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*Mr. Jacobs*  
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(2)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 28, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Donald G. MacDonald  
Assistant Administrator for Asia  
Agency for International Development

SUBJECT: PL-480 for Korea

We have considered your draft message on PL-480 to Korea at a senior level in the NSC and CIEP staffs. We believe the U.S. should be more positive and that the nature of our PL-480 programs in FY-75 and following years should be left completely open at this time. We have discussed our concerns with Ambassador Habib.

At this difficult time of rapid change in the South Korean situation we want to preserve the image of the U.S. as a sound and reliable friend on whose word and commitment the Koreans can rely.

Attached is our suggested redraft of the proposed cable. I am available to discuss this with you or your staff at any time.

*John A. Bushnell*  
John A. Bushnell  
Staff Member

Copies to:  
ASIA/DP:AShadow  
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USDA:AMead  
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DRAFT CABLE TO AM EMBASSY SEOUL

SUBJECT: Korea PL-480 Programs

REF: Seoul 169

FOR ADLER FROM MACDONALD

1. Fully understand your need for Washington policy guidance on USG plans to deal with Korea PL-480 commitments, and appreciate your thoughtful suggestions on how program could be implemented over the next few year period in the face of possible reductions in overall USG agricultural commodity availabilities for PL-480 and other concessional food assistance.

2. It remains our intention to meet our PL-480 commitments as soon as our commodity availabilities permit. The extreme market conditions in FY-74 have caused us to fall substantially behind. Fortunately Korea has been able to overcome the problems caused by this unexpected shortfall in our assistance. We hope to meet our commitment in FY-75. However, shipments of rice will not be possible until our harvest is largely in, perhaps December. The market situation for wheat and cotton is unclear, and we may again be short of some commodities in which Korea is interested next fiscal year depending not only on our own production but also on production and demand in other parts of the world. In our FY-75 budget we are making provision for a full \$150 million program for Korea, but this of course does not guarantee that commodities will be available.

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3. We fully recognize that uncertainties on PL-480 complicate Korean planning. There is no easy solution for these uncertainties. The Koreans should be aware that there is no guarantee we shall have commodities available. Suspect experience of this year has brought this element of uncertainty home to them. They should also understand that should they choose to budget for less than the full \$150 million, this would not prejudice their receipt of the full amount if commodities are available.

4. At this point it does not appear likely that we will be able to make up a large part of the FY-74 shortfall in FY-75. However, we have our total commitment in mind and we shall address the problem of making up deficiencies as the commodity situation in FY-75 and subsequent years becomes clearer.

5. With regard to your specific question on anticipated extent of PL-480 shipments in second half CY 74 (para 6 reftel), I regret that we still cannot be any more specific than I was in my November letter to you on this subject.



## MEMORANDUM

572 - X

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

February 11, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

W. R. SMYSER *RS/SM*  
JOHN A. FROEBE, JR. *JAF*

SUBJECT:

U. K. Plans to Expand Relations  
with North Korea

The U. K. Embassy here has informed the State Department (at the Korean Desk level) that it is prepared to recognize North Korea, but will not do so until after next fall's U. N. General Assembly. The U. K. does intend, however, within the next few weeks to tell Pyongyang that they can open a trade office in London; the U. K. for its own part does not plan to open one in Pyongyang in the near future. London has informed Seoul of its contemplated move; the ROK reaction was strongly negative.

We are concerned over the potential consequences of the planned U. K. move, particularly since this would come on the heels of Australia's recognition of North Korea, which will probably take place within the coming month:

-- Others will be encouraged to follow suit, so as to be among the first and not the last to climb on board. The attached table (Tab A) of Asian and Western European states having diplomatic and consular relations with either or both Koreas makes clear that there are several states in Asia and perhaps half a dozen in Western Europe that would be stimulated to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea. (Tokyo would hopefully do no more than accelerate its expansion of trade and cultural relations with Pyongyang.) Our concern, of course, is that this would happen in the absence of any reciprocal movement from the Communist states toward South Korea. This is likely to be the outcome, given Australia's intention to go ahead despite the unresponsiveness of the East European states it has approached on this score.

-- North Korea will be encouraged toward intransigence, which will be particularly important to us as it may affect our upcoming negotiations over the termination of the U. N. Command.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~XGDS 5b (3)  
BYAUTH Sec Kissinger

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NSC Memo Guidelines; State v. 20 9/17/03  
By *SM* 10/23/10  
10/23/10  
10/23/10

-- North Korea's success will add to the Park Government's problems as it grapples with the recently intensified political criticism at home.

State (EA) does not believe that the U.K. move, any more than Australian recognition of North Korea, will impact adversely on our upcoming negotiations on the UNC. We disagree. While we cannot positively assert that their moves will have a substantial impact, we believe this to be a risk that we should not take.

We believe it would be useful if Under Secretary Sisco would call in the U.K. Ambassador and ask that the U.K. delay any approach to North Korea on a trade office or otherwise expanded relations until after next fall's UNGA. The U.K. may be somewhat reluctant since it has already informed Seoul of its intended move -- although London's proceeding in this manner seems to be something short of the sort of consultations we might hope for on this problem.

Recommendation:

That you ask Under Secretary Sisco to call in the U.K. Ambassador to urge him strongly to delay any approach to North Korea on a trade office or otherwise expanded relations until after next fall's UNGA.

Approach \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Concurrences:

Mr. Solomon *RHS/jm*

Asian Countries

<u>Asian Country</u>	<u>Diplomatic Relations with Republic of Korea (ROK)</u>	<u>Diplomatic Relations with Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)</u>
Australia	Yes	
Burma	Consular Relations	Consular Relations
Cambodia	Yes	
China, Republic of	Yes	
Fiji	Yes	
India	Yes	Yes
Indonesia	Yes	Yes
Japan	Yes	
Malaysia	Yes	Yes
New Zealand	Yes	
Pakistan	Counsular Relations	Yes
Philippines	Yes	
Singapore	Consular Relations	Consular Relations
Thailand	Yes	
Vietnam, Republic of	Yes	

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Western European Countries

<u>Western European Countries</u>	<u>Diplomatic Relations with Republic of Korea (ROK)</u>	<u>Diplomatic Relations with Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)</u> <u>North Korean Trade Mission</u>
Austria	Yes	
Belgium	Yes	
Canada	Yes	
Denmark	Yes	Yes
Finland	Yes	Yes
France	Yes	North Korean Trade Mission
Germany, Federal Republic of	Yes	
Greece	Yes	
Iceland	Yes	Yes
Italy	Yes	
Luxembourg	Yes	
Netherlands	Yes	
Norway	Yes	Yes
Portugal	Yes	
Spain	Yes	
Sweden	Yes	Yes
Switzerland	Yes	



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

March 19, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM:

W. R. SMYSER

SUBJECT:

Your Meeting with South Korean  
Foreign Minister Kim on March 20,  
1974 at 6:00 p.m.

You have agreed to meet with Foreign Minister Kim Dong-jo on March 20, 1974 at 6:00 p.m. Kim is on his way back to Seoul from a tour of South America. He will likely be interested mainly in discussing with you the issue of U.N. Command (UNC) termination and related questions, particularly since he is one of two Korean officials designated by President Park to be the conduit to us on this problem.

As you know, we believe we must move soon to coordinate a negotiating package and strategy with Seoul so that we can approach the PRC and have the ROK approach North Korea hopefully sometime next month. We expect to have the response to NSSM on this question, together with agency comments and recommendations, ready for your and the President's consideration this week.

Suggested Talking Points

1. Termination of the UNC.

-- It is evident from Ambassador Habib's initial discussion of this question with President Park that we both agree that the UNC cannot be preserved except at an unacceptable political cost.

-- (Responding to Park's concern that U.S. forces continue in Korea if the UNC is terminated) We plan no substantial changes in U.S. force levels at least in the near term -- at least until we have completed the transition to the post-UNC termination security arrangements. We would consult the ROK in advance on any changes we would contemplate. Also, we have made no decision to assign the Army division in Korea an additional role of a regional contingency reserve; this is only one longer-term option.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

XGDS 5b (3)  
BYAUTH Sec Kissinger

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TAK

5/17/03  
NSC  
By  
NARA Date 12/2/10

-- Our major objective in the negotiations on the UNC's termination is to arrive at substitute arrangements that will preserve at least the present degree of security for the ROK.

-- We expect to be ready in the next few weeks for detailed discussions with the ROK (Foreign Minister Kim and Presidential Special Assistant Choe) on a negotiating package and strategy.

2. Diplomatic recognition of North Korea by Australia. Kim may raise the question of Australia's opening negotiations with North Korea looking toward diplomatic recognition and the establishment of diplomatic relations. At our urging, Australia approached several East European states suggesting that they recognize South Korea in order to maintain a long-term balance in the diplomatic positions of the two Koreas. The East European states were unresponsive.

-- We will continue to urge friendly governments to expand relations with North Korea no faster than the other side expands relations with South Korea.

-- As appropriate, we will also take up with the PRC and the Soviets our desire for a balanced expansion of relations with both Koreas.

-- We think it would be desirable for the ROK to begin an active campaign to expand trade and diplomatic contacts with states where it does not now have relations.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

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S/SRM

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PROCESSED EAST ASIAN  
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

TO: The Secretary  
FROM: EA - Robert S. Ingersoll

Your Meeting with ROK Foreign Minister Kim  
Wednesday, March 20-6:00 pm

Participants:

ROK: Foreign Minister Kim Dong Jo  
Hahn Pyong Choon, Korean Ambassador

US: The Secretary  
Assistant Secretary Ingersoll  
Donald Ranard, EA/K (Not taken)  
~~P. Wesley Kitcher, EA/K (Not taken)~~

Biographic information is attached at Tab A.

Setting:

On instructions, Ambassador Habib has started discussions with President Park and Foreign Minister Kim on alternative arrangements to the UN Command. Your meeting with Foreign Minister Kim will emphasize the importance we attach to this matter and our determination to proceed as quickly as we can toward resolving the UN Command problem.

Background

Kim is on his way home after an official trip to Latin America. He has been charged by President Park with leading the discussions with us on the UN Command problem and he desires an exchange of views with you.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 3.3

State Dept Guidelines

~~TOP SECRET/NO DIS~~

XGDS

By WA NARA, Date 12/3/10

State v. v. 9/1/03



We expect that the UN Command issue and the related problem of the fall UN General Assembly session will be the main topics of his conversation. Kim will probably raise the importance of discussions with the PRC on this issue. We have not yet made specific decision on the various problems connected with the Command so that your response will necessarily be of a general nature. [We would like to be sure the Koreans understand that we desire that Seoul be the primary site of discussions]

Kim may also want to raise a number of perennial subjects with you, primarily to provide public and private evidence of US support which is particularly important to the ROKG at this time when its dealings with the North have stalemated.

Kim may well try to develop an argument that the North has abandoned peaceful unification and is prepared to undertake some kind of overt action against the ROK. We do not think we should encourage him in this line. The whole issue of North-South relations is now deeply enmeshed with the ROKG's own internal difficulties and the South is taking any opportunity to use the security issue with its friends abroad as well as with its populace at home.

#### Issues/Talking Points

##### 1. Courtesy Talking Points

-- Congratulate him on his appointment as Foreign Minister (December, 1973).

-- Recall effective manner in which Kim represented his country as Ambassador to US (67-73).

##### 2. UN Command Alternatives

ROK Position: President Park has agreed with us that the growing difficulties of defending the UN Command against attack in the UN General Assembly make it necessary to consider alternative arrange-



ments. He does not want to risk defeat in the UN General Assembly on this issue. He has emphasized his desire to have US troops continue their presence in Korea. Ambassador Habib believes the ROKG prefers to respond to our suggestions rather than advance its own.

US Position: The UN Command problem has been examined in the response to NSSM 190, but (the implementing decisions have not yet been made). There is agreement in both State and Defense that prior to the opening of the UN General Assembly this fall we should make clear to the other side we are prepared to terminate the UN Command, and that we should ascertain PRC views at an early date. *he has not yet decided on a specific package.*

Your Talking Points:

*i) The other side will agree to adequate substitute security arrangements,*  
-- We welcome the ROKG response to Ambassador Habib's initial presentation on the UN Command problem, a problem of great importance to both countries.

-- We have not made detailed decisions on the UN Command but we expect to send instructions to Ambassador Habib within the next few weeks for discussions with Kim.

-- We want to move with deliberate speed but we also want to ensure insofar as we are able that any changes we make do not lessen the security of the peninsula.

-- We recognize importance of discussion with the PRC and at an appropriate point we will approach them.

3. UN General Assembly Consideration of a Korean Item

ROK Position: They strongly wish to avoid a debate at New York this year because it would focus on the UN Command and the US troop presence to the detriment of the ROK. They are unsure the world-wide lobbying required would be worth the effort. They



look to us to work out some arrangement with the PRC to avoid inscription of a Korean item on the basis that we will have made some progress on the termination of the UN Command. At the same time the ROK Ambassador at New York has raised with Ambassador Scali the possibility of preemptively inscribing a Korean item which would likely give us the tactical advantage in the General Assembly of prior consideration of our resolution. This proposal has probably been discussed with Foreign Minister Kim.

US Position: We share the ROK's preference for no UN debate this year. The likelihood of North Korea's supporters moving to inscribe a "hostile" Korean item on the UNGA agenda will increase if there is no movement from our side on the UN Command issue. Thus consultations with the ROK and PRC on the UNC are necessary to forestall inscription; after inscription, it will be more difficult to work out a compromise with the PRC. USUN has also pointed out to the ROK the anomaly of stimulating a debate on Korea by preemptive inscription. However, if it is not possible to reach some agreement with the other side on termination of the UN Command and a debate appears likely, inscription of a "friendly" Korean item in advance of the other side's move would be tactically desirable.

Your Talking Points:

-- We would like to avoid a debate on Korea at the UNGA if this is possible.

-- The idea of a preemptive inscription has some attraction but there is the obvious disadvantage of forcing a debate in the absence of any consultation with the other side and of requiring us to make public prematurely proposals on the UN Command. I suggest our UN missions stay in close touch on this question and submit their recommendations.

-- We should concentrate on our own consultations on the UN Command to develop a position we can then discuss with the PRC and others.





#### 4. US Troop Presence

ROK Position: The ROKG has had our assurances (following inaccurate press accounts of Secretary Schlesinger's testimony February 28) that no changes in US troop levels in Korea are planned. Kim will likely want your reiteration of this assurance.

US Position: We have no plans to reduce US force levels in Korea for the next year or two (i.e. until the UNC issue is settled and new armistice arrangements are in place).

##### Your Talking Points:

-- We have no plans [for reducing US troop levels this year.] *to make substantial changes in US force levels in Korea for the near term - at least through the transition to the post-UNC situation*  
-- We will consult with the ROKG before making *any* further troop reductions.

-- The question of a mobile reserve role for the US division in Korea has, as Secretary Schlesinger told Congress, been studied as one of a number of very long-range possibilities.

#### 5. ROK Relations with North Korea

ROK Position: The ROKG has taken the position that North Korea is becoming increasingly belligerent as shown by the Western Islands dispute, the recent attack on ROK fishing boats and the uncovering of a spy ring aimed at overthrowing the ROKG. The North's military preparations are increasing and its unacceptable demands in the North-South talks show that its real aim continues to be domination of the South.

US Position: We have no hard evidence that the North is preparing for overt military action. The North had stalemated the talks and although it now has shown renewed interest in them it probably does not expect significant progress until it is clear that the Park Government can survive its expected spring confrontation with students and Christian groups.



Your Talking Points:

-- We hope the ROKG will react firmly but non-provocatively to North Korean provoked incidents and will continue to do its part in efforts to reduce tension in the peninsula.

-- We hope the ROKG will continue its efforts to engage the North in serious discussion.

6. Diplomatic Recognition of North Korea

ROK Position: The ROKG is distressed by Australia's decision to recognize North Korea and by its own inability to obtain recognition from any of the communist states. It considers its position in the South-North dialogue weakened and would like our help in discouraging other friendly states from recognizing North Korea and in obtaining recognition from communist states particularly the PRC.

US Position: We have agreed to counsel restraint to friendly states proposing to recognize North Korea in those cases we think appropriate. We have also agreed when appropriate to raise the question of recognition with the PRC, USSR and other communist states.

Your Talking Points:

*-- We will continue to urge friendly governments to suspend relations.*

[-- Prospects for recognition of the ROK by the PRC or USSR are limited but we will do what we can.]

[-- The ROKG should not over-react to Western recognition of Pyongyang but should continue its own program of seeking recognition by non-aligned countries.]

Attachments:

*with North Korea no further than the other sides  
appears relations with South Korea, and will  
an appropriate convey this approach to the PRC and others*

Tab A -Biographies on Foreign Minister Kim and  
Ambassador Hahn

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS~~

*one*  
Drafted: EA/K:PWK:kriebel:dpw  
3/18/74:X22332

Concurrences: *Part for*  
EA/K - Mr. Ranard

IO - Mr. Buffum (draft) *Part for*

EA - Mr. Sneider PM/ISP - Mr. Brown (draft) *Part for*





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VOLUME . . . . . 1 page

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TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum  
CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . W.R. Smyser, Richard H. Solomon,  
Richard T. Kennedy  
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger  
TITLE . . . . . NSSM 190: Diplomatic Initiatives in  
Korea  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 03/20/1974  
VOLUME . . . . . 6 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700244  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST  
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TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Henry A. Kissinger

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . The President

TITLE . . . . . Negotiations on Terminating the United  
Nations Command in Korea

CREATION DATE . . . . . 03/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 4 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700244

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST  
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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

National Security Decision Memorandum

TO: The Secretary of Defense  
The Deputy Secretary of State  
Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: Termination of the U. N. Command in Korea

The President has reviewed the response to NSSM 190 and agency comments thereon, and has made the following decisions:

1. Negotiating Package

To maintain and improve ROK security the United States should seek:

- Substitution of U. S. and ROK military commanders for the Commander-in-Chief United Nations Command as our side's signatory to the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. The ROK and North Korean representatives should then become the principal members of the Military Armistice Commission.
- Tacit acceptance by the other side of a continued U. S. force presence in South Korea for at least the short term, in return for a Shanghai-type communique committing ourselves to reduce and ultimately withdraw U. S. forces as the security situation on the Peninsula is stabilized.
- A non-aggression pact between the two Koreas.
- U. N. Security Council endorsement of the agreed-upon package of substitute security arrangements.
- Avoidance of other changes in the Armistice Agreement.

2. Negotiating Strategy

The United States should pursue a negotiating strategy along two tracks. The Seoul-Pyongyang track should be primary. In the second track, we

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XGDS 5b(3)  
BYAUTH H. A. Kissinger

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526 (rev. 10/13/2015) SEC 3.3  
NSC Memo, SecDef, dated 12/3/10, Guidelines  
By MM NARA Date 12/3/10

should make parallel approaches to the major powers involved -- the PRC, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Specifically, we should:

- Consult with the ROK before raising proposals with any of the major powers. We should also seek ROK agreement to transfer operational control of ROK forces from CINCUNC upon its termination to a new U.S.-ROK combined command under a senior U.S. military officer.
- Keep the Soviets generally informed but discourage any spoiling role or direct Soviet involvement.
- Keep Japan continuously informed. In addition, (a) seek an explicit agreement from the Japanese Government that would extend the secret 1961 Kishi Minute to the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty following termination of the UNC, but (b) not seek any extension in Japan of third country basing rights under the U.N. Status of Forces Agreement following termination of the UNC.

The minimum objective of the United States in this negotiating approach is to place ourselves by early summer in a defensible position for possible debate of the Korean issue in the U.N. General Assembly this coming fall.

### 3. U.S. Force Presence in South Korea

There should be no substantial changes in the level or missions of our forces in the ROK during the period of transition to new security arrangements following termination of the UNC.

Henry A. Kissinger





See SRG book  
for NSSM 190



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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum

TITLE . . . . . Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea

CREATION DATE . . . . . 03/06/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 10 pages

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RECEIVER'S TITLE . . . . . Assistant to the President for National  
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TITLE . . . . . Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 03/07/1974  
VOLUME . . . . . 4 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700244  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST  
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TITLE . . . . . Assigned ROK, US, and Katusa Strengths  
as of 31 December 1973  
  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 12/31/1974  
  
VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages  
  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700244  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST  
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CREATOR'S TITLE . . . . . Director  
RECEIVER'S TITLE . . . . . The President  
TITLE . . . . . Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea;  
NSSM-190  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 03/02/1974  
VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700244  
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*sanitized 9/7/04*



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

2 March 1974

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea; NSSM-190

1. Regarding the issue of preserving the UN Command in Korea, I believe that it probably cannot be sustained at the UN beyond this fall's General Assembly session, and that an effort to preserve the UNC for another year would be counterproductive.

2. I feel that North Korea is unlikely to be attracted to any of the three options offered in the response to NSSM-190, but least of all by Option 1. I believe that Option 2, however, stands a chance of gaining serious North Korean consideration, although I am not sanguine in the light of North Korea's current harsh attitude toward the US and South Korea. Therefore, the issue might hinge on China's willingness and ability to persuade Pyongyang that the time had come to modify its hard-line posture.

3. I am concerned that there may be an over-estimation of the degree of influence that China might be able to exercise over North Korean actions in the near term, although I believe that China does want to play a constructive role regarding stability on the Korean peninsula.

4. In this connection, the response to NSSM-190, in its heavy emphasis on US consultation with Peking, may have understated the USSR interest in the situation. I am concerned that Moscow might read the negotiations,

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if pursued as projected, as an effort to exclude it from an influential role in Korean affairs.

5. The other matters raised in the response to NSSM-190 and the associated papers on future United States force dispositions in South Korea are in my view primarily operational in nature, not calling for intelligence comment.

*WEC*  
W. E. Colby  
Director



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TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum  
CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Fred C. Ikle  
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Mr. Henry A. Kissinger  
TITLE . . . . . Diplomatic Initiatives in Korea  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 03/04/1974  
VOLUME . . . . . 4 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700244  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST  
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS STAFF FILES  
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REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum

TITLE . . . . . NSSM 171 Follow-On -- Analysis of the  
Role of the Army Division in Korea

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/13/1973

VOLUME . . . . . 17 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700244

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
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

November 27, 1973


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MEMORANDUM FOR MAJOR GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Strategy and Forces for Asia - NSSM 171

In his memorandum of August 28, 1973, to members of the Defense Program Review Committee, Dr. Kissinger directed the Department of State to prepare an analysis of the political and diplomatic implications of converting the U.S. Second Infantry Division to a more mobile configuration.

The analysis is attached.

  
Thomas R. Pickering  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:  
Analysis

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E.O. 12958 (as amended) SEC 8.3

NSC Memo; 3/30/06, State Dept. Guidelines

By 11 NARA, Date 12/3/11

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TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇReport  
  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . US Force Structure in South Korea  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 11/27/1973  
VOLUME . . . . . 7 pages  
  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033700244  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. NSC EAST  
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