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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/7/08

~~SECRET~~ STATE 109704

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH

SUBJECT: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH HUANG CHEN

1. SECRETARY CALLED IN PRC LIAISON OFFICE CHIEF HUANG CHEN ON MAY 9 FOR HOUR-LONG TOUR D'HORIZON OF POST-INDUCHINA DEVELOPMENTS AND DISCUSSION OF THE ORIENTATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FOREIGN POLICY FOR THE COMING PERIOD. HUANG HAD BEEN GIVEN A WEEK'S NOTIFICATION OF THE SESSION IN HOPES OF HIS GETTING NEW GUIDANCE FROM PEKING WHICH WOULD REFLECT PRC THINKING ON PRESENT AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS.

2. SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT HE HAD READ AN EDITORIAL IN THE PEOPLE'S DAILY OF MAY 8 WHICH OBSERVED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS IN A PERIOD OF STRATEGIC PASSIVITY. HE SAID THAT WHILE THERE WERE MANY POINTS IN THE EDITORIAL HE AGREED WITH, PARTICULARLY THOSE REGARDING THE SOVIET UNION, HE DISAGREED WITH THE VIEW THAT THE U.S. IS IN A STRATEGI-

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 STATE 149704

CALLY PASSIVE POSITION. HE STRESSED THAT IN MANY RESPECTS WE ARE PSYCHOLOGICALLY STRONGER NOW BECAUSE VIET-NAM ISSUES WILL NOT HAVE TO BE DEBATED EVERY WEEK. HE ADDED THAT THERE IS NO CHANGE IN OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE DANGERS OF HEGEMONY IN THE WORLD AS STRESSED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE.

3. TURNING TO SPECIFIC ISSUES, THE SECRETARY OBSERVED THAT REGARDING US-PHC BILATERAL RELATIONS THE ADMINISTRATION FULLY MAINTAINS ITS COMMITMENT TO THE PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. HE OBSERVED THAT OCCASIONAL STATEMENTS WHICH MAY NOT BE FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THIS ORIENTATION ARE DUE TO INADVERTENCE.

4. THE SECRETARY STRESSED THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTENTIONS TO MAINTAIN CLOSE RELATIONS WITH JAPAN AND WITH SOME OF OUR FRIENDS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. HE SAID HE BELIEVED HE WOULD NOW SEE MORE ATTENTION TO AN ASIAN SECURITY SYSTEM AS PROPOSED BY THE SOVIETS. THE U.S. DOES NOT FAVOR SUCH A DEVELOPMENT.

5. THE SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT IT WAS UP TO OTHER COUNTRIES TO CONSIDER THEIR VIEWS ABOUT QUOTE; HEGEMONIES WITHIN THEIR OWN REGIONS. UNQUOTE. THE ADMINISTRATION DOES NOT FAVOR SUCH LOCAL HEGEMONISM; THE U.S. WOULD COOPERATE IN PREVENTING IT WHERE THERE WAS SOME REASONABLE CHANCE OF SUCCESS, BUT WE WOULD NOT DO OTHER PEOPLE'S WORK FOR THEM.

6. WITH RESPECT TO KOREA, THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES TOLERATE A MILITARY ATTACK ON SOUTH KOREA. SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD INVOLVE THE CERTAINTY OF AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT. HE ADDED THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPORT PEACEFUL EVOLUTION ON THE PENINSULA, AND THAT WE REMAIN PREPARED TO DISCUSS APPROACHES TO DISSOLVING THE UNITED NATIONS COMMAND AND HOW TO CREATE CONDITIONS FOR CO-EXISTENCE ON THE PENINSULA.

7. REGARDING THE MIDDLE EAST, THE SECRETARY SAID WE SEE TWO MAIN DANGERS: ONE IS POSSIBLE SOVIET DOMINATION; THE OTHER IS DIPLOMATIC STAGNATION. HE REVIEWED AMERICAN EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVE IN THE AREA

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PAGE 03 STATE 109784

AND SAID THAT WE WERE DETERMINED TO PERSEVERE IN OUR ROLE.

8. WITH RESPECT TO EUROPE AND NATO, THE SECRETARY COMMENTED ON THE PRESIDENT'S FORTHCOMING TRIP TO EUROPE AND HIS EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES. HE STATED THERE WOULD BE NO WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS ANYWHERE EXCEPT THAILAND AND TAIWAN DURING REMAINDER OF THIS ADMINISTRATION, AND PARTICULARLY NOT FROM EUROPE.

9. THE SECRETARY THEN REVIEWED AMERICAN EFFORTS IN THE GULF STATES AND SOUTH ASIA. HE NOTED THAT BOTH PEKING AND WASHINGTON RELATIONS WITH NEW DELHI HAD COOLED SOMEWHAT OF LATE. HE SAID THAT AS THE U.S. AND PRC PURSUE PARALLEL OBJECTIVES IN THEIR FOREIGN POLICIES, WE SHOULD AVOID

PERIPHERAL CONFRONTATIONS.

10. THE SECRETARY QUESTIONED AMBASSADOR HUANG ABOUT POSSIBLE CHINESE VIEWS ON TIMING, TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION, AND POSSIBLE RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S ANTICIPATED TRIP TO PEKING LATER THIS YEAR. HUANG FAILED TO OFFER ANY SUGGESTIONS, SAID THE PRESIDENT WAS WELCOME ANY TIME, AND ASKED FOR OUR VIEWS. THE SECRETARY THEN INDICATED THAT OUR ORIGINAL THOUGHT HAD BEEN OF A TRIP SOME TIME BETWEEN MID-NOVEMBER AND THE FIRST WEEK OF DECEMBER. HE INDICATED OUR INTENTION TO WORK OUT A COMMUNIQUE SUBSTANTIALLY IN ADVANCE OF THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT. HE IRONICALLY INVITED THE PRC FOREIGN MINISTER TO WASHINGTON FOR THIS PURPOSE AND WHEN HE GOT THE STANDARD RESPONSE, THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT HE WOULD PROBABLY AGREE TO A PRIOR TRIP OF HIS OWN.

11. AMBASSADOR HUANG RESPONDED TO THE SECRETARY'S DISCUSSION BY REITERATING WHAT HE TERMED THE PRINCIPLED POSITIONS WHICH THE PRC HAS CONSISTENTLY MAINTAINED IN ITS FOREIGN POLICY AND THAT CHAIRMAN MAO HAD EXPRESSED TO US. HE NOTED THAT THESE POSITIONS ARE EXPRESSED IN THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE. HUANG OBSERVED THAT NOW THAT THE U.S. HAS DISENGAGED FROM VIET-NAM IT SHOULD LEARN CORRECT LESSONS FROM THIS EXPERIENCE. HE STATED THE PRC'S CONSISTENT POSITION OF RESOLUTE SUPPORT FOR THE KOREAN PEOPLE IN THEIR

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
EFFORTS TO REUNIFY THEIR COUNTRY BY QUOTE INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL MEANS. UNQUOTE. HE COMMENTED THAT FROM THE PRC POINT OF VIEW, THE SOUTH KOREANS HAD MADE REPEATED PROVOCATIONS AGAINST THE NORTH. THE SECRETARY COMMENTED THAT WE WOULD PREVENT ANY SOUTH KOREAN ATTACKS ON THE NORTH, BUT THAT IF A WAR STARTED ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA IT WOULD BE CLEAR ON WHICH SIDE OF THE LINE THE TROOPS WERE AND THAT THE U.S. WOULD TAKE ACTIONS ACCORDINGLY. THE SECRETARY WAS VERY FIRM ON OUR WARNINGS AGAINST MILITARY ACTION, WHILE REMAINING OPEN ON PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE ISSUE.

12. IN CONCLUSION, THE SECRETARY REVIEWED HIS, AND THE PRESIDENT'S EUROPEAN TRAVEL PLANS.

13. COMMENT: DESPITE OUR EFFORTS TO DRAW OUT THE PRC SIDE ON ANY SUBSTANTIVE INSIGHTS INTO THEIR FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATION, HUANG GAVE NO INDICATION OF ANY NEW INSTRUCTION FROM PEKING. HE REPEATED STANDARD PRC POLICY POSITIONS. THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THREE POINTS IN THIS PRESENTATION: THAT THE US WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY A STRONG ROLE IN THE WORLD AND THAT INDEED OUR POSTURE WILL BE PARTICULARLY FORCEFUL IN THE WAKE OF INDOCHINA; THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S ORIENTATION TOWARD DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.-

PRC BILATERAL RELATIONS REMAINS UNCHANGED; AND THAT WE WILL NOT TOLERATE ANY MILITARY ACTION BY NORTH KOREA AGAINST THE SOUTH. HE ALSO OBLIQUELY GOT ACROSS THAT WE WERE LOOKING FOR MORE CHINESE COOPERATION--OR AT LEAST LESS UNHELPFULNESS--ON THIRD COUNTRY ISSUES. KISSINGER

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NODIS

E.O. 11652:GDS

TAGS: PPR, CH, CB

SUBJECT: CAMBODIAN SEIZURE OF U.S. MERCHANT VESSEL

1. DEPUTY SECRETARY INGERSOLL CALLED IN HUANG CHEN MONDAY AFTERNOON, MAY 12, TO REQUEST PRC ASSISTANCE IN PASSING MESSAGE TO CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES REGARDING CAMBODIAN SEIZURE OF A US MERCHANT SHIP. INGERSOLL FIRST READ STATEMENT ISSUED TODAY BY THE WHITE HOUSE (SEE BELOW) AND THEN SAID WE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF THE CHINESE WOULD PASS A MESSAGE TO THE CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES. BEFORE HE COULD READ THE MESSAGE, HUANG CHEN INTERRUPTED TO SAY THAT THE GRUNK IS AN INDEPENDENT SOVEREIGN STATE, THAT HE WOULD NOT TRANSMIT ANY MESSAGE FOR US, THAT IF WE HAVE ANY MESSAGE FOR THE CAMBODIANS, WE SHOULD USE OTHER CHANNELS. HE ALMOST BELLIGERENTLY MAINTAINED THAT POSITION, DESPITE OUR STATEMENTS THAT WE HAD NO DIRECT CHANNELS TO THE AUTHORITIES IN CAMBODIA, THAT MATTER WAS URGENT, AND THAT WE THOUGHT US-PRC RELATIONSHIP WAS SUCH THAT CHINESE WOULD BE WILLING TO ASSIST IN TRANSMITTING

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
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STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES

BY: HR, NARA, DATE 7/7/08



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MESSAGE. NEAR END OF CONVERSATION HE SAID THAT IF THIS WAS ONLY SUBJECT INGERSULL WISHED TO DISCUSS, HE WOULD SAY GOODBYE. INGERSULL ASKED IF HE WOULD LISTEN TO THE MESSAGE WE WISHED TO PASS TO CAMBUDIANS AND REPORT IT TO

HIS GOVT. HUANG CHEN REITERATED THAT "THIS IS YOUR MATTER, IT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH US."

2. HUANG CHEN WILL OF COURSE REPORT TO HIS GOVT. IN PEKING, AND WE ASSUME CHINESE WILL INFORM CAMBUDIANS OF OUR APPROACH AND THEIR REACTION.

3. YOU SHOULD URGENTLY DELIVER MESSAGE IN PARAGRAPH 4 TO PRC MFA AS WELL AS TO GRUNK. THERE SHOULD BE NO PERSONAL CONTACT BEYOND DELIVERY IN EITHER CASE AND DELIVERY SHOULD BE BY SOMEONE OTHER THAN DUSH. MESSAGES SHOULD BE WRITTEN, NOT DELIVERED ORALLY.

4. BEGIN TEXT. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES REQUESTS THAT YOU PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE URGENTLY TO THE AUTHORITIES IN PHNOM PENH.

BEGIN QUOTE.


NAVAL FORCES CONTROLLED BY THE CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES HAVE SEIZED AN AMERICAN MERCHANT VESSEL, THE SS MAYAGUEZ, THIS MORNING IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS IN THE GULF OF THAILAND. WE UNDERSTAND THE SHIP AND CREW HAVE BEEN TAKEN TO THE PORT OF KUMPUNG SOM.

THIS IS AN ACT OF INTERNATIONAL PIRACY. THE VESSEL WAS IN INTERNATIONAL WATERS AND REPRESENTED NO DANGER TO THE AUTHORITIES IN CAMBODIA OR TO ANYBODY ELSE.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES DEMANDS THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE VESSEL AND OF THE FULL CREW. IF THAT RELEASE DOES NOT IMMEDIATELY TAKE PLACE, THE AUTHORITIES IN PHNOM PENH WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES. END QUOTE

5. STATEMENT MAY 12 BY WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

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PAGE 03 STATE 110573

BEGIN TEXT. WE HAVE BEEN INFORMED THAT A CAMBODIAN NAVAL VESSEL HAS SEIZED AN AMERICAN MERCHANT SHIP ON THE HIGH SEAS AND FORCED IT TO THE PORT OF KOMPUNG SUM. THE PRESIDENT HAS MET WITH THE NSC. HE CONSIDERS THIS SEIZURE AN ACT OF PIRACY. HE HAS INSTRUCTED THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO DEMAND THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE SHIP. FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD HAVE THE MOST SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES. END TEXT

6. ALTHOUGH PRESS IS BEGINNING TO SPECULATE THAT HUANG CHEN CALL WAS RELATED TO SHIP SEIZURE, WE ARE NOT CONFIRMING THAT WAS THE SUBJECT. INGERSOLL

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*Greg Sager's call, on 5/12/75,
attempted to deliver to
Chinese. Wld not accept
or listen to it.*

The Government of the United States requests that you pass the following message urgently to the authorities in Phnom Penh.

Begin text.

Naval forces controlled by the Cambodian authorities have ^{seized} seized an American merchant vessel, the USS MAYAQUEZ, this morning in international waters in the Gulf of Thailand. We understand the ship and crew [have been taken to] the Port of Kompong Som.

*AT
last
report
were heading
toward*

This is an act of international piracy. The vessel was in international waters and represented no danger to the authorities in Cambodia or to anybody else.

The Government of the United States demands the immediate release of the vessel and of the full crew. If that release does not immediately take place, the authorities in Phnom Penh will be responsible for the consequences.

End text.



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CHINA-SHIP

PARIS (AP) -- CHINESE DEPUTY PREMIER TENG HSIAO PING BURST INTO LAUGHTER TODAY WHEN ASKED HOW PEKING WOULD REACT TO A POSSIBLE AMERICAN MILITARY INTERVENTION TO RECOVER A U.S. MERCHANT SHIP CAPTURED BY CAMBODIA.

"IF THEY INTERVENE, THERE IS NOTHING WE CAN DO," TENG TOLD NEWSMEN.

OTHER CHINESE OFFICIALS ACCOMPANYING TENG, REGARDED AS THE NO. 3 PERSON IN THE PEKING HIERARCHY, ALSO LAUGHED AT HIS REMARK. TENG LEFT IN DOUBT WHETHER HE INTENDED HIS REMARK TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY, AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS DELEGATION REFUSED TO ELABORATE.

TENG EMERGED FROM THE ELYSEE PALACE AFTER A ONE-HOUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT VALERY GISCARD D'ESTAING ON THE SECOND DAY OF HIS OFFICIAL VISIT TO FRANCE AND SAID: "WE HAD SOME VERY FRANK DISCUSSIONS ON THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS WHICH INTEREST US." HE INDICATED THAT THE SUBJECTS DISCUSSED INCLUDED INDOCHINA AND EUROPE, BUT GAVE NO DETAILS.

A REPORTER ASKED WHETHER CHINA WAS PREPARED TO MEDIATE IN THE DISPUTE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEW COMMUNIST AUTHORITIES IN CAMBODIA OVER THE SEIZURE OF THE MAYAGUEZ. WASHINGTON REPORTS HAVE SAID PRESIDENT FORD IS SEEKING DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTION BY CHINA AND OTHER COUNTRIES TO TRY TO RECOVER THE SHIP AND THE 39-MAN CREW.

"YOU ARE JOURNALISTS," TENG REPLIED WITH A LAUGH. "YOU HAVE MORE RECENT INFORMATION THAN I."

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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFDR, CB, IR, PK
SUBJ: CHINESE EMBASSY TEHRAN BELIEVES MAYAGUEZ TO BE
FREED SOON
PAKISTANI FIRST SECRETARY PRESS HISANUDDIN AKBAR TOLD
EMBOFF MAY 14 HE HAD LEARNED FROM SENIOR CHINESE EMBASSY
OFFICIAL HERE PRC WAS EMBARRASSED BY CAMBODIAN SEIZURE
OF U.S. MERCHANT SHIP MAYAGUEZ AND EXPECTED IT TO BE
RELEASED SOON. CHINESE SOURCE NOTED THAT OFFICER FROM
USLO PEKING HAD CALLED ON MFA ABOUT THE SHIP AND COMMENTED
THAT CHINA WAS USING ITS INFLUENCE WITH KHMER ROUGE TO SEEK
EARLY RELEASE OF THE MAYAGUEZ. AKBAR DECLINED TO REVEAL
NAME OF HIS SOURCE, OR HOW HE WAS PRIVY TO THIS
INFORMATION.
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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY NIR, NARA, DATE 7/7/08



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~~SECRET~~ PEKING 925

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PXOR, CH, CB
SUBJECT: PRC REJECTION OF USLO NOTE

REF: PEKING 913

1. AT 1800 LOCAL TIME MAY 14 MFA DELIVERED TO USLO THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

BEGIN QUOTE: THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IS INSTRUCTED TO INFORM THE U.S. SIDE THAT IT IS NOT IN A POSITION TO PASS THE U.S. MESSAGE ON TO THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNION OF CAMBODIA AND HEREBY RETURNS THE MAY 13 NOTE OF THE U.S. SIDE.

END QUOTE

2. MESSAGE WAS DATED MAY 14 AND ENCLOSED WAS USLO NOTE.
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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/7/08



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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR CH CB
SUBJECT: PRC STATEMENTS ON U.S. RESPONSE TO SEIZURE OF "MAYAGUEZ"

REF: A. STATE 110673 B. PEKING 913 C. PEKING 925 D. PEKING 929

1. BY NOW THE DEPARTMENT WILL HAVE SEEN FBIS REPORTS OF LI HSIEN-NIEN'S STATEMENT AT THE MAY 15 VIETNAMESE RECEPTION IN PEKING IN WHICH HE DESCRIBED THE U.S. RESPONSE TO CAMBODIAN SEIZURE OF THE "MAYAGUEZ" AS "AN OUTRIGHT ACT OF PIRACY" AND CLAIMED THAT THE SHIP WAS IN CAMBODIAN TERRITORIAL WATERS. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED THE MAY 16 PEOPLE'S DAILY IN WHICH LI'S REMARKS ARE SUB-HEADLINED UNDER A REPORT OF THE RECEPTION. ON THE INSIDE PAGES PEOPLE'S DAILY ALSO CARRIES LENGTHY CAMBODIAN NEWS AGENCY REPORT OF U.S. ACTIONS AND AN NCNA ARTICLE WHICH TAKES THE SAME LINE AS LI HSIEN-NIEN BUT, IN ADDITION, ALLEGES THAT "MAYAGUEZ" WAS CARRYING ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT AND ENGAGING IN SPYING ACTIVITIES.

2. PRC STATEMENTS ARE BEING REPORTED PROMINENTLY BY LOCAL FOREIGN PRESS CORPS, SO WE CAN EXPECT THE CHINESE POSITION TO BE WIDELY DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE OF CHINA. GIVEN THE PRC'S TOTAL UNWILLINGNESS TO TRY AND ASSIST IN PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM, INCLUDING HUANG CHEN'S REFUSAL EVEN TO LISTEN TO THE DEPUTY SECRETARY'S REQUEST (REF A), I THINK IT IS TIME TO GO PUBLIC WITH AN ACCOUNT OF OUR EFFORTS TO REACH THE CAMBODIANS AND WARN THEM BEFORE IT WAS NECESSARY TO USE MILITARY FORCE. THE CHINESE ARE OBVIOUSLY TRYING TO HAVE IT BOTH WAYS ON THIS ONE, WITH TENG HSIANG-P'ING

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BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/7/08



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PAGE 02 PEKING 00950 161133Z

MAKING IT CLEAR IN PARIS THAT PEKING WOULD DO NOTHING IF U.S. DID USE FORCE TO SECURE THE SHIP'S RELEASE, WHILE LI HSIEN-NIEN BLASTS US HERE FOR "PIRACY".

3. SINCE SOME OF OUR EFFORTS ARE ALREADY LEAKING OUT IN THE PRESS AND THE CONGRESS IS LIKELY TO ASK FOR THE WHOLE STORY, I THINK IT IS TO OUR ADVANTAGE TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE BY PRESENTING THE FULL PICTURE FROM THE START.

4. I RECOGNIZE THERE ARE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN SUCH AN APPROACH, SOME MEMBERS OF MY STAFF HAVE ARGUED THAT THE CHINESE HAVE LITTLE TO LOSE BY OUR GOING PUBLIC AND THE EFFECT WOULD SIMPLY TO PROLONG THE ACRIMONIOUS EXCHANGES OVER WHO WAS AT FAULT. NEVERTHELESS, I THINK ON BALANCE THERE IS MERIT IN SETTING THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON THOSE EFFORTS WE MADE TO AVOID HAVING TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION AND, IN ADDITION, LETTING THE CHINESE KNOW THAT THEIR PROPAGANDA WILL NOT ALWAYS GO UNANSWERED. THE CHINESE HAVE DIRECTLY CHALLENGED PRESIDENT FORD'S VERSION OF THE INCIDENT AND WE SHOULD AT LEAST SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT.

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7194
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7959
USMISSION NATO 4606

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/7/08

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LIMDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJECT: TENG HSIAO-PING VISIT TO PARIS

1. QUAI POLITICAL DIRECTOR DE LABOULAYE GAVE DCM FOLLOWING RUNDOWN TENG HSIAO-PING VISIT TO FRANCE AFTERNOON MAY 15.

(A) TRADE
SUBSTANTIVE SESSIONS WITH TENG HSIAO-PING BEGAN WITH TWO AND ONE-QUARTER HOUR MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER CHIRAC DURING WHICH DISCUSSIONS DEALT WITH BILATERAL QUESTIONS. IT WAS AGREED ON BOTH SIDES IT WAS DESIRABLE TO INCREASE TRADE AND THAT WHILE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS HAD ALREADY BEEN MADE MORE NEEDED TO BE DONE.

(B) CULTURE
ON THE CULTURAL SIDE THERE WAS A DESIRE ON BOTH SIDES TO INCREASE EXCHANGES. THE FRENCH SOUGHT AN AGREEMENT THAT STUDENTS NOT BE LIMITED TO STUDYING ONLY LANGUAGE AND HISTORY BUT ALSO BE PERMITTED TO STUDY SCIENCE IN CHINA.

(C) CIVIL AVIATION
FRENCH REQUESTED AUTHORIZATION OVERFLY SINKIANG IN SAME MANNER AS CHINESE PRESENTLY PERMIT PAKISTANIS AND IRANIANS. TENG AGREED TO THIS REQUEST ON THE SPOT.

2. SECOND DAY'S SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS WERE WITH

*****WHSR COMMENT*****

HAK, SCOWCROFT, LL



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PRESIDENT GISCARD AND CONSISTED PREDOMINANTLY OF OVERALL REVIEW OF THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION. DE LABOULAYE DESCRIBED TENG'S PRESENTATION AS WELL PRESENTED AND COHERENT AND COMMENTED THAT HE WAS "VERY PUGNACIOUS AGAINST THE SOVIETS." SUBSTANCE OF PRESENTATION AS FOLLOWS:

THERE ARE TWO SUPER POWERS VYING FOR HEGEMONY OVER THE REST OF THE WORLD. THE ONE THAT IS THE MOST DANGEROUS (SOVIETS) ISN'T THE ONE THAT APPEARS TO BE THE MOST DANGEROUS (U.S.). THE SOVIETS POSE FAR AND AWAY THE GREATEST THREAT. WHY IS IT THEY ARE BUILDING UP BOTH STRATEGIC AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES IF THEY DON'T HAVE AN IDEA OF MAKING USE OF THEM. TENG POINTEDLY ASKED WHAT FRENCH WERE DOING IN THE FACE OF THIS SITUATION. WHEN GISCARD REPLIED THAT THEY WERE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO BUILD EUROPE TENG REJOINED THAT THEY MUST DO SO WITH THE UNITED STATES. EXISTING ALLIANCES MUST BE MAINTAINED. TENG COMMENTED THAT ALL THINGS CONSIDERED RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES WERE MUCH MORE IMPORTANT THAN THOSE BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA. HE FELT THAT EUROPE WAS DEFENDING THE U.S. JUST AS MUCH AS THE U.S. WAS DEFENDING EUROPE. HE DEPLORED THE CONCEPT OF THE U.S. UNDERTAKING A NUCLEAR UMBRELLA AS A BAD FORMULATION. GROUND TROOPS IN EUROPE WERE ESSENTIAL TO THE UNITED STATES AND THE U.S. KNEW THIS. THEREFORE THERE WAS A BASIS FOR GENUINE EQUALITY AND MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE U.S. AND EUROPE.

3. ACCORDING TO TENG WHAT HAD HAPPENED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA DID NOT WEAKEN THE U.S. THE REVERSE HAD BEEN THE CASE. HE SAID THAT HE HAD OFTEN REMARKED THAT THE U.S. HAD BEEN OVER-EXTENDED IN THEIR COMMITMENTS. IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR THE UNITED STATES TO CONCENTRATE ON THE AREAS THAT WERE REALLY IMPORTANT FOR THEM, NAMELY, EUROPE AND JAPAN, WITH WHOM THEY HAVE A FUNDAMENTAL SOLIDARITY. DE LABOULAYE REITERATED THAT TENG'S PRESENTATION HAD BEEN VERY WELL EXPRESSED AND HE HAD PRESENTED A COHERENT PICTURE.

4. CSCE
TENG SAID THAT THE CSCE REPRESENTED A "FALSE DETENTE." HE HOPED THAT THE FRENCH WERE NOT NAIVE ENOUGH TO BELIEVE IN IT AND THAT THEY WOULD NOT STOP SPENDING MONEY TO REINFORCE THEIR MILITARY STRENGTH. HE URGED



BT

RECALLED
PSN:043091 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:136/14:51Z DTG:161420Z MAY 75

OP: IMMEDI /ROUTINE
FJL336
DE: RUFNPS #2476/02: 136142Z
O R: 161420Z MAY 75
FM: AMEMBASSY PARIS:

TO: SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9467

INFO: USLO PEKING 0197
AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1156
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 7195
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7940
USMISSION NATO 4607

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THEM TO IN FACT INCREASE THE RESOURCES DEVOTED TO
DEFENSE. DE LABOULAYE COMMENTED THAT THIS PORTION OF
TENG'S PRESENTATION WAS VERY MUCH LIKE "SECRETARY
KISSINGER'S BURDEN-SHARING SPEECH."

5. ASIAN SECURITY PACT
IF FOLLOWING ANY CSCE AGREEMENT SOVIETS AGAIN ATTEMPT
TO DUST OFF THEIR ASIAN SECURITY PACT TENG SAID THEY
WOULD FIND NO ONE IN ASIA WHO WOULD ACCEPT IT. FOR ITS
PART, CHINA WAS NOT SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH SOVIET
ATTEMPTS TO ENCIRCLE IT. HE BELIEVED THE REAL INTENTION
OF THE SOVIETS IN THIS REGARD WAS TO UNDERMINE THE
UNITED STATES POSITION.

6. IN RESPONSE TO DCM'S QUESTION DE LABOULAYE SAID
TENG'S VISIT WOULD RESULT IN NO FORMAL AGREEMENTS AND
THERE WOULDN'T EVEN BE A COMMUNIQUE. HOWEVER, THERE
WAS AN UNDERSTANDING THAT HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS TO
DISCUSS POLITICAL ISSUES WOULD BE HELD AS OFTEN AS
NECESSARY AND ALWAYS PRIOR TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY
SESSIONS. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT A FURTHER ROUND OF
CULTURAL TALKS IN GREATER DETAIL WOULD TAKE PLACE
BEFORE THE END OF 1975. FINALLY, THERE WAS AGREEMENT TO
SET UP A MIXED ECONOMIC COMMITTEE. TENG ENDORSED
FRENCH VIEWS REGARDING THE NEED FOR A PRODUCERS-
CONSUMERS DIALOGUE AND THE NEED FOR SUCH A DIALOGUE AT
SOME POINT TO EXTEND TO RAW MATERIALS AS WELL. VIEWS



*****WHSR COMMENT*****

HAK, SCOWCROFT, LL

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WERE EXCHANGED ON THE IMPORTANCE OF INCREASING THE
PURCHASING POWER OF THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES.

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ROUTINE
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DE RUMJDH #5594 1410145
R 210117Z MAY 75
FM AMCONSUL HONG KONG
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5089

TENG HSIAO-PING
STEERING A STABILIZING
COURSE FOR CHINA

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 7067
USMISSION NATO 177
AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 930
AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 2209
AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 1629
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2494
USMISSION USUN 829
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1972
USLO PEKING 4162
AMEMBASSY SEOUL 1953
AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 3275
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI 7869
AMEMBASSY TOKYO 8460
AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON 562
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI
AMEMBASSY MANILA 5603

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ HONG KONG 5594

NOFORN
CINCPAC FOR POLAD
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT PGOV CH
SUBJ: ERA OF TENG HSIAO-PING
SUMMARY: NOW PEKING'S FORMOST LEADERSHIP FIGURE, TENG
HSIAO-PING IS PUTTING HIS PRINT ON THE REIME'S POLICY AND
STYLE WITH A LINE WHIC FEATURES COMESTIC STABILITY, ECONOMIC
CONSTRUCTION AND WORLD PEACE. END SUMMARY

1. AS ILLUSTRATED BY HIS HANDLING OF THE KIM IL-SUNG VISIT
AND THE CONDUCT OF HIS OWN TRIP TO FRANCE NOW JUST CONCLUDED,
TENG HSIAO-PING IS THE FOREMOST PUBLIC FIGURE IN THE PEKING
LEADERSHIP ARRANGEMENT, AND HE STANDS NEARER THE PINNACLE OF
POWER THAN EVER BEFORE IN HIS FIFTY-YEAR POLTTICAL CAREER.
CONTRARY TO THE LACKLUSTER, CARETAKER IMAGE HE PRESENTED
LAST YEAR, TENG'S ERA IN CHINESE POLITICIS HAS ARRIVED, AND



***** W H S R C O M M E N T *****

SCOWCROFT, LL

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/7/08

PSN:048158 PAGE 01 TOR:141/06:33Z DTG:210117Z MAY 75

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WHILE IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW MUCH HE CAN ACCOMPLISH IN THE TIME AND VIGOR LEFT TO HIM, THE 71 YEAR-OLD VETERAN COMMUNIST LEADER IS PUTTING HIS MARK ON CURRENT REGIME POLICY AND STYLE. IT MAY BE AN OVERSIMPLIFICATION OF THE SITUATION IN CHINA, BUT WE ARE INCLINED LOOSELY TO IDENTIFY A CHINESE POLICY OF (A) DOMESTIC STABILITY, (B) WORLD PEACE, AND (C) ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION AS "THE TENGHSIAO-PING LINE".

2. EXPLICIT EVIDENCE OF TENG'S INFLUENCE ON POLICY STILL CENTERS ON HIS UNPUBLISHED SPEECH TO THE PARTY INNER CIRCLE IN JANUARY WHEN HE CRITICIZED THE REGIME'S LOSS OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE AND PINTED OUT THE IMPORTANCE FO STABLE POLICIES IN REGAINING PUBLIC TRUST. THE NEED FOR "STABILITY OF POLICIES" HAS NOW BEEN SPOKEN OF APPROVINGLY IN RED FLAG, WHICH SUGGESTS A MORE OPEN ACCEPTANCE OF THIS ADVICE AND OF TENG'S ADVOCACY OF IT. REPORTS ABOUND OF HIS TAKING A PERSONAL HAND TO QUIET FACTIONAL UNREST COMING OUT OF LAST YEAR'S POLITICAL MOVEMENT. TENG HAS ALSO TAKEN THE LEAD IN ARTICULATING CHINA'S CORRELATIVE DESIRE FOR A LONG PERIOD OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY, A DESIRE NOTED EARLIER AS IMPLICIT IN THE NEW ORIENTATION TO ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT UNVEILED AT THE JANUARY CONGRESS. TENG SPOKE OF CHINA'S NEED FOR PEACE IN HIS MEETING WITH CONGRESSMAN ALBERT AND RHODES IN APRIL AND WENT ON TO RAISE IT PUBLICLY IN HIS OPENING REMARKS IN PARIS IN MAY WHEN HE SAID CHINA WANTS A "RELATIVELY FAVORABLE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT SO THAT WE CAN CARRY ON OUR CONSTRUCTIONS".

3. FROM WHAT IS KNOWN HERE, TENG A YEAR AGO STEPPED INTO CHOU'S SHOES IN OVERSEEING THE COUSE OR SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. EARLY IN HIS MOVE TO TAKE OVER FROM THE AILING, RETIRING PREMIER, TENG TOOK ON THE PRINCIPLE ROLE IN SINO-AMERICAN TALKS WHEN HE MET WITH THE SECRETARY AT THE UN IN APRIL 1974. TENG'S RECENT REMARKS IN PARIS ABOUT THE US HAVING BEEN OVEREXTENDED IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, CONSISTENT WITH THE LINE HE HAS TAKEN SINCE AT LEAST LAST YEAR, AND HIS ASSERTION THAT THE US IS STRONGER RATHER THAN WEAKER NOW AND CAN CONCENTRATE ON IMPORTANT AREAS OF COMMITMENT, IDENTIFY HIM WITH THE CURRENT CHINESE PRIVATE LINE ON THE US.

4. TENG'S PERSONALITY AND STYLE ARE ALSO BEGINNING TO EMERGE, THUS FAR MAINLY FOR FOREIGN EYES. HIS APPARENT TOP-OF-THE HEAD REPLY TO NEWSMEN IN PARIS, THAT IF THE US USED FORCE IN THE MAYAGUEZ AFFAIR WITH CAMBODIA THERE WAS NOTHING CHINA COULD DO, CONVEYED CONFIDENCE AND CANDOR, BUT MAY ALSO HAVE FORETOLD AN INSTINCT FOR USING THE FOREIGN PRESS. THE POSE HE STRUCK FOR FOREIGN PHOTOGRAPHERS ON HIS RETURN HOME FURTHER SUGGESTS THIS. IN AN UNUSUAL GESTURE, TENG'S WIFE HAD BROUGHT THE FAMILY TO THE AIRPORT, AND IN A DISPLAY OF INTIMATE FEELINGS NOT SO RECORDED AMONG CHINESE LEADERS FOR A DECADE,

HR 7/7/08



TENG SCOPPED UP HIS YOUNGEST GRANDCHILD AND HELD HEREFOR THE CAMERAS. IT WAS AN AVUNCULAR STANCE THAT SERVED TO UNDERSCORE THE PEACE AND DOMESTIC CONCERNS HE HAS PROJECTED IN HIS PARIS REMARKS.

5. TENG HAS COME A LONG WAY IN THE TWO YEARS SINCE HE REENTERED PUBLIC LIFE. FROM THE NUMBER TWO RANKING VICTIM OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, OUT OF SIGHT AND UNEMNTIONED FOR SIX YEARS, WHO RETURNED TO OFFICE AS A VICE PREMIER IN 1973, HE HAS STEADILY AND SWIFTLY WORKED HIS WAY BACK TO THE TOP. BUT HE HAS RALY BLOOMED JUST THIS YEAR, WHEN IN A RUSH OF PROMOTIONS AT THE PARTY PLENUM AND NATIOAL PEOPLE'S CNGRESS IN JANUARY, HE WAS RAISED TO VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE PARY, CONFIRMED AS FIRST VICE PREMIER OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND NAMED CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF OF THE MILITARY. DURING THE VISIT HE HAS JUST COMPLETED TO FRANCE, TENG WAS TREATED LIKE A HEAD OF GOVERNMENT, AND HE APPRENTENTLY ACCEPTED THIS AND PLAYED THE ROLE.

6. TENG'S PARTY, GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY POSTIONS SUGGEST A WIDE DOMESTIC BASE OF ACCEPTATNCE AND SUPPORT FOR HIM AND PUT HIM AHEAD OF HIS NEAREST RIVAL, SHANGHAI CHIEF AND LEADING LEFTIST SPOKESMAN CHANG CHUN-CHIAO, WHO FOLLOWS JUST BEHIND TENG IN THESE THREE HIERARCHIES. IT SEEMS LIKELY THERE IS A CONSIDERABLE WEB OF CHECK AND BALANCES IN WHICH THESE TWO ARE CAUGHT. THERE IS ALMOST CERTAINLY A DISTANCE IF NOT BAD BLOOD BETWEEN THE TWO STEMING FROM TENG'S HUMILIATION IN THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, AND THEY HAVE BEEN ON OPPOSITE SIDES IN REGIME POLITICS FOR EVEN LONGER. THEIR RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE UNEASY AND CONTENTIOUS, DESPITE THE MODERATE AND DEFENSIVE STANCE CHANG HAS ADLPTED IN RECENT MONTHS. CHANG, HOWEVER, IS SEVERAL YEARS YOUNGER, AND HIS CHANCES FOR A SUCCESSFUL CHALLENGE TO TENG, VERY POOR NOW, COULD IMPORVE WITH TIME. TENG, TOO, MAY BE HOLDING BACK ON FULL ASSERTING HIMSELF, BIDDING HIS TIME WHILE MAO AND CHOU AE STILL AROUND AND THE LATTER IN PARTICULAR IS STILL A FORCE TO BE RECONED WITH.

7. APART FROM THESE PERSONAL CONSIDERATIONS AND TIME FACTORS, BOTH TENG AND CHANG ARE KEENLY AWARE OF THE COUNTRY'S NEED FOR STABILITY AND UNITY, AND THEY MAY PUT THIS AHEAD OF THEIR PERSONAL RIVALRY--- A LEAST WHERE IT SHOWS. THIS COULD GIVE CHANG, WHO TURNED OUT TO SEND PENG OFF AND WELCOME HIM BACK FROM PARIS, ADDED AND, WITHIN HIS LEFTIST CAMP, FACE-SAVING REASON FOR COOPERATING WITH THE FORMER ARCH REVISIONIST ENEMY, WHILE TENG WORKS TO STEER A STABILIZING COURSE THROUGH THE TWILIGHT PERIOD OF THE MAO-CHOU ERA.

CROSS
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Department of State

AMERICAN EMBASSY
ANKARA TURKEY

TOSEC 10192-
TELEGRAM

CN 8370

22 MAY 75

0800-

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Classification

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0265
BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 119470 TOSEC 010192

MODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.) PFOR, CH

SUBJECT: PRC COMMENT ON MAYAGUEZ OPERATION

REF: SECTO 1055

FOR GOMPERT FROM GLEYSTEN AND LORD (HABIB IS AWAY)

1. PRC COMMENT ON MAYAGUEZ OPERATION HAS CONSISTED OF THREE ITEMS.

-- AT A DRV RECEPTION IN PEKING ON MAY 15, VICE PREMIER LI HSIEN-NIEN DESCRIBED THE UYZACTION AS AN "ACT OF PIRACY," AND THIS WAS MENTIONED IN PEOPLE'S DAILY REPORT ON THE RECEPTION.

-- AN HCHA ARTICLE CARRIED IN PEOPLE'S DAILY MAY 16 SAID THE "USG HAS BRAZENLY SENT PLANES TO BOMB AND ATTACK CAMBODIAN TERRITORY AND BOATS ON THE PRETEXT OF RESCUING" THE MAYAGUEZ, CHARGED THAT THE SHIP WAS ENGAGED IN SPYING, AND CONCLUDED THAT "THIS ONLY SHOWS THAT US IMPERIALISM HAS NOT YET LEARNED THE PROPER LESSON FROM ITS DEFEATS IN CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM."

-- ON MAY 17, PEOPLE'S DAILY CARRIED "COMMENTATOR" ARTICLE CALLING US ACTIONS "ACTS OF PIRACY PURE AND SIMPLE." REFERRING TO USG STATEMENT THAT CAMBODIAN SEIZURE OF SHIP WAS "ACT OF PIRACY," ARTICLE SAID "THIS TRICK OF 'THE THIEF CALLING STOP THIEF' FULLY EXPOSES THE SAVAGE FEATURES OF US IMPERIALISM." IT CHARGED THAT "US IMPERIALISTS ARE IRRECONCILABLE TO THE VICTORIES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE AND CONTINUE TO SABOTAGE AND

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

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HR, NARA, DATE 7/7/08



TAKE TROUBLE," AND CONCLUDED "THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE WILL, AS IN THE PAST, RESOLUTELY SUPPORT THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE IN THEIR JUST STRUGGLE IN DEFENSE OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND AGAINST US AGGRESSION. IF US IMPERIALISM DOES NOT DRAW A LESSON FROM ITS DEFEAT IN INDOCHINA AND CONTINUES TO BE HOSTILE TO THE INDOCHINESE PEOPLE, IT WILL CERTAINLY SUFFER MORE IGNOMINIOUS DEFEAT."

2. PRC UNDOUBTEDLY FELT COMPELLED TO CRITICIZE US ACTION IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN ITS CREDENTIALS WITH CAMBODIANS, TO MEET DOMESTIC REQUIREMENTS AND TO AVOID ANY IMPRESSION THAT IT WAS WILLING TO "COLLUDE" WITH US IN RESOLVING THE MATTER. (WHITE HOUSE PRESS SPOKESMAN CONFIRMED MAY 15 THAT WE HAD TRIED TO PASS MESSAGE TO CAMBODIANS THROUGH PRC.) WHILE THE LANGUAGE IS FAIRLY STRONG, THE PRC DOWNPLAYED THEIR CRITICISM SOMEWHAT BY USING A "COMMENTATOR" ARTICLE, WHICH HAS LESS AUTHORITY THAN A PEOPLE'S DAILY EDITORIAL OR A GOVERNMENT STATEMENT. (BOTH DRV AND PRC ISSUED GOVERNMENT STATEMENTS.)

3. IN A LOW KEY-WAY, WE HAVE ALREADY INDICATED TO CHINESE OUR DISPLEASURE. DURING LUNCHEON CONVERSATION WITH PRCLC DEPUTY CHIEF HAN HSU MAY 15, GLEYSTEN TOOK ISSUE WITH LI HSIEN-NIEN'S DESCRIPTION OF US ACTION TO RECOVER MAYAGUEZ AND ITS CREW AS "ACT OF PIRACY." HE STATED THAT CAMBODIAN SEIZURE OF VESSEL WAS AN ILLEGAL ACT VIOLATING INNOCENT PASSAGE AND US MILITARY ACTIONS WERE IN ACCORD WITH RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE UNDER UN CHARTER. HAN HSU DID NOT GIVE GROUND, BUT PRESUMABLY REPORTED THE CONVERSATION.

4. SUBSEQUENTLY, WE RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM BUSH MENTIONING FIRST TWO CHINESE COMMENTS LISTED ABOVE AND RECOMMENDING THAT WE SET "RECORD STRAIGHT ON THOSE EFFORTS WE MADE TO AVOID HAVING TO TAKE MILITARY ACTION AND, IN ADDITION, LETTING THE CHINESE KNOW THAT THEIR PROPAGANDA WILL NOT ALWAYS GO UNANSWERED.; WE UNDERSTAND THAT SECRETARY SAW THIS TELEGRAM JUST BEFORE HIS MAY 16 PRESS CONFERENCE AND DECIDED HE DID NOT WANT TO GO THAT FAR.

5. WE AGREE WITH BUSH THAT WE SHOULD NOT GIVE THE CHINESE THE IMPRESSION THAT WE ARE ALWAYS WILLING TO LET THEIR CRITICISMS OF US GO UNCHALLENGED. IN VIEW OF THE POINTS MENTIONED ABOVE, HOWEVER, WE CONCLUDE THAT REOPENING THE ISSUE WITH THE CHINESE AT THIS SOMEWHAT DELAYED STAGE WOULD NOT SERVE A MAJOR PURPOSE. THE SECRETARY WOULD OF COURSE HAVE THE OPTION OF MENTIONING OUR DISPLEASURE TO NUANG CHEN IN HIS NEXT MEETING. BUILDING ON HIS LAST CONVERSATION WITH NUANG CHEN, WE COULD ALSO MENTION OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE INCREASING REFERENCES IN PRC COMMENTARY TO "US DEFEAT" IN INDOCHINA AND OUR "STRATEGIC PASSIVITY" AND ISOLATION.

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6. IF SECRETARY DECIDES SOMETHING SHOULD BE DONE NOW, WE BELIEVE LORD AND GLEYSTEN SHOULD CALL IN HAN KSU, AS THIS WOULD BE A MORE DIRECT WAY THAN A PUBLIC STATEMENT TO MAKE OUR POINT WITH CHINESE. THEY COULD STRESS THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE (CALLING THE SPYING CHARGE ABSOLUTELY GROUNDLESS), NOTE THAT THE CAMBODIAN ACTION WAS ILLEGAL BY ALL STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE AND POINT OUT THAT WE TRIED TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF THE VESSEL AND CREW BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS. THEY COULD CONCLUDE BY SAYING THAT PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF THE CHINESE REFUSAL TO ASSIST IN OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORT, WE CONSIDER THE CHINESE STATEMENTS ESPECIALLY UNHELPFUL. INGERSOLL





Department of State ^{STAT 120524 TOL 010259}

AMERICAN EMBASSY
ANKARA TURKEY

TELEGRAM

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0308
BT
UNCLAS STATE 120524 T0SEC 010259

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, CN, CS

SUBJECT: PRC COMMENT ON MAYAGUEZ OPERATION

REF: T0SEC 10192

1. FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF ARTICLE BY "MCNA
CORRESPONDENT" RELEASED MAY 21. COMMENTS BY SEPTEL.

2. BEGIN TEXT

IN THE PAST FEW DAYS WASHINGTON HAS BEEN MAKING A
GREAT HULLABALOO ABOUT THE RECENT U.S. ARMED INVASION OF
CAMBODIA, GIVING MUCH PUBLICITY TO ITS SO-CALLED "NEWS OF
VICTORY" AND PRESENTING ITSELF AS A "GIANT." THIS IS A
TYPICAL FARCE IN SELF-CONSOLATION, WRITTEN AND STAGED
HINGLE-HANDED BY THE VERY SUPERPOWER WHICH THE SMALL
INDOCHINESE COUNTRIES COMPLETELY DEFEATED. AS REPORTED BY
RADIO PHNOM PENH ON MAY 18, CAMBODIAN FIGHTERS SHOT DOWN
FIVE U.S. HELICOPTERS AND KILLED OR WOUNDED MORE THAN 30
U.S. SOLDIERS. THIS IS THE "EXPLOITS" IN WASHINGTON'S
"NEWS OF VICTORY."

FOR ITS OWN POLITICAL NEED, THE UNITED STATES
REPRESENTS THE DEFEAT AS A VICTORY AND INDULGES IN SELF-
GLORIFICATION. LET US TAKE A LOOK AT THIS "VICTORY" SO
BOASTFULLY ADVERTISED BY THE UNITED STATES.

PAGJANDRUMS IN WASHINGTON SAW THE INTRUSION INTO
CAMBODIA'S TERRITORIAL SEA AS AN ACT "IMPROVING THE U.S.
IMAGE IN THE WORLD." THE U.S. IMAGE DOES INDEED NEED TO
BE IMPROVED. ITS INDOCHINA FIASCO HAS DETAILED THE
IMAGE OF THE U.S. PAPER TIGER. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FEELS
COMPELLED TO "IMPROVE" THE IMAGE, TO MAKE IT LOOK MORE
FORMIDABLE, MORE CHARMING. BUT ITS DEFEAT IN CAMBODIA
ONLY GAVE THE PAPER TIGER NEW SIGNS OF WEAR AND TEAR AND



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BROUGHT OUT MORE CLEARLY THE U.S. IMAGE OF A PIRATE. PROTESTING VOICES WERE RAISED ALL OVER THE WORLD; THOUSANDS UPON THOUSANDS OF STUDENTS DEMONSTRATED IN THAILAND IN DAILY PROTESTS AGAINST U.S. PIRACY. THE PEOPLES OF ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA CONDEMNED IT; THE THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES DENOUNCED IT; WEST EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION CRITICIZED IT. THE U.S. IMAGE HAS BEEN THOROUGHLY BLACKENED BY THE SMOKE OF ITS OWN GUNBOATS.

AMONG THOSE TRYING, OPENLY OR SECRETLY, TO WHITENASH THE U.S. IMAGE, ARE THE APOLOGISTS FROM MOSCOW. REPORTING THE DISPATCH OF U.S. MARINES FOR THE CAMBODIA INVASION BY THE PENTAGON, TASS SAID, "THIS STEP WAS TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE DETENTION BY A CAMBODIAN VESSEL OF AN AMERICAN SHIP IN THE AREA OF CAMBODIA'S COAST." TASS TAKES CARE HERE TO USE "AREA OF CAMBODIA'S COAST" RATHER THAN "CAMBODIA'S TERRITORIAL SEA" FOR OBVIOUS REASONS OF ITS OWN.

WASHINGTON SEEKS COMFORT IN ITS CAMBODIAN ADVENTURE, LOOKING TO IT TO "BOOST MORALE" AND MEND THE DOMESTIC RIFTS WIDENED BY THE INDO-CHINA DEFEAT. IMPROVE THE CONGRESSIONAL CLIMATE FOR THE WHITE HOUSE AND EASE THE BICKERINGS AMONG THE RULING FACTIONS. OF COURSE, THIS IS JUST ANOTHER PIECE OF WISFUL THINKING.

THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE VOICED INDIGNANT PROTESTS IN DIVERSE FORMS, HOLDING MEETINGS, WRITING LETTERS AND CONTRIBUTING ARTICLES TO THE PRESS TO CONDEMN THE U.S. PIRACY AND PLEDGE SUPPORT FOR THE CAMBODIAN PEOPLE'S STRUGGLE AGAINST AGGRESSION. IN THE AMERICAN PRESS, ALONGSIDE THE SHOUTED HOORAYS FOR THE U.S. ACTION, WERE MANY WRITERS WHO TOOK THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO TASK AND BLASTED ITS BEHAVIOUR AS "FOOLISH." AMERICAN JURISTS SEE THE INTRUSION INTO CAMBODIA AS A VIOLATION OF INTER-

NATIONAL LAW. THE INCIDENT HAS TOUCHED OFF A NEW STORM OF CONTROVERSY INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. THE RIFTS THAT WORRY GOVERNMENT LEADERS ARE ANYTHING BUT MENDED.

LET THE GENTLEMEN IN WASHINGTON PRIDE THEMSELVES ON THEIR WORK. FOR ALL THEIR SELF-GLORIFICATION, THE U.S. IS MORE TARNISHED TODAY THAN IT WAS A LITTLE OVER A MONTH AGO WHEN THE UNITED STATES SUFFERED TOTAL DEFEAT BY THE INDOCHINESE PEOPLE.

END TEXT. INGERSOLL
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Department of State

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FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3791

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NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGUS1
TAGS: CH, PFUR, IR
SUBJECT: CALL BY AMB BUSH ON PRINCESS ASHRAF

DEPARTMENT PASS TEHRAN AT DISCRETION - ALSO ASST SECY HABIB IN SYDNEY

1. ON MAY 21 AT 6:30 PM I CALLED ON PRINCESS ASHRAF WHO WAS LEAVING THAT EVENING FOR IRAN AFTER A VISIT TO NORTH KOREA AND PEKING. SHE WAS QUARTERED IN GUEST HOUSE 42, THE OLD AMERICAN LEGATION.

2. THE PRINCESS HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY PREMIER CHOU EN LAI AND TENG HSIAO-PING. SHE COMMENTED THAT CHOU EN LAI AND MAO TSE TUNG WERE CLEARLY NOT RUNNING THINGS. I TOLD HER THAT RECENT VISITORS FOUND CHOU TO BE VERY SHARP AND ALERT. SHE AGREED THAT HE WAS SHARP AND ALERT, BUT THAT HE LOOKED BAD AND THAT HE HAD HAD A HEART ATTACK.

3. SHE FOUND TENG TO BE QUITE STRONG AND FORCEFUL AND COMMENTED ON CHIAO KUAN HUA'S GRASP OF WORLD AFFAIRS.

4. THE PRINCESS MENTIONED TWICE THAT THE CHINESE WERE ANGRY WITH US ABOUT THE MAYAGUEZ. I TOLD HER I HOPED I WOULD HAVE A CHANCE TO PRESENT OUR VIEWS TO THEM ON THIS QUESTION SOME TIME BECAUSE THERE WAS CLEARLY PROVOCATION THAT THE US COULD NOT STAND FOR. AT THIS POINT THE PRINCESS EXPRESSED HER CONCERN ABOUT THE ACTIONS OF THE US

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES

BY KRC, NARA, DATE 7/7/08





Department of State

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 02 PEKING 00981 220440Z

CONGRESS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. I ASSURED HER THAT ON THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CONGRESS WERE SUPPORTING THE PRESIDENT OVERWHELMINGLY. (AFTER LISTENING TO TODAY'S VOA I HOPE THIS CONTINGUES TO BE THE CASE.) THE PRINCESS FOUND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HAD SUPPORTED THE PRESIDENT SO STRONGLY.


5. WE DISCUSSED THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT IN DETAIL AND SHE SEEMED TO ACCEPT THE FACT THAT OUR STRONG ACTION WOULD CLEARLY BENEFIT OUR ALLIES AND IN THE LONG RUN MIGHT EVEN HAVE THE TACIT APPROVAL OF THE PRC. THE PRINCESS TWICE MENTIONED THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP'S RESPECT FOR PRESIDENT NIXON. SHE ALSO SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT THERE WAS NO UNFAVORABLE MENTION OF SECRETARY KISSINGER.

6. I ASKED ABOUT HER VISIT AND RECEPTION IN KOREA. SHE WAS CLEARLY PLEASED BY THE BIG TURNOUT AND RECEPTION IN KOREA. THE STREETS LINED WITH SMILING, WAVING DANCING PEOPLE GOT TO HER A LITTLE. SHE WAS REALISTIC IN HER ASSESSMENT OF THE KIM PERSONALITY CULT - NOT ENTHRALLED WITH THAT.

7. I DID NOT ASK HER ABOUT RUMORS THAT IRAN WAS BEING ASKED TO REPAY KOREA'S DEBT.

8. KIM IL SUNG STRESSED HIS DETERMINATION TO SEE KOREA UNIFIED, BUT SURPRISINGLY, HE KEPT STRESSING PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION. THE PRINCESS MENTIONED THREE DIFFERENT TIMES KIM'S WILLINGNESS TO HAVE, INDEED DESIRE TO HAVE, FREE ELECTIONS TO DETERMINE THE FUTURE OF KOREA. IN SPITE OF THE OVERWHELMING NUMBERS OF PEOPLE IN THE SOUTH COMPARED TO THE NORTH, KIM EMPHASIZED THAT HE WANTED FREE ELECTIONS AND HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE WOULD OVERWHELMINGLY VOTE FOR HIM AND AGAINST THE LEADERSHIP IN THE SOUTH. I ASKED ABOUT INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION OF SUCH ELECTIONS BY THE UN. "NO" SAID SHE, THE KOREANS WANT THE UN OUT OF KOREA AND THE AMERICANS TOO. I ASKED ABOUT OTHER IMPARTIAL SUPERVISION OF ELECTIONS. SHE WAS UNCLEAR AS TO WHETHER THEY WOULD ACCEPT ANY SUCH SUPERVISION. SHE USED THE WORD "PLACISCITE" SEVERAL TIMES.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 03 PEKING 00981 220440Z

9. RANDOM TOPICS: PRC LEADERSHIP: THEY DISLIKED THE USSR MORE THAN THE USA.

10. THE PRINCESS WAS VERY TIRED AND HAD A SEVERE MIGRAINE HEADACHE. WHEN I KNEW HER AT THE UN SHE WAS OFTEN PLAGUED WITH SUCH HEADACHES.

11. I CONGRATULATED THE PRINCESS ON THE ROLE OF WORLD LEADERSHIP THAT IKAN HAD BEEN PLAYING. SHE WAS PLEASED BUT SHE "KNUCKED ON WOOD" AS IF TO INDICATE THINGS WERE GOING WELL NOW BUT PROBLEMS LAY AHEAD.

12. INTERESTING THOUGH NOT FLATTERING COMMENT BY THE PRINCESS: "WHY ARE YOU IN CHINA? ARE YOU IN EXILE?" "NO," I SAID. "I LIKE IT HERE, WANTED TO COME HERE, AND THIS RELATIONSHIP IS VERY IMPORTANT TO THE US AND TO THE PRC". SHE BELIEVES THE LAST PART AND MAY HAVE BELIEVED THE FIRST. BUSH

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





Department of State

AMERICAN EMBASSY
ANKARA TURKEY

ToSec 10208
(PEKING 981)¹³
TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

CN 8419

1747

5/22/75

ACTION
SK 10

CHRON

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O 221348Z MAY 75
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 0284
BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 119525 TOSEC 010200

MODIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE, MAY 22, FROM PEKING RPTD
TO YOU:

QUOTE ~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ PEKING 981

MODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDSI
TAGS: CH, PFOR, IR
SUBJECT: CALL BY AMB BUSH ON PRINCESS ASHRAF

DEPARTMENT PASS TEHRAN AT DISCRETION - ALSO ASST SECY HABIB IN
SYDNEY

1. ON MAY 21 AT 6:30 PM I CALLED ON PRINCESS ASHRAF WHO WAS
LEAVING THAT EVENING FOR IRAN AFTER A VISIT TO NORTH KOREA
AND PEKING. SHE WAS QUARTERED IN GUEST HOUSE 42, THE OLD AMERICAN
LEGATION.

2. THE PRINCESS HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY PREMIER CHOU EN LAI AND
TENG NSIAO-PING. SHE COMMENTED THAT CHOU EN LAI AND MAO TSE
TUNG WERE CLEARLY NOT RUNNING THINGS. I TOLD HER THAT RECENT
VISITORS FOUND CHOU TO BE VERY SHARP AND ALERT. SHE AGREED
THAT HE WAS SHARP AND ALERT, BUT THAT HE LOOKED BAD AND THAT
HE HAD HAD A HEART ATTACK.

3. SHE FOUND TENG TO BE QUITE STRONG AND FORCEFUL AND COM-
MENTED ON CHIAO KUAN HUA'S GRASP OF WORLD AFFAIRS.

4. THE PRINCESS MENTIONED TWICE THAT THE CHINESE WERE
ANGRY WITH US ABOUT THE MAYAGUEZ. I TOLD HER I HOPED I
WOULD HAVE A CHANCE TO PRESENT OUR VIEWS TO THEM ON THIS
QUESTION SOME TIME BECAUSE THERE WAS CLEARLY PROVOCATION
THAT THE US COULD NOT STAND FOR. AT THIS POINT THE PRIN-
CESS EXPRESSED HER CONCERN ABOUT THE ACTIONS OF THE US

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC 3.5

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Classification

FORM FS-412(H)
4-68

BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/7/08



PG 3 CN 419

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

10. THE PRINCESS WAS VERY TIRED AND HAD A SEVERE MIGRAINE HEADACHE. WHEN I KNEW HER AT THE UN SHE WAS OFTEN PLAGUED WITH SUCH HEADACHES.

11. I CONGRATULATED THE PRINCESS ON THE ROLE OF WORLD LEADERSHIP THAT IRAN HAD BEEN PLAYING. SHE WAS PLEASED BUT SHE "KNOCKED ON WOOD" AS IF TO INDICATE THINGS WERE GOING WELL NOW BUT PROBLEMS LAY AHEAD.

12. INTERESTING THOUGH NOT FLATTERING COMMENT BY THE PRINCESS: "WHY ARE YOU IN CHINA? ARE YOU IN EXILE?" "NO." I SAID. "I LIKE IT HERE, WANTED TO COME HERE, AND THIS RELATIONSHIP IS VERY IMPORTANT TO THE US AND TO THE PRC". SHE BELIEVES THE LAST PART AND MAY HAVE BELIEVED THE FIRST. BUSH UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CLASSIFICATION

PG 2 CN 8719

CONGRESS IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS. I ASSURED HER THAT ON THE MAYAGUEZ INCIDENT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND CONGRESS WERE SUPPORTING THE PRESIDENT OVERWHELMINGLY. (AFTER LISTENING TO TODAY'S VOA I HOPE THIS CONTINUES TO BE THE CASE.) THE PRINCESS FOUND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HAD SUPPORTED THE PRESIDENT SO STRONGLY.

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9. RANDOM TOPICS: PRC LEADERSHIP: THEY DISLIKED THE USSR MORE THAN THE USA.





Department of State

STATE 120688 TO SEC 010254
TELEGRAM

AMERICAN EMBASSY
ANKARA TURKEY

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TO USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE 8362

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 120688 TOSEC 010254

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY NR, NARA, DATE 7/7/08

3 Chi Exen

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR CH CB

SUBJECT: PRC COMMENT ON MAYAGUEZ OPERATION

REF: A) TOSEC 10192; B) SECTO 1106; C) SECTO 1110

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM LORD AND GLEYSTEN

1. WE ARE SENDING YOU SEPARATELY A FULL TEXT OF THE LATEST PEKING COMMENTARY ON THE MAYAGUEZ AFFAIR, WHICH IS THE SHARPEST PRC CRITICISM OF THE U.S. FOR SOME TIME. IT HAS AN INSULTINGLY SARCASTIC TONE (E.G., "LET THE GENTLEMEN IN WASHINGTON PRIDE THEMSELVES ON THEIR WORK. FOR ALL THEIR SELF-GLORIFICATION, THE U.S. IS MORE TARNISHED TODAY THAN IT WAS A LITTLE OVER A MONTH AGO WHEN THE U.S. SUFFERED TOTAL DEFEAT BY THE INDOCHINESE PEOPLE.") IT ALSO CONTAINS THE MOST POINTED RECENT REFERENCE TO THE UNITED STATES AS A "PAPER TIGER." DESPITE ITS UNAUTHORITATIVE FORMAT--AN ARTICLE BY AN NCHA CORRESPONDENT--A PIECE WITH THIS TONE AND CONTENT WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY REQUIRE HIGH-LEVEL APPROVAL IN PEKING.

2. WE DO NOT YET HAVE ENOUGH CONTEXT TO MAKE A SATISFACTORY ASSESSMENT OF PEKING'S MOTIVES IN PURSUING THIS PROPAGANDA LINE. THERE IS AN OBVIOUS ELEMENT OF REACTION

INVOLVED. THE CHINESE HAVE MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT OUR DEFEATS IN INDOCHINA, AND THEIR HIGH-TONED LANGUAGE CAN BE PARTLY EXPLAINED BY ITS APPEAL TO INDOCHINESE, THIRD WORLD, AND DOMESTIC CHINESE AUDIENCES. THEY UNDOUBTEDLY BELIEVE WE OVER-REACTED. MOREOVER, THEY ARE CLEARLY ANNOYED THAT OUR ACTIONS TO ENGAGE THEM IN RELEASE OF THE MAYAGUEZ HAD THE EFFECT OF PUTTING THEM IN A VERY EXPOSED POSITION. THE REFERENCES TO "PAPER TIGER" AND THE HEAVY SARCASTIC, HOWEVER, ARE HARDER TO EXPLAIN BECAUSE OF THEIR BEARING ON NORMALIZATION AND US/SOVIET/PRC RELATIONSHIPS. IN ANY CASE, WE WILL NEED TO KEEP A CLOSE WATCH ON THIS POTENTIALLY DISTURBING ASPECT OF PEKING'S CURRENT PUBLIC TREATMENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

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ACTION TAKEN

BY
DATE



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CLASSIFICATION

3. WE STILL HAVE SOME RESERVATIONS ABOUT TAKING ACTION NOW: THE CHINESE UNDOUBTEDLY FELT THEMSELVES EXPOSED BY SOME OF OUR MOVES INVOLVING THEM IN THIS ISSUE; THEY ARE IN A TOUGH BIND WITH VARIOUS AUDIENCES; AND WE MIGHT APPEAR OVERLY DEFENSIVE ABOUT PROVING OUR MANHOOD. SOLOMON THINKS ON BALANCE THAT FOR THESE REASONS WE SHOULD HOLD OFF FOR A WEEK OR SO TO SEE IF PEKING'S LINE CONTINUES. LORD AND GLEYSTEN BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD KEEP OPEN THE OPTION OF YOUR CALLING IN HUANG CHEN LATER TO MAKE SOME POINTS MORE FIRMLY AND AUTHORITATIVELY, BUT ON BALANCE AGREE WITH YOU THAT WE SHOULD GO AHEAD AT THEIR LEVEL NOW.

4. ACCORDINGLY, UNLESS YOU INSTRUCT US TO THE CONTRARY, WE INTEND TO GET IN TOUCH WITH THE CHINESE FRIDAY AT 10:00 AM, WASHINGTON TIME, AND TO MAKE THE REPRESENTATION TO HAN HSU LATER THE SAME DAY. WE WOULD INTEND TO USE THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS:

-- I HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO LET YOU KNOW THAT WE HAVE NOTED SOME OF THE RECENT CHINESE COMMENTARIES ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INDOCHINA AREA, PARTICULARLY REGARDING THE MAYAGUEZ AFFAIR.

-- YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH OUR FULL PUBLIC STATEMENTS REGARDING THE MAYAGUEZ PROBLEM, BUT LET ME REVIEW BRIEFLY SEVERAL POINTS.

-- IN THE FIRST PLACE, BY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, THE MAYAGUEZ HAD THE RIGHT OF INNOCENT PASSAGE.

-- ON THE OTHER HAND, THE CAMBODIAN ACTION IN SEIZING THE VESSEL AND CREW WAS CONTRARY TO ALL STANDARDS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE.

-- THE CHARGE THAT THE VESSEL WAS ENGAGED IN ANY SPYING ACTIVITY IS ABSOLUTELY WITHOUT ANY BASIS IN FACT.

-- AS YOU KNOW, WE TRIED TO OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF THE CREW AND VESSEL BY DIPLOMATIC MEANS. BUT IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY RESPONSE FROM THE CAMBODIANS, WE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO ACT AS WE DID TO RECOVER THE CREW AND SHIP AND TO MAINTAIN OUR POSITION ON FREEDOM OF THE SEAS.

-- WE RECOGNIZE THAT YOU DO NOT SHARE OUR VIEWS ON VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE INDOCHINA SITUATION, AND WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT YOUR COMMENTARIES MAY BE DIRECTED AT VARIOUS AUDIENCES.

-- AT THE SAME TIME, ONE OF THE AUDIENCES, INTENDED OR NOT, IS THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, CONGRESS AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC. AND AS YOU WELL KNOW, ALL OF THEM ARE IMPORTANT TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS.

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-- FURTHERMORE, AS SECRETARY KISSINGER STATED TO AMBASSADOR HUANG, THE U.S. DOES NOT INTEND TO BE STRATEGICALLY PASSIVE, AND WE DO NOT BELIEVE IT IS IN YOUR INTEREST TO IMPLY OTHERWISE.

-- I HAVE THEREFORE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO LET YOU KNOW THAT WE CONSIDER THE TONE AND CONTENT OF RECENT CHINESE STATEMENTS TO BE UNJUSTIFIED AND UNHELPFUL.

INGERSOLL
BT



~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

OP IMMED
DE WTE30 #0091 1420800
O 230758Z MAY 75

TO THE WHITE HOUSE
FM PEKING 91 (BUSH)

~~SECRET~~ VIA VOYAGER CHANNELS

PEKING 091 23 MAY 1975

FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: GEORGE BUSH
THRU: GENERAL SCOWCROFT ONLY

BRENT, PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING TO THE PRESIDENT. I HOPE IT WILL BE SHARED ONLY WITH SECSTATE AND NOT RPT NOT BE PASSED TO NSC STAFF OR DEPARTMENT. IT IS PURE POLITICS, BUT I FEEL STRONGLY ABOUT IT.

QUOTE: DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

AFTER TALKING TO ROG MORTON WHEN HE WAS OUT HERE ABOUT DOMESTIC POLITICS, I HAVE A BETTER FEEL FOR WHAT IS HAPPENING AT HOME. IT IS HIS IMPRESSION AND MINE THAT THERE IS LITTLE FOCUS IN THE US ON THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF YOUR TRIP TO CHINA.

THE TAIWAN ISSUE IS ON THE BACK BURNER RIGHT NOW AS IT RELATES TO DOMESTIC POLITICS. I AM VERY CONCERNED THAT AS YOUR TRIP TO CHINA APPROACHES THIS WILL CHANGE DRAMATICALLY. YOUR OWN PERSONAL INTERESTS DICTATE THAT SERIOUS THOUGHT BE GIVEN TO WHAT IS POSSIBLE RPT POSSIBLE FROM A PURELY POLITICAL RPT POLITICAL STANDPOINT.

ANSWERS TO THE TAIWAN QUESTION THAT MAY HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE BEFORE THE COLLAPSE IN CAMBODIA AND VIET NAM MAY NO LONGER BE ANY ANSWERS AT ALL. I WOULD STRONGLY SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING:

(A) AN IN-DEPTH POLL BE TAKEN TO MEASURE PUBLIC OPINION ON VARIOUS SOLUTIONS TO THE TAIWAN QUESTION (THE LAST POLL, I BELIEVE, WAS BY GALLUP LATE LAST YEAR). THE POLL SHOULD PROBE INTO OPINION OF CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERALS AND SHOULD SOUND OUT ATTITUDES TOWARDS VARIOUS SOLUTIONS. OBVIOUSLY THIS POLLING SHOULD BE DONE IN GREAT CONFIDENCE AND COMMISSIONED BY OUTSIDE SOURCES.

(B) AN IN-DEPTH RESEARCH JOB BE DONE ON WHAT THE CONSERVATIVES IN THE US HAVE SAID AND ARE LIKELY TO SAY ON THIS ISSUE. A SIMILAR STUDY SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN ON WHAT THE LEADING DEMOCRATS HAVE BEEN SAYING. N.B.: IT SEEMS TO ME THAT YOUR POLITICAL PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THIS ISSUE ARE QUITE DIFFERENT PRE-GOP CONVENTION COMPARED TO POST-GOP CONVENTION.



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

MR 97-7, #2; NSC letter 12/5/97

By WT NARA, Date 1/20/98

~~SECRET~~

*****S COPY

(C) THOUGHT BE GIVEN AS TO HOW TO KEEP THIS ISSUE FROM BUILDING INTO A MAJOR WEAPON FOR YOUR OPPONENTS BE THEY REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT. SOME WILL TRY TO PAINT A CHINA VISIT WITHOUT A FINAL SOLUTION TO TAIWAN AS A DIPLOMATIC FAILURE, AN INABILITY TO SOLVE THE TOUGH PROBLEMS. OTHERS, PARTICULARLY THE RIGHT WING, WILL SOON START CRITICIZING THE VISIT ITSELF AND WILL BE ON GUARD TO IMMEDIATELY CRITICIZE ANY CONCESSIONS AS A SELL-OUT OF TAIWAN.

IN THIS COMMUNICATION I AM NOT ATTEMPTING TO GO INTO THE FOREIGN POLICY MERITS OF CHINA OPTIONS. I FIRMLY BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT YOUR COMING TO PEKING THIS YEAR, WHATEVER THE CONCRETE RESULTS, IS THE RIGHT THING TO DO. WHAT IS DONE AT THIS STAGE TO ASSESS THE POLITICS OF THE VISIT SHOULD BE SEPARATE FROM THE FOREIGN POLICY MACHINERY AND NOT IN ANY WAY INHIBIT THE THINKING AND PLANNING WHICH UNDOUBTEDLY IS GOING FORWARD AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND NSC. I AM SUGGESTING THAT A TRUSTED CONFIDANT WHO WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED WITH THIS PLANNING BE ENCOURAGED TO THINK OUT THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF YOUR CHINA VISIT.

I HAVE ALREADY DISCUSSED WITH THE STATE DEPARTMENT MY CONCERN THAT WORK NEED BE DONE FAIRLY SOON TO MINIMIZE EXPECTATIONS. MANY JOURNALISTS ARE SAYING, "THE PRESIDENT CAN'T POSSIBLY GO TO CHINA WITHOUT SOLVING THE TAIWAN PROBLEM." IT IS TO YOUR ADVANTAGE TO HAVE THIS TALK DAMPENED, SO THAT EXPECTATIONS BE REALISTIC NOT EUPHORIC AND THAT A VISIT THAT DOES NOT SOLVE THE BIG TAIWAN PROBLEM WILL NOT, POST FACTO, BE CONSIDERED A DIPLOMATIC FAILURE.

PARDON MY INTRUSION ON YOUR BUSY SCHEDULE, BUT, BASED ON MY OWN POLITICAL PAST, I WORRY THAT THIS ISSUE CAN BUILD INTO A POLITICAL NIGHTMARE UNLESS A LOT OF PURE POLITICAL THOUGHT GETS INTO IT SOON.

BARBARA AND I ARE HAPPY OUT HERE. WE FEEL WE ARE MOST FORTUNATE TO BE IN THIS FASCINATING JOB IN THIS FASCINATING LAND.

WARMEST REGARDS TO BETTY.
SINCERELY,
GEORGE

UNQUOTE

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PSN:007255 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:144/02:57Z DTG:230758Z MAY 75

~~SECRET~~

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 SECTO 01123 231231Z

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0123

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NODIS

FOR GLEYSTEN AND LORD FROM GOMPERT

E.O. 11652: GUS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: PRC COMMENT ON MAYAGUEZ OPERATION

REFS: (A) TOSEC 010254 (B) TOSEC 010259

1. SECRETARY WANTS YOU TO GO AHEAD WITH PROTEST PROPOSED
REF A.

2. HOWEVER, HE WANTS YOU TO BOIL DOWN THE TALKING POINTS.
HE WANTS LESS JUSTIFICATION. HE INDICATED YOU SHOULD DRAW ON
FOLLOWING POINTS:

- (A) WE HAVE ALREADY STATED OUR POSITION ON THIS MATTER;
 - (B) THE PRC KNOWS THAT NO ESPIONAGE WAS INVOLVED;
 - (C) IN THE ABSENCE OF A RESPONSE TO OUR DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS
WE HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO TAKE ACTION;
 - (D) SUCH STATEMENTS AS HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE PRC CREATE
A SERIOUS IMPACT ON OUR PUBLIC OPINION;
 - (E) THESE STATEMENTS ALSO RAISE SERIOUS QUESTIONS
ABOUT OUR RELATIONS.
- KISSINGER

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES

~~SECRET~~

BY HR, NARA, DATE 7/7/08



SCOWCROFT, LL

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3 Chi BRch

F31S 12

MAO REPORTEDLY LOSES POWER OF SPEECH

LD250730 LONDON SUNDAY TELEGRAPH IN ENGLISH 25 MAY 75 P 2 LD

(ARTICLE: "MAO LOSES POWER OF SPEECH," BY OUR DIPLOMATIC STAFF)

(EXT) CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG, 81, HAS LOST THE POWER OF SPEECH AND CAN ONLY GRUNT AFFIRMATIVELY TO THE REMARKS OF HIS DISTINGUISHED VISITORS AFTER A SEVERE STROKE LAST AUTUMN.

HE DID NOT FULLY RECOVER FROM THE STROKE, WHICH WAS REPORTED EXCLUSIVELY IN THE DAILY TELEGRAPH. SINCE THAT TIME HIS HEALTH HAS SLOWLY DETERIORATED.

IN RECENT STATEMENTS TO RESIDENT CORRESPONDENTS IN PEKING PRESIDENT KIM IL-SONG OF NORTH KOREA AND MR LINDEMANS, THE PRIME MINISTER OF BELGIUM, HAVE SAID THAT CHAIRMAN MAO WAS "FIT AND ALERT."

BUT THEIR STAFFS HAVE SINCE DISCLOSED TO INTIMATES IN THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS THAT THE CHAIRMAN HAS LOST THE POWER TO COORDINATE HIS MUSCLES. HE IS EXTREMELY DEAF, HIS EYESIGHT IS POOR AND HE TENDS TO DRIBBLE AT THE MOUTH.

WINTER SOJOURN

LAST MONTH CHAIRMAN MAO RETURNED TO HIS EIGHT-ROOMED BUNGALOW IN THE FORBIDDEN CITY OF PEKING AFTER SPENDING THE WINTER IN THE RESORT TOWN OF HANGCHOW, WHICH ENJOYS A MILD CLIMATE.

IT WAS THERE HE RECEIVED MR MINTOFF, THE PRIME MINISTER OF MALTA, ON JANUARY 9 AND HERR FRANZ-JOSEF STRAUSS, THE WEST GERMAN OPPOSITION LEADER, EXACTLY A WEEK LATER.

THEN FOR FOUR MONTHS VISITING HEADS OF STATE WERE TOLD THE CHAIRMAN "HAD A COLD" OR WAS NOT "FEELING TOO FII," AND COULD NOT RECEIVE THEM.

LAST APPEARANCE

THE TRADITION THAT HEADS OF STATE AND VISITING PRIME MINISTERS, AS WELL AS HONOURED GUESTS, WERE INTRODUCED TO CHAIRMAN MAO GREW FROM THE TIME IN MAY, 1971, WHEN HE CEASED TO MAKE PUBLIC APPEARANCES, THOUGH THE CHINESE PEOPLE WATCHED HIM TALK WITH HIS VISITORS ON TELEVISION.

HIS LAST SEMI-PUBLIC APPEARANCE WAS AT THE TENTH PARTY CONGRESS IN AUGUST, 1973, BUT HE DID NOT SPEAK.

25 MAY 0811Z PC/1M



ACTION



UNCLASSIFIED

Classification

Department of State
TELEGRAM

INCOMING

AMERICAN EMBASSY, BRUSSELS

CONTROL: 13129

ORIGINATING POST:

MRN:

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 RUADFBA/FBIS TOKYO
 RUADJHA/CG USARJ CAMP ZAMA/GB-I JAPAN
 RUADKEA/CO 18TH TFW OKINAWA JAPAN
 RUADKEA/313TH AD/CVD OKINAWA JAPAN
 RUADLEA/VOA TOKYO
 RUAGAAA/CGEUSA SEOUL
 RUAOADA/USAGO ZUKERAN JAPAN
 RUAOAHA/376TH STRAT WG/DCI
 RUCLAKA/CDR 4TH PSYOP GROUP FT BRAGG NC
 RUDONKA/FBIS LONDON ENGLAND
 RUDOMLA/FBIS CAVERSHAM/DW
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 RUMMWUA/COMUSNAVPHIL
 RUMRABA/CG THIRD MARDIV OKINAWA JAPAN
 RUMRADA/CG THIRD MAF OKINAWA JAPAN
 RUTLAAA/FBIS WASHDC
 RUYASDG/JIO CANBERRA
 RUEHC/SEC STATE WASHINGTON
 RUFHBS/AMEMB BRUSSELS
 RUAKOKA/AMEMB AND USIS SEOUL
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UNCLAS A7 LD PMU BBC RUAC
 ATTN PETER RODMAN, SECRETARY'S PARTY

~~NCNA CITES FORD'S PLEDGE OF COMMITMENT TO NATO IN BRUSSELS~~

OW302032Y

PEKING NCNA IN ENGLISH 2013 GMT 30 MAY 75 OW

((TEXT)) BRUSSELS, MAY 29, 1975 (HSINHUA) -- THE FIRST MEETING OF THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT OF THE MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION WAS HELD HERE THIS AFTERNOON.

NATO SECRETARY GENERAL JOSEPH LUNS SAID THAT "IN THE FACE OF EVER INCREASING SOVIET MILITARY STRENGTH", IT IS VITAL FOR NATO "TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE DEFENCE

Chi Exch



CHRON

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DISPOSITION". "ONLY UNDER SUCH CONDITIONS CAN WE MAINTAIN ... A FAVOURABLE BALANCE OF FORCE WHICH WILL IN FACT CONSTITUTE THE BASIS OF ANY REAL PROGRESS TOWARDS THE SETTLEMENT OF VARIOUS TOUGH PROBLEMS THAT DIVIDE THE EAST AND THE WEST," HE ADDED.

BELGIAN PRIME MINISTER LEO TINDEMANS SAID THAT THE EXISTENCE OF NATO ENABLES ITS MEMBER COUNTRIES TO BE FREE FROM ANY ATTEMPT OF OTHER COUNTRIES TO EXERT PRESSURE OF FORCE ON THEM. HE STRESSED ON "AN EQUAL PARTNERSHIP" BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE.

U.S. PRESIDENT FORD, SPONSOR OF THE SUMMIT, SAID THE AIM OF THE MEETING IS "TO RENEW OUR COMMITMENT TO THE ALLIANCE," "TO RESTATE OUR PLEDGE TO COLLECTIVE SELF-DEFENSE", "TO ADDRESS THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS WE FACE AND TO REVIEW THE STEPS WE MUST TAKE TO DEAL WITH THEM". "THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNCONDITIONALLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY, REMAINS TRUE TO THE COMMITMENTS UNDERTAKEN WHEN WE SIGNED THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, INCLUDING THE OBLIGATION IN ARTICLE FIVE TO COME TO THE ASSISTANCE OF ANY NATO NATION SUBJECTED TO ARMED ATTACK," FORD DECLARED.

HE STRESSED THAT AS "THE FORCES OF OUR POTENTIAL ENEMIES HAVE GROWN STRONGER", "WE MUST MAINTAIN A STRONG AND CREDIBLE DEFENSE. THIS MUST REMAIN THE FOREMOST OBJECTIVE OF THE ALLIANCE." HE DECLARED, AS FAR AS THE UNITED STATES IS CONCERNED, "OUR COMMITMENT NOT TO ENGAGE IN ANY UNILATERAL REDUCTION OF U.S. FORCES COMMITTED TO NATO REMAINS VALID. BUT THAT IS NOT ENOUGH. WE MUST MAKE MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF OUR DEFENSE RESOURCES."

REFERRING TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE, FORD SAID THAT "WHATEVER EUPHORIC OR INFLATED EMPHASIS THE SOVIET UNION OR OTHER PARTICIPANTS MAY TRY TO GIVZ IT", THE SOVIET UNION MUST ASSURE THAT "THE PROMISES" IT MADE AT THE CONFERENCE "ARE TRANSLATED INTO ACTION". ONLY WHEN SUCH STEPS ARE TAKEN "CAN WE KEEP CSCE IN PERSPECTIVE," HE SAID.

FORD ADMITTED "SERIOUS PROBLEMS" FACING THE NATO. HE ADVOCATED THAT NATO SHOULD "IMPROVZ THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION" AND STRENGTHEN ITS "COOPERATION" SO AS TO "FACE THE CHALLENGES OF THE FUTURE" TOGETHER.

KING BAUDOUIN OF BELGIUM GAVE A BANQUET THIS EVENING IN HONOUR OF THE HEADS OF STATE OR GOVERNMENT TAKING PART IN THE MEETING. FRENCH PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING CAME FROM PARIS TO ATTEND THE BANQUET (HE DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE SUMMIT AND WAS REPRESENTED BY THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER) AND HELD BRIEF TALKS WITH U.S. PRESIDENT G. FORD. THE FRENCH PRESS POINTED OUT THAT BY DOING SO, GISCARD D'ESTAING INTENDED TO EXPRESS FRANCE'S UNITY WITH ITS NATO ALLIES ON THE ONE HAND AND STRESSED ITS INDEPENDENCE ON THE OTHER. PRIOR TO HIS RETURN TO FRANCE, THE FRENCH PRESIDENT TOLD REPORTERS THAT IN HIS TALKS WITH FORD, HE REAFFIRMED TO THE U.S. PRESIDENT THAT ALTHOUGH FRANCE HAS WITHDRAWN FROM NATO MILITARY ORGANS, IT IS STILL A MEMBER OF THE ALLIANCE.

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