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
*Delivered to Kissinger  
ofc - 3:45 pm, 6/19/73  
15*

June 19, 1973

Dear Mr. Huang:

Attached are the three paragraphs from the remarks last evening which Dr. Kissinger said he would provide to you.

Sincerely,



Brent Scowcroft  
Brigadier General, USAF  
Deputy Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

His Excellency  
Huang Chen  
Chief of the Liaison Office  
of the People's Republic of China  
The Mayflower Hotel  
Washington, D. C.

Gen S/lds/6-19-73

But there are other comments, too. There are some who are attempting to cast aspersions on these efforts of our two countries. They are interpreting this noble cause as if the Soviet Union and the United States, should they adjust their relations and put them on a peaceful track, will begin to impose their will upon other nations, and dictate some conditions to someone, and so on.

There is only one thing to be said on that score: in allegations of that kind there is surely not a single grain of truth. It must be absolutely clear to anyone who is at least slightly familiar with the real course of events, and with the real nature of the development of Soviet-American relations, that their improvement in no way prejudices the interests of any third country.

Naturally, the development of good relations between the USSR and the USA will have, and already has, no small a bearing on world affairs. But this influence is of an entirely different nature. It promotes the strengthening of peace, security and international cooperation. In building through joint effort a new structure of peaceful relations, we have no intention of turning it into a secluded mansion completely fenced off from the outside world. We want to keep this spacious edifice open to all those who cherish the peace and well-being of mankind.



1978

Revision 4/21/73 17  
Ch: [initials]

Handwritten by [unclear] to the House  
2:45 pm Fri, 4/22/73

JOINT COMMUNIQUE



At the invitation of President Nixon, extended during his official visit to the USSR in May 1972, and in accordance with a subsequent agreement, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Leonid I. Brezhnev, paid an official visit to the United States from June 18 to June 26. Mr. Brezhnev was accompanied by \_\_\_\_\_.

President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev held thorough and constructive discussions on the progress achieved in the development of US-Soviet relations and on a number of major international problems of mutual interest.

Also taking part in the conversations held in Washington, Camp David, and San Clemente, were:

On the American side \_\_\_\_\_

On the Soviet side \_\_\_\_\_

I. The General State of the US-Soviet Relations

Both Sides expressed their mutual satisfaction with the fact that the Moscow summit meetings of May 1972 and the joint decisions taken there have resulted in a substantial advance in the strengthening of peaceful relations between the US and the USSR and have created the basis for the further development of broad and mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields of mutual interest to the peoples of both countries and in the interests of all mankind. They noted their satisfaction with the mutual effort to implement strictly and fully the treaties and agreements concluded between the USA and the USSR and to expand areas of cooperation.



They agreed that the process of reshaping relations between the US and the USSR on the basis of peaceful coexistence and equal security as set forth in the Basic Principles of relations signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972 is progressing in an encouraging manner. They emphasized the great importance that each side attached to these Basic Principles. They reaffirmed their commitment to the continued, scrupulous implementation and to the enhancement of the effectiveness of each of the provisions of this document.

Both Sides noted with satisfaction that the outcome of the US-Soviet meeting in Moscow in May 1972 was welcomed by other states and by world opinion as an important contribution to strengthening peace and international security, to curbing the arms race and to developing business-like cooperation among states with different social systems.

Both Sides viewed the return visit to the USA of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, and the talks held during the visit as a further expression of their mutual determination to continue the course toward a major improvement in US-Soviet relations.



Both Sides are convinced that the discussions they have just held represent a further milestone in the constructive development of their relations.

Convinced that the constructive development of American-Soviet relations serves the interests of both of their peoples and all of mankind, it was decided to take further major steps to give these relations maximum stability and to turn the development of friendship and cooperation between their peoples into a permanent factor for worldwide peace.


## II. The Prevention of Nuclear War and the Limitation of Strategic Armaments

Issues related to the maintenance and strengthening of international peace were a central point of the talks between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev. Conscious of the exceptional importance for all mankind of taking effective measures to that end, they discussed ways in which both Sides could work toward removing the danger of war and especially nuclear war between the USA and the USSR and between either party and other countries. Consequently, in accordance with the UN Charter and the Basic Principles of relations of May 29, 1973,

it was decided to conclude an agreement between the USA and the USSR on the Prevention of Nuclear War. It was signed by the President and the General Secretary on June 22, 1973 and the text has been published separately.

The President and the General Secretary, in appraising this Agreement, believe that it constitutes an historical landmark in Soviet-American relations and substantially strengthens the foundations of international peace and security. The United States and the Soviet Union state their readiness to consider additional ways of strengthening peace and of removing forever the danger of war, and particularly nuclear war.


In the course of the meetings, intensive discussions were held on questions of strategic arms limitation. In this connection both Sides emphasized the fundamental importance of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and of the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed between the USA and the USSR in May 1972, which, for the first time in history, place actual limits on the most modern and most formidable types of armaments. Having exchanged views on the progress in the implementation of these Agreements, they reaffirmed their intention to carry them out and their readiness to move ahead jointly toward an agreement on the further limitation of strategic arms.



Both Sides noted that progress has been made in the negotiations that resumed in November 1972, and that the prospects for reaching a permanent agreement on more complete measures to limit strategic offensive armaments are favorable.

Both Sides agreed that the progress made in the limitation of strategic armaments is an exceedingly important contribution to the strengthening of US-Soviet relations and to world peace.


On the basis of their discussions, the President and the General Secretary signed on June 21, 1973, Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Further Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. The text has been published separately.



The USA and the USSR attach great importance to joining with all states in the cause of strengthening peace, reducing the burden of armaments, and in reaching agreements on arms limitations and disarmament measures.

Considering the important role which an effective international agreement with respect to chemical weapons would play, the two Sides agreed to continue their efforts to conclude such an agreement in cooperation with other countries.

The two Sides agree to make every effort to facilitate the work of the committee on disarmament which has been meeting in Geneva. They will actively participate in negotiations aimed at working out new measures to curb and end the arms race. They reaffirm that the ultimate objective is general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under strict international control. A world disarmament conference could play a role in this process at an appropriate time.




### III. International Questions: The Reduction of Tensions and Strengthening of International Security

President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev reviewed major questions of the current international situation. They gave special attention to the developments which have occurred since the time of the US-Soviet summit meeting in Moscow. It was noted with satisfaction that positive trends are developing toward the further relaxation of international tensions and cooperative relations in the interest of peace. In the opinion of both Sides, the current process of improvement in the international situation creates new and favorable opportunities for reducing tensions, settling outstanding international issues, and creating a permanent structure of peace.

#### Indochina

The two Sides expressed their deep satisfaction at the conclusion of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, and also at the results of the international Conference on Vietnam which approved and supported this Agreement.


The two Sides are convinced that the conclusion of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam and the subsequent signing of the Agreement on Restoring Peace and Achieving National Concord in Laos meet the fundamental interests and aspirations of the peoples of Vietnam and Laos and open up a possibility for establishing a lasting



peace in Indochina, based on respect for the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the countries of that area. Both Sides emphasized that these agreements must be strictly implemented.

They further stressed the need to bring an early end to the military conflict in Cambodia in order to bring peace to the entire area of Indochina. They also reaffirmed their stand that the political futures of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia should be left to the respective peoples to determine, free from outside interference.

#### Europe



In the course of the talks both Sides noted with satisfaction that in Europe the process of relaxing tensions and developing cooperation is actively continuing and thereby contributing to international stability. The two Sides expressed satisfaction with the further normalization of relations among European countries resulting from treaties and agreements signed in recent years, particularly between the USSR and the FRG. They also welcomed the coming into force of the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971. They share the conviction that strict observance of the treaties and agreements that have been concluded will contribute to the security and well-being of all parties concerned. They also welcomed the prospect of United

Nations membership this year for the FRG and the GDR and recalled, in this connection, that the USA, USSR, UK and France had signed the Quadripartite Declaration of November 9, 1972, on this subject.

The USSR and the USA reaffirm their desire, guided by the appropriate provisions of their Joint Communiqué adopted in Moscow in May 1972, to continue their separate and joint contributions to strengthening peaceful relations in Europe. Both Sides affirm that ensuring a lasting peace in Europe is a paramount goal of their policies.

In this connection satisfaction was expressed with the fact that as a result of common efforts by many states, including the USA and USSR, the preparatory work has been successfully completed for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which will be convened on July 3, 1973. The USA and USSR proceed from the assumption that the Conference will enhance the possibilities for strengthening European security and developing cooperation among the participating states. The USA and USSR will conduct their policy to realize the goals of the Conference and to bring about a new era of good relations in this part of the world.




Reflecting their continued positive attitude toward the conference, both Sides will make efforts to bring the conference to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible time. Both Sides proceed from the assumption that progress in the work of the conference will produce possibilities for completing it at the highest level.

The US and USSR consider the goal of strengthening of stability and security in Europe would be further advanced if the relaxation of political tensions were accompanied by a reduction of military tensions in Central Europe. In this respect they attach great importance to the negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and associated measures in Central Europe which will begin on October 30, 1973. Both Sides state their readiness to make, along with other states, their contribution to the achievement of mutually acceptable decisions on the substance of this problem, on the basis of the principle of undiminished security of any of the parties.

Middle East

[ ]



#### IV. Commercial and Economic Relations

The President and the General Secretary thoroughly reviewed the status of and prospects for commercial and economic ties between the US and USSR. Both Sides noted with satisfaction the progress achieved in the past year in the normalization and development of commercial and economic relations between them. They agreed that mutually advantageous cooperation and peaceful relations would be strengthened by the creation of a permanent foundation of economic relationships.

They recalled with satisfaction the various agreements on trade and commercial relations signed in this past year. Both Sides noted that American-Soviet trade has shown a substantial increase, and that there are favorable prospects for a continued substantial rise in the exchange of goods over the coming years. They believe that the two countries should aim at a total of 2-3 billion dollars of trade over the next three years. The US-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission continues to provide a valuable mechanism to promote the broad-scale growth of economic relations. The two Sides noted with satisfaction that contracts between American firms and their Soviet counterparts are continuing to expand.

Both Sides confirmed their firm intention to proceed from the understanding reached on measures directed at creating more favorable conditions for expanding commercial and other economic ties between the USSR and the USA.



It was noted that as a result of the Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime Matters signed in October 1972, Soviet and American commercial ships have been calling more frequently at ports of the United States and the USSR, respectively, and since late May of this year a new regular passenger line has started operating between Leningrad and New York.

In the context of reviewing prospects for further and more permanent economic cooperation, both Sides expressed themselves in favor of mutually advantageous long term projects. They discussed a number of specific projects involving the participation of American companies, including the delivery of Siberian natural gas to the United States. The President indicated that the US encourages American firms to work out concrete proposals on these projects and will give serious and sympathetic consideration to proposals that are in the interest of both Sides.

To contribute to expanded commercial, cultural and technical relations between the USA and the USSR, the two Sides signed an income tax treaty to reduce the chances of double taxation and eliminate, in many cases, the need for citizens of one country to become involved in the unfamiliar tax system of the other.

Building upon the broad foundation provided by the October 1972 trade agreement, the USA and USSR agreed upon a series of specific actions designed to assist the businessmen of both countries, including



the completion of arrangements for new offices for the US and USSR Commercial Counselors in Moscow and Washington, and authorization by the USSR for eleven US business and financial institutions to open permanent offices in Moscow. The two governments agreed to open full-scale commercial offices in each other's capitals by the end of October of this year.

The two Sides also declared their intention to explore the desirability of the establishment of a US-USSR Chamber of Commerce. US participation in such a chamber would come from the private sector.

V. Further Progress in Other Fields of Bilateral Cooperation


The two Sides reviewed the areas of bilateral cooperation in such fields as environmental protection, public health and medicine, exploration of outer space, and science and technology, established by the agreements signed in May 1972 and subsequently. They noted that they are being satisfactorily carried out in practice in accordance with the programs as adopted.



In particular, a joint effort is underway to develop effective means to combat diseases which are most widespread and dangerous for mankind: cancer, cardiovascular, infectious diseases and arthritis; the medical aspects of the environmental problems are also subjects of cooperative research.

Preparations for the joint space flight of the Apollo and Soyuz spacecraft are proceeding according to an agreed timetable; the joint flight of these spaceships for a rendezvous and docking mission, and mutual visits of Soviet and American astronauts in each other's spacecraft, is scheduled for July 1975.

Building on the foundation created in previous agreements, and recognizing the potential of both the US and USSR to undertake cooperative measures in current scientific and technological areas, new projects for fruitful joint efforts were identified and appropriate agreements were concluded.



## Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy


Bearing in mind the fundamental importance of satisfying the rapidly growing energy demands in both countries and throughout the world, and recognizing that the development of highly efficient energy sources could contribute to the solution of this problem, the President and the General Secretary signed an agreement to expand and strengthen cooperation in the fields of controlled nuclear fusion, fast breeder reactors, and research on the fundamental properties of matter. A Joint Committee on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy will be established to implement this agreement, which has a duration of ten years.

### Agriculture

Recognizing the importance of agriculture in meeting mankind's requirement for food products and the role of science in modern agricultural production, the two Sides concluded an agreement providing for a broad exchange of scientific experience in agricultural research and development, and of information on agricultural economics. A US-USSR Joint Committee on Agricultural Cooperation will be established to oversee joint programs to be carried out under the Agreement.

### Oceanography

Considering the unique capabilities and the major interest of both nations in the field of world ocean studies, and noting the extensive history of US-USSR oceanographic cooperation, the two Sides have agreed



to broaden their cooperation and have signed an agreement to this effect. In so doing, they are convinced that the benefits will accrue not only bilaterally but also to all peoples of the world from further development of cooperation in the field of oceanography. A US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in World Ocean Studies will be established to coordinate the implementation of cooperative programs.

#### Transportation

The two Sides agreed that the field of transportation provides opportunities for the two countries to work together in the solution of problems which the two countries have in this field. To permit expanded, mutually beneficial cooperation in this field, the two Sides concluded an agreement on transportation cooperation. The US and USSR further agreed that a Joint Committee on Cooperation in Transportation would be established for the purpose of implementing the agreement.

#### Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation


Recognizing the general expansion of US-USSR bilateral relations and, in particular, the growing number of exchanges in the fields of science, technology, education and culture, and in other fields of mutual interest, the two Sides agreed to broaden the scope of these activities under a new General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges, and Cooperation, with a duration of six years. The two Sides agreed to this in the mutual belief that it will further promote better understanding between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and help to improve the general state of relations between the two countries.




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Both Sides believe that the talks at the highest level which were held in a frank and constructive spirit were very valuable, made an important contribution to developing mutually advantageous relations between the USA and the USSR and will have a favorable impact on international relations. They noted that the success of the discussions in the United States was facilitated by the continuing consultation and contacts as agreed in May 1972. They reaffirmed that the practice of consultation should continue. They agreed that further meetings at the highest level should be held regularly.

Having expressed his appreciation to President Nixon for the hospitality extended during the visit to the United States, General Secretary Brezhnev invited the President to visit the USSR. The invitation was accepted for a time convenient to both Sides.





1078

sent 9:33 am  
6-24-73  
18

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

HAKTO-5

June 24, 1973



TO: DICK KENNEDY  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT

The U. S. side wishes the Chinese side to know that General Secretary Brezhnev informed the President of the proposed non-aggression treaty with the PRC of which the Chinese side had already informed us. Brezhnev stated that he would wait for an answer until a little while after he returned from the U. S. At that point the Soviet side will publish its draft treaty with appropriate commentary.

The U. S. side appreciated the information supplied by the Chinese side and fully understands the course of action outlined by the Chinese side.

Add Orally:

1. Dr. Kissinger looks forward to welcoming Ambassador Huang Chen to San Clemente for discussions, <sup>during the week of</sup> on July 2.
2. Dr. Kissinger will give Ambassador Huang Chen full account of all other discussions, none of which dealt with urgent matters.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Review*  
3/1/04  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, NARA, DATE 6/27/08


CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5b (3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



19

JOINT US-USSR COMMUNIQUE




At the invitation of the President of the United States, Richard Nixon, extended during his official visit to the USSR in May 1972, and in accordance with a subsequent agreement, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mr. Leonid I. Brezhnev, paid an official visit to the United States from June 18 to June 25. Mr. Brezhnev was accompanied by A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee, CPSU; N. S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade; B. P. Bugayev, Minister of Civil Aviation; G. E. Tsukanov and A. M. Aleksandrov, Assistants to the General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU; L. I. Zamyatin, General Director of TASS; E. I. Chazov, Deputy Minister of Public Health of the USSR; G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; G. A. Arbátov, Director of the USA Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR.

President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev held thorough and constructive discussions on the progress achieved in the development of US-Soviet relations and on a number of major international problems of mutual interest.

Also taking part in the conversations held in Washington, Camp David, and San Clemente, were:

On the American side William P. Rogers, Secretary of State; George P. Shultz, Secretary of the Treasury; Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

On the Soviet side A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee, CPSU; A. F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA; N. S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade; B. P. Bugayev, Minister of Civil Aviation; A. M. Aleksandrov and G. E. Tsukanov, Assistants to the General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU; G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.




## I. THE GENERAL STATE OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS

Both Sides expressed their mutual satisfaction with the fact that the American-Soviet summit meeting in Moscow in May 1972 and the joint decisions taken there have resulted in a substantial advance in the strengthening of peaceful relations between the USA and the USSR and have created the basis for the further development of broad and mutually beneficial cooperation in various fields of mutual interest to the peoples of both countries and in the interests of all mankind. They noted their satisfaction with the mutual effort to implement strictly and fully the treaties and agreements concluded between the USA and the USSR, and to expand areas of cooperation.

They agreed that the process of reshaping relations between the USA and the USSR on the basis of peaceful coexistence and equal security as set forth in the Basic Principles of Relations Between the USA and the USSR signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972 is progressing in an encouraging manner. They emphasized the great importance that each Side attaches to these Basic Principles. They reaffirmed their commitment to the continued scrupulous implementation and to the enhancement of the effectiveness of each of the provisions of that document.

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


other States and by world opinion as an important contribution to strengthening peace and international security, to curbing the arms race and to developing businesslike cooperation among States with different social systems.

Both Sides viewed the return visit to the USA of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev, and the talks held during the visit as an expression of their mutual determination to continue the course toward a major improvement in US-Soviet relations.

Both Sides are convinced that the discussions they have just held represent a further milestone in the constructive development of their relations.

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
## II. THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR AND THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMAMENTS

Issues related to the maintenance and strengthening of international peace were a central point of the talks between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev.

Conscious of the exceptional importance for all mankind of taking effective measures to that end, they discussed ways in which both Sides could work toward removing the danger of war, and especially nuclear war, between the USA and the USSR and between either party and other countries. Consequently, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Basic Principles of Relations of May 29, 1972, it was decided to conclude an Agreement Between the USA and the USSR on the Prevention of Nuclear War. That Agreement was signed by the President and the General Secretary on June 22, 1973. The text has been published separately.

The President and the General Secretary, in appraising this Agreement, believe that it constitutes a historical landmark in Soviet-American relations and substantially strengthens the foundations of international security as a whole. The United States and the Soviet Union state their readiness to consider additional ways of strengthening peace and removing forever the danger of war, and particularly nuclear war.

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USA and the USSR in May 1972 which, for the first time in history, place actual limits on the most modern and most formidable types of armaments.

Having exchanged views on the progress in the implementation of these agreements, both Sides reaffirmed their intention to carry them out and their readiness to move ahead jointly toward an agreement on the further limitation of strategic arms.

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The two Sides expressed their deep satisfaction at the conclusion of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, and also at the results of the International Conference on Vietnam which approved and supported that Agreement.

The two Sides are convinced that the conclusion of the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam, and the subsequent signing of the Agreement on Restoring Peace and Achieving National Concord in Laos, meet the fundamental interests and aspirations of the peoples of Vietnam and Laos and open up a possibility for establishing a lasting peace in Indochina, based on respect for the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of the countries of that area. Both Sides emphasized that these agreements must be strictly implemented.

They further stressed the need to bring an early end to the military conflict in Cambodia in order to bring peace to the entire area of Indochina. They also reaffirmed their stand that the political futures of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia should be left to the respective peoples to determine, free from outside interference.




Europe

In the course of the talks both Sides noted with satisfaction that in Europe the process of relaxing tensions and developing cooperation is actively continuing and thereby contributing to international stability.

The two Sides expressed satisfaction with the further normalization of relations among European countries resulting from treaties and agreements signed in recent years, particularly between the USSR and the FRG. They also welcome the coming into force of the Quadripartite Agreement of September 3, 1971. They share the conviction that strict observance of the treaties and agreements that have been concluded will contribute to the security and well-being of all parties concerned.

They also welcome the prospect of United Nations membership this year for the FRG and the GDR and recall, in this connection, that the USA, USSR, UK and France have signed the Quadripartite Declaration of November 9, 1972, on this subject.

The USA and the USSR reaffirm their desire, guided by the appropriate provisions of the Joint US-USSR Communiqué adopted in Moscow in May 1972, to continue their separate and joint contributions to strengthening peaceful relations in Europe. Both Sides affirm that ensuring a lasting peace in Europe is a paramount goal of their policies.



In this connection satisfaction was expressed with the fact that as a result of common efforts by many States, including the USA and the USSR, the preparatory work has been successfully completed for the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which will be convened on July 3, 1973. The USA and the USSR hold the view that the Conference will enhance the possibilities for strengthening European security and developing cooperation among the participating States. The USA and the USSR will conduct their policies so as to realize the goals of the Conference and bring about a new era of good relations in this part of the world.

Reflecting their continued positive attitude toward the Conference, both Sides will make efforts to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion at the earliest possible time. Both Sides proceed from the assumption that progress in the work of the Conference will produce possibilities for completing it at the highest level.

The USA and the USSR believe that the goal of strengthening stability and security in Europe would be further advanced if the relaxation of political tensions were accompanied by a reduction of military tensions in Central Europe. In this respect they attach great importance to the negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe which will begin on October 30, 1973. Both



Sides state their readiness to make, along with other States, their contribution to the achievement of mutually acceptable decisions on the substance of this problem, based on the strict observance of the principle of the undiminished security of any of the parties.

Middle East

The parties expressed their deep concern with the situation in the Middle East and exchanged opinions regarding ways of reaching a Middle East settlement.

Each of the parties set forth its position on this problem.

Both parties agreed to continue to exert their efforts to promote the quickest possible settlement in the Middle East. This settlement should be in accordance with the interests of all states in the area, be consistent with their independence and sovereignty and should take into due account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.



#### IV. COMMERCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The President and the General Secretary thoroughly reviewed the status of and prospects for commercial and economic ties between the USA and the USSR. Both Sides noted with satisfaction the progress achieved in the past year in the normalization and development of commercial and economic relations between them.



They agreed that mutually advantageous cooperation and peaceful relations would be strengthened by the creation of a permanent foundation of economic relationships.

They recall with satisfaction the various agreements on trade and commercial relations signed in the past year. Both Sides note that American-Soviet trade has shown a substantial increase, and that there are favorable prospects for a continued rise in the exchange of goods over the coming years.

They believe that the two countries should aim at a total of 2-3 billion dollars of trade over the next three years. The Joint US-USSR Commercial Commission continues to provide a valuable mechanism to promote the broad-scale growth of economic relations. The two Sides noted with satisfaction that contacts between American firms and their Soviet counterparts are continuing to expand.

Both Sides confirmed their firm intention to proceed from their earlier understanding on measures directed at creating more favorable conditions for expanding commercial and other economic ties between the USA and the USSR.

It was noted that as a result of the Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime Matters signed in October 1972, Soviet and American commercial ships have been calling more frequently at ports of the United States and the USSR, respectively, and since late May of this year a new regular passenger line has started operating between New York and Leningrad.

In the course of the current meeting, the two Sides signed a Protocol augmenting existing civil air relations between the USA and the USSR providing for direct air services between Washington and Moscow and New York and Leningrad, increasing the frequency of flights and resolving other questions in the field of civil aviation.

In the context of reviewing prospects for further and more permanent economic cooperation, both Sides expressed themselves in favor of mutually advantageous long term projects. They discussed a number of specific projects involving the participation of American companies, including the delivery of Siberian natural gas to the United States. The President indicated that the USA encourages American firms to work out concrete proposals on these projects and will give serious and sympathetic consideration to proposals that are in the interest of both Sides.

To contribute to expanded commercial, cultural and technical relations between the USA and the USSR, the two Sides signed a tax convention to avoid double taxation on income and eliminate, as much



as possible, the need for citizens of one country to become involved in the tax system of the other.

A Protocol was also signed on the opening by the end of October 1973 of a Trade Representation of the USSR in Washington and a Commercial Office of the United States in Moscow. In addition, a Protocol was signed on questions related to establishing a US-Soviet Chamber of Commerce. These agreements will facilitate the further development of commercial and economic ties between the USA and the USSR.



V. FURTHER PROGRESS IN OTHER FIELDS OF BILATERAL COOPERATION

The two Sides reviewed the areas of bilateral cooperation in such fields as environmental protection, public health and medicine, exploration of outer space, and science and technology, established by the agreements signed in May 1972 and subsequently. They noted that those agreements are being satisfactorily carried out in practice in accordance with the programs as adopted.

In particular, a joint effort is under way to develop effective means to combat those diseases which are most widespread and dangerous for mankind: cancer, cardiovascular or infectious diseases and arthritis. The medical aspects of the environmental problems are also subjects of cooperative research.

Preparations for the joint space flight of the Apollo and Soyuz spacecraft are proceeding according to an agreed timetable. The joint

flight of these spaceships for a rendezvous and docking mission, and mutual visits of American and Soviet astronauts in each other's spacecraft, are scheduled for July 1975.

Building on the foundation created in previous agreements, and recognizing the potential of both the USA and the USSR to undertake cooperative measures in current scientific and technological areas, new projects for fruitful joint efforts were identified and appropriate agreements were concluded.

### Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy

Bearing in mind the great importance of satisfying the growing energy demands in both countries and throughout the world, and recognizing that the development of highly efficient energy sources could contribute to the solution of this problem, the President and the General Secretary signed an agreement to expand and strengthen cooperation in the fields of controlled nuclear fusion, fast breeder reactors, and research on the fundamental properties of matter. A Joint Committee on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy will be established to implement this agreement, which has a duration of ten years.

### Agriculture

Recognizing the importance of agriculture in meeting mankind's requirement for food products and the role of science in modern agricultural production, the two Sides concluded an agreement providing for a broad exchange of scientific experience in agricultural research and development, and of information on agricultural economic. A US-USSR Joint Committee on Agricultural Cooperation will be



established to oversee joint programs to be carried out under the Agreement.

#### World Ocean Studies

Considering the unique capabilities and the major interest of both nations in the field of world ocean studies, and noting the extensive experience of US-USSR oceanographic cooperation, the two Sides have agreed to broaden their cooperation and have signed an agreement to this effect. In so doing, they are convinced that the benefits from further development of cooperation in the field of oceanography will accrue not only bilaterally but also to all peoples of the world. A US-USSR Joint Committee on Cooperation in World Ocean Studies will be established to coordinate the implementation of cooperative programs.

#### Transportation

The two Sides agreed that there are opportunities for cooperation between the USA and the USSR in the solution of problems in the field of transportation. To permit expanded, mutually beneficial cooperation in this field, the two Sides concluded an agreement on this subject. The USA and the USSR further agreed that a Joint Committee on Cooperation in Transportation would be established.

#### Contacts, Exchanges and Cooperation

Recognizing the general expansion of US-USSR bilateral relations and, in particular, the growing number of exchanges in the fields of science, technology, education and culture, and in other fields of mutual interest, the two Sides agreed to broaden the scope of these




activities under a new General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges, and Cooperation, with a duration of six years. The two Sides agreed to this in the mutual belief that it will further promote better understanding between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union and will help to improve the general state of relations between the two countries.

Both Sides believe that the talks at the highest level, which were held in a frank and constructive spirit, were very valuable and made an important contribution to developing mutually advantageous relations between the USA and the USSR. In the view of both Sides, these talks will have a favorable impact on international relations.

They noted that the success of the discussions in the United States was facilitated by the continuing consultation and contacts as agreed in May 1972. They reaffirmed that the practice of consultation should continue. They agreed that further meetings at the highest level should be held regularly.

Having expressed his appreciation to President Nixon for the hospitality extended during the visit to the United States, General Secretary Brezhnev invited the President to visit the USSR in 1974. The invitation was accepted.

June 24, 1973



PRESIDENT OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE. CPSU

972



1972

20  
Delivered to Mr. Chi  
4:00 p. m., June 26, 1973

June 26, 1973

Dear Mr. Chi:

Mr. Kissinger asked that the attached transcript of his press conference of June 25, 1973, be forwarded to Mr. Huang Chen.

Mr. Kissinger particularly wished to call attention to the question which is at the bottom of page 11 of the transcript and the answer to that question which is on the top of page 12 of the transcript.

Sincerely,

Richard T. Kennedy  
Deputy Assistant to  
the President

Mr. Chi Ch'ao-cha  
Assistant to the Chief of the  
Liaison Office of the  
People's Republic of China  
Room 573  
The Mayflower Hotel  
Washington, D. C.

RTK:lds:6/26-73



~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY NR, NARA, DATE 6/27/08

JUNE 25, 1973

OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY  
(San Clemente, California)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESS CONFERENCE  
OF

DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT  
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SAN CLEMENTE INN

9:15 A.M. PDT

MR. ZIEGLER: You have the communique, which is embargoed until 1:00 o'clock Eastern time and 10:00 o'clock Pacific time. Dr. Kissinger is here to discuss that with you and take your questions on the communique and also on the summit between the President and General Secretary.

For the statistics buffs in the Press Corps, the President and General Secretary spent a total of 47 hours together. They met in formal sessions with advisors or alone for 18-1/4 hours. In addition, the President and General Secretary were together 28-3/4 hours at informal gatherings, social functions and signing ceremonies, and events of that sort.



Q How much alone, face to face?

MR. ZIEGLER: Almost 10 hours. 9-1/2 hours.

DR. KISSINGER: Ladies and gentlemen: I will not go through the communique because I understand you have already had a chance to read it. Let me make a few general observations about the summit and how it fits into the general development of our foreign policy, and then I will take questions about the communique or any other part of the summit which you may wish to raise.

One good way of assessing the results of the summit is to compare last year's communique with this year's communique. Last year's communique spoke about the desirability of peaceful coexistence. It said:

"Having considered various areas of bilateral U.S. - Soviet relations, the two Sides agreed that an improvement in relations is possible and desirable."

This year we say that: "Both Sides are convinced that the discussions they have just held represent a further milestone in the constructive development of their relations.

"Convinced that such a development of American-Soviet relations serves the interests of both of their peoples and all of mankind, it was decided to take further major steps to give these relations maximum stability and to turn the development of friendship and cooperation between their peoples into a permanent factor for worldwide peace."

MORE

In other words, what marks the turning point last year, in which the fact of peaceful coexistence required special affirmation and possibility of improving relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, was thought deserving of special note, and this year we are speaking of a continuing relationship.

As a result, as relations between the Soviet Union and the United States proceed along the course that was charted last May, and accelerated this June, we cannot expect that these meetings, which we have affirmed should become a regular part of U.S. -Soviet relationships, will produce a dramatic new departure. It is the strength of this relationship as it develops that the road is charted and that what we expect to see is a further evolution along a path which will be increasingly free of confrontations, and which will become increasingly a part of a stable international system. This is the context in which we see the U.S. -Soviet relationship.

If you look back over previous summit meetings between Soviet and American leaders, they almost invariably occurred in the shadow of some crisis, and they were inevitably directed to removing some source of tension and some cause of confrontation.

In May 1972 we still met in this shadow of the Vietnamese war, and the recent decisions that had led to an expansion of military operations in Indochina, but even then, before the first talk, enunciated some common principles of conduct and affirmed the desirability of a long-term evolution toward a peaceful and ultimately cooperative relationship between the two States and the two peoples. These expectations were fulfilled over the course of the year and, therefore, what this summit intended to do was to strengthen the cooperative bonds that had developed in particular areas, to give a new impetus to the key areas of negotiations, especially strategic arms limitations and mutual force reductions, and thirdly, to take the joint principles one step further by embodying them in a formal agreement designed to prevent war, and especially nuclear war.



There is nothing I can add to the particular agreements that are enumerated in the communique that deal with the cooperative relationships in various fields and that represent a continuation of a process that started last year.

I can only say from my personal experience in participating in many of these negotiations that what I told you ladies and gentlemen before the summit has been reinforced by the experience of the summit. Many of these agreements do not themselves take the attention and time of the top leaders, and it would be absurd to pretend to you that the General Secretary and the President sit down and discuss the details of the civil aviation agreements, but it is also true that the imminence of their meetings, and the fact that they have determined to give a symbolic expression to this relationship gives an impetus to negotiations that otherwise would drag on for months, and permits the quick resolution of particular issues which, if left to the expert level, could produce extended stalemate and there is some significance in having the relationship develop on such a broad front, developing on both sides a commitment that is becoming increasingly difficult to reverse.

With respect to the other areas, I have talked to you at some length about the decisions with respect to strategic arms limitation talks. I think you can assume that in addition to what has been stated formally in the agreement on principles, that the two leaders had extensive discussions as to how the process can be accelerated so that a meaningful agreement can be achieved consistent with the deadline that they have set themselves. Therefore, we believe, with considerable hope, that a permanent agreement limiting strategic offensive arms, which would be one of the historic achievements in the field of arms control, can and will be negotiated during the course of 1974.

With respect to the mutual balanced force reductions, we told you before this summit conference that this was not the forum in which to negotiate the specifics. This is a matter of the profoundest concern to our allies, and it had never been intended to discuss the specifics, the specific schemes, at this meeting.

However, as those who have followed the discussions realize, there had been some uncertainty about when these discussions would begin. Prior to the meeting, in the preparatory conferences in Vienna, the Soviet position had tied the opening of the MBFR conference to the ending of the European Security Conference. At this meeting, it was decided that the MBFR conference would begin unconditionally on October 30th, and, of course, both leaders agreed that they would make a serious effort to deal with the question of armaments in Central Europe.

MORE



The Indochina problem, which last year was a source of contention, has received a common expression in this document.

And finally, there has been the agreement on the prevention of nuclear war. Now, I have seen several comments to the effect that it is non-binding, that it is not self-enforcing, and no doubt I have contributed to this by comments that reflect my former professorial profession, so let me state our position: That no agreement in history has ever enforced itself. Every agreement in history that has been observed has depended either on the willingness of the parties to observe it or on the willingness of one or the other parties to enforce it, or on the rewards for compliance and the risks of non-compliance.

This agreement is no different from any other agreement in that respect. When great powers make an agreement with each other, they, of course, have the capability of not observing it unless the other side is prepared to draw extreme consequences. But the violation of this agreement would have serious consequences for the whole context of U.S.-Soviet relations and, conversely, the observance of this agreement can mark, as I said on Friday, a milestone in the achievement of self-restraint by the major countries, a self-restraint which is by definition the essence of peace and which we intend to observe, which we expect the Soviet Union to observe, and which can therefore provide the foundation for a new international relationship.



Of course, history is replete with changes of course and we must be vigilant and prepared for such an occurrence, unique opportunity to create a new and more peaceful system. It is an opportunity that has come about partly as a result of the enormity of the weapons that would be used in case of a conflict: partly by the depth of human aspiration towards peace: partly as a result of the complexities of a world in which the ideological expectations of any side have not been fully met.

But whatever the reasons, we consider the summit as a further advance along that road, that as these meetings become a regular feature of international life, and as we come to take them more and more for granted, the results will follow paths that will come to seem more and more natural and we would consider that one of the best signs that a peaceful world is coming into being.

So this is our assessment of the summit and I will be glad to answer any questions on this, or on what I have said, or on the communique, or anything else related to the summit.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the communique says positive trends are developing in international relations toward the relaxation of tension and the strengthening of cooperative relations in the interest of peace. I wonder if you would apply that sentence specifically to the Middle-East situation and what transpired on it in the summit?

MORE

DR. KISSINGER: As you can see from the communique, the Middle East is one of the most complex areas and it is one in which one has to separate two problems: One, the local tensions; that is, the tensions between the Arab states and Israel, from the so-called great power rivalry in that area. When this Administration came into office, they were inextricably linked. In 1970, the world came close to the brink of war, closer than perhaps was realized generally at the time, over the invasion of Jordan by Syrian tanks, and at that time, every conflict in the Middle East became immediately and inextricably a part of the great rivalry. Even the selection of words by White House briefers was picked up by local newspapers and became a matter of attention in the context of East-West relationships.

Now, I think it is safe to say not that the Soviet Union and we agree on the evolution of the Middle East and how it should be resolved, as the communique makes clear, but I think both sides will make an effort not to become inextricably involved in its conflict with respect to the Arab-Israel conflict.

The communique states that both sides recognize the importance of the solution and that both sides will make efforts to help promote it and therefore, we hope that some progress will be made over the course of the year.



Q Is there any significance in the the dropping of the word balance from mutual balanced force reduction in the communique and I notice that you used it once and didn't use it another time.

DR. KISSINGER: That is because I usually speak extemporaneously. No, there is no significance in the dropping of the word "balance".

In the preparatory discussions in Vienna, there was some discussion about it, but since it concerned entirely procedural matters, it has no substantive significance. The United States' position with respect to the mutual balanced force reduction negotiations has been submitted to our allies. We think that it has received substantial support from our allies. We will enter the negotiations, we are convinced, with a reasonable and united position.

What particular adjective one gives to describe it is really less important, but the substance of it will be that it must be balanced, and that it must reflect the principles of this communique and of May 29th last year, that no negotiation can succeed that attempts to give a unilateral advantage to one side or another.

Q Is there any significance in the brief material on the Middle East to the omissions of the word "security" in the phrase "be consistent with their independence and sovereignty"?

DR. KISSINGER: No, I think it is safe to say that both sides recognize that no solution is possible that does not assure the security of the countries concerned. And there is no dispute about this.

MORE

Q Why didn't the communique then say so?

DR. KISSINGER: The truth is that I don't remember any discussion about the world "security," if somebody there thought of it, it almost certainly would have said so.

Q Dr. Kissinger, do you plan soon to go to China or do you plan to invite a Chinese leader to visit the United States in order to assure them that what they witnessed this past week was not the beginning of some kind of super power condominium?

DR. KISSINGER: We are, of course, always in touch with all interested countries, and it is a fixed element of our policy not to participate in any condominium directed either at our allies or at other interested parties.

We believe that we have a common interest with the Soviet Union in promoting a peaceful order. We believe also that to the extent that a more peaceful conduct emerges by all parties, emerges from our discussions, that all nations benefit.

We have not agreed and we shall not agree nor were we asked to agree, to anything that smacks of super power condominium and our views on this are well known to all interested countries.

We have no specific plans at this moment for any of the visits that you have described and if any should develop, we will, of course, announce them immediately. But we don't have to have such a visit to make that particular point clear.



Q Dr. Kissinger, there has been a considerable amount of confusion in connection with the SALT agreement about MIRVs. In the agreement it states that national means of inspection will be the only possible means. Is it possible to control MIRV through only national means of inspection or should we read into the wording there that in effect, you have abandoned the notion of being able to control MIRVs?

DR. KISSINGER: First, the agreement does not say national means are the only possible means. It says that both sides agree that they must be verifiable by national means. If both sides should decide to have other than national means that wouldn't be precluded, but I think that is extremely unlikely.

So, the realistic assumption has to be that any agreement that will be made is one that will be monitored by national means. Now then, the question is, does that principle really exclude any control of MIRVs.

First, let me say that we believe that MIRVs are an important part of this negotiation and therefore, we believe that it is possible to have some restraints on MIRVs that can be monitored by national means, and therefore a great deal depends on what restraints we are talking about.

(MORE)

If you are talking about bans on production, those would be next to impossible to monitor by national means. If you are talking about deployment, then they are possible to monitor within a margin of error which is larger than is the base in more quantities, than if you are monitoring quantities, but that is finite. If you are talking about a combination of deployment and improvements in accuracy and so forth, so that you could add certain testing restraints, then you have ever greater possibilities of inspection.

I am not saying that these are our specific proposals. I am saying that you cannot just look at this in terms of one category of restraints and assess the relationship of national means to that one category. You have to do it in the whole complex of MIRV technology and of the kinds of restraints you want to employ and we think it is possible to put together a package by combining several restraints verifiable by national means.

Q Dr. Kissinger, on page 12 of the communique, it says they set the goal for trade over the next three years \$2 to \$3 billion. This is the figure for the entire 3-year period, as I understand it; is that right?

DR. KISSINGER: That is right.

Q Since the current trade is running at, I think, \$1.3 billion annually now, '73, would not this be --

DR. KISSINGER: The \$1.3 billion includes agricultural. This is excluding agricultural commodities.

Q Do you have any figure including agricultural commodities?

DR. KISSINGER: I do not have it including agricultural. I think excluding agricultural, it runs at about \$600 million now, and I think this envisages an increase of about 50 percent.

Q Dr. Kissinger, does the communique hint, or more than hint, at an East-West summit at the end of the European Security Conference?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, it obviously mentions it. The position of the communique with respect to the East-West summit is one that we have taken before; that is to say, that the level of the concluding phase of the European Security Conference will be determined by progress that is made in the first two phases, the first of which begins on July 3rd at the Foreign Minister level. Then there will be commission meetings, and upon the conclusion of the commission meetings, one can determine first the final phase of the conference, and secondly, the appropriate level of participation.

We are, in principle, prepared to consider a summit if the results of the first two phases warrant it.

Q May I ask you to enumerate as briefly as possible the total package of benefits that will accrue to the United States as a result of the past few days' activities?

DR. KISSINGER: I can see this is not somebody who has attended previous briefings or he wouldn't have made a demand for brevity. (Laughter)

(MORE)



The benefits that accrue to the United States are the benefits that will accrue to all participants in the international system from an improvement in the prospects of peace. To the extent that we live in an atmosphere of confrontation, the United States, as the strongest country in the non-Communist world, and as the one on which the security of most others depends, is immediately drawn closer to the brink of war than almost any other participant.

Secondly, we expect that as a result of many of these cooperative efforts, both peoples will benefit in a concrete way.

With respect to the economic relationships, about which this question is often asked, they have to be seen in the whole context of the web of relations that is developing between the two countries. Most of the large deals that are being talked about will have to be made by private American industry, and they would presumably not be made unless they were thought to be made unless they were thought to be of mutual benefit.

We have taken the view, from the beginning of this Administration first that negotiations with the Soviet Union should not be conducted on the basis of atmospherics, but on the basis of very concrete negotiation; and secondly, that the economic and political matters should be linked together so that the progress would take place on a broad front, and I must say it is a little ironic that early in the Administration we were all accused of delaying the progress of negotiations, and now many of the same people who accused us then of being too slow are discovering that the benefits may be too one-sided.

Q Dr. Kissinger, what is the reason for including a proposal for a world disarmament conference to be held at an appropriate time? What is your definition of an appropriate time? Does it mean after the treaties on the strategic arms, or what?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, you know that the proposal for a world disarmament conference is one that the Soviet Union has repeatedly made. It was included in last year's communique, and it was repeated in this year's communique, and I think it is safe to say that if our Soviet colleagues and we were pressed to the wall, our definition of the appropriate time might differ. (Laughter)

Q Dr. Kissinger, what we have been listening to is an anthology of the positive results of the summit. Were not there some things that you had hoped to achieve at this particular summit that you have not?

DR. KISSINGER: Either due to lack of imagination or magalomania, I can't really tell you anything that we were hoping to achieve that we didn't. These summits are prepared over a long period of time. This particular summit is the result of many exchanges with the Soviet Union: Secretary Peterson's trip in July, my trip in September, Foreign Minister Gromyko's trip to the United States in October, Secretary Shultz's trip in March, my trip in May, many exchanges between the two leaders.

So it really is organically almost impossible for those summits to occur with a long agenda in which you will say we will try this and see what happens. It is impossible, and also undesirable, because when you have the two leaders of the most powerful nations in the world confronting each other, you do not want to have a situation in which a totally unpredictable clash can occur.

(MORE)



So in this meeting, the range of what was attainable was clearly understood by April or May, and the results were within the range that had been previously agreed to.

Now, at the end of each summit, there is always a very extensive meeting between the two leaders in which they decide the sort of problems they can be working on over the next year. We had such a meeting in the Kremlin on the day of the President's departure in 1972, and that was the third time that this agreement on the prevention of nuclear war in a slightly different context was raised.

As you all know, the President and the General Secretary met for three hours on Saturday night, and there was a discussion of the sort of problems that could be worked on in preparation for next year's summit, and, of course, there is an unfinished agenda. Obviously, the Middle East is part of the unfinished agenda, but we didn't expect to settle it at this meeting. SALT is part of it. MBFR is part of it. This is where we stand now in relation to next year's summit.

Q General Secretary Brezhnev said, as he was departing, that he believed that President Nixon could be returning to the Soviet Union as early as six to eight months. He also said that he expects that there will be more important agreements, or equally important agreements, signed there, indicating to some that he was possibly projecting perhaps an interim agreement on SALT.

On those two points, could you give us the United States view on the timing of a visit, and also on possibilities of an interim agreement on SALT which was referred to in an earlier statement by the principals?

DR. KISSINGER: Well, as you saw, the General Secretary was speaking without notes, and in the exuberance of the moment. (Laughter)

We don't foreclose a meeting earlier than 12 months, that has been customary between the two recent summits, but if we had been asked on that occasion to give our estimate, we would have been somewhat more cautious. So if it is more rapid, then this would indicate a more rapid pace of negotiation than we have foreseen, which we do not exclude, but which we think is unlikely.

Now, it is not at all excluded, as the principals made clear, that there would be an interim agreement on SALT in a period less than the 12 to 14 months that I would have given you as an estimate, and this is one of the matters to which we will now turn.

Q A follow-up on Mr. Kalb's question. Was chemical weapons control one of the things that had been dropped by April or May, or was that actively under consideration at this summit?

(MORE)



DR. KISSINGER: No.

Q You suggested that most things had been decided on the agenda by April or May. I wondered if this matter had been excluded at that point for possible agreement, or was under active consideration for agreement here?

DR. KISSINGER: When I say "had been decided by April or May," let me make clear what I mean. By the end of my visit to Zavidovo, it was not that everything had been decided, but that the range within which the negotiations between the two leaders would take place had been essentially determined, and, therefore the shape of probable agreements had become fairly clear. By that time it was clear that there would be no agreement on chemical warfare.

Q It used to be a theory that it would be a good idea for the top Soviet leaders to come to this country to get an idea of our strength; that is, the size of the country, what the people are like, the size and scope of our production, that kind of thing. This summit conference could have been held on a rock in the Atlantic Ocean for as much or as little that Mr. Brezhnev saw of America and Americans. Did he have at any time any desire to see anything of us and our country outside of the Presidential Compound?


DR. KISSINGER: The nature of the travel of the General Secretary was left to him. We made it clear that he could go anywhere he chose and for as long as he wished, so the General Secretary's itinerary was not determined by us. However, it seemed logical to us, as well, that the General Secretary wanted to follow the summit in Moscow, that had been devoted entirely to work with just two very brief side trips, with another summit in the United States of a more or less similar nature, in which the two leaders would spend most of their time in accelerating the momentum of their previous conversations.

I think, however, it is safe to say that now that the basic course has been established, and many of the major agreements have been achieved, that the purpose to which you referred will be realized in future summits. For example, the General Secretary has pointed out to the President that when he returns to the Soviet Union in 1974, the Soviet Union would like it very much if we would agree to a greater exposure to various aspects of Soviet life, and also to see more of the Soviet Union than proved to be the case last year. We have agreed to this.

If these summits become annual events, and the General Secretary returns here in 1975, it can be taken for granted that much more extensive travel would be included in his program.

Q Dr. Kissinger, concerning Indochina on page 8, the last sentence on page 8 says that the leaders may also reaffirm their stand that the political futures of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia should be left to the respective peoples to determine, free of outside interference.

(MORE)



Have you detected any change, perhaps, in the Soviet attitude concerning the current fighting in Cambodia, and particularly, do the Soviets disapprove at all of any activities that Hanoi may be undertaking in Cambodia, either supply or military?

DR. KISSINGER: First, let us get the Cambodian problem into perspective. We are talking here of the very last phase of a very prolonged war. We are not talking here of the beginning of another Indochina conflict. I don't want to characterize the Soviet attitude toward Cambodia. I think the Soviet Union should speak for itself.

I think that this sentence here states our view exactly: that we agreed that the future of Cambodia should be left to the Cambodian people, and that peace should come consistent with the sovereignty and the rights of self-determination of the Cambodians. We are actively engaged in attempting to bring this about at this moment, and we believe, as I said previously, that as the relationships among the great powers fall into clearer focus, as one looks at these areas less from their symbolic aspect of either being the spearhead of wars of national liberation or of being a conspiracy directed, it was thought once, from Peking, I think that all countries can adopt a more responsible attitude toward the conflict in Indochina and a more disassociated attitude than was the case in the 1960s.

Q My impression is that the granting of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, whether or not it is granted is no longer a serious obstacle to the development of long-term trade. Is that the case?

DR. KISSINGER:: No, we believe that the granting of most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union is important for the development of large-scale trade, and it is extremely important to the development of Soviet-American relations. This was part of the series of understandings in a whole complex of relationships between us and the Soviet Union last year, and it would cast serious doubt on our ability to perform our side of understandings and agreements if, in each case, that part of an agreement that is carried out later by one side or the other is then made the subject of additional conditions that were not part of the original negotiation and, therefore, I would say that for both symbolic and substantive reasons, and substantively both economic and political, it would be very unfortunate if the request to grant most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union, which means nondiscriminatory status vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, were not granted.

Q Can you address yourself to two impressions?

DR. KISSINGER: Impressions or questions?

Q However you like; impressions and a question. First, is there here a signal to the Russians that they have a free hand where China is concerned, as a follow-up to an earlier question; and the second impression, Dr. Kissinger, in the 89 words devoted to the Middle East, one gets the impression that the Soviet Union and the United States are as far apart as before?

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DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the first question, as I said on Friday, I do not want to go into hypothetical cases addressed to particular countries. However, since you raised the question, let me say this: I don't know what a free hand vis-a-vis China means. The Soviet Union has declared officially that it has no military intentions vis-a-vis the People's Republic of China.

On the other hand, it is difficult to conceive a military attack by anybody on the People's Republic of China that would not endanger international peace and security and, therefore, it would be thought to be, from whatever direction it came, not consistent with our view of this treaty, but I repeat: This does not imply that we have any reason to believe that any such attack is contemplated or that any of this subject was discussed at all between them.

With respect to the Middle East, the communique makes clear that there is no unanimity of views. Whether that is as wide as before or narrower, I think we should let the future decide, but obviously the subject was discussed at some length.

Q The glowing manner in which the two leaders have described their past weeks --

DR. KISSINGER: What manner?

Q Glowing manner, the euphoric manner.

DR. KISSINGER: Don't top yourself. (Laughter)

Q -- carries with it the impression that we can now expect an acceleration of demands or requests or proposals, at least within our own country, for the reduction of armaments. A moment ago you talked about the necessity of maintaining vigilance. Would you discuss that in context with the summit meeting?

DR. KISSINGER: This period requires great sophistication on the part of the American people. We have reached this point because we have proceeded from the basis of adequate strength, and because we have consistently taken the position that we would reduce our strength only by agreement with the other side in some agreed relation to the reductions by the other side.

This must remain an essential part of our policy, and we cannot do, as a result of this agreement, unilaterally those things that the Soviet Union will not do. We have made it clear in the communique and we have made it clear in the conduct of our policy that the principal goal of this Administration in the field of foreign policy is to leave behind it a world that can be said to be safer, more peaceful, and more permanently free of crisis than the one we found.

But we, in our view, cannot achieve this by unilateral reductions of American strength, and we believe that the course on which we are, which has made, in our judgment, significant progress, can be maintained only if we were to continue to pursue it on the basis of strict reciprocity.

(MORE)



Q If I may, I would like to come back to this not so important adjective balance. Isn't it true that the Soviets have quite a different interpretation of balance than you have, and is this one of the reasons why not even the formal title of MBFR talks was spelled out in the communique?

DR. KISSINGER: What was spelled out in the communique is, I believe, consistent with what was agreed to in Vienna. The future of force reductions in Europe will not be determined by adjectives. It will be determined by concrete programs. It will not be determined by constant insinuations of some dark American design.

The United States has taken the view and has stated publicly that our security is integrally linked to the security of our European allies. Therefore, we are prepared to work with our European allies on working out a concrete program that reflects the common conception of security. We have invited our European allies to participate with us in developing this program, and we think the time has come to discuss the program, rather than the adjectives of a title of a conference.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did they give us to understand that they would play a useful role in seeking a cease-fire in Cambodia, and did we give them to understand that we will be winding down our bombing there in the meantime?

DR. KISSINGER: I don't think any useful purpose is served if I go into the details of these discussions with respect to Cambodia. The primary problem with respect to Cambodia now is whether it is possible in a finite period of time to bring about a negotiation that leads toward a political settlement and produces a rapid cease-fire. The particular tactics of particular operations are subsidiary to that overriding issue which was the subject of discussions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, does the agreement to prevent nuclear war mean that we would have to enter into consultations with the Russians before we would come to the defense of an ally under attack?

DR. KISSINGER: The agreement for the prevention of nuclear war, in Article 6, makes clear that allied obligations are unaffected. Secondly, the significance of Article 4 is that in case of situations that might produce the danger of nuclear war in general, consultations have to be undertaken. It should, therefore, be seen as a restraint on the diplomacy of both sides, and as I pointed out on Friday, not a guide to action in case those restraints break down and war occurs.

Q Dr. Kissinger: on the economic front, here you talk about that serious and sympathetic consideration should be given by the U.S. Government. Earlier you stressed in your discussion --

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DR. KISSINGER: Consideration to what?

Q To proposals that are in the interests of both sides. These are business proposals, presumably. Earlier you stressed the importance of the private corporations in the negotiations. What happens when they conflict, and a corporation says this is in our mutual best interest, but perhaps you do not? A case in point right now is the natural gas deals. There are two of them that were discussed before. One corporation went out and made a deal. How do you resolve this question?

DR. KISSINGER: To the extent that corporations can implement their deals without the aid of the Government, we can do no more than express our views to their directive. To the extent that the corporations require the assistance of the Government, or the guarantee of the Government of their investment, we have the possibility of gearing the decisions to our national policy.

Now, with respect to the natural gas deal, we are not under the impression that these companies have the resources to do them entirely on their own and, therefore, we can relate them to national policy, but as the communique says, we are looking on them favorably, but it is hard to discuss in the abstract.

Q There is a reference in the communique to a meeting at the highest level to complete the ESC. What sort of time frame do you have in mind?

DR. KISSINGER: As you notice, the communique makes no particular reference to a specific time frame and, therefore, this question will be easier to answer after the Foreign Ministers have met, and particularly after the commissions have started their work. It will depend to some extent on whether the European participants will decide to take a summer vacation and the commissions will decide to take a summer vacation in August or not. The time frame is, as the communique says, the quickest possible time, but there is no particular time limit.

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Q We are talking about some period within less than a year, aren't we?

DR. KISSINGER: That would be a reasonable assumption. But it depends on the progress of the conference, but that is a good working hypothesis.

Q On the Watergate, the inevitable question as to whether Watergate in any way was discussed between the President and the General Secretary, and would you, Dr. Kissinger, be prepared to comment on published speculation that the pressures of Watergate applied a more modest negotiating technique on the part of the President in his expectations on the Summit?

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the first question, Watergate was not discussed. And I don't think the point has yet been reached where our domestic travails are discussed with foreign leaders.

Second, the negotiating frame for the Summit was established last year and was in no way affected by Watergate.

Q Dr. Kissinger, did the Soviet side, coming back to the natural gas deals, ask for a more specific, more categorical American endorsement of these particularly the latest Occidental Petroleum deal, and a promise of guarantees on the credits than is in the communique?

DR. KISSINGER: No, the specific status of the gas deals is now that they have to be moved from these abstract declarations of intent to some concrete propositions. These concrete propositions have to be developed, in the first instance, by the companies concerned that have to make a judgment of the degree of investment that is required and also on whether it is an economic proposition.

At that point, one will have to determine whether this can be done entirely by private capital or if it requires, at least in some of its aspects, some U.S. governmental guarantees. That point has not yet been reached because the projects have not yet been formulated into precise economic propositions.

Q Dr. Kissinger, in what way are the documents and agreements signed by the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party binding in any respect on the Soviet Government and another rather petty question, is there any connection between the timing of this week's events or at least the communique, this press conference this morning and your press conference Wednesday, if you have one -- is there any connection between that timing and the Watergate events going on in Washington?

DR. KISSINGER: With respect to the first question, whenever the General Secretary of the Communist Party signs a document, we are given -- it is actually legally a very good question -- we are given a document by the Soviet Foreign Ministry pointing out that he has full powers to sign that document because, as you know, Mr. Brezhnev has no official governmental position, so that legally the documents which he signed this year and the documents which he signed last year are fully within Soviet constitutional processes and we have also an official Soviet statement that he has full governmental powers to sign the document.



Secondly, with respect to my briefings, our view here has always been that the necessities that produce foreign policies are of a permanent nature, and that our objective is what I described at the beginning, to bring about a more peaceful world. They are not geared in any respect to any of the domestic situations.

This schedule was determined at a time when it was believed that Dean would testify last week and it was agreed then that in view of the fact that the General Secretary's speech was on television yesterday, that his departure statement would be on television yesterday, and in view of the fact that it is more appropriate to release communiques at a time he is leaving the country, that the release of the communique would be on Monday and therefore, the briefing of the communique would be on Monday. That is a schedule that was determined, I repeat, at a time when we did not know that the hearings would be postponed.

If I have another briefing on Wednesday, it is in response to the repeated request of many of you ladies and gentlemen that we have a more informal session, less geared to the words of the communique, to set this in better perspective.

But, since you have raised the issue, I will say now, I will move you to Thursday, to remove any question about it. The thought had never crossed our mind and we will now, if there is one, have it on Thursday.

Q Could I suggest that the day is less important than it be sometime later in the afternoon, California time.

DR. KISSINGER: Work it out with Ron. If there is another briefing, the purpose is to permit a somewhat more philosophical discussion of where we are going. The timing should be left to what produces the best philosophical discussion.

Q Dr. Kissinger, the proposal for a world disarmament conference has been mentioned many times over the years and has not been a subject necessarily of agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States as to its usefulness. I wonder whether the mention of it here in the communique, whether you would characterize it as one of the accomplishments of the summit?

DR. KISSINGER: The world disarmament conference was mentioned in last year's communique and therefore, to have it mentioned again cannot be considered a radical departure and one of the principal accomplishments of the conference.

We have said that we would be prepared to discuss it at an appropriate time, and I suspect that this will lead to several exchanges on that subject.

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1972

Passed by 2/  
Ambassador Henry  
10:30 am July 6, 1975

The Chinese side informed the U.S. side earlier that as Samdech Norodom Sihanouk was visiting in Africa and Europe, it was yet infeasible for the Chinese side to communicate to him U.S. tentative thinking on a settlement of the Cambodian question. Although the Chinese side had informed the U.S. side that negotiations between Samdech Sihanouk and the Phnom Penh traitorous clique would be impossible, the U.S. side nevertheless openly refused to negotiate with Samdech Sihanouk, which enraged him all the more. However, according to news reports, U.S. government officials have recently made some disclosures on this question, which have given rise to various speculations. At the same time, it is learned that the Lon Nol clique has gone to the length of spreading the rumour that the Phnom Penh authorities will enter into official negotiations with the National United Front of Cambodia very soon, with the United States and the Chinese Communists serving as go-betweens. In spreading such utterly groundless assertions, the Lon Nol clique harbours ulterior motives, wildly attempting to confuse public opinion and forestall the settlement of the Cambodian question. The Chinese side is of the view that such a turn of events is extremely disadvantageous to seeking a settlement of the Cambodian question and will even cause trouble. The Chinese side cannot but bring this to the serious attention of the U.S. side.

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