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Department of State TELEGRAM

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 538

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 0242

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR, TZ, AD, US
SUBJECT: NYERERE'S RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT'S LETTER

1. I WAS CALLED TO FONOFF 6:00 PM LOCAL 22 JANUARY AND HANDED ORIGINAL SIGNED TEXT (BEING POUCHED) OF PRESIDENT NYERERE'S RESPONSE TO LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FORD ON ANGOLA. AT TIME FONOFF EUROPEAN AND AMERICAS AFFAIRS DIRECTOR MUGANDA SAID PRESIDENT NYERERE EAGER THAT LETTER BE TRANSMITTED IMMEDIATELY TO PRESIDENT FORD.


2. BEGIN TEXT.

HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD,
THE WHITE HOUSE,
WASHINGTON D. C.,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

THANK YOU FOR YOUR LETTER OF 5TH JANUARY 1976, IN WHICH YOU MADE THE AMERICAN POSITION ON ANGOLA QUITE CLEAR. I HOPE THAT THIS REPLY WILL CONTRIBUTE TO GREATER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, AND THUS ASSIST IN THE MAINTENANCE OF OUR FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION DESPITE ANY POLITICAL DISAGREEMENTS ON THIS OR OTHER ISSUES.

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E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines, State Review 9/17/03

NARA, Date 3/9/04

By [Signature]



Department of State

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I HAVE EXPLAINED TANZANIA'S POSITION TO YOUR AMBASSADOR IN DAR ES SALAAM - BOTH BEFORE THE O.A.U. MEETING IN ADDIS ABABA, AND YESTERDAY IMMEDIATELY UPON MY RETURN FROM INDIA. HIS EXCELLENCY MR. SPAIN WILL UNDOUBTEDLY HAVE REPORTED TO YOU ON OUR DISCUSSIONS.

WAR IN ANGOLA IS, UNFORTUNATELY, NOTHING NEW; IT HAS BEEN - AND STILL IS - PART OF THE WHOLE STRUGGLE FOR NATIONAL FREEDOM AND FOR HUMAN EQUALITY AND DIGNITY IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT HAS NOT BEEN AN IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE BETWEEN COMMUNISTS AND NON-COMMUNISTS SINCE 1961 IT HAS BEEN A STRUGGLE BETWEEN COLONIALISTS AND RACIALISTS ON THE ONE SIDE, AND ANTI-COLONIALISTS AND ANTI-RACIALISTS ON THE OTHER.

THE M.P.L.A. OF ANGOLA WAS BY FAR THE MOST ACTIVE OF THE THREE NATIONALIST MOVEMENTS IN ANGOLA; IT NEEDED, AND USED MORE MILITARY AND OTHER MATERIAL SUPPORT IN CONDUCTING THE WAR AGAINST THE COLONIAL GOVERNMENT. THE M.P.L.A. THEREFORE OBTAINED MORE ARMS FROM THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS THAN EITHER OF THE OTHER TWO MOVEMENTS - ALTHOUGH ALL THREE HAVE HAD, AT VARIOUS TIMES, ARMS SUPPLIES FROM ONE OR MORE COMMUNIST COUNTRIES, BUT NONE OF THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS GOT ARMS FROM THESE COUNTRIES BECAUSE OF AN IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENT TO COMMUNISM. THEY GOT ARMS EXCLUSIVELY FROM EASTERN BLOCK COUNTRIES BECAUSE THEY COULD NOT GET ANY ARMS FROM WESTERN BLOCK COUNTRIES. THE LATTER WERE IN FACT ALLIED WITH PORTUGAL IN NATO THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD OF THE COLONIAL WAR.

WHETHER OPPOSITION TO NATO WAS THE REASON WHY SOME COMMUNIST COUNTRIES WERE WILLING TO GIVE ARMS TO THE ANGOLAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS, OR WHETHER THERE WAS SOME OTHER MOTIVE, ONLY THE DONORS CAN SAY. WHAT WE CAN SAY - AND ON THIS AT LEAST AFRICA IS UNITED - IS THAT ARMS WERE OBTAINED BECAUSE THERE WAS NO OTHER WAY IN WHICH THE PEOPLES OF THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES COULD OBTAIN FREEDOM. THE SALAZAR AND CAETANO GOVERNMENTS REJECTED THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONAL FREEDOM FOR ANGOLA, MOZAMBIQUE, AND GUINEA BISSAU. FINALLY, IN 1974, A NEW GOVERNMENT CAME TO POWER IN PORTUGAL AS A DIRECT RESULT

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OF THE COLONIAL WARS; THE PRINCIPLE OF NATIONAL FREEDOM WAS THEN CONCEDED - AND NEGOTIATIONS REPLACED ARMED CONFLICT.

AMERICA'S INTEREST IN ANGOLA, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, IS THAT ANGOLA SHOULD NOT BECOME A SATELLITE OR PUPPET OF THE U.S.S.R. AND THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO MILITARY BASES ON ANGOLAN SOIL WHICH MIGHT BE USED BY AMERICA'S ENEMIES. TANZANIA'S INTEREST IN ANGOLA STEMS FROM OUR INVOLVEMENT IN OUR OWN CONTINENT, AND OUR DESIRE THAT ANGOLA SHOULD NOT BECOME THE SATELLITE OR PUPPET OF ANY OTHER COUNTRY - WITH A PARTICULAR WORRY IN OUR MIND ABOUT RACIALIST AND COLONIALIST SOUTH AFRICA. AMERICA IS CONCERNED ABOUT CUBAN TROOPS AND RUSSIAN WEAPONS IN SUPPORT OF THE M.P.L.A. TANZANIA IS MUCH MORE CONCERNED ABOUT THE INTERVENTION OF SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AND WEAPONS IN SUPPORT OF F.N.L.A. AND UNITA. FOR ALL THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS OF AFRICA HAVE PERFORCE USED COMMUNIST SUPPLIED WEAPONS THROUGHOUT ANY NECESSARY ARMED STRUGGLE; WE DO NOT YET HAVE AN EXAMPLE OF AN INDEPENDENT AFRICAN COUNTRY WHICH HAS BECOME A SATELLITE OR PUPPET OF THE U.S.S.R. BUT SOUTH AFRICA'S DESIRE FOR A PUPPET REGIME IN ANGOLA IS VERY CLEAR; HAVING LOST ITS PORTUGUESE BUFFER STATE, THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT WISHES TO SUBSTITUTE ANOTHER KIND OF BUFFER TO PROTECT ITS DOMINATION OVER NAMIBIA AND ITS OWN INHUMAN APARTHEID PRACTICES IN SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF.

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I AM CONCERNED, MR. PRESIDENT, THAT BY INTERVENING IN ANGOLA ON THE SAME SIDE AS THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT, AMERICA WILL ACHIEVE TWO THINGS WHICH ARE QUITE THE OPPOSITE OF WHAT I UNDERSTAND YOU TO INTEND. FIRST, YOU WILL BECOME INCREASINGLY IDENTIFIED WITH SOUTH AFRICA'S RACIALIST DOCTRINE, BECAUSE YOU WILL BE FORCED, BY THE LOGIC OF EVENTS, INTO ASSISTING ITS INTERVENTION AND ITS POLICIES. SECOND, ACTIVE INTERVENTION BY AMERICA AGAINST M.P.L.A. WOULD FORCE THE M.P.L.A. GOVERNMENT INTO A DEGREE OF DEPENDENCE UPON THE U.S.S.R. AND ITS ALLIES WHICH WOULD ENDANGER ITS PRESENT DECLARED POLICY OF NON-ALIGNMENT. FOR ALTHOUGH THE M.P.L.A. GOVERNMENT NOW NEEDS TO OBTAIN WEAPONS TO FIGHT SOUTH AFRICA AND ITS ANGOLAN ALLIES, THE EXTENT OF ITS POLITICAL INDEBTEDNESS FOR THIS PURPOSE WOULD BE VERY DIFFERENT FROM THAT INVOLVED IN OBTAINING RUSSIAN HELP AGAINST THE MIGHT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

MR. PRESIDENT, THE HISTORY OF THE LAST FOURTEEN YEARS MEANS THAT THE MPLA GOVERNMENT WILL NATURALLY BE FRIENDLY WITH A U.S.S.R. WHICH RESPECTS ITS SOVEREIGNTY. BUT FRIENDSHIP DOES NOT IMPLY SUBSERVIENCE. THE PRELIMO GOVERNMENT OF MOZAMBIQUE HAS THE SAME KIND OF HISTORICALLY PROMOTED FRIENDSHIP WITH CHINA, BUT IT IS NOT A SATELLITE OF CHINA - ON THE ANGOLAN ISSUE THEY ARE TAKING DIFFERENT SIDES. AND FRIENDSHIP WITH THE U.S.S.R. DOES NOT AUTOMATICALLY LEAD TO ENMITY TOWARDS THE U.S.A. AS YOUR COUNTRY HAS NOW RECOGNISED, NON-ALIGNED NATIONS CAN BE FRIENDLY WITH YOURSELVES AND WITH COUNTRIES OF THE EASTERN BLOCK

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AT THE SAME TIME. IT IS MY HOPE THAT AMERICA'S POLICIES AT THIS VERY DIFFICULT TIME WILL NOT PRECLUDE THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN ANGOLA AND THE U.S.A. IN THE FUTURE.

LET ME ADD THAT MY DISCUSSION WITH YOUR AMBASSADOR YESTERDAY HAS GIVEN ME SOME ENCOURAGEMENT TO HOPE THAT ON ANGOLA THE POSITIONS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES WILL BECOME CLOSER IN THE FUTURE. FOR I DO UNDERSTAND AMERICA'S FEARS ABOUT POSSIBLE SOVIET BASES IN ANGOLA, AND ABOUT FUTURE ANGOLAN HOSTILITY TO THE UNITED STATES. WE ON OUR SIDE ARE ANXIOUS THAT ANGOLA SHOULD BE RUN BY ANGOLANS IN THE INTERESTS OF ANGOLA, AND NOT ANYONE ELSE. BUT I STRESSED TO YOUR AMBASSADOR THAT WE DO NOT REGARD SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA AS A MATTER OVER WHICH THERE CAN BE NEGOTIATION; OUR ABHORRENCE OF SOUTH AFRICAN RACIALIST POLICIES, AND ITS COLONIAL DOMINATION OF NAMIBIA, IS SUCH THAT SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS AND SUPPORT CANNOT BE EQUATED IN ANY WAY WITH OTHER FORCES WHICH ARE HELPING THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT TO DEFEAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN AGGRESSION. THE TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT DOES NOT CONTROL THE MPLA GOVERNMENT; BUT I BELIEVE THAT ON THAT QUESTION OUR ATTITUDE IS THE SAME. FURTHER, IT APPEARS TO ME LIKELY THAT AFTER A COMPLETE SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL FROM ANGOLAN TERRITORY, THE ANGOLAN GOVERNMENT WILL WATCH THE POSITION VERY CAREFULLY, AND WITH SOME SUSPICION, FOR A TIME, BUT WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THEY, LIKE OTHER AFRICAN TERRITORIES, WOULD NOT LIKE TO HAVE FOREIGN TROOPS ON THEIR SOIL, EVEN IN ALLIANCE WITH THEM, LONGER THAN IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY FOR THE INTEGRITY OF THE STATE. THE MPLA POLICY, AND ITS ADOPTED CONSTITUTION, DEMANDS NON-ALIGNMENT AND A FOREIGN POLICY. ANGOLAN LEADERS WILL REALISE THAT THIS REQUIRES THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN TROOPS AS SOON AS THEIR PRESENCE IS NOT MADE NECESSARY BY AN ACTIVE THREAT FROM SOUTH AFRICAN AND ITS SUPPORTERS.

MR. PRESIDENT, ALLOW ME TO CONCLUDE THIS LETTER BY SAYING HOW MUCH I VALUE DIRECT CONTACT BETWEEN US ON THIS AND OTHER ISSUES OF MUTUAL CONCERN. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO EXPRESS MY GOOD WISHES FOR YOU, AND FOR THE AMERICAN

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PEOPLE, FOR THE WHOLE OF 1976.

YOURS SINCERELY,

JULIUS K. NYERERE

END TEXT.
SPAIN

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~~SECRET/NODIS~~ *for Stelling*

STATE - A.I.D. - USIA
ROUTING SLIP

DATE *copy*
Feb. 9, 1976

TO:	Name or Title	Urgen. Symbol	Room No.	Bldg.	Initials	Date
1.	S		7234A	NS		
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Approval	For Your Information	Note and Return
As Requested	Initial for Clearance	Per Conversation
Comment	Investigate	Prepare Reply
File	Justify	See Me
For Correction	Necessary Action	Signature

REMARKS OR ADDITIONAL ROUTING

Received from Amembassy Dar es Salaam.
Text contained in Dar es Salaam 0242,
repeated to the Secretary Jan. 22.

*Make copy for
& Tanzania and
fwd original to WH.*

[Signature]

FROM: (Name and Org. Symbol) <i>ES</i> Ellen Shippy, AF/E	ROOM NO. & BLDG. 5240 NS	PHONE NO. 20857
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
TRANSMITTAL SLIP

CLASSIFICATION
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DATE
January 23, 1976

TO
Department of State

For the Attention of
Ellen Shippy (AF/E)

FROM
Amembassy Dar es Salaam

TO THE FOREIGN SERVICE

TO THE DEPARTMENT

- For Transmittal to Addressee
at the Discretion of Post
- Post Information Only
- Transmit to Foreign Office
- Submit Report
- Reply to the Individual

- Dept. Information Only
- CERP Publications
- Enclosure to Previous
Airgram
- Reply to Department
Request

- Transmit to: (U. S. Agency)
- Inform:

REFERENCE

Dar es Salaam 0242

ITEMS/REMARKS



IN REPLY REFER TO FILE NUMBER AND DRAFTING OFFICE

FILE NO.

SIGNATURE

Herbert Levin

CLASSIFICATION

OFFICE

SECRET / NODIS

Deputy Chief of Mission

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THE STATE HOUSE,
DAR ES SALAAM,
TANZANIA.

22nd January, 1976

His Excellency President Gerald R. Ford,
The White House,
Washington D.C.,
United States of America

Dear Mr. President,

Thank you for your letter of 5th January 1976, in which you made the American position on Angola quite clear. I hope that this reply will contribute to greater understanding between our two countries, and thus assist in the maintenance of our friendship and cooperation despite any political disagreements on this or other issues.

I have explained Tanzania's position to your Ambassador in Dar es Salaam - both before the O.A.U. Meeting in Addis Ababa, and yesterday immediately upon my return from India. His Excellency Mr. Spain will undoubtedly have reported to you on our discussions.

War in Angola is, unfortunately, nothing new; it has been - and still is - part of the whole struggle for national freedom and for human equality and dignity in Southern Africa. The Angolan conflict has not been an ideological struggle between Communists and Non-Communists; since 1961 it has been a struggle between colonialists and racialists on the one side, and anti-colonialists and anti-racialists on the other.

The M.P.L.A. of Angola was by far the most active of the three Nationalist Movements in Angola; it needed, and used, more military and other material support in conducting the war against the colonial government. The M.P.L.A. therefore obtained more arms from the Communist Governments than either of the other two Movements - although all three have had, at various times, ~~arms~~ supplies from one or more Communist countries. But none of the Liberation Movements got arms from these countries because of an ideological commitment to Communism. They got arms exclusively from Eastern Block countries because they could not get any arms from Western Block countries. The latter

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State Dept. Guidelines, State Review 9/17/05
By , NARA, Date 3/9/04



were in fact allied with Portugal in NATO throughout the period of the colonial war.

Whether opposition to NATO was the reason why some Communist countries were willing to give arms to the Angolan Freedom Fighters, or whether there was some other motive, only the donors can say. What we can say - and on this at least Africa is united - is that arms were obtained because there was no other way in which the peoples of the Portuguese colonies could obtain freedom. The Salazar and Caetano Governments rejected the principle of national freedom for Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau. Finally, in 1974, a new Government came to power in Portugal as a direct result of the colonial wars; the principle of national freedom was then conceded - and negotiations replaced armed conflict.

America's interest in Angola, as I understand it, is that Angola should not become a satellite or puppet of the U.S.S.R., and that there should be no military bases on Angolan soil which might be used by America's enemies. Tanzania's interest in Angola stems from our involvement in our own continent, and our desire that Angola should not become the satellite or puppet of any other country - with a particular worry in our mind about racialist and colonialist South Africa. America is concerned about Cuban troops and Russian weapons in support of the M.P.L.A. Tanzania is much more concerned about the intervention of South African troops and weapons in support of F.N.L.A. and UNITA. For all the Liberation Movements of Africa have perforce used communist supplied weapons throughout any necessary armed struggle; we do not yet have an example of an independent African country which has become a satellite or puppet of the U.S.S.R. But South Africa's desire for a puppet regime in Angola is very clear; having lost its Portuguese buffer state, the South African government wishes to substitute another kind of buffer to protect its domination over Namibia and its own inhuman apartheid practices in South Africa itself.

I am concerned, Mr. President, that by intervening in Angola on the same side as the South African government, America will achieve two things which are quite the opposite of what I understand you to intend. First, you will become increasingly identified with South Africa's racialist doctrine, because you will be forced, by the logic of events,

into assisting its intervention and its policies. Second, active intervention by America against M.P.L.A. would force the M.P.L.A. Government into a degree of dependence upon the U.S.S.R. and its allies which would endanger its present declared policy of non-alignment. For although the M.P.L.A. government now needs to obtain weapons to fight South Africa and its Angolan allies, the extent of its political indebtedness for this purpose would be very different from that involved in obtaining Russian help against the might of the United States of America.

Mr. President, the history of the last fourteen years means that the M.P.L.A. government will naturally be friendly with a U.S.S.R. which respects its sovereignty. But friendship does not imply subservience. The Frelimo Government of Mozambique has the same kind of historically promoted friendship with China, but it is not a satellite of China - on the Angolan issue they are taking different sides. And friendship with the U.S.S.R. does not automatically lead to enmity towards the U.S.A. As your country has now recognised, non-aligned nations can be friendly with yourselves and with countries of the Eastern Block at the same time. It is my hope that America's policies at this very difficult time will not preclude the development of economic and political cooperation between Angola and the U.S.A. in the future.

Let me add that my discussion with your Ambassador yesterday has given me some encouragement to hope that on Angola the positions of our two countries will become closer in the future. For I do understand America's fears about possible Soviet bases in Angola, and about future Angolan hostility to the United States. We on our side are anxious that Angola should be run by Angolans in the interests of Angola, and not anyone else. But I stressed to your Ambassador that we do not regard South African intervention in Angola as a matter over which there can be negotiation; our abhorrence of South African racialist policies, and its colonial domination of Namibia, is such that South African troops and support cannot be equated in any way with other forces which are helping the Angolan Government to defeat the South African aggression. The Tanzanian Government does not control the M.P.L.A. Government; but I believe that on that

question our attitude is the same. Further, it appears to me likely that after a complete South African withdrawal from Angolan territory, the Angolan Government will watch the position very carefully, and with some suspicion, for a time. But we have reason to believe that they, like other African territories, would not like to have foreign troops on their soil, even in alliance with them, longer than is absolutely necessary for the integrity of the state. The M.P.L.A. policy, and its adopted constitution, demands non-alignment as a foreign policy. Angolan leaders will realise that this requires the withdrawal of foreign troops as soon as their presence is not made necessary by an active threat from South Africa and its supporters.


Mr. President, allow me to conclude this letter by saying how much I value direct contact between us on this and other issues of mutual concern. I would also like to express my good wishes for you, and for the American people, for the whole of 1976.

Yours sincerely,

Julius K. Nyerere



His Excellency President Gerald R. Ford,
The White House,
Washington D.C.,
United States of America



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