

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

TALKS WITH GROMYKO

September 18-21, 1975

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS



TALKS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO

September 18-21, 1975

DATE, TIME, & PLACE

SUBJECTS

Tab A Gromyko/President/HAK
Thursday, Sept. 18, 1975
4:30 p.m.
Oval Office

Tour d'horizon

Tab B Gromyko/HAK
Friday, Sept. 19, 1975
4:00-6:04 p.m.
State Dept., Conference Room

SALT

Tab C Gromyko/HAK
Friday, Sept. 19, 1975
8:15-10:40 p.m. (dinner)
State Dept., Monroe-Madison Room

Cyprus; CTB & Ban
on New Systems; Korea;
MBFR; Middle East

Tab D Gromyko/HAK
Sunday, Sept. 21, 1975
9:30-11:30 p.m. (dinner)
Soviet Mission to UN, New York

SALT

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY lha, NARA, DATE 10/21/07




SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: USSR: Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Kornienko, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Sukhodrev

US: The President
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counsellor, State Dept.
Walter Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR

DATE & TIME: September 18, 1975 - 4:30 p.m.

PLACE: Oval Office, White House

SUBJECT: Foreign Minister Gromyko's Call on
The President

The President: How is the General Secretary?

Gromyko: He is in good health and he had a good vacation.

(Photographers came in and the President gave Mr. Gromyko an autographed picture for General Secretary Brezhnev showing the General Secretary and the President in conversation during the meeting in Helsinki.)

I want to give you the best wishes and very warm greetings of Leonid Brezhnev. I saw him the day before I left while he was still on leave. He still had a few days to go but, knowing him, I doubt if he will use them.

I am prepared, in my own name and on behalf of the Soviet leadership, to exchange views with you. Speaking for the leadership and personally for the General Secretary, I can say

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EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

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
BY Wa, NARA, DATE 10/21/03

that the Soviet Union is dedicated to the line worked out in the last few years and particularly as a result of the US-Soviet meetings at the highest level and expressed in the relevant treaties and agreements between our two countries. At the outset, I want to emphasize this. I would be happy to hear your views, Mr. President, on our bilateral problems and on broader questions and then I would be pleased to give you our views. Thus, we will be able to touch on the main issues of interest.

The President: I felt that we had a very good meeting at Vladivostok. This was a good example of how we can work together on concrete problems. I also felt that the meeting in Helsinki was good. Perhaps not as much progress was made as we could have hoped, but still it was a good meeting. We should continue in this way. We have had some disappointments but there have also been good results. Our relations now are far deeper than previously. Hopefully, our relations can be expanded to cover an even wider range of subjects.

I hope we can move ahead on SALT and bring those negotiations to a successful conclusion. If we could do that and also have an agreement on grain, this would be very good. I hear encouraging reports about the grain talks; I hope there can be some relationship between grain and oil as I discussed with the General Secretary in Helsinki.





The progress we have made is in the interest of peace in the world. In general, there is a relationship between all of the various problems.

I look forward to the visit of the General Secretary in 1975. If some of the differences on SALT can be narrowed, I believe it can be a successful visit.

These are my general views and now we could get into some details.

Gromyko: I am pleased to hear your statement, Mr. President, and to know that you and your Administration support the policy which has been worked out over the past 4 or 5 years.

The President: I would add, and Ambassador Dobrynin is very familiar with this, that we do have opponents in the US -- not everyone is enthusiastic about our relationship. I won't name any names in this regard. But I am confident that I will be able to defend our relationship. I want it to continue, but we have to see some benefits from it for both sides. If that is the result, then there is no reason why the vast majority of Americans will not support our policy.

Gromyko: More specifically, the crux of the question is whether we will hold to the path of detente or whether there will be a change from this fundamental policy. We carefully follow developments in the United States and we know what you are talking about. We know that some circles -- perhaps for their own tactical reasons including domestic political



considerations -- do not accept the present policy. But we want to believe, as you said, that the policy of detente and improving our relations will be preserved and developed. We believe this and we will follow this line firmly. If the US does the same, then there will be a reliable basis for our future relations. We favor this policy.

The President: I share this view. We should proceed on this basis.

Gromyko: It is correctly emphasized on both sides that the process of detente should be filled with content. We have done some things together, for example in Europe, and this has been useful. Progress can be made only if the fundamental line of detente is observed. It is not right to say that everything depends on the Kremlin. In equal measure, much also depends on the White House and on the US in general.

I welcome what you have said, Mr. President. I wish to emphasize again that what I have stated is the view of the whole Soviet leadership and personally of the General Secretary.

The President: You may reassure the General Secretary and your leadership that the US does believe in detente. I feel that it has been to our mutual interest and benefit and the US will follow this line.

To carry this forward with you it is important that the General Secretary and I meet. If our views are shared, as you indicate, then this should be in 1975. For our planning purposes, it will be useful to have some idea of your views

about the timing of the visit. Of course, we could be somewhat flexible.

Gromyko: Mr. President, let me make a few observations in connection with our exchange of views on the general need to follow the present course of our relations. We have given attention to two circumstances: I don't know how you will assess this or whether you will feel my remarks are critical or not, but I would not be frank if I did not say them.

Mr. President, we value your statements as the Head of State and also statements by other official representatives -- first of all, by Dr. Kissinger -- in support of detente. These have been very clear. But sometimes arguments are marshalled in support of detente which make it appear that one side -- the US -- is absolutely clean with regard to detente, whereas the position of the other side leaves something to be desired. A shadow is cast on the intentions of the other side. This can only cause harm to our relations.

Secondly, the grain. We expressed our desire to buy a certain amount of grain and the US said it would sell. The situation would seem to be clear -- there is a potential consumer and a potential supplier. However, so much noise has been made about this and so much excitement stirred up that ill wishers get food for attacks against the principle of our relations. Shocks and pinpricks are delivered against this policy.





These are thoughts which could not fail to enter our minds.

The President: At the outset, I would say that you must differentiate between what I and the Secretary say and what our opponents say -- those who have reservations about detente. I say very emphatically that I and the Administration believe in detente. But we have to put up with our critics who don't like detente. I have been forthright in support of detente because I believe in it, and I must talk against those who are against detente, either sincerely or for political reasons of their own. You must put what I say in context. What I say is more important than what the critics say.

I agree about the grain deal -- we are a supplier and you a buyer. I support this and so does the Secretary. The Secretary of Agriculture also is a proponent. It would be better for you to believe us -- myself and the Secretary -- rather than to listen to the wailing words of those who oppose our policy. You should believe us and our words just as we do yours. This is the crux of detente and of our relations.

Gromyko: From your remarks I can see that you clearly understand me. We value highly what you have said.

Now, about the visit of the General Secretary. Up to now, and at the present time, we have been talking in the specific context of a new SALT agreement. There can't be any doubts that the understanding about a visit to the US remains fully in force. For the leadership and for the General Secretary, I want to confirm this at the outset. I trust it would be



correct to proceed on the assumption that a new SALT agreement would be signed at the time of the visit.

The President: This is my assumption. We are making progress and we proceed from the assumption that a new agreement will be finalized.

Gromyko: We too proceed from precisely that assumption. There is a substantive connection here.

So far as the timing is concerned, provided a new agreement will be prepared in December, then the visit could take place in December as you have suggested.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we suggested December 16.

Gromyko: You said November 15 or December 16.

But what if we visualize a situation where it is impossible to prepare and finalize an agreement by then? If such a situation occurs, then it would be in the best interests of both sides to put off the visit for a while. We don't see anything wrong in thinking that if an agreement is not reached, then we could visualize an agreement in the spring. Of course, it would be better earlier than later, but if it were in the spring there would be no difficulty in reaching agreement on a date.

The President: In view of the progress we have made, I think it would be far better to do it in December. I feel that 1976 would not be the best time in this country for the culmination of an agreement. I see no reason, as I look at the differences, why, if the General Secretary comes in December, this could not



result in an agreement.

Anything which goes into 1976, when our national elections will be on, raises questions about the timing and the atmosphere. It seems to me better to move now and make an agreement in December.

Gromyko: There is no question of what I would prefer. It would be better to finalize an agreement in December and then, of course, the visit should be in December. But we are talking about a turn of events where the agreement might not be ready that soon. However, there is no question about our preference.

The President: I don't foreclose 1976. I would just point out that the atmosphere in 1976 would be much more difficult in terms of making an agreement. We can do it in 1975. Of course, the agreement is vitally important and it could be postponed and could go into 1976.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, we assumed that the Foreign Minister, with his usual spirit of conciliation, would fully accept our last proposal!

Gromyko: I will give my views later on that.

We believe that for a serious-minded policy the question of finalizing the agreement at the end of December or in the spring of 1976 shouldn't cause such a problem. After all, we are talking about an adjacent period of time. So far as the visit is concerned, it is obvious that we in the Soviet Union will do everything possible to promote a new agreement. I



assure you that our words and deeds will not be separate on this.

But now if I could say a few words on the substance of the negotiations. I don't know how much detail we will want to get into on this today. I know I will talk with Dr. Kissinger on the details. But I will speak with you concerning matters of principle regarding SALT.

In Moscow, on the part of the leadership and of the General Secretary, serious questions have arisen concerning the present situation and what is taking place today about the whole matter. When we began these negotiations, we proceeded from the need to block channels for developing new weapons in greater volume and quantities and we wanted to slow down the strategic arms race. The Vladivostok agreement was dedicated to this aim. Now, we have come to the conclusion that the government of the United States has introduced -- or is introducing or will introduce; you will know best about this -- certain corrections to the line on which Vladivostok was based.

Why does this question arise? Perhaps because you are trying to open up the development of a new type of strategic weapon. Here I refer to cruise missiles. We believe that to proceed along this path would mean giving a unilateral advantage to the United States as compared to the Soviet Union. This would certainly complicate the situation.

We made a major concession on a matter of principle to you. This was on a question which had been personally mentioned by you and by Dr. Kissinger. This involved considering all three types



of missiles as MIRVed because they have all been tested as MIRVs. This was not easy for us to do but we made a concession. We did it in the expectation that you would take a more objective position on other specific questions at issue in the SALT talks. But your position afterwards indicated that you were not taking any step forward to meet our position. This troubles us. Why should we sign a new agreement when it will permit development of a new weapon? It would burst forth like a torrent.

Maybe your military people want this but it is not the basis for an agreement. Our interests must be taken into account. Any agreement must be based on a reasonable compromise. This was the basis for SALT One and for Vladivostok. I hope the US will elaborate a new, more objective position on cruise missiles. Other questions arise as well. For example, the Backfire bomber. Your experts say it is a heavy bomber, but it is not. You will recall that the General Secretary said that at Helsinki. Your people say that various agencies are claiming it is a heavy bomber, but our people know better about our own bombers.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you want to tell us its characteristics?

Gromyko: On the question of range, you will remember that the General Secretary said it was about one half.

Another question involves a definition of when a light missile becomes a heavy missile. Also, there is the question of modification and replacement of missiles.

Dr. Kissinger: You mean silo modification?

Kornienko: Yes.


Gromyko: I would like to call all of these simple questions, but they are not. That is why we ask ourselves if the US can seriously believe that we can accept all of the suggestions made to us.

This is how I would frankly describe the situation regarding the negotiations at present.

The President: It seems to me, Mr. Foreign Minister, that you have touched on the main areas of our differences. There is the problem of Backfire. There is the issue of ballistic (sic) missiles, their range from a bomber or from a submarine. There is the question of the cruise missile, the question of the definition of a heavy ballistic missile, the question of modification. These are matters where we have an area for negotiation.

The Secretary will be meeting with you tomorrow and on Sunday. Rather than get into specifics here, I would say only that I believe there are places where we can be more forthcoming. We have some thoughts and the Secretary will present them to you for consideration by your leadership and by the General Secretary.

We understand you have made a step forward on the verification question. We believe that our position, as it will be presented to you by the Secretary, can move things forward.





On the Backfire, this should not be irreconcilable.

On the question of range on submarines and bombers, I indicated 2500; whether there should be a ban or whether they should be counted is a matter for negotiation.

On submarines, we started at 1500 and then indicated 1200.

On definition of a heavy ballistic missile, the launch weight and throw weight should be included.

I believe these matters can be resolved. Tomorrow, or more likely on Sunday, you will have our views. I believe they can lead to agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: We have not finally fixed on a position and it would be helpful to get your views on these matters. There is a question of reconciling many different points of view on our side. It is not true that we have not changed our position. We have reduced the range for our cruise missiles to eliminate the possibility of reaching populated areas in the Soviet Union. It would be helpful to have any ideas which you brought from Moscow so that we do not go past each other again in our positions.

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, if we take the proposals you have made, including the latest ones, I would say that they change nothing in comparison with the position which you took previously. Your new position does not alter at all the possibility of achieving agreement. The difference in what you propose is microscopic. But let's consider this tomorrow or the next day. Should we now take up the Middle East?

The President: I would be glad to do so.

Gromyko: I know you are interested in learning about our position and we want to know yours. First of all, I must say that, in Moscow, we are disappointed with the actions of the US in the Middle East.

The President: You should realize, Mr. Foreign Minister, that we were asked by the parties to participate in the negotiations. We of course are willing to work with the Soviet Union and to lay a foundation to move toward bringing the Middle East situation to Geneva. On the assumption that what we did during the last month materializes, then you and we can move together toward Geneva.

Gromyko: I am sure you are familiar with our position on this matter and I do not need to go into it in detail. But I will say again that there will not be peace in the Middle East unless there is a full evacuation of the occupied territories by the Israeli forces. Secondly, there will not be peace until the Palestinian question is resolved. Today, the Palestinian problem looks different from what it did five or ten years ago -- it has become much more acute. It can only be resolved on the basis of permitting the Palestinians to establish their own national homeland.

Also, there can be no peace without guarantees of the existence of all states in the area, naturally including Israel.





I would call your attention to the fact, Mr. President, that there is agreement between the Soviet Union and the US that all questions concerning the Middle East would be reviewed and considered together by our two countries. But in fact the US simply decided to ignore the Soviet Union and its role in that area. But I believe you will agree that this cannot be done.

The Soviet Union does exist and it does have a policy in the Middle East.

We ask ourselves why the United States has done this. Perhaps it is to try to denigrate the policy and influence of the Soviet Union and to inflate the role and influence of the US in the eyes of public opinion. But I really don't want to develop this any further.

Of course, we believe that such actions cause damage to the line of policy which we discussed earlier today and which has been agreed by our two countries. It undermines trust and understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States.

We, of course, expressed our disappointment with these actions. They cannot be considered as positive simply because they were done with the consent of certain other parties. We do not believe that the comments of certain Arab leaders -- who do not consider the interests of other Arabs -- can be useful. All of this cannot justify the actions of the US in the Middle East.

Mr. President, you mentioned the Geneva Conference and said that this was an area where the two sides could act jointly.

But where are the grounds for joint action? Even if we tried, we couldn't convene it. How can it be expected that the Soviet Union could agree to convene a conference which would be a failure because of actions which have been taken? A failure of the conference would not be useful to anyone -- to the Arabs, to Israel, or to the US. I consider that the prospects for a Geneva Conference are gloomy.

These are my views about the situation in the Middle East. This is an area which suffers tremors from time to time. This cannot but affect relations between us. Of course, some Arab leader can say that the Soviet Union is bad and the US is good.


Dr. Kissinger: That changes every 10 years!

Gromyko: Time alone will tell how long this situation will obtain. This is a momentary thing. But the role of the Soviet Union and its policy is a permanent thing, as distinct from the position of an Arab leader. I will name no names.

Dr. Kissinger: You shouldn't speak ill of your Syrian friends.

Gromyko: We want nothing in the Middle East but to see peace. If your military people say that we seek bases there, this is not true -- it is nonsense. Everything will depend on the US and the policies pursued by the US. We favor serious, joint actions. We are against policies based on considerations of the moment and steps divorced from the idea of achieving a permanent settlement.





The President: I know the policy of the Soviet Union in the Middle East is based on seeking peace there. We share the same long-range overall objectives. They can be defined in many ways. At the UN, we agreed on resolutions 242 and 348. We believe a settlement based on them would be fair and equitable.

Under no circumstances -- and I want to make this clear -- was our effort with Egypt and Israel aimed at downgrading the role of the Soviet Union. It was aimed, with the best intentions, at a settlement which we want to participate in with the Soviet Union.

I am not as pessimistic as you regarding what could be accomplished at Geneva. I understand the need to take into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinians. I know there are many issues which must be resolved. I won't go into details, but the Soviet Union and the United States can help move the parties toward a settlement.

We should review how we can work together. The Secretary will do this in detail with you and he will report to me on how we can proceed together toward common objectives.

Gromyko: Of course I am prepared to exchange views with the Secretary.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe the presentation of the Foreign Minister was very moderate and constructive.

The President: I reiterate, Mr. Foreign Minister, that

there was no intention on our part to cut down the Soviet interests in the Middle East. I look forward to sharing the effort with you.


Gromyko: I trust our clarifications have helped you to gain a more complete picture of our intentions in the Middle East and our assessment.

There has been much discussion of the agreement between Israel and Egypt and many have said that the Soviet Union will lead a drive against this. We do not conduct any special campaign against this agreement. But we make our own conclusion about it. We will go on doing this -- this is our duty.

Now, about future cooperation in the light of what's been done recently. On the Geneva Conference, I note that you say that you are more optimistic than we. Well, we will have to see. There are many factors to be considered.

Mr. President, with your permission, I would like to consider briefly several other questions.

First, under the general heading of European affairs, I wish to express the satisfaction of our leadership and of Leonid Brezhnev personally that a significant step was taken in Europe with the holding of the European Security Conference. The General Secretary said this to you directly, but I too want to express my appreciation for the cooperation between the US and the Soviet Union in preparing for the conference and bringing it to a successful conclusion.



Now, about the Vienna talks on force reductions. No substantive progress has been made as yet. I don't want to go into the details and maybe Dr. Kissinger will talk about this. However, no cracks have yet appeared in the sky because of the lack of progress. We will do our part, but one side cannot guarantee success. We hope that both sides will make efforts to achieve success.

The President: I appreciate your kind words about our position concerning the Security Conference. I fully supported the agreement and defended it in the US. I feel the spirit in which we entered it -- if fulfilled -- can bring fruits in the coming years.

I am glad you mentioned the Vienna talks. There has not been enough progress there. You feel, and we do also, that we can bring this to a point where there can be an agreement on a reduction. I hope the negotiators in Vienna on both sides will take actions toward this end. I assure you the US will do so.

Gromyko: I appreciate your words, Mr. President.

In Moscow we ask ourselves where things are moving in regard to the arms race. We are conducting negotiations about a SALT agreement which will last until 1985. But other nations are arming themselves. The arms race is continuing in various degrees.



We have made a number of proposals to curb the arms race, but these have not met with a positive response from the US. It is true we have done a few things -- the NPT and prohibiting bacteriological weapons. But these are all too few and the arms race proceeds without restrictions. Where will the world find itself?

We have suggested the convening of a World Disarmament Conference with the participation of all states in the world -- France, China, the UK and others. Perhaps this won't achieve immediate agreement, but at least the problem would be discussed. But we are told that this is not a good idea and the US raises up in arms against it.

We are discussing a SALT agreement bilaterally but other countries are continuing their arms programs. How long can this go on? This is not just a philosophical question divorced from life, but it is a question of practical politics which is related to the situation several years in the future.

The President: Mr. Foreign Minister, the world would be safer if the arms race could be discontinued on a world-wide basis. Perhaps the best way to lead in this direction would be for us to conclude a SALT agreement and MBFR. This would show the good faith of both of us and would show the way toward ending the arms race. It would be an example and would lend credibility to what we want to see in the world as a whole.



Gromyko: I understand your words. It is not easy to give a full answer to this question, but I wanted to call your attention to it. These are matters which exist in real life and this influences life everywhere.

Now, if I could ask you one last question. You made a casual remark earlier that you valued the talks in Moscow by Mr. Robinson about grain. Could you give me your views on this?

The President: As I understand it, the Soviet side and Mr. Robinson have been negotiating on a grain deal which would be made on a five-year basis. Five million tons could be sold annually with an option to purchase three million more tons. Alternatively, six million tons could be specified as a firm figure. In addition, further sales could be made this year. There is some question if the five-year period should begin this year or next.

Mr. Robinson has my full authority to go back go Moscow in a week or so and achieve agreement. I did not mean to pass over this question casually. As we see it, it would be better to have stability in purchases rather than the peaks and valleys of the past. This would be in the spirit of our talk in Helsinki. It should also contain the concept of the sale of oil.

If we can do a grain deal, the oil deal might take a bit longer. But both would be in our mutual interest.



Gromyko: It is clear we are talking about the purchase of grain this year on a one-time basis and a separate agreement on a long term basis.

Dr. Kissinger: This is correct. It is a US bureaucratic problem as to when the five-year period should start. It is clear it should start next year. If you want, you can purchase additional grain this year. As I see the situation, most of the remaining issues are technical.


We will work out an agreement and present it to you. Mr. Robinson will go to Moscow on Wednesday or Thursday.

On the oil question, it would be helpful if 10 million tons could be sold in connection with the grain purchases. Then we can discuss in a more leisurely way with you the idea of an exchange of technology on oil. Robinson can discuss this with you.

You will have the proposed agreement no later than the first two days of next week.

The President: There should be no serious problems about this. I have given instructions that there should be no nit-picking. The agreement would show that detente benefits both sides.

Gromyko: Well, I don't want to go into the details since the talks are continuing. I have had information on them since I have been in the US.



Mr. President, I want to thank you for your reception, your courtesy and the time you have given me. We have expressed our thoughts frankly -- perhaps too frankly -- but this has always been helpful in the past in discussing problems.

The President: I want to reassure you that frankness is very helpful in solving problems. I believe in frankness and candor. I thank you for coming and for helping to lay the groundwork for progress in SALT and in other areas.

I should mention that in my speech in Oklahoma I will say that "encouraging progress" has been made.

Gromyko: I have no objection.

The President: Please give my very best regards to the General Secretary.

* * * *

The meeting terminated at 7:05 p.m.



OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY

THE WHITE HOUSE

REMARKS OF ANDREI GROMYKO
FOREIGN MINISTER OF THE
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
AND
QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION

THE NORTH LAWN

7:03 P.M. EDT

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO: Our discussion with the U.S. President Ford has just ended. During this discussion, we touched upon several problems relating, first and foremost, to the U.S. policies toward the Soviet Union and Soviet policies toward the United States.

We also touched upon some international problems, notably the question of the Middle East, some problems relating to Europe, some questions relating to the arms race and, of course, the question of the talks now in progress between the United States and the Soviet Union on the possibility of concluding a new SALT agreement deserves special emphasis.


That question is one of bilateral -- is bilateral by its character, but at the same time, it does have international significance. Both sides re-emphasized their desire and determination to continue the line of policy that was worked out and took concrete form in the recent years and first and foremost as a result of the Soviet-American summit meetings.

One can't mention all that was discussed in all details, but I think I have mentioned the most important things that we discussed, basically relating to Soviet-American relations.

As regards problems of international questions and the question which I place special emphasis on -- that is the question of a new SALT agreement -- as I said, that is a bilateral issue which has very important international significance.

I feel that there has been a thorough exchange of views. I cannot say it was very easy or simple, but then neither are the questions easy or simple.

MORE



On both sides, the desire -- and I would say the determination -- was expressed to find points of contact on some matters and on some -- and you probably know this yourselves -- there are still some differences as regards the question of preparing a new agreement, a new agreement to limit strategic arms.

Both sides reaffirmed their readiness to continue the negotiations to achieve further success in preparing the agreement. That is all that I am prepared to tell you, and I do believe that you would be acting very correctly if you didn't ask me too many questions.

Q Will there be a summit meeting in Washington with Secretary Brezhnev this year?

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO: The agreement in principle on this matter has been achieved, and it is fully valid today, and this was reaffirmed once again during the meeting.

I would not now like to go into the question of specific dates or timing. I am sure that journalists with such great experience as all of you have will understand me correctly.

Thank you very much.

Q Can you say whether it will be this year, the summit meeting in Washington?

FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO: I just told you I would not like to go into the specific dates and timing, and may I repeat that I trust you will understand me correctly.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END (AT 7:08 P.M. EDT)



B



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo
of the Central Committee, CPSU, and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the
United States
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium
and Chief of USA Division, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs
Vasiliy G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the
Minister
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counselor, Second
European Department, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (interpreter)
Yuliy M. Vorontsov, Minister-Counselor,
Soviet Embassy
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Counselor, Soviet
Embassy
Yuriy E. Fokin, Special Assistant to the Minister

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., American Ambassador
to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the
Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of
Intelligence and Research
Jan M. Lodal, National Security Council Staff
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff

TIME AND DATE:

Friday, September 19, 1975 4:00-6:04 p. m.

PLACE:

Secretary's Conference Room, Department of State

SUBJECT:

SALT

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS



SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/70, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY lka . NARA, DATE 10/24/73

State Review 9/15/83

[From 4:00 to 4:30, Secretary Kissinger, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin conferred alone in Secretary Kissinger's office, then the meeting began in the Conference Room. Photographers were admitted briefly and then dismissed.]

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I don't have to welcome you here. You are always welcome. I thought your meeting yesterday with the President was very fruitful. And I want to reaffirm what the President said, in a larger circle: Our policy of detente is a fixed policy. Our aim, as the General Secretary said, is to make it irreversible. We want to find ways of working together in practical ways and to continue the practice of meetings and consultations, particularly at the highest level. Occasionally there are disappointments and irritations, but we both share a responsibility to ease international tensions. And if we look over the long-term future, we can see fewer issues where our interests will conflict and more issues where our interests will be coming increasingly together.

So it is in this spirit I welcome you here and look forward to our meeting here and on Sunday.

Gromyko: Thank you for those words of welcome, Mr. Secretary. I certainly share your opinion that yesterday's meeting was a useful one. We touched upon several important matters and I set out the policy of the Soviet Union on several questions. The main thing was that on both sides it was reaffirmed that our two countries will continue the line that has been developing over the past two years, mainly as a result of the Soviet-American summit meetings. In this spirit we will take part in our meetings today and on Sunday.

Kissinger: I proposed that we would start with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and reserve for this evening discussion of the Middle East.



Gromyko: I think that would be the right thing to do. The question then is how specifically should we organize our discussion on SALT. I proceed from the view that our position was set out in detail and is known to you, just as your position was set out in detail and is known to us. I suggest we set forth those items that are not agreed.

Kissinger: That would be useful. Let us do an inventory of the issues and why we disagree. Then on Sunday we will have another opportunity to discuss.

Gromyko: That would probably be the best way.


If we agreed on that, who starts? Do you want to, or let me speak?

Kissinger: Perhaps you would like to make a few remarks.

Gromyko: All right. You will remember the reply we gave to the repeated statements made by the American side that the question of verification [kontrol'] is very important for the United States and that it is a question that seriously impedes an agreement, and the fact that there was no understanding on verification was a serious impediment to an agreement. At that time you formulated your position, and the American side--the President-- stated that you were proceeding from the assumption that if a missile of a certain type was tested with MIRVs, all missiles of that type would be treated as MIRVed. That meant all three types of ours you are familiar with would be counted as MIRVed, that is, counted in the 1320 as agreed in Vladivostok.

No, we thoroughly discussed that problem--it was not an easy one. But we took a decision to meet the United States half way and we gave a positive response, as you recall. At that time we thought this was a major concession of principle--and I repeat, there are concessions and concessions and this is a major concession of principle--but the U.S. took no steps that are comparable to the concession we made. And this was surprising. The figures you later gave us regarding missiles on heavy bombers and surface ships showed no change of any significance, and there is no possibility to underestimate the seriousness of the present situation.

Kissinger: What do you mean by "underestimate the seriousness of the present situation"?



Gromyko: How do we assess your position? We assess it this way: We believe that after Vladivostok you reoriented yourselves and decided to open up a new channel of the arms race. You felt that in some respect you had traveled a greater distance than we had and you decided to exploit that in your unilateral interests. If that is so, it would be hard to count on an agreement being reached on that basis.

The problem of cruise missiles in that respect has become a very serious brake on the path of reaching an agreement. We formulated our specific proposals on this matter and those are the ones we abide by to this day. And we believe there is a possibility to find a mutually acceptable solution, provided you leave aside your aim of achieving a unilateral advantage. But to achieve it, you must withdraw from your one-sided position. As for cruise missiles on heavy bombers, our position is that all cruise missiles of over 600-kilometer range should be counted in the number of vehicles, and there is no possibility of even considering 2500. Or any intermediate figure between 600 and 2500 could not be accepted. Regarding sea-based cruise missiles, we also believe a solution can be found on the basis that all of a range of over 600 kilometers be banned.

Kissinger: Banned or counted?

Gromyko: Banned.

Let me remind you of another matter. You recall at Helsinki, at the discussion there, on five points on which our positions coincided or were almost coincidental we decided we would instruct our delegations at Geneva to formulate the final words on those points. Unfortunately, your delegation did not receive instructions on all those five points. To my knowledge. Perhaps there was not enough time, I don't know.

Kissinger: What are the points?

Gromyko: Let me list the five points.

Point 1: intercontinental range cruise missiles we agreed would be banned. There is no problem here. Your delegation did receive instructions and they are working on this now, on the form of words.

Point 2: ballistic missiles of ranges exceeding 600 kilometers on vessels--except submarines, because as you know that's a different matter. There too, it was agreed they would be banned and the delegations would be instructed. There is no problem here; the delegations are at work.



Point 3: cruise missiles with ranges in excess of 600 kilometers on any flying machines except heavy bombers. We agreed here too they would be banned. Except heavy bombers, because they are a different matter altogether. Here, on this point, your delegation has said it has no instruction to engage in any discussion. We are rather surprised by this. Perhaps it is just a matter of time, or you changed your position on it.

Then there was Point 4, that related to both ballistic and cruise missiles. We agreed it would be forbidden to deploy them on the seabed and ocean floor, including internal and territorial waters. We agreed at Helsinki, but your delegation says it has no instructions on this point regarding cruise missiles.

Kissinger: Do we want to put cruise missiles on the ocean floor? Crawling cruise missiles? We didn't understand cruise missiles could be put on the ocean floor.

Gromyko: Not to put.

Kissinger: That is a misunderstanding. There is no problem on that.

Gromyko: Your delegation doesn't work on it. It says it has no instructions.

Then there is the last point, point 5, which concerns the nonplacement in orbit of nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction. On this we thought alike at Helsinki, and we are pleased to see that your delegation has instructions on this and is working on it.

So work continues on three, and on two there is no movement.

Kissinger: The two points are cruise missiles on aircraft other than heavy bombers and cruise missiles on the ocean floor.

Gromyko: Right. That is all I wanted to say regarding cruise missiles.

Now, about the heavy bomber. We want to say quite frankly you must be guided by some sort of consideration of diplomatic bargaining because we cannot believe you really regard that plane--the Backfire--as a heavy bomber. So if someone from some agency is whispering in your ear that it is, you should--in a loud voice--make clear that it isn't. We wish we did have a plane with the characteristics you ascribe to the



Backfire! So when you give us a bonus of 100 extra aircraft, that is of no consequence because the question is one of principle. So that is the case for the Backfire bomber.

Now, on the question of modernization of missiles and our agreement that we would leave in the new agreement the clause of the Interim Agreement, that is, that in modernizing missiles the two sides would be allowed to increase the size of the silos by 10-15%. In effect, we accepted your idea, which did not in fact run counter to our own wishes, to provide a limit in terms of volume to the possible increase in the dimensions of a silo, that in the final analysis the volume of the silo should not be increased more than 32%.

As we see it, you want to introduce, guided I guess by certain one-sided considerations that maybe your military people have prompted you, a limit on vertical changes in the dimensions of a silo by not more than 15%. Regarding horizontal, there is no problem of a limit of 10-15%. We believe such a view is not justified and will serve only a one-sided interest. It is quite right that both sides would undertake not to increase the total volume by more than 32% but it would be up to the side concerned to decide how that figure of 32% would be reached--either by only a vertical change or only horizontal or a combination of both--being limited by 32%.

Kissinger: If you go 32% only vertical you will reach China and we're trying to prevent that.

Gromyko. We are not saying that there can be no increase in the horizontal by 10-15% or that the vertical would be unlimited. That is not what we are asking. The joint position should be fair and equal, that is, that both sides should be free to do it either vertical or horizontal or in combination but without exceeding 32%. That we feel is a fair and neutral position. And we hope you will take a more objective position in this matter.

Now on the question of conversion of non-heavy to heavy missiles and on the conditions which would prevent such conversions.

The starting points for this already have been discussed and there is no need to repeat ourselves. You know the basic unit is taken to be our SS-19 missile. Our view is, and we have already set it out to you: here the basic figure establishing a certain limit should be launching weight, starting weight, not throwweight. That we feel is the simplest.



But simplicity isn't everything in this matter; it is the simplest and most reliable way of guaranteeing this limit. If that method is applied, fewer parameters will have to be verified, and that itself yields a certain advantage.

You know that insofar as throwweight is concerned, that figure can change depending on the range or distance the missile is expected to fly. You can throw a bigger weight smaller distances or a smaller weight bigger distances. So that would complicate matters and make it harder to get accuracy.

Kissinger: Maybe we can let you throw any weight you want a short distance.

Gromyko: Also, the earth unfortunately has the drawback that it revolves. Very long ago it took it into its head to revolve, so you can throw a missile in the direction of the rotation or against. And that too does effect the measurement if you are measuring by throwweight. So regardless of how you treat the whole matter, one cannot fail to agree that this would be a less reliable means of control than the starting weight.

There are certain other matters on which there was some exchange of views, maybe insufficiently complete. On some you have not finalized your position. But I would like to close on that. But the main thing is that in giving you our reply on the question of verification, we stated-- and you will recall this--that our position and our readiness were being extended in the context of agreement being reached on certain other questions, foremost being cruise missiles.

I would like to make one other point: I am sure this applies to you and it certainly does to us, but we want to reach an agreement that is most effective, that holds back and slows down the arms race in this important field and makes the peoples of both our countries and the entire world feel this. We want it to exert a positive influence on the state of affairs in the world. But if in stopping one channel of the arms race you open up another one--cruise missiles--then all the positive elements that would have been reached in other areas will be reduced to zero. And in fact, we will be worse off materially and even strategically, because we don't know, we might be worse off.

But I emphasize that our interest in reaching an accord has not diminished. I said that to the President and I repeat it now emphatically. We are ready to do it now and to work as long as necessary to do it. But we want an accord to be as effective as possible, and we want it--as both agreed--to serve the purpose of holding back the arms race.



Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, this was a very clear exposition and very helpful to our analysis of the problem. Let me make a few observations and go into detail on some. I will say a few things to let you know our thinking, for your colleagues in Moscow.

On the instructions to our delegation. On the issue of cruise missiles on the ocean floor, this is not a problem. We had never considered the possibility of putting cruise missiles on the ocean floor so we had no formal government position on the issue. It is not something that will hold up an agreement. It is just a conceptual problem here.

On cruise missiles on aircraft other than heavy bombers, this is related to the question of how we settle cruise missiles on heavy bombers. So this is easily soluble. And I will come back to this Sunday. If we solve the cruise missile issue in general, we will easily solve this. This will be a 15-minute discussion. But it is difficult to issue instructions on one without solving it all.

So on the issues that were agreed in Helsinki, we can consider them substantially solved.

Now, on the relatively less crucial issues. Silo dimensions. Our difficulty is that under the present agreement, it can't be modified more than 10-15% in any one direction. There is no dispute. The question was whether you can do it 10-15% in both directions. If you can, it means something like a 52% increase in volume. And this seems to us excessive.

Gromyko: This is not the case.


Kissinger: In the existing agreement, that was agreed to in Geneva, the rule was that it can't be more than 15% in one direction.

Korniyenko: It doesn't say anything about directions.

Kissinger: You are quite right. There are three possible interpretations: You can either increase it 15% in volume, which is absurd; 15% in one direction; or 15% in both. But under no possibility can it mean 32% in one direction. Under your interpretation, you could reach a 52% increase in volume by a 15% increase in both directions.

Gromyko: Yes. 52%.

Kissinger: I had the unworthy thought that when you offered 32%, making it much deeper, you weren't doing something to hurt yourself. What you



are now proposing is a volume change of 32% and you would prefer to feel free to take it in any one direction. If you take it only horizontally, you could do it 15% horizontally. But if you go deeper, you could theoretically take it 32%. Theoretically you could go deeper than 15% and increase the volume to 32%.

Gromyko: Either, or in combination.

Kissinger: Yes. You could do any number of things to get 32%. And that is something we have great difficulty with. Because we believe, quite candidly, it would give you . . . it is less favorable for limiting the size of missiles than the Interim Agreement.

Gromyko: So you would agree to the continuation of the present situation, the volume can be increased by 52%?

Kissinger: No. We can agree to a volume limit of 32% as long as you don't take more than 15% in one direction.

Gromyko: Your idea is an advantage to yourself.

Kissinger: We don't want any increase.

Gromyko: It is for your advantage.

Kissinger: Anatol, the Foreign Minister sprung a double negative in the car that took me 15 minutes to figure out.

We cannot accept 52%. We in Moscow in '72 didn't want any change. We frankly thought it would be 15% in any one direction. We never defined it, but it was our thought. If we change it, we are adding quite a new dimension. We are prepared to continue the Interim Agreement limit but add to it a 32% volume limitation. That we are prepared to do. But we can't accept that the whole volume can be taken in one direction.

Regarding throwweight, we are of course talking about missiles of inter-continental range. The SS-17 has a considerable increase in its throwweight by increased propulsion. So if you increase the SS-19 by propulsion you will get a considerable increase in throwweight; it would approach the throwweight of the SS-9.



[Kissinger and Lodal confer.]

Mr. Lodal feels you are not cleared for figures on Soviet throwweight. Be that as it may, that is our estimate. So any further increase in throwweight in the SS-19 will make it practically identical to the SS-9, which by common agreement was heavy in '72. And it hasn't become light in the interim.

We are prepared to combine the launching weight and throwweight, so we don't insist on one. But we would have obliterated the distinction between light and heavy if we permit any increase in the throwweight of the SS-19.

These are two matters which aren't as much issues of principle as the other you raised.

As for discussion of what each side has done since Vladivostok....

Gromyko: You deliberately omitted Backfire.

Kissinger: No, I'm coming to it. I am doing it in a different order, Mr. Foreign Minister, to throw you off stride. [laughter] I am taking the easy ones first, then the issues of principle. Actually I was coming to Backfire next.

On the Backfire there is a difference in the assessment of the two sides, but we will take seriously what you have said, that it is not a heavy bomber. We had another intelligence assessment made, and had another study. We agree with you that it is obviously not intended for an intercontinental role, but it has the capability of an intercontinental role. We will take your view seriously, and we will return to it.


Let me turn to cruise missiles. Did I deliberately leave something else out?

Gromyko: There are other minor issues. Like when the figure of 2400 will be reached. I didn't mention that.

Kissinger: That one will be settled.

Gromyko: Other countries being used to outflank the agreement....

Kissinger: But you didn't raise it. I believe they will be settled, not without difficulty, but they will be settled.



Now, Vladivostok, and its aftermath. You correctly stated that you made an important concession of principle in accepting our verification proposal. But I cannot accept that the U.S. has made no effort to solve problems.

First, at Vladivostok there was no discussion of sea-based cruise missiles. So in theory they were free. In fact, there was no serious discussion of cruise missiles in general, so in this sense there was ambiguity. And there was no discussion of cruise missiles on planes other than heavy bombers. So to put severe limits on both is a significant concession by the U.S. We deliberately put a limit which would put the Soviet Union out of range of any sea-based cruise missiles. So in effect we have said the Soviet Union will be out of range of sea-based strategic cruise missiles. We have said 1000; you have said 600. This is the range. This is not a great difference. But to put a limit on it not only goes beyond Vladivostok but is a significant concession. We have said we will not deploy strategic cruise missiles.

On cruise missiles on aircraft, we have accepted a range limit.

Thirdly, the reason we are reluctant to accept your position on cruise missiles is that bombers have been counted as a unit. Bombers can carry 10 bombs, or a substantial number of bombs. So all bombers can carry more than one weapon. This is inherent in bombers. So whether we deliver it by a missile or drop it, the strategic significance is not very different.

The reason we do it obviously is because of your very heavy air defenses. But we have agreed on no ABM defense. We can agree on no air defense. We can change our position on air-launched cruise missiles. I am giving you our position. I am not making a specific proposal.

So we have accepted a range limit on air-launched missiles, on sea-based missiles, and a ban on ballistic missiles on surface ships. And I would like to point out that we have progressively reduced the ranges, and we have made a major effort to meet some of your concerns.

We will study what you have said and we will see whether we can take more of your concerns into account and will make a serious proposal Sunday night.

But I wanted to explain our reasoning for you and your colleagues. We have accepted severe range limits on air-launched and sea-based missiles,



and we will come to agreement on missiles on heavy bombers. We are concerned about your air defense; we are not trying to open up a new area for strategic competition.

On entry into force, we will find a compromise solution.

There are a lot of other issues I don't want to raise. So I will look at the Backfire and the others and I will give you some ideas, perhaps with concrete numbers, when I see you Sunday.

Gromyko: Good. Good.

Kissinger: The press will be downstairs.

Gromyko: How many times should I speak to the press in the United States? Maybe I will do it at the end of the evening. So now I can go to the roof and parachute down. [laughter]

Kissinger: We can take you out through the basement. But it will... I can say something.

Gromyko: If you met with them alone, they might think Gromyko was angry.

Kissinger: I would prefer you say something. Say we continued a detailed review of SALT positions.

Gromyko: Let's perhaps be very brief. List the headings we discussed. There was only one question. If we are to mention it, I will probably say we discussed the problem. Naturally, both sides considered that the Vladivostok understanding is a very good basis for an agreement. Each meeting, including a meeting of the Ministers, is useful and is a step forward in the direction of working out an agreement.

Kissinger: That is absolutely enough, and would be very good.

Gromyko: Then I would close my eyes. Or maybe one eye.

Kissinger: I will move my lips while you are speaking. [laughter]

I will say the same thing. There was a detailed review; it was a useful discussion.

Gromyko: If there is a question regarding the visit, I will make reference to yesterday's statement and say I have nothing to add.



Kissinger: All right.

Gromyko: That there is no concrete basis for a precise date.

Kissinger: I will say the same thing and add two points--that we had a detailed discussion and I agree it was a useful meeting.

[The meeting concluded at 6:04 p.m. The Secretary accompanied the Foreign Minister downstairs. Their brief remarks to the press are attached.]



GERALD R. FORD

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
 Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.
 Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium and Chief, USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Vasiliy G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Minister
 Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
 Yuliy M. Vorontsov, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy
 Yuriy E. Fokin, Special Assistant to the Minister

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
 Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., American Ambassador to the USSR
 Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
 Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
 William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
 Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff

DATE AND TIME:

Friday, September 19, 1975
 8:15 - 10:40 p.m. (dinner)

PLACE:

Monroe-Madison Room
 Department of State

SUBJECTS:

Cyprus; CTB and Ban on New Systems; Korea; MBFR; Middle East

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.5
 NSC MEMO, 11/24/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Div. on 9/15/03
 BY 14, NARA, DATE 10/14/03



CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 F 1.3
 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp'l. Dec

Sisco: Did you hear the story of Malik and Moynihan? Moynihan said to him after the Special Session speech: "You see, we've learned to give Presidium-length speeches." Malik said, "Yes, but have you learned to get Presidium-length applause?" [Laughter] I think it was Moynihan.

The Foreign Minister has given more General Assembly speeches than anyone.

Kissinger: Every single one?

Gromyko: [thinks] I think so. But not every Special Session. Not this last one.

Sonnenfeldt: When you were in the Oval Office, you had been there before anyone else.

Kissinger: By far.

Gromyko: When Roosevelt was there I first was there. When I presented my credentials. What did we talk about? About the forthcoming Yalta Conference.

I had my papers and a set speech. And he had a speech. He said: "They'll be published an hour from now, so let's forget it." So neither of us delivered any speech. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Was he in good health?

Gromyko: Not in very good health.

Kissinger: Particularly after Yalta, he was in poor health.

Gromyko: At Yalta he spent one day in bed. Stalin, Molotov and I visited him in his room.

* * * *

Gromyko: You still doubt the existence of Leningrad?

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Gromyko: Then in what city did our Revolution begin?

Kissinger: St. Petersburg. [Laughter]



Gromyko: Recognized! Recognized!

Kissinger: It would have been interesting if Lenin, for some reason, hadn't made it. Because in the top leadership, there were very few who wanted to make a Revolution. It was his will power, really.

Gromyko: It raises an interesting question about the role of personality.

Kissinger : Yes.

Gromyko: But the trend of the times was towards that. Timing maybe. Most were in favor of Lenin's view.

Kissinger: Because of his personality. He drove them to it.

Sonnenfeldt: In the State Department we deny the role of personality.
[Laughter]

Kissinger: True.

Hyland: Objective factors!

Gromyko: There was an interesting book by a Marxist, Plekhanov, on the role of personality. The monistic view of history.

Kissinger: It is an interesting question, for Marxists, because there have been so many developments in the history of Marxism that were produced by strong personalities.

Gromyko: But Marxism doesn't deny the role of personality. Maybe this will help the State Department. [Laughter]

Stoessel: Time will tell!

Sisco: It was also true in the birth of our Nation, our Revolution.

Cyprus

Gromyko: Is there anything new on the Cyprus problem now?



Kissinger: I don't think much can happen until our Congress has acted on Turkish aid and Turkey has its election.

Sisco: And Cyprus wants to go through a General Assembly exercise.

Kissinger: What will be your position on Denktash?

Gromyko: On what?

Kissinger: If he comes.

Gromyko: It is impossible for two speakers to come and speak for the same state.

Hartman: It's in the Political Committee.

Gromyko: But it's one state. Cyprus is a member of the General Assembly, not Cypruses. It will be the most unusual thing.

Kissinger: [smiles] You'll have a tough decision to make if Congress doesn't lift the ban.

Gromyko: In what way?

Kissinger: Whether to move towards Turkey or the other way.

Dobrynin: What is the other way?

Kissinger: Towards Greece.

There are no negotiations going on now .

Gromyko: I read they were stopped in New York.

Hartman: Effectively suspended.

Kissinger: Is there a date for resumption?

Hartman: After the Turkish elections.

Gromyko: It's not very encouraging, not very encouraging.



Hartman: It's very bad.

Gromyko: I've met Makarios but not Denktash.

Kissinger: I've never met him. When we were there, Makarios asked me to help with the communal problem. I said "That's one problem I'll never touch." Two months later it blew up.

Gromyko: In that palace....

Sisco: He escaped through the back door.

Dobrynin: Sometimes it's helpful to have a back door!

Kissinger: I don't know what the Greeks expected to accomplish by that coup. Because enosis would never be accepted.

Comprehensive Test Ban and Ban on New Systems

Gromyko: In your speech, will you propose anything for the agenda?

Kissinger: No. If we did, we would tell you. Will you?

Gromyko: One we already proposed.

Kissinger: The complete test ban.

Gromyko: Yes. We may add another, which I wanted to tell you: the banning of new types of weapons. We discussed this before.

Kissinger: I remember. I don't understand what you have in mind.

Gromyko: New systems of mass destruction, new kinds of weapons.

Kissinger: What would be your definition of new systems?

Gromyko: In a sense broader, in a sense narrower than new types of weapons. Generally, when we are asked, our answer is: If and when concrete negotiations take place, we'll be ready with the details.



Kissinger: When you build that new missile that's 32% deeper than other missiles, is that a new system? [Laughter]

Gromyko: Not quite. Not quite.

Kissinger: Does "new" mean new for a country or new in the world?

Gromyko: That did not exist in the world. It will be negotiated.

Kissinger: So India can build missiles up to the SS-19, or planes up to B-1.

Gromyko: That can be discussed too. We won't say that from the first discussion in the Assembly we worked out a complete proposal. It's subject to negotiation.

Korea

Kissinger: The only thing we're thinking of proposing is a four-power arrangement to replace the [Korean] Armistice Agreement if the UN Command is abolished. I don't think it will be accepted.

Gromyko: We would put it in general, our proposal.

Kissinger: I'll have to think about it.

Gromyko: You rightly mention about the spreading.

Kissinger: That's more interesting to me than that others prevent us. If it's about our armaments, we should discuss it in SALT. If it's about the whole world, it's a matter of defining what is new.

Sisco: Will you be submitting a resolution?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: [rises with his glass] Your visits here are regular now, Mr. Foreign Minister. And that shows the role that our two countries have in keeping the peace and in building a constructive environment for the world. We have in the past two years made our



meetings regular features of the international landscape, and we attach great importance to this relationship. Even if events do not often go as smoothly as one of us may want, the trend is clear. We will work so that history will look back on this as the period when this became permanent. As one who was one of its architects, you are always welcome here. So, I propose a toast to the Foreign Minister, to our relationship and to the friendship of the Soviet and American peoples. [All toast]

Gromyko: Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your very kind words. They are very close to our own thinking. There are indeed no few questions that require our consideration and discussion. And even now when we have traversed an important road in the last years, a great effort is required to resolve important issues. The first is the need to prepare and elaborate a new agreement on SALT. And I would like to emphasize that our interest in this has not diminished, absolutely. We believe--and this is the view of General Secretary Brezhnev personally--that a new agreement would have a tremendous importance for our relationship and for the entire world. And we are prepared to have solutions on every question that is before the Soviet Union and the United States; the inventory of issues doesn't boil down to the one I mentioned. And as before, we would like to go on discussing these issues at all levels, including the Foreign Minister level.

I want to thank you for the hospitality here in Washington. I had a very useful meeting yesterday with the President. And whenever you are willing to meet with us, we are always ready.

So, I propose a toast to the Secretary of State, to further successes in this field, to the further development of our relations, and to all your colleagues and co-workers and assistants in this room.

Kissinger: Those are my sentiments exactly. This is a task to which we must devote ourselves.

MBFR

Before we turn to our main subject, do you have any ideas on the direction we might take in Vienna? Or is the present framework....?



Gromyko: First, some time ago you will recall you intimated to me, in Vienna or in Geneva, that you were considering discussing in the framework of the Vienna talks new types of arms. Notice I don't say "new systems"! But since then we have seen nothing new in the Western positions. So we come to the conclusion there is no new Western view.

That is my first point. My second point is: we feel now that what is being demanded of us by the Western side is completely unjust. All these bargaining points--and that's what they are--are impossible. We are told we have too many tanks. And we should just take them out--just for a thank you. And all this is called a mutually advantageous agreement. Maybe I'm exaggerating a little bit, but all this really conveys the spirit of what is happening in Vienna.

Now my third point is: It may well be that soon we may have the urge to discuss this again, maybe on a bilateral basis with the United States, before we decide on what further steps we may take in Vienna. I don't want to be ahead of myself, but this may happen.

Kissinger: It is not excluded.

Gromyko: Not excluded.

Kissinger: Its rejection is not guaranteed. I'm practicing double negatives. But I'm a minor leaguer!

Can I interpret your beginning remarks about nuclear weapons to mean that if this were included, our proposals might look less unequal?

Gromyko: We said in Vienna that it would certainly facilitate matters if there could be a broader approach, both with the number of states involved and the types of arms. But it seems not to have been developed further.

Kissinger: We are studying it, and the possibility of including it is not excluded.

Regarding your third point, we would be interested in bilateral exchanges on that before major steps are taken in Vienna, because it might facilitate matters.



Gromyko: Good. Well, then, when and where do we take up the main question?

Kissinger: We can take it up now.

Gromyko: Let's do it.

Middle East

Kissinger: I thought if I raised another subject, you might forget about the Middle East.

Gromyko: You're the last one to visit the Middle East, so perhaps you'd like to tell us something. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I have said my views on this, including publicly. Our objectives in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiation were several: First, to prevent a situation in the Middle East where a stalemate would lead to such frustration that it could lead to another war. Second, to make some progress in order to unlock the possibility for further progress.


We seriously considered an overall approach, for some months. For a variety of reasons, including domestic, we decided that it wouldn't work. As I explained in my speech the other day [at Cincinnati], we have always considered that the step-by-step approach would merge eventually into a comprehensive approach.

Could we turn the air conditioning on?

The presence of the Soviet Foreign Minister activates so many other electronic devices -- to photograph you, tape you, and give you a medical examination, that it overloads the circuit. [Laughter]

Gromyko: [to Dobrynin:] What we suspected was true! [Laughter]

Kissinger: There are two ways we can proceed. One is by encouraging a negotiation between Syria and Israel. And/or reactivating the Geneva Conference. Or something in between, like intensive consultations with ^{the} parties outside the framework of the Conference, leading eventually to reconvening the Conference.



We are prepared to consult seriously with you to consider the feasibility of these approaches, or any other you might think useful. We have no intention of pursuing the conclusion of these negotiations as a solo American effort. So the only question is how to proceed now, what might be discussed, what could succeed and what possibility exists for contacts between us or between the parties. A Syrian step or an overall step, or an overall that might include as a first step Syria--all these are possibilities, and we have reached no conclusion. As I've communicated with you and said publicly, we are prepared to discuss all of this with you.

[At 9:22 p.m. the party moves out of the dining room to the larger room, where the doors are opened to let in some ventilation.]

Gromyko: I have a question, Mr. Secretary. Do you have any specific plan in the Middle East from now on? Of late you have been making frequent references to the Geneva Conference. You just now expressed the possibility of conducting affairs there with the broad participation of relevant other countries. So, do you have a plan? Or maybe you don't have a thought-out plan? I have a second question.

Kissinger: You're counting on my vanity never to admit I haven't a plan.

Gromyko: While you're always adding to my difficulties, I want to make your situation easier. [Laughter]

My second question is: insofar as the Geneva Conference is concerned, how do you think it can be reconvened and conduct its deliberations? How could it be, so to speak, constitutionalized? How should it be reconvened, or reactivated?

Kissinger: With respect to your first question, we do not have a fixed unchangeable plan. We have some ideas. As soon as our sanity is restored, for example, we could encourage some sort of negotiation with Syria and Israel, some sort of arrangement on the Golan Heights to continue the steps in the Sinai. If they are interested. We told President Asad we might encourage it if they are interested. It would be difficult, like the last one, but not impossible. The Israeli statements are not encouraging, but



they are never encouraging at the beginning. That's one approach. With all the participants in the last war having gotten something, there is a possibility for Geneva.

The other approach is more comprehensive. I have no detailed idea. If, for example, one did not want to reconvene Geneva immediately, because of its formality and complexity, it wouldn't be excluded to have informal meetings of the co-chairmen, and then meetings with the parties. I have no precise proposal.

You ask how it could be organized. If it is reconstituted, the easiest way would be to reconstitute it first with the participants who were there the last time, without prejudice to other possible participants later. This would enable it to begin, leaving the possibility of other participants to come later.

These are some ideas.

Gromyko: With respect to the Geneva Conference, right now we have a very poor understanding as to how the Geneva Conference could be reconvened, in view of the situation that has taken shape after the separate agreement between Egypt and Israel, with you as intermediary and with your active participation. What is the situation now? The Syrians now are not prepared to take part in the Geneva Conference.

Kissinger: Have you asked them?

Gromyko: Yes. We have been in contact with them and it is our impression the Syrians are not prepared to take part, given the present situation.

The second point is the Palestinians have their own position, and their own proposals regarding the situation in the Middle East. They claim--and we feel they have every right--the right to take part in a reconstituted Geneva Conference. We feel that unless this is resolved there is no possibility for fruitful work of the Conference.

So, on the one hand, there is the question of the Palestinians. We know less about the position of Jordan, but, as far as we know, Jordan is not enthusiastic about the work of the Conference. But I can't vouch for them.



So what kind of Conference is it if the Syrians and the Palestinians don't participate? Who will participate? The partners in the deal that took place without us, for the reasons you know? Egypt, Israel, and the United States? Such is the situation. If you have opinions on this, tell us. According to our information, that is the situation now in the Middle East.

Kissinger: But...

Gromyko: That's my first point. My second point is...

Kissinger: Excuse me.

Gromyko: My second point is: If I understand you correctly, you do allow the possibility of undertaking something outside the scope of the Conference but with the participation of a broad circle of participants, and probably you're thinking of the Soviet Union and the United States as well.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: But what kind of action outside the Geneva Conference and in a broad circle are you visualizing? And how would such a mechanism actually operate? You say the United States is ready to consult with the Soviet Union. We are ready to consult with you and always have been. The hitch hasn't been on our side. We are always ready to consult and we have always said the two powers have not used their full powers in this matter. But we do rule out the possibility of having a reconstituted Geneva Conference in which the participants would be the United States, Soviet Union, Egypt and Israel and probably Jordan, but not Syria and the Palestinians. It would be one thing if the Syrians and Palestinians said they wouldn't mind to have the question discussed by those, without them, but I'm sure you'll agree that's highly unlikely.

In terms of a profound consideration of this problem, we believe the United States and the Soviet Union could utilize their contacts with other parties and jointly or separately use their contacts to encourage a settlement. And we are prepared to do that. But in the past,



whenever you say you are ready to engage in joint efforts, several weeks after this understanding it just broke up in the air. We don't take a dogmatic approach. We want to see what can be done.


The third point: We do not approve of what has been done in the Middle East recently. As I told the President, there will be no campaign. But we do not approve of what has been done on a separatist basis. Because Arab territory is still occupied by Israel-- even if a small part has been given up. We have said on various levels, including the level of the General Secretary and the President, that the Middle East doesn't only have an Arab-Israeli aspect but an international aspect. So even if one Arab state said that it would sacrifice one part of its territory for peace, we would not accept that. We would not accept the situation where an aggressor could be given a prize for his aggression. So even if some Arab state were to say: "Due to circumstances that it's impossible to regain all our territories, we are compelled to sacrifice part of our territory," we would regard this as unfair and we could not accept a situation where an aggressor could get a prize for aggression. Because involved here is a broader international aspect, and involved here are many other countries' interests, not only in the Middle East.

You have been aware all along of our readiness for joint measures and to act jointly in all questions regarding the Middle East problem. But evidently other considerations, narrower considerations, got the upper hand in your thinking.

So we should do some more thinking, and after this meeting we should visualize further consultations on what should be done. If you are prepared to make a change in your position, as evidenced by what was done, then perhaps there is a possibility for something still to be done and on a joint basis.

It's up to you to let us know how it can be done.

Kissinger: With respect to Geneva, we are prepared to reconvene but we do not insist on it. If there is no basis for reconvening, then it shouldn't be done. We have not asked the parties about it, and this



would have to be the first step. So what you say about Syria is unfamiliar to us. My experience with Syria -- which is not as extensive as yours -- is that you shouldn't always take their first word as the last. It is not implausible, knowing them, that for a few weeks they'll take this position.

I agree with you, Mr. Foreign Minister, there is no sense convening the Geneva Conference with only the United States, Soviet Union, Egypt, Israel and Jordan.

Gromyko: How can it take place without Syria and the Palestinians? The Soviet Union will be out too.

Kissinger: We will not attend the Geneva Conference without the Soviet Union; that is a firm decision. This strengthens my case. I agree, it is unlikely that Syria and the Palestinians will ask us to hold it without them.

As I told you privately this afternoon, the Palestinian question is an extremely difficult one for us, and if that is the precondition of starting it, it can't start. We believe it is a discussable subject if it recommences with the present participants and considers other participants. Maybe we can ask the Syrians, if you don't object.

Maybe we can discuss having an informal conference, broader than Geneva but outside it.

After all, the consumer-producer conference now is beginning with a preparatory conference. It's not an unheard-of diplomatic phenomenon.

Your third point. I must say I was a little surprised to hear the Soviet Union wouldn't accept it if one Arab state decided to modify its frontiers. We haven't heard any Arab state that said it would do so, and we have not proposed it to any Arab state. But I always thought that you supported the '67 frontiers but if one Arab state modified its position you would support it. It may be a purely theoretical question, because there is no Arab state that would.

Gromyko: We support the 1967 frontiers.



Kissinger: I know, but it's a new position to state that if one Arab state made a change you would not accept it. That is new, and if carried out, will be an interesting statement.

You say you think we act on narrow considerations. I have explained to you and to your Ambassador: We don't want to be involved in a purely theoretical exercise. We have always thought that to move in attainable stages would move us more easily towards solutions. Rather than have a theoretical exercise that proved impossible.


This gives us no special advantage, because the history of the Middle East shows how relationships are transitory. Especially because friendships in the Middle East are expensive, and usually express themselves in money. In order to avoid pressures, political and economic, there had to be some progress. And there could be progress only by the methods we used. We did it to promote progress. I said it publicly, and I will reiterate it. It is not inconsistent with your position. Your approach has been to state general principles, and our approach has been to make concrete progress.

Are we serious? It was us, not you, that initiated the present discussions.

Gromyko: But before.

Kissinger: You've done it often. But this latest exchange was initiated by us. But I agree, in light of our discussion, we should perhaps begin a more intensive discussion between us. I've told you we are encouraging a negotiation between Syria and Israel, but not with overwhelming rapidity. So there is time for an exchange of ideas. We can meet again. Your Ambassador and I could meet. Or Sisco and your Ambassador could resume their discussions. Or whomever you designate.

Gromyko: Of course we are prepared to discuss the substance of these matters, first and foremost the substance. We have been talking up to now about methods, forms -- even this evening -- not territories, a Palestinian state. So if we really want to promote a Palestine settlement, isn't it high time we discussed the matters at hand? You proposed discussions outside of the Geneva Conference, with a broader circle, but how do you contemplate this? If it's a conference outside a Conference, surely the Syrians and Palestinians won't participate. So how will it take place? How do you solve a question that interests the Syrians and Palestinians?



This isn't the first time we've had the United States say the Palestinians should be in the Conference at some later stage after it's reconvened. But how do you do it in practice? But how do you find a solution to the Palestinian problem? Perhaps there will be some correction in your position. What is your substantive position? They have a problem, and practically the whole world supports them. Where is the question of their statehood? A solution to the substantive part of the Palestinian question?

Kissinger: In all frankness, as we conduct our discussions, both of us have the possibility of putting before the other positions that one can't fulfill and to use them to embarrass the other. Our problems with the Palestinian question are obvious, and I say this to every Arab leader. I never promise what I can't deliver. We can't change our position on the Palestinian problem. It's a proposition with which the Palestinians will have to get used. They'll have to accept the framework in which progress can be made.

Borders, guarantees -- we all know the agenda. But where do we go? We have in the past been unable to cooperate because the goal of the discussion wasn't clear. A discussion must take into account -- I'll be frank -- our possibilities. We say this to the Arabs. Any discussion that doesn't take this into account will lead to concern on our part that it's only being done to embarrass us.

The question of the Palestinians to us is a very complicated one, which requires some evolution. It's simple as far as you're concerned.

Whether the Syrians would cooperate in Geneva or outside the Geneva framework, I'm not so sure. The worst mistake one can make in the Middle East is to accept anyone's statement as conclusive the first time, or even the tenth time.

I have the impression the Syrians are interested in a negotiation. They haven't said it explicitly. I have the impression they'll do it without the direct participation of the Palestinians. They'll find some way to do it -- a Joint Command, or some way. I'm just reading between the lines. Then, if they're interested in a negotiation, in what framework will it be? We are prepared to exchange ideas with them, and with you, and we'll keep you informed.



We are at the point where a decision can be made. In the spring, the options were narrowed. Today, we have more maneuvering room. There are many possibilities, including intensive discussions with you.

How should it be constituted? We two could invite the parties. There are many ways it could be done.

Gromyko: Let us agree, then, to continue our consultations on various levels, on the Ambassadorial level, or if needed, the Foreign Minister level. Bilateral consultations. But with the understanding that these should relate not only to methods, forms and approaches, but to the substance of the matter at hand.

On the substance, let us agree the discussion will not circumvent the Syrians or Palestinians, so that if they object to an exchange of view without them it won't be done. But if they agree, consultations will proceed. I'm not saying that without Egypt and Jordan it can be done.

Kissinger: And Israel. [Laughter]

Gromyko: Of course. It goes without saying. Unless the United States objects.

Kissinger: To Israel participating?

It adds excitement to the exercise. [Laughter]

Gromyko: To ignore the views of Syria and the Palestinians would mean marking time without any progress whatsoever. It's a cliché, but we should continue our consultations. You seem more optimistic regarding participation of the Palestinians and the Syrians.

Kissinger: Syria. I know nothing about the Palestinians.

Gromyko: But there should be complete clarity about one thing: circumvention of the Syrians and Palestinians would mean no productive consultations without their consent, and no productive reconvening of Geneva could be contemplated.



Can we agree the United States and the Soviet Union will from now on return to the formula that was agreed on previously but sustained a failure, namely that we will act in concert for a solution to the Middle East issue? Or do you feel it's too early and it can't be considered at this point? If you agree, we should agree on who should meet and when to resume consultations -- I don't mean the exact date. To resume where we leave off.

Kissinger: With respect to your first point: We, of course, have no contact with the Palestinians, and therefore we are generically conducting our policy without consultation with the Palestinians. So that part of your presentation we can't accept. Inherently.

We have the highest regard for President Asad and we will do nothing to the detriment or isolation of Syria. So we agree to the proposition that we will do nothing without consultation with Syria. All the more so as we've said the next negotiation, if there is no overall approach, would be a Syrian-Israeli negotiation which would, of course, require Syrian participation.

We are, of course, prepared for serious discussion of what steps could be taken. Perhaps Sunday, after we've had time to think a bit, we could discuss where and what meetings could take place.

Gromyko: Let's return to the matter on Sunday, then. To specify the points under discussion.

How many more problems do we have to discuss tonight? Five?

Kissinger: I'm willing to surrender. [Laughter]

Gromyko: Conditionally? Unconditionally? [Laughter]

Kissinger: You wouldn't accept an unconditional surrender! Have you any topics?

Gromyko: No, we could adjourn now.

Kissinger: So, 8:00 Sunday.

Dobrynin: 7:30. Is it convenient?

Kissinger: Let me think. Let's say 8:00. Because we may not get to New York on time.

Gromyko: 8 o'clock.





THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of
the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Antoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U. S.
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium
and Chief of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Vasiliy G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Minister
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counselor, Second European
Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Yuliy M. Vorontsov, Minister-Counselor,
Soviet Embassy
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Yuriy E. Fokin, Special Assistant to the Minister

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, INR
Jan M. Lodal, Director of Program Analysis,
National Security Council Staff
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff *PHR*

DATE AND TIME: Sunday, September 21, 1975
9:30 - 11:30 p. m.

PLACE: Soviet Mission to the United Nations
New York City

SUBJECT: SALT



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/99, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY ldn, NARA, DATE 10/21/03

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, perhaps we might then, as we agreed, continue our discussion on the question before us. As I recall I was the last to speak at the last meeting, so perhaps you might want to develop your views. The question is how can we overcome the very serious difficulties we have encountered, and they are indeed substantial.

Kissinger: I assume we're talking about strategic arms limitation, or is it true on every subject?

Gromyko: We agreed [to discuss SALT this time].

Kissinger: Yes. I gave you a detailed explanation of our thinking; I didn't give you any concrete proposals. But basically what we're trying to do is take into account the various ranges of cruise missiles, so those launched from ships couldn't be considered strategic.

The best thing would be to give you some of our new considerations, and go on from there.

But before I do, let me make some general comments, one procedural and one substantive.

The procedural one is, if we want to keep open the option of a visit by the General Secretary around December 15, some progress should be made in October, so that we're not running up against a deadline. If we stick to our plan of a visit by me in November, we should shift most of the issues to Geneva. I think this is very important.

The second issue is: You mentioned to the President that the visit can be delayed until the spring. I recognize we've come up against some issues that make it difficult to see how it will be concluded. We, of course, welcome a visit by the General Secretary anytime.



From the point of view of our election, a visit next year is better for us. But from the point of view of making an agreement, if we have an agreement next April or May, we will be accused of making every concession under the pressure of electoral considerations. Ratification would be in a very unpleasant atmosphere. If it runs into '77, we run into the end of the Interim Agreement. So if it isn't finished in December, we can finish it anytime.

But we consider these summits important to our relations.

And I think after this agreement, we should consider not gearing them to particular negotiations. The Soviet General Secretary and the President of the United States have much to talk about without an agreement.

In SALT, we have the problem of air-launched cruise missiles; we have the problem of sea-launched cruise missiles. On air-launched cruise missiles we have the problem of those on heavy bombers and those on non-strategic bombers. We have the Backfire, but that's our problem. Silo dimensions, and definition of heavy missiles.

On the date the 2400 goes into effect, that's not a major problem. You propose 12 months; we propose the date the agreement goes into effect. I am sure it will be solved.

What other issues are there?

Sonnenfeldt: The reductions negotiations.

Hyland: Noncircumvention.

Gromyko: Start of the other negotiations.

Kissinger: That should be in Geneva. On air-launched cruise missiles, your position is that about 600 kilometers they should be banned planes except heavy bombers, and counted on heavy bombers.

Gromyko: Yes, on that issue, they should be banned on all aircraft except heavy bombers, but on those they should be counted.

Kissinger: Cruise missiles above 600 kilometers in range on aircraft other than heavy bombers should be banned, but those on heavy bombers should be counted.



Dobrynin: That's right.

Kissinger: On ships, they should be banned above 600 kilometers.

Gromyko: Banned.

Kissinger: Backfire you don't want to include.

Silo dimensions, you want to dig towards China.

Gromyko: Salvos?

Kissinger: Silos. You want to dig down. [Laughter] And you want to have the launching weight of missiles.

Let me go through our position. We will accept no cruise missiles above 600 kilometers on any plane except heavy bombers. So we accept your position. On heavy bombers, we have to maintain our position of 2500 kilometers but we are willing to limit the number of planes that will be equipped with cruise missiles above 2500 kilometers. We propose 300. We have about 600 bombers, so that's about half.

We are prepared to ban those above 2500 kilometers. You wanted to count them. We propose to ban them. So it's an attempt to come closer to your position.

On ships we accept 600 kilometers, with one proviso which I will explain.

With respect to Backfire, we have tried to think very hard, and we have tried to estimate what you're likely to do, which may not be right, and we have tried to come up with a position that meets your concerns and some of ours, some of which are domestic.

We accept the General Secretary's position that it is not a heavy bomber, but it is sort of a hybrid. We would like to propose -- the number can be negotiated, but say 300 for purposes of discussion -- that we could have 300 of such hybrid systems, in which we would propose to include 100 FB-111s. This would not be part of the 2400, by the way. It could be a separate protocol. One hundred FB-111s, and about 200 ship-launched cruise missiles of a range between 600 and 2000 kilometers. And any beyond 2000 kilometers would be banned.



So our proposal is that we create a separate category, of so-called hybrid systems, which we define as not being intended for strategic purposes. Two hundred of them between 600 and 2000 kilometers.

The numbers are negotiable. If the concept is acceptable . . . If the number is 300, if you wanted to have 200 Backfire, you could have 100 sea-launched cruise missiles. Each side could compose its 300 as it wanted.

This would be our basic proposal. I repeat, we have attempted to account for many of the considerations you've advanced. We have taken the Backfire out of the 2400. We have tried to estimate what you may do, which may not be right. If the concept is acceptable, we can work out the proportions.

So on sea-launched cruise missiles, the number of bombers carrying them, and taking Backfire out, and banning cruise missiles above 2500 kilometers on airplanes, we have also tried to take into account your considerations.

The way our forces are developing, there are four or five spaces where we could use cruise missiles above the 2500-kilometer range.

On silo dimensions and definition of heavy missiles. If we come to an agreement that we count both launching weight and throwweight together, then we could talk about silo dimension . . . that would not be such an issue of principle.


Here is a copy. [Tab A]

I know you can't give me an answer right away.

Gromyko [to Sudhodrev in Russian]: Translate it, and the figures.

[Sudhodrev translates aloud the paper at Tab A. They confer in Russian.]

Gromyko: First, I just wish to remind you of one fact: Our position on the question of verification -- I say this because it is important and relevant to the whole issue and all elements of the agreement -- will remain valid provided a solution is found on all the other questions on which we



have come up against difficulties. So if there are other questions on which we have come up against difficulties, so our position on verification will become invalid.

Kissinger: I understand.

Gromyko: I just wanted to remind you. My second point is: As regards those new observations you have made, my first impression is that in your exposé there are some elements of clarification and some modification on some matters relating to cruise missiles. But you seem to be still clinging to those cruise missiles and you have not accepted our basic position of principle on these cruise missiles.

So, in short, this channel [of the arms race] is not cut off and it will continue to operate even if a new agreement is reached.

Kissinger: Which channel?

Gromyko: Cruise missiles. In any case, those observations will require study and further discussion.

Three, on Backfire. At first glance your position is rather contradictory. On one hand you say you accept our statement that it's not a heavy bomber, that it doesn't have the characteristics inherent in a heavy bomber. That's a positive aspect. On the other hand, you introduced quantitative limitations on their number; and at the same time, so that he doesn't have too bad a deal [the Backfire] you throw in one of your comparable things to keep him company, so he won't have too bad a time. You're extending the Vladivostok agreement to other categories, one you call the hybrid system. To be consistent, since you accept that the Backfire isn't a heavy bomber, it would be logical to conclude that the whole question simply drops off. As to your analogous systems, we are not raising this question, and we wouldn't cry if our non-heavy bomber spent its life in a state of loneliness, without American companionship. And to add in cruise missiles would complicate things rather than facilitate them.

But on this, too, we will require further study and will give you a reply as soon as we have done so.

Kissinger: And make a counterproposal.



Gromyko: That will depend on the conclusion we draw.

Another matter that will require additional study on our part is your suggestion that a connection be made between the allowable increase in the volume of a silo and the criteria for the definition of heavy missile, that is to define it by both starting weight and throwweight.

Those will require study, and there are various aspects, including the purely technical.

Kissinger: On your various points, may I make a few observations.

We recognize that your acceptance of our verification criteria is linked to solutions of cruise missiles and other issues. If I don't reiterate it, it's because it's understood.

Second, you say our proposal is to keep open the channel of cruise missiles. But it is also attempting to take account of some of your concerns.

First, however one interprets the Vladivostok agreement, there is no question that sea-launched cruise missiles are not included in it. So our willingness to include sea-launched cruise missiles is an attempt to meet your concern. Air-launched cruise missiles we have agreed to ban them over 2500, to limit those under 2500, and to ban them on other than heavy bombers. And fourth, by limiting the number of heavy bombers that can carry them.

Dobrynin: Are they included in the 2400?


Kissinger: They are included.

The only channel we keep open . . . What we've given up is that under Vladivostok we could develop cruise missiles of any range and put them on heavy bombers as long as we count them. And that we've given up, and that is worth considering.

We have not kept the channel completely open. We have tried to meet your concerns, except one point.

On the Backfire, we didn't say it is not a heavy bomber. We say we accept your assurance that it's not intended as a heavy bomber.

Gromyko: It's the same.



Kissinger: I'll tell you our frank assessment. We believe it's designed for peripheral missions, and that it has those characteristics. Unfortunately for the purposes of this agreement, your designers gave it a capacity for a greater range if you really want to. That's why we call it a hybrid.

Gromyko: What is the range of the Phantom?

Kissinger: 500 to 600 miles.

Gromyko: 700.

Kissinger: The Phantom is much smaller.

Lodal [to Kissinger]: Depending on what it carries.

Sonnenfeldt [to Kissinger]: But it can't reach there from the U. S.

Kissinger: We will trade you F-4s for Backfires.

Gromyko: If you want to be guided by that logic, even the Phantom can appropriately be listed in the category of a bomber that has a strategic purpose, while it is not strategic. Because from the Atlantic it can reach Soviet territory. One way, without coming back. So it's a contradictory kind of logic.

Kissinger: On the Backfire, our thinking was to find a formulation, or concept, in which it is brought into relationship with other systems that are not basically strategic, such as short-range sea-launched cruise missiles, and to consider them with other planes which you didn't mention. That plane we have already. It eases the situation here and it reflects the reality that there are some weapons that in an extremity can be used in a certain way even though not basically designed for it.

In your fourth point, you simply stated -- correctly -- the issue of definition of heavy missile and the issue of silo dimension and that we establish a sort of linkage.

In our proposal, if the concept is accepted, the numbers could be negotiated. Even the rate of deployment could be discussed, of certain categories of weapons.

Gromyko: Yes. The rate of deployment?



Kissinger: For example, suppose you accepted this concept of 300 against 300, we might agree not to deploy our 300 more rapidly than you deploy yours.

Dobrynin: Within the time of the agreement?

Kissinger: Within the time of the agreement.

Dobrynin: There is no other time period.

Kissinger: But suppose you deployed only 100 Backfire by 1980. We wouldn't deploy 300 by 1980.

[The Russian side confers.]

Gromyko: That was clarification.

Kissinger: One other thing. When you compare the Phantom to the Backfire. The Backfire in its dimensions is almost indistinguishable from the Bison, which you have agreed to consider a heavy bomber.

Gromyko: In its dimensions?

Kissinger: Range.

Gromyko: A stork has the same dimension as an eagle but it is not the same. Even the American eagle!

Sonnenfeldt: The payload is different!

Kissinger: No, in size, payload, range.

Gromyko: Range? That is one of the weak points of your argument. Because it's not the same range.

Kissinger: Maybe we should sell you some engines. A plane that large . . .

Dobrynin: The F-111 isn't the same as the Bison.

Gromyko: For some reason when the conversation gets around to display of the Phantom's qualities in the Sinai, everyone praises it to the skies, but in negotiations everyone belittles them.



Kissinger: No, they are excellent tactical aircraft.

Dobrynin: And the Bison?

Kissinger: The Bison isn't a tactical aircraft. The Bison is like our B-47.

Sonnenfeldt: Between Egypt and Israel the Phantom is strategic .

Kissinger: Not the range. Not the payload.

Gromyko: Let me say again that was my first reaction to your considerations. If we had more time at our disposal in our visit, we might meet again. But we need two or three days. So we'll continue our exchanges in our channel.


Kissinger: I don't exclude it if we could meet for a day in Europe, if necessary. But we can discuss that.

Gromyko: We shall talk.

What you said at the outset about the visit and its link with a new agreement, what I said earlier frees me from the need to add to it.

Kissinger: Good.

[Kissinger and Gromyko conferred alone between 10:45 and 11:30 p. m. They spoke to the press in the lobby of the Soviet Mission. See Tab B. The Secretary then walked back to the Waldorf Towers.]



GIVEN SOVIET Delegation
(Army KO) Sept. 21, 1975

The US proposes the following approach to resolve the outstanding issues in the new agreement for the limitation of strategic offense armaments.


1. Regarding air launched cruise missiles, the US proposes that they be limited as follows: (a) the development, testing, and deployment of air-launched cruise missiles with ranges greater than 2500 km will be banned; (b) each side will be permitted no more than 300 heavy bombers armed with cruise missiles with a range between 600 and 2500 km; (c) as proposed by the Soviet side cruise missiles with ranges over 600 km will be banned on other aircraft.

2. For the limitation of sea-based cruise missiles, the US accepts the Soviet proposal to ban the deployment of sea-based cruise missiles with a range over 600 except as noted below.

3. The US proposes to ban the development, deployment and testing of sea-based cruise missiles with a range greater than 2000 km.

4. As for the Soviet Backfire bomber the US accepts the Soviet assurance that it is not intended for use as a heavy bomber. With respect to systems in a hybrid category, such as the Backfire bomber, sea-based cruise missiles with a range between 600 km and 2000 km and the US FB-111 bomber, we propose that they not be counted in the ceiling of 2400, but that both sides would be limited to no more than a total of 300 of such systems; for the US this would include the FB-111 bomber and sea-based cruise missiles with a range of between 600 and 2000 km in any combination; for the USSR any combination of Backfire aircraft and sea-based cruise missiles with a range between 600 km and 2000 km.

5. The US position on defining a heavy ICBM remains as previously proposed.



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BY ljk, NARA, DATE 10/24/03

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