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
Read by Gen S to Gen Han
on Wed, 7/11/73

22

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DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *3/1/04*
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA, DATE 6/27/08

I first would like to say something on a personal basis, as a good friend. I know that Dr. Kissinger was surprised at your message that there would be a delay in responding to our proposals relating to the dates of his upcoming visit. He had been under the clear impression that your side wished him to come in early August at a date which would be left up to him, but definitely before the visit of Senator Mansfeld. Dr. Kissinger is puzzled by the fact that we have now been told that a decision must wait until Ambassador Huang has been consulted, when earlier we were given an invitation to come at any time and to stay for any length of time. It will not now be possible to announce the visit on July 16. The U.S. side would recommend that the announcement be made on July 19 or July 23, although the longer the delay, the more speculation will develop.



That was a personal note. Now, I would like to make some observations on a semi-official basis. As you well know, Dr. Kissinger is the principal, and practically the sole, architect of Chinese/American rapprochement. He is inseparably identified with that policy -- and its success, on the U.S. side, has been almost exclusively due to his tremendous efforts on its behalf. For

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some time into the future that will continue to be the case, at least until this policy becomes fairly institutionalized throughout the American Government. At the present time, that is far from the case. In particular, even those now supporting the policy of normalization do it principally on the basis of sentiment. Moving beyond this sentimental plane to the practical concepts of active support of China in the event of a military contingency remains with Dr. Kissinger alone.

I point this out as background. As you undoubtedly know, expectations have been raised about Dr. Kissinger's visit, especially with respect to Cambodia. Under these circumstances, should Dr. Kissinger come back from his visit to Peking empty-handed, that result would seriously undermine his authority in the eyes of the U. S. Government and people and could thus substantially jeopardize the policy of Chinese/American reconciliation with which he is so closely identified. We would therefore appreciate some idea from the Chinese side of what he may be able to bring back regarding the Cambodian situation.





1972


Handed to [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
6³⁰ pm, [unclear], 7/18/73 23

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BY HR, NARA, DATE 6/27/08

(3)

It is believed that the U.S. side is aware of the recent developments in the situation in Cambodia. Of late, Samdech Sihanouk, head of state of Cambodia, and the National United Front and the Royal Government of National Union led by him have repeatedly enunciated their position in public, reiterating the Five-Point Declaration of March 23, 1970, and demanding that the United States immediately end its bombing of Cambodia, stop its military aids to the Lon Nol clique and withdraw all military personnel dispatched by the United States and its allies. In conformity with its consistent position stated to the U.S. side on many occasions, the Chinese side fully supports the above Cambodian demands. Nevertheless, the U.S. side is still obdurately continuing its bombing of Cambodia, intensifying its support to the Lon Nol clique and putting pressure on Samdech Sihanouk and the Royal Government of National Union in other respects. This has all the more enraged Samdech Sihanouk, the Royal Government of National Union and the Cambodian people. Under these circumstances, the Chinese side holds that it is obviously inappropriate to communicate to Samdech Sihanouk the tentative thinking on the settlement of the Cambodian question as set forth by the U.S. side in late May. The Chinese side wishes to inform the U.S. side of this with frankness.



The origin of the Cambodian question is clear to the U.S. side. "It is up to the doer to undo the knot." The key to the settlement of the question is held by the United States, and not by others. If the United States truly desires to settle the Cambodian question, the above reasonable demands raised by the Cambodian side should be acceptable to it. It is hoped that the U.S. side will give serious consideration to this and translate it into action.

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1973

7/19/73

1. The Chinese side has noted the proposal put to the Chief of the Chinese Liaison Office Huang Chen that Dr. Kissinger visit China on August 6. As the first half of August is inconvenient to the Chinese side, we would welcome Dr. Kissinger to visit China on August 16.

2. The Chinese side suggests that the two sides simultaneously publish the news of Dr. Kissinger's visit to China on August 6 or 9. The contents of the news to be published may be decided upon later through consultations.



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BY HR, NARA, DATE 6/27/08

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Passed to Ham F
by S. Schwartz 6/10/73
July 24, 1973

The US side has consistently sought a ceasefire and political settlement in Cambodia since the January 27 Paris Agreement. The other side has continually refused to end the war in Cambodia and responded to the unilateral ceasefire proclaimed by the Phnom Penh government and the cessation of US air actions in Cambodia in February with an intensified military offensive.



The Chinese side declared to the US side in its message of June 4 that it would communicate the US peace proposal of May 27 to Prince Sihanouk. This proposal accepted a long-standing Chinese suggestion for direct talks with Prince Sihanouk made during every visit by Dr. Kissinger to Peking. The contents of the June 4 message were reiterated on June 13 by Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei and again in the Chinese message of July 6, that this awaited only the return of Prince Sihanouk from his travels. On July 6, Ambassador Huang Chen declared that the Chinese side would convey the US proposal to Prince Sihanouk now that he had returned to Peking.

The Chinese message of July 18 has therefore been noted with astonishment. There has been no change in US policy and no increase in US activities. In light of these earlier assurances, and the principles and spirit of the Shanghai Communique, it is difficult to understand why the Chinese side is unable to communicate an American peace proposal to a leader located in Peking. It is utterly unreasonable that this leader

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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *8/27/08*

should publicly demand that communications to him go through Mauritania to which the Chinese side would not entrust the original US communication of May 27. This raises special difficulties because in reliance on the June 4 note and subsequent assurances, the US had not engaged in any other negotiations or responded to any other channels.

As to the substance of the Chinese note of July 18, the Chinese side will not be surprised that the US side rejects a "solution" so arbitrarily weighted against it. This is inconsistent with the requirements of reciprocity and equality. It is beyond the bounds of logic to be asked to negotiate on an issue when the other side, clearly and from the outset, leaves no room for negotiations. In such circumstances the US side will leave negotiations to the Cambodian parties.





1972

*Kissinger, Henry
by Sumner, G. O. S.
July 29, 1973*

ORAL NOTE

My Government notes, with regret, that this is the first time in the development of our new relationship that the Chinese word has not counted.

The Chinese side has often expressed its devotion to principle. The US side is no less serious. One of its firm principles is not to betray those that have relied on it. The US side believes that the Chinese side will welcome US adherence to this principle in other contexts.



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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY *152*, NARA, DATE *6/27/08*

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Handed to Han Han by
Gen Scowcroft, 6⁰⁰ pm,
Wed, 7/25/73

The US side regrets that the August 16 date proposed by the Chinese for Dr. Kissinger's arrival in Peking is inconvenient.

The US side suggests instead that the visit take place preferably from September 13 through September 16, or, alternatively, from September 6 through September 9.



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BY HR, NARA, DATE 6/27/08





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Read to Ha Hsu by
Gen. Scowcroft, 6:00 pm,
Wed, 7/25/73

Oral Note

These are the only dates open to Dr. Kissinger in September. If these dates are not convenient, some date in October would have to be considered, and the US side would welcome a further proposal from the Chinese side. In view of the large number of schedule commitments which are now pending, a reply at the earliest convenience of the Chinese side would be appreciated.

In view of press reports both in the United States and China speculating on the possibility of a visit by Dr. Kissinger to Peking in early August, the US side believes it necessary that both sides be prepared to respond to press inquiries relating to plans for the visit. The US side would be interested in the views of the Chinese side on responding to such inquiries.



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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

State Review
3/1/04

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 6/27/08

*Handed to Tsien & Chi
by Eagleburger & Cooper
7 August 1973*

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The U.S. side wishes to inform the Chinese side that the 1973-1974

U.S. grain crop is likely to be very good, embodying substantial increases over the previous year's production.

At the same time, however, worldwide demand for U.S. agricultural products is very great at this time. As a result of this demand, our ability to supply other countries is strained. In considering this situation, the U.S. Government has taken into account what we believe to be the requirements of the Chinese side and other countries. While we believe that under present circumstances we can meet these requirements, any major increase in demand by individual nations in coming months will cause serious problems. In this respect your attention is called to President Nixon's

remarks on July 18 in his statement on the economy:

"... Limiting our agricultural exports runs counter to our basic policy of building up our agricultural markets abroad. Unless present crop expectations are seriously disappointed, or foreign demands are extremely large, export controls will not be needed."



In order to anticipate future demands, the U.S. side has begun consultations with its major customers, primarily Europe, Japan, and Canada. In these consultations we are seeking cooperation regarding both information about future needs and the limitation of import purchases to amounts needed to meet essential requirements. In particular, we are seeking cooperation from other countries in holding down stock levels to the minimum amounts that are absolutely essential.

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The U.S. side welcomes the Chinese side's purchases of U.S. agricultural products over the past several years. We will be providing substantial amounts of food grains to the PRC this year, and we expect that further production increases in coming years will sustain our ability to meet worldwide demand. We earnestly hope that the present, temporary situation will not compel us to take any action which would limit export availabilities and affect deliveries to the People's Republic of China. However, in recognition of the strained market situation, particularly for wheat but also for corn and soybeans, it would be highly desirable to know of the Chinese side's prospective import demand for the remainder of this crop year for these particular products. We would appreciate it if such information could be provided to the U.S. side on a confidential basis for planning purposes.

We would also encourage the Chinese side to restrict purchases of these products to amounts essential for current requirements until such time as market conditions have eased.

The U.S. side is prepared to discuss this problem in more detail should the Chinese side so desire. In the meanwhile, however, we would appreciate receipt of the above requested information as soon as possible.



Handed to Gen Scowcroft
by Han Han, 6⁰⁰ pm, Fri,
8/17/73. 10

Of the two periods of time suggested by the US side for Dr. Kissinger's visit to China, the period from September 6 through September 9 is convenient to the Chinese side.

If this is agreeable to the US side, the Chinese side suggests that an announcement to the press in the following wording on Dr. Kissinger's visit to China be issued by the two sides either on August 23 or August 27:

"It has been agreed upon through consultations that the Assistant to the U.S. President for National Security Affairs Dr. Henry A. Kissinger will visit the People's Republic of China from September 6 through September 9, 1973."



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
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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HJR, NARA DATE 6/27/08



Presented by memo to Chien Ia-yang
at the Liaison Office of PRC
by Richard Solomon on 22 August,
1973

The U. S. side wishes to inform the Chinese side that the United Nations Commission on the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) will include in its yearly report a call for the dissolution of the organization without prejudice to its past activities. As indicated in recent messages presented to the PRC Liaison Office, the U. S. side will support this position during the 28th Session of the UN General Assembly.



The U. S. side also wishes to reiterate its position that it will use its influence to insure that any debate on the Korean issue in this year's General Assembly not exacerbate tensions, but contribute to an orderly evolution of the Korean situation. On the basis of such circumstances, the U. S. side is prepared to discuss after the 28th session of the General Assembly ways in which the question of the UN Command might be resolved. Efforts of the Chinese side in behalf of this objective will be welcomed.

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NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY *Hr*, NARA, DATE *6/27/08*

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


Handed to Han Han by
Col Kennedy, 10⁰⁰ am,
Thurs, 8/23/73
(accompanied by oral note) 12a

The dates suggested by the Chinese side in the note passed on August 17 are not now convenient for the U. S. side because of impending changes in U. S. Government organization with which the Chinese side is now undoubtedly familiar.

However, Dr. Kissinger would consider, especially in light of these changes, an exchange of views with the Chinese side highly desirable. The best time for Dr. Kissinger to visit China would be for any three-day period between October 21 and October 29. If this is inconvenient or if the Chinese side considers an earlier meeting desirable, Dr. Kissinger could visit the People's Republic of China from October 3 through October 6.

Dr. Kissinger would appreciate the views of the Chinese side on the specific dates suggested.



* In telephone conversation, Col Kennedy changed first date to Oct 18.
8/23/73

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY HR, NARA DATE 6/27/08

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*Read by Col Kennedy
to Han Hsu & Mr Liu
10⁰⁰ am, Thurs, 8/23/73*

Oral Comment

Dr. Kissinger has, in addition, a personal comment which he wishes to make to the Prime Minister.

As far as Dr. Kissinger is concerned, U.S. - Chinese relations constitute a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. He further considers that, in light of the great danger which he foresees, it is increasingly important that synchronization between the policies of the United States and the People's Republic of China take place. As stated in the note, Dr. Kissinger is certainly prepared to visit China, but it will not be possible for him to do so while his confirmation hearings before the Senate are taking place and during the period of the opening of the fall session of the United Nations General Assembly. If it is considered by the Chinese side to be essential, Dr. Kissinger could visit China between October 3 and October 6, but by far the most convenient time would be between October 21 and October 29.

Dr. Kissinger is recalling Ambassador Bruce for a week or so in order that Ambassador Bruce may assist him in the reorganization of the Department of State. Ambassador Bruce will request an appointment with the Prime Minister and the Vice Foreign Minister before his departure. If they will give Ambassador Bruce any messages they may have, Bruce will be authorized to discuss any interim measures which may be appropriate prior to Dr. Kissinger's visit.



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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 3/11/04
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BY *HR*, NARA, DATE *6/27/08*

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