


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BREZHNEV MEMCONS

Helsinki 1975

originals

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BREZHNEV MEMCONS


Helsinki, 1975

Date, Time and Place

Subjects

- | | |
|--|--|
| 1. Wednesday, July 30, 1975
American Ambassador's Residence
9:35 a.m. - 12:00 noon | U.S. -Soviet Relations;
Middle East; Emigration;
Nuclear War |
| 2. Wednesday, July 30, 1975
Outside Residence
12:00 noon | Private Conversation |
| 3. Saturday, August 2, 1975
Soviet Embassy
9:05 a.m. - 12:15 p.m. | SALT |
| 4. Saturday, August 2, 1975
Soviet Embassy
12:15 - 12:35 p.m. | Grain Purchases; Oil |

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
MEMORANDUM

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION



PARTICIPANTS: USSR: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
 Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
 Georgi M. Kornienko, Director of the USA Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
 Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary
 Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
 Andrei Vavilov, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

US: President Ford
 Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Ambassador to the USSR
 Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
 Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
 William G. Hyland, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
 Alexander Akalovsky, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
 Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5
 NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines
 By KSH, NARA, Date 8/7/01

DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, July 30, 1975
 9:35 a. m.

PLACE: American Ambassador's Residence
 Helsinki, Finland

SUBJECTS: US-Soviet Relations; Middle East; Emigration; Nuclear War.

[The President greeted the Soviet party at the front door. As they entered the Residence, the General Secretary called out "Where is Sonnenfeldt?" The President laughed. The group was seated at the table. The press entered for photographs].

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER
 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
 EXEMPTION CODE BY 5 (B) (1, 3)
 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

Original retired for Preservation

Brezhnev: You've lost weight.

Ford: You look like you have too.

Brezhnev: I've been stabilized.

Ford: You look excellent.

Brezhnev: I'm about 78 kilograms. I'm 78.9, 80 at times, but within that limit. That's my stable weight nowadays. I've been stable the last six months or so.

Kissinger: I'm stable within a 10-kilogram range. (Laughter).

Gromyko: You're old acquaintances.

US-Soviet Relations

Brezhnev: Mr. Kissinger, I was saying to the President that we've done a very good job in space.

Kissinger: Yes.

Ford: The handshake was indicative of the progress we have been making.

Brezhnev: Your boys came down at 1:00 a. m. in our country, and our TV was still working.

Kissinger: You saw it.

Brezhnev: We saw it live.

Ford: In our country it was after dinner.

Brezhnev: It is really fantastic when you come to think of it. They go up; they meet somewhere in the limitless vastness of space.

Ford: It's wonderful to know that the technicians and scientists have that capability -- to link up hundreds of miles away.

Brezhnev: [fiddles with his pocket]. I've been thinking -- I know Kissinger's mind works that way -- I'll take a little bomb, put it in my pocket, and....

Kissinger: As long as it's a little one.

Brezhnev: It's a long-range one.

Ford: I'm glad they were up there, and not you and I.

Gromyko: Those are the MIRVs.

Brezhnev: Of course, that is a very complicated issue, seriously.

[The last of the photographers departed].

Frankly speaking, Mr. President, the latest proposals we received on the night of our departure for Helsinki. We can't go into details today. I was just informed of them, and you can't get to the bottom of them right after getting out of the plane.

Kissinger: You mean on strategic arms?

Brezhnev: Yes. Maybe while we are here we can look them over and discuss them the next time we meet.


Ford: Mr. General Secretary, I'd like to make some comments first about detente.

Brezhnev: Please.

Ford: In the United States, there is a very encouraging overall attitude as to the progress we have made, the Soviet Union and the United States, in moving in the right direction on detente. On the other hand, I think it is fair -- and I want to be frank: we have those on the right as well as on the left, who for various reasons, political and otherwise, would like to undermine what we have tried to implement and to destroy detente.

[Mr. Hyland comes in to join the meeting.]

And critics of detente are Democrats as well as Republicans. They would like to slow down or destroy the benefits that come from detente. But I can tell you very forcefully I am committed to detente, and the American people agree with me. I strongly feel our negotiations and our agreements in Vladivostok were pluses, were very successful. I believe the CSCE negotiations, the documents we will sign here, are pluses, and I am confident



as we talk about SALT II, we can achieve success in this area. Perhaps as in our country, you have some critics in your own government who don't believe that Vladivostok, CSCE, and SALT II are in the best interests of your country. But I can tell you in my term of office -- and I expect that to be the next 5 1/2 years -- my aim, objective and total effort on my part will be to narrow our differences and achieve the benefits for your people, for our people, and I believe for the world as a whole.

Brezhnev: [interrupts translation at reference to critics of detente:]
The only two people who are against detente are Kissinger and Gromyko.
[Laughter].

Kissinger: Because as long as there is no detente, we can keep meeting.
[Laughter].

Brezhnev: [interrupts translation at reference to 5 1/2 years:] Why do you say only five years in office? Why not eight years?

[Mr. Akalovsky joins the meeting.]

Ford: Mr. Secretary, of course we have these critics of Vladivostok, the European Security Conference, and SALT, who would like me to have a term of office for 1 1/2 years. But I am convinced beyond any doubt, if we can move the Vladivostok agreement beyond SALT and implement the atmosphere in which CSCE took place, I believe the critics will be pushed aside and the American people will support what you and I want to achieve. If we can make the kind of progress [we seek] on SALT, today and Saturday, it would be a great delight for me to have you visit the United States this fall. I was up in Camp David two weeks ago and Mrs. Ford and I were discussing what a beautiful place it was. I know you enjoyed your visit there before. But the main point is to make headway that will result in a fruitful agreement, that will be of benefit to your country and mine, and will make possible a meeting in the United States between us some time in 1975.

Brezhnev: [interrupts Sukhodrev's translation at reference to Camp David:]
I did like Camp David.

Ford: It is beautiful in the fall.

Brezhnev: Quiet and relaxing.

Ford: With those general observations, Mr. Secretary, I'd be very pleased to have your reactions and any suggestions or comments you would like to make, sir.

Brezhnev: I, too, want to be perfectly honest -- and I trust you will have the opportunity to see that this is so -- let me say once again that we received your latest proposals on SALT some time at night, practically before I was due to leave. They need a thorough working on. Let me say a new agreement on that is something you and we need equally. We had no less difficulties working out the earlier agreement, but we worked them out and solved them. I believe this time, too, it should be possible to work out an agreement that would be advantageous to both sides.

Gromyko: Difficulties ought to be worked out and we will solve them.

Brezhnev: Perhaps during the next few days we will have a respite and see things more clearly. Yesterday after I arrived I met with President Kekkonen, leaders of the GDR and Tito, and got back very late at night. These matters are complicated, serious and do not lend themselves to a cursory glance. As for our objectives, they remain the same -- Vladivostok determines those objectives. Of course, there are some details to be solved.

I would like in this meeting to turn to other matters of interest to the two sides.

I was a bit surprised to learn that in the United States there were some people who were against the Apollo-Soyuz project, arguing that "their technology is weaker" or something. In the United States, everything is criticized. The only person who is never criticized is Dr. Kissinger, but they sometimes criticize even him for the fun of it. [Laughter].

Kissinger: I was going to say it's reached the point where even I am criticized. [Laughter]

Brezhnev: I saw a day or two ago some piece in the press that -- every paper has certain errors, typographical or letters missing -- and every day they print a little note correcting it.

Ford: Always on the back page.

Brezhnev: I often ask, why do they publish this note? They say "it's for the pleasure of our readers."

So, Mr. President, if you have no objections, we could turn to other matters, and when we meet on the second [of August] -- and we could go into the third if you want -- we could discuss the main issue.

The Middle East

Ford: Why don't you go ahead with the matters of interest to you and we will go ahead on matters of interest to us, and on Saturday when we meet we can discuss SALT.

Brezhnev: I think that's the right thing to do. There are quite a few questions. There is the Middle East, with its Arab League -- there we have to do some thinking about how to act. There are some who are calling for the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations. [Lengthy pause] That is a question that I would call a complex one. It's not a question that can be resolved by any kind of Assembly -- I refer to the United Nations under its Charter. Because if something goes wrong, we can impose our veto or someone else can do it.

Ford: I agree with that. If the Middle East problem hasn't been solved in the UN for so many years, the prospect of a solution in the UN now is very unlikely. So other means have to be found. I'd be interested in your observations, Mr. Secretary, on procedure and other aspects of the problem, because a solution there is essential. We don't want a confrontation in the Middle East between our two countries. A solution must come from the people who are there, the nations in the area. However, in the meantime we are doing what we can to bring the parties together, and in this I believe your actions there have been very helpful.

Brezhnev: [Before translation of the President's remarks] In short we must indeed do all we can to further detente and this must be our very businesslike conversation, and frank.

[Sukhodrev then translates the President's remarks]

Brezhnev: When Mr. Kissinger last met Gromyko, he said the United States had not finalized its approach to that problem as yet. So let's discuss this. Because if we don't work out a solution, the Geneva Conference will be nothing more than an empty phrase.

Ford: And very controversial, with no possibility of a solution.

We still are in the process of analyzing the benefits and possibilities of

the step-by-step approach. We are at the point where either it will achieve another success, or else there is the possibility of a comprehensive proposal that will be presented to the American people and Geneva. It will be a comprehensive proposal that would encompass all of the issues that have festered there for years. So we would appreciate your recommendations and suggestions as we prepare our final conclusions.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, both at Vladivostok and now, our position has been that the occupied Arab territories must be given up, the Palestinians should be guaranteed their rights, and Israel should be guaranteed, through whatever means possible, to have free and secure existence without any outside interference. There is no other alternative.

[He confers with Gromyko].

I remember one conversation I had on this with Dr. Kissinger. You'll recall you said to me the step-by-step has certain merits in that it makes some get used to moving back a little, and some to advance a little, so that finally there will be a solution to the complex of issues. I remember this, but this process must be written in the framework of the entire complex of issues. I agree this can't be done in one day.

Ford: The progress made in the step-by-step process will create a more optimistic attitude for that time when we seek a comprehensive solution. The easing of tensions will help create the conditions for a final settlement. So Secretary Kissinger and I see eye to eye on how we can create an environment for a full and final settlement at Geneva.

Gromyko: [To Brezhnev in Russian, not translated] The U.S. is tearing partial solutions out of the total complex of issues. Something gets solved, but what next?

Brezhnev: The only difference between your and our approach, Mr. President, is that in the step-by-step the giving up of occupied lands is in this context divorced from the overall complex, and no specific overall solution is envisaged.

Kissinger: I told -- if I may, Mr. President, -- the Foreign Minister when we met in Geneva that we no longer envisage a number of additional steps, and that after the next step we will have reached the point where a comprehensive approach will be required. Any further steps would be in the context of an overall settlement. So I think we are really reaching the point when we are converging on this issue.

Ford: It is my strong feeling that if we could come to some general agreement on how to proceed in the Middle East [Brezhnev whispers with Gromyko] and on the execution and implementation of the European Security Conference -- because the future of the Conference depends on execution rather than on signature -- and if on Saturday we can reach an important conclusion on SALT II, then our meetings will have a significant impact on detente, which I intend to pursue in the five and a half years that I intend to remain President of the United States.

Brezhnev: [Before translation] Do you mind if I take my coat off? [All take their coats off.]

Gromyko: Now the Americans and the Russians have a real working appearance. A business-like appearance -- still better!

Ford: I believe that was the approach we took at Vladivostok. I believe it is the approach we take here at Helsinki.

[Sukhodrev translates the President's remarks above.]

Brezhnev: Mr. President, I recall that quite recently you had a direct meeting with President Sadat, and that is one of the important countries involved in the conflict. Did you succeed in moving things one step further to a settlement?

Ford: I was encouraged by the good personal relations I established with him. We talked in generalities of the need for a settlement, for a solution that would encompass a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. We didn't get into details -- where the lines should be drawn or where action is to be taken. On the whole, it was a fruitful experience in my first meeting with him.

Gromyko: [To Brezhnev, in Russian, not translated:] Israel is holding on to occupied territories. There are the Palestinians -- where are they to live? So extremist tendencies are developing in the area. Objectively, the whole problem is ripe for solution, but it's all a question of politics. How much longer is it to ripen? There have been two wars already; is one more needed?

Kissinger: Is this a private conversation here, or it directed to us?

Sukhodrev: Private.

Gromyko: Private but not secret. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Is it a private fight or can anybody join? [Laughter]

Brezhnev: This problem is very complicated. It is very complicated for you, for us, and for the Arabs.

Ford: It's almost unbelievable that some of those nations can't talk as you and I do, Mr. Secretary. I am sure if they had the same understanding of the need for discussions and the same willingness that we do, then there would be progress towards a solution by them in that area.

Brezhnev: When things get difficult, the best way is to instruct Kissinger to go into the matter.

Gromyko: But only together with us!

Kissinger: I told the Foreign Minister in Geneva that it is really impossible for either of us to reach a solution on its own, that it can only be done on a common basis. I also told the Foreign Minister -- on the instructions of the President -- that neither of our two sides can achieve a permanent advantage in the Middle East at the expense of the other. And I also said that it would be a tragedy if our countries were drawn into a confrontation because of people whose record is so demonstrably volatile as the people in the Middle East, people who one year are on one side and the next year are on the other. So after the next step, we will have to explore how to move towards an overall solution. If there is a step.

Brezhnev: I laugh, Mr. President -- why I say Kissinger should be brought into these problems -- [To Kissinger:] Didn't you get the highest award from President Sadat?

Kissinger: The second highest. [Laughter] President Nixon got the highest.

Brezhnev: I didn't even get a little medal!

Kissinger: But they took it away from me and will give it to the next visitor, because they have only one.

Gromyko: Mr. President, you made the interesting remark that if the Arabs and Israelis could sit across the table like you and the General Secretary,

they would come to a solution. But the hard fact is they can't. If they did, they would probably start throwing ink wells at each other as in the past. [Laughter] But the Geneva Conference was a forum that was agreed upon by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. You will be present, and we will, and Sadat and the Israelis and the Syrians. So discussions will be a natural thing. We can't understand why the U.S. is hesitant about such a forum -- one, I repeat, that was agreed upon by the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The U.S. says "let's make one more effort to get a partial step going." But you did this once before. Did that step bring the problem any closer to a solution? The step-by-step doesn't yield results. Your earlier efforts have not brought a solution any closer. There should be a comprehensive solution. There should be preliminary discussions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union -- assuming the Israelis and Arabs agree -- and then our ideas should be put on the table. All parties will be present in Geneva -- the U.S., the USSR, Israel and the Arabs, so no one can bite off what has not been agreed to by all participants.

Ford: I believe, Mr. Foreign Minister, if there is careful preparation, if an appropriate environment is created, then a meeting at Geneva will be of benefit for an overall solution. But I would say what has been accomplished thus far has to some extent created a better environment, and another step, if achieved, will further enhance the atmosphere which is so essential for the successful work of Geneva. A failure in Geneva would have extremely serious consequences.

Gromyko: The Conference and its outcome cannot be any worse than the policies of its participants. So if the participants have a desire to achieve positive results, positive results will be achieved.

Ford: It seems to me we have an understanding of your position, and I trust you have an understanding of our position in this area. We do want a solution. So perhaps as we think it over, and as you think it over, we can reach a common understanding of the procedures and approaches we can take to a solution.

Would you like to pass to another subject, Mr. Secretary?

Brezhnev: All right. Maybe we could talk about this: We complete the European Security Conference. But we should not stop at that. We should make further headway. Relaxation of tensions doesn't stop with Europe, the U.S. and Canada.

We should extend further. Maybe we should talk about that. I think it was you who said detente is useful not only for Europe but for all the world, and I certainly associate myself fully with those words.

Ford: I agree. In this connection, I want to note that the United States Senators who met with you in Moscow came back with very favorable reactions to the discussions they had with you, Mr. Secretary. And the Senators join with me in the view that detente is the way our two countries should proceed. They were impressed with the very frank discussions they had with you on energy, economy, trade and other areas. Their impression was that there are distinct possibilities for cooperation in these areas. And I was greatly impressed by the hospitality extended by you and your associates during that visit and the frankness and spirit of cooperation with which these were discussed at the time of their visit.

Brezhnev: In Washington, Mr. President, when I met with a large group of Senators and Congressmen and answered some of their questions, there was one man who sat in the back and asked a question about something. He asked the question in a delicate way, and I said "You are not bold enough. You are obviously referring to the Jewish population in the Soviet Union." When they were in the Soviet Union, he admitted: "It was me." It was Senator Javits, and we then had an interesting discussion with him.

Ford: Javits sitting in the back of the room? [Laughter]

Gromyko: He admitted it was him. He was sitting to one side.

Brezhnev: [To Kissinger] Were you present in Washington during the meeting?

Kissinger: No. I knew about your meeting. You presented some figures to the Senators in that meeting.

Brezhnev: I have some figures on that for this meeting too. It is soon going to be a veritable tragedy!

Ford: Let me say on that point, Mr. General Secretary. I have indicated to you that I intend to submit legislation as to trade and also as to credits. The handling of Congress is a very delicate problem. As you know, it is dominated in our system by the opposition party, so I have influence but not necessarily control. So the matter of timing when to submit legislation on trade and credits is very important. It is my hope this fall to submit remedial amendments so

that we can have trade relations as initially contemplated. I think it was very unfortunate that you were forced to cancel the trade agreement, although I understand the action in Congress might have compelled you to do this. Perhaps by some appropriate action you could help me convince the Congress to approve the changes we will recommend. That would be a very important step, so detente can proceed and we can move in trade relations forward as we anticipated in a constructive way.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, on the whole let me say, there has been no change in our policy. We want as before to have good relations with the United States.

Ford: Mr. General Secretary, a few moments ago you said you had some figures in mind to discuss. I would be most interested.

Brezhnev: I will look. I do have somewhere a brief on this question. We have already added Solzhenitsyn to the list! [Laughter]

Gromyko: What we won't do for the sake of friendship!

Ford: I have heard the name before.

Brezhnev: [Reads over his talking paper and confers with Gromyko] Here are some data. In 1972 -- the first figures are the number of requests for exit permits -- in 1972, there were 26,800 requests. In 1973, there were approximately 26,000. In 1974, there were 14,000. In the first six months of 1975, there were 5,000 requests to leave.

As regards the number of people who actually left for Israel -- actually some went elsewhere -- in 1972, there were 29,000. In 1973, 33,000. In 1974, 19,000. And in the first six months of 1975, 6,000. Some were carry-overs from the past year; there were only 5,000 requests.

I have another figure. From the start of the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union, which dates back to 1945, until July 1, 1975, a total of 116,000 persons left the Soviet Union. This amounts to 98.4 percent of all requests submitted, 98.4 percent were met. You see, at present there is a process of falling off of requests, and probably it will continue. In your country, there are some to whom you don't give permission on security grounds; we also have such people.

[Secretary Kissinger gets up to leave briefly.]

Ford: I must say Mr. General Secretary, Mr. Solzhenitsyn has aligned himself --

Kissinger: I am not leaving because you mentioned that name. [Laughter]

Ford: Mr. Solzhenitsyn aligned himself with those who are very severe critics of the policy I and you believe in, detente. Senator Jackson, Mr. George Meany, President of the American Federation of Labor, have spoken out critically. Meany has embraced Mr. Solzhenitsyn. Some of these critics encouraged Mr. Solzhenitsyn to continue his criticism of detente. As I said before, it is my firm belief that detente must continue and become irreversible if we want to achieve that kind of world which is essential for peace. The figures you mentioned, of course, are very disappointing to those who criticize detente. And any improvement there -- in the requests or the figures of those who get permission to leave -- would undercut some of the criticism and enhance our ability to proceed with detente as we want to do. But I repeat: detente can and will work and can be made irreversible -- particularly if this Saturday we can make headway on SALT.

Brezhnev: I mentioned Solzhenitsyn just in passing. There was some information that he wanted to change his way of life and become a monk or something. Reportedly there was some priest going around with him at some point. He is nothing more than a zero for the Soviet Union. But why do you feel these figures will be disappointing to the people you mentioned?

Ford: In the case of Senator Javits, and Senator Ribicoff, they want to be helpful in Congress to approve the legislation I want to recommend, legislation that will permit trade, to extend credits, that will be very beneficial. If the figures were more encouraging, Mr. General Secretary, they would provide them with arguments for revising legislation that was so harmful to the continuation of detente.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, maybe you didn't understand me correctly. I said we are reaching the point where there will be a tragedy. But what are we to do? Start talking people into leaving? I merely made a factual statement: The number of applications has been decreasing. The number of applications we have been receiving since I was in Washington has been declining. I am sure you and Dr. Kissinger realize this is so. I know virtually dozens of people of Jewish origin. Am I to go to Dymshits, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, and say "You've got to leave?"

And Leibman of the Moscow Soviet -- should I grab him by the hand and tell him to go?

Ford: Certainly the figure of 98 percent is a good record.

Gromyko: Ninety-eight point four percent.

Ford: That is certainly a good batting average, as we say in the United States. I am not suggesting ways for increasing the number of applications. All I want to say is that Ribicoff, Javits and others must be made to understand that if the revised legislation is adopted, there will be the possibility, if not the certainty -- that the figures will be like those of 1974 or 1973. I understand you can't take people by the hand and tell them to leave, but the perception, the appearance, makes a difference.

Brezhnev: I really can't understand what I can do in this regard.

Ford: Let me summarize the situation as I see it from the point of view of detente. I came here, Mr. General Secretary, despite the criticism in the United States, because I believe in detente. The portions I have been connected with -- Vladivostok and here -- have been concrete forward steps, meaningful progress. As I said, the criticism at home has come from elements in America that can be, as I said, brushed aside. Coming here will contribute to detente despite the detente critics. I hope we will achieve in Helsinki what we talked about in Vladivostok. Thinking people in the U.S. know that Vladivostok was a success which serves the interests of both sides. The American people, the majority of the population, hopes for more progress. The majority feels the same way about this conference, and the implementation of the document we sign will be the most conclusive proof that we are on the right track. So I hope we can make progress in SALT. This will be a good preliminary discussion for what we discuss on Saturday. But I repeat with quiet emphasis, detente must be made irreversible. It was my conviction at Vladivostok. I hope we can leave Helsinki with the same feeling, leading hopefully to a visit by you to the United States this fall.

Brezhnev: [Interrupts the translation] And I appreciate very highly the fact that you came here despite the criticism in the U.S.

[Interrupts the translation at statement that detente is beneficial:] And I agree with you on that.

On the second [of August], we will not have too much time, but I want to devote that day to what is most important.

[He starts reading from his talking paper.] At this point, Mr. President, I would like to mention one thing which relates to our common goals. You and we have an agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. We both pledged to act in such a way as to prevent a nuclear war between us. And we both, I am sure, agree that nothing should be done to weaken that goal. In this, all aspects are important -- economic, political, technical, as well as moral and psychological. The very possibility of a nuclear war between us should be made to be inadmissible in anybody's mind. So I cannot but call your attention to statements by certain officials in the United States, notably the Secretary of Defense, that suggest the possibility or even the probability of the United States using nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. [Translated by Sukhodrev as "call to mind the permissibility or even the inevitability of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union."] What he implies is a preventive nuclear blow against the Soviet Union. When our people read that, they can't but be disturbed [translated by Sukhodrev as "it can only be read one way"]. What if we began replying in kind? All our agreements would go to hell. It amounts to the possibility of preventive attack against the Soviet Union. How are we to take that?

Ford: Mr. General Secretary, I am sure you know that in the United States the President of the United States makes the policy and executes the policy. You and I have said in our discussions, and I have said publicly, that nuclear war is abhorrent to us. I can assure you that I intend to pursue that policy, that so long as I am President, policy will be set by me as I described it to you, publicly and privately.

Mr. General Secretary, I have two questions. Would it be possible to meet at 9:00 on Saturday?

Brezhnev: [Confers with Gromyko] There is the grain question. I think that is an easy one. We have given you the relevant information. I think that will not be a problem.

Ford: The main subject I think we should discuss, of course, is SALT.

Brezhnev: That is the main issue.

Ford: Is 9:00 all right?



Brezhnev: All right.

Kissinger: We have to tell our press something. I propose we just list the subjects we discussed.

Brezhnev: We have something.

Kissinger: You have already got a statement?

Gromyko: A unilateral statement.

Kissinger: I have to brief them tonight. If we don't mention SALT, they will wonder, because we told them it was the main subject. The Middle East. No content. We won't write anything.

Gromyko: Unilateral. The Middle East and strategic -- these two in particular.


Kissinger: And Europe and bilateral.

Can we say there was a constructive atmosphere?

Brezhnev: We will say we kept fighting all the time. [Laughter]

Ford: I think "friendly." Very good.

[The meeting ended. The President escorted the General Secretary to his car outside where the party posed for photographs.]



Handed to HAK by
Gummyko in Helsinki
July 30, 1975

I N F O R M A T I O N

Since the emigration began in 1945 through March 1, 1974, 94 thousand persons (with children up to 16 years of age) left the USSR for permanent residence in Israel.

This number includes:

1971	13.7 thousand
1972	29.8 thousand
1973	33.5 thousand
the first two months of 1974	3.3 thousand.

In practice, 95 percent of petitions for emigration to Israel are satisfied. Only those privy to state secrets are denied the request for exit.


As of March 1, 1974, 2160 petitions for emigration are under examination.

Following October 1973 (the period of military activities), the number of requests to emigrate to Israel dropped more than two-fold. If in the period January - October 1973 an average of 2.5 thousand requests per month were submitted, then in the following months submissions can be broken down as follows:

October 1973	1690 petitions
November 1973	1210 petitions
December 1973	1299 petitions
January 1974	1300 petitions
February 1974	1115 petitions

Along with the above, a greater incidence of cases is noted in which persons having received permission declined to emigrate to Israel (402 persons) or have not appeared to receive their exit visas (1112 persons). Such cases occur in Georgia, Uzbekistan, Moldavia, the Ukraine, and in Moscow and Leningrad.

During 1973, the Soviet authorities received more than a thousand requests from former Soviet citizens who




had departed for Israel for permission to return to the USSR. The decline in emigration and the rise in reemigration has been influenced in the first instance by the irrational and aggressive policies of the Israeli Government, as well as social difficulties in that country.

In the list handed over by Dr. Kissinger, 11 out of the 742 names are carried twice. Out of the 731 persons remaining in the list, 367 received permission and in the very near future permission will be given to another 15 persons. 147 have not presented petitions to emigrate, and 41 persons are serving criminal sentences, and will receive permission to emigrate after they have been freed from their places of confinement.

91 persons have been refused permission to emigrate because they were privy to state secrets, in connection with which 70 persons who are members of their families who are also not emigrating.

According to the 1970 census, 11,452 persons of Jewish nationality lived in the Jewish Autonomous Region; petitions from them to emigrate to Israel have not been received by the internal affairs organs.



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of
the Central Committee of the CPSU
President Ford
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

DATE & TIME: Wednesday, July 30, 1975
12:00 Noon (after plenary meeting)

PLACE: Outside American Ambassador's Residence
Helsinki, Finland

[Soviet memcon of private conversation reconstructed from scraps of paper retrieved from Brezhnev's ashtray in Finlandia Hall, Helsinki, after CSCE plenary, by Jan Lodal, NSC staff. Translated and supplemented by Alexander Akalovsky, who also overheard part of the private conversation.]

After a discussion with G. Ford in the presence of others, a short conversation took place eye to eye.

L. I. Brezhnev: I wish to tell you confidentially and completely frankly that we in the Soviet leadership are supporters of your election as President to a new term as well. And we for our part will do everything we can to make that happen.

G. Ford: I thank you for that. I expect to be elected and I think that that meets the interests of the further development of Soviet-American relations, and of the cause of strengthening detente.

L. I. Brezhnev: Yes, on this matter we agree with you that this is precisely how it should be. Unfortunately, however, publicly you call us, the Soviet Union, adversaries, and in your conversations with us you say that we have common goals -- transformation of detente into an irreversible process.

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

SECRET/NODIS/XGDS


NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines

By KSH, NARA, Date 8/7/01

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G. Ford: I can assure you, in full frankness, that I am absolutely prepared to dedicate all my efforts precisely to ensuring that relations between our countries develop steadily, and that detente become irreversible.

[This private conversation took place following the President's and Brezhnev's exchanges with media representatives outside the American Ambassador's residence. As Brezhnev moved to his car, he was overheard asking Sukhodrev if his remarks to the President might have been caught by the correspondents. Sukhodrev assured him that, in interpreting, he had deliberately lowered his voice so that only the President could hear him.]



К записи беседы Л.И.Брежнева с Дж.Фордом

я 1975 года

После Фордом в присутствии других состоялась короткая

беседа с глазу на глаз.

Л.И.БРЕЖНЕВ. Хочу Вам доверительно и совершенно откровенно сказать что мы в советском руководстве сторонни Вашего избрания и на новый срок. И мы будем со своим, чтобы так было.

Дж.ФРД. Благодарю Вас за это. Я рассчитываю быть избранным и думаю, что это отвечает интересам дальнейшей американо-советских отношений, дела упрочения разрядки

Л.И.БРЕЖНЕВ. Да, в этом деле мы с Вами считаем что так и должно быть. К сожалению, однако, при Вы называете нас, Советский Союз, противником. В договорах с нами говорите, что у нас общие цели - превращение разрядки в процесс.

ФРД. Могу заверить Вас вполне откровенно и совершенно готов посвятить все свои усилия именно тому, чтобы отношения между нашими странами постоянно развивались, а разрядка стала бы необратимой.

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES, State Review 9/15/03
BY Ma, NARA, DATE 10/24/03




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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.6

DR 01-144 # 3; at sec 945/01

By ddc NARA, Date 10/16/01

SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: US

The President
The Secretary of State
Walter Stoessel, US Ambassador to the USSR
General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to
the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of
State
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Department of State
Jan Lodal, NSC Staff
Alexander Akalovsky, Department of State

USSR

General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev
Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr. G.M. Kornienko, Chief of American
Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. A. Aleksandrov, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev
Mr. K. Chernenko, Member of the Central
Committee Staff
General Kozlov, Deputy Chief of General Staff
Mr. Detinov
Mr. V. Sukhodrev, MFA
Mr. A. Vavilov, MFA

DATE & TIME: August 2, 1975, 9:05 a.m.

PLACE: Soviet Embassy, Helsinki

Brezhnev: I think the Conference in Helsinki has been
received very well by the public.

The President: Yes, I think the press coverage was
very good. I have also seen a lot of good pictures in the
papers.

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER



Brezhnev: Let's take off our coats; it will be easier to work that way.

[Everybody takes his coat off.]

Bezhnev: How should we start? Perhaps we should draw lots. If the lot is in my right hand, Gromyko will start.

Gromyko: Perhaps. Why not?

Brezhnev: No, maybe we should ask Dr. Kissinger to start.

The President: Mr. General Secretary, I believe you made an outstanding speech at the Conference. I liked its tone and I believe the emphasis you placed on MBFR and SALT has set a correct atmosphere for today's meeting. I would like to compliment you on your speech.

Brezhnev: Thank you very much. If your comment is not merely an expression of politeness, I thank you all the more. [Pause] You know, Mr. President, after this conference, it is morally more difficult to talk about increasing our armaments levels, about introducing new types of weapons, and the like.

The President: I believe it is very interesting to note that the only dispute that surfaced during the conference here was not a dispute between the US and the Soviet Union, but one between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. This is a pleasant change.

Brezhnev: My close colleagues, when they heard those speeches, thought there would be a fist fight.

The President: If there had been one, I believe that from the standpoint of appearance Demirel looked stronger.

Brezhnev: There was also a divine representative there, with a heavy cross!

[Pointing to the cookies which had just been brought in] Dr. Kissinger, this is all for you, you seem to have grown weaker!

[Laughter]

Mr. President, I must thank you for your support and assistance in having this conference precisely at this time. This is something we greatly appreciate and it would be rude of me not to say so. There is also something I would like to



say off the record, and those taking notes please don't do so. Well, we have an agreement, and we also have arms that could put both of us into the grave. After this conference, if we were to make announcements about the introduction of additional arms or of new types of armaments, that would be inappropriate in this atmosphere. But we do need a new agreement. The first one is valid until 1977 and the next one should cover another eight years. This, I am sure, would bring greater tranquility into the minds of our peoples. What we have to discuss is the shape of a new agreement.

The President: I agree. I hope, indeed I believe, that it is possible to reach agreement, and I am looking forward to your visit sometime in the fall to sign, and if need be, to complete the agreement. I believe Dr. Kissinger and your Foreign Minister have moved a number of issues to a point where technicians in Geneva can work out the specifics. We have made substantial progress on such issues as verification of MIRVs; on submarine MIRVs, I don't think the remaining differences are very serious; as regards dimensions, it is a more technical problem. We could draw up a check list of the points where differences continue to exist. Perhaps we could proceed in that way. Last Friday, we gave you our communication. Perhaps you have looked at it and perhaps this would be a good starting point.

Brezhnev: [Pause] Mr. President, this is the second time I am meeting with you on this problem, which is so delicate and most important for our two countries as well as for the entire world. With Dr. Kissinger, we have had numerous meetings on this problem. I would like to speak openly: have we really done everything correctly? First we talked about throw weight, launching weight, modifications of dimensions by 10 to 15 percent, and a ban on the construction of new silos. That is fine, but the fact is that you and we have different fuels which are not comparable. After all, a cup of tea is not a cup of mercury, because the weight of the two is different. But if missiles are used, the result will be the same: Brezhnev dies and Kissinger dies. From the standpoint of the Pentagon and our Ministry, there may be a difference, but from the standpoint of our people at large there is none.

Now, Dr. Kissinger, what do you want: launching weight or throw weight? I am sure you could not answer this question.

The Secretary: I could try.



Brezhnev: We have made a number of concessions: for example, missiles once tested with MIRVs are all to be counted as equipped with MIRVs, although initially our approach was different. But when we asked you not to build B-1 bombers, you said you would. Also, we asked you not to build the Trident, but you are going ahead just the same and that means that we will have to build our Typhoon. Now we have the issue of cruise missiles, which can be launched from both the ground and the air. This is such a complex and delicate issue that it is very difficult to deal with it. But we must give some basic guidance to our representatives in Geneva so that we can sign a document.

[Pause]

Now, I remember that in Vladivostok you agreed . . . [confers with Gromyko] you indicated agreement concerning B-1 missiles of over 600 kilometers. I am raising this issue of cruise missiles only reluctantly, not because I would like to bypass it, but because I want to avoid anything that could spoil our relations, so that we could find some compromise.

When Gromyko met with Dr. Kissinger, we made a very big concession on verification of MIRVs, and it was really a major concession that was not easy for us to make. But Dr. Kissinger was told that this was linked with cruise missiles. [Gromyko prompts him] We told Dr. Kissinger that the solutions of the two issues should be treated as one complex of issues. Also, we said that each cruise missile should be counted as one, just as those on B-1 bombers. Furthermore, we said that air-based cruise missiles of over 600 kilometers and land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range should be banned. But I must tell you, Mr. President, that Dr. Kissinger has completely ignored this proposal.

The Secretary: This is a total violation of the President's instructions. I did all this on my own. If you hadn't told this to the President, he would not have known it, so now I am in deep trouble.

The President: We have agreed to ban land-based cruise missiles with intercontinental range. You wanted this and we said OK. We also agreed to limit sea-based cruise missiles to a range of 1500 kilometers, so we have moved towards you on this issue. We have also agreed to include in the ban cruise missiles on transport aircraft.

Brezhnev: When you say cruise missiles of intercontinental range, do you mean land-based ones?



The Secretary: Land-based intercontinental cruise missiles and also cruise missiles on transport planes. You wanted to ban them and the President has agreed.

Brezhnev: It is also good that we have agreed on banning ICBMs based on the seabed and the ocean floor, including inland and territorial waters.

The President: Also in space!

Brezhnev: Yes, that is very good.

We are prepared to refer to the delegations in Geneva the question of the limits on dimensional modifications of silos. There are still some differences on this.

Gromyko [to Brezhnev]: Those differences will remain in Geneva as well!

The Secretary: Did I understand you correctly that the points you mentioned previously, such as cruise missiles with intercontinental range, should also go to Geneva? At any rate, let's make a list of issues.

Brezhnev: No, I don't think so.

The Secretary: Only silo dimensions?

Brezhnev: Silo dimensions and . . . [prompted by Gromyko] cruise missiles of intercontinental range.

The Secretary: We agree.


Gromyko: The problem is that the differences between our approaches will remain the same in Geneva as they are here.

The Secretary: We are not disputing, we only want to be sure we understand you correctly.

[Pause]

Brezhnev: I would like to give the floor to Gromyko.

Gromyko: There are various issues relating to cruise missiles. On some we have reached agreement, on others we have not. We have agreement on the following points. You have given a positive answer concerning cruise missiles of intercontinental range. So this is agreed and could be referred to



the delegations for drafting appropriate language. We have proposed a ban on cruise missiles on all aircraft other than heavy bombers, and we have also proposed that all air-based ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers, except those on heavy bombers, be banned. You have given a positive answer concerning cruise missiles but are passing over in silence ballistic missiles. So that part of this problem which has been agreed could go to Geneva.

The Secretary: We have agreed to count in the aggregate all ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers no matter what vehicle they are on.

Gromyko: If you say this, and you have not said it before, then we can state that all ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers are banned from all aircraft other than heavy bombers, but if you say that all such missiles are to be counted, then we still have some differences.

The Secretary: Are you, Mr. Minister, saying "count"?

Gromyko: No, not count, ban. Agreement concerning the counting of missiles on heavy bombers was reached in Vladivostok.

The Secretary: Our concern is how to differentiate between heavy bombers and other aircraft.

Gromyko: But you and we have agreed on what types of aircraft are to be regarded as heavy bombers.

The Secretary: Not completely. There is still one type at issue, although you are correct as regards aircraft on our side.

Gromyko: This is a separate issue. It relates to the Backfire and should be discussed separately.

As regards sea-based missiles, we have proposed banning all missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers from all ships. Here we have an obverse situation: You have replied positively as regards ballistic missiles but on cruise missiles you have agreed to ban only those with a range of over 1500 kilometers. So here we have agreement on ballistic missiles but not on cruise missiles, and only the first part of this issue could be referred to Geneva.

The Secretary: For clarity, will you please define what you understand has been agreed regarding sea-based ballistic missiles?



Gromyko: All over 600 kilometers are to be banned.

The Secretary: Correct, we agree.

The President: Yes, we agree.

Gromyko: As Comrade Brezhnev has said, there is also agreement between us regarding emplacement on the seabed and on the ocean floor, so this too can go to Geneva. The same applies to outer space.

All issues are important but the issue of cruise missiles is of particular importance. We understood in Vladivostok that missiles included in the aggregate of 2400 are not to be divided in categories of ballistic and cruise missiles. But you started doing so after Vladivostok and this has greatly complicated matters. As Comrade Brezhnev has said, this is a particularly important issue.

The Secretary: On the other hand, nothing was said in Vladivostok about cruise missiles on aircraft other than heavy bombers. But we are ready to reach agreement on this as well as on sea-based cruise missiles. So we are prepared to generalize this problem.

Gromyko: Well, in Vladivostok the cruise missiles issue was not even mentioned, so that we could not even conceive of drawing a line between cruise and ballistic missiles.

The Secretary: But there was nothing said in Vladivostok about cruise missiles on ships and aircraft other than bombers. Yet, now we are willing to count such missiles in the aggregate. We have also agreed to ban cruise missiles on all aircraft other than heavy bombers, to ban cruise missiles with a range of over 1500 kilometers on ships and submarines, and to ban ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers on ships.

Gromyko: You say nothing was said in Vladivostok on these issues. But it was you who started differentiating between cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. If we had proceeded consistently, there would be no division even today. Now, as regards what should be referred to Geneva. The General Secretary has already mentioned this. If no agreement has been reached on some issues at a high or the highest level, no progress can be expected on those issues in Geneva either. On the contrary, their referral to the delegations might make work in Geneva even more difficult.



Brezhnev: In Vladivostok, in the course of two days, we reached agreement on very important questions and principles!

The Secretary: I would like to make two points. First, we should send to Geneva only those items agreed here. There is no point in sending other issues, because if the General Secretary and the President do not agree, Semenov and Johnson won't either. So I repeat, only agreed items are to be referred to Geneva.

Second, as regards sea-based cruise missiles, most of your sea-based cruise missiles have a range of 300 to 500 kilometers -- and I know that your technicians are always angry when I mention specifications of your weapons. With that range you can hit 40 percent of US cities, a great number of which are along the coast. With similar missiles we can't hit your cities because you very unfairly and inappropriately have located your cities deep inland. So we have a choice: either you give us a longer range or move your cities to the coast.

Gromyko: A very revolutionary proposal! What kind of binoculars do you use?


The Secretary: Our Secretary of Defense proposed moving your cities to the sea coast.

Brezhnev: Put them on barges!

The President: I thought you would suggest moving our cities farther from the sea!

Brezhnev: Not too far!

[A lengthy pause, with Brezhnev reading his brief and then engaging in a long conference with his advisers, only portions of which could be overheard. After reading the paper, Brezhnev waived Kozlov from his seat and asked him what the issue was, commenting that he could not understand it because all missiles were subject to the 600 kilometer limitation. Kozlov, Gromyko and Kornienko explained that the issue was the difference between cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Somewhat later Brezhnev asked if all SALT I provisions would remain in force until 1977. Gromyko replied in the affirmative but pointed out that if agreement were reached now on new points, the new provisions would come into effect under SALT II. After re-reading his brief,



Brezhnev exclaimed that he still did not understand the essence of the issue. Gromyko and Kornienko repeated that it related to cruise missiles. Brezhnev asked if they had in mind land-based cruise missiles, with Gromyko and Kornienko saying that land-based cruise missiles were the lesser part of the problem; Kozlov added that sea-based cruise missiles with the range desired by the US could hit the USSR from the north. Pointing to a paragraph in his brief, Brezhnev asked what the issue of a definition of heavy missiles was all about. Kozlov's response could not be heard.]

Brezhnev: I don't want to burden you, Mr. President, with this question, but what is your view of the definition of heavy missiles? Should it be according to launching weight, or throw weight?

The Secretary: We proposed both, but if we had to choose we would prefer throw weight.

Brezhnev [to Gromyko]: I can't invent anything new here.

Gromyko: You say both. How do you visualize the combination? Can you spell it out?

The Secretary: Your formula for launching weight is that there should be no missiles heavier than the most heavy of the light missiles you now have, that is the SS-19. We say that there should be no missiles with a throw weight larger than the one of the SS-19. We would use these criteria per missile and not overall.

May I make a suggestion. You have been helpful in giving us concrete ideas, and we gave you our proposals. Perhaps you can give us now your views on our recent proposals so we could discuss them with our colleagues and give you our response in a week or so. Then, when the Foreign Minister comes to the US or when I come to Moscow, we could continue our discussion.

[Pause]

Brezhnev: Mr. President, perhaps you don't know the characteristics of our aircraft, but I want to tell you that what you call the Backfire is not a heavy bomber so that your proposal is completely without foundation.

The President: Our understanding is that the Backfire has sufficient range and arms to be counted as a heavy bomber. Perhaps you could give us some technical information that would show that it should not be counted. We understand



that the Backfire is a replacement for the Bison, and the Bison is counted. So the Backfire should also be counted in the aggregate of 2400.

Brezhnev [to Kozlov]: This is not correct, is it?

Kozlov [to Brezhnev]: Myasishchev is a heavy bomber. But this is a medium bomber. It has half the range. TU-22 is a different matter.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, in including the Myasishchev bomber, or what you call the Bison, we gave you a big present. That aircraft is not capable of a two-way mission. But, nevertheless, for formal reasons, we agreed to include it as a heavy bomber. As regards the Backfire, it can't do even half of what the Bison can do. Ask your experts. This is on the record, and I am responsible for what I say. So how can we include it?

President: Our intelligence tells us that the range and the other capabilities of the Backfire are reasonably comparable with those of the Bison. The two aircraft have a similar range and their other capabilities are also similar. I respect your statement, but our information does not coincide with what you tell me. I would have a monumental problem with our intelligence, and with our Congress as well as the American people at large, to whom I have to account, if I were to accept your figures. If we could see the figures, that could perhaps help us in finding some possible arrangement, but this would take time. I really cannot dismiss the information presented to me by my advisers. Every time when we encounter technical problems -- and they are important -- I am reminded of your opening statement on the importance of reaching an agreement that would be in the interests of both of our peoples. So with the time limitation we have, I believe it would be useful if your Foreign Minister and Dr. Kissinger, when Mr. Gromyko comes to the United States, continued discussing this problem. Then, when Dr. Kissinger visits Moscow, he and Mr. Gromyko could further narrow the differences. Then when we meet, we could further refine our views so as to be able to sign an agreement. The differences we have over the Backfire bomber are a very tough problem. Therefore, I would like to ask you if you have anything to say on cruise missiles, so that we could indicate some progress. If you could give us something on cruise missiles that we could take back with us, that would be very useful.



Brezhnev: It is most difficult to discuss these questions. You, Mr. Ford, are President, and I am General Secretary. Your intelligence reports to you certain things that are news to me, so what does it mean when you don't believe what I tell you? My intelligence reports to me that you are converting light missiles into heavy ones. So you get your intelligence reports and I get mine. But we sit here and don't believe each other. Perhaps not we, but our intelligence people, should sit here.

The President: You said we should not do anything to disrupt the good relationship we have established. I agree 100 percent with you on this point, and all Europe wants this. This was the opinion reflected in all the statements we heard at the conference. But we have to state our views openly. I rely on my intelligence, and you on yours.

If you could indicate some movement on cruise missiles, then we could say that our two meetings have been productive. We said 3,000 kilometers for airborne cruise missiles. I am willing to modify this, perhaps to 2,500, although this is very hard for me to do. In the case of surface ships and submarines, perhaps we could consider using something less than 1,500, say 1,200. I offer this despite the technical advice I receive to show good faith and to indicate that I make decisions regardless of advice. Again, I recall your opening words about the importance of reaching agreement, which impressed me greatly.

It seems to me that given the excellent environment created in Helsinki and the faith thirty-three nations have put in your and my hands, it would be very unfortunate if we were to walk out of here unable to say that progress has been achieved in this vital area.

Gromyko [to Brezhnev]: This doesn't solve the issue.

[Lengthy pause]

Brezhnev: You know, to work out a good agreement, an agreement that would be mutually advantageous, considerable time is needed. Dr. Kissinger plans to visit Moscow rather late. This will create great difficulties, because we will be preoccupied with preparations for the visit by Giscard, the Party Congress, etc.

So we should agree on when the next meeting will take place. [Turning to Gromyko] With the President?



Gromyko [to Brezhnev]: Well, maybe we will meet with Dr. Kissinger.

The Secretary: What are your suggestions?

[Pause]

Brezhnev: We should advance the meeting somewhat, although I have had no vacation yet. Also, if you come again with cruise missiles and the Backfire, well then we just won't be able to get any agreement. So let's think this over. Gromyko has not only summed up our analysis of the issues, but also has added something to it. I kept silent because it is impolite to repeat the same thing three times.

The Secretary: When is the Foreign Minister coming to New York?

Gromyko: On September 15 or 16. I believe the General Assembly starts on the 16th.

The Secretary: Why don't we propose a date after the President has reviewed the schedule. To speed up things, perhaps I could come at the end of August.

Gromyko: August is not suitable. There is a great deal of work to be done. Our experts have to study the issues thoroughly.

[Pause]

Brezhnev: I propose a five-minute break.

The President: Of course.

The Secretary: But we don't want to offend your allies!

Sukhodrev [to Brezhnev]: That is a reference to their departure for Romania.

Brezhnev: Romania won't perish!

[During the break, which lasted about 15 minutes, Brezhnev read his briefing papers, underlining certain portions in the process. He also conferred with Gromyko but their conversation was inaudible. Towards the end of the break, Brezhnev stepped out of the room for a few minutes.]





The Secretary [to Gromyko]: Ever since you joined the Politburo you have been even more difficult.

Gromyko: I don't think so.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, when do you believe my visit to Washington would be convenient to you?

The President: I would say the second half of October. Would that be convenient to you? We have some flexibility. What can you suggest?

[Prolonged pause]

Brezhnev: You know, Mr. President, there are many issues that require thorough study: what kind of missiles, what characteristics of missiles, etc. I have not been able to study these matters here because I have had talks every day from morning till evening.

The President: As I said, we could be flexible. You asked for our view concerning the timing of your visit. I believe it is more important to reach a good agreement rather than set a deadline and not be able to meet it.

[Pause]

Brezhnev: In these circumstances, it is apparently difficult to solve the problem before us. But we must issue some kind of a statement.

The President: I have asked Dr. Kissinger to jot down the points we have agreed on, and perhaps he could read them to us. This could be reported to the public. We should not disappoint the public although we should not give it undue optimism. At the same time, we should not destroy the Helsinki atmosphere.

The Secretary: I believe we could say that we have agreed to refer to Geneva certain points on which we have reached agreement without specifying those points. As I see it, we have agreed that: (a) ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers on surface ships will be banned; (b) ballistic missiles and cruise missiles on the seabed, including in territorial waters, will be banned; (c) placing nuclear weapons in orbit will be banned; (d) development, testing, and deployment of cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers on aircraft other than bombers will be banned; and (e) development of land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range will be banned. So all these items should be referred to Geneva, but all we would say to the public is that a number of issues have been referred to Geneva.

Gromyko: With reference to cruise missiles on aircraft other than bombers, do you exclude ballistic missiles?

Secretary: We want to handle ballistic missiles together with land mobile missiles. I don't believe there are great differences in this area but we are not yet prepared to refer this to Geneva.

Gromyko: Your list of items is correct; we agree on these items.

The Secretary: Thus, the President can say that we have agreed on a number of points to be referred to Geneva. He could also say that we would remain in touch, primarily through an exchange of visits between the Foreign Minister and myself. In this way, we would not create an impression of stalemate.

The President: I would like to add that Dr. Kissinger could come to Moscow on the 6th or 7th of September rather than in August. And then you, Mr. Foreign Minister, would be coming to New York after his visit.

The Secretary: I am also prepared to go to Leningrad.

Brezhnev: You haven't been there?

The Secretary: The city may not even exist!

Gromyko: Don't you believe your own wife?

The Secretary: We are also prepared to refer the verification issue to Geneva!

Gromyko [shaking his head]: No, no. There is no proposal on this matter, so we can't do it.

Secretary: I just wanted to catch you in a weak moment!

[At this point, Brezhnev, with Gromyko's assistance, began making changes in the text of the Soviet press statement on the meeting. This drafting session lasted about five minutes.]

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, the agreed points you have listed are not to be specified. The list is only for our own purposes, isn't it?

The Secretary: Correct.



Brezhnev: So we could perhaps issue a statement, I mean a unilateral Soviet statement, that would read like this, and you could issue a similar one.

[Brezhnev hands the text to Sukhodrev, who translates it into English.]

"On 2 August, a meeting between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev and U.S. President Gerald Ford in which member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger took part was held in Helsinki.

"The CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and the U.S. President highly assessed the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It was stressed that the final act of the conference, which embodies the collective political will of its participants, creates a good basis for transforming Europe into a continent of peace and fruitful cooperation and makes a major contribution to the consolidation of world peace and security.

"The two sides continued their exchanges of views on problems of the further development of Soviet-American relations. Great attention was paid to the problem of limiting strategic weapons. The questions on which agreement was reached during the talks will be referred to the delegations in Geneva for appropriate finalization. Negotiations on the remaining issues will continue.


"Leonid Brezhnev and Gerald Ford expressed satisfaction with the exchange of views that took place, which was of a constructive character, and reaffirmed the great significance of personal contacts between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States"

[Sukhodrev: The text then ends with a list of participants in the meeting.]

The Secretary: After the first meeting, we said that it had taken place in a "friendly atmosphere". Questions will be asked if there is any difference.

Gromyko: We can include such a phrase in this statement as well.

The Secretary: You make no mention of the discussions between the Foreign Minister and myself, but I believe we can say this unilaterally.



Brezhnev: I see no need for mentioning names.

Aleksandrov: Dr. Kissinger is asking whether he could tell the journalists about those talks.

Brezhnev: Well, the talks might be with me too! But I have no objection anyway.

The Secretary: If we are asked about the General Secretary's visit we will say that there has been no change in plans, but we would not say what the plans are.

Brezhnev: So far, no change is envisaged in our plans.


The President: Mr. General Secretary, thank you very much. I believe we have made a little, although not enough, headway and I look forward to further discussions. We value your readiness to seek agreement -- we certainly seek it -- and I trust that we will be able to reach an agreement that would meet the interests of the American and the Soviet people as well as of the entire world.

Brezhnev: I want to repeat that there should be no public announcement of the points that have been agreed. Otherwise, the question of trust will arise! Now, Mr. President, I would like to have a brief conversation with only you and Dr. Kissinger.

[The meeting broke up at 12:10 p.m., with the President and the Secretary staying in the room for the restricted meeting.]

Drafted by: Alexander Akalovsky





DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.5

NSC Memo, 11/24/98, State Dept. Guidelines

By KSH, NARA, Date 8/7/01

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: USSR

General Secretary CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev
Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko
Viktor Sukhodrev (Interpreter)

US

President Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
William G. Hyland, State Dept. (Notetaker)

DATE & TIME: August 2, 1975 - 12:15pm - 12:35 pm

PLACE: Soviet Embassy, Helsinki

Brezhnev: Proceeding from the discussion you had with Ambassador Dobrynin, I want to say a few words on grain. You said that you had no problems with the purchase of 10 million tons, but that this should not be made public.

The President: As I recall, concerning the 10 million that had already been purchased we had no problems; if you phased out additional purchases you should come to Dr. Kissinger first, so that the purchases should be phased over time, so as not to cause a rise in prices; then there will be no problems.

Brezhnev: I realized that we have already bought 10 million, but we are prepared to go further and to purchase another 15 million, and in that conversation oil was touched on; in a little time, I can assure you that we can sell approximately 25 million tons over five years.

[Gromyko (to Brezhnev during interpretation): We could say 17 million tons of grain; Brezhnev replies: No, 15 million for now.]

The Secretary: 5 million tons a year?

Brezhnev: On the average, but not less than 25 million tons; at world prices with no overcharges, at current world prices. Thirdly, we are prepared to conclude a long-term agreement on grain purchases.

The President: For 2 years or 5 years?

Brezhnev: A minimum of five years, or simply say five years.

The President: Our problem is that we will know how good our crop is in about 3-4 weeks. If it is as good as it looks, then there is no problem. But I want to emphasize: do not go to the grain traders before discussing it with Dr. Kissinger. We will agree on how purchases are to be made, so that there will be no price increase; this is in both our interests. If we have a private exchange, and assuming our crop is as good as it appears to be, I will be very sympathetic. There is an additional point on oil. I gather you are talking about OPEC prices, but we have to have a discount, because there is ample supply from OPEC sources. We feel, however, that working out an arrangement on prices and purchases is important to our general relationship.

Brezhnev: What kind of discount do you have in mind?

The President: Pulling a figure out of my hat, I would say 20-25 percent below world prices.

Brezhnev: This is only between us (in this room); we will cooperate through Dr. Kissinger.

Gromyko: Kissinger, the world famous farmer.

The President: Don't go to the speculators.

Gromyko: No, we will go to Kissinger who charges 25 percent, but speculators only charge 2 percent.