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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~
D

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Date: August 15, 1975
Time: 10:58 to 11:47 a.m.
Place: Secretary's Conf. Rm.

SUBJECT: Arms Control

PARTICIPANTS:

The Secretary
William G. Hyland, Director, INR
John H. Kelly, C (Notetaker) ~~OK~~
Ambassador Dobrynin (for last 4 minutes only)
Arms Control Study Group

Mr. Robert Kleiman, New York Times Editorial Board
Dr. Paul Doty, Harvard
Dr. Frank Long, Cornell
Dr. Richard Garwin
Dr. Michael Nacht, Harvard
Dr. George Rathjens

Kissinger: I've been in the middle of negotiations with the Israelis. Dobrynin is due in a little while.

Doty: Are things looking up?

Kissinger: There are tough negotiators on both sides. If the process fails this time, it will have failed closer to an agreement than ever before.

Doty: We'd like to press you for your ten-year view. Our group has changed 180 degrees since your time with us. What do you see in the future? What themes would be useful to push with the Soviets? For example, are the Soviets interested in basic dimensions, numbers, size, the visibility of strategic forces so the Soviets can produce political capital? The US relies on technological razzle-dazzle to keep abreast of Soviet strategic forces.

Kissinger: The biggest immediate problem is the basic nature of our relationship with the Soviets. Sometimes I think that I am the last survivor of the arms control seminar of the

~~SECRET/NODIS~~ - XGDS-2

DECLASSIFIED *State Review*
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CLASSIFIED BY: [redacted]
By LR NARA, Date 2/24/12



50's. You can remember how all of our colleagues joined together against the Dulles doctrine. I mean this, I'm not being sarcastic.

When I read the New York Times editorials and what the academics are writing, I don't know what to think. Have you forgotten how in the 50's we thought it spectacular if in our exchanges with Arbatov we saw the slightest twitch on a fourth-level issue? Now we have exchanges at the highest level on the fundamental issues of our relationship. I remember when Doty and I tried to discuss the most minor, marginal problems with the Soviets in the 50's with no success.

Today we have demands levied on us which would wreck detente for five or ten years. What possessed the press and intellectual circles to generate such a reaction to Helsinki? Were not the frontiers of Europe fixed? Who does not recognize those frontiers? Is the US going back to the Dulles era?

The cheapest thing for me to do would be to join the bandwagon. Where will we be in a few years? In a cold war with the same political attacks? What happens if the current Soviet leaders fail and pay the price?

What we need is intellectual leadership from the academic community on where we can go in East/West relations. Certainly no one is more interested in human rights than we are. Every success in this field has been gained by our methods, not by confrontation. We had Jewish emigration up to 38,000. I feel very strongly that we can't continue to harass the Soviets without facing the same reaction as we did on the Trade Bill. We'll have a series of crises. We will have Senators running to Moscow for two hours and claiming to have found the solutions. The New York Times will tell us what to do. Evans and Novak will accuse me of screwing the Defense Department. We have received precious little support from the intellectual community. The Pentagon gets more support than we do. This is a bigger problem than the specific arms control issues with the Soviets.

Kleiman: It depends on what degree that you think academic support is with you. I think it's substantial. If you look at the last issue of Foreign Affairs . . .



Kissinger: I don't read Foreign Affairs any more. I do read Foreign Policy because of my innate masochism.

Doty: In the last Foreign Affairs Michael Nacht has an article taking on Wohlstetter.

Kissinger: It's difficult to talk to the Soviets about weapons systems. The Pentagon wants 11,000 cruise missiles on airplanes alone. They want tens of thousands on other systems. Without cruise missiles, SALT is just not a plausible agreement. We would limit 8,000 warheads and leave 11,000 unconstrained.

The throw-weight argument has been going on for years. Evans and Novak will tell you it is the greatest threat, but nothing has ever stopped us from building bigger throw-weight. The reason we didn't is because we did not know what to use it for. I'm not against restraints on throw-weight, but we need some perspective on the issue. We need some intellectual perspective on the whole context of our relations. I believe what we all were thinking in the 50's and 60's was right. We were trying to implement our policies but on a moral basis.

Doty: This is the same message that Hal Sonnenfeldt was bringing us in Aspen. What are the targets that you aim at in academic circles?

Kissinger: The vocal intellectual community is heard from, but we don't hear from you, the Senate doesn't hear from you. All we get is an assault on Helsinki. Didn't they know we had been negotiating that document for three years? What were we to do, resist all of Europe or pay the price for signing an innocuous document that pays lip service to human rights?

Kleiman: Will the Helsinki document help us in Portugal?

Kissinger: I spoke strongly on Portugal yesterday in Birmingham. This was partly from pressure and partly to prevent the Soviets from putting a hand into Portugal. It's fair to say the Soviets have been spending three to five million dollars a month on the Communist Party. The Western Europeans have been spending an equal amount on the democratic forces. I think the difference in Portugal is that the Communist Party was in resistance until last year, whereas the democratic factions were in exile. The



Armed Forces had been Africanized like the Algerians. The Armed Forces were, therefore, susceptible to the Communists and we have been in a period of paralysis. So, it's not fair to blame the Soviets for what's going on in Portugal.

Kleiman: We're not.

Kissinger: You should ask Bill Hyland and see if he disagrees with me.

Rathjens: It wasn't very helpful for the Soviets to use Helsinki to say the US can't help Portugal.

Kissinger: You're right. The TASS article forced me to make my speech. If the assaults on detente continue, I can see confrontation on Berlin and in the Middle East in the next two years. Where will we be when a new Administration comes in, in 1980, after four years of cold war? That 1980 Administration will look back with nostalgia on 1973, 1974 and 1975 when the Soviet leadership committed itself and its futures to detente. We are not buying the Soviet system, but in an era of nuclear war, our leaders have obligations that have never been faced before. A nuclear war would be a catastrophe beyond comprehension. We took this as axiomatic during the 60's.

Nacht: Is Defense making nuclear war more thinkable? What should we respond if the Soviets ask us about US missile accuracies? Wohlstetter is running around Europe telling everyone that the NATO forces need highly accurate, deliverable nuclear systems.

Kissinger: I believe that if nuclear weapons are ever used at all, it would be in such a mode, if you really talk about making nuclear war possible. But since Watergate there has been no adequate discipline in the Executive Branch. This is just something we will have to live with through 1976 and try to keep the damage to a minimum. After all, peace and virulent anti-Communism is the secret dream of every American. Nothing in what the Pentagon says is conceptually new. It's the same thing McNamara tried to promote.

Doty: But the lower you make the threshold, the more you increase the credibility of using nuclear weapons.

Kissinger: I believe the Pentagon is doing this purely for domestic politics to enhance it's position with Congress. These ideas are untranslatable to operational plans. The



Pentagon can't do it. I have been here for seven years asking them to produce a war plan. I let them pick the country and the conflict. They can't do it whether it's Europe or the Middle East, with or without the Soviets. I have racked my brain. They can tell you where they would drop a bomb, but that's not a war plan. I asked them to suppose that the Soviets invaded Iran. How would they fight a tactical nuclear war? They can't do it.

Don't be confused by the rhetoric in the posture statements. There has been no consecutive thinking on the use of tactical nuclear weapons.

Hyland: The deployments are unchanged.

Kissinger: The SIOP is the same. All they have done is give Omaha some theoretical planning capability. You can't imagine the discontinuity between the Pentagon rhetoric and capability and between the capability and the political framework. But if we don't get their buildup under control, over time they will disassociate the political framework from force levels.

Doty: In Europe they are afraid of what Schlesinger is saying. They fear it might stimulate the Soviets to demonstrate that they can play the same game.

Kissinger: What will happen if we go along with the New York Times and confront the Soviets? It will tip Europe over. If the Europeans believe the Alliance is in jeopardy, the European Left will move in and break away. We cannot provoke confrontation no more than we can make unwitting concessions. We should be mature enough to handle both. We can't afford to be soft. We have a long history ahead of us. We are going to see China emerge in the 1980's with a nuclear capability equal to that of the Soviets today.

Long: China troubles the Soviets.

Kissinger: Right now China is a useful counter-weight to the Soviets, but it could turn the other way.

Rathjens: We don't have a very good story on Schlesinger to tell the Soviets.

Kissinger: You don't need to tell the Soviets about Schlesinger. Tell them that the President and I are determined to keep the process under control and to keep detente intact.



Rathjens: What about these people who want more flexible options?

Doty: It would have been good to get that out of the posture statement.

Kissinger: Yes, but it was a question of how much time I could devote to it.

Hyland: You don't have to agree with the Soviets on Schlesinger. Tell them that it is what they do that gives Schlesinger his ammunition.

Kissinger: That's right. Their buildup and their inflexibility on SALT gives Schlesinger his justification.

Doty: I'm afraid that the slowness of the Soviets may push SALT into an election year.

Kissinger: On SALT, Evans and Novak told you the correct story yesterday. There are three big issues -- Backfire, cruise missiles and a limit on heavy missiles.

Doty: Verification?

Kissinger: Verification is done. The Soviets substantially accepted our terms. In fact, they have accepted our terms. This was a big step but they made it conditional on the resolution of all other issues.

If the Soviets would agree on throw-weight -- that no medium missiles would be larger than the SS-19 -- don't tell them that this is an official proposal -- if no heavy missile is larger than the 18, then they will have plenty of throw-weight to do what they want to. With this position, we could change on cruise missiles -- or those who want to change on cruise missiles would have a better basis to argue for a change here. We can't just abandon cruise missiles, but perhaps we can make some trade on Backfire and ALCM's. We are reasonable on SLCM's.

We've got to nail Vladivostok down this year otherwise we will get into the primaries. We will have strategic arguments in the campaign.

Doty: It's most imperative.



Kleiman: We certainly agree we can put pressure for an agreement.

Kissinger: I would welcome a US SALT brawl with an agreement that one could defend in good conscience. Then the academic community can help. I'm not afraid of a SALT brawl.

Nacht: How important is an agreement to Brezhnev?

Kissinger: People here keep telling me that it is important to him before the Party Congress, but we both have the option to use a SALT failure to justify going the other way. They can hold out longer than we can. If there's no agreement, we're back to the 1950's. And now we just don't have Kistia-kowsky and Doty on Capital Hill yelling at all the Senators. If we put ourselves in a posture of confrontation, the Soviets won't reverse things for five years. All of our Eastern European contacts indicate that if Brezhnev goes, his successor will be in a weak position and will have to placate the bureaucracy. We have never yet encountered anyone but Brezhnev who can handle the Soviet military.

Gromyko is just a waste of time. He has no margin to negotiate beyond his instructions. He doesn't know what is going on. I'll give one example. We were arguing the 15% silo dimensions. I said that we can accept up to a 15% increase in either dimension, so long as the volume doesn't exceed 32%. Gromyko did not understand. He argued that you could increase the depth more than 15% and go down as far as 32% if you made the width narrower. That makes no strategic sense. It was obvious to everyone there, even Dobrynin, Gromyko did not know what he was talking about.

If we can get some other restraints, for instance, on the upper weight of missiles and more importantly on throw-weight, it would make sense. But Gromyko is useless. Sometimes Brezhnev is useless but he will throw the military out and make a move and every move is made only by Brezhnev. The reason we use the private channel from Dobrynin to Brezhnev is not to bypass the Pentagon as everyone here says, but to bypass the Soviet Pentagon and get our proposals straight to the Politburo.

Let me sum up. If there is no agreement and Brezhnev leaves the scene in two or three years, cruise missiles will have come further down the road.

Garwin: How do you deal with cruise missiles?



Kissinger: I have to confess I'm partly to blame for cruise missiles. I kept them in the Pentagon budget for two years just to give away. Now they have grown into a monster. The cruise missile is a problem. Perhaps we can limit the number of planes that can carry cruise missiles.

Rathjens: We're not going to limit the number of non-nuclear cruise missiles, are we?

Kissinger: It's not an easy problem. But if cruise missiles are unconstrained, it would appear that we were negotiating with complete cynicism. The Soviets can't accept that.

Garwin: I can't accept it either, but how can we hold cruise missiles down?

Hyland: Our cruise missiles are not deployed yet.

[The Secretary is handed a note.]

Kissinger: Dobrynin is here. I'll bring him in for about five minutes.

Kleiman: About the TTB, are the PNE negotiations high on your list? Are they less important than Vladivostok?

Kissinger: I don't lay awake at night worrying about them. They can fail without a final rupture. They are marginally useful. If they fail, it would be symbolically bad, but there is no clear alternative to them.

Garwin: It would be plausible to think about a CTB.

Kissinger: The Soviets haven't expressed any interest. They are not sincere about a CTB. In the present climate in Washington, we can't even look at one. A CTB will have to wait until 1977.

Hyland: The chances for a CTB will improve with the TTB, particularly the inspection provisions.

Kissinger: Yes, but this is marginal. Vladivostok is of central importance.

Doty: I just want to say that the bilateral scientific and technical commissions set up in 1972 are working out better



than I thought. The real difficulty is that there is no basis for funding some of the important commissions. What we need is five million dollars this year which would grow to ten million dollars in four more years. The NSF is not including this in it's budget. It is hard to see it in the State budget.

Kissinger: Give me a memo on this. Who has funded you up to now?

Doty: It has come from other areas, some of which we can't report to Congress. It has been under the table, and because of that, it can't last.

Kissinger: When do you all go to Moscow?

Kleiman: Over the next two days. We'll be there to meet on Wednesday. On the NPT, if we can't sell the seven nuclear suppliers on a hold on reprocessing plants, can we maintain the US policy?

Kissinger: Yes.

Long: Have the Soviets been helpful in the Nuclear Suppliers Conference?

Kissinger: Yes. Tell the Soviets we need help on the right. We're not going to throw in the towel because of a whole plethora of attacks. The Soviets may have reacted to the Trade Bill because of the vicious reaction to Vladivostok. We came home with the agreement and were beaten silly. They fear the prospect of the same treatment.

[The Secretary leaves and returns with Dobrynin. He introduces Dobrynin to each.]

Kissinger: They're all going to Moscow.

Dobrynin: To discuss disarmament?

Kissinger: They'll meet with Gromyko.

Dobrynin: He's the best man to meet with.

Kissinger: These are all people with whom I worked.

Dobrynin: Are they going to talk on SALT?

Kissinger: Yes. They'll talk about whatever they can.



Dobrynin: Do they propose solutions to SALT?

Kissinger: Nothing new. I told them to tell their Soviet colleagues not to pay any attention to the noise here.

Dobrynin: That's good advice, but my colleagues in Moscow won't be able to follow it. They do pay attention to the noise.

Doty: Actually we will not be meeting Gromyko. We will meet with Arbatov and his people.

Dobrynin: I don't know to what extent you are briefed on SALT. Our people know the general line, but are not familiar with the details of the negotiation. Don't quote me on that. If I can speak off-the-record, you should give your ideas on an informal basis. In our case, there is a clear division between bureaucrats and academics. The latter can speak only on an unofficial basis.

Kleiman: Henry would be upset if we said we were official.

Kissinger: I talked to them in a general way about the future of detente.

Dobrynin: On cruise missiles, you are better briefed than my friends in Moscow. Do you see any movement?

Kissinger: It's been very good to see you all.

* * * * *





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September 1, 1975

Dear Yuly:

Attached is the Oral Message from Secretary Kissinger to Foreign Minister Gromyko which I discussed with you over the telephone.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

His Excellency
Yuly M. Vorontsov
Charge d'Affaires
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
1125 - 16th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036



*Delivered to New Toronto
via Messengers at 11:30 AM
Sept 1, 1975*

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ORAL MESSAGE

Secretary Kissinger wants the Foreign Minister to know that announcements will be made shortly in Washington, Cairo and Jerusalem that Egypt and Israel will initial today an agreement between them as a further significant step toward a just and lasting peace. This agreement is the result of the exploratory discussions which the Parties asked us to conduct following the suspension of the negotiations in March, and of understandings worked out during the Secretary's present visit to the area.

Under the terms of the agreement, Israel will withdraw its forces from the Sinai Passes and oil fields, and both Parties agree not to resort to force and to continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338. The Parties also agree that UNEF is essential and shall continue its functions and that its mandate shall be extended annually. In addition, the United States has agreed to make available civilian personnel not to exceed 200 in number, to whom will be entrusted an early warning system in the area of the Sinai Passes.

The Secretary wants in particular to emphasize that the United States views this agreement as an integral part of the process of moving toward an overall peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict in all its aspects, in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.



The Foreign Minister will recall that the Secretary, in their discussions in Vienna and Geneva, described several ways in which he felt the peace-making process could make progress, and such an agreement was one of the possibilities he referred to, assuming the Parties found it in their interest to follow this course. He hopes the Foreign Minister will share our view that this step will serve the cause of peace in the Middle East, which remains our objective, and is therefore in the interest of US-Soviet relations as well.

The Parties will probably meet in Geneva in the Working Group of the Middle East Peace Conference on September 4 (although no definite date has been set) to sign the agreement, and will begin within five days thereafter to negotiate a detailed Protocol for implementation of the agreement, upon signature of which in about three weeks time the agreement will come into effect. The Secretary intends to send a representative to Geneva to be present for the signing, who will be pleased to be in touch with a representative of the Soviet Government, in our capacity as co-chairmen of the Conference, if the Soviet Government also plans to have a representative present in Geneva for this purpose.

The Secretary looks forward to meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko during the forthcoming UN General Assembly and to discussing



with him at that time the question of how the efforts of our two Governments can best be exerted to assure continuing progress toward peace in the Middle East within the framework of the Geneva Conference.



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Delivered by Men Vorontsov
7:00 pm 9/1/75 to 3
Gen. Secaucroft

For obvious reasons in Moscow attentively follow the negotiations conducted with the US mediation between Israel and Egypt on a partial withdrawal of Israeli forces on Sinai.

The President is well aware of our definite negative attitude towards such separate actions in the Middle East as well as of our principled position on the problem of the Middle East settlement on the whole. That is why we are not going to outline it once more on a broad scale.

However there is one specific aspect on which we consider it necessary to state now for the President our considerations. We have in mind the plans to dispatch American personnel with control functions to the zone of disengagement of the Egyptian and the Israeli forces in which the UNEF forces are stationed. The President himself mentioned such plans recently during one of his press-conferences.

In this connection we would like to say to the President with all clarity that if it really comes to realization of such plans then it could not be viewed by us otherwise but as bringing into the Middle East situation a new and complicating element. Such a step would contradict the Security Council decisions by which the UN Middle East control machinery was created and which were based on the understanding of "appropriate auspices" reached between our two countries in October of 1973.

It goes therefore without saying that the Soviet Union would reject any attempts to get its approval - direct or indirect, within the framework of the Security Council or the Geneva Conference - for admitting the said American personnel into the zone of action of the UNEF. We say it frankly and in advance so there will be no vagueness for the American side on this score.



In Moscow would like to hope that the President will pay due attention to the above considerations of ours dictated by the desire to avoid a new aggravation of the Middle East situation and its negative influence on the relations between our countries.





*Delivered from Soviet Embassy
at 7⁰⁰ pm, Tuesday, 9/2/75*

EMBASSY OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
1125 - 16TH ST. N.W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036

September 2, 1975

Dear Brent:

Attached is the Oral Message from Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary Kissinger which I discussed with you over the telephone.

Sincerely,



Yuly M. Vorontsov
Charge d'Affaires
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

Lieutenant General
Brent Scowcroft
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington D.C.



ORAL MESSAGE

In connection with the communication of the Secretary of State concerning the initialing of an agreement between Egypt and Israel on partial withdrawal of the Israeli forces in Sinai which was prepared through unilateral mediation of the United States, A.A.Gromyko would like to state to the Secretary the following.

The Secretary is well aware of the principled position of the Soviet Union on the problem of the Middle East settlement including our definite negative attitude towards such separate actions in the Middle East.

During the meeting in Vienna last May the Secretary made assurances that henceforth the United States will not only be no organizer of but also no party to any new separate deals in the Middle East. However the actions after that obviously do not correspond to those assurances.

While repeatedly stating to the American side our position on the key questions of the Middle East settlement we, as the Secretary knows, have not rejected in principle a possibility also of partial measures of settlement. However we have always stressed that, first, agreement on such measures should be a product of joint efforts of all the interested parties including the Soviet Union in the framework of the Geneva Conference and, second, any such agreement should lead towards general settlement by being in fact, and not simply in words, its integral part.

Not once was the Secretary also advised that we are against using the Geneva Conference as some kind of a parade ground for



formalizing separate deals prepared outside its framework. It would bring more harm than usefulness to exploit the Conference in such a way.

That is why the Soviet Union does not intend naturally to send its representative to Geneva to be present for the signing of any document prepared without the participation of the USSR.

About our negative attitude towards sending American personnel with control functions into the zone of action of the UNEF on Sinai we have already informed the United States earlier.



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September 3, 1975

Dear Yuly:

Attached is the message I discussed with you
on the telephone.

Sincerely,

Brent Scowcroft
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

His Excellency
Yuly M. Vorontsov
Charge d'Affaires of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
1125 - 16th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036



*To be turned to Mrs. Vinton
New messages at 2:40 p.m.
Sept 3, 1975*

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The President wishes the following message brought to the personal attention of General Secretary Brezhnev.

I have received your comments on the new Middle East Agreements, which were apparently written before receipt of Secretary Kissinger's message to Foreign Minister Gromyko. There are several points in the Soviet communication that I wish to address quite frankly, lest there be any misunderstanding between us.

I am surprised and disappointed that the Soviet Union views the latest Agreements, including the provisions concerning the role of a small number of American civilian personnel, as a complicating element, contradicting Security Council decisions and our understanding about "appropriate auspices." As the Agreement clearly states, both Parties are determined "to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant step towards that end." Moreover, the Agreement commits both Parties to resolve the conflict between them and in the Middle East by peaceful means, not by military force.

It is difficult for me to understand why such statements of intent are not in the interests of all Parties concerned, including the Soviet Union. After all, the United States and the Soviet Government agreed in a solemn document in 1973 that we would be guided in the formulation of our foreign policy by the objective of reducing the threat of war. For Egypt and Israel, who have been such bitter enemies, to undertake to resolve their disputes by peaceful means ought to be considered a significant accomplishment. Your Ambassador was informed in a general way about the progress of the negotiations.

I am also puzzled by the description of these Agreements as "separate actions" which are apparently opposed by the Soviet Government. My recollection of our discussions in Helsinki is that the Soviet side was not opposed to further agreements between Israel and Egypt. Indeed, the General Secretary, at one point, indicated that drawing a new ceasefire line eastward might be helpful in promoting an atmosphere more conducive to taking up the issues of a final settlement. The General Secretary said at that time that he realized all the issues could not be solved in one day, and that time would be required.

As for the presence of American personnel, it must be emphasized that both Parties found this an important element in the Agreement, and a source of confidence that the Agreements would be maintained. As described in the accompanying documents, involvement of US civilian personnel, not



to exceed 200, which the Parties have agreed to complements UNEF but is completely separate from it and no way alters the basic character of the UN role or creates any special advantages for the US. Indeed, the US is acting in full consistency with UN Resolution 338.

It is, of course, for the USSR to decide its attitude towards these new Agreements. They are in no sense directed against the Soviet Union. Frankly, I do not understand why the Soviet Union should reject "any approval" of these Agreements.

The United States is still prepared, as I informed General Secretary Brezhnev, to work together to promote conditions for a peaceful and just settlement in the Middle East. With a new step toward peace having been achieved, our cooperation should be more important than ever. As noted in Secretary Kissinger's message, we look forward to meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko to review the situation and consider how we can work together on the next steps. We will at that time be prepared to agree to a time for reconvening the Geneva Conference.

If the Soviet Union nevertheless decides to campaign actively against these Agreements, this cannot fail to have a harmful effect on our relations. This would be particularly unfortunate in this crucial period, when we are working toward another historic agreement limiting strategic arms, and are discussing the possibility of a significant agreement on the sale of grain and oil. Thus, I am convinced it would be in the best interests of our relationship, of peace in the Middle East, and of world peace, if the Soviet Union would carefully reconsider the implications of its latest communication and avoid taking actions that would cast a shadow over a significant achievement for peace in this greatly troubled and dangerous area.



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Hand delivered by the Situation Room
September 3, 1975 10:15 p.m.

b6

September 3, 1975

Dear Yuly:

**Attached is the oral message from the
Secretary to the Foreign Minister which
we discussed on the telephone.**

Sincerely,

**Brent Scowcroft
Lieutenant General, USAF
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs**

**His Excellency
Yuly M. Vorontsov
Charge d'Affaires of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
1125 - 16th Street, NW
Washington, D. C. 20036**

**BS:mb
9/3/75**



bc

The Secretary regrets that the USSR has decided not to send a representative to Geneva to witness the signing. In light of this, we have instructed our representative to refrain from being in the room at the time of the signing ceremony. As Mr. Gromyko knows, we do not consider the agreement achieved between Egypt and Israel as a "separate" action, but rather a step towards an overall settlement. Moreover, on a number of occasions, including at Vienna, the Secretary made clear that any interim agreement between Egypt and Israel would constitute useful preparation for any renewed Geneva Conference. We regret that there should be any misunderstanding with respect to the US role undertaken at the request of the Parties which has led to the latest agreement. We do not see how Mr. Gromyko from the talks on the Middle East either at Vienna or Geneva could come away with the impression that the Secretary had made a commitment to refrain from being helpful to the Parties in achieving the latest interim step, especially since there were several discussions between the Secretary and Ambassador Dobrynin on the subject of the US initiative.

We believe the latest agreement serves the interests of both the US and USSR. We fail to see how the Soviets can object to a limited number of American technicians serving in a separate capacity from the UN at the request of both Parties. Egypt has a right to request another state to undertake a role on its own sovereign territory.

The US continues to be prepared to work with the USSR in helping to promote a just and durable peace in the Middle East in accordance with Security Resolution 338. The Secretary is prepared to discuss this in a concrete way with Mr. Gromyko when he meets with him at the UNGA later this month. As previously indicated, the Secretary is prepared to discuss the question of reconvening the Geneva Conference on the occasion of Mr. Gromyko's visit to Washington.

