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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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O 110012Z AUG 74 ZFF6

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUHQOG/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 6268

INFO RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 4273

RUQNGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 7934

RUQMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 7247

RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8473

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 175374

CONTROL: 2 8 9 0 Q

RECD: 10 AUGUST 7

9 36 PM

NOOIS

State Review
3/3/04
By HR 5/10/11

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CY

SUBJECT: CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON UNDER SECRETARY SISCO

GENEVA FOR HARTMAN

1. CYPRIOT AMBASSADOR DIMITRIOU CALLED ON UNDER SECRETARY SISCO AT 1100, AUGUST 10. SISCO OPENED BY REFERRING TO PRESIDENT FORD'S DESIRE THAT ALL AMBASSADORS IN WASHINGTON UNDERSTAND THAT MAIN LINES OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY WILL CONTINUE AS IN THE PAST. SECRETARY HAD SENT MESSAGE ALONG THESE LINES TO ACTING PRESIDENT CLERIDES ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT FORD.

2. DIMITRIOU EXPRESSED APPRECIATION AND SAID HE HAD WRITTEN PRESIDENT FORD CONGRATULATING HIM AND ASKING THAT HIS ADMINISTRATION DO ALL POSSIBLE TO PROTECT SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE OF CYPRUS. HE ASKED WHETHER COPY OF MESSAGE TO CLERIDES HAD BEEN SENT TO MAKARIOS AND WHAT WAS STATUS OF ARCHBISHOP. SISCO REPLIED THERE HAD BEEN NO MESSAGE TO MAKARIOS, WHOSE STATUS WAS UNCHANGED AS FAR AS WE ARE CONCERNED.

3. DIMITRIOU CHARACTERIZED NEW CYPRIOT CABINET AS "VERY GOOD" INVOLVING PERSONS WITHOUT POLITICAL AMBITIONS. HE HAD SPOKEN WITH ARCHBISHOP PREVIOUS DAY AND MAKARIOS WAS PLEASED.

4. SISCO BRIEFED AMBASSADOR ON LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AT GENEVA WHERE A DEADLOCK HAD DEVELOPED OVER SEATING ARRANGEMENTS. HE NOTED THAT ON GROUND IN CYPRUS SITUATION SEEMED TO HAVE QUIETED DOWN.



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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-2- STATE 175374

5. DIMITRIOU ARGUED STRONGLY THAT USG MUST PLAY MAJOR ROLE IN REACHING A SOLUTION MAINLY THROUGH PERSUADING TURKEY TO EXERCISE MODERATION. SISCO REPLIED THAT US HAD TRIED TO PLAY CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE AND WAS CURRENTLY ACTIVE WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN PRESENT IN GENEVA. IT WAS NOT, HOWEVER, CLEAR EXACTLY WHAT COULD BE DONE AT THIS MOMENT, THOUGH WE HAVE CONTINUOUSLY PURSUED MATTER OF CONSOLIDATING CEASEFIRE.

6. DIMITRIOU SUGGESTED TURKISH GOVERNMENT HAD MISLED USG INTO THINKING THEY DESIRED PEACE WHILE INSTEAD MOUNTING FULL-SCALE OPERATION AGAINST CYPRUS. THIS HAD CREATED SERIOUS PROBLEM INVOLVING SURVIVAL OF CYPRUS AS INDEPENDENT, SOVEREIGN STATE.

7. SISCO REPLIED THAT USG HAD MADE IT CLEAR WE WOULD NOT SUPPORT ENOSIS OR PARTITION. DIMITRIOU CLAIMED TURKISH PROPOSALS WOULD LEAD TO PARTITION PARTICULARLY IN THEIR INSISTENCE ON A DEMARCATION LINE. HE SAID CYPRUS WAS AT TURKEY'S MERCY. OTHER INTERESTED PARTIES, INCLUDING US AND UK, SHOULD CONVINCEN TURKS TO HOLD BACK OTHERWISE LONG-RANGE PROBLEMS WOULD BE CREATED IN REGION.

8. SISCO SAID USG FEELS ANY SOLUTION MUST BE ACCEPTABLE TO BOTH CYPRUS COMMUNITIES AND GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND WE DO NOT DESPAIR THAT A FORMULA MAY BE FOUND, THOUGH THIS WILL NOT BE EASY.

9. DIMITRIOU ASKED ABOUT SOVIET INTENTIONS AND SISCO STRESSED IT WAS NOT IN ANYONE'S INTEREST TO INJECT THE SOVIET FACTOR. RATHER, IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SEEK SOLUTION WITHIN GENEVA FRAMEWORK AND WESTERN CONTEXT. DIMITRIOU OBSERVED THAT WITHOUT A SETTLEMENT SOVIETS COULD EXPLOIT SITUATION AND KARAMANLIS WOULD FIND IT DIFFICULT TO CONTINUE IN OFFICE. ALL THIS MADE US ROLE MOST VITAL. SISCO ASSURED AMBASSADOR WE UNDERSTOOD HIS POINT. KISSINGER

EUR/SE:WLCAGLETON:CF
8/10/74 EXT 20455
P-JJSISCO (BY P. MARTINEZ)

EUR - MR STABLER
S/S: WLUERS

EUR: JLOWENSTEIN



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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CONTROL: 2 8 9 9 Q

RECD: 10 AUGUST 74 -

11 13 PM

Z 110159Z AUG 74 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION GENEVA FLASH 4276
BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 175381

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TU, GR, CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS - PHASE II

FROM THE SECRETARY FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN

1. I APPRECIATE YOUR FULL REPORTING ON DEVELOPMENTS IN GENEVA. FRANKLY, I AM AGAIN DISTURBED BY CALLAGHAN'S POSTURING WHICH MAKES IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR US TO GIVE HIM THE SUPPORT HE NEEDS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME RETAINING FLEXIBILITY IN OUR DEALINGS WITH THE PARTIES CONCERNED. CALLAGHAN'S STRATEGY WHICH YOU OUTLINED IN GENEVA 5151 SEEMED TO BE ALONG THE RIGHT TRACK, BUT HE ALSO SEEMS TO HAVE A PREDILECTION FOR "PLAYING WITH SOLDIERS".

2. PLEASE TELL CALLAGHAN ON MY BEHALF THAT I HAVE TALKED TO ECEVIT BY TELEPHONE AND I AM SENDING HIM A MESSAGE URGING HIM TO KEEP THE TALKS GOING AND TO REFRAIN FROM ANY MILITARY ACTION. ECEVIT HAS ASSURED ME THAT HE WILL NOT MOVE AND WILL AWAIT MY MESSAGE WHICH WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF PREPARING.

3. CALLAGHAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE PRESS ABOUT THE F-4'S IS DISTINCTLY NOT HELPFUL AND WE ARE CONVINCED THAT SHOULD ANY OF THE OTHER MILITARY MOVES THE UK HAS IN MIND

BECOME PUBLIC, THE TURKS WOULD FEEL THEMSELVES PUSHED FURTHER INTO A CORNER. YOU MIGHT TELL CALLAGHAN THAT ECEVIT MENTIONED TO ME THE PRESS STORIES ABOUT THE F-4'S AND THE DOMESTIC PRESSURES THEY MIGHT GENERATE IN TURKEY FOR UNILATERAL ACTION.

~~SECRET~~ State Review
3/3/04

By: HR 5/10/11

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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4. YOU SHOULD ALSO TELL CALLAGHAN THAT WE WANT TO BE HELPFUL IN EVERY WAY WE CAN, BUT THIS MILITARY POSIURING IS NOT IN OUR VIEW THE WAY TO GO ABOUT MATTERS. HE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT IT IS OUT OF THE QUESTION TO BE ASKING A PRESIDENT IN THE FIRST 48 HOURS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION TO CONSIDER SUPPORTING MILITARY ACTION OF THE SORT CALLAGHAN APPEARS TO HAVE IN MIND. WE WILL DO EVERYTHING WE CAN TO ASSIST IN KEEPING THE TALKS GOING, BUT WE WILL HAVE LITTLE ROOM FOR MANEUVER IF HE CONTINUES TO RATTLE THE SABER. KISSINGER

EUR:WSTABLER:EMT:DW
8/10/74:21010
S - THE SECRETARY

P - MR. SISCO

|S/S - MR. LUERS



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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O 112200Z AUG 74 ZFFG
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 4277
 INFO RUGMBU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 7936
 RUGMAT/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 7248
 RUGMGB/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 6269
 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 8488
 RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 8126
 RUFHNA/USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE 4886

CONTROL: 2 8 9 7Q
 RECD: 10 AUGUST 74
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BT
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NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
 TAGS: PFOR, TU, GR, CY
 SUBJECT: CYPRUS - PHASE II

FROM THE SECRETARY FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY HARTMAN

1. YOU MAY TELL CLERIDES THAT WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH THE
 TURKS ABOUT THE SITUATION IN GENEVA. WE DO NOT THINK IT
 ADVISABLE, HOWEVER, THAT YOU TELL THEM WHAT LINE WE ARE
 TAKING WITH THE TURKS.

2. SINCE FOR THE MOMENT THE GREEKS DO NOT APPEAR TO BE
 PRESSING US, IT MIGHT BE JUST AS WELL NOT TO DISCUSS OUR
 APPROACH TO THE TURKS LEST THEY GET THE IDEA THAT WE ARE
 SUPPORTING CALLAGHAN'S PRESENT MILITARY POSTURING. KISSINGER

EUR:WSTABLER:LM
 8/10/74:21010
 S - THE SECRETARY

P - MR. SISCO

S/S - MR. LUERS

State Review
 8270 3/3/04
 By HR 5/10/11

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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Z 110200Z AUG 74 ZFF6

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY ANKARA FLASH 7935

INFO RUEHCR/USMISSION GENEVA FLASH 4275

BT

~~SECRET~~ STATE 175382

CONTROL: 2 8 9 5 Q

RECD: 10 AUGUST 74

10 10 PM

NODIS/CHEROKEE

~~SECRET~~ State Review
3/3/04

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, TU, GR, CY

SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM SECRETARY

BY 12 5/10/11

GENEVA FOR HARTMAN

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

1. YOU SHOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE EARLY ON AUGUST 11 TO PRIME MINISTER ECEVIT FROM ME:

BEGIN QUOTE DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I WAS GLAD TO HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK WITH YOU ON THE TELEPHONE YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND I APPRECIATE YOUR ASSURANCE THAT TURKEY WILL TAKE NO UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION ON CYPRUS PENDING A FURTHER CLARIFICATION OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION IN GENEVA.

AS YOU KNOW, FROM THE VERY START OF THE CYPRUS CRISIS, THE UNITED STATES HAS TRIED IN EVERY WAY TO SHOW SYMPATHY AND HELPFUL UNDERSTANDING FOR THE TURKISH POSITION. WE RECOGNIZED THAT TURKEY HAD LEGITIMATE CONCERNS OVER THE POSITION OF THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY AND THAT FAILURE TO CORRECT THIS SITUATION OVER THE YEARS DEEPLY DISTURBED TURKISH PUBLIC OPINION. DURING THE FIRST GENEVA CONFERENCE, WE STRONGLY OPPOSED ANY ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE

TURKEY THROUGH THE IMPOSITION OF UNJUSTIFIABLE DEADLINES. WE HAVE MADE EVERY EFFORT TO KEEP YOU CURRENTLY INFORMED OF OUR THINKING ON THIS PROBLEM AND YOU KNOW, MR. PRIME MINISTER, MY CONVICTION THAT IT IS OF PARAMOUNT STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE THAT THE SOVIETS BE DEPRIVED OF THE PRETEXT FOR FURTHER INCURSIONS INTO THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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-2 - STATE 175382

IT IS IN THIS SAME SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP AND CANDOR THAT I MUST TELL YOU THAT ANY FURTHER UNILATERAL MILITARY ACTION BY TURKEY IN CYPRUS WOULD PRESENT US WITH THE MOST ENORMOUS DIFFICULTIES. SUCH A MILITARY MOVE BY TURKEY IN THE FIRST FEW DAYS OF PRESIDENT FORD'S ADMINISTRATION WOULD SIMPLY NOT BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE UNITED STATES. WHEN THE PRESIDENT RECEIVED THE REPRESENTATIVES OF OUR NATO ALLIES YESTERDAY AS HIS FIRST ACT FOLLOWING HIS ASSUMPTION OF THE PRESIDENCY, YOUR AMBASSADOR URGED THAT WE ENDEAVOR TO KEEP THE CYPRUS QUESTION OUT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. I TOLD HIM THAT WE WERE ENTIRELY AGREEABLE TO THIS. HOWEVER, IF TURKEY SHOULD TAKE UNILATERAL MILITARY MEASURES IN CYPRUS TO ENLARGE THE AREAS WHICH IT NOW HOLDS, THE UNITED STATES WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO SUPPORT TURKEY IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

I WANT YOU TO KNOW, MR. PRIME MINISTER, THAT WE ALSO HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE OTHER PARTIES TO DISCOURAGE ANY POSSIBLE UNILATERAL MOVES ON THEIR PART. WE ARE TOTALLY OPPOSED TO THE RESORT TO ANY TACTIC OF PRESSURE.

AMBASSADOR MACOMBER HAS REPORTED TO ME FULLY ON YOUR CONVERSATION OF AUGUST 10. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT ALL THE ISSUES ARE CAPABLE OF EARLY SOLUTION, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE DEFINITION OF THE TURKISH AREA. I UNDERSTAND THAT TURKEY WISHES TO REACH A PROMPT SETTLEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND DOES NOT WISH TO HAVE THE TALKS PROLONGED UNNECESSARILY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THIS IS A COMPLEX QUESTION INVOLVING THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS NOT ONLY OF TURKEY, BUT ALSO OF GREECE, WHICH HAS JUST EMERGED FROM A LONG AND DIFFICULT PERIOD, AND OF THE CYPRIOTS THEMSELVES. AS I UNDERSTAND THE PRESENT SITUATION, THE DIFFERENCES WITH REGARD TO THE FUTURE STRUCTURE OF CYPRUS SEEM TO BE BETWEEN THE TURKISH DESIRE TO HAVE A SINGLE AUTONOMOUS ZONE AND THE GREEK CYPRIOT VIEW THAT THERE SHOULD BE A CANTONAL ARRANGEMENT, POSSIBLY INVOLVING MORE THAN ONE CANTON. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE DIFFERENCES HERE MIGHT BE NARROWED AND I WOULD URGE THAT AN ATTEMPT BE MADE TO DO SO. PERHAPS, FOR EXAMPLE, YOUR GOVERNMENT COULD CONSIDER

TWO OR THREE WELL-DEFINED TURKISH AREAS RATHER THAN ONE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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-3- STATE 175382

SINGLE GEOGRAPHIC ZONE. AS I HAVE TOLD YOU BEFORE, THE UNITED STATES IS NOT WEDDED TO ANY ONE PARTICULAR FORMULA AND I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT WE WOULD SUPPORT ANY REASONABLE COMPROMISE WHICH COULD ASSURE PEACE AND STABILITY IN CYPRUS.

I AM SURE THERE ARE MANY OTHER IDEAS WHICH WOULD BE CONSIDERED AS TO THE NATURE OF A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT. I WOULD SUGGEST THAT THE MINISTERS IN GENEVA INSTRUCT A WORKING GROUP OF SENIOR OFFICIALS OF GREECE AND TURKEY AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES TO GO INTO IMMEDIATE SESSION TO EXPLORE THE DETAILS OF SUCH A SETTLEMENT. THE MINISTERS WOULD INSTRUCT THIS WORKING GROUP TO REPORT BACK TO THEM AT A SPECIFIED TIME WHICH, IN OUR VIEW, NEED NOT BE MORE THAN THREE WEEKS.

WE MUST NOT LET THIS OPPORTUNITY PASS, MR. PRIME MINISTER, TO DEMONSTRATE ONCE AGAIN TO THE WORLD THAT, AS MEMBERS OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, WE ARE ALL RESOLVED TO PRESERVE THE PEACE AND TO LIVE IN HARMONY WITH ONE ANOTHER. IT IS IN THIS SPIRIT THAT I APPEAL TO YOU TO MAKE A FURTHER CONTRIBUTION TO THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF THIS VITAL AREA OF THE ALLIANCE.

I ASSURE YOU THAT THIS LETTER WILL BE KEPT COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL. WARM REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER. END QUOTE. KISSINGER

EUR:WSTABLER:LM:DW

8/10/74 21010

S - THE SECRETARY

S - MR. SISCO

| S/S - MR. LUERS



~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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111405Z AUG 74 ZFF4
TO COMMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7700

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~~SECRET~~ GENEVA 5160

MODIS/CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

DECLASSIFIED State Review
NO. 111405Z AUG 74 3/3/04
BY HR DATE 5/10/11

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CY
SUBJ: CYPRUS

1. I WILL BE REPORTING BY SEPTEL MY CONVERSATION THIS MORNING WITH CALLAGHAN IN WHICH I MADE YOUR POINTS STRONGLY ON MILITARY POSTURING, NOT ATTEMPTING TO BOX US AND HAVING ADVANCE CONSULTATION BEFORE ANY STEP, PARTICULARLY A PUBLIC STEP IS TAKEN. I BELIEVE I HAD GOOD SUCCESS IN OBTAINING THE NECESSARY ASSURANCES ALTHOUGH AS YOU WILL SEE FROM MY REPORT CALLAGHAN STILL BELIEVES THE CONTINGENCY IS REAL AND WILL CONTINUE HIS OWN PLANNING.
2. THE BRITISH DELEGATION JUST CALLED TO SAY THAT CALLAGHAN IS CLIMBING THE WALL BECAUSE HIS NEXT GUEST AFTER HE WAS THE TURKISH AMBASSADOR (GUNES IS OUT FOR A DRIVE) TO WHOM HE PRESENTED THE LIST OF TURKISH VILLAGES THAT THE GREEKS AND CLERIDES HAVE AGREED TO FREE. DURING THE CONVERSATION, THE TURK SAID THAT THE REASON FOR GUNES' REQUEST FOR A DELAY IN TODAY'S MEETING IS THAT THE CABINET IS IN SESSION IN ANKARA TO CONSIDER SOME AMERICAN PROPOSALS. SINCE I ONLY MENTIONED THE EXISTENCE OF A MESSAGE, INDICATED I DIDN'T HAVE A COPY, AND GAVE ONLY THE TWO POINTS IN YOUR INSTRUCTION TO ME, I AM SURE HE SEES DUPLICITY. HIS STAFF FEELS HE WILL REQUIRE A LOT OF REASSURING AND PERHAPS WISH TO SEE THE MESSAGE.
3. MY READING OF THE MESSAGE IS THAT THIS COULD BE EMBARRASSING ON THREE COUNTS: THE REFERENCE TO OUR HAVING EARLIER OPPOSED ANY ATTEMPTS TO ISOLATE TURKEY BY UNJUSTIFIABLE DEADLINES, OUR DEALING WITH THE SPECIFICS OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION TO THE POINT OF SUGGESTING "TWO OR THREE WELL-DEFINED TURKISH AREAS" BEFORE THE PARTIES THEMSELVES HAVE EVEN DISCUSSED THE MATTER, AND FINALLY THE DETAILED PROCEDURAL SUGGESTION WITHOUT CONSULTING THE FELLOW WHO IS CURSING THIS BEAST ALONG.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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-2- GENEVA 5160, AUG 11, NODIS/CHEROKEE

A. YOUR WILL RECALL THAT MY IDEA HAD BEEN TO TRY SOME LANGUAGE OUT ON CALLAGHAN (GENEVA 5153). I STILL HAVE NOT DONE SO ALTHOUGH I AM STILL PLAYING WITH THREE OR FOUR ALTERNATIVES BASED ON WHAT PEOPLE TELL ME. CALLAGHAN HAS NOW GIVEN ME THE TEXT THEY DID BEFORE LEAVING LONDON WHICH, ALTHOUGH IT IS DATED BY THE TALKS HERE, AT LEAST SHOWS THAT THEY WERE HEADED IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. IN MY OPINION, THERE IS NOTHING IN THE MESSAGE TO ECEVIT INCONSISTENT WITH WHAT I HAVE BEEN SAYING HERE BUT YOU MAY WISH TO CALL YOUR FRIEND JIM AND AND SOOTHE HIM BY SAYING THERE WERE A COUPLE OF ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES IN THE MESSAGE BUT NOTHING MORE AND THAT IF THE TURKS WANT TO SOFTEN THEIR POSITION THEY MAY BE DELIBERATELY SAYING THESE EXAMPLES ARE USG PROPOSALS IN ORDER TO HELP THEM GET OFF THE HOOK BY IMPLYING WE BLUDGEONED THEM INTO A COMPROMISE. I RECOMMEND AGAINST LETTING HIM SEE THE MESSAGE. FOR GOODNESS SAKE, TRY TO SHUT THE TURKS UP. DALE



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MESSAGES BETWEEN ANKARA AND WASHINGTON BUT DID NOT GO INTO ANY DETAIL. HE THEN SAID THAT THE POLITICAL CLIMATE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE CONFERENCE SEEMS TO BE DETERIORATING, REFERRING TO THE ANNOUNCED UK MOVE NOT TO RECALL ITS F-4'S, TO TURKISH POPULAR REACTION THERETO, TO STATEMENTS IN TALKS HERE BY UK AND GREECE AND CLERIDES INDICATING THAT GREECE AND UK WANT TO WASH THEIR HANDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE, AND TO THE FAILURE OF GREECE, UNFICYP AND THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO LIBERATE THE TURKISH ENCLAVES AS SPECIFIED IN PARA 3 OF THE JULY 30 GENEVA DECLARATION. HE SAID THAT EVERYONE SEEMS TO BE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE REMOVAL OF TURKISH TROOPS FROM THE ISLAND RATHER THAN OTHER ISSUES AND THIS IS THE "WORST POSSIBLE APPROACH" TO RESOLVING THE PROBLEM. THE TURKISH TROOPS HAD THE CAPABILITY TO TAKE VERY LARGE PORTIONS OF CYPRUS BUT THE ORDER HAD BEEN GIVEN TO STOP. THIS ORDER WAS NOT GIVEN BECAUSE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RES. BUT BECAUSE OF TURKEY'S DESIRE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HAD ASKED THAT IT TRY AND FIND A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, HAVING ESTABLISHED ITS PRESENCE ON THE ISLAND, AND TO KEEP GOOD RELATIONS WITH ITS OTHER ALLIES, ESPECIALLY GREECE. THERE HAD BEEN A LITTLE EXPANSION AFTER THE CEASEFIRE WAS ACCEPTED BUT THIS HAD BEEN DONE EITHER IN ORDER TO PROTECT TURKISH TROOPS IN POSITIONS ALREADY HELD OR ON LOCAL INITIATIVE NOT AUTHORIZED BY ANKARA. THE UK SEEMED TO THINK THAT TURKEY HAD STOPPED BECAUSE IT WAS AFRAID OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT THIS IS NOT SO. NOR WOULD TURKEY BE STOPPED BY THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH F-4'S ON THE ISLAND. TURKEY IS SEEKING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION BECAUSE IT WANTS TO AVOID A DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND ITS OTHER CLOSE ALLIES.

2. GUNES CONTINUED THAT THERE IS AN URGENT NEED TO DECIDE ON A FORMULA FOR A FUNDAMENTAL SOLUTION BUT THAT NO ONE SEEMED TO BE PAYING ATTENTION. SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO HIS PRIME MINISTER SUGGESTING THAT SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND BUT THAT IT WOULD TAKE A LITTLE TIME. AS ECEVIT HAS TOLD AMBASSADOR MACOMBER, TIME IS LIMITED. IT IS NOT UP TO GUNES TO SAY WHETHER IT SHOULD BE THREE WEEKS OR ONE OR FOUR. THIS IS A GOVERNMENTAL DECISION AND THE TURKISH CABINET IS PRESENTLY MEETING TO DECIDE UPON SUCH BASIC MATTERS. GUNES SAID HE THEREFORE REQUESTED CALLAGHAN TO DELAY THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTER UNTIL 1600 SO HE WOULD HAVE NEW INSTRUCTIONS.

3. I TOLD GUNES THAT I AGREED WITH HIM THAT THERE HAS BEEN TOO MUCH ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE FACT OF THE TURKISH MILITARY PRESENCE ON CYPRUS AND NOT ENOUGH ON HOW TO DEAL SERIOUSLY WITH THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM AND FIND A SOLUTION FOR THEM. THE DYNAMICS OF THE SITUATION HAVE EVOLVED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CAUSE THE INITIAL CONCERN TO BE DIRECTED AT THE TURKISH ACTION AND THE CEASE-FIRE



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ASPECTS. THIS HAD BEEN DIFFICULT TO WORK OUT AND IN THE PROCESS NOT ENOUGH ATTENTION HAD BEEN GIVEN TO OTHER MATTERS. FOR EXAMPLE, I REMINDED GUNES THAT THE USG, PARTLY AS A RESULT OF WHAT I HAD SEEN ON CYPRUS, HAD TAKEN A STRONG POSITION IN URGING ALL CONCERNED THAT MORE ATTENTION BE GIVEN TO FREEING THE TURKISH ENCLAVES AS CALLED FOR IN PARA 3 OF THE GENEVA JULY 30 DECLARATION. THE GREEK GOVT, WHATEVER MR. MAVROS MIGHT HAVE SAID IN THE TALKS, IS KEENLY AWARE OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS REGARD AND PM KARAMANLIS TOLD ME IN ATHENS THAT HE HAD SENT A REGULAR GENERAL OFFICER FROM THE GREEK ARMY TO TAKE THE CYPRIOT NATIONAL GUARD UNDER CONTROL AND DISARM THE IRREGULARS SUCH AS EDKA-B. KARAMANLIS WAS NOT TRYING TO DUCK HIS RESPONSIBILITIES, NOR WAS CLERIDES, IN MY JUDGMENT, BUT IT TAKES TIME TO REDRESS SUCH A DIFFICULT SITUATION AS THAT WHICH EXISTS ON THE GROUND IN CYPRUS. TURKEY SHOULD BE A BIT MORE AWARE OF THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF CLERIDES AND THE NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT, SINCE BOTH OFFER THE BEST PROSPECTS FOR GOOD FUTURE RELATIONS WITH TURKEY AND THE SORT OF EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM WHICH TURKEY WANTS. I SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT TURKEY SHOULD CONSIDER SOME SORT OF A FORMULA FOR THE ONGOING TALKS WHICH SOMEHOW BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE TURKISH POSITION THAT THERE SHOULD BE 2 AUTONOMOUS ZONES UNDER A SINGLE FEDERAL STATE OR WHATEVER IT WAS TO BE CALLED AND THE CLERIDES POSITION THAT IF HE SAID THIS HE WOULD HAVE TO RESIGN AT ONCE. CLERIDES TOLD ME HE THOUGHT HE COULD TALK ABOUT GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOT AUTHORITIES IN THE GEOGRAPHIC AREAS THEY CONTROL AND THAT HE HAS GIVEN UP THE IDEA OF THE UNITARY STATE. THESE ARE IMPORTANT POINTS, COMPARED TO PAST GREEK CYPRIOT POSITIONS, AND THERE SHOULD BE A WAY TO FIND A BRIDGE BETWEEN THEM, NOT TO SOLVE THE BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS BUT IN ORDER TO GET TALKS GOING ON THE BASIS OF A FORMULA ACCEPTABLE TO ALL CONCERNED. THERE MIGHT BE A DEADLINE SET FOR THE RESULTS OF THESE TALKS TO BE REPORTED BACK TO THE THREE GUARANTORS.

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DE RUFHGV #5161/2 2231545
O 111420Z AUG 74
FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7702

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIACT IMMEDIATE 696
AMEMBASSY ATHENS NIACT IMMEDIATE 540
AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 6142
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACT IMMEDIATE 242
USMISSION NDAT NIACT IMMEDIATE 2616
USMISSION USUN NY IMMEDIATE 927

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 5161

EXDIS

4. GUNES SAID THAT WHAT I HAD INDICATED AS TO THE NEW POSITION OF CLERIDES WOULD NOT HAVE MUCH IMPACT IN TURKEY WHERE EVERYONE FULLY AWARE OF THE NUANCES OF THE PAST INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. SINCE THE IDEA OF A UNITARY STATE HAD NOT BEEN ACCEPTED, EVEN BY THE EASTERN BLOC AND CHINA, IT HAD NOT REAL STATUS AND SO ITS ABANDONMENT WOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A TURKISH GAIN. I STRONGLY DISAGREED, I TOLD HIM, IN LIGHT OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN GREECE AND ON CYPRUS, THAT IS THE REAL WORLD, NOT THE USSR OR OTHER OUTSIDERS, AND THAT IS WHAT TURKEY SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. CLERIDES HAS AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS PROBLEM AT HOME WITH NARARISO AND HE WILL CERTAINLY BE ATTACKED STRONGLY BY THE ARCHBISHOP FOR GIVING UP THE LATTER'S PRINCIPAL OF THE UNITARY STATE.

5. GUNES THEN SAID THAT TURKISH OPINION HAS CHANGED DRASTICALLY AND IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY TURKISH GOVT TO GO TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND SAY THAT WHILE ITS ACTIONS ON CYPRUS HAVE NOT OBTAINED ENOUGH, IT WILL SETTLE FOR WHAT IT CAN GET BECAUSE "EVERYONE ELSE SAID TO ACCEPT AUTONOMY FOR WHAT WE PRESENTLY HOLD, AND WE AGREED."

6. GUNES SAID THAT THE IDEA OF TURKEY ACCEPTING SEVERAL ZONES INSTEAD OF ONLY ONE, IS A MATTER FOR THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, TURKEY SAID DURING ONGOING TALKS THAT IT WOULD ACCEPT CLERIDES CANTONAL IDEA ON CONDITION THAT EACH CANTON



*****WHSR COMMENT*****

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HAVE ACCESS TO THE SEA BY A PORT WHICH IT CONTROLS, THAT EACH CANTON BE RATHER LARGE AND THAT EACH BE PROTECTED BY A CONTINGENT OF THE TURKISH ARMY, THEN ATHENS AND CLERIDES WOULD REJECT THE CANTONAL IDEA, THEN EVERYONE WOULD BE BACK IN THE SAME POSITION.

7. GUNES SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO RECOGNIZE POLITICAL REALITIES AND NOT HUMILIATE KARAMANLIS OR CLERIDES, BUT HE COULD NOT LEAVE DISCUSSION TO A GROUP OF EXPERTS WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO SAY IT IS NO LONGER A CASE OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS BUT SOMETHING ENTIRELY DIFFERENT. HE SAID THAT MAYBE WE CAN LEAVE IN SUSPENSE THE IDEA OF "WHETHER THERE WILL BE ONE, TWO OR THREE TURKISH ZONES" BUT WE NEED TO SPELL OUT THE OTHER PRINCIPLES, PERHAPS IN A SUPPLE FORMULA ALLOWING THE OTHERS TO SAY EVERYTHING HAS NOT BEEN DECIDED BUT PRECISE ENOUGH TO SAY THERE WILL BE TURKISH REGIMES. BUT IF MAVROS AND CLERIDES CONTINUE TO SAY THE GUARANTORS HAVE NO RESPONSIBILITY CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTION, TURKEY WILL END THE GUARANTOR TALKS.

8. I TOLD GUNES THAT I THOUGHT HE WAS ON THE RIGHT TRACK, THAT MORE ATTENTION NEEDED TO BE GIVEN IN THE TALKS TO DEVELOPING A FORMULA WHICH COULD COMMAND AGREEMENT. PERHAPS THE TWO FRIENDLY LAWYERS, CLERIDES AND DENKYASH, COULD AGREE ON ONE IN THEIR TALKS. PERHAPS CALLAGHAN COULD FIND ONE. I WAS CERTAIN THAT ONE COULD BE FOUND WITH ENOUGH GOOD WILL.

9. GUNES SAID THAT NO MATTER WHAT FORMULA WAS ADOPTED IT WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO AGREE ON WHAT LIES BEHIND IT, ON WHAT WE ARE REALLY TALKING ABOUT WHAT THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION WILL BE. DALE
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BY M.F. DATE 11/21/09



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REF ID: A66066488

3. CONSIDERABLE NEW ACTIVITY IS APPARENT TODAY IN THE GREEK ARMED FORCES IN THE ATHENS AREA. EARLY PM, NO OBSERVED PREPARATIONS FOR MOUNT-OUT AT 3RD MARINE INF REG HQTRS IN ATHENS AREA. PER: CONNEL WERE ARRIVING BY TAXIS AND OTHER MEANS, FAMILIES WERE SAYING GOOD BY WITH TEARS AS IF SEPARATION WAS TO BE OF POSSIBLE LONG DURATION. MARINES WERE HURRIDLY READYING APC'S AND LOADING THEM WITH WHAT APPEARED TO BE AMMO BOXES. TRUCK CONVOYS WERE FORMING UP OUTSIDE OF COMPOUND, SOME LOADED WITH SUPPLIES, OTHERS CONFIGURED FOR TROOP SEATING. SOME VEHICLES WERE CAMOUFLAGED WITH NETS OR MUD PAINT. AT 114400Z THE TRUCK CONVOY HAD DEPARTED BUT THE APC'S WERE STILL IN THE COMPOUND AND APPARENTLY READY TO GO. OBSERVATIONS AT THE 275TH

MARINE INF BN AND THE RAIDING FORCES PARACHUTE BATTALION LOCATED AT DIONYSUS (NEAR ATHENS) SHOWED THE SAME MOUNT-OUT PREPARATIONS UNDERWAY, EXCEPT FOR LACK OF CAMOUFLAGING.

4. THOUGH NO UNABLE TO OBSERVE INSIDE COMPOUND, CONSIDERABLE TRACKED VEHICLE ACTIVITY COULD BE HEARD INSIDE GOUDI TRAINING AREA IN ATHENS.

5. THOUGH IT IS SUNDAY THE ARMED FORCES HQTRS GAVE THE APPEARANCE OF A WORKING DAY ROUTINE. CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES OR CHIEF OF ARMY (UNABLE TO DETERMINE WHICH) WAS OBSERVED RETURNING TO PENTAGON FROM DIRECTION OF PARLIAMENT BUILDING AT 113345Z.

6. AN AS SOURCE REPORTS THAT A MISSILE UNIT ATHENS AREA HAS GONE TO BATTLE STATIONS AS OF 110415Z WITH TWO MISSILES READY TO FIRE IN EACH SECTION.

7. COMMENT: DESTINATION OF THE UNITS OBSERVED MOUNTING OUT IS UNKNOWN AT THIS TIME, BUT IT IS A SIGNIFICANT MOVE FOR THEM TO MOUNT OUT ALL AT ONCE, CONSIDERING THAT THEY ARE THE PRIMARY SECURITY FOR THE ATHENS AREA AND HAVE TRADITIONALLY BEEN ELITE UNITS SERVING AS PALACE GUARDS. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT THE THREE UNITS OBSERVED INCLUDE TWO AMPHIBIOUS BN'S AND ONE PARACHUTE BATTALION.

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 7704
BT
~~SECRET~~ GENEVA 5163

CONTROL: 29390
RECVD: 11 AUG 74
1:06PM

NOOIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM HARTMAN

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TU, GR, CY
SUBJ: CYPRUS--PHASE II

~~SECRET~~ State Review
3/31/04
BY LR 5/10/11

1. CALLAGHAN ASKED TO SEE ME AT NOON ON AUGUST 11 TO GET AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTIONS HE HAD PUT TO YOU THROUGH ME ON AUGUST 10 (GENEVA 5156) AND TO BRING ME UP TO DATE ON THE TALKS. HE SAGEN BY TELLING ME OF HIS SUCCESS IN OBTAINING FROM MAVROS AND CLERIDES A LIST OF TURKISH CYPRIOT VILLAGES WHICH THEY HAD PROMISED TO EVACUATE, THEREBY ALLOWING SOME 13,000 PERSONS WHO HAD LEFT TO RETURN TO THEIR HOMES. THERE WOULD STILL BE AN ESTIMATED 60,000 PERSONS IN OTHER VILLAGES, ENCLAVES, ETC. UNDER SOME DEGREE OF GREEK CYPRIOT RESTRAINT BUT TURKEY COULD NO LONGER SAY THAT NO ACTION WAS BEING TAKEN CONCERNING PARA 3 OF THE GENEVA DECLARATION.

2. CALLAGHAN THEN SAID HE WAS PLEASED WITH THE EFFECT OF HIS REMARKS TO THE BRITISH PRESS ABOUT NOT WITHDRAWING THE UK F-4'S. HE SAID HE PLANNED TO KEEP UP THIS OSRT OF PRESSURE SO AS TO SHOW TURKEY IT COULD NOT PUSH PEOPLE AROUND. THAT IS THE ONLY LANGUAGE TURKEY UNDERSTANDS. CALLAGHAN SAID HE HAD IN MIND ANNOUNCING TODAY THAT HE IS SENDING REINFORCEMENTS TO CYPRUS IN THE FORM OF ADDITIONAL F-4'S AND AN ADDITIONAL COMMANDO BRIGADE. HOWEVER, BEFORE DOING SO HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW YOUR REACTION TO HIS APPROACH.

3. I REPLIED THAT I HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD TELEPHONED ECEVIT YESTERDAY AND FOLLOWED IT UP WITH A MESSAGE. I HAD NOT SEEN THE MESSAGE BUT FROM WHAT I HAD BEEN TOLD IT FOLLOWS THE APPROACH I HAD EXPLAINED TO CALLAGHAN AT LENGTH IN LONDON, ON THE PLANE AND HERE IN GENEVA ABOUT OUR PREFERENCE FOR NOT ISOLATING OR APPEARING TO APPLY PRESSURE TO ONE OF THE PARTIES IN A NEGOTIATION BUT RATHER TO SPELL OUT VERY CLEARLY WHERE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

2- GENEVA 5163, 11 AUG 74



THEIR POLICY WOULD TAKE THEM. I EXPLAINED THAT YOU DID NOT BELIEVE THAT APPEARING TO THREATEN TURKEY IN PUBLIC WOULD BACK ECEVIT DOWN BUT THAT IT WOULD MAKE HIM MORE INTRASIGENT. WE BELIEVE THAT A COMBINATION OF FIRMNESS AND SYMPATHY, EXPRESSED CANDIDLY IN PRIVATE, WOULD GO FURTHER THAN PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENTS ABOUT F-4'S WHICH YOU FELT WERE DISTINCTLY UNHELPFUL. I WAS CERTAIN THAT YOUR LETTER TO ECEVIT HAD BEEN ALONG THESE LINES AND I HAD BEEN TOLD THAT ECEVIT GAVE YOU ON THE TELEPHONE ADDITIONAL ASSURANCES ABOUT NOT TAKING MILITARY ACTION. CALLAGHAN'S OBJECTIVES AND OURS ARE THE SAME. OUR DIFFERENCES ARE TACTICAL BUT NONETHELESS SERIOUS

4. IN RESPONSE TO THE SPECIFIC QUESTION CALLAGHAN HAD ASKED ABOUT HIS IDEA OF INTERPOSING THE BRITISH ARMY SHOULD TURKEY TRY TO TAKE MORE TERRITORY, AND WHAT WOULD THE USG POSITION BE, IT TOLD CALLAGHAN THAT YOU HAD GIVEN THIS QUESTION AS WELL AS THE WHOLE CYPRUS PROBLEM CONSIDERABLE PERSONAL ATTENTION DESPITE YOUR OTHER CONCERNS. YOUR REPLY WAS THAT IT WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION TO BE ASKING PRES. FORD IN HIS FIRST 48 HOURS TO CONSIDER SUPPORTING MILITARY ACTION OF THE SORT SUGGESTED. CALLAGHAN PRESSED ME AGAIN TO GET FROM YOU AN ANSWER ON HOW THE USG WOULD REACT SHOULD TURKEY MOVE MILITARILY. IS THE USG DOING ANY CONTINGENCY PLANNING? I SAID THAT IT WAS CERTAIN YOU WOULD NOT WANT TO BE BOXED INTO ANSWERING CALLAGHAN'S QUESTION AND THAT IT WAS CERTAIN WE WERE CONSIDERING THE CONTINGENCY. HOWEVER, YOUR APPROACH IS TO PAINT THE PICTURE FOR TURKEY, IN A FRIENDLY AND SYMPATHETIC WAY, ABOUT WHAT THIS WOULD MEAN SO THAT ECEVIT WOULD DRAW THE PROPER CONCLUSION ON HIS OWN. CALLAGHAN THEN SAID HE ASSUMED YOU WERE IN FACT "FACING THE SITUATION" BUT WILL NOT TELL HIM WHAT YOUR CONCLUSIONS ARE.

5. I REPLIED THAT YOU ARE NOTED FOR BEING FAR-SIGHTED BUT YOU ALSO FEAR THAT EXCESSIVE FOCUS ON THE MILITARY POSSIBILITY COULD HELP BRING ABOUT THE VERY SITUATION WE ALL FEAR AND ARE DOING OUR BEST TO FORESTALL. ABOVE ALL, THIS ATTITUDE SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO CARRY OVER INTO THE DELICATE TALKS UNDERWAY HERE.

6. I THEN SUMMARIZED FOR CALLAGHAN MY TALKS WITH GUNES (GENEVA 516) AND CLERIDES (GENEVA 5159). I CONGRATULATED HIM ON GETTING SOME TANGIBLE PROGRESS ON THE TURKISH ENCLAVE QUESTION AND URGED HIM

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Department of State TELEGRAM

-3- GENEVA 5163, 11 AUG 74

TO CONTINUE TO BE PATIENT, AS HE HAD BEEN, IN TRYING TO LEAD THE TALKS TO A SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION. CALLAGHAN CHIDED ME--ARTHUR, IF YOU SAY BE PATIENT ONCE MORE, I'LL HIT YOU ON THE HEAD. I AM PATIENT IN THE MEETINGS--EVEN THOUGH I LET MYSELF GO WITH YOU." HE THEN DELIVERED HIMSELF OF A FEW CHOICE COMMENTS ON GUNES FOR ALLEGEDLY OBSTRUCTING THE TALKS. HE SAID HE WAS TOO BUSY TO WAIT MUCH LONGER FOR AGREEMENT TO EMERGE. I RAN THE RISK OF A CLOUT ON THE HEAD TO REMIND HIM OF THE DAMASCUS SHUTTLE AND THE VIETNAM PEACE TALKS AS EXAMPLES WHERE LONG HOURS OF LISTENING PAID OFF. I ALSO REMINDED HIM THAT GUNES HAD FINALLY BEEN ABLE TO COMPROMISE YESTERDAY AND AT THE PREVIOUS GENEVA TALKS. ALSO, HE SHOULD NOT FORGET THAT ANKARA CALLS THE SHOTS AND NOT GUNES. THEREFORE OUR ACTIONS AUGUST 10 WITH ANKARA WERE MEANT TO GIVE HIM, CALLAGHAN, MAXIMUM SUPPORT, BY PRODUCING MORE REALISM IN GUNES' INSTRUCTIONS.

7. CALLAGHAN RETURNED TO THE CHARGE ON THE MILITARY ANGLE, SAYING HE BELIEVES THE WORST POSSIBLE INTENTIONS SHOULD BE ASCRIBED TO TURKEY. HE ASKED ME TO TELL YOU HIS CANDID VIEW THAT YOU ARE NOT BEING TOUGH ENOUGH WITH THE TURKS, YOU ARE NOT HANDLING IT IN A WAY THEY UNDERSTAND.

8. I PROMISED TO CONVEY HIS REMARKS BUT SAID THAT, FOR OUR PART, WE ARE EQUALLY CONVINCED THAT ANNOUNCEMENTS TO THE PRESS ABOUT MILITARY PREPARATIONS ARE NOT THE WAY TO LEAVE ROOM FOR US TO INFLUENCE THE TURKS. IT JUST BUILDS THE DOMESTIC PRESSURE ON ECEVIT TO BE MORE INTRANSIGENT. CALLAGHAN SAID HE HAS GREAT ADMIRATION FOR YOU AND BELIEVES IN THE CARDINAL PRINCIPLE OF WORKING VERY CLOSELY WITH THE UNITED STATES. THEREFORE HE WILL HOLD OFF ON THE ANNOUNCEMENTS HE PLANNED TO MAKE ABOUT REINFORCEMENTS TO SEE WHAT EMERGES FROM THE MEETING OF THE TURKISH CABINET. HE ALSO PROMISED, IN RESPONSE TO MY URGING, TO EITHER TALK TO YOU DIRECTLY OR CONSULT WITH US BY OTHER MEANS IN ADVANCE OF ANY FURTHER ACTION. HE ADDED HOWEVER, THE UK HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE LIVES OF THEIR FORCES AND THEIR FAMILIES ON THE ISLAND, AS WELL AS RESPONSIBILITIES AS THE GUARANTOR POWER, AND THAT THEY WOULD THEREFORE HAVE TO MAKE THEIR FINAL DECISION THEMSELVES AFTER TALKING TO US. DALE

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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Z 110924Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5570

CONTROL: 2 9 1 1 Q

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~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 6412

UNCLASSIFIED State Review RECD: 11 AUGUST 74 -
NO. 3/3104

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NODIS/CHEROKEE

By llc 5/10/11

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO GENEVA FLASH FOR HARTMAN

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, TU, GR, CY
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR PRIME MINISTER FROM SECRETARY



REF: STATE 175382

1. I MET EARLY MORNING AUGUST 11 WITH PRIME MINISTER TO DELIVER YOUR MESSAGE (DEPTEL 175382). DEFENSE MINISTER ISIK AND NOTE-TAKER ONLY OTHER PERSONS PRESENT.

2. MEETING BEGAN WITH PRIME MINISTER READING YOUR MESSAGE ALOUD TO HIMSELF AND ISIK. AT CONCLUSION, HIS FACE WAS FLUSHED AND HIS EFFORT TO SUPPRESS ANGER WAS NOT ALTOGETHER SUCCESSFUL. HE SAID HE WAS "DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THIS MESSAGE" -- AND HE WAS CLEARLY THE MOST UPSET THAT I HAVE EVER SEEN IN ALL MY DEALINGS WITH HIM. IF THIS WAS AMERICA'S ATTITUDE, HE SAID, "THERE IS NO HOPE." HE SAID TURKEY WAS BEING THREATENED BY THE BRITISH AND THAT ONCE THE GREEKS AND THE GREEK CYPRIOTS SENSED THE US ATTITUDE, AS EXPRESSED IN YOUR MESSAGE, THERE WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY NO POSSIBILITY OF ALTERING THE TOTAL INTRANSIGENCE WHICH THEY HAD SHOWN TO THIS POINT. IN A SOMEWHAT CALMER MANNER, HE THEN ADDED THAT HE KNEW YOUR EFFORTS WERE HIGHLY MOTIVATED BUT, IF I WOULD EXCUSE HIM FOR SPEAKING BLUNTLY, HE MUST SAY THAT YOUR PROPOSAL WAS BASED ON A LACK OF DETAILED UNDERSTANDING OF THE COMPLEXITIES THAT HAD DEVELOPED OVER THE YEARS ON THE ISLAND -- PARTICULARLY OVER THE LAST 10 YEARS. HE SAID THAT CANDOR REQUIRED HIM TO ADD THAT UP TO NOW THE US HAD NOT REPEATED ITS MISTAKES OF THE PAST, BUT THAT WITH THE ARRIVAL OF YOUR MESSAGE HE BELIEVED FOR THE FIRST TIME THE US WAS REPEATING ITS EARLIER MISTAKES. HE SAID MOREOVER THAT WHAT YOU WERE PROPOSING WAS IN FACT A CONTINUATION OF THE DE FACTO CANTONAL SITUATION WHICH HAD EXISTED FOR SEVERAL YEARS NOW ON THE ISLAND, NOW AND WHICH SIMPLY HAD NOT WORKED. IF IT WERE DUPLICATED AGAIN, HE ASSERTED, IT WOULD AGAIN PRODUCE CHAOTIC CONDITIONS AND EVENTUALLY A REPEAT OF THE CRISES WHICH HAD RACKED GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS FOR SOM MANY YEARS.

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-2- ANKARA 6412

3. AT THIS POINT, IT WAS OBVIOUS HE WISHED TO TERMINATE THE INTERVIEW. I PREVENTED THIS BY INSISTING THAT HE HOLD OFF ON THE CONCLUSION HE HAD JUST EXPRESSED UNTIL HE HAD HEARD ME OUT. I SAID FIRST OF ALL YOU HAD EXPRESSED YOUR VIEWS CANDIDLY TO HIM, BUT ONLY TO HIM. THESE WERE NOT VIEWS THAT YOU WERE PASSING TO ANYONE ELSE, AND I COULD ASSURE HIM THAT OTHERS WERE IN NO POSITION TO TAKE COMFORT FROM THEM. ON THE CONTRARY, I POINTED OUT THAT YOU HAD CONSISTENTLY INSISTED THAT OTHER PARTIES TO THIS DISPUTE RECOGNIZE THAT THE SITUATION WAS DIFFERENT ON THE ISLAND NOW AND THAT A WAY MUST BE FOUND TO MEET TURKEY'S LEGITIMATE INTERESTS.

4. BY THIS POINT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD BEGIN TO RELAX SOMEWHAT, AND HE REPEATED TO ME HIS CONVICTION THAT YOU HAD NOTHING BUT THE HIGHEST MOTIVES IN THE SITUATION. I AGAIN STRESSED THAT, AS YOU HAD JUST REITERATED IN YOUR MESSAGE, YOU REMAIN DEEPLY SYMPATHETIC TO TURKEY'S LEGITIMATE INTERESTS. I POINTED OUT THAT A CAREFUL REREADING OF YOUR LETTER WOULD SHOW THAT WHAT YOU WERE TRYING TO DO IS FIND A WAY AROUND THE PRESENT IMPASSE, A WAY WHICH WOULD STILL FULLY MEET TURKEY'S LEGITIMATE NEEDS. THE PRIME MINISTER INTERRUPTED AT THIS POINT TO SAY THAT THE ONLY WAY TURKISH BASIC INTERESTS COULD REALLY BE MET WAS THROUGH THE TURKISH PROPOSAL WITH WHICH THE SECRETARY AND I WERE FAMILIAR.

5. IN RESPONSE, I SAID THAT I COULD NOT AGREE THAT THERE WAS "ONLY ONE POSSIBLE WAY" THAT TURKEY'S NEEDS COULD BE MET, AND I WAS SURE THAT YOU DID NOT FEEL THIS WAY EITHER. I SAID A KEY STUMBLING BLOCK WAS THE CYPRIOT VIEW THAT IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ANY CYPRIOT GOVERNMENT TO AGREE TO A DIVIDING OF THE ISLAND IN TWO. ON THE OTHER HAND, I EMPHASIZED, CLERIDES WAS OBVIOUSLY PREPARED TO ACCEPT A CANTONAL ARRANGEMENT OF SOME KIND. I ASKED WHETHER IT WAS REALLY OUT OF THE QUESTION FOR TURKEY TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES THROUGH A SOLUTION WHICH LEFT THEM ONE OR TWO MAJOR CANTONS AND ONE OR MORE SMALLER ONES. I SAID I WAS SURE THAT TURKISH INGENUITY COULD FIND A WAY TO RUN THESE CANTONS INTERNALLY AS IF THEY WERE ONE. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THIS WAS COMPLETELY IMPRACTICABLE, AND AT THIS POINT IN OUR CONVERSATION HE JUMPED UP, LEFT THE ROOM MOMENTARILY, AND RETURNED WITH A MAP OF THE ISLAND WHICH GRAPHICALLY SHOWED HOW NUMEROUS AND WIDELY DISPERSED WERE THE PRESENT TURK CYPRIOT COMMUNITIES. HE SAID I COULD OBVIOUSLY SEE FROM LOOKING AT THIS MAP THAT WHAT WAS BEING SUGGESTED WAS NOT POSSIBLE. I SAID THAT I COULD NOT AGREE.

6. FOR THE NEXT TWO OR THREE MINUTES, WITH A MAP IMMEDIATELY BEFORE US, WE ARGUED THE PRACTICALITIES OF A CANTONAL SYSTEM AS AN AL-

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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-3- ANKARA 6412

TERNATIVE DEVICE TO MEET FUNDAMENTAL TURKISH NEEDS. TOWARDS THE END, THE PRIME MINISTER BECAME MORE INTERESTED IN SOME LINES I WAS DRAWING ON THE MAP, WITH MY FINGER, BY WAY OF THE MOST GENERAL ILLUSTRATION OF HOW A CANTONAL SYSTEM MIGHT STILL MEET HIS REQUIREMENTS -- AND BE SOMETHING AT THE SAME TIME WHICH GREEK CYPRIOTS COULD LIVE WITH. AT ONE POINT, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID, "OF COURSE, IF WE HAD SEPARATE CANTONS, WE WOULD HAVE TO HAVE TURKISH TROOPS IN EACH OF THESE CANTONS -- AT LEAST AT FIRST." I LET THAT PASS WITHOUT COMMENT.

7. I, OF COURSE, EMPHASIZED THE ILLUSTRATIVE CHARACTER OF THE LINES I WAS INDICATING, STRESSING THEY REPRESENTED NO ONE'S OFFICIAL THINKING. THE LINE I INDICATED, HOWEVER, STARTED FROM THE NORTHWEST ROUGHLY HALF WAY BETWEEN THE POINT TURKS CURRENTLY HOLD ON THE COAST THERE AND THE POINT FARTHER WESTWARD SHOWN ON THE MILLIYET MAP, AND THEN REAN IN A SHALLOWER CURVE EASTWARD (SO THAT THE CENTER TURK CANTON WAS NOTABLY THINNER AND SHORTER THAN THE MILLIYET MAP). AS THE LINE PROCEEDED EASTWARD, I THEN HOOKED IT BACK TO THE NORTHERN COAST SHORT OF THE POINT WHERE IT REACHED THE PANHANDLE. THEN LEAVING A GAP FOR GREEK CYPRIOT TERRITORY, I MARKED ANOTHER LINE WITH MY THUMB ACROSS THE NECK OF THE PANHANDLE -- INDICATING THAT THE PENINSULA MIGHT THEN POSSIBLY END UP BEING A SECOND CANTON. I NOTED THAT THIS CANTONAL ARRANGEMENT WULD COME PRETTY CLOSE TO WHAT THE TURKS WERE ASKING FOR, AND WHILE THE 30 PERCENT FIGURE HAD OBVIOUSLY TO BE NEGOTIATED, IT SEEMED TO ME THERE COULD BE A THIRD AND POSSIBLY A FOURTH CANTON SOMEWHERE WHICH WOULD BRING THE TOTAL TURK HOLDINGS UP TO WHATEVER PERCENTAGE IS NEGOTIATED.

8. THERE WAS A SILENCE FOR SOME TIME AFTER THIS, AS THE PRIME MINISTER AND ISIK LOOKED AT THE MAP. ISIK SAID, "WE CAN'T HAVE THE PANHANDLE SEPARATED FROM THE MAIN CANTON," BUT AGREED THAT A CENTRAL CANTON COULD BE A CONSIDERABLY THINNER VERSION OF THE MILLIYET MAP AND ONE THAT STERTED SHORT OF THE WESTERN EXTREMITY THE MILLIYET MAP HAD CALLED FOR. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY CONCEDED IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO HAVE A SMALLER CENTRAL CANTON OF THIS KIND ASSOCIATED WITH ONE OR TWO (ISIK SAID "AT LEAST TWO") OTHER CANTONS. AT THIS POINT, I STRESSED AGAIN THAT ANYTHING I HAD BEEN DRAWING ON THE MAP HAD NO STANDING WHATSOEVER. I SAID, HOWEVER, THAT I WOULD LIKE TO BE ABLE TO TEL YOU THAT THE GOT WAS PREPARED TO LOOK AT AN ALTERNATE ARRANGEMENT OF THIS KIND, RECOGNIZING THAT IT MIGHT OFFEE MORE ACCEPTABLE COSMETICS TO THE GREEK CYPRIOTS WHILE STILL FUNDAMENTALLY MEETING TURKISH NEEDS. THERE WAS ANOTHER SILENCE WHICH ECEVIT FINALLY ENDED BY SAYING, "ALL RIGHT, I WILL CONSIDER IT."

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Department of State

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-4- ANKARA 6412

9. HE THEN SAID, "AND I WILL CONSIDER IT TODAY. IT SHOULD NOT TAKE LONGER THAN ONE DAY TO REACH CONCLUSIONS ABOUT A MATTER OF THIS KIND." THIS, HE MADE CLEAR, WAS A REFERENCE TO HIS CONCERN OVER THE "NOT MORE THAN THREE WEEKS" TIME LIMIT FOR THE WORKING GROUP YOU SUGGESTED.

10. COMMENT: WHILE YOUR MESSAGE AND THE ABOVE CONVERSATION HAVE OPENED THE DOOR HERE A CRACK, I BELIEVE IT IS ONLY A CRACK. I CANNOT RULE OUT OF COURSE THAT ECEVIT, WITHOUT FURTHER PERSUASION FROM US, MIGHT AGREE TO ACCEPT A CANTONAL ARRANGEMENT IN PRINCIPLE. MY CONCERN HOWEVER IS THAT BEFORE THE DAY IS OVER THIS SOFT-SPOKEN BUT IMPLACABLE MAN WILL TELL US THAT HE AND THE TURKISH MILITARY HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE CANTONAL SOLUTION IS A NON-STARTER. THEREFORE, I URGE THAT YOU PICK UP THE PHONE EARLY IN YOUR WORKING DAY (WHICH WILL STILL BE QUITE LATE IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S DAY) IN ORDER TO PURSUE THE ABOVE CONVERSATION AND PRESS IT FURTHER. IF YOU SHOULD FEEL, HOWEVER, THAT A DIRECT CALL FROM YOU WOULD BE PREMATURE, I SUGGEST AS AN ALTERNATIVE THAT YOU SEND ME SOME ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS THAT I CAN ADVANCE TO ECEVIT ON YOUR BEHALF.

MACOMBER

NOTE: NOT PASSED GENEVA BY OC/T.



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FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7701
AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIACT IMMEDIATE 695
AMEMBASSY ATHENS NIACT IMMEDIATE 539
AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 6141
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACT IMMEDIATE 241
USMISSION NATO NIACT IMMEDIATE 2615
USMISSION USUN NY IMMEDIATE 926

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 5161

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PEDR, CY

SUBJ: CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS--TALK WITH TURKISH FOREIGN MINISTER *- over - Dan*

SUMMARY: IN AN HOUR AND A HALF MEETING WITH GUNES THIS MORNING I EXPLORED THOROUGHLY BOTH THE NECESSITY AND THE MEANS OF FINDING A FORMULA FOR ON-GOING TALKS BY CLERIDES AND DENKTASH, WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF GREECE AND TURKEY AND PERHAPS UK IN SOME CAPACITY, AND REPORTING BACK TO THE GUARANTORS WITH A FIXED, SHORT DEADLINE. FOR THE FIRST TIME GUNES ENTERED INTO A DIALOGUE ON WHAT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE ALONG THESE LINES PROVIDED HE IS GIVEN SOME FLEXIBILITY BY TURKISH CABINET WHICH PRESENTLY MEETING IN ANKARA. HE WAS AWARE OF THE EXCHANGE OF TELEPHONE CALLS AND MESSAGES BETWEEN YOU AND ECEVI T.

DURING OUR DISCUSSING GUNES WAS LED TO PUT FORWARD SOME IDEAS ON THE SORT FORMULA WHICH WOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THERE IS TO BE NO RETURN TO THE PREVIOUS PATTERN OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS, THAT THE FUNDA M-

MENTAL SITUATION ON ISLAND HAS CHANGED, AND YET NOT BE SO PRECISE CONCERNING THE TURKISH DESIRE FOR ONE ZONE OR THE GREEK-GREEK CYPRIOT DESIRE FOR OTHER ARRANGEMENTS THAT THE FORMULA WOULD BE REJECTED BY ONE SIDE OR OTHER. HOWEVER, HE ADDED THAT MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE QUESTION OF THE WORDING OF A COMPROMISE FORMULA IS A BASIC UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT SORT OF SOLUTION WE ARE REALLY TALKING ABOUT. I EXPLAINED TO GUNES HOW HELPFUL WE HAD BEEN AND WISH TO CONTINUE TO BE TO TURKEY, AND URGED HIM TO LOOK HARD FOR AN ACCEPTABLE COMPROMISE. END SUMMARY.



1. GUNES ASKED LAST NIGHT TO SEE ME EARLY AUGUST 11. HE OPENED

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THE MEETING BY REFERRING TO THE EXCHANGE OF TELEPHONE CALLS AND MESSAGES BETWEEN ANKARA AND WASHINGTON BUT DID NOT GO INTO ANY DETAIL. HE THEN SAID THAT THE POLITICAL CLIMATE INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE CONFERENCE SEEMS TO BE DETERIORATING, REFERRING TO THE ANNOUNCED UK MOVE NOT TO RECALL ITS F-4'S, TO TURKISH POPULAR REACTION THERETO, TO STATEMENTS IN TALKS HERE BY UK AND GREECE AND CLERIDES INDICATING THAT GREECE AND UK WANT TO WASH THEIR HANDS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE, AND TO THE FAILURE OF GREECE, UNFICYP AND THE GREEK CYPRIOTS TO LIBERATE THE TURKISH ENCLAVES AS SPECIFIED IN PARA 3 OF THE JULY 30 GENEVA DECLARATION. HE SAID THAT EVERYONE SEEMS TO BE PREOCCUPIED WITH THE REMOVAL OF TURKISH TROOPS FROM THE ISLAND RATHER THAN OTHER ISSUES AND THIS IS THE "WORST POSSIBLE APPROACH" TO RESOLVING THE PROBLEM. THE TURKISH TROOPS HAD THE CAPABILITY TO TAKE VERY LARGE PORTIONS OF CYPRUS BUT THE ORDER HAD BEEN GIVEN TO STOP. THIS ORDER WAS NOT GIVEN BECAUSE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RES. BUT BECAUSE OF TURKEY'S DESIRE TO MAINTAIN CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, WHICH HAD ASKED THAT IT TRY AND FIND A DIPLOMATIC SOLUTION, HAVING ESTABLISHED ITS PRESENCE ON THE ISLAND, AND TO KEEP GOOD RELATIONS WITH ITS OTHER ALLIES, ESPECIALLY GREECE. THERE HAD BEEN A LITTLE EXPANSION AFTER THE CEASEFIRE WAS ACCEPTED BUT THIS HAD BEEN DONE EITHER IN ORDER TO PROTECT TURKISH TROOPS IN POSITIONS ALREADY HELD OR ON LOCAL INITIATIVE NOT AUTHORIZED BY ANKARA. THE UK SEEMED TO THINK THAT TURKEY HAD STOPPED BECAUSE IT WAS AFRAID OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT THIS IS NOT SO. NOR WOULD TURKEY BE STOPPED BY THE PRESENCE OF BRITISH F-4'S ON THE ISLAND. TURKEY IS SEEKING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION BECAUSE IT WANTS TO AVOID A DETERIORATION IN RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND ITS OTHER CLOSE ALLIES.

2. GUNES CONTINUED THAT THERE IS AN URGENT NEED TO DECIDE ON A FORMULA FOR A FUNDAMENTAL SOLUTION BUT THAT NOT ONE SEEMED TO BE PAYING ATTENTION. SECRETARY KISSINGER HAD SENT A MESSAGE TO HIS PRIME MINISTER SUGGESTING THAT SOLUTION COULD BE FOUND BUT THAT IT WOULD TAKE A LITTLE TIME. AS ECEVIT HAS TOLD AMBASSADOR MACOMBER, TIME IS LIMITED. IT IS NOT UP TO GUNES TO SAY WHETHER IT SHOULD BE THREE WEEKS OR ONE OR FOUR. THIS IS A GOVERNMENTAL DECISION AND THE TURKISH CABINET IS PRESENTLY MEETING TO DECIDE UPON SUCH BASIC MATTERS. GUNES SAID HE THEREFORE REQUESTED CALLAGHAN TO DEALY THE MEETING OF FOREIGN MINISTER UNTIL 1600 SO HE WOULD HAVE NEW INSTRUCTIONS.

3. I TOLD GUNES THAT I AGREED WITH HIM THAT THERE HAS BEEN TOO MUCH ATTENTION FOCUSED ON THE FACT OF THE TURKISH MILITARY PRESENCE ON CYPRUS AND NOT ENOUGH ON HOW TO DEAL SERIOUSLY WITH THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM AND FIND A SOLUTION FOR THEM. THE DYNAMICS OF THE SITUATION HAVE EVOLVED IN SUCH A WAY AS TO CAUSE THE INITIAL CONCERN TO BE DIRECTED AT THE TURKISH ACTION AND THE CEAS



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FIRE ASPECTS. THIS HAD BEEN DIFFICULT TO WORK OUT AND IN THE
PROCESS NOT ENOUGH ATTENTION HAD BEEN GIVEN TO OTHER MATTERS. 194
3/-,013, I REMINDED GUNES THAT THE USG, PARTLY AS A RESULT OF WHAT
I HAD SEEN ON CYPRUS, HAD TAKEN A STRONG POSITION IN URGING ALL
CONCERNED THAT MORE ATTENTION BE GIVEN TO FREEING THE
TURKISH ENCLAVES AS CALLED FOR IN PARA 3 OF THE GENEVA JULY 30
DECLARATION. THE GREEK GOVT, WHATEVER MR. MAVROS MIGHT HAVE
SAID IN THE TALKS, IS KEENLY AWARE OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES IN THIS
REGARD AND PM KARAMANLIS TOLD ME IN ATHENS THAT HE HAD SENT A
REGULAR GENERAL OFFICER FROM THE GREEK ARMY TO TAKE THE CYPRIOT
NATIONAL GUARD UNDER CONTROL AND DISARM THE IRREGULARS SUCH AS
EDKA-B. ~~KARAMANLIS WAS NOT TRYING TO DUCK HIS RESPONSIBILITIES, NOR
WAS CLERIDES, IN MY JUDGMENT, BUT IT TAKES TIME TO REDRESS
SUCH A DIFFICULT SITUATION AS THAT WHICH EXISTS ON THE GROUND IN
CYPRUS. TURKEY SHOULD BE A BIT MORE AWARE OF THE POLITICAL PROBLEMS
OF CLERIDES AND THE NEW GREEK GOVERNMENT, SINCE BOTH OFFER THE BEST
PROSPECTS FOR GOOD FUTURE RELATIONS WITH TURKEY AND THE SORT OF
EQUITABLE SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM WHICH TURKEY
WANTS. I SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO ME THAT TURKEY SHOULD CONSIDER
SOME SORT OF A FORMULA FOR THE ONGOING TALKS WHICH SOMEHOW
BRIDGE THE GAP BETWEEN THE TURKISH POSITION THAT THERE SHOULD BE 2
AUTONOMOUS ZONES UNDER A SINGLE FEDERAL STATE OR WHATEVER IT WAS
TO BE CALLED AND THE CLERIDES POSITION THAT IF HE SAID THIS HE WOULD
HAVE TO RESIGN AT ONCE. CLERIDES TOLD ME HE THOUGHT HE COULD TALK
ABOUT GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOT AUTHORITIES IN THE GEOGRAPHIC
AREAS THEY CONTROL AND THAT HE AS GIVEN UP THE IDEA OF THE UNITARY
STATE. THESE ARE IMPORTANT POINTS, COMPARED TO PAST GREEK
CYPRIOT POSITIONS, AND THERE SHOULD BE A WAY TO FIND A BRIDGE
BETWEEN THEM, NOT TO SOLVE THE BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE NEXT
FEW DAYS BUT IN ORDER TO GET TALKS GOING ON THE BASIS OF A
FORMULA ACCEPTABLE TO ALL CONCERNED. THERE MIGHT BE A DEADLINE
SET FOR THE RESULTS OF THESE TALKS TO BE REPORTED BACK TO THE THREE
GUARANTORS.~~

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7702

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA NIACT IMMEDIATE 696
AMEMBASSY ATHENS NIACT IMMEDIATE 540
AMEMBASSY LONDON NIACT IMMEDIATE 6142
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA NIACT IMMEDIATE 242
USMISSION NDAT NIACT IMMEDIATE 2616
USMISSION USUN NY IMMEDIATE 927

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 2 OF 2 GENEVA 5161

EXDIS

4. GUNES SAID THAT WHAT I HAD INDICATED AS TO THE NEW POSITION OF CLERIDES WOULD NOT HAVE MUCH IMPACT IN TURKEY WHERE EVERYONE FULLY AWARE OF THE NUANCES OF THE PAST INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS. SINCE THE IDEA OF A UNITARY STATE HAD NOT BEEN ACCEPTED, EVEN BY THE EASTERN BLOC AND CHINA, IT HAD NOT REAL STATUS AND SO ITS ABANDONMENT WOULD NOT BE SEEN AS A TURKISH GAIN. I STRONGLY DISAGREED, IT TOLD HIM, IN LIGHT OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN GREECE AND ON CYPRUS, THAT IS THE REAL WORLD, NOT THE USSR OR OTHER OUTSIDERS, AND THAT IS WHAT TURKEY SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. CLERIDES HAS AN EXTREMELY SERIOUS PROBLEM AT HOME WITH MARARISD AND HE WILL CERTAINLY BE ATTACKED STRONGLY BY THE ARCHBISHOP FOR GIVING UP THE LATTER'S PRINCIPAL OF THE UNITARY STATE.



5. GUNES THEN SAID THAT TURKISH OPINION HAS CHANGED DRASTICALLY AND IT IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE FOR ANY TURKISH GOVT TO GO TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AND SAY THAT WHILE ITS ACTIONS ON CYPRUS HAVE NOT OBTAINED ENOUGH, IT WILL SETTLE FOR WHAT IT CAN GET BECAUSE "EVERYONE ELSE SAID TO ACCEPT AUTONOMY FOR WHAT WE PRESENTLY HOLD, AND WE AGREED."

6. GUNES SAID THAT THE IDEA OF TURKEY ACCEPTING SEVERAL ZONES INSTEAD OF ONLY ONE, IS A MATTER FOR THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE. IF, FOR EXAMPLE, TURKEY SAID DURING ONGOING TALKS THAT IT WOULD ACCEPT CLERIDES CANTONAL IDEA ON CONDITION THAT EACH CANTON

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HAVE ACCESS TO THE SEA BY A PORT WHICH IT CONTROLS, THAT EACH CANTON BE RATHER LARGE AND THAT EACH BE PROTECTED BY A CONTINGENT OF THE TURKISH ARMY, THEN ATHENS AND CLERIDES WOULD REJECT THE CANTONAL IDEA. THEN EVERYONE WOULD BE BACK IN THE SAME POSITION.

7. GUNES SAID HE UNDERSTOOD THE NEED TO RECOGNIZE POLITICAL REALITIES AND NOT HUMILIATE KARAMANLIS OR CLERIDES. BUT HE COULD NOT LEAVE DISCUSSION TO A GROUP OF EXPERTS WITHOUT BEING ABLE TO SAY IT IS NO LONGER A CASE OF INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS BUT SOMETHING ENTIRELY DIFFERENT. HE SAID THAT MAYBE WE CAN LEAVE IN SUSPENSE THE IDEA OF "WHETHER THERE WILL BE ONE, TWO OR THREE TURKISH ZONES" BUT WE NEED TO SPELL OUT THE OTHER PRINCIPLES, PERHAPS IN A SUPPLE FORMULA ALLOWING THE OTHERS TO SAY EVERYTHING HAS NOT BEEN DECIDED BUT PRECISE ENOUGH TO SAY THERE WILL BE TURKISH REGIMES. ~~BUT FI MAVROS AND CLERIDES CONTINUE TO SAY THE GUARANTORS HAVE NO RESPONSIBILITY CONCERNING THE CONSTITUTION, TURKEY WILL END THE GUARANTOR TALKS.~~

8. I TOLD GUNES THAT IT THOUGHT HE WAS ON THE RIGHT TRACK, THAT MORE ATTENTION NEEDED TO BE GIVEN IN THE TALKS TO DEVELOPING A FORMULA WHICH COULD COMMAND AGREEMENT. PERHAPS THE TWO FRIENDLY LAWYERS, CLERIDES AND DENKTASH, COULD AGREE ON ONE IN THEIR TALKS. PERHAPS CALLAGHAN COULD FIND ONE. I WAS CERTAIN THAT ONE COULD BE FOUND WITH ENOUGH GOOD WILL.

9. GUNES SAID THAT NO MATTER WHAT FORMULA WAS ADOPTED IT WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY ESSENTIAL TO AGREE ON WHAT LIES BEHIND IT, ON WHAT WE ARE REALLY TALKING ABOUT WHAT THE ULTIMATE SOLUTION WILL BE. DALE
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PAGE 01 ANKARA 06414 111808Z

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Z 111726Z AUG 74
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5572
INFO USMISSION GENEVA FLASH

~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 6414

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS
FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR
GENEVA FOR HARTMAN.

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CY, TU, GR
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER

1. I MET WITH PRIMIN AT HIS REQUEST AT 6:39 P.M. LOCAL TIME, AUGUST 11, AS FOLLOW UP TO HIS SEPARATE CONVERSATIONS WITH YOU AND WITH ME EARLIER IN THE DAY, I FOUND ATMOSPHERE OF MY EARLIER MEETING REPLACED BY A WARMTH WHICH BORDERED ON EXCITEMENT.

2. PRIMIN TOLD ME THAT IMMEDIATELY AFTER OUR MEETING, HE HAD SUMMONED DEPUTY PRIMIN ERBAKAN BACK FROM BLACK SEA COAST AND HAD MET WITH GENERAL SANCAR AND OTHER SENIOR MILITARY MEN. HE THEN SAID (AND HERE I AM QUOTING FROM HIS TALKING PAPER WHICH HE HANDED TO ME FOR TRANSMISSION TO YOU FOLLOWING YOUR BRIEF CONVERSATION ON THE PHONE):

3. "WE HAVE STUDIED YOUR PROPOSAL FOR A COMPROMISE.

"I CAN SEE THAT IT MAY BOTH MEET OUR REQUIREMENTS TO SOME EXTENT (I SHALL EXPLAIN OUR RESERVE) AND, AT THE SAME TIME, MAY RE-ASSURE THOSE WHO MAY BE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT LOCAL AUTONOMY BASED ON GEOGRAPHICAL FOUNDATIONS MIGHT EVENTUALLY LEAD TO PARTITION.

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3/3/04
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TELEGRAM

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"WHEN I PUT A RESERVE FROM OUR ANGLE, MY REASON IS THIS: IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT FOR US TO PROVIDE FOR THE SECURITY OF THE TURKISH CANTONS DISPERSED IN VARIOUS CANTONS. BUT I REALIZE THAT WE CANNOT HAVE EVERYTHING AS WE WISH IF WE ARE TO SEEK A SOLUTION IN A PEACEFUL WAY. I ALSO REALIZE THAT THIS WILL BE A WAY OF PREVENTING "HUMILIATION" FOR THE GREEKS WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, GIVING US AN OPPORTUNITY TO END THE HUMILIATIONS THAT THE TURKISH COMMUNITY HAS SUFFERED FOR SO MANY YEARS.

"HOWEVER WE HAVE ONE CONDITION THAT WE CANNOT FORGO, IF WE ARE TO ACCEPT YOUR COMPROMISE SOLUTION: WE MUST ACQUIRE IMMEDIATE CONTROL IN THE MAJOR CANTON THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE ESTABLISHED FOR AUTONOMOUS TURKISH-CYPRIOIOT RULE. AND THIS CANTON SHOULD BE THE ONE TO INCLUDE THE AREA THAT IS NOW UNDER OUR CONTROL (KYRENIA-NICOSTIA) AND WILL EXTEND WESTWARD--INCLUDING CHATOS (WHICH IS DENSELY TURKISH INHABITED), BUT LEAVING OUT KARPASIA FOR THE TIME BEING AND INCLUDING THE TURKISH SECTION OF FAMAUSTA. REGARDING THE PORT TOWN OF FAMAUSTA WE COULD BE SATISFIED WITH A NARROW STRIP LEADING THERE FROM NORTH.

"WE LAY CLAIM TO ABOUT ONE THIRD OF THE ISLAND FOR TURKISH-CYPRIOIOT ADMINISTRATION ZONES. YET THE ZONE THAT WE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY DEFINE AND TAKE OVER FOR TURKISH-CYPRIOIOT ADMINISTRATION (WHICH SHOULD, OF COURSE, ENTAIL THE IMMEDIATE EVACUATION OF THE GREEK MILITARY FORCES THERE) WOULD ONLY AMOUNT TO ABOUT 17 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL AREA OF CYPRUS.

"FOR THE OTHER CANTONS THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO SEE UNDER TURKISH-CYPRIOIOT AUTONOMOUS RULE, WE HAVE PROVISIONALLY DEMARCATED CERTAIN ZONES IN THE FOLLOWING REGIONS:

- * LEFKA (NORTH-WEST)
- * POLIS (WEST)
- * PAPHOS (SOUTH-EAST)
- * LARNACA (SOUTH-EAST)
- * KARPASIA (NORTH-EASTERN TIP OF THE ISLAND)

"THESE ARE ALL REGIONS IN WHICH THERE ARE LARGE CONCENTRATIONS OF TURKISH PEOPLE. ALL TOGETHER THEY AMOUNT TO 2977 SQUARE KILOMETERS, AND TO 32.5 PERCENT OF THE WHOLE ISLAND.



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"THE EXACT DEMARCATIONS AND AREAS OF THE CANTONS PROPOSED WOULD BE NEGOTIABLE WITHIN REASONABLE BOUNDS, WE WOULD NOT BE TOO RIGID.

"WE REALIZE, OF COURSE, THAT IT WILL TAKE A LOT OF DETAILED STUDY BY EXPERTS TO MAKE THE EXACT AND FAIR DEMARCATIONS, AND THIS WILL NEED TIME.

"WE CAN ONLY AFFORD ALLOWING SUCH TIME IF WE ARE ASSURED FROM THE BEGINNING THAT THE TURKISH ADMINISTRATION ON CYPRUS IS TO TAKE IMMEDIATE CONTROL OF THE BASIC ZONE COMPRISING OF KYRENIA-NICOSIA-CHATOI AND PART OF FAMAGUSTA. THIS IS ESSENTIAL FOR OUR SENSE OF SECURITY AND FOR FEELING CONFIDENT THAT WE MAY REACH A FAIR SOLUTION FOR THE WHOLE ISLAND IN DUE TIME."

4. THE PRIMIN SEEMED SOMEWHAT LET DOWN FOLLOWING HIS PHONE CONVERSATION WITH YOU. HE SAID "THE SECRETARY SEEMS TO BE BACKING AWAY." IN RESPONSE, I SAID THAT I WAS SURE THAT YOU WERE VERY PLEASED BY THIS DISPLAY OF WILLINGNESS ON PART OF GOC TO CONSIDER ALTERNATIVES. I ASSURED HIM THAT I HAD ABSOLUTELY NO DOUBT ABOUT THAT. I ALSO SAID, HOWEVER, THAT I WAS SURE THAT YOU COULD NOT BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE SPECIFICS OF THE PROPOSAL. I ADDED THAT I THOUGHT YOU AND EVERYONE ELSE WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY WITH THE TURKISH CLAIM TO 32.8 PERCENT OF THE ISLAND. THE PRIMIN SAID THAT THIS LATTER WAS A FAIR CLAIM "BUT A NEGOTIABLE ONE." HE ADDED THAT IT WOULD BE MUCH EASIER FOR HIM TO COME DOWN ON THAT FIGURE IF IT NEVER BECAME PUBLIC.

5. IN THESE LATEST CONVERSATIONS WITH BOTH YOU AND ME, THE PRIMIN HAD A MAP IN FRONT OF HIM ON WHICH HE HAD DRAWN HIS "TENTATIVE" PROPOSALS FOR THE TURKISH CANTONS. IN AN IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM, I WILL SEND A DESCRIPTION OF WHERE THESE LINES RUN.

6. FINALLY, THE PRIMIN ASKED ME TO URGE YOU TO GIVE HIM YOUR REACTION TO THE FOREGOING BY OPENING OF BUSINESS TURKISH TIME TOMORROW. HE SAID HE HOPED HE COULD HEAR FROM YOU EARLIER THAT THAT AND GAVE ME THE NUMBER OF THE PRIVATE PHONE WHICH RINGS BY HIS BED.

7. I HAVE SPOKEN TO WELLS STABLER ON THE PHONE AS A RESULT OF THAT CONVERSATION, HAVE ALREADY TALKED TO ISIK ABOUT THE ABSOLUTE

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NECESSITY OF NOT CALLING WHAT HAS BEEN DISCUSSED TODAY AN "AMERICAN PLAN." ISIK PROMISED ME HE WOULD IMMEDIATELY CALL GUNES IN GENEVA AND ALSO PASS ON AT ONCE TO PRIMIN YOUR CONCERNS ON THIS SCORE.
MACOMBER

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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUHQGU/AMBASSY ANKARA FLASH 7937
INFO RUFHQW/MISSION GENEVA FLASH 4279

CONTROL: 2940Q
RECVD: 11 AUG 74

~~SECRET~~ STATE 175402

MODIS

S. O. 115825 COS
TAGS: PROC. TU. CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS

FOR THE AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY
GENEVA FOR HARTMAN

PLEASE URGENTLY ASK EDEVIT TO INSTRUCT HIS PEOPLE IN
GENEVA NOT TO CHARACTERIZE OUR ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLE AS A
"PROPOSAL". WE HAVE NOT MADE A PROPOSAL; WE HAVE ONLY SUG-
GESTED THAT THERE MAY BE OTHER ARRANGEMENTS WHICH COULD BE
LOOKED AT BY THE PARTIES TO FIND A COMPROMISE WHICH ALL
COULD SUPPORT. WISSINGER
BT
175402

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E/11/74:ELDTD
- MR. WISCO

15- THE SECRETARY (SUBS)

S/S - R.ELTZ

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FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 5573
INFO USMISSION GENEVA FLASH

~~SECRET~~ ANKARA 6415

EXDIS HANDLE AS NODIS

FOR SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

GENEVA FOR HARTMAN

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CY, GR, TU
SUBJECT: CYPRUS: MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER

State Review
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1. FOLLOWING IS DESCRIPTION OF ECEVIT'S TENTATIVELY PROPOSED CANTONS AS TAKEN FROM MAP HE HANDED TO ME IN OUR MEETING ON EVENING AUGUST 11. LINES WERE DRAWN WITH A BLUE GREASE PENCIL, WITHOUT PRECISE CARE, ON A TURKISH MAP WHOSE SCALE WAS 1:250,000. DESCRIPTION OF WHERE LINES RUN IS AS FOLLOWS:

2. MAIN CANTON AREA (CHATOS SERDARLI):
LINE STARTS ON N. COAST AT VASILYA, PROCEEDS SW, THEN CURVES SSE AROUND MIRTI, PROCEEDS SW PARALLEL TO HIGHWAY, ON SW SIDE, AND INTERSECTS NORTH(N) CORNER OF NICOSIA AIRPORT BOUNDARY; PROCEEDS BETWEEN AYDEMET AND INCIRLI (WESTERN EDGE OF NICOSIA) THRU CENTER OF NICOSIA, EASTWARD CROSSING MAJOR HIGHWAY INTERSECTION IN EASTERN SECTION NICOSIA; PROCEEDS EASTWARD, SLIGHTLY NORTHWARD TO JUST N OF MUSULITA; CONTINUES EASTWARD, CURVING SLIGHTLY SOUTHWARD THRU CENTER OF FAMAGUSTA, THRU INTERSECTION OF MAJOR N & SW HIGHWAY, TO SEA. THIS SECTOR THEN PROCEEDS NORTHWARD ALONG COAST TO POINT JUST W OF GASTRIYA; PROCEEDS NORTHERLY AND BENDS SLIGHTLY WESTWARD, JUST WEST OF BUYUKKANUK, TO SEA. SECTOR THEN BOUNDED BY COAST WESTWARD TO STARTING POINT.



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3. LEFKA CANTON:

LINE STARTS ON NW COAST AT PASIAMINO, PROCEEDS ESE CROSSING PEAK OF HILL 2577 CONTINUING TO KATIDATA; CURVES NE JUST W ASAGI KARTBOGA AND ABOUT ONE MILE FURTHER CURVES 90 DEGREES LEFTWARD TO NW FOR TWO MILES, THEN SWINGS N THROUGH GAZIVERE AND ONE-HALF MILE FURTHERWESTWARD TO SEA. THIS SECTOR IS CLOSED BY COASTLINE PROCEEDING WESTWARD TO STARTING POINT.

4. POLIS CANTON:

LINE STARTS ON NORTH SIDE OF ISLAND, WESTERN TIP, DUE N OF YENIKOY AND CURVES SSW AND S TO ABOUT ONE MILE FROM WEST COAST, SWINGING EASTWARD TO PASS ONE-HALF MILE S INYA. LINE PROCEEDS EASTWARD THRU ASAGIKARDALI AND OLUKONU AND SWINGS SE TO LASA. LINE THEN SWINGS NORTH, JUST EAST OF GRIDHARUY AND GORMELI, CONTINUING NORTHWEST, JUST NORTHEAST OF KINUSA TO COAST, ONE MILE NW OF ARGAKA, THENCE WESTWARD ALONG COAST TO STARTING POINT.

5. PAPHOS CANTON:

LINE STARTS ON WEST COAST, TWO MILES NW KASABA, GOING NE ONE AND ONE-HALF MILE N KASABA, SWINGING EASTWARD THEN SLIGHTLY SOUTH THRU NADA; CONTINUES E TO KAVAKLI, TURNING SE THRU CELIKTAS AND THREE MILES BEYOND, TURNING SHARPLY SW TO ONE MILE S AT DUZKAYA, AND TURNS S TO INTERSECT COAST AT 32 DEGREES 45MINUTES. THIS SECTOR CLOSED BY COASTLINE WESTWARD TO STARTING POINT.

6. LARNAKA CANTON:

LINE STARTS AT NORTHERN BOUNDARY OF LARNAKA AND PROCEEDS WESTWARD SWINGING S TWO MILES INLAND TO EASTERN EDGE OF MORMENEKSE; LINE SWINGS LIGHTLY WESTWARD JUST WEST OF CITE AND SWINGS SSE TO COAST. SECTOR CLOSED ALONG COAST TONORTH TO STARTING POINT.

7. KARPAS CANTON:

IN BARGAINING PROCESS TURKS MIGHT SEEK IN LIEU OF LESS TERRITORY ELSEWHERE TO EXTEND "BASIC CANTON" (CHATOS SERDARLI) TO NE TIP

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OF ISLAND WHICH INCLUDES ENTIRE KARPAS PENINSULA.

8. THE MAP USED BY PRIMIN IS IDENTIFIED AS KIBRIS, MSB HARITA GENEL
MUDURLUGU - 1972.
MACOMBER

NOTE BY OC/T: CCD, DELIVER TO OFFLINE FOR PROCESSING.

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O 112137Z AUG 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO: USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 4283
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE 7941
AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 7251
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 6272

~~SECRET~~ STATE 175413

EXDIS
E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CY
SUBJECT: CYPRUS PROBLEM AND USSR

FOR HARTMAN

REF: GENEVA 5138 (NOTAL)

1. INR ASSESSMENT REQUESTED IN GENEVA'S REFTEL FOLLOWS.

2. WE TEND TO TAKE ECEVIT'S EXPLANATION OF THE SOYSOL MIS-
SION TO MOSCOW AT FACE VALUE -- THAT IT IS INTENDED TO
ELICIT SOVIET POLITICAL SUPPORT BY ASSURING MOSCOW THAT
ANKARA DOES NOT INTEND TO PARTITION CYPRUS. ANKARA PROB-
ABLY ALSO HOPES TO FORESTALL SOVIETS FROM RESORTING TO THE
UN FORUM WHERE THE TURKISH POSITION IS RELATIVELY WEAK.
WE WOULD NOT RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE TURKS MIGHT
IN ADDITION SEEK ASSURANCES OF SOVIET UNDERSTANDING SHOULD
THEY FEEL COMPELLED TO RESUME MILITARY OPERATIONS ON CY-
PRUS, ALTHOUGH WE HAVE NO EVIDENCE ON THIS POINT.

3. FURTHERMORE, WE DISCOUNT TWO OTHER POSSIBILITIES:

A. THAT ANKARA IS SEEKING SOVIET MILITARY ASSISTANCE
AS A PRELUDE TO TURKISH MILITARY ACTION ON THE ISLAND.
TRADITIONAL TURKISH FEARS OF THEIR RUSSIAN NEIGHBORS WOULD



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OUTWEIGH THE DESIRABILITY OF MILITARY SUPPLIES FROM MOSCOW OR AN OFFER OF WARSAW PACT MILITARY PRESSURE ON GREECE.

3. THAT ANKARA HAS DECIDED TO INVITE SOVIET PARTICIPATION AT GENEVA TALKS IN EXCHANGE FOR DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT. ANKARA WOULD NOT WELCOME THE PROSPECT OF A PERMANENT SOVIET VOICE IN ANY CYPRUS SOLUTION AND ITS ENFORCEMENT WHICH WOULD INEVITABLY FOLLOW FROM SOVIET PARTICIPATION AT GENEVA.

4. SOVIET SUSPICIONS OF TURKEY'S ULTIMATE INTENTIONS WILL NOT BE LAID TO REST BY SOYSOL'S REASSURANCES. HOWEVER, MOSCOW WILL PROBABLY BE WILLING TO PROFFER THE TURKS A MODICUM OF POLITICAL BACKING, PRIMARILY FOR LACK OF PROMISING ALTERNATIVES. THE IMMEDIATE SOVIET CONCERN WILL BE TO MAINTAIN INFLUENCE IN ANKARA AND SLOW DOWN MOVEMENT TOWARD PARTITION OF CYPRUS, WHICH THE SOVIETS NOW FEAR IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY LIKELY. NOR DO THEY SAVOR PROSPECTS OF A NATO-LINKED GRECO-TURKISH WAR SO CLOSE TO THEIR FRONTIERS. THUS THEY CAN BE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE COUNSELLING SOME DEGREE OF RESTRAINT EVEN WHILE EXTENDING MORAL SUPPORT.

5. BUT THEY WILL SEEK TO LINK THEIR POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR TURKEY WITH PRESSURE FOR A MORE DIRECT SOVIET ROLE IN THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATIONS. IT WOULD ALSO SEEM TO SERVE SOVIET INTERESTS TO PUBLICIZE THE SOYSOL MISSION IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE THAT MOSCOW IS A PARTY TO CYPRUS DEVELOPMENTS. THE USSR WOULD CALCULATE THAT THE TURKISH OVERTURE IS WORRISOME TO THE US AND NATO, AND THAT THE NEW ATHENS GOVERNMENT MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO TRY A SIMILAR GESTURE.

6. WE HAVE NOT HAD EVIDENCE OF ANY GREEK INITIATIVE TOWARD THE SOVIETS TO DATE. ALTHOUGH ATHENS WOULD HOPE TO CAPITALIZE ON MOSCOW'S PREFERENCE FOR AN INDEPENDENT CYPRUS BY STRESSING THAT TURKEY'S POSITION AMOUNTS TO PARTITION IN DISGUISE, KARAMANLIS WILL, FOR THE TIME BEING, RESIST ANY SOVIET ATTEMPT TO USE ATHENS FOR EXPLOITING THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. KISSINGER

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