The original documents are located in Box 6, folder "China, unnumbered items - (38), 12/3/76 - 12/29/76" of the Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

6388

INFORMATION December 3, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR:

BRENT SCOWCROFT

WILLIAM GLEYSTEEN

SUBJECT:

FROM:

Letter of Congratulations from Secretary Kissinger to PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua

The following is the text of the congratulatory message Secretary Kissinger is sending (via cable to USLO) to newly appointed PRC Foreign Minister Huang Hua.

Dear Mr. Minister:

You have my warm congratulations on your appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. I have valued our periodic conversations during your distinguished tenure as Permanent Representative of your country to the United Nations and know that my successor as Secretary of State will look forward to working with you in consolidating the new and more positive relationship between our two countries that has been achieved in recent years on the basis of the Shanghai Communique. Please accept my personal good wishes as you assume your important new responsibilities.

Sincerely,

Henry A. Kissinger

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

SECRET

December 20, 1976

NODIS

TO : The Secretary

S/P

FROM :

- Winston Lord

Your Meeting with Ambassador Huang Chen, Tuesday, December 21, 1976, at 4:30 p.m.

Background

I have asked EA to prepare separately a roundup on recent developments in our bilateral contacts, PRC domestic politics, and Chinese foreign policy.

You will recall that the Ambassador was "sick" and therefore unable to see you just before the elections, though he was certain to get well within a day or two after November 2nd. I have not specified the purpose of this meeting, but the Chinese will undoubtedly assume it is in the nature of your November (It took them two days to confirm the appointproposal. ment this time.) This is a personal meeting, a blend of nostalgic ruminations and visions of the future. You will presumably not wish to press any particular issues, though you may wish to indulge in a brief review of certain international issues. If so, this is likely to be even more unilateral than usual, since the Ambassador's customary reserve will be reinforced by their own domestic situation, the changes under way in their Foreign Ministry, and our transition period.

There are unconfirmed rumors that Ambassador Huang may soon be replaced by our old friend, Chang Wen-chin. The Ambassador intimated that his tour might soon be up during the lunch he gave for Ambassador Gates. Chang, you will recall, has been PRC Ambassador to Canada where he was posted a couple of years ago allegedly because of his questioning of what we were up to with Moscow.

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He is the master linquist who worked on the Shanghai Communique while he was their Assistant Secretary for American Affairs, and he flew with us from Pakistan to Peking in July of '71. Another rumor has it that their current Ambassador to Tokyo, Ch'en Chu, will take Huang Hua's place in New York where we met him a couple of times when he was the Deputy.

The Chinese undoubtedly are somewhat concerned by policy statements emanating from the Carter camp. These include the President-elect's emphasis on Taiwan's security and independence during the campaign, the stress that both Carter and Vance have since put on US/Soviet relations and suggestions of cuts in the Defense budget, and Asian troop withdrawals. (Comment: I think it would be useful if you personally introduced Vance to the Ambassador sometime in January.)

Suggested Themes:

Following are a few themes you may wish to sound during your meeting:

- -- You are seeing the Ambassador as an old friend, as you take leave of office, in order to underline again your personal commitment to the improvement of US/China relations. Indeed, you had purposely planned to see him before the elections to emphasize your attitude no matter what the outcome.
- -- During all the events and turbulence of the past eight years nothing has meant more to you personally than your participation in the opening up of relations between our two great countries. In your view no process has greater portent for international affairs. On a personal level you will always recall your conversations with Chairman Mao and Prime Minister Chou and other Chinese leaders as among the most profound, stimulating and important.
- -- You will also always remember with warmth your lengthy association with the Ambassador, both during the early days in Paris and more recently here in Washington.

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- You are convinced that despite inevitable fluctuations in our relations and domestic complications in both countries the basic factors which brought our two nations together will continue to strengthen our relations over the coming years. The progressive development of our ties is clearly crucial to both countries and to global stability. You have talked in this vein to your successor, Mr. Vance, and you are convinced that the next Administration fully appreciates these factors and will work to carry on the process that has been launched.

(After giving general indications of your own future plans), you will do whatever you can as a private citizen to support the strengthening of US/Chinese relations in the coming years.

- -- (You may wish to probe about the Ambassador's own future. You may wish also to indicate that you would like to introduce your successor to him in early January.)
- -- (If you wish to review certain international issues, I recommend the following:
 - Africa -- what we are up to there and what the Soviets are up to there -the implications for Chinese interests.
 - The Middle East -- the likely evolution in the light of Lebanon, the Israeli election process, and the next Administration's approach.
 - NATO -- your recent trip to Brussels and the mood of the alliance concerning the Soviet threat, as well as the generally sound state of US-European relations.
 - Japan -- the domestic political situation and the likely prospects for Japanese foreign policy.)

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Brief Update on the PRC

China has been almost totally preoccupied with internal developments since the July earthquake and the death of Mao in September. The subsequent purge of the radical "Gang of Four" is leading to greater emphasis on modernization and economic development at home. Thus far, however, there is no evidence of change in Chinese foreign policy, an area where radical influence had already been minimal.

Sino-US relations. The Chinese have adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward the Carter Administration. The official PRC media has implicitly noted with approval the Carter message conveyed by the Secretary earlier this month of continued support for NATO. Unofficially, the Chinese have used PRC-controlled newspapers in Hong Kong to signal disappointment with Carter's campaign pledge to support the independence of "the people of Taiwan." The Hong Kong communist papers have expressed hope that the President-elect will realize such views are incompatible with his professed desire to normalize relations with China.

The Chinese continue to maintain that the USSR is the primary issue in Sino-US relations and that Taiwan is secondary. This view was reaffirmed by leading Chinese officials in November, when Codel Curtis visited the PRC. We have had inconclusive intelligence reports that a handful of Chinese diplomats abroad have reflected to third country contacts "patience" regarding the Taiwan problem. The Chinese, however, also reiterated to Codel Curtis their position that no further improvement in Sino-US relations on such matters as exchanges is possible before normalization.

Internal Developments. The dramatic purge of four leading radicals following Chairman Mao's death has not brought stability to the Chinese political environment. During high-level meetings in October (enlarged Politburo) and December (NPC Standing Committee), the leadership failed to fill important vacancies opened up by deaths and the recent purge. One issue contributing to continuing indecision apparently is disagreement over the role to

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be played by Teng Hsiao-p'ing, whose rehabilitation is widely anticipated; how deeply the purge should extend is another issue. Factionalism remains a problem in the provinces but it appears not to be as troublesome now as press reports have suggested. The new regime does seem to have consensus agreement, however, on the need for more capital construction, heavy industry, and technological imports; policy disputes will be over how these increased investments are to meet civilian and military claims and fulfill demands of the various regions of China.

Foreign Affairs. Internal developments have impacted on the Foreign Ministry but not on foreign policy. Chiao Kuan-hua was dropped as Foreign Minister reportedly because he had been too vigorous in his denunciations of Teng and because he and his wife had otherwise been currying favor with the Chiang Ching group. Chiao's replacement by Huang Hua implies no foreign policy change. There will, however, be further personnel changes. Twenty PRC ambassadors have been recalled to Peking, and many of these will be given new assignments. Both former Ambassador to Japan Ch'an Ch'u and Chang Wen-chin, who has been PRC Ambassador to Canada, have been rumored to replace Huang at the UN. We have one unconfirmed report that PRCLO Chief Huang Chen recently told a third country diplomat that he also had been recalled, but we do not know of any plans to leave.

The Soviet Union has marked the death of Mao by ceasing its polemical attacks on the Chinese leadership. The Chinese are continuing their attacks on the Russians, and declare themselves to be waiting to see if the USSR's changed propaganda will be matched by a changed attitude on the border negotiations (which resumed after a long hiatus following border negotiation Ilichev's November 27 return to Peking). The Chinese are skeptical--as are we--that the Soviets intend to make the kind of concessions now that would be necessary to bring about a border settlement. But the PRC seems ready to respond favorably to any genuine Russian concessions.

Chinese opposition to Soviet expansionism continues to play a major role in PRC political dealings with Western Europe and Japan. The PRC privately is apprehensive about the effect of Fukuda's rise on the Peace Treaty negotiations. On the economic side, Western Europe and Japan can expect to be major beneficiaries

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of the renewed Chinese interest in modernization. The Chinese have indicated they expect to step up trade with the West and increase imports of whole plants and other Western technology--limited only by the PRC's ability to finance the imports.

In Southeast Asia China hastened to assure the new Thai military government that China welcomed its attempts to curb "Soviet subversive activities" within Thailand and to express hope that Thailand would act--in unspecified ways--to "counterbalance" growing Soviet influence in the region. While China clearly still fears the pro-Sovietism of Viet-Nam and Laos, the PRC continues to give some aid to both of them.

PRC policies toward the rest of the third world are still combining anti-Sovietism with support for regional and global third-world stands. Though it warns third world countries about the danger of letting in the Soviet "tiger" while expelling the US "wolf," China stops short of promoting the US cause in areas where we may be unpopular. Thus the PRC refused to support the US peace initiative in Rhodesia and denounced both "superpowers" for "meddling" in Southern Africa, but it has not attacked the Geneva negotiations. Only in the case of Angola has China refused to participate in "third world solidarity." China still has no relations with Angola and refused to vote for its admission to the UN.

Ambassador Gates' Peking Meetings. Ambassador Gates, whom you have authorized to make a courtesy call on Foreign Minister Huang, has not yet met with him. Gates did meet December 17 with Vice Foreign Minister Wang Hai-jung to discuss the US-PRC exchange program for 1977, principally to support the proposals for increased exchanges sponsored by the two American committees. Wang was cordial but implied that the PRC would resist any expansion in the program. Gates also suggested a continuation of the facilitated Congressional visits, but Wang made no direct comment on this.

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December 20, 1976



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(TOKYO) -- A JAPANESE NEWSPAPER SAYS TODAY A CHINESE OFFICIAL HAS OFFERED A FORMULA BY WHICH THE UNITED COULD GRANT FULL RECOGNITION TO PEKING. THE OFFICIAL QUOTED BY THE NEWSPAPER 'ASAHI (AH-SAH'-HEE) SHIMBUN'' IS CHEN-YI-SUNG, A MEMBER OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF CHINA'A NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS. HE SAYS THE U-S COULD RESTORE DIPLATIC RELATIONS WITH CHINA -- BREAK RELATIONS WITH TAIWAN AND ALLAY AMERICAN FEARS OF A COMMUNIST ATTACK ON THE DATIONALIST-HELD ISLAND.

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THE NEWSPAPER QUOTES CHEN AS SUGGESTING THAT THE UNITED STATES ADD TO DOCUMENTS RECOGNIZING THE PEKING GOVERNMENT A DECLARATION OF GRAVE CONCERN FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC.

THIS, IT IS IMPLIED, WOULD ALLEVIATE U-S FEARS THAT TAIWAN MIGHT BE ATTACKED BY THE COMMUNISTS AFTER AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC TIES TO THE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT WERE SEVERED AND ITS SECURITY TREATY ABROGATED.

PRESIDENT-ELECT JIMMY CARTER HAS SAID HE WANTS CLOSER TIES WITH PEKING BUT IS CONCERNED OVER TAIWAN'S SECURITY.

SOME U-S CHINA SCHOLARS HAVE SAID THAT SUCH A STATEMENT OF U-S CONCERN FOR PEACE IN THE REGION WOULD RESOLVE THE AMERICAN DILEMMA OVER TAIWAN'S FUTURE. CHEN DESCRIBED HIS VIEWS, SET FORTH IN AN EIGHT-HOUR INTERVIEW WITH THE PAPER, AS PERSONAL. ASAHI NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT BEFORE LEAVING PEKING CHEN CONFERRED AT LENGTH WITH A NUMBER OF CHINESE LEADERS. 07:56AES 12-29-76

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SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE:

Tuesday, December 21, 1976 4:35 p.m. - 5:40 p.m.

PLACE:

Secretary Kissinger's Office Department of State

PARTICIPANTS:

Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of PRC Liaison Office Mr. Tsien Ta Yung, (Counselor at Liaison Office) (No. 3 man) Mr. Hsu Shang-wei, Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State Mr. Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff

Ambassador Huang: Are you busy?

Secretary Kissinger: Am I busy? Well, I'm somewhat busy. I am spending a lot of time with my successor these days. I'm going to invite you in January to come to lunch so that I can introduce you to my successor.

Ambassador Huang: You are old friends. I know that Secretary-designate Vance was Chairman of the Board of the Rockefeller Foundation.

Secretary Kissinger: Right.

Ambassador Huang: You are old friends.

Secretary Kissinger: I have known him for a long time.

Ambassador Huang: About a week ago David Rockefeller paid a visit to me. He wants to go to China.

He talked to me about your relationship.

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SECRET - XGDS (3) CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER Secretary Kissinger: Between David Rockefeller and me? Ambassador Huang: He talked about his relationship to Vance and Vance's relationship to you. Secretary Kissinger: Yes, we have worked together for a long time. Ambassador Huang: So that's good. It's easier for you to transfer the work. Secretary Kissinger: Yes, that makes it a lot easier. Ambassador Huang: As you know Mr. Vance visited China last year as Head of the Delegation of the World Affairs Council. Secretary Kissinger: He was there just before I was. A number of our Chinese friends referred to his visit when I was there. Ambassador Huang: He spent more than 3 weeks in China. So you know each other quite well. Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I know him well and I think his basic philosophy will probably be similar to mine. Ambassador Huang: Also in terms of foreign policy? Secretary Kissinger: Especially in terms of foreign policy.

In fact I wanted to see you before I left office on a personal basis to tell you of all the things I have done in public life the opening to China is the policy that has been among the most significant. And as one of the co-authors of the Shanghai Communique I feel even as a private citizen I will always stand for the implementation of the Shanghai Communique and progress for the normalization of our relations.

Ambassador Huang: There have been several months since we met last. The last time we met was when you came to our Liaison Office to pay condolences at the parting of Chairman Mao. During this period United States has held a general election. I can tell you, Mr. Doctor, that

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the situation in China is now excellent. Our Party's Central Committee headed by Chairman Hua Kuo-feng has followed Chairman Mao's behest and smashed at one blow the "Gang of Four" and the anti-Party clique. After exposing the interference and disruption of the "Gang of Four", we should even better implement and carry out Chairman Mao's revolutionary line and policy in our foreign affairs. Doctor, you have met the Chairman . . (Discussion among the Chinese) you have met Chairman Mao 5 times. I can say that no other Foreign Minister has met Chairman Mao so many times. As I know, you have had several long talks with Chairman Mao.

Secretary Kissinger: They were of great importance.

Ambassador Huang: Chairman Mao during these long talks elucidated our position and views on the international situation, Sino/US relations and every major international issue in great detail.

Secretary Kissinger: In great detail and with great profundity.

Ambassador Huang: It proved that there are many common points among us; the most important item is that we join together to cope with the Polar Bear.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly.

Ambassador Huang: Although Chairman Mao has passed away his revolutionary policy in foreign affairs remains. And in the future we will strictly act accordingly. The revolutionary line and policy formulated by Chairman Mao will never change.

Secretary Kissinger: It's my conviction that the line as we discussed it with Chairman Mao and other Chinese leaders, especially Chairman Mao, about having common interests, especially in relations with the Soviet Union, must be a basic principle of American foreign policy. I will always support this policy and do my best to see to it that it is maintained, and I believe that Secretary Vance will also see matters in a similar light.

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Ambassador Huang: In the last 6, 7, or 8 years, actually we can say that since 1969, Doctor, you have gone through the whole process of the evolution of Sino/US relations. You are quite aware of the background of Sino/US relations.

Secretary Kissinger: I think I have seen every message and every exchange.

Ambassador Huang: And also the commitments made by the US side.

Secretary Kissinger: At least 5 pounds of my over-weight is due to what the Ambassador fed me in Paris.

Ambassador Huang: All of that still remains fresh in my mind. Each friendly meeting is still fresh in my mind. In opening the relationship with the Chinese under the instruction of former President Nixon you have done a lot of work and we are also aware of the role played by you in this.

Secretary Kissinger: And Winston Lord, too.

Ambassador Huang: (pointed toward lord) We had dinner during the last Moon Festival and I talked to Mr. Lord about this.

As you mentioned the Shanghai Communique I would like to say a word. The Chinese side still maintains that so long as all the principles in the Shanghai Communique are strictly observed by both sides, the relationship of our two countries can continue to be improved. Any action which runs counter or goes back on the principles of the Shanghai Communique will lead to severe consequences which the Chinese side will oppose too. As to how the future Sino/US relationship will be, this will not entirely depend on the Chinese side.

And during the past years I have personally been in contact with the Doctor and I am very glad personally to have established a friendship with you. I hope I can also establish a friendly relationship with your successor, Mr. Vance, as good as ours.

<u>Secretary Kissinger</u>: This is why I suggested that perhaps the Ambassador could accept an invitation from me in

January where I would invite Mr. Vance so I could introduce you. (The Ambassador nods in agreement.)

I believe very strongly that the implementation of the Shanghai Communique strictly on both sides must be the guideline of our policy and I will strongly advise Secretary-designate Vance to do this. And I shall always work in this direction. We must never -neglect that relationship or permit any doubt to arise about our commitment to oppose hegemony and work toward normalization of relations. (The Secretary repeats this sentence for the interpreter upon the latter's request.) Our policy must always be one in which we conduct ourselves so that no doubt exists that we oppose hegemony and promote normalization. I think you will find my successor open-minded and committed to improving relations. I personally believe, as I have said on many occasions, that a strong China is an element of stability in the world and of equilibrium.

Ambassador Huang: We learned from the newspapers that not long ago you went to Plains, Georgia.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I spent about 7 hours with President-elect Carter.

Ambassador Huang: You knew him beforehand?

<u>Secretary Kissinger</u>: Yes, I met the President-elect in 1974 when I went to Atlanta and I met him once again in 1975. And then of course I had a very long talk with him when I visited him in Plains, Georgia, which is a very little town in the middle of nowhere.

Ambassador Huang: Seven hours is a long talk.

Secretary Kissinger: He is a very intelligent man. (Not translated.) We reviewed relations with China and I explained to him the origin and our understandings and my conviction that the Soviet Union understands only strength, that one cannot deal with the Soviet Union from weakness. I told him that the most profound analysis of the world situation I generally heard in Peking from Chairman Mao and others, and that he should pay attention to your view of the world situation.

Ambassador Huang: We learned also from the newspapers that you said to some reporters that the Chinese mean what they say.

Secretary Kissinger: Right. I said that their word counts.

Ambassador Huang: They quoted your sentence.

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Secretary Kissinger: Did you notice, however, that I compared what you can believe the Soviets say to what the Chinese say.

Ambassador Huang: Recently there are some people who raise such questions, that maybe Doctor you also heard, they raised such questions to the effect that the United States has already had two Presidents visit China and now it is the Chinese turn to send you their highest leaders to come to the United States. Our reply is clear and Just as Senator Mansfield said clearly, before simple. normalization it is unrealistic to expect the Chinese leaders to come to the United States, because as always we oppose a two-China policy and here in Washington there is still Chiang's so-called Embassy, so of course high leaders could not come here. When your leaders came to China it was not the situation that they could not go to China because there was another American Embassy in Peking. Thus we regularly oppose a two-China policy as a matter of principle. We can not barter away principle.

Secretary Kissinger: Does this apply to every American city or just Washington?

Ambassador Huang: (laughing) As I told you, Mr. Doctor, we always go through the front gate, not the back door.

Secretary Kissinger: I remember we had these discussions a few years ago already and I will be sure to pass on your view to my successor.

What do you think the biggest problem in our relationship will be over the next few years?

Ambassador Huang: (laughing) Since our late Chairman Mao held several long talks, especially last year in October and December, Chairman Mao has already elaborated on those major issues so I have nothing to add. (Gesturing with his hands) You have talked with Chairman Mao as many as 5 times and in all the long talks Chairman Mao delineated his position and point of view on the international situations, bilateral relations, and also

major international issues. Maybe you can tell your successor about these talks for many days.

Secretary Kissinger: You can be sure. We are going to spend several days just on these problems in January. Even after I leave office I will be in contact with various people.

Ambassador Huang: I believe entirely that after you leave this office you will continue to work toward improving relations between our two countries and make your contribution.

Secretary Kissinger: You can be sure that this will be the case.

Ambassador Huang: Recently, Mr. Doctor, you visited Europe and attended the NATO Ministerial Conference. Also you still had several talks about the Middle East situation and also African issues. Is there anything you would like to tell me?

Secretary Kissinger: I think, with regard to NATO, that the relationship between us and the Western European countries has never been better. And there is a realization reflected in the NATO Communique that the defenses of NATO must be strong. And you will see that in the Defense budget for next year which President Ford will submit; it will represent a substantial increase over last year. Unfortunately in Great Britain the economic situation has lead to a slight reduction in defense expenditures but the need to strengthen the defenses of NATO was very well understood by all of my colleagues.

With respect to the Middle East it is my belief that we should begin, and we intend to begin, a peace initiative very soon.

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Ambassador Huang: From your side? The United States would take the initiative?

Secretary Kissinger: The United States should take the initiative and should do it in a manner that doesn't enable the Soviet Union to re-enter the Middle East situation. We believe that Soviet influence has declined in Syria and that therefore we ought to use this opportunity to make fairly rapid progress, or rapid progress, toward peace in the Middle East. I think that this is also the view of the new Administration.

With respect to Africa, quite candidly the Soviet Union is quite active in Southern Africa. The British will make a new initiative on the Rhodesian problem which we will support, and they are sending a mission next week. But that situation is still complicated, and we must all make sure that there is not a repetition of Angola in other places like Rhodesia and Namibia.

How is my old friend Huang Hua? Is he well settled in as Foreign Minister?

Ambassador Huang: He is also an old friend of yours.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, he was there on my first visit at the airport.

Ambassador Huang: You are old friends.

Secretary Kissinger: He is an old friend. So is Marshal Yeh.

Ambassador Huang: (after discussion among the Chinese) You have many friends in China.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think of them with great warmth.

Ambassador Huang: (smiling) I learned from today's newspaper that there will be a Kissinger office for writing memoirs. This will be a gigantic work.

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Secretary Kissinger: I am scaring everybody half to death.

Ambassador Huang: We can quite imagine that your memoirs will be quite a best seller. We heard that most of your documents will go to the Library of Congress.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but under restrictions where they cannot be opened. This was the best way to protect them, but they cannot be opened for 25 years.

Ambassador Huang: They will observe these restrictions? Is there a legal background?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, there is a legal contract, a legal document.

Ambassador Huang: There was some previous news reports that part of your papers will be your private papers that you will keep and the other part will go to the public.

Secretary Kissinger: I am giving practically all my papers to the Library of Congress but will not publish any documents.

Ambassador Huang: For example, those records of foreign conversations will also be regarded as formal papers?

Secretary Kissinger: Conversations with foreigners are official papers. They will be treated with the same restrictions as government papers. They will be under exactly the same restrictions as government papers; they will not be available to the public for 25 years and then only if the Department of State agrees to it.

Ambassador Huang: But when you write your memoirs you can use these papers.

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<u>Secretary Kissinger</u>: But I cannot quote them. Ambassador Huang: There are many legal problems. - 10 -

Secretary Kissinger: I won't quote them but at least they can refresh my memory. Ambassador Huang: When will your memoirs be published? Secretary Kissinger: Quite some time. Many years. Ambassador Huang: Many years, (in English) how soon? It's not going Secretary Kissinger: Four to 5 years. to happen next year. Ambassador Huang: I wish I could read your memoirs earlier. Secretary Kissinger: They will be very friendly to I have been a great admirer of your leaders. China. . . . Ambassador Huang: We can quite imagine (laughing). They won't include such problems as the fact that each time you came to my office in Paris you put on 5 pounds of weight. Secretary Kissinger: That I may describe, but not what we said. Ambassador Huang: I am very glad once again that I had this opportunity to meet an old friend. I wish you a happy New Year. Thank you, the same to you. Secretary Kissinger: Ambassador Huang: Also to your wife. Secretary Kissinger: I will see you in the New Year with my successor, but if I don't see you alone any more, I want you to know that I have enjoyed working with you. (There were continued friendly exchanges as the Secretary escorted the Ambassador to the door and Mr. Lord then took the Chinese to the Diplomatic entrance of the State Department.) SECRET/NODIS