to Cyprus which you addressed in your letter of September 6, were very constructive in tone. It is important that the United States and Yugoslavia maintain a continuing dialogue on such issues of common interest.

In this spirit, I accept with pleasure your invitation to visit Yugoslavia. I look forward to a personal exchange of views on US-Yugoslav relations as well
as international subjects of importance, particularly
the prospects for world peace and stability. While
it is too early to propose specific timing, we can
determine a mutually satisfactory date during the
coming year.

Again, I appreciate your thoughtful letters.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Marshal Josip Broz Tito
President of the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia
Belgrade
MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reply to President Tito's August 21 and September 6 Letters to President Ford

Yugoslav Ambassador Granfil called on Secretary Kissinger August 27 to present a personal letter from President Tito to President Ford. The letter, dated August 21, invited President Ford to visit Yugoslavia at the time most convenient to him. On September 10, Granfil handed Assistant Secretary Hartman a letter from Tito to President Ford dated September 6. This letter outlined Tito's views on the Cyprus problem and solicited the views of President Ford.

Replies to both these letters were held up when Tito alleged in a September 12 speech that the CIA and NATO engineered the Cyprus coup.

In view of Secretary Kissinger's recent meeting with President Tito, we believe this would be an appropriate time for the President to respond to Tito's letters. A proposed reply which accepts Tito's invitation in principle and expresses the hope that President Ford will be able to set a date for a visit to Yugoslavia sometime in the coming year is attached. The reply also notes that President Ford understands that Tito and the Secretary had a useful exchange of views on the Cyprus question during the Secretary's November 4 visit to Belgrade.

If approved, the text of the attached message would be cabled to our Embassy in Belgrade for delivery to President Tito. The cable transmitting the message would indicate that the White House does not plan to release the text and presumes the Yugoslavs will not wish to do so either.
We would appreciate receiving a signed original to be forwarded to Belgrade subsequently via diplomatic pouch.

George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachments:
(1) Suggested Message
(2) Tito's Letter of August 21
(3) Tito's Letter of September 6
MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

October 23, 1974

Subject: Transmittal of Signed Originals of Letters from President Tito to President Ford

The Yugoslav Minister-Counselor called at the Department October 21 to deliver the signed originals of President Tito's letters of August 21 and September 6 to President Ford. The letters, which are in Serbo-Croatian, and English versions of them are attached.

An English version of Tito's August 21 letter, which invited President Ford to visit Yugoslavia at the time most convenient to him, was delivered to Secretary Kissinger on August 27. The English version of the September 6 letter, which outlined Tito's view on the Cyprus problem and solicited the views of President Ford, was presented to Assistant Secretary Hartman on September 10.

Draft replies to the two Tito letters were held up when Tito alleged in a September 12 speech that the CIA and NATO engineered the Cyprus coup in order to turn the island into a NATO base. In our view, formal replies to the letters should await the outcome of Secretary Kissinger's talks with Tito and other Yugoslav leaders on November 4.

Attachments:
As stated.
Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for your letters of August 21 and September 6.

I accept with pleasure your kind invitation to visit Yugoslavia and look forward very much to a personal exchange of views on US-Yugoslav relations as well as international issues of importance to the peace and security of Europe and the world. Although I am unable at this time to suggest a specific date, I hope to be able to visit Yugoslavia sometime next year.

Secretary Kissinger has informed me of the very useful talks he had with you and your colleagues during his visit to Belgrade November 4. I understand that your discussions with Dr. Kissinger included a broad exchange of views on the situation in Cyprus, which you raised in your letter of September 6.

His Excellency
Marshal Josip Broz Tito
President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Belgrade.
I welcome the prospect of meeting you personally and send you my best personal regards.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford
September 6, 1974

Dear Mr. President:

It gives me personal pleasure to convey herewith the contents of the message of Josip Broz Tito, President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia addressed to you.

With kindest regards,

Toma Grčnik

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Message of President Josip Broz Tito:

"Brdo kod Kranja, September 6, 1974

Dear Mr. President:

I should like to submit my views on the Cyprus crisis, especially with respect to what Yugoslavia deems necessary and possible to be undertaken with a view to finding a way out of the prevailing dangerous situation. The crisis relating to Cyprus is not being pacified, instead in many aspects it is becoming more acute, giving cause for grave concern and apprehension of the entire international community. The independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the non-aligned Republic of Cyprus continue to be endangered and violated, bringing into question its very existence. Regrettably, in spite of the efforts of the United Nations and initiatives of individual governments, in actual fact the resolving of the true causes of this crisis has not as yet been undertaken, the negative consequences of which continue to burden even more the otherwise complex and unstable international situation.

It is my firm belief that the essence of the Cyprus problem lies in the fact that to the unresolved and

His Excellency
Gerald R. Ford
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.
neglected relations between the Greek and Turkish national communities in Cyprus constantly are added foreign intervention and conflicting interests of external factors. The coup in Cyprus, inspired and organized from outside with an aim of liquidating the independence and non-aligned position of the Republic of Cyprus and overthrowing the legitimate government of President Makarios, has caused a chain reaction of events that have led to the present difficult situation in which the both Cyprus national communities have suffered great human losses and destruction.

Yugoslavia has been resolutely lending its full support to the defence and safeguarding of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and the non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, considering that any violation of the independence of the Republic of Cyprus constitutes, as the same time, an attack both on the very foundations of international peace and security, and on the principles upon which international relations rest. We hold that this attack has been at the same time aimed against the principles and objectives of the policy of non-alignment.

The Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has, closely cooperating with the non-aligned and other friendly countries in the United Nations and on other occasions, warned that the deterioration and intensification of the Cyprus crisis constitutes a threat to peace and security in that region and elsewhere in the world.

The Cyprus crisis is, at the same time, closely related to the crisis in the Middle East, which is a perpetual source of war conflicts and constitutes a direct
threat to the world peace and security. After the military disengagement in Sinai and on the Golan Heights, which we assessed only as initial steps towards the settlement of the Middle East crisis, no progress has been achieved towards reaching a peaceful and just solution. On the contrary, Israel is pursuing a policy of aggressive acts against the Arab countries and peoples, mobilizing military forces and making open threats, which points to a real danger of an outbreak of a new armed conflict. Simultaneously, efforts are being intensified to ignore the national rights of the Arab people of Palestine and to prevent the participation of its legitimate representatives in the settlement of the Middle East problem.

Such a development renders the Middle East crisis even more complex and explosive, with new temptations and great uncertainties for peace and security in the world.

In this we constantly have in mind the fact that the security in Europe and in the Mediterranean is indivisible in the same way as are the peace and security in Europe inseparably linked to the peace and security in the world.

In this light we also view the importance and possible consequences of the present Cyprus crisis. I also feel that the positive results achieved on the plane of the relaxation of international tension, as well as the efforts aimed at consolidating European security and co-operation, could be endangered unless urgent action towards finding a just and lasting settlement both for the Cyprus and the Middle East crisis is taken. Once again it is being demonstrated that for a successful continuation of the process of the international relaxation of tension, it is indispensable that this process
becomes universal and that it leads to the solving of the basic international problems with the participation of all countries. The non-aligned countries have been constantly emphasizing that the hotbeds of crises and the outstanding international problems must be solved through the participation of the peoples and countries directly concerned, and with due respect for their legitimate rights, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

Having in mind the real causes and essence of the Cyprus problem, the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is convinced that a just and lasting solution of this problem should be based on the safeguarding of independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, on the establishment of full national equality of the two communities, and on the withdrawal of all foreign military forces from Cyprus. The very method of resolving the crisis must be acceptable, in the first place, to the parties most directly concerned - the Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey - without the threat and use of force and attempts to impose the solution from outside, and with equitable participation of the Republic of Cyprus, through legitimate representatives of the Greek and Turkish national communities in all negotiations. In all this, the United Nations, especially the Security Council, should play an active role, in the spirit of the responsibility entrusted to them under the Charter. I am of the opinion, considering all the circumstances, that resolution of the Cyprus crisis should be approached without delay.

I wish to inform you that I have addressed
personal messages to the leaders of Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus, in which I outlined our positions and stressed our concern over the development of the crisis. In Athens, the Vice-President of the Federal Executive Council and Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Milos Minic presented the message to the President of the Republic of Greece Mr. Faidon Ghizikis and to the Prime Minister Mr. Constantine Karamanlis, in Ankara, to the President of the Republic of Turkey Mr. Fahri Koruturk and to the Prime Minister of the Government Mr. Bülent Ecevit, and, in Nicosia, to the Acting President of the Republic Mr. Glafkos Clerides and to the Vice-President of the Republic Mr. Rauf Denkâz. In London, the message was presented to President Makarios by the Assistant Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Miljan Komatina. They both expressed our desire that the crisis should be overcome as soon as possible and that peace should be established and independence restored in the Republic of Cyprus on the basis of equality of the two national communities, and pointed out the willingness of the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to contribute, within the limits of its possibilities, to the realization of the set objective.

In the talks held on that occasion all the sides had expressed their readiness to seek on an agreed basis a political solution to the crisis. They had also declared themselves in favour of preserving the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus, against its division, and for the indispensability of the substantial changes in relations between the two national communities on the Island. However, their positions evidently •
are still considerably distant, particularly regarding the conditions and manner of negotiation, the settlement of relations between the two national communities as well as the form of the state order of the Republic of Cyprus.

The extremely difficult situation on Cyprus, the absence of negotiation and the accumulation and emergence of new problems affecting in particular the life and existence of a great number of the Cyprus population, threaten to create on the Island conditions for yet more serious internal conflicts and for the continuation of foreign interference with unforeseeable consequences. All this increases the responsibility of the whole international community and calls for the undertaking of appropriate measures as soon as possible.

In such a situation useful is every constructive initiative that leads to the overcoming of the crisis, takes into account the need to safeguard the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the non-aligned Republic of Cyprus and ensures the equitable participation of its legitimate representatives in all negotiations.

I am confident that your Government also shares the concern over the danger of the expansion of the Cyprus crisis and that it is aware that everything should be done in order to undertake as soon as possible the substantive resolving of its true causes, even more so since the United States of America, as a great country and as a permanent member of the Security Council, has great possibilities to contribute to a just and lasting solution of the crisis in a peaceful manner.

I wish to assure you that Yugoslavia will support all constructive steps and proposals directed to this end.
I would appreciate very much is, in the spirit of the friendly relations between our two countries and the practice of exchanging opinions in such circumstances, you would kindly acquaint us with the views of your Government on the situation relating to Cyprus and about the ways and means of an early surmounting of the Cyprus crisis.

Sincerely Yours,

( signed ) Josip Broz Tito
Poštovani gospodine Predsjedniče,

Želim da Vam iznesem svoje gledište o kiparskoj krizi, posebno o tome što Jugoslavija smatra da je potrebno i moguće da se preduzme u cilju pronalaženja izlaza iz sadašnje opasne situacije.

Krizu u vezi sa Kiprom ne samo da se ne smiruje, već u mnogim vidovima postaje sve akutnija, što izaziva krajinu zabrinutost i oznemirenost čitave medjunarodne zajednice. Nezavisnost, suverenitet i teritorijalna integritet nesvrstanje Republike Kipar i dalje se ugrožavaju i krše, dovodeći u pitanje i sam njen opstanak. Nažalost, i pored napora Ujedinjenih nacija i inicijativa pojedinih vlada, još se, u stvari, nije pristupilo rješavanju pravih uzroka ove krize, čije negativne posljedice sve više opterećuju i nestabilnu medjunarodnu situaciju.

Po mom čvrstom uvjerenju, sustina kiparskog problema leži u tome što se na neriješene i zapostavljene odnose između grčke i turske nacionalne zajednice na Kipru stalno nadovezuju strano miješanje i suprotni interesi spoljnih faktora. Puć na Kipru, inspiriran i organizovan spolja u cilju likvidacije nezavisnosti i nesvrstanje pozicije Republike Kipar i obaranja legitimne vlade predsjednika Makariosa, izazvao je lančanu reakciju događaja koji su doveli do sadašnje teške situacije u kojoj obje kiparske nacionalne zajednice podnose velike žrtve i stradanja.

Jugoslavija odlučno daje punu podršku odbranu i očuvanju nezavisnosti, suvereniteta, teritorijalnog integriteta i nesvrstanosti Republike Kipar, smatrajući da svakako narušavanje nezavisnosti Republike Kipar, predstavlja istovremeno napad na same osnove medjunarodnog mira i bezbjednosti, kao i na principe na kojima su zasnovani medjunarodni odnosi. Ovaj napad istovremeno je uperen protiv principa i ciljeva politike nesvrstanosti.

Njegova Ekselencija
Gospodin Džerald R. Ford
Predsjednik Sjedinjenih Američkih Država
Washington
Vlada Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije tijesno saradjuje sa nesvrstanim i drugim prijateljskim zemljama u Ujedinjenim nacijama i u drugim prilikama, upozoravala je da zaostavljanje i produbljavanje kiparske krize predstavlja opasnost za mir i bezbjednost na samom području i šire u svijetu.

Kiparska kriza je, ujedno, usko povezana sa krizom na Bliskom istoku, koja je neprestani izvor ratnih sukoba i predstavlja direktnu prijetnju svjetskom miru i bezbjednosti. Nakon vojnog dez-angazovanja na Sinaju i Golanu, koje smo ocijenili samo kao prve korake u rješavanju krize na Bliskom istoku, nemao nikakvog napretka u pravcu postizanja miroljubivog i pravednog rješenja. Naprotiv, Izrael nastavlja sa politikom agresivnih akata protiv arapskih zemalja i naroda, vršći vojnu mobilizaciju i upućujući otvorene prijetnje, što ukazuje na realnu opasnost od izbijanja novog oružanog sukoba. Istovremeno, pojašnjuju se nastojanja da se prenebregnu nacionalna prava arapskih naroda, ali i njegovih legitimnih predstavnika u rješavanju bliskoistočnog problema. Ovakav razvoj čini krizu na Bliskom istoku još složenijom i ekspanzivijom, sa novim iskustvima i velikim neizvjesnostima za mir i bezbjednost u svijetu.

Pri tome, stalno imamo u vidu da je bezbjednost u Evropi i na Sredozemlju nedjeljiva, kao što su mir i bezbjednost u Europi neodvojivo vezani za mir i bezbjednost u svijetu. U tom svjetlu, gledamo na značaj i moguću posljedice sadašnje kiparske krize, što tako smatram da postignuti pozitivni rezultati na planu popustanja medjunarodne zategnutosti, kao i napori za učvršćenje evropske bezbjednosti i saradnje, mogu da budu ugrožene ukoliko se što hitnije ne pristane rešavanju pravednog i trajnog rješenja kiparske krize. Još jednom se potvrđuje da je za uspješno rješavanje procesa popustanja medjunarodne zategnutosti neophodno da se procesi popustanja međunarodne zategnutosti rešavaju na osnovnom profesionalnom razumijevanju i da vodi rješavanju osnovnih medjunarodnih problema, uz učestvo sva zemalja. Nesvrstane zemlje stalno ističu da je pravednost, a to ugrađeno u medjunarodne zategnutosti, iako nema uzeti u obzir u rješavanju bliskoistočnog problema.

Naslučujući uzroke i suštini kiparskog problema, vlada Socijalističke Federativne Republike Jugoslavije uvjeren je da pravedno i trajno rješenje ovog problema treba da se zasniva na čuvanju nezavisnosti, suvereniteta, teritorijalnog integriteta i nesvrstanosti Republike Kipar, na uspostavljanju pune nacionalne ravnopravnosti dviju zajednica i na povlačenju svih stranih vojnih snaga sa Kipra. S to čime rješavanja mora, u prvom redu, biti prihvatljivi za najneposrednije zainteresovane strane, Republiku Kipar, Grčku i Tursku, bez prijetnji i potrebe ile i pokušaja nametanja rješenja sa strane, a uz ravnopravno učesnictvo Republike Kipar u licu legitimnih predstavnika grčke i turske nacionalne zajednice u svim pregovorima.
U svemu tome, Ujedinjene nacije, a posebno Savjet bezbjednosti, treba da imaju aktivnu ulogu u duhu odgovornosti koja im pripada po Povelji. Mišljenja sam, na osnovu svih okolnosti, da razrješavanju kiparske krize treba pristupiti bez odlaganja.


U rasgovorima koji su tom prilikom vodjeni sve strane su izrazile spremnost da se sporazumno nadje političko rješenje krize. One su se takodje, izjasnile za očuvanje nezavisnosti, suvereniteta, teritorijalnog integriteta i nesvrstanosti Republike Kipar, protiv njegovih podjele i za neophodnost suštinskih promjena u odnosima izmedju dvije nacionalne zajednice na Ossrvu. Pokazalo se medjutim, da su njihova gledišta još uvijek dosta udaljena, narodno u pogledu uslova i načina pregovaranja, uredjenja odnosa dvije nacionalne zajednice i oblika državnog uređenja Republike Kipar.

Veoma teško stanje na Kipru, osustvo pregovora i nagnilavanje i stvaranje novih problema, koji naročito pogadaju žive i egzistenciju velikog broja stanovnika Kipra, prijeti da se na Ossrvu razviju uslovi za još tešće unutrašnje sukobe i nastavljanje stranog miješanja, a neuglednim posljedicama. Sve to povećava odgovornost čitave medjunarodne zajednice i zahtijeva da se što prije preduzmu odgovarajuće mjere.

U takvoj situaciji korisna je svak konstruktivna inicijativa koja vodi prevoženju krize, počevši od neophodnosti očuvanja nezavisnosti, suvereniteta i teritorijalnog integriteta nesvrstan Republike Kipar, kao i od ravnopravnog učešća njegovih legitimnih predstavnika u svim pregovorima.

Uvjerem sam da i vaša vlada dijeli zabrinutost zbog opasnosti prožirivanja kiparske krize i da uvidja da treba činiti sve da se što prije prije našim kom rješavanju njegovh pravih uzroka, tim više što Sjedinjene Američke Države kao velika zemlja i kao stalni član
Savjeti bezbjednosti imaju velike mogućnosti da doprinesu pravičnom i trajnom rješenju krize mirnim putem.

Želim da Vas uvjerim da će Jugoslavija podržati sve konstruktivne korake i prijedloge koji vode u tom pravcu.

Veoma bih cijenio ako biste nas, u duhu prijateljskih odnosa između naše dvije zemlje i prakse rasmijene mišljenja, u ovakvim prilikama, upoznali sa gledistem Vaše vlade o situaciji u vezi sa Kiprom i putevima što skorijeg prevazilaženja kiparske krize.

S poštovanjem,

[Podpis]
Poštovani gospodine Predsjedniče,


Pozdravljam Vašu riješenost da se založite za nastavljanje politike popuštanja i obezbijedenje trajnog mira u svijetu. Želim da Vas uvjerim da će konstruktivne akcije Sjedinjenih Američkih Država, u pravcu jačanja uslova u kojima će svi narodi svijeta, na bazi nezavisnosti i ravnopravnosti, moći da daju svoj puni doprinos rješavanju medjunarodnih problema i unaprijedjenju mira i bezbjednosti u svijetu, nalazići se i na podršku naroda i vlade SFRJ i moju lično. Medjunarodna situacija i dalje je bremenita mnogim opasnostima, što, po mom mišljenju, iziskuje ulaganje najširih napora za miroljubivo rješavanje spornih pitanja u duhu Povelje UN.

Moji kontakti sa uvaženim ranijim predsjednicima Sjedinjenih Američkih Država imaju značajno mjesto u unaprijedjenju odnosa između naše dvije zemlje. Čvrsto sam uvjeren u korisnost takve prakse. U želji da nastavim razmjenu mišljenja sa Vama, sa zadovoljstvom korišćim ovu priliku da Vas uputim poziv da posjetite Jugoslaviju, u vrijeme koje Vam bude odgovaralo,

I ovom prilikom upućujem Vam najjednačnije želje da uspješno obavljavanju Vaše odgovorne funkcije i za Vašu ličnu sreću.

S poštovanjem,

Njegova Ekselencija
Gerald R. Ford
Predsjednik Sjedinjenih Američkih Država
Washington

Predsjednik Republike
Dear Mr. President:

It gives me personal pleasure to convey herewith the contents of the message of Josip Broz Tito, President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia addressed to you.

With kindest regards,

Toma Granfil

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C.
Message of President Josip Broz Tito:

"Brioni, August 21, 1974

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your friendly message of August 10, 1974. I received with pleasure your assurances that you shall carry forward the policy of close relations and mutually beneficial cooperation between the United States of America and Yugoslavia, founded upon the principles established in the joint statement of President Nixon and myself in 1971, as the lasting basis of stable relations between our two countries, whose value has been confirmed in practice. I highly appreciate your intention to contribute personally to the strengthening of relations and expansion of our mutual cooperation. The development of equitable cooperation with your country constitutes a lasting interest of independent and non-aligned Yugoslavia.

I welcome your determination to exert efforts with a view to continuing the policy of detente and securing lasting peace in the world. I wish to assure you that the constructive actions of the United States of America towards strengthening conditions in which all peoples of the world would be able, on the basis of

His Excellency
Gerald R. Ford
President of the United States of America
Washington, D.C.
2.

independence and equality, to make their full contribution to the settlement of international issues and to the promotion of peace and security in the world, will meet with the support of the peoples and government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well as my own. The international situation continues to be inherent with many dangers, which, in my opinion, calls for investing of the greatest possible efforts by all countries towards peaceful settlement of conflicting issues in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations.

My contacts with the esteemed former Presidents of the United States of America occupy an important place in the promotion of the relations between our two countries. I am firmly convinced in the usefulness of such a practice. In a desire to continue the exchange of views with you I am availing myself of this opportunity to extend with pleasure an invitation to you to visit Yugoslavia at the time most convenient to you.

On this occasion I also wish to convey to you my most sincere wishes for success in discharging your responsible functions and for your personal happiness.

Sincerely,

(Signed) Josip Broz Tito
Let us mention, in

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Henry A. Kissinger

SUBJECT: Reply to President Tito of Yugoslavia

With the letter at Tab B, President Tito has expressed his appreciation for the message you sent him on August 10 affirming your commitment to further improving US-Yugoslav relations, and he has extended an invitation to you to visit Yugoslavia.

On September 6, Tito sent you another letter (at Tab C) setting forth in some detail Yugoslav concern over Cyprus, reviewing the diplomatic contacts his government had undertaken on this issue, and expressing the hope that the United States agrees on the need to take every step possible to resolve the crisis as soon as possible.

Our relations with Yugoslavia were subsequently complicated when Tito alleged in a September 12 speech that the CIA and NATO had engineered the Cyprus coup. I took the Yugoslav Foreign Minister to task on this point during our September meeting in New York. During my visit to Belgrade on November 4, I had frank and detailed discussions with Tito and other leading members of the Yugoslav Government, not only on the even-handed approach we are taking toward Cyprus, but also on the need to consult at the government-to-government level rather than agreeing in speeches and in the press on issues where we have different positions. I believe this point was understood and taken well. As the result of the positive tone of these consultations with the Yugoslavs, I believe it would now be appropriate for you to reply to President Tito’s letters.

A reply at this time would also be propitious because of recent events in Yugoslavia that have contributed to a more positive attitude toward the United States. In September, Tito revealed that the Soviet Union had been caught — again — meddling in Yugoslav internal affairs. The subversive Soviet activity, revealed at its most bungling in the “Cominformist” plot, has angered Tito, confirmed the Yugoslavs’ worst fears that Titoism remains...
TO: PRES
FROM: KISSINGER, H
CSC Quote

SUBJECT:

DATE: 11/30

TO:
FROM:

REFERENCE:

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

ACTION REQUIRED

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STAFF SECRETARY
FAR EAST
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
MID EAST/ N. AFRICA/ SO. ASIA
EUROPE/ CANADA
LATIN AMERICA
UNITED NATIONS
ECONOMIC
SCIENTIFIC
PROGRAM ANALYSIS
INFORMATION PLANNING
CONGRESSIONAL
GOVERNMENT POLICY
INTELLIGENCE

FOR ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR HAK
MEMO FOR PRES
REPLY FOR
APPROPRIATE ACTION
RECOMMENDATIONS
SECOND MEMO
REFER TO
RECOMMENDATIONS
DUE DATE:

COMMENTS:

SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):

11/30
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
SECRET

TELEGRAM

TO:
FROM:

SECRET

THE UNITED STATES AND YUGOSLAVIA

WILL NOT BE CONFIRMED UNTIL A DATE OF COMMON INTEREST IS DETERMINED. IN THIS EVENT, I ACCEPT WITH PLEASURE YOUR INVITATION TO VISIT YUGOSLAVIA. I LOOK FORWARD TO A PERSONAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON US-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS AS WELL AS ON INTERNATIONAL SUBJECTS OF IMPORTANCE, PARTICULARLY THE PROHIBITION FOR WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY, WHILE IT IS TOO EARLY TO PROPOSE SPECIFIC DATES, I LOOK FORWARD TO EXPLORING WITH YOU A MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY TIME FOR THE VISIT. SINCERELY, GEORGE K. FORD. END QUOTE.

1. WHITE HOUSE AND DEPARTMENT DO NOT RPT. NOT PLAN TO RELEASE COMPLETE TEXT OF THIS MESSAGE AND PRESUME THE YUGOSLAVS WILL NOT RPT. NOT WISH TO DO SO EITHER. WE WOULD NOT OBJECT, HOWEVER, IF YUGOSLAVS WOULD WISH TO ANNOUNCE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS ACCEPTED TITO'S INVITATION IN PRINCIPLE.

2. ORIGINAL BEING DUCHED.

4. FYI: ON JANUARY 13 UNDER SECRETARY SISCO TOLD ASSISTANT SECRETARY MILICICIC ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS THAT PRESIDENT FORD HAD AGREED TO VISIT YUGOSLAVIA ON A DATE TO BE DETERMINED, AND THAT OUR EMBASSY WOULD BE DELIVERING A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO TITO IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. TELEGRAMS MINUS OF SISCO-MILICICIC MEETING WILL FOLLOW, END FYI. INVERSOLL

SECRET

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRET
May 7, 1975

Dear Mr. President:

On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Allied victory in World War II, the American people mark with deepest respect the wartime contributions and sacrifices of Yugoslavia. We recall with special gratitude that during the struggle against the common foe, Yugoslav civilians and soldiers alike risked their lives to save crews of American planes downed in Yugoslavia.

Our two countries experienced the agonies of war as allies. The anniversary of our wartime cooperation is a timely reminder of the need to continue to work together toward the goal of a more peaceful world which we share.

In this spirit, the United States is pleased to send a delegation to Yugoslavia's commemorative celebration of the Allied victory. Two distinguished Americans, John A. Blatnik and Major General Clay T. Buckingham will represent the United States.

I am certain that these commemorative ceremonies will contribute further to the development of mutual understanding between our countries.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

His Excellency
Marshal Josip Broz Tito
President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Belgrade
MEMORANDUM FOR: GEORGE SPRINGSTEEN
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TO: Marshal Tito
FROM: President
DATE: May 7, 1975
SUBJECT:

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR: PRESIDENT'S SIGNATURE
DIRECT REPLY
WHITE HOUSE STAFF SIGNATURE
FURNISH INFO COPY
OTHER

DUE DATE:
URGENT
ROUTINE

COMMENTS:

Charlotte D. Vigonte
for JEANNE W. DAVIS
Staff Secretary
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 7, 1975

Dear Mr. President:

On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Allied victory in World War II, the American people mark with deepest respect the wartime contributions and sacrifices of Yugoslavia. We recall with special gratitude that during the struggle against the common foe, Yugoslav civilians and soldiers alike risked their lives to save crews of American planes downed in Yugoslavia.

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I am certain that these commemorative ceremonies will contribute further to the development of mutual understanding between our countries.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

His Excellency
Marshal Josip Broz Tito
President of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
Belgrade
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
May 6, 1975

Pass to Jeanne Davis for cabling to Belgrade. Blanick has already left.

Bud
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Message to President Tito

At the invitation of the Yugoslav Government, the United States is sending a two-man delegation to Yugoslavia's May 8-9 celebration of the 30th anniversary of the Allied victory in World War II. The delegates will be former Representative John A. Blatnik, who served in Yugoslavia during the War, and Major General Clay T. Buckingham of the Seventh Army.

I believe it would be appropriate for the US delegates to carry a personal message from you to President Tito for this occasion. The letter for your signature at Tab A would note the contributions and sacrifices of Yugoslavia during the War and pay tribute to Yugoslav aid to downed American flyers. It would observe that this anniversary is a timely reminder of the need to work together to maintain the peace and would name the US representatives who will attend the ceremonies in Yugoslavia.

Your letter to President Tito has been cleared with Paul Theis.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the letter at Tab A.
MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

URGENT ACTION

May 5, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: Mr. Clift

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to President Tito

At the invitation of the Yugoslav Government, the United States is sending a two-man delegation to Yugoslavia's May 8-9 celebration of the 30th anniversary of the Allied victory in World War II. The members of the delegation will be former Representative John A. Blatnik, who served in Yugoslavia during the War, and Major General Clay T. Buckingham, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army. The USSR, UK and France have also been invited to send delegations to the celebration.

With the memorandum at Tab II, the Department of State recommends -- and I concur -- that it would be appropriate for the delegation to carry a personal message from the President to President Tito (bearing in mind that the President has written Podgorny in connection with the USSR ceremonies).

The memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab I would inform him of the commemorative events in Yugoslavia and also forward a proposed message. The message would note the contributions and sacrifices of Yugoslavia during the War, observe that this anniversary is a timely reminder of the need to work together to maintain the peace, and would name the US delegates to the ceremonies in Yugoslavia.

The President's message has been cleared with Paul Theis.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you sign the memorandum for the President at Tab I.

2. That Jeanne Davis LDX the text as approved by the President to State for immediate dispatch by telegram to Embassy Belgrade, with the signed original to follow by pouch.
MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Proposed Message from President Ford to President Tito on Occasion of Celebration of the 30th Anniversary of World War II Allied Victory

May 3, 1975

At the invitation of the Yugoslav Government, we are sending a two-man delegation to Yugoslavia's 30th anniversary celebration May 8 and 9 of the Allied victory in World War II. The delegation will be headed by former Congressman John A. Blatnik, who served in Yugoslavia as an Army Air Corps Intelligence and OSS Officer during World War II, and Major General Clay T. Buckingham, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, United States Army, Europe and Seventh Army. The USSR, the United Kingdom and France have also been invited to send delegations to this celebration.

We believe it would serve our interests if the delegates were to carry a personal message from President Ford to President Tito. A proposed message which congratulates President Tito on the Yugoslav role in the Allied Victory is attached.

Paul E. Bland
George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Suggested letter.
Suggested Message

Dear Mr. President:

On the solemn occasion of the anniversary of the Allied victory in World War II, I would like to salute you personally, and through you the peoples of Yugoslavia, for the heroic role you played in the liberation of your country from foreign occupation and the important contribution you made to our common triumph over the forces which aimed at depriving the peoples of Europe of their liberty. In recalling the days of our struggle against the common foe, I would like to pay a special tribute to those Yugoslav civilians and soldiers who risked their lives to save American flyers downed over Yugoslavia.

I look forward to meeting you personally soon and I send you my best personal regards.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

His Excellency
Marshal Josip Broz Tito,
President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
Belgrade.

Department of State
TO: PRES KISSINGER
FROM: KISSINGER, COLBY, SCHLESINGER, ST

MEMO FOR
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REPLY FOR------------------
APPROPRIATE
ACTION

MEMO-----
TO-----
RECOMMENDATIONS
JOINT MEMO.
REFER TO
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FOR:

ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
CONCURRENCE.
DUE DATE:
COMMENTS:
(INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

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SUSPENSE
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**NSC/S**
MEMORANDUM FOR GEORGE SPRINGSTEEN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Presidential Message to President Tito on the Middle East Agreement -- LDX Document 1220 (Received 9/15/75)

The substance of the proposed Presidential message to President Tito on the Middle East is approved but we recommend the following changes:

--9th line on page 2: "I am" should be inserted in place of "You can be" so that the sentence beginning line 9 reads: "I am certain that President Sadat shares this view....

--10th line on page 2: "I believe" should be inserted after "However," so that the sentence beginning at the end of line 10 reads: "However, I believe he has come to recognize....."

--lines 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 -- the entire paragraph beginning "I know you share our belief that the process..... and ending "of all will be accommodated." -- should be dropped on page 2.

--line 33: an insertion should be made after the first word "progress." (p. 2) so that line 33 would read: "progress, and to create the opportunity for the Middle East to turn from a succession of wars to the achievement of peace in which the legitimate interests of all nations and peoples of the area are accommodated. I know you share with me the high hopes we"......

--line 36 page 2: the first word in line 36, "at", should be changed to "over" and the word "possibly" in that line should be dropped.

--"With warm personal regards" at the end of the message on page 2 should be dropped. "Sincerely" should be inserted.

Jeannette Davis
Staff Secretary

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12352, SEC. 3.5
NODIS, NARA, DATE 1/24/98, DEPT. GUIDELINES
FOR JEANNE DAVIS

Jeanne,

The attached cable containing a Presidential message to Tito was run by General Scowcroft for final clearance. He approved our recommended changes as contained in the attached memo to George Springsteen. Recommend this memo be LDXed to State this evening.

Bob O'Reilly

Jeanne—This is threading & should probably not go routinely to files.
FOR URGENT CLEARANCE

FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

Brent,

Denis and I have reviewed the attached proposed Presidential message to President Tito which came here for clearance because of the Presidential angle. The substance is consistent with the approaches we are making in Sadat's behalf. We suggest, however, some minor editorial changes as reflected in the attached memo which we believe Jeanne Davis should send back to State.

We thought you would want to be aware of this message, and recommend you approve the Davis-Springsteen memo attached.

APPROVE Davis-Springsteen memo

APPROVE as amended

DISAPPROVE: clear cable as is
FOR URGENT CLEARANCE

FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT

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Denis and I have reviewed the attached proposed Presidential message to President Tito which came here for clearance because of the Presidential angle. The substance is consistent with the approaches we are making in Sadat's behalf. We suggest, however, some minor editorial changes as reflected in the attached memo which we believe Jeanne Davis should send back to State.

We thought you would want to be aware of this message, and recommend you approve the Davis-Springsteen memo attached.

____ APPROVE Davis-Springsteen memo

____ APPROVE as amended

____ DISAPPROVE; clear cable as is

Bob Oakes

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE/DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY: NARA, DATE: 10/11/96
MEMORANDUM FOR GEORGE SPRINGSTEEN
Executive Secretary
Department of State

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Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
SECRET

NCA: ALBERTONI SKG
9/13/75 X29585
S THE SECRETARY

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IMMEDIATE BELGRADE

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
IMMEDIATE DAMASCUS, CAIRO IMMEDIATE, ALGIERS IMMEDIATE

E.O. 11652; XGDS-3

TAGS: PROR, VO, AG, IR

SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT - MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT TITO

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY:

1. IN VIEW MODERATE AND RESPONSIBLE STAND TAKEN BY YUGOSLAVIA ON NEW EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI INTERIM AGREEMENT, WE WOULD LIKE TO OBTAIN PRESIDENT TITO'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATION IN SUPPORT OF AGREEMENT TO ARAB RADICALS, PARTICULARLY ALGERIA AND IRAQ, WITH WHOM HE HAS CLOSE RELATIONSHIP. IN PURSUIT OF THIS END REQUEST YOU DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT FORD TO PRESIDENT TITO:

BEGIN TEXT: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I WAS PLEASED TO SEE THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT'S SPOKESMAN HAS DESCRIBED THE NEW EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI INTERIM AGREEMENT AS QUOTE A POSITIVE STEP UNQUOTE AND QUOTE A SIGNIFICANT MOMENT IN MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS. UNQUOTE - I APPRECIATE THIS EVALUATION, MR. PRESIDENT, AND I KNOW YOU LOOK, AS I DO, BEYOND THIS AGREEMENT TO A JUST AND LASTING PEACE FOR ALL THE NATIONS AND PEOPLES OF THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS AGREEMENT MUST BE FOLLOWED BY CONTINUOUS EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE PROGRESS ON OTHER FRONTS, INCLUDING EFFORTS TO PROMOTE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA...
AND ISRAEL. AS I INDICATED IN OUR MEETING IN BELGRADE IN AUGUST, OUR INTENTION IS TO REMAIN ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN THE PEACEMAKING PROCESS, AND NOT TO TOLERATE A STALEMATE.

PRESIDENT SADAT IS PURSUING THE SAME SORT OF FARSEENING, SOUND, AND COURAGEOUS POLICY, BRAVING CRITICISM FROM THOSE WHO DISAGREE, AS YOU HAVE ALWAYS DONE. I KNOW THAT YOU WOULD PREFER, AS WE WOULD, TO MOVE FORWARD MORE RAPIDLY ON ALL ASPECTS OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT, INCLUDING THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE. [YOU CAN BE] CERTAIN THAT PRESIDENT SADAT SHARES THIS VIEW. HOWEVER, HE HAS COME TO RECOGNIZE AS WE HAVE THE REALITY THAT THE BEST MEANS OF MAINTAINING MOMENTUM TOWARD PEACE IS BY TAKING ANOTHER MORE LIMITED STEP AS HE HAS AGREED TO, RATHER THAN FOLLOWING THE SUPERFICILY EASIER COURSE OF CALLING FOR IMMEDIATE ALL-OR-NOTHING SOLUTIONS. IN DOING SO, HE HAS CREATED AN OPENING FOR PEACE WHICH, I AM CONVINCED, HISTORY WILL RECORD AS A COURAGEOUS ACT OF STATESMANNISH TO THE BENEFIT OF ALL THOSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHO SEEK A TRULY JUST AND LASTING PEACE.

I KNOW YOU SHARE OUR BELIEF THAT THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATING, OF WHICH LAST WEEK'S AGREEMENT IS AN IMPORTANT PART, PROVIDES THE BEST CHANCE TO SEE THE MIDDLE EAST TURN FROM A SUCCESSION OF WARS TO THE PROSPECT OF PEACE IN WHICH THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF ALL WILL BE ACCOMMODATED.

UNFORTUNATELY, SOME HAVE TENDED TO DENIGRATE WHAT HAS ACCOMPLISHED IN REACHING THE AGREEMENT SIGNED BY EGYPT AND ISRAEL LAST WEEK. SUCH ANTAGONISM CAN ONLY THREATEN WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED. INDEED, ATTACKS ON THE AGREEMENT CAN THREATEN THE VERY TENIOUS PEACE SO FAR MAINTAINED IN THE MIDDLE EAST. I BELIEVE YOU WILL AGREE THAT THE UNITY OF THE ARAB STATES IS THE BEST MEANS TO BUILD ON LAST WEEK'S AGREEMENT SO AS TO KEEP THE MOMENTUM FOR PEACEFUL PROGRESS. IF YOU ALSO SHARE WITH ME THE HIGH HOPES WE HAVE FOR THE AGREEMENT AND WHAT IT CAN PORTEND FOR THE PEACEMAKING PROCESS, IF YOU ALSO SHARE WITH ME THE CONCERN THAT CAN PROBABLY RESULT FROM CONTINUING ATTACKS BY THOSE WHO OPPOSE THE AGREEMENT, I WOULD BE DEEPLY GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD MAKE AVAILABLE TO OTHERS YOUR WISDOM AND COUNSEL IN THIS REGARD, IN PARTICULAR TO THE LEADERS OF SUCH COUNTRIES AS IRAQ AND ALGERIA WHOSE VOICES ARE OF SOME IMPORTANCE IN THE ARAB WORLD. YOUR SUPPORT NOW COULD MAKE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO KEEPING THE PEACE PROCESS MOVING.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS, GERALD R. FORD END TEXT.}

[Signature]

SECRET

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9/13/78 XGDS-3
S THE SECRETARY

STAGS: FOR: 39 AG: IR

SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT - MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

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MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT

PRESIDENT

MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT

SECRET
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PRESIDENT SADAT IS PURSUING THE SAME SORT OF Farseeing, Sound, and Courageous Policy, Braving Criticism From Those Who Disagree, As You Have Always Done. I Know That You Would Prefer, As We Would, To Move Forward More Rapidly On All Aspects Of An Overall Settlement, Including The Legitimate Interests Of The Palestinian People. You Can Be Certain That President Sadat Shares This View. However, He Has Come To Recognize, As We Have, The Reality That The Best Means Of Maintaining Momentum Toward Peace Is By Taking Another More Limited Step As He Has Agreed To, Rather Than Following The Superficially Easier Course Of Calling For Immediate All-Or-Nothing Solutions. In Going So, He Has Created An Opening For Peace Which, I Am Convinced, History Will Record As A Courageous Act Of Statesmanship To The Benefit Of All Those In The Middle East Who Seek A Truly Just And Lasting Peace.

...ING, OF WHICH LAST WEEK'S AGREEMENT IS AN IMPORTANT PART, PROVIDES THE BEST CHANCE TO SEE THE MIDDLE EAST TURN FROM A SUCCESSION OF WARS TO THE PROPECT OF PEACE IN WHICH THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF ALL WILL BE ACCOMMODATED.

Unfortunately, Some Have Tended To Denigrate What Was Accomplished In Reaching The Agreement Signed By Egypt And Israel Last Week. Such Antagonism Can Only Threaten What Has Been Accomplished. Indeed, Attacks On The Agreement Can Threaten The Very Tenuous Peace So Far Maintained In The Middle East. I Believe You Will Agree That The Unity Of The Arab States Is The Best Means To Build On Last Week’s Agreement So As To Keep The Momentum For Peaceful Progress. I Know You Share With Me The High Hopes We Have For The Agreement And What It Can POrTen For The Peacemaking Process. If You Also Share With Me The Concern What Can Probably Result From Continuing Attacks By Those Who Oppose The Agreement, I Would Be Deeply Grateful If You Would Make Available To Others Your Wisdom And Counsel In This Regard. In Particular To The Leaders Of Such Countries As Iraq And Algeria Whose Voices Are Of Some Importance In The Arab World, Your Support Now Could Make An Important Contribution To Keeping The Peace Process Moving.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS, GERALD R. FORD END TEXT.
BEograd YUGOSLAVIA 1905 25 SEPTEMBER 1975

THE PRESIDENT

THE WHITE HOUSE

BLUE CY: WHHR
PINK CY: MR R LINDER

ALLOW ME, MR. PRESIDENT TO TELL YOU HOW MUCH I CONDEMN
THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION AS WELL AS HOW SINCERELY
GLAD I AM THAT YOU ARE UNHURT MY WIFE JOINS ME IN
EXTENDING TO YOU AND YOUR WIFE OUR BEST WISHES AND
THE ASSURANCES OF OUR FRIENDLINESS

JOSIP BROZ TITO
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I have received your message of 18 September, for which I thank you most cordially. I am pleased to note that you agree with our evaluation that the new disengagement agreement in the Sinai can constitute a positive step and a significant moment in the development of the situation in the Middle East, provided it is followed by further cont-
NUOUS EFFORTS AIMED AT ACHIEVING A LASTING AND COMPREHENSIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE CRISIS.

WE CONSIDER THAT OUR RECENT TALKS IN BEOGRAD, AS WELL AS THE MEETING BETWEEN OUR SECRETARIES OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DR. HENRY KISSINGER AND MR. MILOS MINIC, IN WASHINGTON, HAVE BEEN VERY SUCCESSFUL AND USEFUL. WE APPRECIATE YOUR ASSURANCES THAT YOU WILL CONTINUE YOUR EFFORTS AND REMAIN ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN CONTRIBUTING TOWARD FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NEWLY-CREATED SITUATION, NOTWITHSTANDING THE ACHIEVED RESULTS, CONTINUES TO BE FRAUGHT WITH NUMEROUS UNCERTAINTIES AND DANGER THAT COULD JEOPARDIZE PEACE UNLESS FOLLOWED BY NEW STEPS, WITHIN THE SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME, WHICH SHOULD SECURE ISRAEL'S WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL THE TERRITORIES OCCUPIED IN 1967 AND THE REALIZATION OF THE LEGITIMATE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE ARAB PEOPLE OF PALESTINE, INCLUDING THE RIGHT TO ESTABLISH A NATIONAL STATE. THIS IS THE ONLY WAY TO ENSURE THE INDEPENDENCE AND SECURITY OF ALL THE STATES AND PEOPLES OF THE AREA.

I FULLY SHARE YOUR VIEW THAT THE UNITY OF THE ARAB PEOPLES CONSTITUTES ONE OF THE MOST ESSENTIAL FACTORS IN THE BUILDING OF A JUST PEACE AND KEEPING THE CURRENT PROCESS OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE CRISIS MOVING. I ASSURE YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT WE, FOR OUR PART, HAVE ALWAYS POINTED OUT THIS FACT TO OUR ARAB FRIENDS. NOW THAT THE NEUTRAL ENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED BETWEEN THE ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT AND ISRAEL, WE ARE CONTINUING TO DO SO, THROUGH OUR INTENSIVE CONTACTS WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ARAB COUNTRIES, INCLUDING THE COUNTRIES THAT YOU HAVE MENTIONED ON YOUR VALUED MESSAGE.

BEARING IN MIND OUR JOINT STATEMENT DURING OUR RECENT TALKS IN BEOGRAD ON THE INDISPENSABILITY OF A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN ISRAEL'S INTRANSIGENT STANCE, AS THE MOST IMPORTANT OBSTACLE STANDING IN THE WAY TO PEACE, I WISH TO REEMPHASIZE THAT WE ATTACH EXCEPTIONAL IMPORTANCE TO YOUR
EFFORTS AND CONTRIBUTION IN THIS REGARD.

AT THE SAME TIME, I WISH TO REASSURE YOU THAT THE SOCIALIST FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA, TOO, WILL CONTINUE TO EXERT EFFORTS, WITHIN ITS POSSIBILITIES, WITH A VIEW TO ACCELERATING PROGRESS TOWARD AN OVER-ALL SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM. HOWEVER, WE FEEL THAT THE GRAVITY AND UNCERTAINTY OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEVELOPMENTS CALL FOR AN ALL-OUT ENGAGEMENT OF THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY AND, FIRST AND FOREMOST, OF THE COUNTRIES DIRECTLY INVOLVED, IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE CRISIS IN ORDER TO AVOID A POSSIBLE NEW DANGER OF WAR AND ANOTHER BETRAYAL OF THE HOPES OF THE NATIONS OF THAT REGION WHO HAVE SUFFERED SO MUCH.

SINCERELY YOURS, JOSEPH BROZ TITO

HIS EXCELLENCY
GERALD FORD
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D.C. END QUOTE. KISSINGER

NOTE BY OCT: OCT PASS MPI.