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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ IAEA VIENNA 10166

EXDIS
 DEPT PASS ID/SCT
 ED 11652: GDS
 TAGS: PARM, TECH, IAEA, IN
 SUBJ: HEAVY WATER SUPPLIED BY USSR TO INDIA

1. MISSION HAS OBTAINED FROM IAEA SECRETARIAT FOLLOWING
 INFO RE STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT
 WITH GOI IN CONNECTION WITH SUBJECT HEAVY WATER:

A) APPROXIMATELY TWO MONTHS AGO, SECRETARIAT PREPARED
 DRAFT "UNILATERAL SUBMISSION" TYPE OF SAFEGUARDS
 AGREEMENT WHICH, AFTER CLEARING INFORMALLY WITH USSR
 MISSION, SECRETARIAT TRANSMITTED TO GOI FOR ITS
 CONSIDERATION.

B) GOI REPLIED THAT, RATHER THAN NEW AGREEMENT, IT
 PREFERRED THAT SAFEGUARDS ON USSR-SUPPLIED HEAVY
 WATER BE PROVIDED FOR BY MEANS OF AMENDMENT TO GOI-
 CANADA-IAEA TRILATERAL AGREEMENT (INFCIRC/211) CON-
 CERNING RAJASTHAN POWER STATION.

C) SECRETARIAT CONSULTED BOTH CANADIAN AND USSR
 MISSIONS CONCERNING GOI PROPOSAL AND RECEIVED STRONG
 NEGATIVE REACTION FROM BOTH. ACCORDINGLY, SECRETARIAT
 HAS (OR IS ABOUT TO) INFORMED GOI THAT ITS PROPOSAL IS
 NON-STARTER AND REITERATING REQUEST FOR GOI RESPONSE TO
 SECRETARIAT'S DRAFT OF NEW GOI/IAEA AGREEMENT SPECIFICALLY
 ADDRESSING USSR-SUPPLIED HEAVY WATER.

2. ACCORDING TO SECRETARIAT, GOI HAS EARLIER AGREED

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E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3

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By NR NARA, Date 11/21/12

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TO CONTINUATION OF IMPLEMENTATION OF INFCIRC/211 FOR AN ADDITIONAL SIX MONTHS BEYOND SEPT 30, 1974 IN SAME MANNER AS DURING INITIAL FIVE-YEAR PERIOD.

3. MEANWHILE, SECRETARIAT HAS BEEN SURPRISED TO RECEIVE INFORMATION FROM GOI THAT 40 TONNES OF HEAVY WATER HAD BEEN RECEIVED FROM THE USSR ABOUT ONE MONTH AGO AND THAT FURTHER 25 TONNES HAD BEEN RECEIVED MORE RECENTLY. WE UNDERSTAND SECRETARIAT HAS ADVISED GOI THAT SUCH HEAVY WATER SHOULD NOT RPT NOT BE USED UNTIL ARRANGEMENTS FOR SAFEGUARDS HAVE BEEN MADE PURSUANT TO FORMAL AGREEMENT. PRESUMABLY, SECRETARIAT HAS ALSO INFORMED USSR MISSION OF THIS SITUATION.

4. MISSION NOTES THAT DELIVERY TO GOI BY USSR OF SUCH QUANTITIES OF HEAVY WATER IN THE ABSENCE OF ASSURANCE THAT IAEA SAFEGUARDS WILL BE APPLIED TO SNM PRODUCED THROUGH USE OF SUCH HEAVY WATER, PURSUANT TO AGREEMENT WITH AGENCY, IS CONTRARY TO USSR POLICY AS COMMUNICATED PRIVATELY TO USG AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS BY DIPLOMATIC NOTES OF AUGUST 22, 1974 (AND LATER TO STILL OTHER GOVERNMENTS) AND COMMUNICATED BY USSR LETTER TO IAEA DIRECTOR GENERAL PUBLISHED IN INFCIRC/209, ALL OF WHICH WERE IN CONNECTION WITH NPT EXPORTERS (ZANGGER) COMMITTEE. USSR ACTION IS ALSO CONTRARY TO LONGON SUPPLIERS GUIDELINES. STONE

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 IAEA VIENNA 10261

EXDIS
DEPT PASS IO/SCT
ALSO PASS ERDA AT YOUR DISCRETION
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, TECH, IAEA, IN
SUBJECT: SOVIET DELIVERY OF HEAVY WATER TO INDIA
REF: IAEA VIENNA 10166
SUMMARY. DESPITE SOVIET ATTEMPT PLACE BLAME
OF LACK OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT ON HEAVY WATER
TO INDIA ON IAEA SECRETARIAT, FACTS OBTAINED BY
MISSION REVEAL LAXITY IN SOVIET HANDLING OF MATTER.
ACTION RECOMMENDED: APPROACH TO SOVIETS ALSON
LINES SUGGESTED PARA 6. END SUMMARY.

1. DURING CALL ON SOVIET AMBASSADOR EROFEEV
DECEMBER 14, I TOLD HIM I HAD HEARD A REPORT THAT
HIS GOVERNMENT HAD DELIVERED HEAVY WATER TO INDIA
WITHOUT SAFEGUARDS. I THEN INQUIRED WHETHER
THIS COULD POSSIBLY BE TRUE.

2. EROFEEV ENGAGED IN CIRCUMLOCUTORY EXPLANATION,
FINALLY ADMITTED THAT REPORT WAS INDEED TRUE
BUT CLAIMED THAT THE BLAME FOR THE SITUATION LAY
WITH IAEA SECRETARIAT WHICH HAD BEEN DRAGGING
ITS FEET IN PREPARING SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT.
HE CLAIMED THAT BI-LATERAL AGREEMENT HAD BEEN
CONCLUDED BETWEEN INDIA AND SOVIET UNION PRIOR
TO SHIPMENT OF HEAVY WATER AND THIS AGREEMENT
CALLED FOR APPLICATION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS. HE
ASSURED ME THAT IT WAS SOVIET FIRM INTENTION TO



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HAVE SAFEGUARDS APPLIED AND THAT IT WOULD ONLY BE A MATTER OF DAYS BEFORE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WOULD BE CONCLUDED.

3. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION WHETHER THAY HAD HAD ANY PROBLEMS WITH INDIANS, HE REPLIED IN THE NEGATIVE AND CLAIMED DELAYS WERE CAUSED SOLELY BY IAEA SECRETARIAT.

4. MISSION HAS SUBSEQUENTLY LEARNED THAT ACTUAL DETAILED SEQUENCE OF EVENTS WAS:

(A) GOI AMBASSADOR MEHTA SENT IAEA LETTER DATED SEPTEMBER 13, 1976, REFERRING TO BILATERAL AGREEMENT CONCLUDED WITH USSR FOR SUPPLY OF 200 TONNES HEAVY WATER "FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES" IN RAJASTHAN II REACTOR AND THAT INITIAL SHIPMENT OF HEAVY WATER WAS EXPECTED SHORTLY. LETTER STATED THAT BILATERAL PROVIDES THAT HEAVY WATER SUPPLIED BY USSR, UPON ARRIVAL AND SUBSEQUENT USE IN INDIA, MUST BE SUBJECT TO SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH IAEA. ACCORDINGLY, GOI SOUGHT TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENT WITH IAEA UNDER WHICH FISSIONABLE MATERIAL PRODUCED THROUGH USE OF SUCH HEAVY WATER WOULD BE SUBJECT TO SAFEGUARDS. LETTER WAS ACKNOWLEDGED SEPTEMBER 17. (SECRETARIAT HAS NOT SEEN TEXT OF BILATERAL.)

(B) DURING GENERAL CONFERENCE IN RIO, INDIAN DEL MET WITH IAEA INSPECTOR GENERAL ROMETSCH AND REQUESTED DRAFTS OF ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF AGREEMENT: (1) AMENDMENT OF EXISTING CANADA-GOI-IAEA TRILATERAL (INFCIRC/211) BY SIMPLE ADDITION OF PROVISION ADDRESSING USSR-SUPPLIED HEAVY WATER (PRESUMABLY ALONG LINES OF EXISTING SECTION ELEVEN), AND (2) NEW "UNILATERAL SUBMISSION" ADDRESSING ONLY USSR-SUPPLIED HEAVY WATER. ROMETSCH HAS NOTES OF MEETING INDICATING THAT HE POINTED OUT THAT FIRST SUGGESTION WAS INFEASIBLE.

(C) UPON RETURN TO VIENNA, IAEA SECRETARIAT PREPARED DRAFT TEXT OF "UNILATERAL SUBMISSION" FROM OF AGREEMENT WHICH WAS FIRST SHOWN TO USSR MISSION AND AFTER RECEIVING ITS CLEARANCE, WAS TRANSMITTED TO GOI MISSION OCTOBER 27.

(D) ON NOVEMBER 5, GOI AMBASSADOR MEHTA INFORMED SECRETARIAT THAT 40 TONNES OF HEAVY WATER HAD ARRIVED IN INDIA FROM USSR.

(3) ON NOVEMBER 12, SECRETARIAT WROTE AMBASSADOR MEHTA, RECALLING NECESSITY UNDER GOI-USSR BILATERAL FOR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT, AS NOTED IN MEHTA'S LETTER OF SEPTEMBER 13. LETTER POINTED OUT THAT



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IAEA WAS NOT PREPARED ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR SAFEGUARDING IN ABSENCE AGREEMENT AND REAFFIRMED SECRETARIAT'S READINESS TO NEGOTIATE SUCH AGREEMENT. LETTER SATATED THAT MEANWHILE SECRETARIAT ASSUMED THAT HEAVY WATER WOULD REMAIN IN STORAGE AND WOULD NOT BE INTRODUCED INTO ANY FACILITY.

(F) IN LETTER DATED NOVEMBER 25, AMBASSADOR MEHTA REFERRED TO GOI REQUEST (IN RIO DISCUSSIONS) FOR ALTERNATIVE DRAFTS AND STATED THAT GOI LOOKED FORWARD TO THEIR RECEIPT, AFTER WHICH GOI WOULD BE READY TO NEGOTIATE.

(G) ON DECEMBER 3, MEHTA INFORMED SECRETARIAT OF ARRIVAL IN INDIA OF ADDITIONAL FIFTEEN TONNES (VICE 25 TONNES REPORTED REFTEL) HEAVY WATER FROM USSR.

(H) IN COURSE OF PREPARING RESPONSE TO MEHTA'S LETTER OF NOVEMBER 25, SECRETARIAT CONSIDERED POSSIBILITY OF VARIATION OF GOI SUGGESTION (1) MADE IN RIO DISCUSSIONS. VARIATION WOULD BE TO USE OPPORTUNITY OF BRINGING USSR-SUPPLIED HEAVY WATER INTO CANADA-GOI-IAEA TRILATERAL TO RENEGOTIATE ENTIRE TRILATERAL. WHEN SECRETARIAT DISCUSSED THIS APPROACH WITH

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CANADIAN AND USSR MISSIONS HOWEVER, NEITHER WAS INTERESTED.

(1) SECRETARIAT REPLIED DECEMBER 13 TO MEHTA'S LETTER OF NOVEMBER 25, POINTING OUT THAT ANY MODIFICATION OF EXISTING CANADA-GOI-IAEA TRILATERAL WOULD REQUIRE CONCURRENCE BY CANADA AND THAT SECRETARIAT HAD NO INDICATION OF CANADA'S INTEREST IN AMENDING OR RENEGOTIATING TRILATERAL. ACCORDINGLY, THERE WAS NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE TO "UNILATERAL SUBMISSION," DRAFT TEXT OF WHICH HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN TRANSMITTED. LETTER STATED SECRETARIAT STOOD READY TO NEGOTIATE SUCH AGREEMENT AND REITERATED URGENCY, IN LIGHT OF DELIVERY OF HEAVY WATER.

5. MISOFF HAD OPPORTUNITY DECEMBER 15 TO OBTAIN CONFIRMATION FROM MISHARIN OF USSR MISSION THAT USSR HAS NO INTEREST IN NEGOTIATING USSR-GOI-IAEA TRILATERAL, BUT EXPECTS GOI TO ENTER INTO "UNILATERAL SUBMISSION" TYPE OF AGREEMENT WITH IAEA. MISHARIN SAID THAT USSR DOES NOT ENTER INTO TRILATERAL SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS, AS MATTER OF POLICY. WE NOTE THAT IN CASE OF INDIA, BOTH US AND CANADIAN TRILATERALS ARE IN RECIPROCAL FORM, CALLING FOR IAEA SAFEGUARDS IN CERTAIN US AND CANADIAN INSTALLATIONS RESPECTIVELY, UNDER SPECIFIED CIRCUMSTANCES. USSR DOUBTLESS ANTICIPATED THAT GOI WOULD INSIST UPON SUCH "NON-DISCRIMINATORY" ARRANGEMENTS IN ANY TRILATERAL WITH USSR, WHICH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO USSR.

6. COMMENT AND RECOMMENDATION: EROFEEV'S

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BLAMING SECRETARIAT FOR DELAY IN
NEGOTIATING SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH GOI IS
DISINGENUOUS, IN LIGHT OF CHRONOLOGY OUTLINED
ABOVE. MOST EFFECTIVE LEVERAGE UPON GOI TO
EXPEDITE COMPLETION OF NEGOTIATIONS WOULD HAVE
BEEN REFUSAL BY USSR TO DELIVER ANY HEAVY WATER
UNTIL AGREEMENT APPROVED BY IAEA BOARD OF GOVERNORS
AND BROUGHT INTO EFFECT BY GOI. IN PRESENT SITUATION,
USSR COULD STILL PROVIDE INCENTIVE BY TAKING FIRM
POSITION WITH GOI THAT NO FURTHER SHIPMENTS
WILL BE MADE UNTIL THAT CONDITION MET, AND THAT
HEAVY WATER ALREADY DELIVERED BE SEALED BY USSR,
PENDING SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT COMING INTO FORCE.
MISSION URGES THAT VIEW BE CONVEYED TO USSR SOONEST,
IN ORDER TO PROVIDE INCENTIVE TO GOI TO BEGIN AND
COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS. SUGGEST USSR ALSO BE
ENCOURAGED TO INFORM GOI THAT TERMS OF AGREEMENT AND
RELATED SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE SCRUTINIZED
BY USSR TO ASSURE ITSELF THAT PROVISIONS ARE ADEQUATE
TO PERMIT IAEA TO CARRY OUT SAFEGUARDS EFFECTIVELY. END COMMENT.
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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ MOSCOW 19723

EXDIS
ED 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM TECH IAEA IN UR
SUBJECT: SOVIET DELIVERY OF HEAVY WATER TO INDIA
REF: IAEA VIENNA 10261

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1. CANADIAN AMBASSADOR FORD INFORMED ME TODAY THAT HE HAS APPOINTMENT WITH SOVIET DEPUTY MINISTER ZEMSKOV NEXT WEEK TO PROTEST SOVIET DELIVERY OF HEAVY WATER TO INDIA AND TO SEEK FURTHER DETAILS ON SAFEGUARDS APPLIED. APPROACH BASED ON CANADIAN INVOLVEMENT IN INDIAN NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT AND PARTICIPATION IN TRILATERAL AGREEMENT, FORD ADDED THAT HE HAS PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED MATTER WITH DEPUTY DIRECTOR MFA INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DIVISION TIMERBAYEV, BUT HAD RECEIVED ONLY "LIES AND EVASIONS" FROM HIM, SO THAT HE HAS NOW BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE VIGOROUS REPRESENTATIONS AT HIGHER LEVELS.

2. FORD SAID THAT IN HIS VIEW SOVIET ACTION IS FLAGRANT VIOLATION OF UNDERSTANDINGS REACHED AT NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS CONFERENCE AND ALSO DEMONSTRATES CONTEMPT FOR IAEA. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN LONDON CONFERENCE AND MEMBERS IAEA WOULD WEIGH IN HEAVILY WITH SOVIETS.

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USIA-06 FEA-01 ACDA-07 EB-07 NRC-05 DES-06 ERDA-05
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AMEMBASSY PARIS
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E.O. 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PARM TECH IAEA UR IN
SUBJ: SOVIET SALE OF HEAVY WATER TO INDIA

REF: IAEA VIENNA 10261 (NOTAL)

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: INDIAN POLITICAL COUNSELOR ARORA (PROTECT) TOLD EMBOFF THAT SOVIET SALE OF HEAVY WATER TO INDIA WAS A STRAIGHTFORWARD COMMERCIAL DEAL AND THAT THE SOVIETS HAD INSISTED ON A CLAUSE SPECIFYING THAT IT WAS NOT TO BE USED IN THE MANUFACTURE OF AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE. ARORA SAID INDIA HAD RESISTED THIS CLAUSE BUT SOVIETS HAD INSISTED, CITING THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE LONDON SUPPLIER GUIDELINES. END SUMMARY.

2. IN THREE-WAY CONVERSATION WITH EMBOFF AT DINNER PARTY, ARORA REPLIED TO A QUERY BY U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT CORRESPONDENT ROBIN KNIGHT BY SAYING THAT THE PRESS

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STORIES THUS FAR HAD MADE MORE OF THE STORY THAN IT DESERVED AND HAD GOTTEN SOME DETAILS WRONG. THERE WAS NEVER ANY INTENTION, SAID ARORA, TO KEEP THE DEAL SECRET, SINCE IT WAS A STRAIGHT COMMERCIAL TRANSACTION AND MET ALL INTERNATIONAL RULES AND REGULATIONS. THE DOCUMENTS HAD BEEN SUBMITTED TO THE IAEA IN VIENNA, SAID ARORA, AS EVIDENCE THAT THERE WERE NO HIDDEN ELEMENTS.

3. ON THE SPECIFIC NEGOTIATIONS, ARORA SAID THAT THE INDIANS HAD RESISTED THE CLAUSE STATING THAT THE HEAVY WATER WOULD NOT BE USED FOR ANY NUCLEAR "EXPERIMENT", A EUPHONISM FOR AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE. THE EARLIER PART OF THE SAME SENTENCE, SPECIFYING WHAT THE MATERIAL COULD BE USE FOR, CAUSED THE INDIANS NO PROBLEM, SAID ARORA, ALTHOUGH THEY FELT THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO BE SO SPECIFIC. HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS HAD INSISTED ON BOTH PARTS, ARORA CONTINUED, CITING THE NECESSITY TO ABIDE BY THE GUIDELINES ESTABLISHED BY THE LONDON "CLUB" OF NUCLEAR EXPORTING COUNTRIES.

4. DESPITE THEIR RESERVATIONS, SAID ARORA, THE INDIANS ACCEPTED THE SOVIET-PROPOSED LANGUAGE, PARTLY BECAUSE THEY HAD NO CHOICE, AND PARTLY BECAUSE THEY DID NOT INTEND TO USE THIS HEAVY WATER FOR AN EXPLOSIVE DEVICE ANYWAY. HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE USED IN A RESEARCH FACILITY IN RAJASTAN WHICH HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH SUCH WORK AND HAS NO CONNECTION WITH THE FACILITY WHICH DEVELOPED THE EARLIER EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.

5. THE INDIANS ARE, IN ANY CASE, DEVELOPING THEIR OWN ABILITY TO PRODUCE HEAVY WATER, TOGETHER WITH OTHER NUCLEAR MATERIALS, SAID ARORA, AND WHEN THEY HAD DEVELOPED THIS CAPABILITY, THEY COULD DO WITH IT WHAT THEY WISHED, WITHOUT ACCEPTING LIMITATIONS FROM OTHER COUNTRIES. INDIA HAS NOT SIGNED THE NPT SPECIFICALLY FOR THIS REASON. THIS PURCHASE WAS NECESSARY, SAID ARORA, BECAUSE CANADA HAD STOPPED SUPPLYING ANY NUCLEAR-RELATED GOODS OR SERVICES

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TO INDIA AND THE U.S. HAD LIKEWISE REFUSED TO SELL HEAVY WATER. THE AMOUNT IN THE PRESENT DEAL WAS EXPECTED TO SATISFY INDIA'S NEEDS FOR ABOUT THREE YEARS, HE CONCLUDED.

6. COMMENT. ARORA'S VERSION, NOT SURPRISINGLY, PAINTS THE SOVIETS AS RESPONSIBLE ADHERENTS TO THE NPT AND AS INSISTING ON COMPLIANCE WITH THE LONDON GUIDELINES. IT STRIKES US AS DISINGENUOUS AT BEST, IN VIEW OF THE ACTUAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (REFTEL). PERHAPS MORE SIGNIFICANT AND ALARMING IS HIS INDICATION THAT THE INDIANS IN EFFECT RESISTED ANY RESTRICTIONS AT ALL, AND LOOK FORWARD WITHIN A FEW YEARS TO BEING ABLE TO PRODUCE ALL THE NECESSARY MATERIALS TO MANUFACTURE ADDITIONAL EXPLOSIVE DEVICES.
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TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4776

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AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0066
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EXDIS
E.O. 11652: XGDS

TAGS: PARM, UR, IN

SUBJECT: SOVIET SUPPLY OF HEAVY WATER TO INDIA

REF: (A) IAEA VIENNA 10166; (B) IAEA VIENNA 10261; (C)
MOSCOW 19723; (D) PARIS 37850

1. WE ARE CONCERNED BY CONFIRMATION CONTAINED IN REF (B) THAT SOVIET SHIPMENTS OF HEAVY WATER HAVE REACHED INDIA BEFORE CONCLUSION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS ARRANGEMENTS. BEARING IN MIND THAT COMPLICATIONS COULD ARISE IF PARTIES CONCERNED, FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER, ARE UNABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH IAEA ON A SAFEGUARDS INSTRUMENT, WE BELIEVE THAT SHIPMENT OF HEAVY WATER PRIOR TO CONCLUSION OF IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT IS HIGHLY QUESTIONABLE PRACTICE.

2. CHARGE IS REQUESTED TO APPROACH MOROKHOV AND OTHER APPROPRIATE SOVIET AUTHORITIES EXPRESSING OUR CONCERNS, DRAWING ON FOLLOWING POINTS.

(A) WE UNDERSTAND THAT SHIPMENTS OF SOVIET HEAVY WATER HAVE REACHED INDIA, ALTHOUGH A SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE IAEA HAS NOT BEEN CONCLUDED.

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(B) WE ASSUME THAT INDIANS HAVE BILATERALLY AGREED TO ENTER

INTO APPROPRIATE SAFEGUARDS ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE AGENCY BEFORE PERMISSION IS GRANTED TO UTILIZE THESE SHIPMENTS. NONETHELESS, WE HOPE THAT ADDITIONAL SHIPMENTS WILL NOT BE MADE PRIOR TO A SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND THAT THE HEAVY WATER ALREADY IN INDIA BE SEALED BY THE USSR PENDING ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT.

(C) IN ADDITION, WE URGE THAT THE SOVIETS ENCOURAGE THE INDIANS TO NEGOTIATE PROMPTLY AND CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE IAEA AND ENSURE THE APPLICATION OF STRINGENT SAFEGUARDS ON FACILITIES USING THE SOVIET HEAVY WATER. IN THIS CONNECTION, THE SOVIETS MAY RECALL OUR CONVERSATIONS IN RIO ON THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING SAFEGUARDS FOR THE RAPP II REACTOR, ALSO TRIGGER SAFEGUARDS ON THE RAPP I REACTOR. AS MOST OF THE HEAVY WATER IN THE RAPP I REACTOR (130 TONNES) WAS OF US ORIGIN AND WAS PROVIDED TO THE INDIANS BY THE CANADIANS WITH OUR EXPECTATION THAT SAFEGUARDS WOULD BE MAINTAINED, WE ARE NATURALLY CONCERNED THAT THAT FACILITY CONTINUE TO BE SAFEGUARDED. WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RAPP STATIONS; I.E., THE LIKELIHOOD THAT HEAVY WATER INTRODUCED INTO ONE REACTOR WILL EVENTUALLY BE INTERMINGLED WITH HEAVY WATER IN THE OTHER, COULD USE THE CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO EXTEND SAFEGUARDS--AS WELL AS OTHER PROVISIONS CONSISTENT WITH LONDON SUPPLIER GUIDELINES--OVER BOTH REACTORS, ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT INTERCHANGE WILL OCCUR, THUS PROVIDING FOR LONG-TERM SAFEGUARDS DURATION AND COVERAGE TO PRECLUDE THE USE OF ANY PLUTONIUM DERIVED FROM THESE REACTORS IN ANY EXPLOSIVE DEVICE.

3. SOVIETS IN RESPONSE MAY RAISE US FUEL SHIPMENTS TO EURATOM PRIOR TO ENTRY INTO FORCE OF SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH THE IAEA. CHARGE MAY POINT OUT THAT EURATOM/IAEA SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT HAS BEEN NEGOTIATED AND APPROVED BY ALL PARTIES AND IS ABOUT TO ENTER INTO FORCE IN NEAR FUTURE, WHILE WE UNDERSTAND THAT INDIA/IAEA AGREEMENT HAS YET TO BE DRAFTED SO SITUATION IS NOT ANALOGOUS.

4. EMBASSIES OTTAWA AND PARIS. EMBASSIES MAY INFORM APPROPRIATE CANADIAN AND FRENCH AUTHORITIES RESPECTIVELY OF THE GENERAL LINES OF OUR APPROACH TO SOVIETS ON THE HEAVY WATER TO INDIA QUESTION.

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INFO AMCONSUL BOMBAY 0032
 AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 958
 AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 689
 AMEMBASSY PARIS 4752
 USMISSION IAEA VIENNA 4994

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 20276

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1

TAGS: PARM, IN, UR

SUBJECT: SOVIET SUPPLY OF HEAVY WATER TO INDIA

REF: (A) STATE 312667, (B) MOSCOW 19723

1. WE REQUESTED APPOINTMENT FOR CHARGE WITH MOROKHOV TO DISCUSS IAEA SAFEGUARDS AND WERE TOLD BY MFA COUNSELOR BORIS KRAUSULIN THAT MOROKHOV WOULD BE "OUT OF TOWN" UNTIL JAN 10. KRAUSULIN SUGGESTED MEETING WAIT UNTIL THEN, NOTING THAT MOROKHOV IS "MOST APPROPRIATE" OFFICIAL. WE COULD REQUEST APPOINTMENT WITH DEPUTY MINISTER ZEMSKOV IF DEPT WISHES OR WAIT UNTIL JAN 10 TO PUT IN FOR MEETING WITH MOROKHOV. WE WERE INFORMED BEFORE REQUESTING APPOINTMENT THAT TIMERBAYEV IS ON VACATION AND AFTER MAKING REQUEST, THAT ISRAELYAN IS "SICK." ALSO, KRAUSULIN SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER ZEMSKOV WOULD BE AVAILABLE, AND REPEATED HIS COMMENT THAT MOROKHOV WOULD BE MOST APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL.

2. CANADIAN AMBASSADOR DID SEE ZEMSKOV AS HE PLANNED (REF B) AND, ACCORDING TO CANADIAN EMBOFF WHO ACCOMPANIED, WAS "COMPLETELY STONEWALLED," GETTING NO REACTION AT ALL FROM ZEMSKOV.

3. ACTION REQUESTED: GIVEN THAT SOVIETS, WHO CAN EASILY DEDUCE REASON FOR REQUEST, ARE NOT ANXIOUS TO RECEIVE US, WE REQUEST DEPARTMENT'S GUIDANCE ON WHETHER WE SHOULD PRESS FOR MEETING WITH

***** WHSR COMMENT *****

HYLAND, MATHENY

PSN:039824

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DECLASSIFIED *State Review*

E.O. 13526 (as amended) SEC 3.3 12/3/02

State Dept Guidelines

By 102 NARA, Date 11/7/12

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ZEMSKOV--WITH NO ASSURANCE OF GETTING IT--OR WAIT
UNTIL JAN 10 TO SEE MOROKHOV.
MATLOCK
BT



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