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then Ambassador Hodgson will also sit in. This detail remains to be resolved with the Japanese. I plan also to hold separate but parallel talks with Foreign Minister Kimura.

- C. Press Arrangements. The press arrangements are still being worked out with the Japanese.

III. TALKING POINTS

- A. Reaffirmation of the Alliance. You will want to leave no doubt in the Japanese mind of the importance of the alliance to the US and of your personal commitment to it.
- I want to assure you that the U. S. attaches the highest importance to our alliance with Japan.
 - It has been and remains the vital cornerstone of our policy in the Pacific.
- B. Continuity of U.S. Policies Globally. Given Japan's basic dependence on us for its ultimate security and its still strong inclination to follow our lead diplomatically, Prime Minister Tanaka will be keenly interested in your views on principal world issues.
1. Detente with the Soviets. You will want to reassure Tanaka that we intend to pursue detente with the USSR in a way that will contribute to global stability. We are aware in our negotiations with the Soviets of a need for balanced concessions, and we will not compromise the vital interests of our allies or other third countries (See Tab A.).
- During Secretary Kissinger's visit to Moscow last month, progress was made toward a SALT negotiating framework that should be helpful in achieving an agreement on strategic arms limitations that will extend until 1985.
 - My visit to Vladivostok is designed to establish a personal relationship with Soviet leaders and to review where we stand in our relationship at present.
 - We are hopeful that, as regards the Middle East situation, the Soviets will continue to show restraint and will permit the step-by-step progress we believe is essential to an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By MA NARA, Date 10/11

State review 10/5/03



11/11/74

-- We look for improvement in our bilateral economic relations with the Soviet Union, particularly if our Congress passes the Administration's Trade Bill in the near future, as we anticipate. As regards the question of U.S. grain sales to the Soviet Union, we are moving on two fronts in an effort to avoid disruption of our domestic and world markets and to prevent hardships to our customers. Domestically, I have acted to provide government supervision for our grain sales. Externally, we have made clear to the Soviets the importance of advance information on their requirements and of the need of them to regulate their purchases.

-- In general, we are trying to convince the Soviets that they have a basic national interest in cooperating to solve the problems of international monetary reform, food, and energy.

2. Normalization of Relations with the PRC. We have since 1971 consulted closely with Japan on both of our countries normalization of relations with the PRC. The outcome has been quite satisfactory; we have both achieved step-by-step progress in this direction, avoiding a competitive race to Peking that could only hurt both of us. Tanaka will be interested in whether any new major progress toward normalization of U.S. -PRC relations can be expected from my upcoming visit to Peking. (See Tab A.)

-- As you know, Secretary Kissinger's coming Peking visit is another of the periodic high-level U.S. -PRC exchanges contemplated in the Shanghai Communiqué.

-- We expect no drastic change in U.S. -PRC relations in the future. As Secretary Kissinger told Foreign Minister Kimura in late September, we see our political relations with the PRC as being "exactly the appropriate relationship" for now. If we anticipate any sharp departures, we will inform you in advance.

-- Any complete normalization of relations would require a resolution of basic problems such as the U.S. defense commitment to Taiwan. We intend to move very cautiously on that problem.

-- The kind of progress we look for in the near future is the further development of trade relations and cultural exchanges with the PRC.



- We are careful to insure that the Chinese understand that our relationship with the Soviet Union is not directed against Peking.
- On the Korean issue, the PRC so far has not been willing to compromise on the U.N. Command issue now before the current session of the U.N. General Assembly. Publicly, however, the PRC continues to distinguish between U.S. forces in Korea and those under the U.N. flag.

C. Multilateral Issues

1. U.S. - Japan Energy Cooperation. (See Tab B.)

a. Oil

Japan's heavy dependence on imported energy (88% of energy is imported) accentuates its historical feelings of isolation and insecurity. While Japan recognizes the importance of consumer country cooperation, its vulnerabilities make it reluctant to take positions which appear to confront producers. Our objective is to underscore the importance we attach to Japanese support for and cooperation in efforts to increase consumer solidarity and to demonstrate an understanding of Japan's need to diversify energy sources.

- We realize that Japan relies heavily on imported energy, places a high premium on assurance of continued petroleum supplies, and has suffered serious disruption as the result of higher oil prices.
- We genuinely appreciate Japan's constructive cooperation in the Energy Coordinating Group, and believe that its decision to join the International Energy Program is an essential step toward reducing its vulnerability to an interruption of oil supplies.
- The major consuming nations now need to move rapidly to establish effective programs in such areas as conservation and financial solidarity.



- On conservation, we do not envision a rigid burden-sharing exercise but concerted efforts by each nation to do what is necessary to reduce imports. This helps reduce the transfer of financial (and with it political and military) power to oil producing countries, reduces the build up of debt to oil producers, and reduces vulnerability to future oil cutoffs.
- On financial solidarity, we believe that arrangements are needed so that consuming countries could provide economic support to individual countries to avoid internationally disruptive unilateral action. Our proposal is that countries agree to undertake loan commitments which a common fund could call on when loan assistance was needed, and approved, for a particular country.
- With respect to a consumer/producer dialogue, since the Washington Energy Conference we have operated under the assumption that a meeting with producers would be useful only after consumer cooperation had strengthened to the point that such a dialogue could achieve results in the common interest of consuming nations. Progress has been made through the ECG and IEP, but we believe more needs to be done before such a dialogue can achieve positive results.

B. Yakutsk Natural Gas Project

- We understand Japan's desire for U.S. participation in the Yakutsk natural gas project. We are, in principle, favorably disposed toward participating in the exploratory phase. A final decision on Ex-Im credits, however, can be made only after we see the outcome of Ex-Im Bank legislation now in Congress and have examined the recently submitted blueprint for Operation Independence.
- I hope we will have an answer for you in December. In the interim, we have no objection if you move ahead or if US firms wish to participate with Japanese firms. We would provide political support for participating American firms if problems arose which warranted this.



c. Uranium Enrichment Services for Japan

- I want to assure you of our ability and our determination to continue as Japan's primary partner in the development of its nuclear power capabilities. We intend to meet the contractual obligations with Japan for uranium enrichment, and to meet future requests for enrichment services through the construction of new capacity.
- The US supports the establishment of a joint US-Japan enrichment venture in the US. We strongly encourage Japanese financial participation. Under suitable arrangements, we are prepared to share our gaseous diffusion and centrifuge enrichment technology with Japan for the construction of an enrichment plant in Japan or elsewhere.

2. Trade and Monetary Issues: The Japanese trade balance is recovering quickly from the shock of higher oil prices. We want to ensure that Japan does not improve its trade balance at the expense of the US and others; and we want to emphasize our desire to cooperate with Japan in coming multilateral trade negotiations. (See Tab C).

- It is essential that countries cooperate in meeting their balance of payments problems and refrain from actions which will exacerbate the deficits in their trade balances. We have heard reports that Japan is attempting to realize a very large trade surplus in the future. This is bound to adversely affect our trade balance and that of others. It will raise fears of the recurrence of the major imbalances of past years. We both have an interest in avoiding the development of such a situation, and we should both watch it closely. It might be useful if the sub-cabinet level economic meeting planned for January could carefully review this situation.

3. Food. Japan is the largest market for US agricultural exports and, as in the case of oil, extremely vulnerable to supply disruptions. In this period of shortage it is extremely important that major producing and consuming countries equally share the burden of adjustment and that while we give assurances of our intention to continue providing adequate supplies, Japan avoid disruptive actions--such as over-fishing in the northeast Pacific and excessively restrictive limits on US beef imports--and cooperate in negotiating our WFC proposals. (See Tab D).



- We have a common interest in an improved world food situation. We hope that Japan is prepared to work with us to establish a system of world food reserves involving equitable distributions of food stocks among major trading countries. Combined with increased agricultural production and increased food aid, this can help assure future adequacy of world food availabilities.
 - We value Japan as our most important agricultural export market. The US fully intends to remain a reliable supplier of food to Japan. This will, of course, require continuation of the close cooperation and consultation which have helped enable us to meet Japan's essential food import requirements during recent periods of shortage. It is particularly important that Japan continue to refrain from speculative purchases and to provide us with information on its commodity availabilities and requirements.
 - We are confident that Japan recognizes that dependability of markets is important to the US, much as dependability of supply is to Japan. We deeply appreciate the efforts of Japan, and you personally, to reduce import barriers in recent years. We are concerned, however, that certain Japanese restrictions limit the market for various US products. We especially hope that Japan will resume the importation of reasonable amounts of beef from the US and other normal suppliers. We recognize the sensitivity of this issue in Japan; but, barriers to beef imports force American cattlemen to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of low beef prices and high feed prices.
 - With regard to the question of over-fishing in the northeast Pacific, our scientists are firmly convinced that significant (roughly 30 percent) reductions by all countries involved will be required to ensure an optimum sustainable yield from this valuable source of protein. Our experts and yours are now negotiating this issue. I urge you to urge your negotiators to work with ours to find a solution. Otherwise Congress is likely to move unilaterally to impose a 200 mile jurisdiction over coastal fishing.
4. Asian Regional Problems -- Korea and Indochina. Although we are working with Japan on a wide range of issues in Asia, both of us are particularly interested in the situations in



Korea and Indochina. Japan has a heavy stake in the stability of the Korean Peninsula. Since the Korean War, Japan has strongly supported South Korea economically and politically. Diplomatic relations with Seoul have taken a turn for the worse in the past year, however, as a result of the August 1973 abduction of the Korean opposition leader Kim Tae-Chung from Tokyo, and last August's murder of President Park's wife by a Korean resident of Japan in an assassination attempt on Park himself. In the context of detente, Japan is also cautiously expanding trade and cultural contacts with North Korea. (See Tab E.)

As regards Indochina, Japan has given active political support and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Cambodia and now to the new coalition government of Laos. We want to encourage Japan to increase its aid to South Vietnam. Japan has taken a lead in this year's UN General Assembly fight to preserve the present Cambodian Government's seat there. Japan has recognized North Vietnam, but is proceeding carefully in expanding its relations with economic assistance to North Vietnam.

] a. Korea

- The US attaches great importance to Japan's continued strong support of South Korea. We appreciate your restraint during the recent diplomatic crisis with Seoul over the assassination attempt against President Park.
- (If raised) I understand the effects produced in Japan by the Park Government's tightened authoritarian controls. There has been a similar reaction in the US. We have made our views known privately to the Park Government, but we regard this primarily as a matter for the people of South Korea to resolve themselves.
- I appreciate your caution in expanding trade and cultural relations with North Korea. I believe it essential, given the continuing militancy of North Korea, to take fully into account the effect that expanded relations with North Korea could have on the stability of the Peninsula.



b. Indochina

- The US firmly intends to maintain the level of our assistance in Indochina, and particularly that to South Vietnam and Cambodia.
- We appreciate the strong assistance, both economically and diplomatically, that Japan is giving. This is especially true of Japan's current efforts in behalf of the Cambodian Government's seat in the UN General Assembly. We hope that Japan will make every effort to increase its aid and investment, especially in South Vietnam.
- We are encouraged by the outcome of the recent Indochina Aid Donors Conference, and appreciate the constructive role you played there.
- We share Japan's hopes for meaningful talks between the several parties in Cambodia. We have discussed our views with both Peking and Moscow. However, until the Khmer UN credentials question has been successfully resolved, we do not expect much movement toward these talks.
- We appreciate Japan's cautious approach to expanded relations with North Vietnam.

5. Nonproliferation. You should reaffirm the US interest in strengthening multilateral constraints against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Japan has been concerned that we did not react more strongly to India's nuclear explosion, and that we offered nuclear power plants and fuel to Egypt and Israel. Japan's participation in non-proliferation efforts is essential to an effective strategy in this area. It is thus in our interest that Japan proceed next year, as the Tanaka Government recently indicated it would, with ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty (which it signed in 1970), and that Japan cooperate with us in strengthening restraints on the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.



- We welcomed your Government's statement that you intend to seek ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty at your coming Diet session. This will do much to help enhance confidence in the nonproliferation system.
- We look forward to Japan's cooperation in improving restraints against the proliferation of nuclear weapons through measures such as strengthened coordinated nuclear export policies by key supplier states and improved physical security standards for nuclear facilities and material.
- Let me reassure you unequivocally, in this context, that the US intends to fulfill its commitments under the US-Japan mutual security treaty.

D. Bilateral Issues

1. **US-Japan Security Relations.** You will want to express appreciation to Prime Minister Tanaka for his government's continued cooperation on our military basing problems in Japan. Our bases in Japan are essential to our strategy in Asia, as well as to our defense commitment to Japan. We currently have about 55,000 forces in Japan (including about 23,000 on Okinawa). We are reducing the land we occupy, and particularly that in or nearby crowded urban areas, through an on-going base consolidation program.
 - I want to leave no doubt in your mind as to the vital importance we attach to the continuation of our military bases in Japan. These are indispensable to our strategy in Asia, and thus we believe to stability in the region.
 - I want to convey to you my deepest appreciation for the cooperation you and your Government have extended to us on the base problem. I understand the domestic political problems these bases can sometimes cause you, and we want to do our utmost to help alleviate these frictions wherever possible.



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- The US Government intends to continue its cooperative effort with your Government to consolidate our bases and facilities in Japan wherever feasible. We always welcome your Government's suggestions in this regard.

Attachments:

- | | |
|----------------|--|
| Tab A - | Tokyo's Relations with Moscow and Peking |
| Tab B - | US-Japan Energy Cooperation |
| Tab C - | Trade and Monetary Issues |
| Tab D - | Food |
| Tab E - | Asian Regional Problems - Korea and Indochina |

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ (XGDS)(3)ACTION

November 12, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *mf*

SUBJECT:

Recommended Talking Points for
the President's Meeting with South Korean
President Park Chung-hee During the
President's Visit to Korea,
November 22-23, 1974

At Tab I is a draft briefing memorandum from you to the President containing suggested talking points for his meeting with President Park Chung-hee during the President's visit to South Korea, November 22-23, 1974.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the draft memorandum to the President at Tab I.


Concurrence:

Mr. Hormats *RH/dor*~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~ (XGDS)(3)

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/00, State Dept. Guidelines

By *MA* NARA, Date *1/3/11*

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WITHDRAWAL ID 033095

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇBriefing Paper

CREATOR'S NAME Henry A. Kissinger

RECEIVER'S NAME The President

TITLE Meeting with President of the Republic
of Korea, Park Chung-hee

CREATION DATE 11/1974

VOLUME 9 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700344

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 18

FOLDER TITLE President Ford's Trip to Seoul,
November 1974 (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/24/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH

PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULAKey Conclusions

The possibility of another war in Korea seems remote under present circumstances.

- The presence of U. S. forces in South Korea and the Mutual Security Treaty with the U. S. deter North Korea from major military adventures.
- North Korea cannot rely on the firm support of its allies for another invasion of the South.
- The North does not have the military strength to deliver a knockout blow to the South at the outset of any invasion.

There has been only very limited progress, however, in defusing the inherently unstable Korean situation.

- The USSR and China appear constrained by their competition for favor in Pyongyang from cooperating in measures to guarantee the legitimacy of South Korea.
- The North-South talks have had no concrete result.
- Occasional military incidents continue to hold the potential for escalation into serious clashes.
- The North has not given up its hope of unifying the peninsula under communist rule. Political instability in the South, if it becomes much worse, might entice the North to act in support of anti-Pak elements.

Involvement of the Powers

The prospect of renewed hostilities on the Korean peninsula has decreased basically as a result of Moscow and Peking's unwillingness to endorse or support North Korean aggression. This attitude has been reinforced in recent years by the changes in relations among the major powers. The deepening of the Sino-Soviet split, the Sino-U. S. rapprochement, and progress in U. S. -Soviet detente have created an

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

~~SECRET~~NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines; *alt. v. 2.0 12/5/03*By *WA* NARA, Date *1/3/11*

atmosphere in which the powers -- and Japan as well - now share a common interest in preserving stability in Korea and removing the peninsula as a potential source of friction among them. In practical terms, this has meant unspoken approval of the continued division into "two Koreas. "

Despite this common interest, there has been only limited cooperation among the powers in dealing with the Korean problem. Since Korea remains an integral element in the rivalry between Moscow and Peking, they have found it important to their interests to court North Korea as an ally. This has permitted Pyongyang to play one against the other -- though it is now much closer to Peking -- and to seek and obtain increasing quantities of sophisticated weaponry as the price for good relations. The quest for influence in the North has also inhibited Moscow and Peking in responding to overtures from the U. S. for mutual recognition of the two Korean governments.

Mutual recognition by the major Communist powers has so far been strongly opposed by Pyongyang which sees it as a major step in the direction of ratifying the permanent division of the peninsula. Peking, however, did cooperate with the U. S. a year ago in working out a compromise resolution on the Korean question at the U. N. The Chinese helped avert an acrimonious debate in which the presence of U. S. forces in South Korea would have been loudly attacked. The Soviets also went along with the compromise. Pyongyang's disappointment was lessened somewhat by a concurrent agreement to dissolve the U. N. political apparatus in South Korea.

The North Koreans are asking for more at the U. N. this year -- the withdrawal of all "foreign troops under the U. N. flag. " The Soviets are again backing Pyongyang, though without enthusiasm. Peking's support for the hard North Korean line seems firmer than a year ago, though the Chinese may again show interest in a last-minute compromise if -- as is likely -- a pro-Seoul resolution has the votes to pass.

The North-South Dialogue

While changed relationships among the powers have reduced the possibility of a new Korean war, they also have generated anxieties in both Pyongyang and Seoul, neither certain of the reliability of its allies. Their most notable adjustment has been an exploratory dialogue opened in 1971. At high tide, in July 1972, this dialogue produced a joint communique in which the two sides agreed to work for peaceful reunification.

By mid-1973, the dialogue had foundered on conflicting views of its objectives. During the past year, Pyongyang and Seoul have returned to the pattern of harsh propaganda exchanges which prevailed before 1971. Neither side, however, has moved to end the bilateral talks. Neither wants to accept the onus of doing so. Both find uses, however marginal, for the forum.

Diplomatic Competition

In the changed international environment, North and South have also undertaken a wide-ranging search for additional sources of political, economic, and military support. Pyongyang has had dramatic success in increasing the number of states with which it has official relations. Some 70 states now recognize Pyongyang, compared to 38 before the 1972 joint communique. Many of the Third World and European countries that have recognized North Korea previously had ties only with Seoul; in most cases, these ties have been maintained. Pyongyang accepts this duality as a necessity if it is to achieve international parity with the South. Pyongyang is making considerable progress in expanding its foreign trade beyond the confines of the communist world, especially with Western Europe and Japan.

The South Koreans still have relations with more countries than Pyongyang -- 94 at last count. But Seoul is seriously concerned that it has lost the diplomatic initiative to the North Koreans. In particular, South Korea wants to open contacts with Peking, Moscow, and the Eastern Europeans to balance Pyongyang's gains in the West. Efforts to do so, however, have had no significant success.

The Military Balance

The military balance on the peninsula favors South Korea with respect to ground forces, but North Korea in the air and on the sea. Both, however, remain dependent on external support to sustain any major military operation beyond a few weeks duration. This situation is unlikely to change for some years despite increased emphasis in both countries on developing independent capabilities for carrying on warfare against the other. This effort includes increased military budgets, the provision of additional domestic weapons production capacity, and increased interest in overseas procurement of relatively sophisticated equipment, especially from Western Europe.



Thus, while the opposition of the major powers to renewed hostilities is a strong inhibiting factor, it is also leading to a situation in which the Koreans, over time, will be less restrained by their respective allies. Pyongyang, for example, will soon for the first time have extensive oil storage capacity -- now an inhibiting factor in its war planning. The North, moreover, has recently demonstrated willingness to initiate risky actions in the air and sea space along its frontiers. With regard to Seoul, there is reliable reporting that it is bent on developing a nuclear deterrent as soon as possible.

North Korea's Internal Situation

Among the major concerns of the South Koreans is the nature of the competing regime in the North, one of the most disciplined and assertive in the world. State and party are dominated by the 62-year old Kim Il-song, the object of a personality cult of extreme intensity. There is no sign that Kim, after more than 25 years in power, is threatened by any segment of the North Korean party, bureaucracy, or army. But he does have domestic critics and has felt compelled at times to respond by switching major domestic and foreign policy lines. Nepotism is one criticism of Kim that has not been met. Kim has groomed a younger brother and, more recently, a son as potential successors to his leadership. Speculation on the succession, however, centers heavily on the extraordinary difficulties any new Northern leadership would encounter in maintaining tight control.

POLITICAL PROSPECTS IN SOUTH KOREA

In the three years since his narrow victory in the 1971 presidential election, Pak Chung-hee has undertaken a systematic campaign to strengthen and perpetuate his control over South Korea. He has used threats and intimidation, declared martial law and emergency situations, rewritten the constitution to his own specifications, and issued emergency decrees providing for severe punishment of any who question his policies.

To a great extent, the South Korean populace has tacitly accepted Pak's policies and acquiesced in the loss of the democratic processes that seemed ready to flourish in the late 1960s. Pak's support among many South Koreans stems from the fact that under his leadership the country has been transformed from a backward agricultural society to an important light industrial state with a powerful military and considerable international prestige.

The Opposition

But Pak has never been totally successful in getting a significant portion of the educated urban elite to accept his authoritarian policies. He has faced persistent opposition from university students who, however, have lacked the organization and popular appeal that would make them a serious threat to the regime. But in the past year the nature of the opposition has changed. Partly as a result of the government's heavy-handed tactics against the students and partly because of increasing disaffection with the regime's uncompromising policies, Christian leaders, the press and spokesmen for the political opposition have joined ranks with the students adding heretofore missing organizational talent, resources, commitment and the ability to focus foreign criticism on Seoul's domestic policies particularly in the U. S. and Japan.

The goals of those opposed to Pak vary. Many simply want to return to the pre-1972 system of limited parliamentary government which Pak tolerated partly out of deference to his government's then heavy dependence on the U. S. Others, however, increasingly believe that if Pak will not change his policies, he must be removed. Their determination to press for changes has, in recent weeks, raised the prospect of increasingly serious domestic unrest in South Korea.

With the potential for domestic turmoil mounting, Pak is also facing the prospect of erosion of the support he has always enjoyed from more conservative elements in the society. His willingness to risk a break in relations with Japan in the wake of the assassination of his

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

NSC Memo, 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines; *State review 12/5/03*

By *AA* NARA, Date *1/3/11*

wife was unsettling for many in Korea. Though the dispute was settled to Seoul's satisfaction, some may still be disturbed about Pak's seemingly irrational handling of the situation. Perhaps more significantly, Pak's ability to provide the nation with strong and imaginative economic leadership -- a basic underpinning of his regime -- may come into question with Seoul now entering its most serious economic slump in a decade.

Pak is dealing firmly with the renewed unrest. Universities have been closed down, at least temporarily. Dissident leaders have been picked up for police interrogation and warnings. But probably out of concern for U. S. reactions on the eve of your visit, the authorities have avoided the use of mass arrests and strong-arm tactics. Indeed, the opposition has been counting on at least this measure of government flexibility in the period preceding your visit.

Pak is also moving to head off increased unemployment and labor unrest and is seeking to shore up relations with his allies particularly the U. S. He recognized that holding Seoul's economy on course will require strong backing from Tokyo and Washington and that his ability to count on the loyalty of the armed forces will in large measure be determined by a continued American security commitment to his government.

Pak's measures have had a fallout in the U. S. -- in Japan as well. U. S. church organizations and media have inveighed against Pak's tight controls. In Congress, the Fraser Sub-Committee has held hearings on human rights in South Korea. This in turn has added momentum to moves to reduce drastically our military assistance to South Korea or to terminate it outright. A recent letter to you from Congressman Fraser and seven others asked you to tell Pak that "unless human rights are restored to the Korean people, the United States will begin to disengage from South Korea."

The Outlook

Perhaps the most compelling reason for concern over South Korea's future is the fact that President Pak appears to have foreclosed the possibility of peaceful change in political leadership. Pak may indeed be able to maintain control for another period of months, or even years, through a judicious combination of concessions and restraints. He still has the loyalty, if not the wholehearted approval, of the



powerful military leadership. He has an effective Security Service. And, most important, the bulk of the South Korean population probably continues to view him as the best man for the job.

Pak appears to have weighed carefully the odds for and against certain domestic policies and the possible foreign repercussions. Though withdrawn and taciturn, Pak is not isolated from the day-to-day functioning of his government nor is he unfamiliar with the mood of the people. His advisors, though wary of challenging his views, are not merely sycophants anxious to share in the power of the leader. In short, Pak is not an enfeebled Syngman Rhee, nor is there any similarity between Pak's regime and the Rhee Government in its final days.

But Pak must deal with a determined opposition, committed increasingly to achieving fundamental changes in his regime's policies. Their agitation can be suppressed, or at least contained, perhaps for a long time. The outlook, however, is for an increase of the scope and intensity of the political unrest of the past year so long as Pak refuses to set some limit on what appears to be open-ended occupancy of South Korea's presidential office.



NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
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WITHDRAWAL ID 033099

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL ÇBriefing Paper

CREATOR'S NAME Henry A. Kissinger

RECEIVER'S NAME The President

TITLE Meeting with the President of the
Republic of Korea, Park Chung-hee

DESCRIPTION Duplicate

CREATION DATE 11/14/1974

VOLUME 9 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700344

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES

BOX NUMBER 18

FOLDER TITLE President Ford's Trip to Seoul,
November 1974 (1)

DATE WITHDRAWN 03/24/2011

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST TMH