

The original documents are located in Box 3, folder “Pakistan - Prime Minister Bhutto (3)” of the National Security Adviser’s Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5743 Add-on #3

~~SECRET/NODIS (GDS)~~

ACTION
October 15, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RO*

*HAK thinks no
reply now
needed.
B*

SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to Letter of August 17
from Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan

You will recall Prime Minister Bhutto's messages to the President and you of June 13 following your meeting with Aziz Ahmed in Ankara [Tab II]. You replied to both of these via a message to Bhutto and oral instructions to Ambassador Byroade, which Byroade noted, effectively closed out the June 13 messages [Tab III]. In your message to Bhutto, you also acknowledged his new letter to the President of August 17, indicating that the President would respond after you had a chance to discuss it with him following your return from the Middle East.

The President has now seen Aziz Ahmed but he still owes Bhutto a reply to the August 17 letter. At Tab I is a memo transmitting that letter and proposing a reply. The suggested reply has been developed from a State draft and coordinated here, revised to reflect the fact of the Presidential meeting last week.

RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the memo at Tab I to the President seeking his signature on a letter of reply to Bhutto.

_____ APPROVE _____ APPROVE AS AMENDED

Concurrence in Presidential reply: Messrs. Solomon, *Cliff*

MICROFILM DATA
DO _____
NOV 11 1975
TO) <i>PK</i>
WFO _____
SUBJ _____

Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified on
December 31, 1983.

~~SECRET/NODIS (GDS)~~

W 3/9/04



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

5743 - Add-on #3

ACTIONSECRET/NODIS (GDS)

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Reply to Letter from Prime Minister
Bhutto of Pakistan

At Tab B is a letter to you from Prime Minister Bhutto expressing his concern over the direction of Soviet policies in South Asia. These concerns are not new but they have been heightened by recent events such as the Helsinki Summit--which Bhutto thinks will permit the Soviets to devote even more time to their ambitions in South Asia--and statements allegedly made recently by the Soviet representative in Kabul implying sympathy for Afghan designs on Pak territory.

Bhutto does not make explicit new appeals to you for greater political and material support but does state that Soviet aggressive designs on Pakistan are encouraged by the lack of "credible evidence of support from the US."

Bhutto's letter is a further attempt to keep his security concerns before you and to elicit your personal reassurance and support. Aziz Ahmed followed the same themes in his talks with you here and with me in New York. Within the framework of our current policy toward South Asia and our interest in avoiding any destabilizing moves, we are doing about as much as we can for Pakistan, including economic assistance, PL-480 and military sales programs. You and I have made this clear to Aziz Ahmed.

If only for reasons of courtesy, I believe that you should send a written reply to Bhutto, giving broad reassurance on the issues he raises, although you have said as much to Aziz Ahmed.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter to Prime Minister Bhutto at Tab A. (The text has been cleared with Paul Theis.)

SECRET/NODIS (GDS)

WA 3/9/04

Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified on
December 31, 1983.



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

Thank you for your letter of August 17. It is important that we maintain the close personal dialogue which we so effectively began in our very constructive meetings of last February. I know that Secretary of State Kissinger has also been in touch with you, and both of us have now had the opportunity to exchange views with your Minister of State, Aziz Ahmed.

Let me assure you at the outset there is no question that the integrity and independence of Pakistan are important to the United States and essential to the stability of South Asia. In a period in which we are working to lessen tensions between the major powers, while safeguarding our vital security interests and those of our friends, my Government remains fully cognizant of its responsibility to insure that an easing of tensions in one area does not create opportunities for exploitation elsewhere. Nor can it in any way impact adversely on our relations with other countries in our objectives of regional stability and world peace. We have, therefore, made clear to the Soviet leadership that our continuing attention to improved relations between the United States and the Soviet Union is heavily conditioned by developments in other parts of the world. I believe this position is well understood and will continue to benefit your Nation's security and independence.

Let me emphasize that there will be no lessening of our resolve to help our friends in South Asia. Secretary Kissinger has already made clear our appreciation for Pakistan's concerns. These have been the subject of



continuing attention in the United States Government for some time, as you know from our discussions here last February and as you have certainly heard from Aziz Ahmed and your Ambassador in Washington.

I believe we have taken significant steps to help Pakistan, both through the lifting of the arms embargo and in our on-going economic assistance programs. In the months ahead there will be visible results, as we respond to specific requests for arms purchases and as we reach new agreements on various economic development programs.

We admire the progress you have stimulated in the process of normalization of relations among the countries of South Asia and we intend to continue to offer maximum encouragement to your efforts.

In closing, I want to reiterate my strong wish to visit Pakistan at an early date and to meet with you again. It now appears that my schedule through the remainder of this year will make it impossible for me to accept your warm hospitality at this time. As you know, I do plan to visit the People's Republic of China fairly soon. I intend to discuss with the Chinese leaders our common interests in promoting stability in South Asia and your important contribution to that end. I look forward to accepting your hospitality at a mutually convenient time. In the meantime, I remain grateful for and committed to the further strengthening of the close relations between our two countries.

With best personal wishes,

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Islamabad



Islamabad,
August 17, 1975.

PRIME MINISTER

Dear Mr. President,

I am writing to share with you our apprehensions over the likely Soviet role in Asia after the Helsinki Summit, particularly following recent developments in our region.

2. We feel deeply disturbed over the establishment of an authoritarian system in India on the one hand, and the growing hostility of an unstable Afghan regime towards Pakistan on the other. Our fears are heightened by our perception of the increasing dependence of these two regimes in our immediate neighbourhood on the Soviet Union with which they are allied and which is enabled by the Helsinki accord to pay greater attention to our region in pursuance of its historic objectives and global ambitions. We foresee that, assured of security in Europe, the Soviet Union will relentlessly exert pressures on the smaller states of Asia and on Pakistan in particular, with a view to achieving its purpose of establishing an unchallengable sphere of influence in this continent.

3. Situated as we are, we cannot but be conscious of Soviet designs and the nature of Soviet ambitions in Asia, and what these portend for us. Despite the Soviet Union's role in the dismemberment of our country in 1971, we have, within the framework of our principles and policies,

...2-





PRIME MINISTER

left no stone unturned to improve our relations with it in order to reduce its hostility towards Pakistan which, rightly or wrongly, it has regarded as an obstacle in the path of its ambitions in Asia. This above all was the purpose of my visit to Moscow in March 1972 and again in October last year.

4. Soviet goals and ambitions are inflexible and hardly amenable to any basic change as a result of the efforts of a small country such as ours, which in the interest of the preservation of its own sovereignty, national independence and territorial integrity, has stoutly declined to toe the Soviet line. The passage of time makes clearer both the ever-growing threat to our existence from Moscow's expansionist policies and the woeful inadequacy of our resources to meet this threat.

5. The Soviet Union is determined to subject us to intensified pressures while continuing to be outwardly affable. The most recent and disturbing illustration of this came during recent exchanges between our diplomats and their Soviet counter parts in Kabul. Our Minister was asked by his Soviet counter part whether Pakistan would agree to cede some territory to Afghanistan. On receiving a firm reply in the negative the Soviet Minister threw up his hands and said, "Then God alone knows what will happen." When our Ambassador sought clarification of the Soviet attitude from the Soviet Ambassador, the latter not only accused Pakistan of not wanting to improve relations with Afghanistan but went so far as to assert that the Durand Agreement - defining the international frontier between Afghanistan and





PRIME MINISTER

Pakistan - was a legacy of the colonial times which Pakistan should not try to defend and that the Durand Line had been foisted upon the Afghans, since no nation would, according to the Soviet Ambassador, "willingly agree to have its own people divided into two parts." The Soviet Ambassador concluded by saying that the Asian Security Pact was the real and the only answer for establishing peace and security in Asia.

6. I have no doubt that the United States is cognizant of the Soviet threat to the countries of this region and in particular to Pakistan which has so far stood its ground. We greatly appreciate the various statements of political support to Pakistan which were given to us by the United States at the highest level to counter the Soviet threat. The fact, however, needs to be registered that these declarations, valuable though they are, seem to have made little impact on Soviet expansionism. Soviet policies continue to be stridently asserted and Soviet purposes aggressively reiterated.

7. In these circumstances, our ability to resist Soviet pressures will depend not so much on the reliance we place on the American political assurances as on the credibility the Soviet Union attaches to them. The lack of a credible evidence of support from the U.S. encourages the Soviet Union to expect that the security requirements of Pakistan would compel us to make readjustments demanded by the changing power equilibrium in our region.





PRIME MINISTER

8. I need hardly assure you, Mr. President, of how much we cherish our relations with the United States. We sincerely hope that they will continue to expand and gain strength in the coming months and will be sustained by our commitments to the goals and objectives of peace and stability which we share.

9. With my best wishes and warmest personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
(Zulfikar Ali Bhutto)

His Excellency
Mr. Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America,
WASHINGTON D.C.



13 June 1975

TAB 4

TAB II

My dear Dr. Kissinger,

As you are aware, we have done, and will continue to do, our utmost to normalize our relations with India in accordance with the Simla Agreement. Nevertheless, we are seriously concerned over the probability of India deciding to launch a war against Pakistan in which Afghanistan will also join and both will have the full backing of the Soviet Union. Such a war could come at any time the Soviet Union should judge the situation to be ripe. It is our assessment that it could be unleashed within two years, before we have had the time adequately to strengthen our defence capability. India could contrive a pretext on the basis of its brazen claim to Jammu and Kashmir being an integral part of India and Pakistan being in control of a part of the State.

Against this background, I was relieved to hear from Mr. Aziz Ahmed what you had told Gromyko and what you planned to tell the Chinese about the action the United States would take if the Soviet Union attacked China for coming to Pakistan's assistance in the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan.

This latter assurance could have a most vital bearing on the balance of power in Asia and fortify peace and stability in this critical region. I consider it to be the most effective counter yet to the Soviet ambitions to extend hegemony over the region comprising the Persian Gulf and the sub-continent.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
State Review 9/17/03
NARA, Date 3/9/04



To Pakistan, which is the immediate target of these ambitions, it comes as a refreshing indication of a new determination in the United States Administration to safeguard peace and stability in South Asia.

I should also add that this assurance is another manifestation of the far-sighted statesmanship and clarity of vision which I, like many others, have always admired in you. Only such a perception of lurking dangers and the undistracted will to avert them can transform the fears of today into the hopes of tomorrow.

May I suggest that the question of Chinese assistance to Pakistan in the event of an Indian attack may be taken up with the Chinese leaders while they are still considering the issue. It could help them materially to decide what China could do in that contingency.

Mr. Aziz Ahmed took up the matter of the Chinese press attacks on the United States with the Chinese Ambassador along the lines indicated by you soon after his return from Ankara.

With warm personal regards,

Yours sincerely,

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

His Excellency Dr. Henry A. Kissinger,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Washington D. C.



PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister's House
Rawalpindi

13 June 1975

Dear Mr. President,

I have been wanting to write to you on a matter of vital interest both to the security of Pakistan and to the peace and stability of our vast and populous region. However, since you have been preoccupied with momentous issues relating to Europe and the Middle East, I thought it better to wait until you returned home and had time to address your attention to other matters of importance to world peace.

On May 22, Secretary Kissinger and my Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs, Mr. Aziz Ahmed, met in Ankara. In the course of that meeting, Dr. Kissinger informed Mr. Ahmed that he had spoken to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in very strong terms to the effect that an Indian attack on Pakistan with Soviet equipment would invite a response from the United States.

It is an established fact that practically all of India's armed forces are equipped with Soviet weapons.

Moreover, in view of the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971, an armed attack on Pakistan by India would necessarily carry Soviet approval and, indeed, direct involvement.

As you are aware, Mr. President, my Government is determined to further the process of normalization of relations with India in accordance with the Simla Agreement. We will sustain this policy as long as it is reciprocated by India.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

State Dept. Date 3/9/04

NARA, Date 3/9/04

State Review 9/17/05

PRIME MINISTER

- 2 -

Nevertheless, our considered assessment of the situation, as Mr. Ahmed conveyed to Dr. Kissinger, is that war could come at any time the Soviet Union wanted it, as India would have no difficulty in contriving an excuse for starting one. For instance, India could brazenly assert its spurious claim to the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India and prepare the stage for an invasion of Azad Kashmir on the pretext that it sought to release it from Pakistan's control. All-out hostilities would be ineluctable result.

Dr. Kissinger asked what China would do in the event of an Indian attack on Pakistan. We had put precisely the same question to the Chinese Vice-Premier when he visited Pakistan recently. The Chinese Government are considering this question but have given us no answer so far. Their decision in this regard cannot but be influenced by the existence of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. The constraint on China's freedom to act as a result of this Treaty was tragically demonstrated when India attacked Pakistan in 1971. China was hamstrung while Pakistan was dismembered with Soviet instigation and support.

Dr. Kissinger then enquired whether he could ask China what exactly it would do if India attacked Pakistan and added that, if China posed the counter-question as to what the United States would do in such an event, it would be informed that if India attacked Pakistan and China came to its help and if in consequence the Soviet Union attacked China, the United States would not be able to stay out of that situation.

PRIME MINISTER

-3-

To Pakistan, confronted with an overwhelming military threat from India and Afghanistan, both armed and backed by the Soviet Union, this forthright enunciation of the determination of the United States to ward off a danger of vast and incalculable proportions comes as most welcome news.

I am deeply impressed, Mr. President, by the clarity with which your Administration has perceived the implications of an attack on Pakistan for the peace and stability of this strategic area. This unclouded approach envisages, for the first time, a concrete step which could restore the power equilibrium in this region. This could operate as a decisive factor in maintaining peace, defending freedom and protecting the vital interests of the United States in South Asia. If the shadow of blackmail and the spectre of war which darken the horizons of this strife-torn subcontinent were removed from it, a turning point would be reached in its history. The global balance of power would gain reality and the structure of peace in our critical region could become truly inviolable.

With best wishes and warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

His Excellency Mr. Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America
White House,
Washington D. C.

TAB III
Pakistan 10
008449
TELEGRAM



30 AUG 75Z 10 06
Department of State
~~SECRET~~ N00658

PAGE 1 SECTO 10198 01 OF 02 300946Z

21
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISU-00 /001 W ----- 030931

O 302913Z AUG 75 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN ALEXANDRIA
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 SECTO 10198

NODIS
FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

EO. 11652: XGDS-3

TAGS: PFDR, PK, US
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO

REF: STATE 202508 TOSEC 100162

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT FOLLOWING FROM ME TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO.
2. BEGIN MESSAGE:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

SINCE I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU PLAN TO VIST SAUDI ARABIA THIS COMING MONDAY, I THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL TO GIVE YOU A BRIEF REPORT ON THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS. SINCE COMING TO THE AREA, I HAVE BEEN ENGAGED IN THE INTENSIVE NEGOTIATIONS IN AN EFFORT TO HELP EGYPT AND ISRAEL ACHIEVE A FURTHER INTERIM AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, CONSTITUTE A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD THE JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH REMAINS OUR OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE. THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN DIFFICULT. THE ISRAELIS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE MILITARY AND STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE PASSES AND OIL FIELDS IN SINAI IN CIR-

~~SECRET~~

*Reply to Bhutto's
Messages of June 13
to President and
Secretary*

Added by Sec.



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines, State Review 9/17/03
By lhb, NARA, Date 3/9/04

SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SECTO 10198 01 OF 02 300946Z

CUMSTANCES WHERE AN END TO BELLIGERENCY AND PEACE STIL LIE IN THE FUTURE. THE EGYPTIANS, FOR THEIR PART, ARE CONCERNED ABOUT ENTERING POLITICAL UNDERTAKINGS THAT ARE OF SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ARAB WORLD GENERALLY IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE MUCH OF THEIR AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORY REMAINS OCCUPIED AND THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE PALESTINIANS REMAIN UNFULFILLED. DESPITE THESE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS ON BOTH SIDES, I BELIEVE WE HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS AND THAT THE CHANCES FOR ACHIEVING THIS AGREEMENT ARE GOOD. EVEN THOUGH A NUMBER OF OBSTACLES REMAIN TO BE OVERCOME AND A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION IS NOT YET FULLY ASSURED. I WANT TO EMPHASIZE IN PARTICULAR THAT PRESIDENT SADAT HAS APPROACHED THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH GENUINE STATESMANSHIP, AND THAT WE HAVE HAD HEARTENING SUPPORT FROM OUR SAUDI FRIENDS.

I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE IS CONCERN IN THE ARAB WORLD THAT THIS AGREEMENT, IF ACHIEVED, WILL LEAD TO DIMINISHED INTEREST IN FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI PROBLE. IT IS OUR FIRM INTENTION, HOWEVER, THAT THERE MUST BE ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS -- HOWEVER DIFFICULT THEY WILL BE AND HOWEVER MUCH TIME THEY MAY TAKE -- WITH RESPECT TO THE SYRIAN AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM. OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS REQUIRE NOTHING LESS. I AM CERTAIN THAT THE SAUDI LEADERS WOULD BE REASSURED BY ANY ENCOURAGEMENT YOU COULD GIVE THEM. THE PRESIDENT AND I ARE DETERMINED TO PURSUE THIS EFFORT AND, DESPITE SOME OF THE DIFFICULTIES WE ARE EXPERIENCING AT HOME, I AM CONFIDENT THAT THE AMERICAN CONGRESS AND PEOPLE WILL SUPPORT OUR PEACE EFFORTS AND OUR POLICIES OF STRENGTHENING RELATIONS WITH OUR ARAB FRIENDS. THE VERY ACHIEVEMENT OF A NEW AGREEMENT SHOULD HAVE A POSITIVE EFFECT ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ATMOSPHERE AND, IF IT IS SCRUPULOUSLY IMPLEMENTED AND OBSERVED, CAN BROADEN THE BASIS OF CONFIDENCE WHICH IS NEEDED FOR BOTH SIDES TO TAKE THE HARD POLITICAL DECISIONS THAT WILL BE REQUIRED AS THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS GOES FORWARD IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO TAKE THIS OCCASION, MR. PRIME MINISTER, TO TELL YOU HOW PLEASED THE PRESIDENT AND I WERE TO HEAR FROM YOU IN YOUR LETTERS OF JUNE 13 REGARDING YOUR CONCERNS FOR PAKISTAN'S SECURITY, I REGRET THAT

~~SECRET~~



State part with minor revision



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~


PAGE 03 SECTO 10198 01 OF 02 300946Z

THE DEMANDS OF THE MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATIONS HAVE DELAYED MY SENDING YOU A CONSIDERED RESPONSE BEFORE THIS. I HAVE DISCUSSED YOUR LETTERS IN DETAIL WITH THE PRESIDENT AND HE HAS ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE ARE DEEPLY SYMPATHETIC TO YOUR CONCERNS. IT WAS WITH THESE IN MIND THAT THE PRESIDENT ORDERED THE LIFTING OF THE EMBARGO ON ARMS SALES TO PAKISTAN LAST FEBRUARY. WE ARE ALSO COMMITTED TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO HELP MEET YOUR FOOD AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE REQUIREMENTS IN THE YEAR AHEAD. THIS IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO ASSURE PAKISTAN'S CONTINUED SECURITY AND WELL-BEING. I HAVE ALSO ASKED AMBASSADOR BYROADE TO CONVEY OUR VIEWS ON VARIOUS SPECIFIC POINTS YOU RAISED IN YOUR EARLIER LETTER.

Since MY DEPARTURE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST, THE PRESIDENT SHARED WITH ME YOUR AUGUST 17 LETTER TO HIM, RE- EMPHASIZING YOUR CONCERNS IN THE CONTEXT OF RECENT CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN YOUR REPRESENTATIVES AND SOVIET DIPLOMATS IN KABUL. UPON MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON, I WILL DISCUSS THIS SUBJECT WITH THE PRESIDENT, AND HE WILL, OF COURSE, BE RESPONDING TO YOU. MEANWHILE, I UNDERSTAND YOU ARE SEEKING CLARIFICATION FROM THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STATEMENTS MADE BY ITS OFFICIALS IN KABUL, AND I HOPE YOU WILL KEEP AMBASSADOR BYROADE INFORMED.

WARM REGARDS,
HENRY A. KISSINGER
END MESSAGE

3. IN CONVEYING THE ABOVE MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO,





30 AUG 75Z 10 12

Department of State

008450

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

NOD660

PAGE 01 SECTO 10198 02 OF 02 301007Z

12
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

031197

0 300913Z AUG 75 ZFF-6
FM USDEL SECRETARY IN ALEXANDRIA
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 SECTO 10198

NODIS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

WE WERE PLEASED TO NOTE THE PRIME MINISTER'S EX-
PRESSION, IN HIS JUNE LETTERS, OF CONTINUING SUPPORT
FOR THE SIMLA PROCESS. WE HAVE ALSO NOTED THE WISE POLICIES
OF CAUTION AND RESTRAINT SHOWN BY THE GOP DURING THIS
DELICATE PERIOD OF DIFFICULTIES IN INDIA.

IT IS OUR VIEW THAT CONTINUED PROGRESS UNDER THE
SIMLA PROCESS WILL REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED
HOSTILITIES ON THE SUBCONTINENT. THE IMMEDIATE INTEREST
OF THE UNITED STATES, AND ONE WHICH WE FULLY SHARE WITH
PAKISTAN, IS TO AVERT SUCH AN EVENTUALITY. IT WAS WITH
THIS OBJECTIVE IN MIND THAT THE SECRETARY CONVEYED TO
FOREIGN MINISTER GRUMYKO IN MAY THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH
THE UNITED STATES WOULD REGARD AN INDIAN ATTACK AGAINST
PAKISTAN. ~~REASON TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET~~
LEADERSHIP HAS FULLY UNDERSTOOD THE POSITION OF THE UNITED
STATES ON THIS QUESTION.

DIRECT INVOLVEMENT BY THE SOVIET UNION AND CHINA IN A
SOUTH ASIAN CONFLICT WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE IMPLICATIONS
OF THE GRAVEST NATURE AND WOULD BE OF GREAT CONCERN TO
THE UNITED STATES. THE RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES
WOULD BE A MATTER FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE EXECUTIVE

~~SECRET~~



SECRET



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 SECTO 10198 02 OF 02 301007Z

BRANCH IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR CONSTITUTION AND OUR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE 1959 MUTUAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN.

THE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY ARE HOPEFUL THAT THEY WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO HOLD TALKS IN PEKING WITH LEADERS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA LATER THIS YEAR. THESE TALKS WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THE FULL RANGE OF SECURITY ISSUES AFFECTING RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR COUNTRIES AND PAKISTAN, AND WAYS IN WHICH OUR GOVERNMENT MIGHT CONTINUE TO ASSIST PAKISTAN IN ITS EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN ITS SECURITY.

THE SECRETARY WAS MOST APPRECIATIVE THAT MR. AZIZ AHMED HAS COMMUNICATED TO THE CHINESE OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE EFFECT WHICH THEIR PROPAGANDA HAS ON OUR ABILITY TO MOBILIZE DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR THE PRC'S SECURITY.

IN DISCUSSING YOUR LETTERS IN WASHINGTON, I FOUND A DEEP AND CONTINUING INTEREST IN THE ADMINISTRATION IN PAKISTAN'S SECURITY AND WELFARE, AND A STRONG DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL IN WAYS THAT ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH OUR OWN LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS.

AS I KNOW YOU ARE AWARE FROM YOUR OWN DISCUSSIONS WITH AMERICAN LEADERS, INCLUDING SENATORS AND CONGRESSMEN, THE UNITED STATES IS NOT ABLE TO UNDERTAKE ADDITIONAL FORMAL SECURITY COMMITMENTS, OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF OUR FORMAL TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS.

WITH REGARD TO THE RECENT STATEMENTS MADE BY SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES TO PAKISTANI OFFICIALS IN KABUL CONCERNING THE DURAND LINE, IF THESE IN FACT REPRESENT A CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN, WE WOULD OF COURSE VIEW THEM WITH GRAVE CONCERN.

WE WILL BE INTERESTED TO HAVE YOUR FURTHER VIEWS ON THE SOVIET POSITION, FOLLOWING YOUR FURTHER CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES.

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 23 SECTO 14198 02 OF 02 381607Z

4. IN ADDITION TO THE SUBSTANTIVE POINTS ABOVE, YOU SHOULD SEEK TO CORRECT THE DIFFERENCES WHICH EXIST BETWEEN WHAT I SAID TO AZIZ AHMED IN ANKARA ON MAY 22 AND THE INTERPRETATION OF THESE REMARKS CONTAINED IN BHUTTO'S LETTERS OF JUNE 13. THE FOLLOWING POINTS SHOULD BE MADE SO THAT THE RECORD WILL BE CLEAR:

DURING MY WASHINGTON CONSULTATIONS, I REVIEWED THE MINUTES OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN MINISTER AZIZ AHMED AND SECRETARY KISSINGER. OUR RECORD CONTAINS SOME IMPORTANT NUANCES WHICH, IF NOT PRECISELY GRASPED, COULD LEAD TO MISUNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WE BOTH WANT TO AVOID.

THE SECRETARY INFORMED AZIZ AHMED HE HAD TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE WOULD HOLD THEM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE USE MADE OF THEIR EQUIPMENT ANYWHERE, AND ESPECIALLY IN PAKISTAN.

(BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT STATES: "DR. KISSINGER INFORMED MR. AHMED THAT HE HAD SPOKEN TO...GROHYKO IN VERY STRNG TERMS TO THE EFFECT THAT AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN WITH SOVIET EQUIPMENT WOULD INVITE A RESPONSE FROM THE UNITED STATES.")

THE SECRETARY ASKED AZIZ AHMED IF WE COULD ASK THE CHINESE WHAT THEIR RESPONSE WOULD BE IF PAKISTAN IS ATTACKED. THE SECRETARY ALSO INDICATED THAT A GENERAL WAR FOLLOWING AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN AND INVOLVING THE SOVIETS AND CHINESE WOULD HAVE THE GRAVEST IMPLICATIONS FOR THE WHOLE OF ASIA AND FOR U.S. POLICY IN THE AREA. (BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE SECRETARY STATES: "...I WAS RELIEVED TO HEAR FROM MR. AZIZ AHMED...WHAT YOU PLANNED TO TELL THE CHINESE ABOUT THE ACTION THE UNITED STATES WOULD TAKE IF THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA FOR COMING TO PAKISTAN'S ASSISTANCE IN THE EVENT OF AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN." BHUTTO'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT STATES: "DR. KISSINGER ...ADDED THAT, IF CHINA POSED THE COUNTERQUESTION AS TO WHAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD DO IN SUCH AN EVENT AN INDIAN ATTACK ON PAKISTAN), IT WOULD BE INFORMED THAT IF INDIA ATTACKED PAKISTAN AND CHINA CAME TO ITS HELP AND IF IN CONSEQUENCE THE SOVIET UNION ATTACKED CHINA, THE

~~SECRET~~



Department of State


TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04 SECTO 10198 02 OF 02 301007Z

UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO STAY OUT OF THAT
SITUATION.)
KISSINGER

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

Pakistan
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 2244

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 08056 021739Z

43
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISN-00 1026 W

R 020731Z SEP 75 ZOK
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1835

~~SECRET~~ ISLAMARAD 0056

FXDIS

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PK, US
SUBJ: BHUTTO INFORMED OF USG POSITION CONCERNING POINTS
RAISED IN HIS LETTERS TO PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY

REF: SECTO 10198

1. I SAW BHUTTO IN KARACHI ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPARTURE FOR SAUDI ARABIA ON THE SUBJECT OF REFTEL CONTAINING YOUR LETTER TO HIM AND INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING MY ORAL REMARKS IN CONNECTION WITH PAST LETTERS FROM HIM TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT. BHUTTO WAS OBVIOUSLY PLEASED TO RECEIVE THIS DIRECT COMMUNICATION FROM YOU IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE OPPORTUNITY IT GAVE HIM TO BE UP-TO-DATE AND IN TOUCH WITH YOU JUST BEFORE VISITING SAUDI ARABIA.

2. AFTER HIS REMARKS TO ME ON THE MIDDLE EAST, WHICH HAVE BEEN REPORTED SEPARATELY, I TOLD HIM THAT I WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO MAKE A NUMBER OF POINTS TO HIM, IN CONNECTION WITH THESE EXCHANGES OF CORRESPONDENCE. I SAID THE EXACT PHRASEOLOGY OF THE POINTS I WAS INSTRUCTED TO MAKE HAD BEEN WORKED OUT VERY CAREFULLY AND THAT SOME OF THE POINTS TO BE COVERED WERE COMPLEX, CONTAINING IMPORTANT NUANCES. I SAID THAT IN THE INTEREST OF COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING, AND AS A KINDNESS TO HIM, IT MIGHT BE BETTER THAT HE READ THE TEXT OF THESE POINTS RATHER THAN JUST LISTEN TO AN ORAL PRESENTATION FROM ME.

*Secretary's reply closes
out June 13 messages
(acc to Byroads - par 5 ->)*

- AFR/UN _____
- EUR/CAN _____
- FE _____
- LA _____
- NEA/SA _____
- PRC _____
- SEA _____
- NSG/PLNS _____
- PGM/ANL _____
- SCI/ENV _____
- ECON _____
- OPIL/INT _____
- SS/PR _____
- CONGR _____

EXD
S
EXD
S
EXD
S

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines
NARA, Date 2/19/04



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 ISLAMA 08056 021739Z

3. BHUTTO READ CAREFULLY MY PREPARED TEXT WHICH HAD BEEN EXTRACTED VERRATIM FROM ABOVE REFTTEL. WHEN HE FINISHED, HE TOLD ME THAT HE UNDERSTOOD COMPLETELY AND WAS GLAD TO HAVE THIS MATTER SETTLED SO THAT NO FURTHER CONVERSATION ON THIS SUBJECT BETWEEN US WOULD BE NECESSARY. HE SAID AGAIN HE REGRETTED HAVING ACCEPTED BAD ADVICE ON HIS LETTERS TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT GROWING OUT OF YOUR TALK WITH AZIZ AHMED IN ANKARA. I HAVE NO DOUBT BUT THAT HE UNDERSTOOD COMPLETELY THAT I WAS IN THE

W/AAA!

PROCESS OF A NECESSARY CORRECTION OF THE RECORD.

4. BHUTTO ASKED IF HE COULD KEEP THE COPY OF MY ADDITIONAL POINTS THAT HE HAD READ. WHILE I OBVIOUSLY DO NOT WANT TO BECOME A PARTY IN HIS FRICTIONS WITH AZIZ AHMED, I GAVE HIM MY PERMISSION TO DO SO THINKING THAT THIS WOULD HELP TO SERVE TO MAKE THE RECORD COMPLETELY CLEAR FOR OUR OWN PURPOSES. THERE WAS NO DOUBT BUT THAT HE PLANNED SERIOUS DISCUSSION WITH BOTH AZIZ AHMED AND AGHA SHAHI ON THE PLANE TO SAUDI ARABIA ON BOTH YOUR LETTER AND MY ADDITIONAL POINTS.

5. YOU MAY REST ASSURED, HOWEVER, THAT BHUTTO HOLDS NO RESENTMENT AT US ON THE ISSUES INVOLVED. IT IS A COMPLETELY CLOSED SUBJECT AND BEST NOT REFERRED TO AGAIN ON ANY LEVEL.

] X

RYROADE

RECEIVED
EXD
S
EXD
S
EXD
S
EXD
S

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

Pakistan TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 1827

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 88247 021136Z

46 ACTION SS-25

RA

INFO OCT-01 ISD-00 /026 W

2/09/77

054797

R 021527Z SEP 75
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1831
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

- AFR/JUN _____
- EUR/CAN _____
- FE _____
- LA _____
- NEA/SA _____
- PRC _____
- SEA _____
- NSC/PLNG _____
- PGM/ANL _____
- SCI/ENR _____
- ECON _____
- OPNL/INT _____
- SS/PR _____
- CONGR _____

5

~~SECRET~~ ISLAMABAD 8047

EXDIS

F.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PK, AF, UR
SUBJECT: PAK-SOVIET RELATIONS: PM BHUTTO'S COMMENTS

REF: ISLAMABAD 7507 AND 7453

1. IN A DISCUSSION ON OTHER MATTERS WITH BHUTTO IN KARACHI, AUGUST 31, HE DIGRESSED TO GIVE ME WHAT HE SAID HE ACCEPTED AS THE FINAL SOVIET POSITION ON THE ALLEGED POLICY REMARKS OF THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN KARUL RE THE DURAND LINE AND OTHER MATTERS, AND THEIR SUBSEQUENT DOWNGRADING BY SOVIET AMBASSADOR HERE (AND I SUSPECT IN MOSCOW). HE SAID THE SOVIET POSITION WAS THAT THEIR POLICY RE PAKISTAN REMAINED AS SET FORTH IN THEIR JOINT COMMUNIQUE AT THE TIME OF HIS VISIT TO MOSCOW IN OCTOBER 1974. ACCORDING TO THE SOVIETS, WAS THEREFORE NECESSARY ASREGARDS ANY ALLEGED REMARKS OF SOVIET AMBASSADOR.

2. BHUTTO SAID HE HAD PERSONALLY TALKED TO HIS AMBASSADOR KARUL AND THAT HE BELIEVES THE ALLEGED REMARKS WERE TRUTHFULLY AND ACCURATELY REPORTED. HE SAID IT APPARENT THAT OUR JOINT SPECULATION ON THIS MATTER (REFTELS) WAS PROBABLY CORRECT. BUT HE SAID HE HAD GIVEN UP ON ANY EFFORT TO GET ANY PUBLIC REASSURANCE FROM THE SOVIETS TO

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines, Stat. Rev. 9/17/03

NARA, Date 2/9/04



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

.PAGE 32 ISLAMA 08047 021136Z

COMPENSATE FOR THE DISQUIETING MANOUVER ON THEIR PART
AS TOO MANY THINGS HAD HAPPENED IN THE INTERVAL (AN
OBVIOUS REFERENCE, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO BANGLADESH)
AN HE WAS CERTAIN THEY WOULDNIT DO IT.
RYROADE

SECRET



Pakistan



Department of State

COPY OF 13 COPIES

~~SECRET~~

NOD987

PAGE 01 ISLAMA 08041 010827Z

20
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /021 W

045140

0 02:544Z SEP. 75
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1829

~~SECRET~~ ISLAMABAD 8041

NODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFCR, PK, US, XF
SUBJ: BHUTTO'S COMMENTS ON THE MIDDLE EAST

REF: SECTO 10198

1. I SAW BHUTTO IN KARACHI ON THE EVE OF HIS DEPART-
URE FOR SAUDI ARABIA ON THE SUBJECT OF REFTEL CONTAIN-
ING YOUR LETTER TO HIM AND INSTRUCTIONS REGARDING MY
ORAL REMARKS IN CONNECTION WITH PAST LETTERS FROM
HIM TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT. THIS MESSAGE WILL COVER
ONLY HIS REMARKS ON THE MIDDLE EAST PORTION OF YOUR
LETTER.

2. BHUTTO SAID HE WOULD BE MOST HAPPY TO PUT ACROSS TO
THE SAUDIS THE POSITIVE VIEWS YOU EXPRESSED IN YOUR
LETTER. HE WAS HIMSELF IMMENSELY PLEASED TO NOTE YOUR
EMPHASIS THAT OTHER MOVES SUCH AS ON THE SYRIAN PROBLEM
AND THE PALESTINIANS NEEDED TO BE TACKLED, AND THE DETER-
MINATION OF BOTH YOURSELF AND THE PRESIDENT THAT IT HAD
TO BE SO. HE HAD NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER THAT YOU BOTH
MEANT THIS AND WOULD LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED, AND AT WHAT-
EVER ENERGY AND EFFORT REQUIRED, TO MAKE IT SO.

3. HAVING SAID THIS, HE THOUGHT THAT OUT OF OUR FRIEND-
SHIP HE WOULD TELL US THAT HE DIDN'T THINK THINGS WOULD

~~SECRET~~

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

70

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines stat. Review 9/17/03
By , NARA, Date 3/9/04





Department of State

TELETYPE

~~SECRET~~

PAGE #2 ISLAMA 08041 010827Z

WORK OUT AS WE WISHED AND THAT THE NEXT STEP, ASSUMING YOUR PRESENT EFFORT SUCCEEDS AS REGARDS THE EGYPTIAN FRONT, WOULD LEAD TO AN IMPASSE. HE SAID HE WAS SPEAKING AS ONE WHO CONSIDERED RELATIONS WITH THE US AS VITAL AND WHO BELIEVED THAT ANY SETBACK IN THEM WOULD BE DISASTROUS FOR PAKISTAN. IN THIS CONTEXT HE THOUGHT YOU AND THE PRESIDENT WOULD WANT TO CONSIDER ALL FACETS OF EVERY PROBLEM IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND PERHAPS HIS OWN PESSIMISTIC FEELINGS ABOUT THE FUTURE.

4. BHUTTO SAID THAT, WHILE HE WOULD NOT MENTION IT IN CONNECTION WITH ANY OF THE SPECIFICS HE WAS ABOUT TO TELL ME, AN UNDERLYING FACTOR IN HIS THINKING WAS THE UNFORTUNATE TIMING OF OUR COMING ELECTIONS AS FAR AS THE MIDDLE EAST WAS CONCERNED. HE SAID HE WAS FIRST AND FOREMOST A POLITICIAN, AND KNEW FIRST HAND THAT THE EMOTIONS OF PEOPLE HAD A POWER OF THEIR OWN THAT COULD NOT BE IGNORED, PARTICULARLY IN A DEMOCRACY SUCH AS OURS.

5. BHUTTO SAID HE HAD HIGH REGARD FOR SADAT AND THOUGHT THAT HE HAD BEEN VERY ACCOMMODATING. BUT HE SAID HE WOULD NOT NECESSARILY DESCRIBE THE CONCESSIONS HE HAD MADE AS STATESMANSHIP BUT MORE AS AN ACCOMMODATION. HE SAID (1) HE THOUGHT THE EGYPTIAN MILITARY HAD LOST THEIR WILL TO FIGHT AND SADAT HAS HAD TO TAKE THIS INTO ACCOUNT, AND (2) THAT SADAT WAS STAKING EVERYTHING, ON BOTH HIS FIRST AND SECOND AGREEMENTS THROUGHOUT YOUR GOOD EFFORTS, TO MAKE POSSIBLE AN ECONOMIC BOOM TO TURN ATTENTIONS AWAY FROM THE ISRAELI PROBLEM. HE SAID (1) ABOVE HAD INHERENT IN IT THE DANGER THAT SADAT COULD BE OVERTHROWN. AS REGARDS (2) ABOVE, BHUTTO REMINDED ME THAT HE WAS FROM AN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY AND HE KNEW THAT THE ECONOMIC MIRACLES SADAT WAS HOPING FOR JUST DIDN'T HAPPEN OVERNIGHT, WHETHER IN A VERY RICH UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY LIKE IRAN OR A VERY POOR COUNTRY. SO THERE WOULD BE NO GREAT QUICK CHANGE FROM POVERTY FOR THE EGYPTIANS. AFTER A PERIOD OF GREAT EXPECTATIONS AND BUDYANCY, IN WHICH THE PUBLIC POSTURE OF EGYPT MIGHT APPEAR TO TURN BELLICOSE OR EVEN CHAUVANISTIC, THE LETDOWN WHICH WOULD COME WOULD ALSO ENDANGER SADAT. IF HE TRIED TO RECOUP BY BOLDNESS AGAIN ON THE ISRAELI FRONT HIS MILITARY MIGHT GET RID OF HIM AS

~~SECRET~~



Department of State

REF ID: A611
11/10/1974

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 ISLAMA 08041 010827Z

A PRETEXT FOR NOT FIGHTING AGAIN.


6. AS A COROLLARY TO THIS SCENARIO HE SEES THE ISRAELIS SAYING "BAS" (ARABIC AND URDU FOR ENOUGH OR STOP) AS REGARDS FURTHER MOVES RE SYRIA, THE PALESTINIANS, ETC. (HE WAS POLITE ENOUGH NOT TO SAY SO BUT I THINK HE HAD OUR ELECTIONS IN MIND). THEN HE SAID THERE WOULD BE A DIVISIVE EFFECT AMONG THE ARABS. HE THOUGHT SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF STATES WOULD TOLERATE A STATUS QUO FOR AWHILE AND POSSIBLY TUNISIA, MOROCCO MAYBE AND SUDAN PERHAPS. LIBYA WOULD DENOUNCE AND ALGERIA (UNLESS WE ARE MAKING MORE INROADS THAN HE KNOWS THERE). IRAQ OF COURSE WOULD BE IN THIS CAMP. SYRIA, AND ASSAD IN PARTICULAR, WOULD BE INTENSELY TROUBLED, CHINA WOULDN'T LIKE IT--AND THE SOVIETS WOULD BE AROUND SMILING LIKE CHESHIRE CATS!

7. BHUTTO RETURNED TO HIS EARLIER REMARK THAT HIS OWN PREDICTIONS WOULD IN NO WAY AFFECT SUPPORTING YOUR VIEWS IN YOUR LETTER AND YOUR OBVIOUS DETERMINATION. HE SAID HE EARNESTLY HOPED HIS PREDICTIONS WERE WORKING, AS PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS SO VITAL TO US, AND INDEED TO PAKISTAN AS WELL. BUT HE SAID HE COULD NOT GO BEYOND THE ROLE OF TRYING TO BE HELPFUL AS PAKISTAN WAS MUSLIM BUT NOT ARABIC, AND THE ARABS HAD TO MAKE THEIR OWN POLICY, BE IT WAR OR NEGOTIATIONS, STEP BY STEP OR GENEVA, PEACE OR CAPITULATION.

8. I SAID I WAS ENCOURAGED BY YOUR LETTER AND ITS OBVIOUS STRESS ON NECESSARY NEXT STEPS. HE AGREED BUT REMINDED ME AS A LAST THOUGHT THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE VERY SMART PEOPLE. I SAID I SUSPECTED YOU KNEW THEM PRETTY WELL YOURSELF BY NOW.

9. MY CONVERSATIONS WITH BHUTTO ON THE LETTERS TO YOU AND THE PRESIDENT FOLLOWING YOUR TALK WITH AZIZ AHMED WENT WELL. IN VIEW OF PAST TALKS WITH BHUTTO BY BOTH YAGUB AND MYSELF, THIS IS NO LONGER A LIVING SUBJECT HERE. MY NEXT MESSAGE WILL THEREFORE BE PRIMARILY TO COMPLETED AND CLOSE THE RECORD ON THIS SUBJECT.
BYROAD

~~SECRET~~



NO DISSEMINATION



Department of State

Lat-01
Pakistan
WELSON
TAB IV

2420

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NOD444

PAGE 01 STATE 193876

SI
ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/PABIRAPECK:LAB
APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY
PIJJSISCO
NSC:ROAKLEY (DRAFT)
NEA:ISSUER
S/S - MR. ONTIZ

081429

P 1516Z AUG 75 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ STATE 193876

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PK, US

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO

REF.: ISLAMABAD 7272

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

1. PLEASE CONVEY THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO PRIME MINISTER BHUTTO:

QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

AMBASSADOR BYROADE HAS TOLD ME OF YOUR DEEP PERSONAL DESIRE THAT PRESIDENT FORD VISIT PAKISTAN THIS YEAR. I HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE PRESIDENT YOUR CONCERNS AND THE HIGH IMPORTANCE BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS ATTACH TO THIS VISIT TO PAKISTAN AS A SYMBOL OF OUR CLOSE BILATERAL RELATION.
NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ah 3/9/04



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 STATE 193876

SHIP.

WE ARE STILL IN THE MIDST OF WORKING OUT A SCHEDULE FOR POSSIBLE FOREIGN TRAVEL BY THE PRESIDENT DURING THE REMAINDER OF THE YEAR. AS YOU KNOW, WE ARE STILL HOPEFUL THAT THE PRESIDENT WILL BE ABLE TO VISIT CHINA BEFORE THE END OF THE YEAR, BUT THE SCHEDULE IS STILL UNCERTAIN AND NO

DECISIONS HAVE BEEN MADE ON THE POSSIBILITY OF VISITING OTHER COUNTRIES ON THE SAME TRIP. THUS THE TIMING OF A VISIT TO PAKISTAN REMAINS UNSETTLED, BUT THE PRESIDENT HAS ASKED ME TO ASSURE YOU THAT HE REMAINS MOST ANXIOUS TO VISIT YOUR COUNTRY AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY, IF NOT THIS YEAR AT LEAST NEXT YEAR, IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR INVITATION.

WE WILL BE IN TOUCH WITH YOU AGAIN AS SOON AS WE HAVE A MORE DEFINITE VIEW OF THE PRESIDENT'S SCHEDULE IN THE MONTHS AHEAD.

WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER. END QUOTE.

2. FYI: ABOVE MESSAGE IS INTENDED TO ASSURE BHUTTO THAT THIS MATTER IS INDEED RECEIVING THE MOST CAREFUL ATTENTION, BUT ALSO TO CONVEY THOUGHT THAT THERE IS LIKELY TO BE SLIPPAGE IN PRESIDENT'S TRAVEL TO PAKISTAN. KISSINGER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

~~SECRET~~/NODIS (GDS)

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 9/17/03
BY lby, NARA, DATE 3/9/04

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Pakistan

Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
Yaqub Khan, Ambassador to the US
Iqbal Riza, Minister, Pakistan Embassy
Iqbal Akhund, Permanent Representative to the UN

United States

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff *RV*

DATE AND TIME:

Tuesday, September 30, 1975
11:30 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.

PLACE:

Suite 34-A, Waldorf Towers
New York, New York

Ahmed:

Congratulations on your success in the Middle East.
It must have been tough.

Kissinger:

It was rough but not nearly as rough as since I came
back. We are in a nihilistic phase of Congressional
behaviour. Of course, they are hurting themselves by
this since the really damaging thing politically would be
to attack the Administration on domestic policy rather
than foreign policy. What do they think they are doing?
In any event, I am relaxed since this cannot last.

Ahmed:

Look at the investigation of the CIA and everything else.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS (GDS)

Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified on
December 31, 1983.

Kissinger: It is typical of this stage of nihilism. I have refused to allow them to call up Foreign Service Officers to testify on what their policy recommendations were. This would be like the McCarthy period. My decision will cause a tremendous brawl.

Ahmed: We have submitted to you two lists of arms we need.

Kissinger: I hope the nuclear weapons are on the second list.

Ahmed: They are on the third list; we have the Pershing on the second list.

Kissinger: The Pershing issue is a big fraud. We never had any intention of giving it to Israel in any foreseeable time frame. The people who are pushing all this are the pro-Israelis who want to lock us into commitments to Israel. But you didn't want it anyway.

Ahmed: No, only the nuclear weapons.

Kissinger: The 1960 models are in surplus now so we should be able to give you some--but I had better watch what I say since there is no telling what you might report back to Bhutto.

Ahmed: We are being modest and restrained in handling the arms question.

Kissinger: Do you have the money yet?

Ahmed: We will find it from Saudi Arabia. But we think it will be easier to get answers first from you on just what is available and how much it costs. Then we can go to the Saudis.

Kissinger: I can inform you that we have approval to supply you with 24 TOW launchers and 450 missiles. You can get started on a training program while awaiting delivery of the rest. It is our intention to start slowly on our new military relationship with you, concentrating on defensive weapons, and get it going well before it can

Kissinger:
(Continuing)

be disrupted. So let us not give any publicity to the TOW's or the invitation we are extending to your Air Marshal. Let us build up slowly but steadily--with maybe some artillery next--weapons that can reasonably be described as defensive.

Ahmed:

We have been very careful in compiling our lists.

Kissinger:

If you narrow the gap with India to 1 to 10 you will be in good shape. Seriously, we want you strong enough so that India will be afraid to attack.

Ahmed:

We want A-7 and other weapons in a hurry. India might well attack us the 2nd or 3rd week of November in Kashmir.

Kissinger:

Can they really attack there? I thought the terrain was too rugged, and it would seem as aggression anyway.

Ahmed:

According to the Indian Constitution, all of Kashmir is part of India. We can take them on in Kashmir but they will fight us all along the border. We cannot be certain but we think this will happen and we must look out for it. If it happens, it will be a two-front war with Afghanistan joining in anytime there is war with India. But we can handle this with the A-7.

Kissinger:

It has very long range and is an attack plane, isn't it?

Ahmed:

Yes. Are you saying it is not considered defensive? It is a fighter as well.

Kissinger:

I am simply stating facts about the plane.

Ahmed:

We have been very interested in this plane for a long time. We want about 110 of them. We also need weapons in a short time frame since ordinary delivery will never get them in our hands before the war in November. We will do our best by ourselves but we need arms. It all depends on the USSR. The Indians cannot move without Soviet approval because of their treaty which obliges the USSR to help India.

Kissinger:

The treaty is not so binding.

Ahmed:

Yes it is since if India is attacked, the USSR is obliged to come in until the threat is removed. Really, this would bring the Soviets in even if India went first and we hit back. So whenever India wants to start something, she must have Soviet support. We think India will probably start a war. Mid-November to mid-December is the probable time. This year is unlikely, but we must be watchful, and next year is more certain. If we seem to be in trouble, the Afghans will join in. We have told our chaps to be ready to do their best on two fronts and not to expect anyone to come to their help. Outside help is a bonus and they should not count upon it. Iran could stop the Afghans by moving some of its units up to the borders but it would not do so for fear of the USSR. So what they will really do to help us is questionable. Nor have we been able to get China to assure us of support. That is why we need weapons off the shelf.

Kissinger:

We have serious problems with our own army on rapid delivery. Don't you have a team coming soon? We can discuss all this when they come in October.

Ahmed:

Thank you. That is the best approach. Also, concerning the Soviet threat, you know about the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul. When Bhutto had the Soviet Ambassador in Islamabad in to ask about this, he had us all present. The Soviet Ambassador said he would report immediately to Moscow and was sure it would be cleared up soon. He would let us know. But he has never returned. When our Ambassador to Moscow took it up there, the Foreign Ministry expressed surprise that we would credit any such statement. But when our Ambassador asked the Soviets about the Durand line, they said they were "not empowered" to discuss borders. It is not conclusive but it is very worrisome and worthy of note. We have informed you and the Iranians and the Chinese.

Kissinger:

As I told you in Ankara, we would take a grave view of Soviet machinations and you can be certain that the Soviets understand that. The Indian Foreign Minister will be in Washington next week and I will tell him that any Indian pressure on Pakistan will ruin Indian efforts at friendlier relations with the United States. They are trying hard to improve their relations with us at the present time, due to their internal developments. It is nothing spectacular, but it is interesting.

Ahmed:

Will there be a Communique in connection with Chavan's visit?

Kissinger:

An agreed minute of the Joint Commission meeting, words but no real substance. The biggest question concerning the visit is whether I will be able to survive a dinner given by Ambassador Yaqub's colleague, Ambassador Kaul. He insists upon making some sort of comment about each of his guests after dinner, and since he takes at least half a minute for at least forty guests, that is already twenty minutes and then he gives a long toast in which he attacks United States policy. It is very boring. The last time I was at one of his affairs he gave a toast saying that some nations like economic power and some like military power but India likes spiritual power. I replied that I was surprised that he came out with spiritual power since I had expected him to say India has chosen nuclear power. In Bhutto's recent letter to President Ford he said that Pakistan may have to adjust its policy to meet the political realities in the area. What does that mean?

Ahmed:

There will be no change in our relationship with you or with the Chinese, you can be sure of that.

Kissinger:

What is the Chinese mood?

Ahmed:

We hope we can get more support from them. They have been hard to pin down. They defer to you so I hope that you will talk to them about Pakistan when you go to China.

Kissinger: What is their attitude toward the United States?

Ahmed: Last night, Chou gave me the impression that it is about time something happened as a follow-up by you to the Shanghai Communique. As you know, they have been very cautious and patient on this issue but for the first time I detected a bit of impatience. In the past he has always said he appreciates the problems of the United States. This time he did not say that and he hinted that China is impatient. But they clearly want to continue to have good relations with you.

Kissinger: I will get eager on October 17 or 18.

Ahmed: Will you also visit Pakistan?

Kissinger: I simply do not have the time although I would love it. On this subject, I notice that your Prime Minister is excited over the visit by President Ford. You know we never set a date for the visit and whether or not President Ford visits Pakistan is not dependent upon what he does with India. We have a special relationship.

Ahmed: Can he come in connection with his visit to China?

Kissinger: This was never planned and I cannot imagine how anyone got this idea. You know how the Chinese are. Certainly we would never consider going to India or even to Pakistan in connection with a visit to China. It has always been seen as a separate trip. The President may visit Southeast Asia after China, perhaps the Philippines. They need to be shored up after what happened in Indo-China. Is it true that you are buying arms from North Vietnam?

Ahmed: We have made some inquiries but there is nothing definite. The article in Newsweek saying we are interested in buying arms from North Vietnam upset them very much although the leak did not come from us. We have no details of what they can supply and we have made no decision but we are checking. It appears that almost everything belongs to South Vietnam. We shall have to see what happens.



~~SECRET~~/NODIS (GDS)

Kissinger: I do not know what they have to sell. Some things in some categories but I do not believe they have large overall totals. Also, I do not know what kind of shape it is in.

Ahmed: We are having more trouble with the Tarbela Dam. Last year we had to empty the reservoir in order to repair damage to the tunnels. This has been fixed but it now turns out that the river bed has been scarred by closing the tunnels and this must be repaired. This means a delay in refilling the reservoir with a subsequent loss of water for irrigation. We had been counting on a good crop this year, especially for wheat, in 1976 but it now looks as if we shall have to wait for another year. Can you help us with more PL 480 wheat?

Kissinger: What do we have already planned?


Atherton: 500,000 tons in the planning figure. The same as for India.

Ahmed: We needed at least one million before learning of the Tarbela problem. Now we need more.

Kissinger: We shall review the problem and see what can be done. Who built the dam with which you are having so much trouble? Repairing a big dam is a very tricky problem.

Ahmed: It was a French, Italian construction with some participation by the United States. It is the biggest dam in the world and they may have taken on more than they could handle.

Kissinger: We shall see what we can do with PL 480.



~~SECRET~~/NODIS (GDS)

Sent 3/19/76

PA

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 18, 1976

Brent:

The Paks and French are within a few days of making a public announcement of the conclusion of the arrangements for the reprocessing deal. It will be even more difficult to get Bhutto to consider backing away after that occurs. State therefore requests urgent action on this package. They would like to cable the President's letter Friday or Saturday if possible.

D. E.

David Elliott



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*Pg 1 - Job a 24
retype past*~~SECRET~~

March 18, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID ELLIOTT *D.E.*
ROBERT OAKLEY *RO*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Bhutto on
Pakistani Nuclear Issues

HAK has requested the President to send a letter to Bhutto asking him to forego acquisition of a chemical reprocessing plant from France and a heavy water production facility from the FRG (Tab B). Neither of these facilities has any economic justification since Pakistan has only one natural ^{uranium} reactor and that does not use plutonium fuel. The purpose of these facilities almost certainly is to put Pakistan in an independent position eventually leading to the capability to produce nuclear weapons.

We have much less leverage with Pakistan than we had with Korea, and unless we are prepared to withhold conventional arms and economic assistance, we probably will be unsuccessful in halting Pakistan's acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability. State might consider such pressure or Congress might mandate it, but before we get to that point we should exhaust the diplomatic possibilities.

HAK previously asked Sauvagnargues and Genscher not to supply Pakistan with these nuclear facilities. The Germans have held up to watch developments but the French gave us a cold no. HAK's talk with Bhutto in New York last month also elicited a flat rejection and Pak Ambassador Yaqub has reported to Bhutto that, in his judgment, the U.S. will not apply economic or military leverage on this matter.

The proposed letter from the President to Bhutto is our best diplomatic try and should be taken before we consider other possibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you initial the memorandum to the President at Tab I, recommending that he sign the letter to Bhutto at Tab A.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state review 9/17/03
BY Ma, NARA, DATE 3/9/04



Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am writing to you in the spirit of friendship and mutual understanding which has traditionally characterized exchanges between our two Governments. During your visit to Washington last year, we held very productive discussions and reached broad areas of understanding on matters of mutual interest. I am encouraged by the openness of our relationship to approach you quite candidly on Pakistan's plans to acquire certain sensitive nuclear facilities, a matter which is of deep concern to my Government.

I know from my discussions with you that you share our fear over the threat to the general peace posed by the unrestrained spread of nuclear explosives technology. My Government has welcomed your forthright assurances that Pakistan will not divert its civil nuclear development efforts into an explosives program, and that Pakistan's nuclear activities will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.

You should be aware, however, that there is considerable apprehension in this country and elsewhere over the spread on a national basis of the nuclear technology associated with the development of nuclear explosives -- specifically, uranium enrichment, heavy water production and chemical reprocessing. Secretary Kissinger stated at the UN General Assembly last September the view of this Government that the further spread of nuclear reprocessing facilities under national control would seriously aggravate the problem of nuclear proliferation.

For this reason we welcomed Korea's decision to forego acquisition of a national reprocessing plant. For the same reason I am now writing to you to ask that you give serious consideration to the broader implications of this matter for stability both in your region and in the world. At this juncture,



#1623

I believe that I understand the difficulties that my request to you will present to your Government. I would not raise this matter with you, however, if I did not consider it to be of the utmost importance. I would be grateful if you would let me have your views on the points I have raised.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Islamabad

Retyped page 3:GRF:BS:feg:3/19/76



22

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am writing to you in the spirit of friendship and mutual understanding which has traditionally characterized ~~the~~ exchanges between our two Governments. During your visit to Washington last year, we held very productive discussions and reached broad areas of understanding on matters of mutual interest. I am encouraged by the openness of our relationship to approach you quite candidly on Pakistan's plans to acquire certain sensitive nuclear facilities, a matter which is of deep concern to my Government.

I know from my discussions with you that you share our fear over the threat to the general peace posed by ^{an} unrestrained spread of nuclear explosives technology. My Government has welcomed your forthright assurances that Pakistan will not divert its civil nuclear development efforts into an explosives program, and that Pakistan's nuclear activities will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.

You should be aware, however, that there is considerable apprehension in this country and elsewhere over the spread on a national basis of the nuclear technology associated with the development of nuclear explosives--specifically, uranium enrichment, heavy water production and chemical reprocessing. ~~In fact,~~ Secretary Kissinger stated at the UN General Assembly last September the view of this Government that the further spread of nuclear reprocessing facilities under national control ^{would} ~~will~~ seriously aggravate the problem of nuclear proliferation.

For this reason we welcomed Korea's decision to forego acquisition of a national reprocessing plant. For the same reason I am now writing to you to ask that you give serious consideration to the broader implications of this matter for stability both in your region and in the world. At this juncture,



I believe that I understand the difficulties that my request to you will present to your Government. I would not raise this matter with you, however, if I did not consider it to be of the utmost importance. I would be grateful if you would let me have your views on the points I have raised.

Personal regards,

His Excellency
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1976

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am writing to you in the spirit of friendship and mutual understanding which has traditionally characterized exchanges between our two Governments. During your visit to Washington last year, we held very productive discussions and reached broad areas of understanding on matters of mutual interest. I am encouraged by the openness of our relationship to approach you quite candidly on Pakistan's plans to acquire certain sensitive nuclear facilities, a matter which is of deep concern to my Government.

I know from my discussions with you that you share our fear over the threat to the general peace posed by the unrestrained spread of nuclear explosives technology. My Government has welcomed your forthright assurances that Pakistan will not divert its civil nuclear development efforts into an explosives program, and that Pakistan's nuclear activities will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.

You should be aware, however, that there is considerable apprehension in this country and elsewhere over the spread on a national basis of the nuclear technology associated with the development of nuclear explosives -- specifically, uranium enrichment, heavy water production and chemical reprocessing. Secretary Kissinger stated at the UN General Assembly last September the view of this Government that the further spread of nuclear reprocessing facilities under national control would seriously aggravate the problem of nuclear proliferation.

For this reason we welcomed Korea's decision to forego acquisition of a national reprocessing plant. For the same reason I am now writing to you to ask that you give serious consideration to the broader implications of this matter for stability both in your region and in the world. At this juncture,

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES state declass 9/17/03
BY , NARA, DATE 3/9/04

3A

I believe your Government has an opportunity to make a highly important contribution to worldwide efforts effectively to forestall further nuclear proliferation.

My concern is not the reliability of the assurances of your Government. It is that the establishment of sensitive nuclear facilities under national control inevitably gives rise to perceptions in many quarters that, under circumstances which perhaps cannot even be foreseen today, non-peaceful uses may be contemplated. Whether justified or not, such perceptions could be by themselves destabilizing and undermine the mutual confidence and sense of security which must be created if we are to build a system of international peaceful nuclear cooperation.

These perceptions are heightened in Pakistan's case by the lack of a persuasive economic justification for obtaining sensitive nuclear facilities. For example, the experience of the United States, as well as of all countries with major nuclear power programs, is that reprocessing of spent reactor fuel is only economic within a very much larger reactor program than Pakistan could contemplate for the foreseeable future.


I know that Secretary Kissinger has already expressed similar views to you on this matter, but I want to underline to you my deep personal concern over the possible effect of your actions in this area on our ability to sustain support in public opinion here for our close cooperation on a broad range of issues of interest to both our governments. I fear that many in this country will be critical of Pakistan's actions and skeptical regarding its intentions. Friendship with Pakistan has enjoyed broad popular support in this country among the public and in the Congress over the years. However, Pakistan's acquisition of these sensitive facilities would, I believe, arouse considerable criticism and could erode this support.

With these considerations in mind, I hope that you will give serious consideration to foregoing present plans to acquire reprocessing and heavy water facilities until your future nuclear program is sufficiently developed to establish a clear need and until other alternatives, such as a multinational venture, are thoroughly explored.



I believe that I understand the difficulties that my request to you will present to your Government. I would not raise this matter with you, however, if I did not consider it to be of the utmost importance. I would be grateful if you would let me have your views on the points I have raised.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Gerald R. Ford". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned below the word "Sincerely,".

His Excellency
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Islamabad



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

March 19, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

SUBJECT: Letter to Bhutto on Pakistani
Nuclear Issues

Secretary Kissinger has requested that you send a letter to Prime Minister Bhutto concerning Pakistan's acquisition of sensitive nuclear facilities (Tab B).

Consistent with our long-standing efforts to prevent increased national access to sensitive nuclear technology, we have asked France, the FRG, and Pakistan to reconsider transactions involving national reprocessing and heavy water facilities for Pakistan. If these projects were to go forward, they would provide Pakistan with important basic elements needed for a nuclear explosive program.

Secretary Kissinger's direct and forceful intervention on this subject with Prime Minister Bhutto last month was politely but frankly rejected. We also have other reliable indications of continuing high-level Pakistani determination to pursue this independent nuclear option. Our concern is heightened by the obvious lack of economic justification for these projects and the equally obvious Pakistani concern not to be at the mercy of India. Although these facilities and their products would be safeguarded, it would be possible for the GOP to contravene or abrogate any safeguards agreements, a possibility we must take seriously in view of Pakistan's perception of its critical security situation.

Even if Pakistan kept its agreements, its possession of a potential nuclear explosives capability could by itself adversely affect South Asian stability. Future decisions on nuclear issues by other regional states such as Iran could be affected, and our own ability to cooperate with Pakistan might be jeopardized as Congressional and public opinion focus increasingly on the implications of Pakistan's nuclear activities. This has already been raised with Secretary Kissinger in Congressional hearings.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES *state review 9/17/03*
BY ld, NARA, DATE 3/9/04

~~SECRET~~

2

In order to underscore the extent of our concern, Secretary Kissinger recently sent letters to the Foreign Ministers of France and the FRG reinforcing the demarches already made with their governments (Tab C). It would be most helpful for you to sign the attached letter (Tab A) to Prime Minister Bhutto, reinforcing our request for reconsideration of its present plans.

Bob Hartmann's office has cleared the text of the letter.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached letter to Prime Minister Bhutto.

~~SECRET~~



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

March 18, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: DAVID ELLIOTT *D.E.*
ROBERT OAKLEY *RO*

SUBJECT: Presidential Letter to Bhutto on
Pakistani Nuclear Issues

HAK has requested the President to send a letter to Bhutto asking him to forego acquisition of a chemical reprocessing plant from France and a heavy water production facility from the FRG (Tab B). Neither of these facilities has any economic justification since Pakistan has only one natural ^{uranium} reactor and that does not use plutonium fuel. The purpose of these facilities almost certainly is to put Pakistan in an independent position eventually leading to the capability to produce nuclear weapons.

We have much less leverage with Pakistan than we had with Korea, and unless we are prepared to withhold conventional arms and economic assistance, we probably will be unsuccessful in halting Pakistan's acquisition of a nuclear weapon capability. State might consider such pressure or Congress might mandate it, but before we get to that point we should exhaust the diplomatic possibilities.

HAK previously asked Sauvagnargues and Genscher not to supply Pakistan with these nuclear facilities. The Germans have held up to watch developments but the French gave us a cold no. HAK's talk with Bhutto in New York last month also elicited a flat rejection and Pak Ambassador Yaqub has reported to Bhutto that, in his judgment, the U. S. will not apply economic or military leverage on this matter.

The proposed letter from the President to Bhutto is our best diplomatic try and should be taken before we consider other possibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:


That you initial the memorandum to the President at Tab I, recommending that he sign the letter to Bhutto at Tab A.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, *state review 9/11/03*
BY *lh*, NARA, DATE *3/9/04*



1625 3D

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

7605327

March 16, 1976

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: Henry A. Kissinger *AK*

Subject: Further Demarches on Pakistani
Nuclear Issues

Consistent with our long-standing efforts to prevent increased national access to sensitive nuclear technology, we have asked France, the FRG, and Pakistan to reconsider transactions involving national reprocessing and heavy water facilities for Pakistan. If these projects were to go forward, they would provide Pakistan with important basic elements needed for a nuclear explosive program. We have reliable indications of continuing high-level Pakistani interest in pursuing this option, and our concern is heightened by the lack of economic need for these projects. Although these facilities and their products would be safeguarded, it would be possible for the GOP to contravene or abrogate any safeguards agreements, a possibility we must take seriously in view of Pakistan's perception of its critical security situation. Even if Pakistan kept its agreements, its possession of a potential nuclear explosives capability could by itself adversely affect South Asian stability, future nuclear decisions by other regional states such as Iran, and our own ability to cooperate with Pakistan in the future as Congressional and public opinion focuses increasingly on the implications of Pakistan's nuclear activities.

SECRET/EXDIS
XGDS3



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines, state review 9/11/03
By , NARA, Date 3/9/04

France and Pakistan appear intent on moving ahead quickly on the reprocessing plant despite our previous demarches and my expression of concern to Prime Minister Bhutto in New York. The FRG is temporarily delaying a decision on the heavy water plant until France and Pakistan have responded to our demarches.


In order to underscore the extent of our concern, I have recently sent letters to the Foreign Ministers of France and the FRG reinforcing the demarches already made with their governments (copies attached). I believe it would be helpful with Pakistan for you to sign the attached letter to Prime Minister Bhutto underlining our request for reconsideration of its present plans.

Following my recent communications to the French and German Foreign Ministers, and my decision to recommend that you write to Prime Minister Bhutto, I appeared before the Senate Government Operations Committee on non-proliferation and nuclear export questions on March 9th. In response to Committee questions, I indicated that we were pursuing the issue of the reprocessing facility with the governments involved.

I anticipate that these additional approaches will prompt serious review before France, the FRG, and Pakistan make their final decisions. If these communications should not lead to cancellation of the reprocessing transaction, they may at least contribute to the evolution of French and German nuclear export policy in more reassuring directions. I would also hope that these efforts would enhance our ability to act affirmatively in the future in preserving our important continuing relationship with Pakistan.

Recommendation:

That you send the attached letter concerning Pakistan's acquisition of sensitive nuclear technology to Prime Minister Bhutto.



~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

-3-

Attachments:

1. Suggested letter to Prime Minister Bhutto
2. Letters to Foreign Ministers of France
and FRG

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~



3E

SECRET/EXDIS

SUGGESTED LETTER

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am writing to you in the spirit of friendship and mutual understanding which has traditionally characterized the exchanges between our two Governments. During your visit to Washington last year, we held very productive discussions and reached broad areas of understanding on matters of mutual interest. I am encouraged by the openness of our relationship to approach you quite candidly on Pakistan's plans to acquire certain sensitive nuclear facilities, a matter which is of deep concern to my Government.

I know from my discussions with you that you share our fear over the threat to the general peace posed by unrestrained spread of nuclear explosives technology. My Government has welcomed your forthright assurances that Pakistan will not divert its

His Excellency

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,

Prime Minister of the

Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Department of State

SECRET/EXDIS

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
State Dept. Guidelines, State Review 9/17/03
By MA, NARA, Date 2/9/04



~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

-2-

civil nuclear development efforts into an explosives program, and that Pakistan's nuclear activities will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.

You should be aware, however, that there is considerable apprehension in this country and elsewhere over the spread on a national basis of the nuclear technology associated with the development of nuclear explosives--specifically, uranium enrichment, heavy water production and chemical reprocessing. Indeed, Secretary Kissinger stated at the UN General Assembly last September the view of this Government that the further spread of nuclear reprocessing facilities under national control will seriously aggravate the problem of nuclear proliferation. This is why we welcomed Korea's decision to forego acquisition of a national reprocessing plant, and also why I am writing to you to ask that you give serious consideration to the broader implications of this matter for stability both in your region and in the world. At this juncture, I believe your Government has an opportunity to make a highly important contribution to worldwide efforts effectively to forestall further nuclear proliferation.

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~



~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

-3-

My concern is not the reliability of the assurances of your Government. It is that the establishment of sensitive nuclear facilities under national control inevitably gives rise to perceptions in many quarters that, under circumstances which perhaps can not even be foreseen today, non-peaceful uses may be contemplated. Whether justified or not, such perceptions could be by themselves destabilizing and undermine the mutual confidence and sense of security which must be created if we are to build a system of international peaceful nuclear cooperation.

These perceptions are heightened in Pakistan's case by the lack of a persuasive economic justification for obtaining sensitive nuclear facilities. For example, the experience of the United States, as well as of all countries with major nuclear power programs, is that reprocessing of spent reactor fuel is only economic within a very much larger reactor program than Pakistan could contemplate for the foreseeable future.

I know that Secretary Kissinger has already expressed similar views to you on this matter, but I want to underline to you my deep personal concern

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~



~~SECRET/EXDIS~~

-4-

over the possible effect of your actions in this area on our ability to sustain support in public opinion here for our close cooperation on a broad range of issues of interest to both our governments. I fear that many in this country will be critical of Pakistan's actions and skeptical regarding its intentions. Friendship with Pakistan has enjoyed broad popular support in this country among the public and in the Congress over the years. However, Pakistan's acquisition of these sensitive facilities would, I believe, arouse considerable criticism and could erode this support.

With these considerations in mind, I hope that you will give serious consideration to not proceeding with present plans to acquire reprocessing and heavy water facilities until your future nuclear program is sufficiently developed to establish a clear need and until other alternatives, such as a multinational venture, are thoroughly explored.

I believe that I understand the difficulties that my request to you will present to your Government. I would not raise this matter with you, however, if

~~SECRET/EXDIS~~



SECRET/EXDIS

-5-

I did not consider it to be of the utmost importance.
I would be grateful if you would let me have your
views on the points I have raised.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

SECRET/EXDIS



30

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Jean:

I am writing you on a matter of profound importance to our efforts to promote stability and deter the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities: the threat posed to those efforts by increased national access to sensitive nuclear technology -- particularly chemical reprocessing facilities -- especially in areas of conflict and instability.

I have been heartened by the progress we have made since our Presidents met in Martinique in 1974. The meetings of nuclear suppliers in London have succeeded in strengthening and expanding guidelines for nuclear safeguards and controls. We take very seriously their provisions for consultation, restraint in sensitive nuclear exports, and encouragement of multinational alternatives to such exports. We have applauded the active cooperation of France which has made possible the success of this effort.

I continue to believe, as I noted last September to the UN General Assembly, that the further spread under national control of reprocessing facilities will seriously aggravate the problem of nuclear proliferation. My concern is all the greater in the case of countries whose incentives to acquire nuclear

His Excellency
Jean Sauvagnargues,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the French Republic,
Paris.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines, State Review 9/17/03

By hls, NARA, Date 3/9/04



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

weapons are substantial. This is why we welcomed Korea's decision to forego acquiring a national reprocessing plant, and why we deeply appreciated France's constructive stance which contributed so much to our efforts. We have made emphatically clear to the Korean Government that future US cooperation should not hamper or replace its peaceful nuclear cooperation with France.

We are therefore at a juncture where we can move to consolidate a pattern of restraint in sensitive nuclear transfers while fostering effectively safeguarded cooperation in non-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. It is in this context that we are asking France to join us in an act of leadership to deter or delay Pakistani acquisition of a national reprocessing capability and to pursue, when the need is clear, safer and more economic alternatives, such as a multinational venture in the region.

In this connection, we have asked Pakistan to consider cancellation of present plans to acquire a reprocessing plant until its future nuclear program is sufficiently developed to establish clear need and until other alternatives have been more thoroughly explored. I expressed my personal concern about these plans to Prime Minister Bhutto. I must be frank in pointing out that compared to Korea, Pakistan is pursuing a much larger plutonium-production capability, for which it has no economic need but it does have considerable potential for being used either to counter India's nuclear capability or to try to obtain concessions for not doing so. We must also face the danger of contravention or abrogation of even the most effective safeguards agreement if a nation finds this to be in its national interest.

I believe that I understand the difficulties that my request may present to your Government. While I would prefer that France participate with us in persuading Pakistan to cancel its facility, it would help our efforts with Prime Minister Bhutto if France could delay further actions on this transaction for a reasonable period of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

time. I believe that we can make no more enduring contribution to international stability than a decisive act to forestall further transfers of national reprocessing capabilities, particularly in circumstances where there is a substantial risk that they might be used for non-peaceful purposes.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



34

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Mr. Minister:

I know that you are aware of our concern over the Government of Pakistan's plans to acquire a pilot reprocessing plant from France and a heavy water plant from the Federal Republic. I have personally discussed the matter with Prime Minister Bhutto but have not yet received a definitive response. In the meantime, I wanted to ensure that you understand the importance we attach to this matter, and to ask that in reaching a decision on this transaction, you take into account not only the immediate risks which we perceive but some of the longer-term implications which in my view must be considered.

In reviewing the totality of Pakistan's planned nuclear program, we find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that there is a substantial risk of nuclear proliferation. Neither a chemical reprocessing nor a heavy water production capability are needed to meet Pakistan's civil nuclear needs. Both facilities would, however, provide important elements in an indigenous capability to produce nuclear explosives. Whether or not Pakistan in fact chooses to produce explosives, I believe the capability to do so would in itself contribute to a highly unstable situation in South Asia, with sharply increased danger that other nations will

His Excellency
Hans-Dietrich Genscher,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Germany,
Bonn.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines, State Review 9/17/03

By tdm, NARA, Date 3/9/04



CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

feel impelled to take countermeasures. In such circumstances, there would inevitably be a greater risk of conflict, which because of its nuclear aspect could threaten the security of countries both within and without the area.

I am also concerned that our long-term mutual objective of developing nuclear power as an alternative world energy source may be prejudiced if we fail to contain the proliferation problem. This has been an important consideration in pursuing greater cooperation among major nuclear suppliers. The recent London Guidelines, in which the FRG played an important role, are an impressive start toward such cooperation. However, I cannot stress too strongly the growing apprehension in this country about the dangers of nuclear proliferation, and my own view that unless supplier governments deal adequately and convincingly with those dangers in pursuing peaceful nuclear transfers, our long-term economic interests as well as our security may be affected.

I am grateful for your Government's recent decision to defer further action on the proposed heavy water sale until we have received the reactions of France and Pakistan to our recent approaches. As you may be aware, we had hoped to seek deferral of the French/Pakistani safeguards agreement at the recent IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, in order to allow us more time to convince Pakistan that it is in its own interest not to acquire sensitive nuclear facilities at this time. This did not prove feasible.

For Pakistan, an independent ability to produce heavy water would be a critical link in an indigenous fuel cycle which would give Pakistan the ability to develop nuclear explosives. Therefore, I would

CONFIDENTIAL



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

appreciate your personally reviewing this problem
irrespective of what positions other governments
may adopt.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



34
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Jean:

I am writing you on a matter of profound importance to our efforts to promote stability and deter the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities: the threat posed to those efforts by increased national access to sensitive nuclear technology -- particularly chemical reprocessing facilities -- especially in areas of conflict and instability.

I have been heartened by the progress we have made since our Presidents met in Martinique in 1974. The meetings of nuclear suppliers in London have succeeded in strengthening and expanding guidelines for nuclear safeguards and controls. We take very seriously their provisions for consultation, restraint in sensitive nuclear exports, and encouragement of multinational alternatives to such exports. We have applauded the active cooperation of France which has made possible the success of this effort.

I continue to believe, as I noted last September to the UN General Assembly, that the further spread under national control of reprocessing facilities will seriously aggravate the problem of nuclear proliferation. My concern is all the greater in the case of countries whose incentives to acquire nuclear

His Excellency
Jean Sauvagnargues,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of
the French Republic,
Paris.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines, State Review 9/17/03

By WJA, NARA, Date 3/9/04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -


weapons are substantial. This is why we welcomed Korea's decision to forego acquiring a national reprocessing plant, and why we deeply appreciated France's constructive stance which contributed so much to our efforts. We have made emphatically clear to the Korean Government that future US cooperation should not hamper or replace its peaceful nuclear cooperation with France.

We are therefore at a juncture where we can move to consolidate a pattern of restraint in sensitive nuclear transfers while fostering effectively safeguarded cooperation in non-sensitive parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. It is in this context that we are asking France to join us in an act of leadership to deter or delay Pakistani acquisition of a national reprocessing capability and to pursue, when the need is clear, safer and more economic alternatives, such as a multinational venture in the region.

In this connection, we have asked Pakistan to consider cancellation of present plans to acquire a reprocessing plant until its future nuclear program is sufficiently developed to establish clear need and until other alternatives have been more thoroughly explored. I expressed my personal concern about these plans to Prime Minister Bhutto. I must be frank in pointing out that compared to Korea, Pakistan is pursuing a much larger plutonium-production capability, for which it has no economic need but it does have considerable potential for being used either to counter India's nuclear capability or to try to obtain concessions for not doing so. We must also face the danger of contravention or abrogation of even the most effective safeguards agreement if a nation finds this to be in its national interest.

I believe that I understand the difficulties that my request may present to your Government. While I would prefer that France participate with us in persuading Pakistan to cancel its facility, it would help our efforts with Prime Minister Bhutto if France could delay further actions on this transaction for a reasonable period of

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

time. I believe that we can make no more enduring contribution to international stability than a decisive act to forestall further transfers of national reprocessing capabilities, particularly in circumstances where there is a substantial risk that they might be used for non-peaceful purposes.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



31

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Mr. Minister:

I know that you are aware of our concern over the Government of Pakistan's plans to acquire a pilot reprocessing plant from France and a heavy water plant from the Federal Republic. I have personally discussed the matter with Prime Minister Bhutto but have not yet received a definitive response. In the meantime, I wanted to ensure that you understand the importance we attach to this matter, and to ask that in reaching a decision on this transaction, you take into account not only the immediate risks which we perceive but some of the longer-term implications which in my view must be considered.

In reviewing the totality of Pakistan's planned nuclear program, we find it difficult to avoid the conclusion that there is a substantial risk of nuclear proliferation. Neither a chemical reprocessing nor a heavy water production capability are needed to meet Pakistan's civil nuclear needs. Both facilities would, however, provide important elements in an indigenous capability to produce nuclear explosives. Whether or not Pakistan in fact chooses to produce explosives, I believe the capability to do so would in itself contribute to a highly unstable situation in South Asia, with sharply increased danger that other nations will

His Excellency
Hans-Dietrich Genscher,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Republic of Germany,
Bonn.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines state review 9/17/03

By llk, NARA, Date 3/9/04

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 2 -

feel impelled to take countermeasures. In such circumstances, there would inevitably be a greater risk of conflict, which because of its nuclear aspect could threaten the security of countries both within and without the area.

I am also concerned that our long-term mutual objective of developing nuclear power as an alternative world energy source may be prejudiced if we fail to contain the proliferation problem. This has been an important consideration in pursuing greater cooperation among major nuclear suppliers. The recent London Guidelines, in which the FRG played an important role, are an impressive start toward such cooperation. However, I cannot stress too strongly the growing apprehension in this country about the dangers of nuclear proliferation, and my own view that unless supplier governments deal adequately and convincingly with those dangers in pursuing peaceful nuclear transfers, our long-term economic interests as well as our security may be affected.

I am grateful for your Government's recent decision to defer further action on the proposed heavy water sale until we have received the reactions of France and Pakistan to our recent approaches. As you may be aware, we had hoped to seek deferral of the French/Pakistani safeguards agreement at the recent IAEA Board of Governors meeting in Vienna, in order to allow us more time to convince Pakistan that it is in its own interest not to acquire sensitive nuclear facilities at this time. This did not prove feasible.

For Pakistan, an independent ability to produce heavy water would be a critical link in an indigenous fuel cycle which would give Pakistan the ability to develop nuclear explosives. Therefore, I would

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

- 3 -

appreciate your personally reviewing this problem
irrespective of what positions other governments
may adopt.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am writing to you in the spirit of friendship and mutual understanding which has traditionally characterized the exchanges between our two Governments. During your visit to Washington last year, we held very productive discussions and reached broad areas of understanding on matters of mutual interest. I am encouraged by the openness of our relationship to approach you quite candidly on Pakistan's plans to acquire certain sensitive nuclear facilities, a matter which is of deep concern to my Government.

I know from my discussions with you that you share our fear over the threat to the general peace posed by unrestrained spread of nuclear explosives technology. My Government has welcomed your forthright assurances that Pakistan will not divert its civil nuclear development efforts into an explosives program, and that Pakistan's nuclear activities will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.

You should be aware, however, that there is considerable apprehension in this country and elsewhere over the spread on a national basis of the nuclear technology associated with the development of nuclear explosives--specifically, uranium enrichment, heavy water production and chemical reprocessing. In fact, Secretary Kissinger stated at the UN General Assembly last September the view of this Government that the further spread of nuclear reprocessing facilities under national control will seriously aggravate the problem of nuclear proliferation.

For this reason we welcomed Korea's decision to forego acquisition of a national reprocessing plant. For the same reason I am now writing to you to ask that you give serious consideration to the broader implications of this matter for stability both in your region and in the world. At this juncture,

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines *State Review 9/17/03*

By lha, NARA, Date 3/9/04




I believe your Government has an opportunity to make a highly important contribution to worldwide efforts effectively to forestall further nuclear proliferation.

My concern is not the reliability of the assurances of your Government. It is that the establishment of sensitive nuclear facilities under national control inevitably gives rise to perceptions in many quarters that, under circumstances which perhaps cannot even be foreseen today, non-peaceful uses may be contemplated. Whether justified or not, such perceptions could be by themselves destabilizing and undermine the mutual confidence and sense of security which must be created if we are to build a system of international peaceful nuclear cooperation.

These perceptions are heightened in Pakistan's case by the lack of a persuasive economic justification for obtaining sensitive nuclear facilities. For example, the experience of the United States, as well as of all countries with major nuclear power programs, is that reprocessing of spent reactor fuel is only economic within a very much larger reactor program than Pakistan could contemplate for the foreseeable future.

I know that Secretary Kissinger has already expressed similar views to you on this matter, but I want to underline to you my deep personal concern over the possible effect of your actions in this area on our ability to sustain support in public opinion here for our close cooperation on a broad range of issues of interest to both our governments. I fear that many in this country will be critical of Pakistan's actions and skeptical regarding its intentions. Friendship with Pakistan has enjoyed broad popular support in this country among the public and in the Congress over the years. However, Pakistan's acquisition of these sensitive facilities would, I believe, arouse considerable criticism and could erode this support.

With these considerations in mind, I hope that you will give serious consideration to foregoing present plans to acquire reprocessing and heavy water facilities until your future nuclear program is sufficiently developed to establish a clear need and until other alternatives, such as a multinational venture, are thoroughly explored.



I believe that I understand the difficulties that my request to you will present to your Government. I would not raise this matter with you, however, if I did not consider it to be of the utmost importance. I would be grateful if you would let me have your views on the points I have raised.

Personal regards,

His Excellency
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan



34

DOC		RECD			LOG NUMBER
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
3	16	3	17	17	7601625

INITIAL ACTION O
Elliot

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

TO: PRES + FROM: SECSTATE + S/S 7605327 UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
 SCOWCROFT _____ SECDEF _____ LOU NO FORM NODIS
 NYLAND _____ DCI _____ X-REF _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS
 DAVIS _____ STATE EXSEC _____ S CODEWORD
 OTHER _____ TS SENSITIVE

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

SUBJECT: *State position paper re further
 remarks on Pakistani Nuclear
 Issues*

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC CY FOR
ADV CYS S'GROFT/WGH	ACTION	CONCURRENCE	COORDINATE	INFO	
STAFF SECRETARY					
CONGRESSIONAL				<u>+</u>	<u>+</u>
ECONOMIC					
EUR/CANADA/OCEANS				<u>+</u>	<u>+</u>
FAR EAST/PRC					
INTELLIGENCE					
LATIN AMERICA					
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA			<u>+</u>		<u>+</u>
NSC PLANNING					
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				<u>+</u>	<u>+</u>
SCIENTIFIC	<u>X</u>				<u>+</u>
SUB-SAH/AFRICA/UN					

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT. _____

MEMO FOR PRES _____ +

REPLY FOR _____

APPROPRIATE ACTION _____

MEMO _____ TO _____

RECOMMENDATIONS _____

JOINT MEMO _____

REFER TO _____ FOR: _____

ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____

CONCURRENCE _____

DUE DATE: 3-24

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO
<u>3/18</u>		<i>Staff</i>	<u>X</u>	<i>has to sign letter to Bhutto</i>	<u>3/29</u>	
<u>3-19</u>		<i>Pres</i>	<u>P</u>	<i>Sign letter to Bhutto</i>		
<u>3-19</u>			<u>C</u>	<i>Pres signed letter to Bhutto</i>		

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH + *hand-carried by Dr. Elliott 3-20-76* NOTIFY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

SPECIAL INDEXING: _____

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED NO

MICROFILM & FILE ROOMS

M/F/D _____ BY _____

CRT ID: _____

OPEN _____

CLOSE PA



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7607747
2211

40

April 14, 1976

SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Transmittal of Bhutto Letter
to the President

The attached letter from Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto is in response to the President's letter to him of March 19. The letter was given to the Secretary by Pakistani Ambassador Yaqub-Khan during a meeting in the Secretary's office on April 12.

The Department, in conjunction with Dr. Eliot of your staff and representatives of ACDA, is considering options as to possible further steps which might be taken in pursuit of the objectives outlined in the President's letter of March 19.


George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Letter to the President

SECRET/EXDIS

GDS

Wa 3/9/04





Handwritten signature



PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister's House,
Rawalpindi.

30 March 1976

Dear Mr. President,

I have given the most careful consideration to your letter on the subject of Pakistan's decision to acquire a reprocessing plant and heavy water facilities which was handed over to the Foreign Office by your Ambassador on March 21. Let me assure you at the outset that, far from being insensitive to it, we ourselves fully share the serious concern about the spread of nuclear weapons which permeates your communication.

In this spirit and mindful of the traditional bonds between our two countries, I appreciate your candour and welcome the opportunity to explain both the factual position and our viewpoint on this matter of far-reaching importance to the economic viability of Pakistan. As I recollect our meeting in Washington and my deep impression of your perceptions of the forces at work in this region, I feel hopeful that our mutual understanding will not fail on an issue which is of profound significance to us.

As you know, we have repeatedly and voluntarily given categorical assurances about the peaceful intent of our nuclear programme. More significantly, we have accepted iron-clad safeguards for every one of our nuclear facilities. Lest these be overlooked, as I fear they apparently are, I must recount some of the most pertinent facts which need to be borne in mind in this context.

First, neither our nuclear programme nor the plan to build a reprocessing plant constitutes a new decision

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines, State Review 9/17/03

NARA, Date 2/9/04





PRIME MINISTER

-2-

or a reaction to what others may have done. The programme is almost two decades old. We negotiated for a research reactor from the United States under the Atoms for Peace Plan in the early 1960's. The project was completed in 1965. Since then we have built a large nuclear research centre around it. In 1966, we started construction of a Canadian-supplied nuclear power plant (KANUPP) which was completed in 1972 and which supplies power to Karachi. About that time, we also started discussions with France for the supply of a reprocessing plant. Agreement in principle was reached in 1972 and the actual design work was started in 1973. What has happened now is merely the signing of a formal bilateral agreement with France on the supply, support and safeguard aspects of this facility. This has been accompanied by the conclusion of a trilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA which was approved by its Board of Governors last month. It was a matter of great satisfaction to my Government that these agreements were approved by consensus and without opposition not only in the Agency but in the European Economic Commission in Brussels.

Second, we have gone beyond the normal IAEA rules about safeguards and accepted the most stringent conditions from France, fully conforming to the guidelines recently adopted by the seven nuclear exporting countries. This is as convincing an earnest as any of our commitment to use this facility exclusively for peaceful purposes. I have responded favourably to Prime Minister Trudeau's proposal to revise existing safeguards on KANUPP and, after





PRIME MINISTER

-3-

exhaustive discussions between the two sides, I am happy to inform you that an agreement satisfactory to both is in sight. We are also in touch with the Federal Republic of Germany with regard to the safeguards to be applied to the small heavy water plant which will be barely adequate for meeting KANUPP's requirements and which will not be used for any other purpose. Thus we have not only placed all our nuclear facilities under safeguards but also agreed to make existing safeguards agreements even more fail-safe to satisfy the additional conditions laid down by the nuclear suppliers.

Third, we have made a prolonged and unprejudiced examination of the economic necessity of our nuclear programme of which a reprocessing plant forms an integral part. Pakistan is especially poor in terms of indigenous fuel. It has, therefore, been hit hardest by the recent energy crisis and the phenomenal rise in oil prices. Vast tracts of our valuable land have been rendered uncultivable by water-logging and salinity. This destructive process persists. We must have the necessary power to sink and operate at least one hundred thousand tubewells to deal with this menace. This is a demand superimposed upon the accelerating energy needs of our increasing population and the requirements of our growing industry. If we do not plan now with some foresight, we will find no answer to a gnawing problem and we will face an appalling situation in the 1980's. For these plans to be more than visionary, it is essential for us to embark now on a large-scale nuclear power programme and, to this end, to build the necessary infra-structure and facilities and to train





PRIME MINISTER

-4-

the required manpower.

Our sincerity of purpose, Mr. President, is thus not merely a matter of verbal pledge but something that is fully insured by agreements that are inviolable. Unhappily, the same cannot be said of the nuclear programme of our neighbouring country. India, having already exploded a nuclear device on our doorstep, makes no secret of its intention to carry out a series of nuclear explosions. Pakistan was threatened with cessation of all supplies for KANUPP if we did not accept the additional safeguards proposed by Canada. On the other hand, I am not aware that the supply of enriched uranium to India for the operation of Tarapur reactors has been discontinued by the United States or that India will be compelled to accept safeguards for the unsafeguarded Canada-India CIRRUS reactor which enabled her to carry out its nuclear explosion in 1974.

I am not suggesting that Pakistan or other countries should similarly be given a free hand to develop unrestrained nuclear programmes. On the contrary, we believe that, for world peace and stability in our region, the nuclear powers need to concentrate on India to prevent it from going forward with its plans to develop nuclear weapons. What is happening at this time is that while India is getting away with the fruits of its 'fait accompli', it is Pakistan which is being treated with discrimination and suspicion. Our people see Pakistan, bound by alliance with the United States, being subjected to pressures while they observe India, allied to Soviet Union in a 20-year military pact, being treated with consideration and deference.





PRIME MINISTER

-5-

I am sure that if the full significance of the kind of safeguards that Pakistan has accepted with respect to its nuclear facilities were fully known to your Congress and the public, there could be no ground to fear that they might, in certain circumstances, be used for non-peaceful purposes. With these apprehensions dispelled, one cannot imagine that the United States would wish Pakistan to reverse its considered decision, shelve its nuclear energy programme and thus not only frustrate the expectations of its people about their development but also inflict lasting damage on their expectation of support from the United States in their legitimate interests.

I have, of course, given serious thought to your view that the establishment of purely national reprocessing facilities should be discouraged and the establishment of regional facilities promoted. Even before I received your letter, I had taken advantage of the recent visit to Pakistan of the Shahanshah of Iran to discuss this matter with him. He was agreeable to joining us in converting the reprocessing plant in Pakistan into a regional project. We both will explore the possibility of inviting one or two other countries in this region to participate in this venture. As I said at the outset, we are thus making a constructive response to your concerns.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

His Excellency
Mr. Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America,
WASHINGTON, DC.



4d

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 19, 1976

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I am writing to you in the spirit of friendship and mutual understanding which has traditionally characterized exchanges between our two Governments. During your visit to Washington last year, we held very productive discussions and reached broad areas of understanding on matters of mutual interest. I am encouraged by the openness of our relationship to approach you quite candidly on Pakistan's plans to acquire certain sensitive nuclear facilities, a matter which is of deep concern to my Government.

I know from my discussions with you that you share our fear over the threat to the general peace posed by the unrestrained spread of nuclear explosives technology. My Government has welcomed your forthright assurances that Pakistan will not divert its civil nuclear development efforts into an explosives program, and that Pakistan's nuclear activities will be devoted exclusively to peaceful purposes.

You should be aware, however, that there is considerable apprehension in this country and elsewhere over the spread on a national basis of the nuclear technology associated with the development of nuclear explosives -- specifically, uranium enrichment, heavy water production and chemical reprocessing. Secretary Kissinger stated at the UN General Assembly last September the view of this Government that the further spread of nuclear reprocessing facilities under national control would seriously aggravate the problem of nuclear proliferation.

For this reason we welcomed Korea's decision to forego acquisition of a national reprocessing plant. For the same reason I am now writing to you to ask that you give serious consideration to the broader implications of this matter for stability both in your region and in the world. At this juncture,

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES *state review 9/17/03*
BY lab, NARA, DATE 3/9/04



I believe your Government has an opportunity to make a highly important contribution to worldwide efforts effectively to forestall further nuclear proliferation.

My concern is not the reliability of the assurances of your Government. It is that the establishment of sensitive nuclear facilities under national control inevitably gives rise to perceptions in many quarters that, under circumstances which perhaps cannot even be foreseen today, non-peaceful uses may be contemplated. Whether justified or not, such perceptions could be by themselves destabilizing and undermine the mutual confidence and sense of security which must be created if we are to build a system of international peaceful nuclear cooperation.

These perceptions are heightened in Pakistan's case by the lack of a persuasive economic justification for obtaining sensitive nuclear facilities. For example, the experience of the United States, as well as of all countries with major nuclear power programs, is that reprocessing of spent reactor fuel is only economic within a very much larger reactor program than Pakistan could contemplate for the foreseeable future.

I know that Secretary Kissinger has already expressed similar views to you on this matter, but I want to underline to you my deep personal concern over the possible effect of your actions in this area on our ability to sustain support in public opinion here for our close cooperation on a broad range of issues of interest to both our governments. I fear that many in this country will be critical of Pakistan's actions and skeptical regarding its intentions. Friendship with Pakistan has enjoyed broad popular support in this country among the public and in the Congress over the years. However, Pakistan's acquisition of these sensitive facilities would, I believe, arouse considerable criticism and could erode this support.


With these considerations in mind, I hope that you will give serious consideration to foregoing present plans to acquire reprocessing and heavy water facilities until your future nuclear program is sufficiently developed to establish a clear need and until other alternatives, such as a multinational venture, are thoroughly explored.

GERALD R.

- 8 -
- 3 -

I believe that I understand the difficulties that my request
I believe that I understand the difficulties that my request
to you will present to your Government. I would not raise
this matter with you; however, if I did not consider it to be
of the utmost importance, I would be grateful if you would
let me have your views on the points I have raised.

Sincerely,
Sincerely,



His Excellency
His Excellency
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Prime Minister of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan
Islamabad

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		PAGE			LOG NUMBER
NO	DA	NO	DA	NR	
316	3	1	1	7	7601625

INITIAL ACTION D
Elliott

TO: State FROM: SECRETARY S/S: 7605327 UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT

SCHEMATIC _____ RECEIPT _____ LOU _____ NO FORM NODIS

WYLAND _____ SERIALIZED _____ C _____ EYES ONLY EXDIS

DATE _____ STATE _____ TS _____ CODEWORD

SENSITIVE

State position paper re further demands on Pakistani Nuclear Program

NO	DA	NO	DA	NR	REC. CY	ACTION REQUIRED
						MEMO FOR SCHEMATIC <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
						MEMO FOR <u>WYLAND</u> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
						REPLY TO _____ <input type="checkbox"/>
						APPROPRIATE ACTION _____ <input type="checkbox"/>
						MEMO _____ TO _____ <input type="checkbox"/>
						RECOMMENDATIONS _____ <input type="checkbox"/>
						JOINT MEMO _____ <input type="checkbox"/>
						REFER TO _____ FOR _____ <input type="checkbox"/>
						ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____ <input type="checkbox"/>
						CONCURRENCE _____ <input type="checkbox"/>
						DUE DATE: <u>3-24</u>
						COMMENTS (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED OR TAKEN	DUE	CY TO
3/18	<i>Smith</i>	<i>x</i>		<i>has to sign letter to Bhutto</i>	3/29	
3-19	<i>Price</i>	<i>P</i>		<i>Sign letter to Bhutto</i>		
3-19		<i>C</i>		<i>Price sign letter to Bhutto</i>		

DISPATCH *to State* *hand-carried by Dr. Elliott 320-76* NOTIFY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION _____

SPECIAL INDEXING _____

MICROFILM & FILE ROOMS

W/F/D _____ BY _____

CRT ID _____

OPEN _____

CLOSE 7A PA

NO





PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister's House,
Rawalpindi.

30 March 1976

Dear Mr. President,

I have given the most careful consideration to your letter on the subject of Pakistan's decision to acquire a reprocessing plant and heavy water facilities which was handed over to the Foreign Office by your Ambassador on March 21. Let me assure you at the outset that, far from being insensitive to it, we ourselves fully share the serious concern about the spread of nuclear weapons which permeates your communication.

In this spirit and mindful of the traditional bonds between our two countries, I appreciate your candour and welcome the opportunity to explain both the factual position and our viewpoint on this matter of far-reaching importance to the economic viability of Pakistan. As I recollect our meeting in Washington and my deep impression of your perceptions of the forces at work in this region, I feel hopeful that our mutual understanding will not fail on an issue which is of profound significance to us.

As you know, we have repeatedly and voluntarily given categorical assurances about the peaceful intent of our nuclear programme. More significantly, we have accepted iron-clad safeguards for every one of our nuclear facilities. Lest these be overlooked, as I fear they apparently are, I must recount some of the most pertinent facts which need to be borne in mind in this context.

First, neither our nuclear programme nor the plan to build a reprocessing plant constitutes a new decision

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines

NARA, Date 3/9/04

State review 9/17/03





PRIME MINISTER

-2-

or a reaction to what others may have done. The programme is almost two decades old. We negotiated for a research reactor from the United States under the Atoms for Peace Plan in the early 1960's. The project was completed in 1965. Since then we have built a large nuclear research centre around it. In 1966, we started construction of a Canadian-supplied nuclear power plant (KANUPP) which was completed in 1972 and which supplies power to Karachi. About that time, we also started discussions with France for the supply of a reprocessing plant. Agreement in principle was reached in 1972 and the actual design work was started in 1973. What has happened now is merely the signing of a formal bilateral agreement with France on the supply, support and safeguard aspects of this facility. This has been accompanied by the conclusion of a trilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA which was approved by its Board of Governors last month. It was a matter of great satisfaction to my Government that these agreements were approved by consensus and without opposition not only in the Agency but in the European Economic Commission in Brussels.

Second, we have gone beyond the normal IAEA rules about safeguards and accepted the most stringent conditions from France, fully conforming to the guidelines recently adopted by the seven nuclear exporting countries. This is as convincing an earnest as any of our commitment to use this facility exclusively for peaceful purposes. I have responded favourably to Prime Minister Trudeau's proposal to revise existing safeguards on KANUPP and, after





PRIME MINISTER

-3-

exhaustive discussions between the two sides, I am happy to inform you that an agreement satisfactory to both is in sight. We are also in touch with the Federal Republic of Germany with regard to the safeguards to be applied to the small heavy water plant which will be barely adequate for meeting KANUPP's requirements and which will not be used for any other purpose. Thus we have not only placed all our nuclear facilities under safeguards but also agreed to make existing safeguards agreements even more fail-safe to satisfy the additional conditions laid down by the nuclear suppliers.

Third, we have made a prolonged and unprejudiced examination of the economic necessity of our nuclear programme of which a reprocessing plant forms an integral part. Pakistan is especially poor in terms of indigenous fuel. It has, therefore, been hit hardest by the recent energy crisis and the phenomenal rise in oil prices. Vast tracts of our valuable land have been rendered uncultivable by water-logging and salinity. This destructive process persists. We must have the necessary power to sink and operate at least one hundred thousand tubewells to deal with this menace. This is a demand superimposed upon the accelerating energy needs of our increasing population and the requirements of our growing industry. If we do not plan now with some foresight, we will find no answer to a gnawing problem and we will face an appalling situation in the 1980's. For these plans to be more than visionary, it is essential for us to embark now on a large-scale nuclear power programme and, to this end, to build the necessary infra-structure and facilities and to train





PRIME MINISTER

-4-

the required manpower.

Our sincerity of purpose, Mr. President, is thus not merely a matter of verbal pledge but something that is fully insured by agreements that are inviolable. Unhappily, the same cannot be said of the nuclear programme of our neighbouring country. India, having already exploded a nuclear device on our doorstep, makes no secret of its intention to carry out a series of nuclear explosions. Pakistan was threatened with cessation of all supplies for KANUPP if we did not accept the additional safeguards proposed by Canada. On the other hand, I am not aware that the supply of enriched uranium to India for the operation of Tarapur reactors has been discontinued by the United States or that India will be compelled to accept safeguards for the unsafeguarded Canada-India CIRRUS reactor which enabled her to carry out its nuclear explosion in 1974.

I am not suggesting that Pakistan or other countries should similarly be given a free hand to develop unrestrained nuclear programmes. On the contrary, we believe that, for world peace and stability in our region, the nuclear powers need to concentrate on India to prevent it from going forward with its plans to develop nuclear weapons. What is happening at this time is that while India is getting away with the fruits of its 'fait accompli', it is Pakistan which is being treated with discrimination and suspicion. Our people see Pakistan, bound by alliance with the United States, being subjected to pressures while they observe India, allied to Soviet Union in a 20-year military pact, being treated with consideration and deference.





PRIME MINISTER

-5-

I am sure that if the full significance of the kind of safeguards that Pakistan has accepted with respect to its nuclear facilities were fully known to your Congress and the public, there could be no ground to fear that they might, in certain circumstances, be used for non-peaceful purposes. With these apprehensions dispelled, one cannot imagine that the United States would wish Pakistan to reverse its considered decision, shelve its nuclear energy programme and thus not only frustrate the expectations of its people about their development but also inflict lasting damage on their expectation of support from the United States in their legitimate interests.

I have, of course, given serious thought to your view that the establishment of purely national reprocessing facilities should be discouraged and the establishment of regional facilities promoted. Even before I received your letter, I had taken advantage of the recent visit to Pakistan of the Shahanshah of Iran to discuss this matter with him. He was agreeable to joining us in converting the reprocessing plant in Pakistan into a regional project. We both will explore the possibility of inviting one or two other countries in this region to participate in this venture. As I said at the outset, we are thus making a constructive response to your concerns.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

His Excellency
Mr. Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America,
WASHINGTON, DC.



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG. NUMBER
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
4	14	4	15	10	7602211

INITIAL ACTION O
Oakley

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: SECSTATE _____ S/S 7607747 UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
 SCOWCROFT + SECDEF _____ LOU NO FORM NODIS
 HYLAND _____ DCI _____ X REF _____ C EYES ONLY EXDIS
 DAVIS _____ STATE EXSEC + _____ S CODEWORD
 OTHER _____ TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: *Cell ltr to Sec for PM Bhutto of Pakistan*
re his Ind ltr to Sec of Mar 19 1976
re US-Pakistani Nuclear Issues

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC CY FOR
ADV CYS S'CROFT/WGH	ACTION	CONCUR- RENCE	COOR- DINATE	INFO	
STAFF SECRETARY					
CONGRESSIONAL					
ECONOMIC					
EUR/CANADA/OCEANS					
FAR EAST/PRC					
INTELLIGENCE					
LATIN AMERICA					
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA	<i>*</i>		<i>X</i>		
NSC PLANNING					
PROGRAM ANALYSIS					
SCIENTIFIC	<i>X</i>		<i>X</i>		
SUB-SAH/AFRICA/UN					

ACTION REQUIRED

MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT. ()

MEMO FOR PRES ()

REPLY FOR _____ ()

APPROPRIATE ACTION ()

MEMO _____ TO _____ ()

RECOMMENDATIONS ()

JOINT MEMO ()

REFER TO _____ FOR: _____ ()

ANY ACTION NECESSARY? *at this time* (***)

CONCURRENCE ()


DUE DATE: *4-21*

COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

→ Logged per Oakley's instructions
Backups attached

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO



NSC/S INSTR DISP

DISPATCH _____ NOTIFY _____

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____

SPECIAL INDEXING: *760 1625*

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED _____

MICROFILM & FILE ROOMS

M/F'D _____ BY _____

CRT ID: *(initials)*

OPEN _____

CLOSE _____

IF _____

NS DY _____

WH SA FP _____

PA _____



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7607747

2211

4h

April 14, 1976


SECRET/EXDIS

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Transmittal of Bhutto Letter
to the President

The attached letter from Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto is in response to the President's letter to him of March 19. The letter was given to the Secretary by Pakistani Ambassador Yaqub-Khan during a meeting in the Secretary's office on April 12.

The Department, in conjunction with Dr. Eliot of your staff and representatives of ACDA, is considering options as to possible further steps which might be taken in pursuit of the objectives outlined in the President's letter of March 19.


George S. Springsteen
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Letter to the President

SECRET/EXDIS

GDS

DA 3/9/04





PRIME MINISTER

Prime Minister's House,
Rawalpindi.

30 March 1976

Dear Mr. President,

I have given the most careful consideration to your letter on the subject of Pakistan's decision to acquire a reprocessing plant and heavy water facilities which was handed over to the Foreign Office by your Ambassador on March 21. Let me assure you at the outset that, far from being insensitive to it, we ourselves fully share the serious concern about the spread of nuclear weapons which permeates your communication.

In this spirit and mindful of the traditional bonds between our two countries, I appreciate your candour and welcome the opportunity to explain both the factual position and our viewpoint on this matter of far-reaching importance to the economic viability of Pakistan. As I recollect our meeting in Washington and my deep impression of your perceptions of the forces at work in this region, I feel hopeful that our mutual understanding will not fail on an issue which is of profound significance to us.

As you know, we have repeatedly and voluntarily given categorical assurances about the peaceful intent of our nuclear programme. More significantly, we have accepted iron-clad safeguards for every one of our nuclear facilities. Lest these be overlooked, as I fear they apparently are, I must recount some of the most pertinent facts which need to be borne in mind in this context.

First, neither our nuclear programme nor the plan to build a reprocessing plant constitutes a new decision


DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

State Dept. Guidelines State Review 9/17/03

By , NARA, Date 3/9/04






PRIME MINISTER

-2-

or a reaction to what others may have done. The programme is almost two decades old. We negotiated for a research reactor from the United States under the Atoms for Peace Plan in the early 1960's. The project was completed in 1965. Since then we have built a large nuclear research centre around it. In 1966, we started construction of a Canadian-supplied nuclear power plant (KANUPP) which was completed in 1972 and which supplies power to Karachi. About that time, we also started discussions with France for the supply of a reprocessing plant. Agreement in principle was reached in 1972 and the actual design work was started in 1973. What has happened now is merely the signing of a formal bilateral agreement with France on the supply, support and safeguard aspects of this facility. This has been accompanied by the conclusion of a trilateral safeguards agreement with the IAEA which was approved by its Board of Governors last month. It was a matter of great satisfaction to my Government that these agreements were approved by consensus and without opposition not only in the Agency but in the European Economic Commission in Brussels.

Second, we have gone beyond the normal IAEA rules about safeguards and accepted the most stringent conditions from France, fully conforming to the guidelines recently adopted by the seven nuclear exporting countries. This is as convincing an earnest as any of our commitment to use this facility exclusively for peaceful purposes. I have responded favourably to Prime Minister Trudeau's proposal to revise existing safeguards on KANUPP and, after





PRIME MINISTER

-3-

exhaustive discussions between the two sides, I am happy to inform you that an agreement satisfactory to both is in sight. We are also in touch with the Federal Republic of Germany with regard to the safeguards to be applied to the small heavy water plant which will be barely adequate for meeting KANUPP's requirements and which will not be used for any other purpose. Thus we have not only placed all our nuclear facilities under safeguards but also agreed to make existing safeguards agreements even more fail-safe to satisfy the additional conditions laid down by the nuclear suppliers.

Third, we have made a prolonged and unprejudiced examination of the economic necessity of our nuclear programme of which a reprocessing plant forms an integral part. Pakistan is especially poor in terms of indigenous fuel. It has, therefore, been hit hardest by the recent energy crisis and the phenomenal rise in oil prices. Vast tracts of our valuable land have been rendered uncultivable by water-logging and salinity. This destructive process persists. We must have the necessary power to sink and operate at least one hundred thousand tubewells to deal with this menace. This is a demand superimposed upon the accelerating energy needs of our increasing population and the requirements of our growing industry. If we do not plan now with some foresight, we will find no answer to a gnawing problem and we will face an appalling situation in the 1980's. For these plans to be more than visionary, it is essential for us to embark now on a large-scale nuclear power programme and, to this end, to build the necessary infra-structure and facilities and to train






PRIME MINISTER

-4-

the required manpower.

Our sincerity of purpose, Mr. President, is thus not merely a matter of verbal pledge but something that is fully insured by agreements that are inviolable. Unhappily, the same cannot be said of the nuclear programme of our neighbouring country. India, having already exploded a nuclear device on our doorstep, makes no secret of its intention to carry out a series of nuclear explosions. Pakistan was threatened with cessation of all supplies for KANUPP if we did not accept the additional safeguards proposed by Canada. On the other hand, I am not aware that the supply of enriched uranium to India for the operation of Tarapur reactors has been discontinued by the United States or that India will be compelled to accept safeguards for the unsafeguarded Canada-India CIRRUS reactor which enabled her to carry out its nuclear explosion in 1974.

I am not suggesting that Pakistan or other countries should similarly be given a free hand to develop unrestrained nuclear programmes. On the contrary, we believe that, for world peace and stability in our region, the nuclear powers need to concentrate on India to prevent it from going forward with its plans to develop nuclear weapons. What is happening at this time is that while India is getting away with the fruits of its 'fait accompli', it is Pakistan which is being treated with discrimination and suspicion. Our people see Pakistan, bound by alliance with the United States, being subjected to pressures while they observe India, allied to Soviet Union in a 20-year military pact, being treated with consideration and deference.





PRIME MINISTER

-5-

I am sure that if the full significance of the kind of safeguards that Pakistan has accepted with respect to its nuclear facilities were fully known to your Congress and the public, there could be no ground to fear that they might, in certain circumstances, be used for non-peaceful purposes. With these apprehensions dispelled, one cannot imagine that the United States would wish Pakistan to reverse its considered decision, shelve its nuclear energy programme and thus not only frustrate the expectations of its people about their development but also inflict lasting damage on their expectation of support from the United States in their legitimate interests.

I have, of course, given serious thought to your view that the establishment of purely national reprocessing facilities should be discouraged and the establishment of regional facilities promoted. Even before I received your letter, I had taken advantage of the recent visit to Pakistan of the Shahanshah of Iran to discuss this matter with him. He was agreeable to joining us in converting the reprocessing plant in Pakistan into a regional project. We both will explore the possibility of inviting one or two other countries in this region to participate in this venture. As I said at the outset, we are thus making a constructive response to your concerns.

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto

His Excellency
Mr. Gerald R. Ford,
President of the United States of America,
WASHINGTON, DC.



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NUMBER
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
4	14	4	15	10	7602211

INITIAL ACTION BY *Oakley*

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES FROM: SECSTATE S/S 7607747 UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT

SCOWCROFT SECDEF LOU NO FORM NODIS

HYLAND DCI X REF C EYES ONLY EXDIS

DAVIS STATE EXSEC S CODEWORD

OTHER TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: *Cell ltr to Kes for PM Bhutto of Pakistan*
re Kes Ind ltr to Ken of Mar 19 1976
re W. Pakistani Nuclear Issues

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
ADV CYS S'CROFT/WGH	ACTION	CONCURRENCE	COORDINATE	INFO		
STAFF SECRETARY						MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT. <u> </u>
CONGRESSIONAL						MEMO FOR PRES <u> </u>
ECONOMIC						REPLY FOR <u> </u>
EUR/CANADA/OCEANS						APPROPRIATE ACTION <u> </u>
FAR EAST/PRC						MEMO <u> </u> TO <u> </u>
INTELLIGENCE						RECOMMENDATIONS <u> </u>
LATIN AMERICA						JOINT MEMO <u> </u>
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA			X			REFER TO <u> </u> FOR: <u> </u>
NSC PLANNING						ANY ACTION NECESSARY? <u>AT THIS TIME</u> <u> </u>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS						CONCURRENCE <u> </u>
SCIENTIFIC	X					DUE DATE: <u>4-21</u>
SUB-SAH/AFRICA/UN						COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)

→ Logged per Oakley's instructions
Backup attached

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO
1-11-77	Elliott	Oakley		For appropriate followup		
1/12			C	Close per Oakley		

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH NOTIFY

SPECIAL DISPOSITION:

SPECIAL INDEXING: 760 1625

MICROFILM & FILE ROOMS

M/F'D BY

CRT ID: IF

OPEN NS DY

CLOSE SA FP

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED