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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

SECRET/NODIS

August 4, 1975

TO: The Secretary

FROM: EA - Philip C. Habib <sup>H</sup>/William Gleysteen <sup>H</sup>  
S/P - Winston Lord <sup>W</sup>  
NSC - Richard H. Solomon <sup>RHS</sup>

Partial Steps Toward Normalization  
of US/PRC Relations in Conjunction with  
the President's Trip to Peking

1. As you asked in our meeting of July 7, we have examined whether there are further steps short of full normalization which we might take in conjunction with the President's trip this fall to sustain the momentum in US/PRC relations. Bearing in mind the need not to stir up excessively those who are opposed to a change-over in relations, we have looked at moves which would:

- indicate to people in the United States, PRC, and elsewhere that we are continuing to move toward full normalization of relations.
- signal the Soviets that our relationship with the PRC remains sound.
- ease doubts among PRC elements who may question wisdom of Peking's acquiescing in normalization delays.
- discourage Taiwan from assuming there had been a setback or that it could exploit the lack of dramatic movement in our relations with Peking.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/8/08

*State Review*  
*3/21/04*



2. We find that the concept of an interim step has some merit as an alternative for reaching full normalization this year (or as a fallback in the event such an attempt were authorized and proved unsuccessful). There is, we think, some possibility of devising adequately balanced US and PRC measures which would not involve major concessions on our part or invite serious domestic criticism. Even though the Chinese might be hard to budge, they might see the advantage of small, matched concessions to provide an aura of success at the summit.

3. Nevertheless, the boundaries for an interim step are quite narrow. Peking continues to set three political preconditions to full normalization: breaking diplomatic relations with Taipei and recognition of Peking "as the sole legal government of China;" full withdrawal of the American military presence from Taiwan and abrogation of our defense treaty with the ROC; and US recognition of Taiwan as part of China.

4. For the purpose of this paper, we assume that domestic and international constraints will prevent us from fully and explicitly accepting any of these conditions at this time. However, we could touch on these various conditions by unilateral statements going beyond those we made in the Shanghai Communique. We would not, of course, wish to go so far as to make a major unilateral concession in the absence of agreement on other elements of a final normalization package. Without the elements of reassurance that would hopefully be included in full normalization arrangements, we would also have to be especially careful not to panic Taiwan and its supporters in this country.


5. A second category of steps -- which hopefully might be combined with any political statements -- would involve agreement with the Chinese on practical issues such as claims, exchanges, trade, or governmental relations (branch liaison offices, etc.). Agreement along these lines, which would require some shift in PRC positions, would convey a sense of strengthened ties and continuing momentum toward normalization.



Political Half Steps

6. One China Formulations. As a sign of political movement we could make a unilateral statement in the communique taking us beyond our Shanghai Communique position of not challenging the view that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China." Short of a direct affirmation, which would seem premature in this context, the most far-reaching formulation would be a fairly clear though indirect acknowledgment that "Taiwan is part of China." (See Tab 1). Such an important concession on our part, even if accompanied by progress on practical issues, would entail rather serious risks. In the absence of some offsetting statement about our concern for Taiwan's security, it would intensify anxieties on Taiwan, possibly to the danger point, and it would almost surely come under attack in this country from both self-determinationists and more conservative supporters of the ROC. We would face political criticism, and conceivably legal problems, from the contradiction of continued diplomatic recognition of the ROC, while having acknowledged in an official communique with the PRC that Taiwan was part of China.


7. A considerably more attractive possibility would play on the PRC's November 1973 Communique statement that "the normalization of relations between China and the United States can be realized only on the basis of confirming the principle of one China." Given Chou's initiative on this point, it should have some appeal for Peking. This variant could, moreover, be phrased to maintain linkage to the "peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves." (See Tab 2). The impact on Taiwan should be constructive because the formulation would constitute a useful conditioning step toward the future without setting up shock waves. Proponents of normalization might criticize it as a rather empty, teasing step, but such complaints could be countered by coupling it with some other measures of a practical nature in a package suggesting distinct, if not dramatic, progress.



8. Full Normalization. In the summit communique, we could either unilaterally or jointly speak in terms of further progress toward full normalization of relations, a phrase which we have not so far used in formal declarations. The nuance would raise the communique's temperature several degrees, especially if coupled with the "one China" formulation discussed above. It would not be welcome in Taiwan but would hardly come as a great surprise. In this country it might stimulate unhelpful counter moves trying to box us in regarding the unstated but inevitable corollary prospect of a break in US/ROC diplomatic relations. However, we believe these risks are manageable.

9. Military Withdrawals. An interim step could also include further unilateral reference to US military withdrawals from Taiwan. There is a range of statements we could make short of announcing a complete withdrawal. The most extreme would be a statement that, assuming continued reductions in tensions in the area, we intended substantially to complete withdrawals of our military forces from Taiwan by some specific date. This would attenuate the basic linkage in the Shanghai Communique between complete withdrawals and the prospect of a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem. A more immediate disadvantage would be great anxiety in Taiwan and unhelpful questioning here. If the reaction in Taiwan appeared to threaten the island's "stable" adjustment to our evolving relations with Peking, the statement might even misfire with the PRC which, in any event, does not seem to doubt our good faith on troop withdrawals. Thus we question whether this card should be played without some compensating PRC movement on the issue of peaceful settlement.

10. Most of the difficulties -- and, to be sure, some of the drama -- would be eliminated if the communique merely referred approvingly to the substantial withdrawals that have taken place on Taiwan and noted the prospect for additional cuts if tensions continued to ease.



11. Given our present schedule we should be in position by November/December to justify an additional withdrawal statement which would of course be unilateral, even though you might wish to inform the Chinese at the time of your trip of our contemplated drawdowns. (Last November you told Teng Hsiao-ping that we would reduce our forces in Taiwan even in the absence of a normalization agreement, and when we informed the PRC early this year of certain reductions in Taiwan you indicated there would be further drawdowns this year and that we would keep Peking informed. The benefit of these moves vis-a-vis Peking might be increased if we also told the Chinese privately before the summit that we intended to consolidate the Taiwan Defense Command and MAAG and/or to reduce the rank of the commanding officers. However, we have not yet decided on this step which would be quite unsettling in Taiwan.)

12. Diplomatic Representation. The only diplomatic measure we could adopt short of a break in US/ROC relations would be lowering the level of our representation from an ambassador to charge, or reducing the size of the embassy. (You told the Chinese in November 1974 that we would reduce the seniority of our diplomatic representation before 1976 even in the absence of full normalization. However, replacement of Unger with a junior ambassador might be counterproductive in view of the fuss Peking made over our replacement of McConaughy.) Either of these steps, especially, if announced in a communique, would be welcomed by Peking but we think they would be ill-advised. More than any of the other measures discussed above, they would be seen on Taiwan as impending notice of radical change. Some of the same destabilizing tendencies which would come into play with a full break in US/ROC relations would be stimulated with plenty of time to cause us serious trouble and without our being in position to make the kind of reassuring gestures that might be possible in the context of full normalization.



13. In sum, after considering the balance of advantage and disadvantage, the political measures which seem promising would be the play on Chou En-lai's November 1973 statement on "confirming the unity of China" (para 7 above) a reference to "full normalization" (para 8), and possibly a rounded reference to continuing progress in the withdrawal of US forces from Taiwan (para 10). Even without some matching advance from the Chinese side, we might find one or possibly more of these initiatives in our interest as a means of getting the right message to various audiences, not simply the PRC. Obviously it would be far better if our statements were part of a carefully balanced package, including some bilateral agreements with the PRC. Such a package might consist, for example, of one or more US political statements, a claims agreement, exchange of defense liaison officers or a hot line, and some qualitative improvements in the exchange program. (Even if not in a publicly useable form it would be helpful if you were able to obtain PRC agreement to adopt a less antagonistic tone toward us on international issues.) The Chinese might resist such an extensive "interim step," but we should have enough choice to ensure that the measures were adequately balanced in terms of US interests.

Bilateral Issues Where Progress Might Be Made

14. Irrespective of any progress in resolving the political issues which remain between us and Peking in conjunction with the President's trip, you should seek agreement on a number of outstanding bilateral issues in the areas of claims, exchanges, trade, and governmental relations. Agreements of this kind would strengthen our ties with the PRC, sustain abroad a sense of continuing momentum in our relationship, and help justify to domestic audiences a second Presidential trip to Peking. The alternative to such agreements is conclusion of a modest set of understandings in already-familiar exchange areas which would do little more than indicate to the world that US/PRC relations were coasting at their present level.



15. Following are a number of possible areas for agreement which would strengthen our bilateral relationship with the PRC. Some would constitute a step forward in ongoing matters; others would break new ground. We must emphasize that to date the Chinese have indicated an unwillingness, for example, to solve the claims/assets problem, before our relationship is fully normalized. They may not shift their position, either because doing so would limit their future leverage on the outstanding normalization issues, and/or because there probably exist domestic PRC political constraints on concessions in these areas in the absence of progress toward full normalization. Nevertheless, if the Chinese share our desire to demonstrate continuing momentum in our relationship, they may be more receptive to one or more of these steps than they have been in the past.

16. Claims Settlement. A settlement, despite the existing agreement in principle in March 1973, would have a sizable symbolic value: the issue has received considerable public attention, and it would be the first formal US/PRC intergovernmental agreement. More concretely, a settlement would remove a major impediment to further progress in economic/commercial relations, such as ~~banking~~, ~~trade~~ exhibits and air and sea links.

17. Settlement has been prevented by the Chinese unwillingness to compromise on several issues. However, in the counterpart talks during your November 1974 visit, it became clear that the Chinese did not want a settlement then and were using the few remaining problems as a pretext for stalling. We believe that whenever the Chinese decide that a settlement is desirable, those problems can be resolved relatively easily. If they are receptive, an agreement could be signed during the Presidential trip.

18. Branch Liaison Offices. An agreement to establish branch liaison offices, e.g., in San Francisco and Canton, would have considerable symbolic value. However, the Chinese would derive far more benefit; they



could take full advantage of our open society, while our branch would be of limited value to us. This situation might change if our branch were involved in implementing an agreement on the reuniting of families (see separate item).

19. Defense Liaison Officers. We could suggest an exchange of "defense liaison officers." In addition to publicly expanding the scope of our two Liaison Offices, the move might be welcomed by the Chinese because of its impact on the Soviets. We would need to carefully consider such an exchange in terms of our relations with Moscow, and Taipei would be displeased. In a more practical vein, foreign military attachés in Peking have minimal contact with the Chinese military, and our Liaison Office is so crowded that Chinese cooperation in providing more office space would probably be necessary.

20. Hot Line. We could propose that a "hot line" be established between Washington and Peking and that an announcement be included in the communique. You have tentatively floated this idea before with the PRC without any interest on their part. But it remains the only feasible step in the arms control area.

21. Exchanges. We have already been requested by the two committees involved in our exchange program to support their efforts to improve the quality of the exchanges and to achieve a better balance between the benefits to the PRC and the interests of American participants. In addition to seeking this general improvement, we could again propose several specific steps which would visibly demonstrate forward movement. The possibilities include:


- Exchange of students for language study.
- Longer term joint research efforts, preferably intergovernmental, in such fields as agriculture or environment.

-- Permanent press representation in Peking and Washington.

22. Reuniting Families. The Canadians have an agreement with the PRC designed to make it easier for Chinese in the PRC to join their close relatives in Canada. In this country there are probably thousands of Chinese-Americans who want to bring their close relatives in China to the United States, and many members of Congress receive requests for assistance. Moreover, the 1974 Trade Act makes the extension of MFN partially contingent on the other country's willingness to permit the reuniting of families. We seriously doubt that the PRC, in the absence of full diplomatic relations, would be prepared to negotiate an agreement, and they will not want to appear to be yielding to the Trade Act provisions on emigration policies. Nevertheless, since an intergovernmental agreement on this subject would have a substantial positive impact in this country, we could make a low-key effort to determine the PRC attitude.

23. Trade Agreement and MFN. We have indicated to the PRC that once the claims issue is settled, we would be prepared to discuss extension of the Most Favored Nation treatment to PRC exports to the United States. However, the 1975 Trade Act provides that MFN can be extended only through a bilateral trade agreement under which we would receive some comparable benefits. Moreover, the "emigration" provisions of the Act (the Jackson-Vanik amendment and an article about reuniting families) will be unacceptable to the PRC. Proposing preliminary discussions of a trade agreement, including MFN, therefore seems pointless. However, we could suggest a more limited agreement, e.g., on trade exhibits, trademarks, and arbitration of business disputes.

24. Embassy Sites. Our Liaison Office in Peking is now so crowded that little expansion of staff is possible. The PRC Liaison Office here has plenty of room, and we do not know if they would move when embassies



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are established. In any event, we could tell the Chinese that in anticipation of the time when our two Liaison Offices are changed to embassies, we would like to start discussions on permanent sites for our respective missions. A statement to this effect could be included in a communique, along the following lines: "The two sides, looking forward to the further normalization of relations, have agreed to initiate discussions regarding more permanent facilities for their respective missions in each other's capital." Such a statement would obviously have significant symbolic impact.

25. Jamming of VOA. The Chinese continue to jam the Chinese-language broadcasts of VOA. As far as we know, these are the only foreign broadcasts which are jammed (even those from the Soviet Union are not jammed). We could express our puzzlement and our hope that the jamming could be ended. If they agreed, we would not press for any mention of jamming in the communique, but we could make the change public by other means.

26. We will continue to work on formulas and other ideas but wanted you to have our thoughts so far.

Attachments:

- TAB 1 - Formulation indirectly acknowledging Taiwan as part of China
- TAB 2 - Alternative formulation regarding the "principle of one China"

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
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"The U.S. side, in view of the fact that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China, and consistent with the position it expressed in the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations at the end of World War II, reaffirms its support for the principle of one China".



"In the communique signed at Shanghai on February 27, 1972, the United States side stated: 'The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves.'

In the communique issued on November 14, 1973 the Chinese side 'reiterated that the normalization of relations between China and the United States can be realized only on the basis of confirming the principle of one China.' The United States side has concluded that these statements by the two sides are not inherently inconsistent, and intends to work for the further normalization of relations on the basis of that conclusion."



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Date 9/19/75  
Initial WJ

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: August 12, 1975  
3:45 PM

SUBJECT: 1) President Ford's Trip to Europe and the Miki Visit  
to Washington

2) The President's and the Secretary's Trips to China

PARTICIPANTS: U.S. Side: The Secretary  
Assistant Secretary Philip C. Habib  
Director Winston Lord  
Deputy Assistant Secretary William Gleysteen

PRC Side: Ambassador Huang Chen  
Chien Ta-yung  
Shen Jo-yun  
Yang Hsu-ching

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Ambassador Huang: You must be very busy Mr. Secretary.

Secretary: Yes. I wanted to have dinner with you tonight at Marquis Childs' but unfortunately I have to work on a speech instead, my speech in Birmingham. Perhaps it could be arranged on another occasion. We could have dinner at the house of another mutual friend.

Ambassador: Good. Let's do that.

Secretary: It's been too long since we last saw each other. I thought we should have a brief review of events. We have, as you know, just come back from the Helsinki meetings and Eastern Europe.

Ambassador: Are you going away soon on another round of shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East?


Secretary: It's not settled yet, but chances are now better than 50-50. The chances are that I will go the middle of next week.

Let me say a few things about our recent trip. The President's trip was obviously not designed to strengthen Soviet control over Eastern Europe. We deliberately visited those countries in Eastern Europe that have shown the most independence. In Romania we found

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EA:WHGleysteen, Jr.:avm  
(Drafting Office and Officer)

BY WJ, NARA, DATE 7/8/08



deep concern and hostility toward the Soviets. I am sure you are familiar with the situation in Yugoslavia. As we announced during our trip, we will start selling some military equipment to Yugoslavia.

Ambassador: Is it decided already?

Secretary: Yes. It has been decided.


Let me first say something about the formal conference at Helsinki. I think it is a great mistake to overstate the significance of the conference. We do not see it as having ratified any frontiers. No new legal status was accorded to frontiers beyond the status they had from previous agreements. The Declaration dealt only with the methods of change, not the sanctity of borders.

In the bilateral meetings with Soviet leaders, Brezhnev seemed to us to have been in better health in other places we have met him than he was in Helsinki. He seemed to have a little trouble concentrating. We talked primarily about the problems of strategic arms limitation, but we haven't come to any final conclusions; we are not even sure they are possible.

On other issues, I made clear that we would not participate in the Soviet scheme for an Asian collective security system. (The Secretary turned to Lord and asked if he had sent to the Chinese his Helsinki press statement which ruled out US participation in such an exercise. Lord replied that he had.) Of course, if China should favor our participation, we might reconsider our position.

Ambassador: I received a copy of your statement. We think that the Soviets will have a very hard time peddling their collective security system.

Secretary: I agree. We will oppose it. We also told Brezhnev privately about our position. Those were the only significant issues in our bilateral discussions with the Soviet leaders. The President also had an extremely good meeting with the British Prime Minister, the President of France, and the German Chancellor concerning ways of strengthening cooperation. The meeting was extremely constructive and may be followed by another one in the fall dealing with the economic situation.





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Ambassador: I understand from the press that less than a week after the Helsinki conference, the Soviets violated Norwegian airspace. This would seem to confirm our view that the conference represents no change in basic Soviet strategy. They will continue to feint toward the East and move toward the West.

Secretary: Maybe they will feint toward the West and move toward the East, but for us the problem is the same. Although I am not aware of the Norwegian overflight, I won't contest that it actually occurred. I agree there has not been any fundamental change in Soviet policy.

Ambassador: We do not think that the CSCE will change things, especially the Soviet strategy of feinting to the East but moving to the West.

Secretary: It won't change our determination to prevent an attack in either direction.

I would also like to tell you about our meetings with Prime Minister Miki of Japan. We told the Japanese we supported their attempt to improve relations with you. Miki asked me privately about the anti-hegemony clause in the treaty negotiations. I told him we couldn't object to what we put in our own communique with you.

The Japanese expressed great concern over the Korean situation. We agreed with them on the extreme importance of maintaining peace in the Korean peninsula. We also told the Japanese that we were opposed to the Soviet's Asian collective security scheme or any other moves which seemed directed at the People's Republic of China.


At some point, not necessarily now, we would be interested in your Government's assessment of the Indochina situation, especially the relations of Cambodia and Viet-Nam. We would like your real assessment.

Ambassador: I think our leaders have already discussed this with some of your recent visitors.

Secretary: I haven't seen any such reports. You must get your reports faster than we do.

Ambassador: The situation in Cambodia is good.

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Secretary: Except for all the people who had to leave Phnom Penh. Seriously, although I would not have recommended or endorsed the measures adopted by the Government in Phnom Penh, we are genuinely interested in Cambodian independence.

Ambassador: Cambodian conditions are really very good.

Chien: We don't discuss such relationships or even make suggestions.

Ambassador: We are opposed to expansionism in Southeast Asia.

Secretary: Expansionism? I agree.

Do you have any views or comments on my review?

Ambassador: Nothing in particular.

Secretary: I also wish to discuss the possibility of the President's visit to China. We are thinking of the beginning of December, give or take a day or so. Specifically, the President might arrive on November 29th or 30th. For my trip, I would plan to go to China five or six weeks earlier than the President, around the 16th of October or so. And if these plans are convenient, we could first announce my visit, perhaps in mid-September, and then when I leave China we could announce the President's trip.

Ambassador: We will report.

Secretary: Please confirm to my colleagues or me, if this is convenient.

Ambassador: We will report and tell your colleagues. Did you say your own trip would be around the 16th?

Secretary: Yes, the 15th or 16th.

Ambassador: For how long?

Secretary: Maybe three or four days. I think we should agree on the communique while I am there. It would be too precarious to leave it until the President's trip. The President is also thinking of a stay of about four days. Of course, we are open to suggestions.



Ambassador: We would follow the old practice of making a joint announcement of the President's trip at the end of your trip. Is that correct?

Secretary: Exactly.

I should tell you that the President is also thinking of visiting a few other countries, not on the way to Peking but on the way home. He certainly would not visit India because of the situation there, but he probably will go to the Philippines, Australia, and possibly Indonesia.

Ambassador: Will he go to Singapore? I saw something in the press about his visiting Singapore.

Secretary: Certainly not. We cannot go to Singapore without going to Malaysia. We have no scheme to visit Singapore or Malaysia.

Ambassador: How definite is Indonesia?

Secretary: There is a good chance of stopping in Indonesia. We haven't discussed these plans with any of the countries involved. In my own case, I have to get to a NATO meeting by the 11th of December. I know you wouldn't want me to miss it.


Ambassador: Yes. You should help strengthen NATO. How about the situation in Turkey and Greece? What is happening on the southern flank of NATO?

Secretary: I have told many friends that China would be watching the southern flank even though it was far away, because I remember my conversation with Chairman Mao. What is happening is a total stupidity. I think we can get it reversed by mid-September when Congress returns.

Ambassador: Good.

Secretary: By then, there is also hope for an interim agreement in the Middle East.

Ambassador: Will you spend about ten days in the Middle East?



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Secretary: A week to ten days.

Ambassador: I see that there are two Israeli delegations here.

Secretary: Yes. They are here right now to help us draft.


Ambassador: I understand one delegation is here about aid.

Secretary: Yes. We have held up aid matters. However, it has also been understood that we would give aid after the agreement was reached. The technical studies just happen to coincide with the arrival of the aid delegation.

Who is going to head your delegation to the UN General Assembly?

Ambassador: Even I do not yet know.

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TO AMBASSADOR BUSH, USLO PEKING

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DELIVER AT OPENING OF BUSINESS WH51499

WASH 111

AUGUST 13, 1975

TO: AMBASSADOR BUSH, USLO PEKING

FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT, WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S CONVERSATION WITH HUANG CHEN

1. SECRETARY MET WITH HUANG CHEN ON AUGUST 12 TO GIVE THE CHINESE A BRIEF ASSESSMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO EUROPE AND MEETINGS WITH PRIME MINISTER MIKI, AS WELL AS TO DISCUSS TRAVEL PLANS FOR THE CHINA VISITS.

2. SECRETARY EXPLAINED THAT IMPORTANCE OF CSCE SHOULD NOT BE OVERSTATED, IT DID NOT ADD SANCTITY TO FRONTIERS OR CHANGE BASIC SOVIET POLICY, AND WE OBVIOUSLY DID NOT INTEND TO SEE IT STRENGTHEN SOVIET CONTROL OVER EASTERN EUROPE. PRESIDENT DELIBERATELY VISITED ROMANIA AND YUGOSLAVIA AS THE TWO EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHICH HAVE SHOWN THE MOST INDEPENDENCE. BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIETS FOCUSED ON SALT, WHICH HAS NOT YET REACHED FINAL CONCLUSIONS. JUST AS HE HAD STATED PUBLICLY, SECRETARY SAID HE HAD TOLD BREZHNEV PRIVATELY THAT US WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN SOVIET ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SCHEME.

3. WITH MIKI, SECRETARY NOTED THAT WE HAD MADE CLEAR OUR SUPPORT FOR JAPANESE EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH PRC

\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

MC FARLANE, RODMAN, SOLOMON

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
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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/8/08




AND OUR UNWILLINGNESS TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY SOVIET EFFORTS DIRECTED AGAINST PRC. BOTH U.S. AND JAPAN AGREED MAINTAINING PEACE IN KOREA WAS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT.

4. SECRETARY INFORMED HUANG THAT PRESIDENT WAS THINKING OF VISITING CHINA DURING FIRST WEEK OF DECEMBER, ARRIVING NOVEMBER 29 OR 30 FOR ABOUT 4-DAY VISIT. IN HIS OWN CASE HE PROPOSED TO MAKE 3 OR 4-DAY VISIT, ARRIVING IN PEKING AROUND THE 15 OR 16TH OF OCTOBER. DURING HIS OWN STAY, HE WOULD WISH TO AGREE ON THE COMMUNIQUE FOR THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT, SINCE IT WOULD BE TOO PRECARIOUS TO LEAVE IT UNTIL THE PRESIDENT WAS IN CHINA. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT IF THE CHINESE WERE AGREEABLE TO THESE PLANS, WE COULD ANNOUNCE HIS VISIT PERHAPS IN MID-SEPTEMBER AND THEN JOINTLY ANNOUNCE THE TIMING OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT WHEN SECRETARY LEFT CHINA IN OCTOBER. HUANG PROMISED TO REPORT THESE PROPOSALS TO PEKING AND TO PASS ALONG PEKING'S REACTION.

5. THE SECRETARY ALSO TOLD HUANG THAT THE CHINESE SHOULD KNOW THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS CONTEMPLATING VISITING A FEW OTHER COUNTRIES ON THE WAY HOME FROM PEKING. HE WOULD PROBABLY GO TO THE PHILIPPINES, AUSTRALIA, POSSIBLY INDONESIA, BUT DEFINITELY NOT INDIA.

6. THIS INFORMATION, ESPECIALLY ON TRAVEL PLANS, IS OF COURSE EXTREMELY SENSITIVE AND THUS IS BEING SENT TO YOU VIA THIS CHANNEL FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY.

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028051

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇMemorandum  
CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . W. E. Colby  
CREATOR'S TITLE . . . . . Director  
RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Henry A. Kissinger  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Politburo member  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 08/14/1975  
VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200137  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER.  
KISSINGER-SCOWCROFT WEST WING OFFICE  
FILES  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 5  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . China unnumbered items (17)  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/12/2008  
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



## Department of State

TELEGRAM

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
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NODIS CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PFOR CH US  
SUBJECT: WANG HAI-JUNG ON PRESIDENT'S VISIT

DURING LUNCH TODAY AT THE RESIDENCE, VICE FOREIGN MINISTER WANG HAI-JUNG MADE A PARTICULAR POINT OF REITERATING THAT PRESIDENT FORD WAS WELCOME TO VISIT THE PRC WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. IN THE HEARING OF SEVERAL OF MY OFFICERS AS WELL AS MYSELF, SHE NOTED THAT THE IDEA OF THE VISIT HAD COME FROM THE U.S. SIDE AND SHE RECALLED WHAT TENG HAS SAID TO THE SECRETARY ON THIS SUBJECT LAST NOVEMBER, AS WELL AS TENG'S REMARKS TO THE ASNE GROUP. SHE FURTHER REMARKED THAT PRESIDENT FORD WAS INVITED ON ESSENTIALLY THE SAME TERMS AS PRESIDENT NIXON HAD BEEN; AND QUOTED MAO'S LIFE MAGAZINE COMMENTS TO EDGAR SNOW ABOUT THE TERMS ON WHICH NIXON WOULD BE WELCOME IN CHINA; I.E. AS EITHER A STATESMAN OR A TOURIST.

BUSH

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY 152, NARA, DATE 7/8/08~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



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August 22, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE SECRETARY  
FROM: WINSTON LORD *W*  
SUBJECT: "Mood-Setters" in Our Relations  
With the Chinese

Attached is a memo to you from Dick Solomon setting forth a selection of events for possible Presidential participation to warm up the mood in advance of his trip to China. My views are as follows:

- I think some gesture is in order but this should be done selectively and only after we hear back from the Chinese concerning the scheduling for your trip and the President's trip.
- Once we hear from the Chinese, and assuming it is favorable, I think the President should greet either the Trade Delegation or the Scientific Delegation. I think to meet both of them would probably be overkill and he should settle for whichever one is higher ranking and more important.
- I think it is inadvisable for either the President or you to attempt a major address on China before the National Committee or anywhere else. I do think a Presidential message to the National Committee's annual meeting would be appropriate.
- I think the First Lady should receive the Chinese Ambassador's wife before the President's trip to Peking.

In sum I would recommend approval in Solomon's memo of the following recommendations by number: 1 or 2, 4 and 6, but I would not move on any of them until we hear from the Chinese concerning dates for the two visits.

MORE

OVER →



Ron Nessen's Blooper

As you know Ron Nessen in response to a question a couple of days ago said that the President probably would be visiting China in late November or early December. This did not get much attention but obviously was gauche, particularly in this period when we are waiting to hear from the Chinese. I checked and confirmed that Nessen did put out a clarifying statement to the effect that nothing is set and this subject is being discussed with the Chinese. To my knowledge this has received no attention. You may wish to have Bud McFarlane call the Chinese in low key to say that Nessen misspoke inadvertently and that a clarification has been put out. On the other hand this might look overly defensive and perhaps eager as we await their response on dates. On balance I would suggest doing this.

Approve, McFarlane to call the Chinese \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_



## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

July 31, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECRETARY KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD H. SOLOMON


SUBJECT: "Mood-Setters" in Our Relations  
With the Chinese

There are a number of opportunities which will present themselves early in the fall for the President to identify himself publicly with the People's Republic of China. You may wish to have him take advantage of one or a number of the following occasions both to signal to Peking his orientation to the current state of U.S.- PRC relations and to set the mood for our own public in advance of his trip to China.

-- The Chinese will be sending their official trade delegation (the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade) to the U.S. in September. The President has received a request from the organizers of the Washington leg of their trip that he receive this group for a few minutes if his schedule permits. You may wish to have Mr. Ford meet with this group as an expression of his personal interest in our growing trade with the PRC.

-- The Chinese are also sending to the U.S. their official scientific organization which promotes exchanges with other countries, the All-China Scientific and Technical Association. This group will also be in Washington in September. The President might meet with this group as an expression of his support for our scientific exchanges with the PRC.

-- The President has received an invitation from the National Committee on U.S.- China Relations, the group that handles our cultural exchanges with the PRC, to give an address to their membership during their annual meeting in late October. As you may have completed your advance trip to Peking by this time, you might want the President to make some form of public statement to this group as a way of setting the public mood in advance of his trip to Peking. Alternatively, the President could just send the National Committee a statement of support, or you might address the group. (Based on our recent discussion, however, you may wish to adopt a lower "China profile" than would be implied by a speech by the President or yourself.)



-- You will recall that last October Huang Chen requested that his wife have an opportunity to call on the First Lady. No such meeting was held, however. The Chinese raised the issue again early in the spring. Again no action was taken because of the conjunction of the request with developments in Indochina. You may wish to consider having the First Lady receive Madame Huang within the next few months (particularly if the First Lady will accompany the President on his trip to Peking).

If you will provide guidance, we will handle the staffing of these requests as you indicate.

Recommendations:

1. That the President receive the delegation from the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade:

Approve HK Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That the President receive the delegation from the All-China Scientific and Technical Association:

Approve HK Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

3. That the President accept the invitation of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations to address their annual meeting (in late October):

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove HK

Alternatives:

4. That the President send the annual meeting a message (which we will prepare):

Approve HK Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_


5. That you address the National Committee's annual meeting:

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

6. That the First Lady receive Madame Huang Chen at some convenient time in advance of the President's trip to Peking:

Approve HK Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

3 Sept. 1975



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FM THE SITUATION ROOM//TOHAK 09//

TO ADAMS/RODMAN FOR THE SECRETARY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ VIA BLACK PATCH WH51560

TOHAK 09

TO: RODMAN/ADAMS  
FOR: WINSTON LORD (TRAVELLING WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER'S  
PARTY)

FROM: RICHARD W. SOLOMON

SUBJECT: CHINESE THROW US A CURVE BALL ON THE MAYORS' EXCHANGE  
DELEGATION

1. AFTER YESTERDAY'S APPARENTLY HELPFUL "NON-PARTICIPATION"  
POSITION ON THE PUERTO RICO ISSUE AT THE U.N., THE CHINESE  
HAVE NOW THROWN US A CURVE BALL ON THE SAME ISSUE IN OUR EXCHANGE  
PROGRAM. A DELEGATION OF MAYORS SCHEDULED TO DEPART FOR THE PRC  
IN THREE WEEKS INCLUDES AS ITS DEPUTY HEAD THE MAYOR OF SAN  
JUAN. AT 4:00 P.M. TODAY A PRCHO OFFICIAL CALLED IN A STAFF  
MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS,  
THE FACILITATING ORGANIZATION HANDLING THE VISIT, AND TOLD  
HER THAT "A PROBLEM HAS ARISEN DUE TO THE SPECIAL CONDITIONS  
SURROUNDING PUERTO RICO AT THIS TIME. THEREFORE, WE FIND IT  
INCONVENIENT TO RECEIVE THE MAYOR OF SAN JUAN."

2. I HAVE DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE WITH GENERAL SCOWCROFT, THE  
PRC DESK AT STATE, AND THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE STAFFER INVOLV-  
ED, AND THERE IS GENERAL CONSENSUS THAT THE CHINESE ACTION  
VIOLATES TWO BASIC GROUND RULES OF THE EXCHANGE PROGRAM:  
THAT POLITICS SHOULD NOT BE INJECTED DIRECTLY INTO EXCHANGES  
(THE TAIWAN SONG PRECEDENT); AND THAT EACH SIDE HAS THE RIGHT  
TO CHOOSE MEMBERS OF ITS OWN DELEGATION (THE PERCY DELE-  
GATION'S ESCORT PROBLEM, AND THE PRECEDENT OF AN ACADEMIC



\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

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
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/8/08

ESCORT FOR A LINGUISTICS DELEGATION). IN ADDITION, OF COURSE, WE HAVE THE ELEMENT OF BUSH'S DEMARCHE TO WANG HIA-JUNG ON THE PUERTO RICO ISSUE OF AUGUST 16.

3. PHIL HABIB AND BRENT SCOWCROFT BOTH WANTED TO MAKE SURE THE SECRETARY HAS THE OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS HIS VIEWS ON HOW TO PROCEED IN THIS MATTER, AND AN ACTION CABLE IS BEING SENT OUT TO HIM VIA STATE CHANNELS. THERE IS GENERAL CONSENSUS AMONG ALL THOSE CONTACTED THAT IT WOULD BE A MISTAKE NOT TO CHALLENGE THE CHINESE ACTION IN SOME WAY. THERE IS ALSO AGREEMENT THAT IT WOULD BE BEST IF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, THE GROUP WHICH HAS PUT THE DELEGATION TOGETHER, CARRIES THE FREIGHT ON THIS ONE WITH THE CHINESE. THE FEELING HERE IS THAT IF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON U.S. - CHINA RELATIONS INFORMS THE MAYORS THAT THE CHINESE ACTION VIOLATES THE GROUND RULES OF THE EXCHANGE PROGRAM, THEY (THE MAYORS) ARE LIKELY TO MAKE SOME FORM OF PROTEST TO THE PRC LIAISON OFFICE. THE ACTION MEMO TO THE SECRETARY WILL REQUEST HIS AUTHORIZATION TO HAVE THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE, IN EFFECT, ENCOURAGE THE MAYORS TO REQUEST OF THE CHINESE THAT THEY RECONSIDER THEIR POSITION.

4. THE HEAD OF THE MAYORS DELEGATION IS JOSEPH ALIOTO OF SAN FRANCISCO. ALIOTO BELIEVES HE HAS A "SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP" WITH HUANG CHEN BECAUSE OF HUANG'S ASSISTANCE IN GETTING THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL EXHIBITION TO SAN FRANCISCO. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT ALIOTO WILL GO TO HUANG AND REQUEST A RECONSIDERATION OF THE DECISION. GIVEN THE WAY THE CHINESE HAVE LINKED THEIR OBJECTION TO THE MAYOR OF PUERTO RICO GOING ON THIS TRIP WITH THE PUERTO RICO ISSUE IN THE U.N., HOWEVER, I FRANKLY DOUBT THAT THE CHINESE WILL BACK OFF. INDEED, IT IS NOT INCONCEIVABLE THAT THEY WANT A "REVOLUTIONARY INCIDENT" TO SURFACE PUBLICLY NOW IN ORDER TO COVER THEIR COP-OUT ON THE U.N. VOTE -- WHAT WITH THE UPCOMING LIMA CONFERENCE. I MUST ADMIT, HOWEVER, I FIND THIS A RATHER CONTORTED WAY OF DOING BUSINESS EVEN FOR REVOLUTIONARIES. IN ANY EVENT, WE WILL OBVIOUSLY TAKE EVERY PRECAUTION HERE TO KEEP THIS ISSUE FROM SURFACING PUBLICLY IN ORDER TO GIVE A RECLAME STRATEGY A CHANCE TO WORK (IF THAT IS WHAT THE SECRETARY AUTHORIZES). HOWEVER, ONCE THE MAYORS ARE INFORMED OF THE PROBLEM THERE IS GOOD LIKELIHOOD THAT THE ISSUE WILL LEAK. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, IT SEEMS PRUDENT TO ANTICIPATE THAT THE MAYORS' DELEGATION WILL BE "POSTPONED" BECAUSE OF PRC OBSTINACY ON THE EXCLUSION OF THE MAYOR OF SAN JUAN. IF THEY REVERSE THEMSELVES, SO MUCH THE BETTER.



5. I AM SURE THE SECRETARY DOESN'T NEED ANOTHER "TAIWAN SONG" INCIDENT RIGHT NOW. ALL I WOULD SAY IS THAT AT THIS END THERE

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IS UNANIMITY AT STATE, NSC, AND WITH THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE THAT WE WILL BE CAUSING OURSELVES MORE PROBLEMS BY NOT CHALLENGING THE CHINESE THAN BY GOING ALONG WITH THEM. I WOULD ALSO BE VERY SURPRISED IF THE MAYORS (ONCE THEY ARE CONTACTED) WANTED TO PROCEED WITH THEIR TRIP UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

6. WE WILL HOLD OFF IN HAVING THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE INFORM THE MAYORS OF THE ISSUE UNTIL WE HAVE HEARD FROM YOU. LET ME JUST NOTE THAT ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WE ARE TRYING TO AVOID IS A LONG DELAY BETWEEN THE TIME THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE WAS INFORMED BY THE CHINESE, AND THE TIME THAT THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE RAISES THIS PROBLEM WITH THE MAYORS. THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO DO SO FRIDAY AFTERNOON WASHINGTON TIME AT THE LATEST.

7. A RELATED ISSUE -- ONCE AGAIN -- IS WHO WE SHOULD SEND TO THE ARCHAEOLOGICAL EXHIBITION RECEPTION IN SAN FRANCISCO NEXT WEDNESDAY. IN VIEW OF THE PRC "NON-PARTICIPATION" VOTE ON THE PUERTO RICO ISSUE AT THE U.N. YESTERDAY, WE HAD ARRANGED TO HAVE ASSISTANT SECRETARY RICHARDSON GO OUT TO HUANG CHEN'S RECEPTION. THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS ALREADY INFORMED PRCLO THAT RICHARDSON WILL ATTEND. IT IS MOST UNLIKELY THAT WE WILL SEE ANY CHANGE IN THE CHINESE POSITION ON THE EXCLUSION OF THE MAYOR OF SAN JUAN BEFORE NEXT WEDNESDAY. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES WE HAVE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WE SHOULD CANCEL RICHARDSON'S PLANS, AND SO INFORM PRCLO. A CANCELLATION WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE A STRONG SIGNAL OF OFFICIAL DISPLEASURE WITH THE CHINESE ATTEMPT TO POLITICIZE THE EXCHANGE PROGRAM. AS WELL, IT WOULD MAKE GOOD ON BUSH'S WARNING TO WANG HAI-JUNG THAT A HOSTILE PRC POSITION ON THE PUERTO RICO ISSUE WOULD AFFECT OUR RELATIONSHIP (ALTHOUGH HE CLEARLY DID NOT HAVE THIS THIST ON THE ISSUE IN MIND WHEN HE MADE HIS PITCH). I LEAVE IT TO YOU TO SORT OUT WHETHER MAYOR ALIOTO WILL BE MORE UPSET WITH THE CHINESE BLACK-BALLING HIS DEPUTY DELEGATION LEADER THAN WITH THE GOVERNMENT NOT SENDING AN OFFICIAL TO HUANG'S RECEPTION -- WHICH OF COURSE WILL BE HELD IN HIS FAIR STRIKE-BOUND CITY.

8. SORRY TO BURDEN YOU WITH ALL THE COMPLICATIONS OF THIS ISSUE, BUT I AM SURE YOU WOULD WANT TO BE FULLY BACKGROUNDED IN A SITUATION WHERE THE SECRETARY IS LIKELY TO SEEK YOUR COUNSEL. IF YOU HAVE ANY GUIDANCE TO OFFER, I CAN BE REACHED VIA THIS CHANNEL.

9. NI HAO, BING JI LING, WARM REGARDS.

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4. IF THERE IS TO BE A BREAK IN THIS SITUATION, IT MAY TAKE THE FORM OF THE CHINESE AGREEING TO RECEIVE MAYOR ROMERO-BARCELO IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES RATHER THAN AS MAYOR OF SAN JUAN. I SHALL KEEP YOU INFORMED OF FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.  
INGERSOLL

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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 028052

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . ÇNational security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . ÇTelegram

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Richard H. Solomon

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re China items

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VOLUME . . . . . 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033200137

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FOLDER TITLE . . . . . China unnumbered items (17)

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 08/12/2008

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR