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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Soviet Side
General Secretary Brezhnev
Foreign Minister Gromyko

US Side
Secretary of State Kissinger
Counselor of the Department of State Sonnenfeldt

Interpreter
Viktor M. Sukhodrev

PLACE: Brezhnev's Kremlin Office

DATE AND TIME: October 26, 1974
4:30 - 6:45 p.m.

Brezhnev: There is always good and evil in the world. I am the epitome of good. Gromyko and Sonnenfeldt are the epitome of evil.

Kissinger: Gromyko is the chief obstacle to SALT.

[Brezhnev gets up and goes to his desk and brings back to the conference table a model of an artillery piece which he points at Secretary Kissinger.]

Brezhnev: I don't know how to operate this thing.

Gromyko: It is a good thing there are no correspondents here.

Kissinger: They do want a picture [referring to the fact that no US correspondents were allowed into the opening conference for pictures].

Brezhnev: We will let them.

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E.O. 12958 Sec. 3.8

MR 98-23, #7 MSC # 3/26/99
By KBH NARA, Date 7/10/00



Kissinger: [Referring to the gun] It has a bullet in it?

Brezhnev: It is supposed to be operational but I don't know how to work it. You know I haven't missed once since I got the Colts. I am like Chuck Connors.

Gromyko: But you only shoot once a year.

Brezhnev: Did you have a good lunch?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: The Foreign Minister made a long toast.

Brezhnev: We missed the morning discussion today and I trust Gromyko explained the reason to you and you understand it.

Kissinger: No -- of course I understand. I have so much work along with me anyway.

Brezhnev: I have given up work.

I have been doing some thinking. We should not get involved in a 15-year treaty [on SALT].

Kissinger: I agree completely.

Brezhnev: Let's begin now the private conversation I had with President Nixon. I would like to know your view.

Kissinger: President Nixon never explained to me fully your proposal. I would appreciate a more detailed explanation of what you told him. President Nixon told me that you had talked about an agreement for mutual cooperation but he did not quite explain the details before he resigned.

Brezhnev: As always, I want to be absolutely frank. I too at that time did not go into great detail. I suggested an idea which never left my mind since. There were no selfish aims. I was guided only by the




desire to jointly do something in the world which would forever exclude atomic war or any war in general. The gist of the conversation was this: even in the presence of the agreement between us -- and we sincerely believe in it -- to the effect that we would not use nuclear weapons against each other, could we not also agree ...

[Brezhnev throughout his remarks and the translation had been manipulating the artillery piece. Kissinger: I have never been shot at by the General Secretary. Brezhnev trains the gun at Sonnenfeldt. Gromyko: You should train it at your own Foreign Minister and not frighten the Americans. Brezhnev inserts a shell into the gun and pulls the lanyard. Nothing happens. Brezhnev: I have to ask Sadat for spares. Kissinger: He probably has them in the wrong guns.]

[translation resumes] ... could we not give thought to the possibility of our two powers who possess for the foreseeable future immense strength, especially in the military realm, achieving a treaty or an agreement in some form, in the interest of all mankind, and bearing in mind the threat of nuclear weapons to all peoples, to the effect that, in the event of an attack on either of us by any third power -- we could even name it -- each side, in the interest of keeping the peace, would use military power in support of the other. This would also apply to allies -- say an attack on the FRG or Italy -- we would also come to the assistance of them. Surely this would be a warning against those tempted to use nuclear weapons against us or our allies.

That was the purport of the proposal. I am not suggesting a military bloc of any kind. And this would respect national sovereignty, but it would solve the problem of preventing thermonuclear war between us or other countries. All this could be formulated in a way to be sure that all parties understand that it is not a diktat but meets the interests of all in peace.

At the time, President Nixon indicated he considered it a very interesting idea and seemed to support the general concept underlying it. He added that he took interest in the idea and in another couple of months would be in a position to give a reply to my propositions. We did not go into greater detail and what I have said is in effect a quotation of that talk. I give you my word, and Sukhodrev is responsible with his life, that I never showed the memorandum of the conversation to anyone. Even today, quite some time after the meeting with President Nixon, I still



think in the same way. I am not prompted by fear or hostility toward anyone. Why should anyone object to the proposition that no one will ever touch them with weapons -- Belgium, Holland and the rest.

Kissinger: Let me understand. Suppose the FRG attacks the Soviet Union. We would then support the Soviet Union militarily under this idea?

Brezhnev: Yes. [Keeps pulling lanyard on the gun.] Equally, assume that the Czechs or someone would attack you or your allies or friends with nuclear weapons, we would come to your help. It would primarily apply to an attack with nuclear weapons since the time of conventional weapons has past. In a preamble to such an arrangement, it would be said that it is not directed against anyone and it is in the interest that each State has against the use of nuclear weapons ... [to Sonnenfeldt: you should stop taking notes. Kissinger: This is only for President Ford and I assure you it will not leave the White House. Brezhnev: That is impossible in the United States.] ... it would be a sign of great success for us and our allies. It would not be necessary to make a reference to the parties who might attack. I am just talking about principles now.

Kissinger: The principle is this: If either of us or one of our allies is attacked with nuclear weapons the other one would come to his assistance.

[Brezhnev again pulls the lanyard and this time the gun goes off with a loud bang.]

Brezhnev: Now they will say you are under duress.

Kissinger: I once stepped on a certain button in the President's office and all the Secret Service came charging in. It was early in the Nixon Administration.

Brezhnev: This was originally made to fire paper caps like children's pistols but it wouldn't fire. So then they developed blank shells. I got it as a souvenir.

Kissinger: It is more impressive than the bell you rang downstairs yesterday.

[Brezhnev brings more shells from his desk.]



Kissinger: You already fired a few.

Brezhnev: No, just one. They have no warheads like in the United States. They just make noise. I just got to the bottom of how this thing works; there is a little lever.

Gromyko: We will MIRV it.

Brezhnev: Well, I just wanted to amuse you. [Pushes gun aside.]

Brezhnev: [Responding to Kissinger's last substantive statement.] Yes. I don't have in view the mention of a specific country. And we are not doing it on a bloc basis. Our allies do not have nuclear weapons, though yours do. Such an agreement could generate conditions to warn anyone that no one has the right to attack anyone so all nations should live at peace with each other. I value the life of every Soviet citizen, of every United States citizen, and the citizens of other countrys. If we do not do something like this we will raise our military potential and raise suspicions. As I said yesterday, others will say: Here are the United States and the Soviet Union. They had an old agreement on strategic arms with certain ceilings. Now they have a new agreement with higher ceilings. It means that they closed their eyes to their obligations. My proposal meets all the needs. I have never shown the memorandum of conversation to anyone. I put it forward as a personal idea, as a useful idea. I am not for blocs. We each have friends, though one bloc is defensive and the other is military. They is why I asked those questions of you the day before yesterday. I had written them in my own handwriting in my notebook.

To ensure that people will understand it clearly, I suggest that Dr. Kissinger formulate the preamble and we could just sign it. So no one would think it was a new bloc.

Kissinger: Let me ask this so I understand completely: It is between us and applies to us and our allies. Suppose China attacks India, which is not an ally. Does it apply? And it applies only to nuclear weapons?

Brezhnev: The very fact that the preamble would say that the agreement is directed against nuclear war on the planet -- without mention of China,



India, etc. -- would imply that everyone could be sure there would be no nuclear war. If for instance China wants to attack us -- maybe, who knows, in five years they will attack you -- the agreement would be subordinated to the interest of peace. There should be no reference to "allies." Who knows who will be allies?

Kissinger: So any nuclear attack on anyone we would jointly oppose, including an attack on ourselves?

Brezhnev: What I suggest be said is that we will jointly retaliate against an attack on you, on us, on an ally, so that people understand that nuclear weapons cannot be used with impunity. On us, or allies. It would mean in effect that our two powerful nations, who won't be overtaken for 50 years, would guarantee a world free of nuclear war. So that many problems will fall away.

Kissinger: But then we would have to extend it to other countries; that is my point. Otherwise any country could attack a country which is not your or our ally.

Brezhnev: So far the only nuclear powers are you, us, your allies, and China, and who knows whose ally it is?

Kissinger: And India.

Brezhnev: Oh, India -- it doesn't change the substance. The main thing is that there be no attack on the United States, the Soviet Union, or our respective allies. This is just my private thinking and it must not be repeated. Don't think I will assemble the leadership tomorrow. I just advanced it on my own.

Kissinger: This is only going to President Ford. No other official in the United States Government will get it, nor of course any foreigner. Let me say that it is a very interesting and far-reaching concept and I will discuss it with President Ford now that I understand it. Maybe we will have a brief talk in Vladivostok.

Brezhnev: We are now bargaining about 20, 100, 200 rockets and about whether to MIRV them or not. This doesn't accord with the idea of converting the Interim Agreement into a permanent one. What are 100 rockets when we have thousands?



Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: After all, what difference does it make for any American or Soviet man what he died from, one million or half a million tons. In practice, as the situation is today, one group of states pins its hopes on US nuclear weapons and another group pins its hopes on Soviet nuclear weapons. We spend lots of money and we argue. Surely it is no solution.

Kissinger: As I said, it is an extremely far-reaching and comprehensive approach. I had told President Ford generally that there were discussions between you and President Nixon. I will discuss it with the President when I return and of course well before your meeting at Vladivostok.

Brezhnev: Please understand. This is not an alternative to the detailed proposal we are discussing. It is simply a deeply felt idea. So, report it to President Ford not as a condition. Maybe he will see his way clear to achieving this with us. It would be a great hope for the world and eliminate all the charges of US hostile intent. So I made it very confidential with just one additional person on each side and Sukhodrev who doesn't exist. [Brezhnev brings a large, youthful looking photograph of himself from his desk.] This is me as I will look in 1985 -- it was taken on my 65th birthday.

Kissinger: It is a very nice picture.

Brezhnev: I will have it on my new Party card. They could have made me look still younger. [Pointing to a globe.] This shows the best line of attack against the United States. Of course we have a less intricate net than you have.

Kissinger: I recognize that these two subjects, SALT and your proposal, are not dependent upon each other. On the other hand, what you propose doesn't make sense if the arms race continues.

Brezhnev: I agree. But it is also true, in terms of this idea, that in 50 years it is very hard for anyone to catch up with us.

Kissinger: No, I meant an arms race between us.

Brezhnev: We should end the build-up. What you have, especially in MIRVs, is quite enough.



Kissinger: I will discuss it with President Ford.

Brezhnev: We could easily and calmly agree that if you need them you add three more submarines and so could we, as long as it is by agreement. Meanwhile, we would divert the funds we need for arms from domestic uses. It means billions of rubles. One B-1 costs seven billion.

Kissinger: No. 70 million. But your point is the same anyway.

Brezhnev: On a personal basis, we couldn't invent anything better than this proposal. I am speaking my mind but you are a diplomat. Now, really what is your view?

Kissinger: This is the first time I have heard it in detail. It would have a revolutionary effect on the international situation. It would certainly prevent nuclear war against any other country.

[Brezhnev lights his cigarette lighter and holds it near Sonnenfeldt's note pad, as if to burn it.]

Brezhnev: That is exactly what I want. No one should be tempted to start a nuclear war. In that case we would not be interested in B-1s and all that. It would put the whole question in a different light. It would make no difference then if we agreed to add three submarines or five rockets on each side. But in the other case, we engage in all these calculations and no one knows what they come to.

Kissinger: It is certainly a very radical solution.

Brezhnev: The older you become the wiser you are. I don't wear a wedding ring but I play with this signet ring. It says in here "To Leonid Brezhnev from Novorissisk." It is a memento of one full year I spent when we were allies. Three hundred days of battle with no step back. That is why Novorissisk is a hero city. I had the honor to present the award. On that occasion I was presented this ring. It is not just any ring. It represents a whole epoch when we fought fascism.

Kissinger: It is very moving. I have always been convinced ^{of} the General Secretary's deep emotional commitment to peace. I remember the story he told me of his father.




Brezhnev: I am by nature an emotional man. Whenever the war comes up I read and re-read. Tears come to my eyes. It may be difficult for some to understand. This is not to say that I don't set great store by the contributions made by those who remain in the rear. But I don't forget those who lost their life in battle, on mine fields or barbed wire. Or barbarities like burning people alive or that Jewish people were herded into ghettos -- ghettos right? -- and were destroyed. My own family saved many Jews from bandits during the ^{Civil} war. To this day I have great respect for them, those who are really honest. Basically it is this abhorrence of war that prompted the peace program of the 24th Congress. I cited Lenin when I put forward that program and the economic program. I just recently addressed the US-Soviet Trade Council and I quoted Lenin: We must have good relations with all countries, especially the United States. I would like to be only one tenth as perspicacious as Lenin. But people like that are born just once in a century. That is why it is so hard to conduct negotiations as we have done in the last two days, since they will result in raising arms levels. Its ideas [of the Party Congress] are supported by an overwhelming number of people. Fifty million in the Party and Young Pioneers and millions more. So this is really a matter of substance not just of emotion. When Napoleon, who was a great warrior, got to Moscow he said he had lost the war. It is a small step from the great to the ridiculous.

Kissinger: There is no military solution to contemporary problems.

Brezhnev: No temporary military victory could lead to a solution of the desires of the peoples. I am sure you could draw the conclusion from your own trip to the Middle East that there can be no military solution. When a new flare-up will occur is hard to say but the situation is still a dangerous one. I am not alone in thinking of the need to ensure peace. I have been in the leadership for 23 years and even with Khrushchev's ramblings this has always been true.

Kissinger: I think the overwhelming problem is that of peace, and the General Secretary has made a far-reaching and interesting proposal.

Brezhnev: Comrade Gromyko, who is a member of the Politburo, knows that on more than one occasion I have said to our colleagues that to lead means to predict not just to note. One has to see through the fog. It is in that context that I talked about the Middle East the other day. We have solved nothing. Only the firing has stopped.



Kissinger: I agree. The problems continue to exist.

Brezhnev: Especially since they are young states headed by very emotional statesmen who are very devoted to sovereignty, they have never said they want to destroy Israel. They just want their territory back.

Kissinger: Assad could be convinced to destroy Israel. It would not take much to persuade him.

Brezhnev: I would be against it.

Kissinger: No, I know. I heard what the Foreign Minister said at the UN and I recognize the Soviet position.

Brezhnev: In all my statements I have always stressed that Israel should not be destroyed. We have espoused it since it has been created. And with Bhutto yesterday, he raised the Middle East and spoke in favor of legitimate rights of all the people, including Israel. I agreed with him. He had raised it himself. I can't say that I have contact with all the non-aligned, but India, Yugoslavia, Algeria, they all support a settlement in the Middle East. That is why we favor joint action. We do not want to push anyone out. We need no oil and they have no gas, just Oriental bazaars. I recall a conversation with the late Nassar. I told him to talk more to the people, to use radio and TV. He said all right, but the real way is to put on a fez and go to the bazaars and talk to Ahmed and the others. That is the way.

Kissinger: You will soon see yourself.

Brezhnev: I already have an idea. Nassar was here and Sadat has been here several times. [Sukhodrev gives Brezhnev the Kalb Brothers' book on Kissinger with an inscription in Russian to Brezhnev from Marvin Kalb. Brezhnev looks at the photographs in the book. Brezhnev: Ha, Zavidovo. You know I would like to take you to Dneproderzhinsk where I was born. Kissinger: Very moving.]

Brezhnev: What now?

Kissinger: Maybe the others should join now?



Brezhnev: After our peaceful discussions here, I don't know.

Kissinger: We have practical problems, leaving aside your great project. We have the SALT delegations in Geneva and we are going to call ours home because there is nothing more to talk about.

Brezhnev: Well, there are people downstairs you can talk to -- Gromyko, Aleksandrov.

Kissinger: The problem is that if we would like an agreement in 1975, we have to find a concrete method of negotiations.

Brezhnev: I wonder what we have on tonight. Football maybe?

Kissinger: We were going to go to the Ballet, but is there a football game? I am a great fan.

Brezhnev: Is Mrs. Kissinger at the Ballet? How nice to know Dr. Kissinger isn't getting there again.

Kissinger: Its okay. I know the plot.

Brezhnev: I guess we have got to go downstairs. But not for endless bargaining. We can't conclude an agreement today.

Kissinger: No, but the principles of how we go to an agreement.

Brezhnev: The only thing to do would be to agree on some basic principles for an agreement to be signed when I go to Washington.
K


Kissinger: I don't know what you would want to say at Vladivostok.

Gromyko: The discussions can continue and then there would be a further continuation after that.

Kissinger: Partly in Geneva and partly in the Channel.

Brezhnev: I surely would love to go to Zavidovo. [Brezhnev brings over photos of him and Tito hunting in the Ukraine.]

[The meeting ends at 6:45 p.m.]





THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary and Member of the Politburo, CPSU Central Committee
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
Member CPSU Politburo
Anatoly Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador to United States
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Aide to General Secretary Brezhnev
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Oleg Sokolov, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department, Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Jan M. Lodal, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
A. Denis Clift, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council *ADC*

TIME AND DATE: October 26, 1974
7:10 p.m. - midnight

PLACE: Old Politburo Room
The Kremlin, Moscow

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MR97-20, #39; NSC Letter 9/29/97

By *Ut* NARA, Date 3/11/98

(The meeting began at 7:10 p.m. following a 4:30 - 7:00 p.m. meeting in General Secretary Brezhnev's office involving Brezhnev, Gromyko and Sukhodrev on the Soviet side and Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt on the U.S. side.)

Brezhnev: Our colleagues don't know what we decided on. I want to review it. Tomorrow morning, we're leaving for Zavidovo for a hunting trip. It was Sonnenfeldt's idea. Dr. Kissinger agreed; I was very pleased. I certainly wouldn't mind if all the others present joined us.

Well, unfortunately because of other matters, we weren't able to meet this morning, but we didn't lose too much time. Since the basic objective of this meeting is to debate the principles which could form an agreement, we should talk about the principles. The details can be elaborated later, but not the major issues. So, if you agree, we can spend some time discussing those principles.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: Do you have anything new to tell me for the U.S. side?

Kissinger: I have given you the substance of our position yesterday, Mr. General Secretary.

Brezhnev: No, I meant maybe something more interesting that may have happened in the United States. I haven't been able to follow events there. Maybe Jackson's invented something new. Maybe you have something new by way of instructions.

Kissinger: Any instructions that Jackson sent me would have to be sent to our Secret Service first. They might explode.

Brezhnev: So, in short, there has been nothing new in the United States since our last meeting -- anything new in Ethiopia, perhaps?

Kissinger: The Emperor is still alive and well.

Brezhnev: You're a very humorous man.

Kissinger: The Emperor of Ethiopia makes the longest toasts of any man.

Brezhnev: I've met him, but I've never had the occasion to hear his toasts.

Kissinger: His private conversation is like his toasts. His speech is like King Faisal's.



Brezhnev: I haven't had the pleasure of listening to it.

Kissinger: Faisal or the Emperor?

Brezhnev: The Emperor.

Kissinger: I can tell you that King Faisal thinks that Moscow is run from Jerusalem.

Brezhnev: I liked the photo of you two.

Kissinger: He made an exception for me.

Brezhnev: See the privileges you enjoy!

Well, let's get down to the specifics we wanted to discuss. First, by way of summing up, from the political point of view we can state that both sides reaffirmed their determination to make every effort to improve relations between their countries in accordance with previous agreements, and to endeavor to make that progress irreversible. And, I feel that this is in line with the President's wishes.

And, secondly, as I see it, to those ends, both sides will do all they can not only to develop their bilateral relations but also in international matters to closely coordinate and maintain a parallel line with respect to the European Security Conference and the Middle East.

And, thirdly, we agree that the agreements signed in 1972 and 1973 retain full validity. The two sides underline their determination strictly to observe them, especially so far as the question of strategic arms is concerned, without allowing any violation of those agreements through the very end of their duration. And fourthly, the two sides have agreed for the purpose of preventing the danger of thermonuclear war and in the interests of peace not only between the two countries but also the peace of the world, to prepare for signing next year a new agreement on strategic arms to run until 1985. The following basic principles should underline that new agreement. Each side should by the termination of the duration of the new agreement -- i. e., by the end of 1985 -- have an equal quantity of strategic arms vehicles, that number to be 2,200 (corrects himself) that number to be 2,400 strategic arms vehicles.



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The Soviet Union, considering the geographic and other factors, will be entitled to carry out its program of vehicles to a limit of 2,400 strategic arms vehicles, choosing at our discretion where those vehicles are to be placed -- that is, land-based sea-based or placed on bombers.

Within the same period, the United States will fulfill its program or plans de facto of 2,200 strategic arms vehicles with the same right of choice as to how they are to be distributed, but with the understanding that by the end of 1985 the total quantity of strategic arms vehicles on each side should be equal.

The United States and the Soviet Union agree that the total quantity of MIRVs should be equal by the end of 1985 and amount to 1,320 on each side.

Each side undertakes in this period to act in accordance with previously concluded agreements and not to violate previous agreements on either side by including new strategic arms vehicles. But both sides shall be entitled in accordance with previous agreements to carry out modernization and improvement of existing land-based ICBMs as provided for in the agreement of 1972.

Brezhnev: Do you understand this, Sonnenfeldt?

Kissinger: We understand. We are awed by your ability to do it without paper in front of you.

Brezhnev: Well, everything is so clear, one doesn't need any paper.


Kissinger: I'm impressed.)

Brezhnev continues: After the end of the duration of the previous accord -- that is, after 1977 -- the United States will be entitled up to the end of 1985 to build other, more modern submarines of the Trident class to the amount of 10 such submarines. The Soviet Union in the same period of time will also be entitled to build 10 modernized submarines of the Typhoon class.

The number of missiles on these submarines on each side should be part of the total quantity of strategic arms vehicles provided for in the agreement.

The United States will build its B-1 bombers carrying missiles with a range of not more than 3,000 kilometers. The total number of missiles of these bombers will be determined by the United States, but also will be part of the total number to be included by the end of 1985. The Soviet Union will be entitled to take a decision at its own discretion as to whether to build a

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strategic bomber capable of carrying nuclear weapons vehicles, or instead to deploy such vehicles on land or in submarines. The proportion of these numbers may be subject to additional understandings which, for example, in substance means that if one aircraft can carry 20 missiles this does not mean that if they are not used on planes they must be replaced by the same number of land-based launchers -- for example, there may be 15 or less.

The two sides have agreed that the total number of missile-armed vehicles should be equal on both sides but with due account taken of the third country vehicles of such countries as are allied with the United States by the end of 1985.

The aforesaid has been initialled by Kissinger and Gromyko to be subsequently signed by President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev.

(At the conclusion of Brezhnev's presentation in Russian, the following dialogue took place -- prior to Sukhodrev's translation.)

Brezhnev: After you have heard this, we can ask for some cognac to be brought in and some hot frankfurters and have a drink. It's worth drinking; I have forwarded such a mutually worthy agreement.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, without having heard the translation, my colleagues and I are extremely impressed over the way you have all the elements of such a position in your head. We would have to draw diagrams.

Brezhnev: This is easy. There are more complicated things.

Kissinger: Before I have heard the translation . . .

Brezhnev: I don't think we should argue about one rocket here, 17 there, where the cement dries quicker -- yours doesn't seem to dry at all. However, I am sure your concrete is quite dry by now. I'm sure it won't rain while you install new missiles.

Kissinger: Dobrynin, who reads our Defense Budget, knows we are not putting new missiles in silos.

Brezhnev: Pity poor Comrade Dobrynin having to write reports about Comrade Kissinger having a net over his house. What's the matter; is your roof leaking?

Kissinger: Will you translate, or should I sign it in Russian?

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Brezhnev: Let's do that! (He offers Secretary Kissinger a pen.)

(Sukhodrev then translates Brezhnev's SALT proposal, as set forth in the paragraphs above.)

Brezhnev: We can say the sides have agreed to be guided by the aforesaid principles in their further working negotiations on this issue.

Kissinger: Let me first ask a few questions.

Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: First, this is a serious proposal which gives us a basis for discussion, and obviously serious work has been done which also tries to understand our point of view. There are aspects which give us difficulties. But, it gives us a framework in which to talk.

You say that by the end of 1985 the figure for the Soviet Union should be 2,400. The U.S. figure . . . and so will the U.S. figure . . . by the end of 1985, but not before then. Before then you say it will be 2,200. My question is: Can I understand this to mean that at no time between 1977 and 1985 will the Soviet force exceed 2,400?

Brezhnev: It will not exceed 2,400.

Kissinger: So, in the whole period from 1977 through 1985, the Soviet force will be 2,400? And in this whole period, the U.S. force will be no more than 2,200? That's an important question.

Dobrynin: You have 2,200.

Kissinger: And will at no time have more than 2,200? I just want to have an understanding.

(Gromyko, Dobrynin and Korniyenko and Brezhnev consult.)

Kissinger: (Aside to Aleksandrov) Aleksandrov must have worked on this.

Aleksandrov: I was present.

Kissinger: They couldn't have done it all this morning.

Aleksandrov: (Nods affirmatively)

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Kissinger: We can't accept all of it but we can work from it.

(The full meeting resumes after 15 minute break.)

Kissinger: What is the answer to my question?

Brezhnev: Well, do you want to ask me all your questions first, making it easier? Otherwise, you'll start undressing me article by article.

(Brezhnev gestures as if stripping off his clothes.)

Kissinger: No, no. I'm not debating. My first question is that you say 2,400 for you and 2,200 for us. That means that at no time can we exceed these numbers after the end of 1977. My second question: You said there could be partial modernization of land-based missiles provided for under the agreement as under the interim agreement. How about sea-based missiles other than the 10 Tridents? We understand that only 10 Trident boats can be built, but what is the coverage of other boats?

Brezhnev: Well, we will be guided by the principle established in this regard -- until 1977, building the submarines we are allowed and installing the same rockets we are building already. You will install new missiles on your Trident and we will install new missiles on our new boat. But, it's hard to say now how many rockets will be installed on your Trident or the Typhoon in our case. But, speaking informally, and being frank, my personal estimate is that the number of missiles on our Typhoon will be less than the number on the Trident.

Kissinger: We know how many we will have -- 24.


Brezhnev: Again, informally, we will not have as many on our Typhoons. Although I said that I was mentioning this informally I don't rule out absolutely the possibility of an equal number of missiles on the Typhoon, but, in no event will there be more.

Kissinger: It counts against the total so it does not matter.

Brezhnev: Of course. Equally, it doesn't worry us. You can have 26 if you like. Any way, the old agreement says we have 950 missiles until 1977. It makes no difference whether they are all on one boat or spread out on 50.

Kissinger: That's right.

Brezhnev: Obviously, you will scrap part of your old submarines and so will we. You'll say: What the hell!



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Kissinger: But then, there's a question: If one scraps old submarines can one replace them with submarines of a comparable type?

Brezhnev: Practically, that's out of the question.

Kissinger: Why?

Brezhnev: Because they're not up to the mark in terms of their size. They're morally obsolete.

Kissinger: Morally?

Brezhnev: Morally, although it is true you are installing MIRVs on your Poseidon, the agreement stipulates nothing on missiles for that boat, and I, of course, have nothing new to add to a treaty which I have already signed.

Kissinger: As I understand it, each side is free to compose a force up to 2,400.

Brezhnev: Yes.

Kissinger: But, if you can't build new silos and if you can't replace old submarines, you have not got a choice. I am not arguing; I am trying to understand.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger . . .

Kissinger: I'm not debating; I am trying to understand.

Brezhnev: To be absolutely frank, let me explain why we want our total number at 2,400 and yours at 2,200. You will realize that unless we set those levels we will have to scrap a certain number of our land-based missiles.

Kissinger: I understand that.

Brezhnev: That's all there is to it.

Kissinger: I understand . . .

Brezhnev: So there will be factual equality even if it will appear on paper that we have more than you do. That's the mechanism. There it is laid bare before you.

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Kissinger: One other question: I don't understand this business of missiles on bombers. Would you count any missile? Supposing there is a missile with a range of 100 kilometers, does that count too?

Brezhnev: Well, (Brezhnev confers with Gromyko and Korniyenko) well, Dr. Kissinger, in our previous agreement there was no mention of bombers. So when I mention bombers today I did not mean old types of bombers; I was referring to nuclear, missile-carrying bombers.

Kissinger: In other words the B-1?

Dobrynin: The B-1 type. Now you don't have a B-1 type with nuclear missiles.

Kissinger: You won't count B-52s in this program?

Brezhnev: Generally speaking that is one point we should give additional thought to. (He again confers with Gromyko, Korniyenko and Dobrynin.) So, since it is a new matter not covered in the previous agreement, we need not elaborate right now.

Who knows, maybe as we go into the program further you might want to scrap your program and we might not go ahead with our program.

Kissinger: I understand. Let me . . .

Brezhnev: Because, I guess that one of the reasons why under the previous agreement we were given a certain advantage in the number of missiles was because you had an advantage in bombers.

Kissinger: That's correct. I understand. May I have an answer to my first question?

Brezhnev: You have no further questions?

Kissinger: I have questions for technicians, but no other questions worthy of your attention.

Brezhnev: There are no questions in your mind about MIRVs?

Kissinger: We have noticed that you have said nothing about heavy missiles.

Brezhnev: They shouldn't be mentioned.





Kissinger: That is something we can negotiate.

Brezhnev: I don't think we should end our discussions as to the number of 1300. On your bombers, you may want to have MIRVed missiles. You may want one heavy instead of smaller ones. Let's consider it settled.

Kissinger: Don't assume that the things about which I ask no questions are agreed. I have to discuss them with my associates. It just means that I understand it. As I told you, there are many positive elements in your proposal.

Brezhnev: Well then, how do we end our work?

Kissinger: First, can we get your proposal in writing?

Brezhnev: Your associates have it in your notebooks.

Kissinger: That's an unreliable way of proceeding, but we can take it from our notebooks.

Gromyko: Well you didn't give us any formal documents.

Kissinger: No, but we gave a written document to Dobrynin.

Gromyko: At some stage this can be done.

Kissinger: It just makes it harder for us to study, but we can put it together from our notes.

Brezhnev: Well, Dobrynin will have this as a working paper.

Kissinger: Good enough, a working document.

Brezhnev: He hasn't the right to alter a single word but he will have the . . . One question: How many missiles do you plan to put on the B-1's. I ask this out of curiosity, not subject to controls.

Kissinger: Yes, but you count them.

Brezhnev: Of course. What they are are airborne launchers. Come here. (Brezhnev gestures to Secretary Kissinger; they both rise and Brezhnev leads the way to a large wall map of the world. He points to the USA and the USSR.) They can enter either from your own territory or the territory of your allies.

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You fly to a certain point and launch your missiles. They cover a certain part of the territory and thus they are airborne launchers.

Kissinger: But that is not the purpose of the B-1, because if so it wouldn't be built as a supersonic bomber. If we wanted to shoot a missile with a range of 5000 kilometers we would stay out here (he points into an area in the vicinity of the United States).

Brezhnev: That's exactly what I say, they are nothing but an airborne launcher. Another thing you can fly over the Pole like we can; that's a reply to your question.

Kissinger: I have to get to the hot dogs before Sonnenfeldt does.

Brezhnev: I have a question: Why fly at all?

Kissinger: You mean, why should we fly when we can launch a missile from the United States?

Brezhnev: Why build the B-1?

Kissinger: I have been asking our Generals that one for years.

Brezhnev: That's why I say if you want it go ahead. That's why I said we will be entitled to build an equal number.

The other point to further confuse matters, what about installing rockets in the Arctic and covering them with snow?

Kissinger: We have a bomber which plays the national anthem of the country it is flying over. (They both return to the table.)

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, your question is really warranted. Your question about us giving you a piece of paper with our position set out. I told you Comrade Dobrynin would have a piece of paper. I agree that at some point you will have such a paper.

Kissinger: It doesn't have to be signed. It would enable us to study your proposal.

Brezhnev: So, so, please don't understand me as having said there will be nothing in writing.

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

Kissinger: Would you answer the first question: At no time after 1977 will you have more than 2,400?

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, by the end of 1985 the total number on each side will be the same. We will be equal. Throughout that period we will not have a number in excess of 2,400, but account will be taken of the missiles at the disposal of your allies.

Kissinger: How?

Brezhnev: In the total quantity of missiles.

Kissinger: On whose side?

Brezhnev: Both. Our allies have neither missiles or submarines capable of carrying nuclear arms.

Kissinger: The Chinese do.

Brezhnev: That changes things. If we have reached that point then let's have a drink, a toast. Sonnenfeldt! (Sonnenfeldt downs his drink) That's an honest man; all the others have nets over their glasses. (To Hyland): Are you the guy who puts the nets over the missiles?

Kissinger: What is the compensation for the missiles of the allies you're thinking about?

Brezhnev: There's no compensation; we will count them in the total number.

Kissinger: (laughs) On your side or on ours?


Brezhnev: Your side. Now, if and when Mr. Wilson comes to the Soviet Union and tells me Great Britain is going to join the Warsaw Treaty, then we will add his missiles.

Kissinger: Does that mean we are to deduct France and Great Britain from the 2,200, or is that deducted before?

Brezhnev: No, they are already incorporated in the 2,200.

Kissinger: I understand. My question is: Under those 2,200, can we have 2,200 U.S. systems or 2,200 minus the French and British?

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



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Dobrynin: The 2,200 can all be American.

Brezhnev: We regard that as the total number of rockets aimed against us.

Kissinger: 2,200 minus the 64 British?

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, we unfortunately don't have any ally we can either add or subtract.

Kissinger: I wonder by what theory you explain an advantage of 200, and then subtract the British force.

(A 25-minute recess)

Brezhnev: This recess has deprived us of all of our pleasure. Let me make a correction as to numbers and in doing so reply to your questions as to what 2,200 means -- that is, purely U.S. or not. By way of equalization, the 2,200 will be purely American missiles after the numbers have become equal.

Kissinger: I understand: 2,400 minus the U.K. force. Mr. General Secretary, may I make a suggestion. I believe we should proceed as follows. I will speak frankly, and I believe Dobrynin will confirm the correctness of what I say. If we put this proposal in its present form to our bureaucracy, it will lead into a process in a way most unfavorable to the Soviet Union -- and not useful to the talks at Vladivostok. I propose that Ambassador Dobrynin is given a rough piece of paper when he comes to Washington and that we keep the discussion for the time being entirely in this channel. Because then we can refine many considerations. I think there are positive elements in your proposal that we can take seriously. There are some considerations that we have that you may take seriously. I would prefer to handle this in the channel until after the meeting in Vladivostok. I proposed that Dobrynin and I have a number of meetings in Washington about this -- not to negotiate, but to clarify points. Then you and the President can talk in Vladivostok. And, I do this in order to prevent those people who are looking for difficulties to cause trouble because I believe there are many aspects here we can take very seriously. And, I will work on it only with my closest collaborators -- all who are in this room. But, we will say you haven't given us a formal proposal; this is a sign that we are taking you seriously. Otherwise, we will have Senator Jackson. You know what will happen -- he will hold hearings.

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Brezhnev: I agree with you on one condition: That whatever amendments you make will not be in the nature of fundamental new proposals or new in principle. Because, I don't want this forthcoming -- this first -- meeting with the President to begin with a dispute.

Kissinger: If it looks difficult, we will eliminate it from the agenda and have further discussions. There would be no surprises at Vladivostok. I can give Dobrynin our considerations and then, if it looks difficult we will just defer it. But, we are not intending to come up with anything radically new. I think we have come closer together in this visit than ever before. And, our intention will be to narrow the distance further, not to widen it. But, if on analyzing your proposal we find difficulties we will defer discussion. But, my expectation is that we will come closer together. Our considerations will be in the area in which I have asked questions; so they will be quite predictable.

Brezhnev: You did understand what I said about the B-1's?

Kissinger: Yes, but we will have to study it because I don't have a precise answer. I want to study the range of missiles and other matters. For example, I know we have some missiles that are only air defense, short distance. This is why I would like to analyze it before giving my reply. But I understand the principle.

Brezhnev: When I refer to the B-1's, I was referring only to bombers carrying strategic missiles.

Kissinger: I understand, but this is what I would like to study.

Brezhnev: Of course. Then I will have one question to ask Dr. Kissinger face to face. Here, I would like to express appreciation and satisfaction that we have worked constructively and usefully.

Kissinger: I believe we have worked seriously and that we have made good progress. We will try to work by all available means to come to an agreement by the time you visit the United States in 1975, and we will do our utmost to make the meeting in Vladivostok a success -- and the beginning of close cooperation between you and President Ford.

Brezhnev: Thank you. That is what I want!

Please do not forget not only the substance of this discussion on missiles but also what we discussed on the first day. I know you have not forgotten, and I won't discuss it any more. I endeavored to set out our position as clearly as possible, and I trust you will not disagree.

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Kissinger: I take it seriously. I talked with your Foreign Minister at luncheon telling him, for example, there is a chance I will visit Ankara next week, and I promised to be in touch afterward.

Brezhnev: Good. Those very small minor amendments to the overall communique we've made in the belief that it might be useful in terms of Vladivostok.

Kissinger: I agree. You understand our problem on MBFR.

Brezhnev: We can accept it.

Kissinger: And we accept. If you make many more concessions like this you'll have Alaska by next year.

(Sukhodrev translates; Gromyko translates again and Brezhnev and Soviet side laugh.)

Kissinger: On the timing of the communique release -- (asks U.S. side) what's the time difference between Delhi and here (two and one-half hours) -- can we say 9:00 p. m. in Delhi and 6:30 here? That way I can give out the communique on the plane.

Now, Sonnenfeldt and Hartman are going to talk to Schmidt then we will talk to Schmidt when he comes to Washington. If we keep each other informed on how that concerns CSCE we can make some progress.

Brezhnev: I agree.

Kissinger: We'll keep you informed.

Dobrynin: One suggestion for the communique; one phase (relating to the Middle East): The two sides have agreed to make efforts to bring about the early convening of the Geneva Conference, without mentioning any dates.

Gromyko: Otherwise we will have lost the Conference.

Korniyenko: The sides have agreed to make efforts to obtain the early convening of the Geneva Conference.

Brezhnev: Otherwise, there would be an unfavorable reaction in the Arab world, and with respect to you and us.

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Kissinger: The two sides agree to make efforts to being about the convening of the Geneva Conference at an early, appropriate date. Can I discuss this with my Middle Eastern expert and call Korniyenko at home?

Brezhnev: Let's try to meet a position.

Kissinger: As far as I can see this is your position, and I have given you a compromise. (Further give and take in the communique language.)

The two sides agree that the early convening of the Geneva Conference could play a useful role in finding such a settlement.

Gromyko: Should play.

Kissinger: O. K., should play.

Brezhnev: (The General Secretary gets up and walks around to the American side of the table.) It remains to shake hands. (He shakes the hands of the U.S. participants.)

Kissinger: And to say that we will meet in one month's time.

Brezhnev: I attach great importance to that meeting, and I appreciate that the President wants to have a working meeting. It is a big step forward toward my visit to Washington, and I believe that the meeting will be instrumental in terms of the political situation in the United States.

Kissinger: That's no longer so important.

Brezhnev: The important think is that Ford and Kissinger shouldn't be under fire -- only Sonnenfeldt!

(The meeting concluded at 10:20 p.m., and Secretary Kissinger and General Secretary Brezhnev then had a private discussion.)

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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October 27, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT 

Secretary Kissinger asked me to pass you the following report on his Saturday afternoon meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev.

"I had seven and a half hours with Brezhnev starting at 4:30 p. m. The first two and a half hours were in his office, with only Gromyko on his side and Sonnenfeldt with me. The session was entirely devoted to recapitulation of the proposition Brezhnev made to President Nixon privately at the last summit, which is too sensitive for cable traffic. Brezhnev demonstrated his rather bizarre sense of occasion by spending virtually the entire time he was talking also fidgeting with a model artillery piece, training it now at me, now at Sonnenfeldt. He eventually succeeded in loading it with a dummy shell, but several tugs at the lanyard produced no result until about an hour and a half into the conversation, when a loud bang sounded.

"A three and a half hour meeting with the larger group in the conference room resulted in a major Soviet SALT proposal evidently put together in the Politburo this morning. Brezhnev recited it from memory, a rather remarkable intellectual feat which came as quite a surprise after his undisciplined performances earlier. The essence of the proposal involves equal aggregates by 1985 at 2400, but a Soviet advantage of 2400 to 2200 throughout the process. The final aggregate would also involve a deduction for the U. S. equal to the British force. Other features are equal MIRVs as in our paper, but no prohibition on heavy MIRVs. The most complex and difficult aspect relates to bomber armaments, for which the Soviets would demand some sort of compensation. I will give you more details on my return when I also expect to have from Dobrynin a more precise rendition.

"This proposal is a major step forward toward a SALT agreement in 1975, and perhaps a significant announcement at Vladivostok. However, in its present form it would be shredded by DOD, leaked to the press and Jackson, and destroyed before we can shape it. I am reasonably confident that we

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.5

N9C MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY hld, NARA, DATE 10/17/03




will be able to distill a sensible proposal out of it that DOD will buy, but only after I return. I therefore propose to have Scowcroft tell Schlesinger that the Soviets responded in a conciliatory fashion to considerations you gave him, but they will not give us a formal reply for several weeks.

"In a further hour and a half, Brezhnev tried to get me to accept the Soviet SALT position on the spot; I simply told him we would examine the Soviet position, viewing it as a serious response to our ideas, and that I would have some considerations to provide before Vladivostok.

"My assessment is that the Soviets did make an effort to bring their position closer to ours and that we may have some possibility of developing agreed principles on aggregates, MIRVs, and possibly a few other issues during your meeting with Brezhnev. For now, I think it is essential that elements of the Soviet position be kept totally outside interagency process until I have had an opportunity to analyze it further and discuss the next steps with you.

"I believe on the whole that my Moscow visit has had more positive results than I thought likely, in that the Soviets were willing to respond substantively on SALT. Brezhnev himself was explicit in saying that he wanted to avoid disputes with you in his first meeting, suggesting that he remains interested in maintaining forward movement in our relations. But it remains to be seen whether sufficient flexibility can be mustered on both sides to bring SALT positions into real negotiating range."





THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

October 27, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT 

Following the session with General Secretary Brezhnev on Saturday, Foreign Minister Gromyko spoke privately with Secretary Kissinger regarding the Jackson amendment to the trade bill. Henry's report of that conversation follows and the text of a letter which Gromyko handed him at the same time is at Tab A.

"Last night after our meeting, Brezhnev and Gromyko took me aside to tell me privately of their total outrage at Jackson's behavior. It has put them in an impossible situation, since they are being publicly described as having yielded to U.S. pressure tactics on a domestic matter covered by their domestic laws. They find this intolerable. In addition, they said it is causing them problems in their relations with the Arabs, which they consider extremely important.

"All of this shows that what I predicted and warned Jackson about for months has now happened.

"Gromyko has written me a letter, which is attached, laying out their perception of the situation. One possible reading of the letter is that it does not repudiate our understanding. It simply asserts that it is not new but a continuation of existing practice. On that basis, we could see how they actually operate. But a second interpretation could be that the letter might be used to show that now no change in Soviet emigration policies will take place.

"I believe there is not an insubstantial danger that the Soviets will publish Gromyko's letter or let it become known. However, they have agreed not to publicize it before I return -- first, because of the potentially harmful impact it might have on Javits' campaign, and second, because in any case the trade bill is not up for consideration until November.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY llh, NARA, DATE 10/17/09



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"However, I do believe we should plan to get the three Senators in after my trip to discuss with them how we now proceed in light of the Soviet letter. We have two choices: (1) To stick by our exchange of letters and see how it works in practice; or, (2) To cancel the whole effort. I favor the first course because basically the Soviet emigration policies will be determined not by the letters, but by their desire to protect their relationship with you. The worst that could happen is that the Soviets will get MFN for 18 months for nothing. I think they will perform quite well for fear of strengthening Jackson."

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TEXT OF GROMYKO LETTER TO SECRETARY KISSINGER

"Dear Mr. Secretary of State:

"I consider it necessary to invite your attention to a matter concerning the publication in the USA of materials known to you regarding the exit from the Soviet Union of a particular category of Soviet citizens.

"I must say directly that the cited materials, including the exchange between you and Senator Jackson, create a distorted impression of our position and of what was said to us by the American side on this question.

"Clarifying in response to your wishes the real situation, we underlined that in itself this question relates entirely to the internal competence of our state. We warned in this connection that in this regard we have acted and will act exclusively in accordance with our present legislation.

"But it is just about this that there is now silence. At the same time, one attempts to give those explanations which we made the character of some kind of assurances and given obligations from our side concerning the procedures for the exit of Soviet citizens from the USSR and even to hold us to some kind of figures concerning the proposed number of such citizens; one talks of the expected increase of this number in comparison with past years.

"We decisively reject such an interpretation. What we said -- and you know this very well, Mr. Secretary of State -- related only to the real situation on this question. And if there was talk -- in the form of giving information to you regarding the actual situation -- about number, then it was only about the past, about the developing tendency toward a lessening of the number of persons wishing to leave the USSR for permanent residence in other countries.

"We think it is important that in this whole matter, in view of its importance of principle, there should not be any lack of clarity with regard to the position of the Soviet Union."

(Signed) A. Gromyko
Minister of Foreign Affairs
of the USSR

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
NSC MEMO, 11/20/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY 149, NARA, DATE 10/17/03





PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE

October 27, 1974

No. 442



COMMUNIQUE ON THE VISIT
OF THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE
HENRY A. KISSINGER
TO THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
OCTOBER 27, 1974

As previously agreed, Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State of the United States of America and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, visited Moscow from October 23 to October 27.

He had discussions with Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

Taking part in the discussions on the Soviet side were:

The Ambassador of the USSR in the United States, A.F. Dobrynin
Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, A.M. Alexandrov
Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the USSR, G.M. Korniyenko.

On the American Side:

The Ambassador of the United States to the USSR, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
Officials of the Department of State: Alfred A. Atherton, William
G. Hyland, Winston Lord, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Arthur A. Hartman,
and Jan M. Lodal and A. Denis Clift of the Staff National
Security Council.

In the course of the discussions, a thorough exchange of views took place on a wide range of issues concerning American-Soviet relations and on a number of current international problems.

The two sides noted with satisfaction that the relations between the USA and the USSR continue to improve steadily, in accordance with the course previously established.

In this connection they again emphasized the fundamental importance of the decisions taken as a result of the U.S. - Soviet summit meetings, and expressed their mutual determination to continue to make energetic efforts to ensure uninterrupted progress in U.S. - Soviet relations.

Particular attention was given to the problem of the further limitation of strategic arms. In their consideration of this problem the two sides were guided by the fundamental understanding with regard to developing a new long-term agreement which is to follow the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972. Useful exchanges took place on the details

For further information contact:



involved in such an agreement. Discussions on these matters will continue.

The two sides noted that as a whole ties in various spheres between the USA and the USSR have been developing successfully. They agreed that full implementation of the agreements already concluded will open favorable prospects for further expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries.

The two sides continue to be concerned over the situation in the Middle East. They reaffirmed their determination to make efforts to find solutions to the key questions of a just and lasting settlement in the area. The two sides agreed that the early reconvening of the Geneva Conference should play a useful role in finding such a settlement.

Noting the progress achieved by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the two sides will continue to work actively for its successful conclusion at an early date. They also believe that it is possible to achieve progress at the talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

The exchange of views was marked by a business-like and constructive spirit. Both sides consider it highly useful. In this connection they reaffirmed the positive value of the established practice of regular consultations between the two countries. Both sides emphasized the special importance of summit meetings for a constructive development of relations between the USA and the USSR. As has been announced, Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States and L.I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, will hold a working meeting in the vicinity of Vladivostok at the end of November 1974.

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