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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 039172

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum  
CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Robert B. Oakley  
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Brent Scowcroft  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Masirah Island  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 04/21/1976  
VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034300226  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC MIDDLE  
EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN STAFF: FILES  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 19  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Oman (2)  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 04/11/2013  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

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*Owner*

*1<sup>c</sup>*

PRIORITY /ROUTINE

LDN574

DE RUOTC #4978 0911422

P R 311420Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0331

INFO AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0125

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 04978

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, MPOL, MU, UK, US

SUBJECT: UK INTENT DEPART MASIRAH ISLAND

REF: STATE 67173

1. FCO HEAD OF MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT LUCAS TOLD EMROFF MARCH 30 THAT BRITISH HAD GIVEN US ADVANCE NOTICE OF THEIR IMPENDING ABANDONMENT OF RAF BASE AT MASIRAH IN OMAN SO THAT USG COULD DISCUSS ANY "MODALITIES" BEFORE BRITISH INFORM SULTAN. BRITISH WOULD NOW LIKE TO INFORM SULTAN BY MID-APRIL, AND WOULD THEREFORE APPRECIATE ANY USG REACTION BEFORE THEN.

2. LUCAS SAID BRITISH WITHDRAWAL FROM MASIRAH MAY NOW BE LINKED TO BRITISH TURNOVER OF SALALAH AIR BASE CONTROL. BRITISH HAD ORIGINALLY INFORMED SULTAN THEY PROPOSED TO TURN OVER SALALAH IN OCTOBER 1976. HOWEVER, SULTAN HAS BEEN HAVING SOME SECOND THOUGHTS ABOUT THIS AND MAY ASK BRITISH TO CONTINUE TO OPERATE SALALAH THROUGH MARCH 1977. IF SULTAN SO PROPOSES, BRITISH MAY REPLY TO HIM THAT BRITISH MAY OBTAIN ADDITIONAL FUNDS NEEDED TO EXTEND SALALAH OPERATION BY TIMELY CLOSING OF MASIRAH.

ARMSTRONG

BT

DECLASSIFIED *State Website*

E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 4/11/13





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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 039173

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram  
CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Secstate WashDC  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Masirah Island  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 04/08/1976  
VOLUME . . . . . 4 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034300226  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC MIDDLE  
EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN STAFF: FILES  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 19  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Oman (2)  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 04/11/2013  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

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ROUTINE  
LDN287  
DE RUOTC #5586 1001724  
R 091722Z APR 76  
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0664

INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2347  
AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0127  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 2500

~~SECRET~~ LONDON 05586

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGOS-1

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, MPOL, UK, UX

SUBJECT: US/UK DISCUSSIONS OF MASIRAH ISLAND

REF: STATE 84477

1. EMBOFF SAW ECD ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY WEIR AFTER-  
NOON APRIL 9 TO MAKE SURE HE HAD FULL VERSION OF /US/UK  
DISCUSSION OF APRIL 7 ON MASIRAH. EMBOFF SOUGHT UNSUC-  
CESSFULLY TO PRY OUT OF WEIR EXACTLY HOW MUCH LONGER  
BRITISH COULD GIVE USS BEFORE INFORMING SULTAN OF DECISION  
TO WITHDRAW RAF. /USS REQUEST TO DEFER DATE OF INFORMING  
SULTAN WOULD HAVE TO BE RUN THROUGH NEW FOREIGN SECRETARY  
CROSLAND TO CABINET LEVEL.

2. WEIR STRESSED THAT DECISION TO WITHDRAW WAS DICTATED  
NOT MERELY BY FINANCIAL STRINGENCY. WITH THIS DIS-  
MANTLING OF ITS CHAIN OF BASES TO SINGAPORE, RAF DOES NOT  
WISH TO KEEP ITS PERSONNEL IN AN EXCESSIVE HARDSHIP POST  
SUCH AS MASIRAH FOR NO APPARENT USEFUL PURPOSE.

3. HMG ALSO HAS A LEGAL PROBLEM ON ITS HANDS SINCE IT HA  
A 99-YEAR LEASE ON THE BASE AREA AND HAS NO ADEQUATE PRO-  
VISION IN THE LEASE FOR UNILATERAL ABROGATION. BRITISH  
AFRAID THAT WHEN THEY DO ABROGATE, THE SULTAN MAY DEMAND  
COMPENSATION. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, BRITISH WISH TO  
GIVE THE SULTAN AS MUCH ADVANCE NOTICE OF WITHDRAWAL AS  
POSSIBLE. HENCE, HMG WOULD STILL LIKE TO ADHERE TO MID-  
APRIL TIMING OF NOTIFICATION.

4. IN ANY CASE, WEIR SAID, BRITISH ARE INCLINED TO BE-

DECLASSIFIED *State Website*

E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By *HR* NARA, Date *4/11/13*

PSN:056310

RECALLED

PAGE 01

TOR:101/09:22Z

DTG:091722Z APR





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LIEVE THAT, FOLLOWING THE PATTERN OF BRITISH WITHDRAWAL  
FROM BAHRAIN BASE, US SHOULD NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITH  
SULTAN OVER ANY FUTURE US USE OF MASIRAH.

5. WEIR SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THAT BBC FACILITIES AS  
DISTINCT FROM RAF FACILITIES WOULD REMAIN IN MASIRAH, AND  
THAT OMANI GOVERNMENT HAS SOME PLANS TO USE AIRFIELD  
AS A FLYING SCHOOL.

ARMSTRONG

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PSN:056310 RECALLED PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:101/09:22Z DTG:091722Z APR 76

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X NSSM 238

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PRIORITY /ROUTINE  
ESA417QMB025  
DE RUQMMT #0515 1190740  
P R 280555Z APR 76  
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2068

INFO AMEMBASSY JIDDA 227  
AMEMBASSY LONDON 232  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 225

~~SECRET~~ MUSCAT 0515

EXDIS  
E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR, MARR, MU, UK, US  
SUBJECT: MASIRAH ISLAND

ACTION \_\_\_\_\_  
EVAL \_\_\_\_\_  
FE \_\_\_\_\_  
LI \_\_\_\_\_  
MAY \_\_\_\_\_  
PRO \_\_\_\_\_  
SIA \_\_\_\_\_  
NO \_\_\_\_\_  
POM \_\_\_\_\_  
SOM \_\_\_\_\_  
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SOF \_\_\_\_\_  
CON \_\_\_\_\_

1. FOREIGN MINISTER ZAWAWI ON APRIL 27 ASKED IF I WOULD FIND OUT WHAT IS THE PRESENT USG POSITION ON USE OF MASIRAH ISLAND, WHICH SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD BROUGHT UP WITH SULTAN QABOOS IN JANUARY 1975. ZAWAWI SAID HE IS ASKED NOW AND THEN BY NEWSMEN WHATEVER HAPPENDED TO THE U.S. REQUEST, AND IT WOULD BE HELPFUL TO LEARN WASHINGTON'S POSITION ON IT NOW. I UNDERTOOK TO GET SOMETHING FOR HIM AS SOON AS POSSIBLE, AND IN ANY CASE BEFORE MID-MAY WHEN I WOULD BE LEAVING FOR WASHINGTON CONSULTATION.

2. COMMENT: IS WORTH NOTING THAT THIS IS THENFIRST TIME I RECALL HAVING BEEN ASKED ABOUT MASIRAH BY ANY OMANI OFFICIAL SINCE MATTER SURFACED IN WASHINGTON OVER 15 MONTHS AGO. CAN ONLY GULSS AT WHAT REALLY PROMPTED ZAWAWI'S SUDDEN INTEREST IN QUESTION, AND MY GUESS WOULD BE THAT OMANIS HAVE SENSED THAT BRITISH SOON WILL BE GIVING THEM NOTICE OF THEIR DEPARTURE FROM MASIRAH AIRBASE AND THESE-FORE ARE STARTING TO THINK ABOUT WHERE THIS LEAVES THEM -- PARTICULARLY ON MAINTENANCE OF BASE FACILITIE' AND LIVELIHOOD OF OMANI ISLANDEERS DEPENDENT ON JOBS WITH RAFM

3. LAST "IF ASKED" GUIDANCE I HAVE ON MASIRAH QUESTION WAS IN 75 STATE 247257 AND OBVIOUSLY IS PARTLY DATED IN VIEW OF VARIOUS US-UK EXCHANGES IN PAST SIX WEEKS OF WHICH DEPARTMENT HAS KEPT ME INFO MED. WOULD WELCOME DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE FOR REPLY TO ZAWAWI'S INQUIRY. (I WOULD PLAN TO RESPOND DIRECTHBD HIM, BUT IN EVENT MY LONG-STANDING REQUEST FOR AUDIENCE WITH SULTAN QABOOS

State Website

HR

4/11/13

PSN:019285

PAGE 01

TOR:120/02:33Z

DTG:280555Z APR 76

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COMES THROUGH SOON, AS I NOW HAVE REASON TO EXPECT, THERE MAY  
BE SOME MERIT IN TALKING ABOUT THIS WITH THE SULTAN.)

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*Oman*

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OP IMMED /ROUTINE  
DE RUEHC #4071 1210210  
D R 300203Z APR 76  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY MUSCAT IMMEDIATE 2533

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON 1940  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 2813  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 1531

*Handwritten initials: TDJ, TW*

~~SECRET~~ STATE 104071

EXDIS  
E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, MU, UK

SUBJECT: MASIRAH ISLAND

REF: MUSCAT 515

1. FYI ONLY: BRITISH DECISION TO TERMINATE THEIR STAGING OPERATION IN MASIRAH HAS RENEWED INTEREST IN WASHINGTON IN REVIEWING AGAIN WHETHER AND HOW WE MIGHT WISH MAKE USE OF AIRFIELD FACILITIES. WE HAVE ASKED AND HMG HAS AGREED TO HOLD OFF NOTIFYING SULTAN QABOOS UNTIL WE DETERMINE WHETHER WE HAVE SUCH INTEREST. WE UNCERTAIN, HOWEVER, JUST HOW LONG HMG WILL DELAY NOTIFYING QABOOS OF ITS DECISION. END FYI.

2. IF YOU BELIEVE IT IS USEFUL, YOU MAY INFORM FORMIN ZAWAWI THAT YOU HAVE REPORTED HIS CONVERSATION INQUIRING ABOUT WASHINGTON'S POSITION ON MASIRAH AND THAT WE ARE AGAIN REVIEWING THE MATTER AND WE WILL KEEP HIM INFORMED.  
SISCO  
BT

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E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By NR NARA, Date 4/11/13



PSN:020553

PAGE 01

OF 01

TDR:121/02:12Z

DTG:300203Z APR 76

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 039174

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇCable  
  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Oman  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 05/01/1976  
VOLUME . . . . . 5 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034300226  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC MIDDLE  
EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN STAFF: FILES  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 19  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Oman (2)  
  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 04/11/2013  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



Department of State

Oman 5  
**TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 6055

PAGE 01 MUSCAT 00537 040503Z

14

ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SSM-03 OMB-01 SAM-01 SAB-01 IO-13

EB-07 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 SCCT-01 /096 W

----- 041861

R 040340Z MAY 76  
FM AMEMBASSY MUSCAT  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2084  
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY SANA  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MUSCAT 0537

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MOPS, MORG, PINS, MU

SUBJECT: OMAN MILITARY COMMANDER DISCUSSES DHOFAR SITUATION AND  
CURRENT SAF MILITARY PLANNING

1. SUMMARY. ASIDE FROM SPORADIC SHELLING OF FORWARD OMANI POSITIONS AROUND SARFAIT IN WESTERN DHOFAR, THE MILITARY SCENE IN THAT PROVINCE HAS BEEN QUIET SINCE DECEMBER. CIVIL ACTION TO REHABILITATE AND BEGIN DEVELOPMENT OF THE JABAL IS STILL BOGGED DOWN, WITH OMAN STILL HOPING FOR FINANCIAL AID FROM THE SAUDIS. THE SULTAN HAS DECIDED TO DIVIDE HIS ARMED FORCES INTO THREE SEPARATE SERVICES IN 1977, AND IS GREATLY INCREASING THE FIRQA (IRREGULAR) COMPONENT OF HIS FORCES. END SUMMARY.

2. DHOFAR MILITARY SITUATION. IN SHORT BRIEFING REQUESTED BY AMBASSADOR, CSAF GENERAL PERKINS SAID MILITARY SCENE IN DHOFAR HAS BEEN ALMOST COMPLETELY CALM SINCE DECEMBER. ONE CAN SAY WITH CONVICTION THE WAR ENDED FOUR OR FIVE MONTHS AGO. DEFECTORS KEEP COMING IN (SAF ANNOUNCEMENT ON APRIL 18 SAID 332 MEMBERS OF PFLO ACCEPTED SULTAN'S AMNESTY OFFER SINCE DECEMBER 10, 1975, AND ALL HAD BEEN PARDONED). PERKINS SAID

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# Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MUSCAT 00537 040503Z

THERE ARE PERHAPS 40-50 REMAINING GUERRILLAS WHO ARE CENTERED IN THE JABAL AROUND MARBAT. MOST OF THEM LOOK FOR LEADERSHIP TO ONE RASHID HAMUD AND SAF HAS REASON TO BELIEVE HE MAY SOON TURN HIMSELF IN. SINCE DECEMBER, MINING AND SNIPING INCIDENTS IN JABAL HAVE BEEN PRACTICALLY NIL BUT PERKINS SUSPECTS THEY MAY INCREASE SOMEWHAT DURING THE MONSOON.

3. MAIN EXCEPTION TO QUIET SITUATION HAS BEEN OCCASIONAL FIRING AT SARFAIT BY ROCKETS AND MORTARS - SOME HAVE COME FROM OMANI SIDE OF BORDER AND SOME FROM PDY. NO ONE HAS BEEN KILLED AND THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE DAMAGE. FIRE HAS NOT BEEN RETURNED. PERKINS' THEORY IS THAT REMAINING PFLO REBELS AND SUPPORTERS HAVE BEEN USING UP THEIR AMMO STOCKS THOUGH HE ALSO SUSPECTS LOCAL PDY COMMANDER AT HAUF MAY BE DELIBERATELY TURNING A BLIND EYE TO SOME CONTINUING ASSISTANCE FROM PDY TYPES.

PERKINS THINKS THIS REBEL FIRING MAY CEASE ALTOGETHER IN MONTH OR SO. ASKED IF SULTAN QABOOS IS EQUALLY RELAXED HE INDICATED THAT SEEMS TO BE THE CASE. HE NOTED THAT ALL RESUPPLY OF SARFAIT AND SURROUNDING POSITIONS IS BY AIR. THOUGH SAF HAD PLANNED TO CONSTRUCT A ROAD THROUGH TO SARFAIT, PROJECT WAS STOPPED JUST OVER HALFWAY FROM MANSTON BECAUSE DIFFICULT TERRAIN WOULD HAVE MADE FINANCIAL COST PROHIBITIVE.

4. DHOFAR CIVIL ACTION. PERKINS SAID THERE HAS BEEN VERY LITTLE PROGRESS ON ECONOMIC FRONT SINCE WAR ENDED, IN FACT REALLY NONE AT ALL. NO ONE HAS COME UP WITH MONEY AND EVEN IF THE SAUDIS DO SO SOON THERE CANNOT BE ANY VISIBLE PROGRESS UNTIL FALL. (FOREIGN MINISTER ZAWAWI TOLD AMBASSADOR LAST WEEK HE NOW EXPECTS A SAUDI COMMITTEE TO ARRIVE IN MID-MAY TO LOOK AT DHOFAR FIRST HAND AND RECOMMEND TO RIYADH WHAT PROJECTS MIGHT USEFULLY BE FUNDED TO PROMOTE ECONOMIC REHAB AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE JABAL. ZAWAWI ADDED THAT SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER HAS ASSURED HIM THIS COMMITTEE WILL BE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO TAKE A POSITIVE LOOK AND BE GENEROUS IN ITS RECOMMENDATIONS.)

5. PERKINS MADE CLEAR HE DOES NOT CONSIDER CIVIL ACTION AS SAF BUSINESS ANY MORE. DURING THE FIGHTING, YES, BUT NOW IT SHOULD BE A CIVILIAN OPERATION EXCEPT FOR SOME ROAD AND TRACK MAINTENANCE. PERKINS SAID HE SEES CIVIL ACTION SHAPING UP IN

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# Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 03 MUSCAT 00537 040503Z

SUCH A WAY THAT WALI BRAIK, GOVERNOR OF DHOFAR, WILL DO THE CONTRACTING FOR ROADS, BUILDINGS AND OTHER FACILITIES AND THEN CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES WILL MOVE IN TO ADMINISTER WHAT IS BUILT.

6. SAF ORGANIZATION AND STRENGTH. PERKINS CONFIRMED THAT THE SULTAN HAS DECIDED TO HAVE THREE SEPARATE ARMED SERVICES WITH A SMALL CENTRAL COORDINATING STAFF. THIS WILL REPLACE PRESENT SAF SETUP, WITH CHANGEOVER TO TAKE EFFECT WHEN PERKINS' TOUR ENDS IN MID-1977. DETAILS NOW BEING WORKED OUT. PERKINS SAID HE IS PLEASE WITH PROGRESS IN OMANIZATION OF ARMED FORCES AND HE PERSONALLY SEES NO REASON WHY THIS CANNOT BE COMPLETELY ACCOMPLISHED BY 1980-1981. SOME EXPATRIATE SPECIALISTS INCLUDING PILOTS WOULD BE NEEDED THEREAFTER, HOWEVER. HE MENTIONED THAT SULTAN INTENDS TO ADD 3,000 NEW MEMBERS TO THE FIRQA (IRREGULAR FORCES IN THE JABAL).

7. NORTHERN OMAN. ASKED IF PFLO HAS SHOWN ANY SIGN OF REACTING TO DHOFAR DEFEAT BY CAUSING PROBLEMS IN THE NORTH, PERKINS REPLIED THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY SIGN OF THIS. BUT A FEW MINOR DIFFICULTIES HAVE CONTINUED IN MUSANDAM, ATTRIBUTABLE TO LONG-STANDING PROBLEMS BETWEEN OMANIS IN THAT REGION AND TRIBES FROM RAS AL-KHAIMAH. RECENT TROUBLE HAS BEEN IN AREA SOUTHWEST OF LIMAH AND SAF RECENTLY REINFORCED ITS SMALL CONTINGENT IN THAT VICINITY.  
WOLLE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 039175

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum  
CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.through Mr.  
Sisco  
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . The Secretary  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Masirah Island  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 05/18/1976  
VOLUME . . . . . 7 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034300226  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC MIDDLE  
EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN STAFF: FILES  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 19  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Oman (2)  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 04/11/2013  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR

COVERING SECRET

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BRITISH EMBASSY,

7603327

WASHINGTON, D.C.

The Honorable  
Henry A Kissinger  
Secretary of State  
State Department  
Washington DC

7 May 1976

*Dear Mr Secretary,*

The Secretary of State for Foreign and  
Commonwealth Affairs, Mr Anthony Crosland, has asked  
me to forward the enclosed message to you.

*Yours sincerely,*

*Thomas Bridges*

*for*

Peter Ramsbotham  
H M Ambassador

COVERING SECRET





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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 039176

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇLetter

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Robert Ellsworth

CREATOR'S TITLE . . . . . Deputy Secretary

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Joseph J. Sisco

RECEIVER'S TITLE . . . . . Undersecretary for Political Affairs

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Masirah Island

CREATION DATE . . . . . 05/18/1976

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 034300226

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC MIDDLE  
EAST AND SOUTH ASIAN STAFF: FILES

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 19

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Oman (2)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 04/11/2013

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



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~~SECRET~~

Masirah Island

Talking Points

(For use if you have decided that we should not oppose British departure from Masirah as presently planned.)

-- We have been urgently considering the Masirah question. Although we have not definitively determined our own interest there for the immediate future, or in the long term, we have decided that there would be no particular advantage to us in seeking to further delay British withdrawal. Accordingly, we now have no problems with your plans to inform the Sultan of your withdrawal by the end of this year, or your proceeding to work out arrangements with him concerning future British involvement in running the airfield under an Omani flag.

-- If we determine that we have some interest in the base, we will proceed to initiate discussions directly with the Omani Government. We will, of course, consult closely with your government at each step along the way.

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*

E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3 12/4/03

State Dept Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 4/11/13

~~SECRET~~



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~~SECRET~~

Masirah Island

Talking Points

(For use if you have decided that we should seek to persuade the British to continue to operate the airfield at Masirah under their existing lease for one more year.)

-- We have been urgently considering the Masirah Island question for some time now. Although we have not yet finally determined our level of interest, our interest is real.

-- We believe it would be most advantageous to discuss with the Omanis our interests in a coordinated fashion with you, and in the context of your own withdrawal. We also suspect that your negotiations with the Omanis would be facilitated if carried on in the context of some US replacement for your role there.

-- We will be in a position to begin to work out a coordinated negotiating approach to the Omani Government within a few weeks.

-- If you are agreeable, I believe that an arrangement agreeable to your Government, my Government, and the Omani Government could be worked out allowing for substantial British withdrawal from Masirah during 1977.

*State Review*  
33124/03  
~~SECRET~~

*HR*  
4/11/13

~~SECRET~~

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### Talking Points

(For use if you have decided that we should seek as our objective an indefinite continued British presence on Masirah.)

-- We have been urgently studying the Masirah question for some time. In the context of our mutual interests in the Persian Gulf and in the strategically important northwest quadrant of the Indian Ocean, we believe it is vitally important that the RAF base on Masirah be maintained indefinitely. We have come to this conclusion realizing full well that it runs contrary to the thrust of your 1974 defense review.

-- We fully realize the burden which this request places on your Government. We understand and appreciate your desire to terminate your political commitment in Oman at this propitious time, in the wake of your successful conclusion of the Dhofar War. We realize the political liabilities to any British Government of a continued military establishment east of Suez. We understand the financial burden. We understand the morale problem of the RAF in maintaining a detachment of several hundred British airmen on an island as desolate as Masirah.

-- Nevertheless, you will understand that it would be a far more difficult, perhaps impossible, task to--in effect--establish a new US military facility in the Indian Ocean area, given the present mood of the American body politic and the attitudes of the Congress as reflected in our struggle to maintain the facility at Diego Garcia.

-- You are aware of the growing Soviet involvement in the Indian Ocean. You are aware of the rather formidable successes of Soviet global strategy recently in Southern Africa. We share the view that the Indian Ocean ought to be a zone of peace; that we and the Soviets should work out suitable agreements on arms restraint in the area. But, we both realize that the only way to deal with the Soviets on arms restraint--in the Indian Ocean, or anywhere else--is from a position of strength. Unilateral withdrawal of the RAF from Masirah would result in a serious degradation of our military capabilities in the northwest quadrant. We have therefore concluded that it is vitally important in our mutual interest to maintain the RAF base on Masirah.

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*

EO 12958/24/03

~~SECRET~~

1872 4/11/13

~~SECRET~~

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7609327

Dear Henry

When we met on 24 April you raised the subject of Masirah, and I agreed to have the question looked at again urgently, although I told you that any deferment of the schedule presented us with considerable difficulties.

I have looked into this. Your request does cause me considerable difficulties, since our plans to leave Masirah have reached an advanced stage and I am under pressure from the Sultan to discuss his plans for an SOAF flying school at Masirah. My officials have been discussing this question with yours for some time now, but we have not yet been given an indication of any proposals you may have for involvement in the area.

Having said this, I understand the extent of your involvement with other important issues at the present time, and particularly in Africa, which is very important to both our interests at the moment. I have therefore decided to refrain from immediate action on this subject until we have a chance to discuss the matter further at the NATO meeting in May. I am sure you will recognise, however, the necessity for us thereafter to take immediate action on this matter with the Sultan. I therefore hope that before we meet it will be possible for your officials to make final recommendation to you concerning the modalities of our withdrawal of the RAF station on Masirah.

Warmest regards,

Tony Crosland

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 13526 (no exceptions) SEC 3.1

State Dept Guidelines

By HL - TARA, Date 4/11/13

7 May 1976



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

2856

ACTION

~~SECRET~~ (GDS) ATTACHMENT

May 21, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: BRENT SCOWCROFT  
FROM: ROBERT B. OAKLEY *RO*  
SUBJECT: Presidential Reply to the Sultan of Oman

We received only this week from the Department of State a letter to the President from the Sultan of Oman along with a suggested reply (approved by the Secretary's staff--draft at Tab II). It took one month before State informed us they had this letter.

The memorandum at Tab I to the President transmits the letter, summarizes its contents and recommends a letter of reply--a shortened version of the State draft which has been reviewed and cleared by Messrs. Horan, Clift, Low and Boverie as well as Mr. Hartmann's office (Smith).

RECOMMENDATION: That you forward the memorandum at Tab I to the President transmitting the Sultan's letter at Tab B and seeking the President's signature on the reply at Tab A.

APPROVE \_\_\_\_\_


AS AMENDED \_\_\_\_\_

~~SECRET~~ (GDS) ATTACHMENT



76

I



MEMORANDUM

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET (GDS)ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

SUBJECT: Letter from the Sultan of Oman--  
Proposed Reply

The Department of State has transmitted a letter to you from the Sultan of Oman at Tab B. A proposed reply is at Tab A. His Majesty recalls with pleasure his meeting with you during his January 1975 visit to Washington.

The Sultan expresses admiration for your policies of opposing outside (Soviet, Cuban) intervention in Angola and elsewhere in Africa and the broader Middle East/Indian Ocean region and concern about the trend of Soviet activities in these areas. He does so because of Oman's experience with this problem--radical South Yemen's backing (with Soviet arms and support) of a rebellion in Oman's western (Dhofar) province. Through a combination of firmness on the Sultan's part; military assistance from an Iranian brigade, a small Jordanian contingent and British officers seconded to the Omani armed forces; and Saudi financial incentives to South Yemen for moderation, the rebellion has apparently been defeated.

The Sultan remains concerned over the activities ("expansionist policies") of the Soviet Union in the general Indian Ocean area, including Southern and East Africa and the Persian Gulf. The possibility of a resurgence of radicalism in South Yemen is also of concern, and the Sultan points out the military support which that country has received from the USSR (we estimate some 300 advisers) and the Cubans (we estimate 100-200 advisers), although he acknowledges that neither Cubans nor Soviets participated directly in the Dhofar rebellion. The Sultan asks that you not forget the common interests of the US and Oman in combatting Soviet expansion and radicalism, especially in the Indian Ocean area. He hopes to maintain a dialogue with us on subjects of mutual concern in this area.

SECRET (GDS)

Subject to GDS of E. O. 11652

Automatically Downgraded at  
Two Year Intervals and Declassified  
on December 31, 1984.


DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
EO 12958 12/14/03  
NDC Memo  
3) LR 4/11/13

The Sultan's letter provides an opportunity for you to strongly reaffirm support for friends such as Oman in a common effort to oppose outside intervention and the growth of Soviet influence generally. We have strong interests in a sound relationship with Oman, given its position straddling the entrance to the Persian Gulf, its commitment to the West and the US, its moderation and its desire to collaborate with other friends in the Gulf area in the interests of regional stability. We may wish to discuss with the Sultan the possibility of using Omani airfields, ports or other facilities to support our military activities in the Indian Ocean--Persian Gulf area, particularly given the abandonment by the UK of an airfield it has operated on Oman's Masirah Island and the probability that we shall have to pull COMIDEASTFOR out of Bahrain.

The proposed letter at Tab A is responsive to concerns raised by the Sultan. It will be well received by him and will also give us an opening should we wish to explore at some later date the possible use of Omani military facilities.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the letter to the Sultan of Oman at Tab A. [Text coordinated with Mr. Hartmann's office (Mr. Smith).]

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Your Majesty:

Thank you for your letter regarding the situation in your area. Recalling with pleasure our meeting last year, I certainly appreciate this opportunity to exchange views with you on matters of concern to both our countries.

I am pleased that Your Majesty's policy of firmness towards the Communist-dominated rebels in Dhofar has had success. This is a tribute to the efficacy of your military strategy--firmness tempered with restraint at the appropriate time--as well as of your foreign policy. I wish Your Majesty further success in your efforts in support of the civil development of that region.

As Your Majesty points out, the challenges which your country has faced are a reflection of a broader problem which affects the region as a whole. My Government has made clear that we do not accept the adventurist activities of outside powers to advance their presence and influence.

I appreciate Your Majesty's perspective on the situation in southern Africa. The remaining serious problems there offer similar temptations

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12/4/83  
By 142 4/11/13

for the Soviet Union and make more urgent the need for finding solutions to the problems of racial injustice in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. My Government has recently affirmed our support for self-determination, majority rule, equal rights and human dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa and outlined a series of proposals to support this policy. It is grounded in the conviction that no outside power should seek to impose solutions or divide Africa into confronting blocs. Nor should ambitions of hegemony be encouraged. Rather, African unity and integrity should be supported.

Developments in Africa and the activities of the Soviet Union have also been a factor in my Government's position with regard to our role in the Indian Ocean and the areas bordering on it. It is our view that restraint in Soviet military deployments in the Indian Ocean and forbearance from adventurism generally are essential to improving the prospects for the stability of the region as a whole.


I can assure Your Majesty that the United States will continue its firm stand in opposition to Soviet pressure and expansionism and that we will continue to seek moderate Soviet behavior. In turn, we look to the states of the regions affected by such ambitions, including the Middle East, to promote their own security through regional cooperation and we are prepared to work with them to this end. I am aware of the particular effort which Oman, under your leadership, has made. The success which has thus far been achieved demonstrates the beneficial effort of regional cooperation. In this context, I very much agree with Your Majesty that we maintain a dialogue on ways to deal with problems of mutual concern in your area of the world.


Be assured of my hope that relations between Oman and the United States shall be strengthened for the future. I wish Your Majesty and the people of Oman a future blessed with peace and security as well as good fortune.

Sincerely,

His Majesty  
Sayyid Qaboos bin Said al Bu Said  
Sultan of Oman  
Muscat







79  
The Palace,  
Muscat,  
Sultanate of Oman.

28th March, 1976.

Mr. President.

It has been just over one year since we enjoyed our first visit to the United States; a short but satisfying experience which gave us the opportunity of meeting you and your senior officials involved in foreign affairs. Since that time we have naturally followed American policy with a personal interest based upon our new appreciation of your great country.

In our own country many changes have occurred and it is now much stronger and more settled than it was at the time of our meeting. The most important change, as you are undoubtedly aware, is our successful conclusion of the foreign-supported rebellion in Dhofar after ten years of struggle, which diverted national resources from development projects into military projects. Thanks be to God, most of the rebels saw the error of their ways and most of them, some one thousand four hundred, defected voluntarily from the enemy before the final military victory.


We have chosen to mention our own modest successes because we believe that they have a bearing upon one of the problems which has been plaguing American policy-makers recently. That problem is the support of national Leftist

Review  
12/4/03

4/11/13

142






- Page 2 -

guerrillas by a combination of material support from the Soviet Union, military support from Cuba, the use of safe-havens for these guerrillas offered by neighbouring Marxist-oriented States and the world-wide dissemination of Soviet-inspired propaganda. The latest case in point, and the one that has drawn world-wide attention, has been the intervention of other States in the internal affairs of Angola.

As you are aware from our discussion at the White House in January 1975, Angola is not the first case of this kind. For at least seven years of the ten-year struggle in Dhofar, the Soviet Union assisted the Dhofar rebels with arms and military training, either directly or through the assistance of the neighbouring State, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. In recent years the rebels were assisted with military training by Cuban personnel. Unlike the case of Angola, Cuban Advisers did not, as far as we know, actually take part in the fighting.

Oman, therefore, is quite familiar with the Soviet/Cuban combination, and this combination has created some unease; not just during the conflict itself. We have long regarded the growing presence in the area of the Soviet Union with concern, noting the position that it has acquired with respect to East and Southern Africa, the Naval presence in the Indian Ocean, its growing influence around the periphery of that Ocean, and the failure of Area States to take organised action to counter this growing influence.




- Page 3 -

We therefore are heartened by the firm position taken both by you, Mr. President, and some of your responsible Officers in statements made recently on the subject of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of other States. Although our own fighting is over, we continue to view with alarm the spread of similar situations. We appreciate the fact that so long as a favourable climate for interference exists, armed violence will continue to plague our area.

Oman is an old and proud country with its own traditions of civilisation, naval and military prowess; traditions which are once more emerging with the rebirth of its people. We are proud of our victory in Dhofar, primarily because it was achieved by the return of the rebels to the support of their own people and government rather than by massive slaughter in battle. The few rebels who remain are for the most part convinced Communist revolutionaries, harbouring wherever they can find shelter and having no popular support.

Oman, however, recognises that the threat from revolution, promoted by foreign States and inspired by Marxist ideologies and propaganda, still exists and will remain constant. We are particularly concerned that the peoples of Southern Africa, whatever their ethnic origins, should be allowed to develop their own form of government, without the influence of terror in support of the Soviet Union's expansionist policy. Supported by the great majority of the Omani people, we remain resistant to

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- Page 4 -

these threats.

At the same time we applaud efforts made by more powerful and more influential States to combat the same tendencies in world affairs, particularly those in the Indian Ocean area, where our future must to some extent be involved. We hope that you, Mr. President, and the United States Government, will not forget Oman's role in combatting a common enemy in the days to come and that our two Nations will remain bound by the same ties of common interests in the right of self-determination without foreign interference. We hope that we can continue to maintain a dialogue on subjects of mutual concern in this area.

We wish you, your family and the people of the United States, every success and good fortune in this year and the years ahead.

*Qaboos bin Said*  
SULTAN OF OMAN

7h.

II



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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May 14, 1976

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
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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Response by President Ford to Letter  
From Sultan Qaboos

On April 9, the Omani Ambassador delivered the attached letter from Sultan Qaboos of Oman to President Ford. The letter raises no specific issues of bilateral US-Omani concern, but does address in a broad tour d'horizon fashion some larger issues.

A proposed reply is attached which responds to the concerns raised by Sultan Qaboos.

  
George S. Springsteen  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Suggested Letter
2. Letter from Sultan Qaboos to President Ford

~~SECRET~~  
GDS

EX-100-100000

HC 4/11/13



State draft

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Suggested Letter

Your Majesty:

I am most appreciative of your letter of March 28, 1976, and welcome the opportunity it provides to discuss matters of concern to both our countries.

We are pleased that your policy of firmness toward the Communist-dominated rebels in Dhofar has borne good fruit. Your victory is a tribute to the efficacy of your military strategy -- firmness tempered by restraint at the appropriate time -- as well as of your foreign policy. I understand now that the military phase of this protracted struggle appears to be successfully concluded, and you are placing increased emphasis on projects for civil development in Dhofar. We wish you all success in this endeavor.

As you point out, the challenges which your country has faced are a reflection of a wider problem which affects the region as a whole: the desire of <sup>an outside power</sup> ~~the Soviet Union~~ to advance its presence and influence ~~through a variety of methods, including the use of Cuban forces. The Soviet Union has viewed the existence of social and political problems, as in Angola, as providing opportunities for it to advance its interests and influence.~~ <sup>The United States has</sup> ~~We have~~ made clear that we cannot accept this kind of behavior. *adventuristic expansionism.*

His Majesty

Sayyid Qaboos bin Sa'id Al Bu Sa'id,  
Sultan of Oman  
Muscat

Department of State

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*  
E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3 12/4/13  
State Dept Guidelines  
By HR NARA, Date 4/11/13



21 NSC  
Soviet etc

The remaining serious problems of southern Africa offer similar temptations for the Soviet Union, and make more urgent the need for finding solutions to the problems of racial injustice in Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa. My government has recently affirmed our support for self-determination, majority rule, equal rights and human dignity for all the peoples of southern Africa, and outlined a series of proposals to support this policy. Our policy is grounded in the conviction that no outside power should seek to impose solutions, to divide Africa into confronting blocs or to pursue hegemonial ambitions, but rather that African unity and integrity should be supported.

Developments in Africa and the activities of the Soviet Union have also been a factor in my government's position with regard to our role in the Indian Ocean and the areas bordering on it. ~~We have noted the development of naval and air support facilities in Somalia, and the general increase in deployments of naval vessels by the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean area since 1969.~~ It is our view that restraint in Soviet military deployments in the Indian Ocean area and a more general forbearance from adventurism are essential to improving the prospects for stability in the region as a whole.

Let me assure Your Majesty that the United States will continue to take a firm stand in the face of Soviet pressure and expansionism, and to seek to moderate Soviet behavior. In turn



and are prepared to  
work with them to this end.

we look to the states of the regions affected by Soviet ambitions, such as the Middle East, to promote their security through regional cooperation. We are aware of the particular effort which Oman has made in this regard, <sup>we</sup> and look forward to a continuing dialogue with Your Majesty's Government, ~~on matters of mutual concern. My government would hope to have Oman's support~~ as we examine ways to deal with the challenges which face us all.

I wish you, ~~your family~~, and the people of Oman a future blessed as much by peace and security as good fortune.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

and the success which has thus far been achieved demonstrates the efficacy of regional cooperation. It is important to remain vigilant, and, in this context,



72.  
For purposes of Routing and recording only:

This copy of Page 1 of a letter to President Ford from the Sultan of Oman, is to be treated As a note from the Omani Emb, dated April 9, 1976, because the letter was delivered on that date to NEA/ARP by the Omani Ambassador .

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NEA

The Palace,  
Muscat,  
Sultanate of Oman.

28th March, 1976.

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In our own country many changes have occurred and it is now much stronger and more settled than it was at the time of our meeting. The most important change, as you are undoubtedly aware, is our successful conclusion of the foreign-supported rebellion in Dhofar after ten years of struggle, which diverted national resources from development projects into military projects. Thanks be to God, most of the rebels saw the error of their ways and most of them, some one thousand four hundred, defected voluntarily from the enemy before the final military victory.

We have chosen to mention our own modest successes because we believe that they have a bearing upon one of the problems which has been plaguing American policy-makers recently. That problem is the support of national Leftist

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enc 4 Page letter to Pres.

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E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

By HR NARA, Date 4/11/13







# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 0242

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-04 H-02  
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AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MANAMA  
AMEMBASSY SANA  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 MUSCAT 0629

FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, EGEN, MILI, MU  
SUBJECT: VIEWS OF SULTAN QABOOS ON OMAN DEVELOPMENTS AND SOUTH ARABIAN SCENE

1. SUMMARY. SULTAN QABOOS' HIGH SPIRITS ABOUT OMAN'S GENERAL SITUATION MATCHED THE 120 DEGREE TEMPERATURE OUTSIDE DURING AMBASSADOR'S 45-MINUTE AUDIENCE MAY 19 AT SEEB PALACE. HN WAS PROUD OF OMAN'S RECOVERY FROM 1975 FINANCIAL PROBLEMS AND EXPANSIVE ABOUT THE FUTURE IN TERMS OF OIL PRODUCTION AND REVENUES, EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS, COPPER PROSPECTS AND FISHING POTENTIAL. HE EXPRESSED MODERATE SATISFACTION WITH PDRY'S

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E.O. 13526 (no amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

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By *HR* NARA, Date *4/11/13*





# Department of State TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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RESPONSIVENESS TO CONDITIONS PLACED ON IT BY SAUDIS IN MARCH 1976 AGREEMENT BETWEEN RIYADH AND ADEN, BUT OBVIOUSLY FEELS "JURY IS STILL OUT." SAID HE PLANS TALK WITH SHAH IN JUNE ABOUT FUTURE AREAS OF COOPERATION WITH IRAN, IN WHOM HE OBVIOUSLY PLACES MUCH TRUST. DOMESTICALLY, LACK OF PROGRESS IN AGRICULTURE BUGS HIM, BUT HE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT. SULTAN ASKED WHETHER IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE FOR OMAN TO BUY THREE C-130 TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT. END SUMMARY.

2. NEAR BEGINNING OF AMBASSADOR'S MAY 19 AUDIENCE WITH THE SULTAN, HE MENTIONED FORTHCOMING CONSULTATION IN WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK AND SAID IT WOULD BE VALUABLE TO CARRY BACK HM'S PERSONAL COMMENTS ON OMANI DOMESTIC SCENE AND ON RELATIONS WITH HIS NEIGHBORS AT THIS STAGE. SULTAN OBLIGED WITH RUNNING COMMENTARY REPORTED BELOW.

3. SULTAN SAID FINANCES ARE MUCH BETTER THAN A YEAR AGO. THE BANKERS WHO HAD COME UP WITH HELPFUL RECOMMENDATIONS IN EARLY 1975 WHEN OMAN HIT BY CASH FLOW CRISIS HAD VISITED HM RECENTLY AND WERE FULL OF PRAISE FOR ACTION TAKEN IN LIMITING AND COORDINATING EXPENDITURES. TRUE THERE WOULD BE A SMALL DEFICIT THIS YEAR, BUT IT IS INCONSEQUENTIAL. OIL INCOME IS UP CONSIDERABLY AND HM IS OPTIMISTIC ABOUT MEDIUM TERM BENEFITS FROM NEW FIELDS IN EASTERN OMAN BEING PREPARED FOR PRODUCTION BY PDO. ALSO, ELF-EKAP'S INITIAL WELL AND OTHER TESTS OFFSHORE MUSANDAM HAVE PROVEN FEASIBILITY OF PROFITABLE NEW OIL PRODUCTION THERE WHICH WILL BE SHARED WITH IRAN. SULTAN HAS HIGH HOPES FOR SUN OIL IN THE SOUTH (OFFSHORE) AND FOR ANOTHER AMERICAN FIRM, QUINTANA, IN THE NORTHERN INTERIOR.

4. HM POINTED TO COPPER AND FISHING AS CERTAIN SOURCES OF NEW INCOME. WITH THE COPPER IT NOW IS MAINLY A QUESTION OF FINDING SOURCES TO HELP WITH HEAVY CAPITAL INVESTMENT NEEDED. "SOME TELL ME I AM SITTING ON A COPPER EMPIRE." HE SAID. HM SAID HE HAD RELUCTANTLY AGREED TO THE RECENT FISHING COMPACT WITH A JAPANESE COMPANY, SINCE JAPANESE HAD BEEN "STEALING" OMAN'S FISHING RESOURCES RIGHT ALONG. BUT HE CLAIMED OMAN WILL RECEIVE REVENUES OF R.O. 6 MILLION IN FIRST YEAR ALONE FROM THIS JAPANESE VENTURE EVEN THOUGH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





# Department of State TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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IT IS LIMITED TO A SMALL PORTION OF COUNTRY'S POTENTIAL GROUNDS.

5. SULTAN GLOWED WHEN TALKING ABOUT EDUCATION, BUT GLOWERED IN DISCUSSING AGRICULTURE. HE PRAISED PAST PROGRESS IN BUILDING SCHOOLS AROUND OMAN, THOUGH SAYING PAST EDUCATION MINISTERS LEFT MUCH TO BE DESIRED IN IMAGINATION AND DRIVE. HE WAS FULSOME IN PRAISE OF NEW MINISTER AHMAD GHAZILI, SAYING HE "THINKS EXACTLY THE WAY I DO" AND HAS EXCITING PLANS FOR BUILDING A SECONDARY SCHOOL SYSTEM AND FOR TECHNICAL EDUCATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, AGRICULTURE HAS BEEN GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT; DESPITE LOTS OF THRASHING AROUND AND DEVOTION OF RESOURCES TO THIS SECTOR, IT HAS LANGUISHED ALMOST COMPLETELY. HN SAID HE DOES NOT KNOW WHAT ANSWER IS, BUT STRONGER EFFORTS MUST BE MADE.

6. IN DHOFAR MOUNTAINS, SAID HM, DEVELOPMENT EMPHASIS WILL BE ON CATTLE INDUSTRY WITH ANY THOUGHT OF PLANTATION CROPS THERE ABANDONED. HE NOTED THAT REPS FROM SAUDI ARABIA'S ARAB DEVELOPMENT FUND HAVE FINALLY ARRIVED AND HE HAS NOT GIVEN UP HOPE OF AID FROM RIYADH FOR DHOFAR DEVELOPMENT, THOUGH CUSTOMARY SAUDI SLOWNESS IS DISHEARTENING. HE EXPECTS THAT IN TIME DHOFAR ECONOMY WILL GAIN NOTABLY FROM OIL ACTIVITY AND EMPLOYMENT, JUST AS WILL BE THE CASE IN MUSANDAM ONCE ELF-ERAP BECOMES GEARED UP. ALL IN ALL, HE SAID, IMMEDIATE FUTURE CAN BE PICTURED AS BRIGHT, MEDIUM-TERM AS FULL OF ENCOURAGING SIGNS, AND LONG-TERM AS REASONABLY OPTIMISTIC PROVIDED EDUCATION LEVELS CAN BE RAISED AND TECHNICAL SKILLS ABSORBED.

7. SULTAN SPOKE IN PARTICULARLY DETERMINED FASHION WHEN MENTIONING THAT SOME CRITICS SAY THERE ARE TOO MANY PRESTIGE PROJECTS. HE STRONGLY DISAGREED. MANY THINGS HAD TO BE BUILT, WOULD COST MUCH MORE IF DELAYED EVEN A FEW YEARS. HE DEFENDED NEW DESALTING POWER PLANT THOUGH ADMITTING MISTAKES HAD BEEN MADE IN IT. ALSO IN SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE TONE HE SPOKE OF BAC AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM, ASSERTING HE HAS LOOKED INTO IT CAREFULLY BECAUSE OF ESCALATING COSTS AND HAS RECENTLY SET A FIRM UPPER LIMIT FOR EXPENDITURE ON IT (DID NOT GIVE THE FIGURE). THOUGH ONLY SOUTH YEMEN WAS A POSSIBLE THREAT AT PRESENT, HE

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# Department of State TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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SAID, HE BELIEVED A FIRM DEFENSIVE POSTURE ESSENTIAL IF HE IS TO DEAL ON SATISFACTORY BASIS WITH ALL HIS NEIGHBORS.

8. CONTINUING ON PDY, HM EXPRESSED GENERAL SATISFACTION WITH WAY IN WHICH PDY HAS RESPONDED TO NEW RELATIONSHIPS

ESTABLISHED WITH SAUDIS IN EARY MARCH. SAID NO SHELING HAS OCCURRED ALONG BORDER FOR THREE WEEKS NOW, AND HE THINKS CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN ADEN WAS SAT ON PFLO HARD-LINERS FAIRLY HARD ALTHOUGH SOME FRESH AMMO MAY BE REACHING TROUBLEMAKERS ALONG BORDER DESPITE THIS. HE IS CONCERNED, HOWEVER, BY VERY RECENT INTELLIGENCE REPORT FROM USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE INDICATING A SAUDI VISITOR TO ADEN HAS SUGGESTED SAUDIS WILL PROVIDE MONEY FOR ALL PDY MILITARY SALARIES. HE FINDS THIS, IF TRUE, QUITE INCONGRUOUS - AND ASKED IF WE HAD HEARD SAME THING.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





# Department of State TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 0241

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11

ACTION NEA-10

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TRSE-00 XMB-02 OPIC-03 CIEP-01 LAB-04 SIL-01 OMB-01

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TO SECSTATE 2149  
INFO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI  
AMEMBASSY DOHA  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MANAMA  
AMEMBASSY SANA  
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 MUSCAT 0629

9. ASKED WHAT HE FORESAW IN RELATIONS WITH IRAN NOW THAT WAR IS OVER, SULTAN REPLIED HE WOULD BE EXCHANGING IDEAS ON THIS WITH SHAH IN IRAN NEXT MONTH. HE SAID THE "TWO THOUSAND OR SO" IRANIAN TROOPS IN DHOFAR WOULD REMAIN FOR SOME TIME, FOR HE BELIEVED IN KEEPING UP HIS GUARD FOR SUFFICIENT TIME TO BE MORE CONFIDENT OF PORY INTENTIONS. SHOULD PRESSURE BUILD UP TO ASK FOR IRANIANS TO GO, HE COULD ALWAYS POINT PUBLICLY TO THE CUBANS IN PORY. HE THOUGHT SCOPE FOR FUTURE COOPERATION WITH IRAN WAS EXTENSIVE: PERHAPS IN FISHERIES, IMPORTATION OF SOME SPECIALIZED AGRICULTURAL WORKERS, OIL PRODUCTION OFF MUSANDAM, ETC. "I FIND MYSELF COMPLETELY AT EASE ABOUT THE IRANIANS, MORE SO THAN ABOUT SOME ARABS" HE CONFIDED.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





# Department of State TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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10. REACTING TO AMBASSADOR'S COMMENT THAT OBVIOUSLY THE SUPPORT RENDERED BY SEVERAL FRIENDLY STATES IN HIS REGION HAD BEEN GREAT HELP IN WINNING DHOFAR WAR, HM AFFIRMED THIS WAS SO AND THAT EVERYTHING HAD BEEN WELCOMED. THIS WOULD CONTINUE TO BE CASE, HE SAID, THOUGH ONE MUST NOT EXPECT OMAN TO GO AROUND HAT IN HAND. SULTAN SAID FIRMLY THIS SIMPLY WAS NOT HIS NATURE, NOR DID OMAN'S SITUATION DEMAND SUCH A POSTURE, BUT OMAN WILL BE GRATEFUL WHENEVER ITS FRIEND WHO KNOW THE SITUATION OF THIS COUNTRY THAT GOT SUCH A LATE START ON MODERNIZATION, WANT TO CHIP IN IN SOME APPROPRIATE METHOD.

11. HM RESERVED HIS ONE REQUEST TO THE END. HE ASKED IF AMBASSADOR WOULD SOUND OUT THE POSSIBILITY OF OMAN BUYING C-130 TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT FOR ITS AIR FORCE. SAID IRANIAN C-130S HAD IMPRESSED OMANIS GREATLY, AND IF THERE IS PRACTICAL PROSPECT OF PURCHASING ABOUT THREE, WITH PAYMENTS SPREAD OVER A FEW YEARS, HE WOULD GIVE THE IDEA SERIOUS CONSIDERATION. AMBASSADOR AGREED TO TEST GROUND FOR THIS WHILE IN DEPARTMENT.

12. COMMENT. HM WAS RELAXED AND A MITE MORE CHEERFUL THAN USUAL. HE OBVIOUSLY IS CONVINCED OMAN'S ECONOMY AND DEVELOPMENT WILL CONTINUE TO MOVE AHEAD RAPIDLY. IT SEEMS APPARENT THAT IF HE COULD HAVE ONE WISH ON THE INTERNAL SCENE, IT WOULD BE TO FIND SOMEONE TO WORK SOME MODEST MIRACLES GIVING OMANI AGRICULTURE A PUSH AHEAD. THOUGH HE WAS APPROPRIATELY JUDICIOUS IN REMARKS ABOUT THE SAUDIS, HM CLEARLY IS IRKED BY THEIR TRADITIONAL SLOWNESS. HE REMAINS COMPLETELY CONFIDENT OF THE SHAH'S GOOD INTENTIONS. ZSEIFEL

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