

The original documents are located in Box 1, folder “France - President Giscard d'Estaing (2)” of the National Security Adviser’s Presidential Correspondence with Foreign Leaders Collection at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

- For close out green
to NSC/5

I have checked

[Signature]

as to Oakley &
Oliver

file w/ Ed Rote



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	7507790x	
11	21	11	22	11		

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES _____ FROM: Oakley KISSINGER, H REFERENCE: _____ CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
 KISSINGER _____ COLBY, W _____ S/S _____ UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
 SCOWCROFT X _____ SCHLESINGER, J _____ OTHER _____ LOU NO FORN NODIS
 DAVIS _____ ST EX SEC _____ TS S EYES ONLY EXDIS
 C CODEWORD
 S SENSITIVE


SUBJECT: Direct reply for Pres Ford to Pres Giscard
D'Estang of France - LA

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO.		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR:
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE.
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE:
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
11/21		Scowcroft	X	Decision (11/30)	
11/24	Oakley	Scowcroft			
12/22		NSC's		Scowcroft cleared cable	



NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH _____
 CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: _____
 NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____
 SPECIAL DISPOSITION: _____
 CROSS REF W/ _____
 SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: _____ FOLDER: _____

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:
 M/F'D _____ BY _____

CRT ID: _____	SA	SF
OPEN _____	HP	NS
CLOSE _____	WH	EP
	PA	DY

MEMORANDUM

7790-X

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/GDS

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 
SUBJECT: Cable from President Giscard d'Estaing
of France

President Giscard d'Estaing has sent you the message he received from President Asad of Syria (Tab B), as he promised at Rambouillet he would do.

Asad's cable to Giscard covers two major subjects; the Sinai Accord and the situation in Lebanon. Asad takes his usual negative view of Sinai as dividing the united Arab front, giving too much to Israel, and ignoring the rights of the Palestinians. He notes that Syria believes it necessary "to deal with the two great powers without falling in the political wake of one of them," and says the Sinai Accord will polarize the region. He further notes that the secret clauses relating to the Sinai Accord reinforce Syria's conviction about the danger of the Accord, show that the United States will continue to not recognize the PLO, and reveal that the United States has tied its position on the Geneva Conference to the Israeli position.

On Lebanon, Asad despairs over the fratricidal killing and underscores the importance of the cooperation of all friendly countries, and particularly France, to dissuade Israel from attempting to exploit the present situation in Lebanon.

Asad's views on the Sinai Accord are consistent with Syria's recent demand for use of the United Nations Security Council rather than Geneva as the forum for further peace talks, Syria's strong championing of the Palestinians, the uncertainty which it has shown concerning renewal of the UNDOF mandate, and the first terrorist incidents on the Golan since the May, 1974 Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement. As you know,

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE/GDS

DECLASSIFIED


E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 9/16/03
BY ll, NARA, DATE 3/3/04




Ambassador Murphy will be seeing President Asad soon to reassure him of our determination to maintain the momentum of the peace process, and encourage him to adopt a more helpful attitude.

At Tab A is a suggested reply from you to President Giscard thanking him for his cooperation in providing us with this useful information. The message does not attempt to answer the specific points made by Asad, but instead is a general reaffirmation of our position on an overall peace settlement as well as an expression of the concern (which we share with France) over the tragic, dangerous situation in Lebanon.



1d

A



Blue
VIA GABINET LINE

Sent 12/22

B

12

For: President Giscard d'Estaing

December 22, 1975

Dear Mr. President:

I very much appreciate your sending me the October 30 message you received from President Asad of Syria. It is very useful to me and to Secretary Kissinger to have the benefit of President Asad's thinking as expressed to you.

As you know from our discussions at Rambouillet, I am determined to maintain momentum toward an eventual overall peace settlement in the Middle East, one which will deal with all the issues involved. Secretary Kissinger and I are aware of the importance of the role which Syria as a nation and President Asad as its leader have for the future of the Middle East and the success of efforts to help bring peace to the region.

President Asad's letter to you presents his viewpoint and problems with great clarity. *I* hope that in time we will be able to convince both sides on practical, effective means of moving ahead toward an overall settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The climate of opinion in this country for such a settlement is becoming increasingly more favorable. However, recent actions such as the anti-Zionist resolution at the United Nations General Assembly and the fedayeen attacks on the Golan front are disturbing because they tend to reverse this favorable trend and create greater Israeli resistance

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES *State Review 9/16/03*
BY *Jan*, NARA, DATE *3/3/04*




to any further movement. I am sure you understand the difficulties such developments create, and I trust that President Asad is aware of this important factor.

Secretary Kissinger will be in touch with Minister Sauvagnargues to keep you both abreast of our thinking with respect to the most effective next steps in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

18



B



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017577

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Cable

CREATOR'S NAME Elysee France

RECEIVER'S NAME White House

DESCRIPTION English translation of President
Giscard d'Estaing's letter to President
Ford re Syria

CREATION DATE 11/19/1975

VOLUME 10 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035100022

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN LEADERS

BOX NUMBER 1

FOLDER TITLE France - President Giscard d'Estaing
(2)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/12/2004

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG

14.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 24, 1975

Bob Oakley

Brent reviewed the attached and believed that the incoming ought to go to the President. Over the weekend, to avoid bothering you, Art House roughed out a draft for your consideration (memo to the President). Could you take a look at it and make any changes you see fit and send it back? Brent also said that it would be OK to coordinate the package on a close hold basis with Roy. Perhaps you've already done this.

Many thanks

Bud



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE (GDS)

ACTION
November 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *ROO*
SUBJECT: Draft Reply from President Ford to President Giscard

Attached at Tab A is a draft reply from President Ford to President Giscard of France, thanking him for sending the letter from Syrian President Asad which the two men discussed at Rambouillet (Tab B). I have not tried to answer Asad's many points, but did inject a few of our basic themes for the benefit of the French and made it clear that we are interested in working with Asad if at all possible. This is because it is likely something will filter back from Giscard to Asad concerning his communications with President Ford. I checked the general line of the proposed reply with Roy Atherton, on a personal basis.

Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified
on December 31, 1983

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, *State review 9/16/03*
BY *lqa*, NARA, DATE *3/3/04*



MEMORANDUM

*HAIC
has Tab I*

7790X
Re-do

1g 711

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Retyped Subs I & A

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE (GDS)

ACTION
November 24, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *ROO*

SUBJECT: Draft Reply from President Ford to President Giscard

*Retyped
Tab I & A
11-29*

Attached at Tab I is a draft memo from you to President Ford, attaching a draft reply from him to President Giscard of France, thanking Giscard for sending the letter from Syrian President Asad which the two men discussed at Rambouillet (Tab B). I have not tried to answer Asad's many points, but did inject a few of our basic themes for the benefit of the French and made it clear that we are interested in working with Asad if at all possible. This is because it is likely something will filter back from Giscard to Asad concerning his communications with President Ford. I have coordinated this with Roy Atherton, on a personal basis.

*Base
H.A.H. not
pass to it.*

Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified
on December 31, 1983

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, *state review 9/16/03*
BY *ldo*, NARA, DATE *3/3/04*



142

Tab

I



12

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE/GDS

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Cable from President Giscard d'Estaing of France

President Giscard d'Estaing has sent you ^{the} a cable (Tab B) which includes a message to him from President Asad of Syria, ~~President Giscard promised to send this to you at Rambouillet.~~ (Tab B) as he

President Asad's cable to Giscard ^{covers} ~~concerns~~ two major subjects; the Middle East and the Sinai Accord, and the situation in Lebanon. Asad takes his usual negative view of Sinai as dividing the united Arab front, giving too much to Israel, and ignoring the rights of the Palestinians. He notes that Syria believes it necessary "to deal with the two great powers without falling in the political wake of one of them," and says the Sinai Accord will polarize the region. He further notes that the secret clauses relating to the Sinai Accord reinforce Syria's conviction ~~as to admit~~ the danger of the Accord, show that the United States will continue to not recognize the PLO, and reveal that the United States has tied its position ^{concerning} the Geneva Conference to the Israeli position.

On Lebanon, Asad despairs over the fratricidal killing and underscores the importance of the cooperation of all friendly countries and particularly France to dissuade Israel from attempting to exploit the present situation in Lebanon.

Asad's views on the Sinai Accord are consistent with Syria's recent demand for use of the United Nations Security Council rather than Geneva as the forum for further peace talks, Syria's strong championing of the Palestinians, the uncertainty which it has shown concerning renewal of the UNDOF mandate, and the first terrorist incidents on the Golan since the May, 1974 Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement. ~~Following his~~

SECRET/SENSITIVE/GDS



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES State Review 9/16/03
 BY DA, NARA, DATE 3/2/04

As you know,
~~meeting with you and consultations with Secretary Kissinger,~~ Ambassador
Murphy will be seeing President Asad soon to reassure him of our *determination* sincerity
~~in wanting~~ to maintain the momentum of the peace process, and *encourage* urge him
to adopt a more *helpful* realistic attitude.

The message
At Tab A is a suggested reply from you to President Giscard thanking
him for his cooperation in providing us with this useful information. ~~We~~
did ~~have~~ not attempted to answer the specific points made by Asad, but *instead* ~~we~~
~~have included~~ a general reaffirmation of our position on an overall
peace settlement as well as an expression of the concern (which we share
with France) over the tragic, dangerous situation in Lebanon.



REWRITE

7990 X 1m
redo

SECRET/SENSITIVE/GDS

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: Cable from President Giscard d'Estaing
of France

President Giscard d'Estaing has sent you the message to him from President Asad of Syria, (Tab B) as he promised at Rambouillet he would do.

Asad's cable to Giscard covers two major subjects; the Sinai Accord and the situation in Lebanon. Asad takes his usual negative view of Sinai as dividing the united Arab front, giving too much to Israel, and ignoring the rights of the Palestinians. He notes that Syria believes it necessary "to deal with the two great powers without falling in the political wake of one of them," and says the Sinai Accord will polarize the region. He further notes that the secret clauses relating to the Sinai Accord reinforce Syria's conviction about the danger of the Accord, show that the United States will continue to not recognize the PLO, and reveal that the United States has tied its position on the Geneva Conference to the Israeli position.

On Lebanon, Asad despairs over the fratricidal killing and underscores the importance of the cooperation of all friendly countries and particularly France to dissuade Israel from attempting to exploit the present situation in Lebanon.

Asad's views on the Sinai Accord are consistent with Syria's recent demand for use of the United Nations Security Council rather than Geneva as the forum for further peace talks, Syria's strong championing of the Palestinians, the uncertainty which it has shown concerning renewal of the UNDOF mandate, and the first terrorist incidents on the Golan since the May, 1974 Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement. As you know,

SECRET/SENSITIVE/GDS

REWRITE by kln/11/27/75

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state review 9/16/03
BY WJ, NARA, DATE 3/3/07



Ambassador Murphy will be seeing President Asad soon to reassure him of our determination to maintain the momentum of the peace process, and encourage him to adopt a more helpful attitude.

At Tab A is a suggested reply from you to President Giscard thanking him for his cooperation in providing us with this useful information. The message does not attempt to answer the specific points made by Asad, but instead is a general reaffirmation of our position on an overall peace settlement as well as an expression of the concern (which we share with France) over the tragic, dangerous situation in Lebanon.



order to realize a just peace, on the basis of complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, and of the reestablishment of the rights of the people of Palestine.

We have realized, obviously, after the adoption of Resolution 338 of the Security Council following the October war, that action aiming towards the establishment of a just and durable peace in the region will go hand in hand with a thorough program based on the resolutions of the United Nations. We have thought that nothing justifies the policy of partial steps, especially since Resolution 338, confirmed by all the parties concerned, stipulates in its articles 2 and 3 the immediate beginning of a complete action for the establishment of the (garbled phrase - looks like "durable peace"). Consequently, we have not found any justification for dividing this resolution.

And when some have proclaimed the necessity of the separation of engaged forces on the lines of ceasefire with the aim of lessening tension and creating a better climate for the work of (garbled, possibly "peace"), we accepted the disengagement of forces, out of a sincere desire for peace, on the basis that the disengagement would be followed by a serious political action in order to attain an overall solution of all the aspects of the conflict.

But we have been disappointed to see the efforts converging toward the policy of small steps. Afterwards, it was said that it was necessary to have a second disengagement of forces even though the second



DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/68, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

State Review 9/16/03

BY WJ, NARA, DATE 3/3/04

- 2 -

7790X Re-do

Rewrite

order to realize a just peace, on the basis of complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, and of the reestablishment of the rights of the people of Palestine.

We have realized, obviously, after the adoption of Resolution 338 of the Security Council following the October war, that action aiming towards the establishment of a just and durable peace in the region will go hand in hand with a thorough program based on the resolutions of the United Nations. We have thought that nothing justifies the policy of partial steps, especially since Resolution 338, confirmed by all the parties concerned, stipulates in its articles 2 and 3 the immediate beginning of a complete action for the establishment of a durable peace. Consequently, we have not found any justification for dividing this resolution.

And when some have proclaimed the necessity of the separation of engaged forces on the lines of ceasefire with the aim of lessening tension and creating a better climate for the work of peace, we accepted the disengagement of forces, out of a sincere desire for peace, on the basis that the disengagement would be followed by a serious political action in order to attain an overall solution of all the aspects of the conflict.

But we have been disappointed to see the efforts converging toward the policy of small steps. Afterwards, it was said that it was necessary to have a second disengagement of forces even though the second





Dear Mr. President:

I very much appreciate your
Thank you for *to you from* sending me the message President Asad of Syria.

October 30
sent you last ~~October 30~~. It is very useful to me and to Secretary Kissinger, as have been ~~the~~ *our* exchanges *with* you and Minister Sauvagnargues on the Middle East.

As you know from our discussions at Rambouillet, I am determined to maintain ~~the~~ momentum toward an eventual overall peace settlement in the Middle East, one which will deal with all the issues involved.

Secretary Kissinger and I are aware of the importance of the role *which* Syria, *as* a nation, *and* President Asad, *as* a leader, have for the future of the Middle East and the success of efforts to help bring peace to the region.

it might be possible
I had hoped *we were not able to schedule such a meeting* to arrange a meeting somewhere in Europe with President Asad in connection with my trip to France. It was not, however, convenient for him at that time. In order to consider how to strengthen the dialogue

which Secretary Kissinger established in his meetings with President Asad,

and have done
for consultations on everything else
we have asked our Ambassador to Syria to return to Washington. He has

Following
had discussions with me and with Secretary Kissinger, *the Ambassador* as part of our

effort to move the peace process forward. He returned to Damascus

this past weekend and hopes to see President Asad this week.

presents his
After reading President Asad's letter to you ~~and after talking with~~

our Ambassador and Secretary Kissinger, President Asad's viewpoint

with great clarity
and problems *reach agreement* are more clear. I hope that we will be able to agree with

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *ab*, NARA, DATE *3/3/04*

State Dev. as 9/16/03 under present circumstances

believe with President Assad

him on practical, effective means of moving ahead toward an overall settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The climate of opinion in this country for such a settlement is becoming

increasingly ~~more~~ favorable. However, ~~recent~~ ^{recent} actions such as the anti-Zionist resolution at the United Nations General Assembly and the ~~recent~~ ^{attacks} fedayeen actions on the Golan front are disturbing because they tend to reverse this favorable trend and create greater Israeli resistance to any further movement. I am sure you understand ~~this~~ ^{this}, and I ~~hope~~ ^{trust} that President Asad ~~is~~ ^{is aware of this important factor.}

Secretary Kissinger will be in touch with Minister Sauvagnargues as soon as we have ~~reached conclusions on what can most effectively~~ ^{arrived at a judgement on the} ~~be done~~ ^{steps in} ~~vis-a-vis~~ the Middle East. *next*

Sincerely,

GRF

the differentis such developments create



18
Dear Mr. President:

I very much appreciate receiving the copy of the message that President Asad of Syria sent you last October 30. It is very useful to Secretary Kissinger and myself, just as have been the exchanges we have had with you and Minister Sauvagnargues on the Middle East.

As you know from our discussions at Rambouillet, I am determined to maintain the momentum of movement toward an eventual overall peace settlement in the Middle East, one which will deal with all the issues involved. Secretary Kissinger and I are fully aware of the vital importance of the roles of Syria, as a nation, and President Asad, as a leader, for the future of the Middle East and the success of efforts to help bring peace to that area.

I had hoped to arrange a meeting somewhere in Europe with President Asad in connection with my trip to France. However, for understandable reasons, it was not convenient for him at this time. In order to maintain the dialogue which Secretary Kissinger has established in his meetings with President Asad, we asked our Ambassador to Syria to return to Washington. He has had discussions with Secretary Kissinger as well as meeting with me, as part of our extensive review of how best to move the peace process forward. He returned to Damascus November 23 and has asked to see President Asad soon.

After reading President Asad's letter to you and talking with our Ambassador and Secretary Kissinger, I believe I have an understanding

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5


NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, state review 9/16/03
BY lan, NARA, DATE 3/3/04



PAGE 2

of his viewpoint and problems. We have a high regard for President Asad and take his concerns seriously. In our dialogue with him we shall explain our conviction, with which you are familiar from Secretary Kissinger's talks with Minister Sauvagnargues, that the recent Sinai Accord was the only realistically achievable means of making early progress. We shall also explain that we recognize the need for early movement on the other aspects of the Middle East problem, including those of particular interest to Syria, and why we believe that transferring the negotiating process to the Security Council will not advance matters. At the same time, we will seek to reach agreement with him on practical, effective means of moving ahead toward an overall settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The climate of opinion in this country for such a settlement is becoming more favorable. However, actions such as the anti-Zionist resolution at the United Nations General Assembly and the recent fedayeen actions on the Golan front are disturbing because they tend to reverse this favorable trend, as well as creating greater resistance on the part of Israel to any further movement. I am sure you understand this, and I hope that President Asad does.

On the subject of Lebanon, we have discussed with President Asad, as Secretary Kissinger has with Minister Sauvagnargues, our concern over the situation and our desire to see that tragic country's independence, territorial integrity, national unity and cohesion maintained. The Syrian



PAGE 3

role has, on balance, been positive and is obviously crucial to the resolution of the Lebanese problem. Our Ambassador has been instructed to raise this matter again upon his return, indicating our continued desire to cooperate with Syria in working for a peaceful political solution. In this connection, I am very appreciative of the initiative which you have taken in sending Couve de Murville to Lebanon. If there is anything we can do to assist his mission, I am sure you will let us know. This is a problem on which our governments should maintain close contact.

Secretary Kissinger will be in touch with Minister Sauvagnargues as soon as we have come to some clearer conclusions on what can most effectively be done next vis-a-vis the Middle East.

Sincerely,

GRF



REWRITE

7790 X
re-dw in

Dear Mr. President:

I very much appreciate your sending me the October 30 message to you from President Asad of Syria. It is very useful to me and to Secretary Kissinger, as have been our exchanges with you and Minister Sauvagnargues on the Middle East.

As you know from our discussions at Rambouillet, I am determined to maintain momentum toward an eventual overall peace settlement in the Middle East, one which will deal with all the issues involved. Secretary Kissinger and I are aware of the importance of the role which Syria as a nation and President Asad as its leader, have for the future of the Middle East and the success of efforts to help bring peace to the region.

President Asad's letter to you presents his viewpoint and problems with great clarity. I hope that we will be able to reach agreement with him on practical, effective means of moving ahead toward an overall settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The climate of opinion in this country for such a settlement is becoming increasingly more favorable. However, recent actions such as the anti-Zionist resolution at the United Nations General Assembly and the fedayeen attacks on the Golan front are disturbing because they tend to reverse this favorable trend and create greater Israeli resistance

REWRITE by kln/11/27/75

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/75, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, *State Review 9/16/03*
BY *[initials]*, NARA, DATE *3/2/04*



to any further movement. I am sure you understand the difficulties such developments create, and I trust that President Asad is aware of this important factor.

Secretary Kissinger will be in touch with Minister Sauvagnargues as soon as we have arrived at a judgment as to the most effective next steps in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

GRF

REWRITE by kln/jl/27/75



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/GDS~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT
SUBJECT: Cable from President Giscard d'Estaing of France

President Giscard d'Estaing has sent you a cable (Tab B) which includes a message to him from President Asad of Syria. President Giscard promised to send this to you at Rambouillet.

President Asad's cable to Giscard concerns two major subjects; the Middle East and the Sinai Accord, and the situation in Lebanon. Asad takes his usual negative view of Sinai as dividing the united Arab front, giving too much to Israel, and ignoring the rights of the Palestinians. He notes that Syria believes it necessary "to deal with the two great powers without falling in the political wake of one of them," and says the Sinai Accord will polarize the region. He further notes that the secret clauses relating to the Sinai Accord reinforce Syria's conviction as to the danger of the Accord, show that the United States will continue to not recognize the PLO, and reveal that the United States has tied its position concerning the Geneva Conference to the Israeli position.

On Lebanon, Asad despairs over the fratricidal killing and underscores the importance of the cooperation of all friendly countries and particularly France to dissuade Israel from attempting to exploit the present situation in Lebanon.

Asad's views on the Sinai Accord are consistent with Syria's recent demand for use of the United Nations Security Council rather than Geneva as the forum for further peace talks, Syria's strong championing of the Palestinians, the uncertainty which it has shown concerning renewal of the UNDOF mandate, and the first terrorist incidents on the Golan since the May, 1974 Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement. Following his

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/GDS~~

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 9/16/03
BY John, NARA, DATE 3/3/04



meeting with you and consultations with Secretary Kissinger, Ambassador Murphy will be seeing President Asad soon to reassure him of our sincerity in wanting to maintain the momentum of the peace process, and urge him to adopt a more realistic attitude.

At Tab A is a suggested reply from you to President Giscard thanking him for his cooperation in providing us with this useful information. We have not attempted to answer the specific points made by Asad, but have included a general reaffirmation of our position on an overall peace settlement as well as an expression of the concern (which we share with France) over the tragic, dangerous situation in Lebanon.

BS:RCMcF:feg:11/25/75



Dear Mr. President:

Thank you for sending me the message President Asad of Syria sent you last October 30. It is very useful to me and to Secretary Kissinger as have been the exchanges you and Minister Sauvagnargues on the Middle East.

As you know from our discussions at Rambouillet, I am determined to maintain the momentum toward an eventual overall peace settlement in the Middle East, one which will deal with all the issues involved. Secretary Kissinger and I are aware of the importance of the roles Syria, as a nation, and President Asad, as a leader, have for the future of the Middle East and the success of efforts to help bring peace to the region.


I had hoped to arrange a meeting somewhere in Europe with President Asad in connection with my trip to France. It was not, however, convenient for him at that time. In order to consider how to strengthen the dialogue which Secretary Kissinger established in his meetings with President Asad, we have asked our Ambassador to Syria to return to Washington. He has had discussions with me and with Secretary Kissinger as part of our effort to move the peace process forward. He returned to Damascus this past weekend and hopes to see President Asad this week.

After reading President Asad's letter to you and after talking with our Ambassador and Secretary Kissinger, President Asad's viewpoint and problems are more clear. I hope that we will be able to agree with

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/20/68, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Dept. 9/16/03
BY ML, NARA, DATE 3/3/04



him on practical, effective means of moving ahead toward an overall settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The climate of opinion in this country for such a settlement is becoming more favorable. However, actions such as the anti-Zionist resolution at the United Nations General Assembly and the recent fedayeen actions on the Golan front are disturbing because they tend to reverse this favorable trend and create greater Israeli resistance to any further movement. I am sure you understand this, and I hope that President Asad does.

Secretary Kissinger will be in touch with Minister Sauvagnargues as soon as we have reached conclusions on what can most effectively be done next vis-a-vis the Middle East.

Sincerely,

GRF



MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Cable from President
Giscard d'Estaing of France

President Giscard d'Estaing has sent you a cable (Tab B) which includes a message to him from President Asad of Syria. President Giscard promised to send this to you at Rambouillet.

President Asad's cable to Giscard concerns two major subjects; the Middle East and the Sinai Accord, and the situation in Lebanon. Asad takes his usual negative view of Sinai as dividing the united Arab front, giving too much to Israel, and ignoring the rights of the Palestinians. He notes that Syria believes it necessary "to deal with the two great powers without falling in the political wake of one of them," and says the Sinai Accord will polarize the region. He further notes that the secret clauses relating to the Sinai Accord reinforce Syria's conviction as to the danger of the Accord, show that the United States will continue to not recognize the PLO, and reveal that the United States has tied its position concerning the Geneva Conference to the Israeli position.

On Lebanon, Asad despairs over the fratricidal killing and underscores the importance of the cooperation of all friendly countries and particularly France to dissuade Israel from attempting to exploit the present situation in Lebanon.



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/18/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY 164, NARA, DATE 3/3/03 *State Review 9/16/03*

PAGE 2

Asad's views on the Sinai Accord are consistent with Syria's recent demand for use of the United Nations Security Council rather than Geneva as the forum for further peace talks, Syria's strong championing of the Palestinians, the uncertainty which it has shown concerning renewal of the UNDOF mandate, and the first terrorist incidents on the Golan since the May, 1974 Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement. Following his meeting with you and consultations with Secretary Kissinger, Ambassador Murphy will be seeing President Asad soon to reassure him of our sincerity in wanting to maintain the momentum of the peace process, and urge him to adopt a more realistic attitude.

At Tab A is a suggested reply from you to President Giscard thanking him for his cooperation in providing us with this useful information. We have not attempted to answer the specific points made by Asad, but have included a general reaffirmation of our position on an overall peace settlement as well as an expression of the concern (which we share with France) over the tragic, dangerous situation in Lebanon.




7790

11/24/75^{IV}

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Bud -

Ant Housie cover memo was fine, with a couple of minor changes. Rey wanted to add a general defense of the Sinai Accord to the draft message, which also reflects the concern we share with the French over Lebanon. Bob



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE (GDS)

ACTION
November 24, 1975


MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY
SUBJECT: Draft Reply from President Ford to President Giscard

Attached at Tab I is a draft memo from you to President Ford, attaching a draft reply from him to President Giscard of France, thanking Giscard for sending the letter from Syrian President Asad which the two men discussed at Rambouillet (Tab B). I have not tried to answer Asad's many points, but did inject a few of our basic themes for the benefit of the French and made it clear that we are interested in working with Asad if at all possible. This is because it is likely something will filter back from Giscard to Asad concerning his communications with President Ford. I have coordinated this with Roy Atherton, on a personal basis.

Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652
Automatically Downgraded at Two
Year Intervals and Declassified
on December 31, 1983

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE (GDS)

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/75, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 9/16/03
BY lka, NARA, DATE 3/3/04



MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT:

• Cable from President
Giscard d'Estaing of France

President Giscard d'Estaing has sent you a cable (Tab B) which includes a message to him from President Asad of Syria. President Giscard promised to send this to you at Rambouillet.

President Asad's cable to Giscard concerns two major subjects: the Middle East and the Sinai Accord, and the situation in Lebanon. Asad takes his usual negative view of Sinai as dividing the united Arab front, giving too much to Israel, and ignoring the rights of the Palestinians. He notes that Syria believes it necessary "to deal with the two great powers without falling in the political wake of one of them," and says the Sinai Accord will polarize the region. He further notes that the secret clauses relating to the Sinai Accord reinforce Syria's conviction as to the danger of the Accord, show that the United States will continue to not recognize the PLO, and reveal that the United States has tied its position concerning the Geneva Conference to the Israeli position.

On Lebanon, Asad despairs over the fratricidal killing and underscores the importance of the cooperation of all friendly countries and particularly France to dissuade Israel from attempting to exploit the present situation in Lebanon.

State review 9/16/03

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, BY , NARA, DATE 3/27/04



PAGE 2

Asad's views on the Sinai Accord are consistent with Syria's recent demand for use of the United Nations Security Council rather than Geneva as the forum for further peace talks, Syria's strong championing of the Palestinians, the uncertainty which it has shown concerning renewal of the UNDOF mandate, and the first terrorist incidents on the Golan since the May, 1974 Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement. Following his meeting with you and consultations with Secretary Kissinger, Ambassador Murphy will be seeing President Asad soon to reassure him of our sincerity in wanting to maintain the momentum of the peace process, and urge him to adopt a more realistic attitude.

At Tab A is a suggested reply from you to President Giscard thanking him for his cooperation in providing us with this useful information. We have not attempted to answer the specific points made by Asad, but have included a general reaffirmation of our position on an overall peace settlement as well as an expression of the concern (which we share with France) over the tragic, dangerous situation in Lebanon.



14

Dear Mr. President:

I very much appreciate receiving the copy of the message that President Asad of Syria sent you last October 30. It is very useful to Secretary Kissinger and myself, just as have been the exchanges we have had with you and Minister Sauvagnargues on the Middle East.

As you know from our discussions at Rambouillet, I am determined to maintain the momentum of movement toward an eventual overall peace settlement in the Middle East, one which will deal with all the issues involved. Secretary Kissinger and I are fully aware of the vital importance of the roles of Syria, as a nation, and President Asad, as a leader, for the future of the Middle East and the success of efforts to help bring peace to that area.

I had hoped to arrange a meeting somewhere in Europe with President Asad in connection with my trip to France. However, for understandable reasons, it was not convenient for him at this time. In order to maintain the dialogue which Secretary Kissinger has established in his meetings with President Asad, we asked our Ambassador to Syria to return to Washington. He has had discussions with Secretary Kissinger as well as meeting with me, as part of our extensive review of how best to move the peace process forward. He returned to Damascus November 23 and has asked to see President Asad soon.

After reading President Asad's letter to you and talking with our Ambassador and Secretary Kissinger, I believe I have an understanding

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/66, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY , NARA, DATE 3/3/04 *State review 9/10/03*

of his viewpoint and problems. We have a high regard for President Asad and take his concerns seriously. In our dialogue with him we shall explain our conviction, with which you are familiar from Secretary Kissinger's talks with Minister Sauvagnargues, that the recent Sinai Accord was the only realistically achievable means of making early progress. We shall also explain that we recognize the need for early movement on the other aspects of the Middle East problem, including those of particular interest to Syria, and why we believe that transferring the negotiating process to the Security Council will not advance matters. At the same time, we will seek to reach agreement with him on practical, effective means of moving ahead toward an overall settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The climate of opinion in this country for such a settlement is becoming more favorable. However, actions such as the anti-Zionist resolution at the United Nations General Assembly and the recent fedayeen actions on the Golan front are disturbing because they tend to reverse this favorable trend, as well as creating greater resistance on the part of Israel to any further movement. I am sure you understand this, and I hope that President Asad does.

On the subject of Lebanon, we have discussed with President Asad, as Secretary Kissinger has with Minister Sauvagnargues, our concern over the situation and our desire to see that tragic country's independence, territorial integrity, national unity and cohesion maintained. The Syrian



PAGE 3

role has, on balance, been positive and is obviously crucial to the resolution of the Lebanese problem. Our Ambassador has been instructed to raise this matter again upon his return, indicating our continued desire to cooperate with Syria in working for a peaceful political solution. In this connection, I am very appreciative of the initiative which you have taken in sending Couve de Murville to Lebanon. If there is anything we can do to assist his mission, I am sure you will let us know. This is a problem on which our governments should maintain close contact.

Secretary Kissinger will be in touch with Minister Sauvagnargues as soon as we have come to some clearer conclusions on what can most effectively be done next vis-a-vis the Middle East.

Sincerely,

GRF



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017578

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Cable

CREATOR'S NAME Elysee France

RECEIVER'S NAME White House

DESCRIPTION English translation of French President
Giscard d'Estaing's letter to President
Ford re Syria (duplicate)

CREATION DATE 11/19/1975

VOLUME 10 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 035100022

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
CORRESPONDENCE WITH FOREIGN LEADERS

BOX NUMBER 1

FOLDER TITLE France - President Giscard d'Estaing
(2)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/12/2004

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG