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we all have to decide whether we want words or actions. In the context of the good feelings between you and Egypt or even Egypt's self interest -- there are a lot of things they will do.

Allon: Why cannot we add just two or three words to the earlier bit, which we agreed upon already, about our relations with other states? One can also add "international bodies." And then comes the paragraph about America's help.

Kissinger: If this gets to the Congress in any way, and since the staff members are leaking like crazy, it looks as if Egypt was a particularly vulnerable case which requires special assurances to you. The fact is we worked with Egypt on this very effectively.

Dinitz: No, I am accepting the suggestion of "all governments," and I think then it's an honorable paragraph.

Rabin: Then why put it here?

Allon: It's not for Egypt but Syria too.

Kissinger: Asad thought it was stupid too.

Peres: Because then we can tell our own government that "all governments" includes Egypt.

Kissinger: In fact we talked to Syria about it. I talked to Asad and I told him it was the stupidest thing he did, and I didn't have the impression they were working so hard on it. I will give it to you in writing.

Allon: I do not need it in writing, I take it for granted. But if you could say "including Egypt," it gives our fellows here a feeling that Egypt, too, is among the countries that you are working with.

Kissinger: Let's look at the facts. We worked with Egypt closely on that. As I told your Ambassador in Washington on a number of occasions, Egypt helped us on this. We know of Egyptian circular telegrams on this subject. Last week I talked to Asad about it. He made it very clear that he was pushing it but he was going to lose, which is exactly what happened. I do not think they fought like maniacs for it in Lima, because if they had, it would have been a messier situation.



We now have to go through this nightmare and complete it, but if we are going to work on a serious common strategy, we have to decide what we want done and what we want said. And to single Egypt out is just to make it totally vulnerable on something that is our declared policy. You haven't had the slightest trouble with us on your membership in international bodies. But if it gives you an added assurance, we will give it to you in writing.

Allon: I count on American friendship without anything in writing.

Kissinger: We will be glad to put it in writing for all countries and make it public if you want to.

Rabin: We do not need it made public.

Sisco: Why not say "the U.S. Government will seek the assurances of all governments that they will refrain from initiating and supporting any measures directed against Israel..." This is the policy of the U.S., and it's been successful.

Rabin: We do not need it.

Allon: We don't need it for all governments. We need something with reference to Egypt.

Let me tell you something. Henry is quite rightly trying to explain to us certain difficulties in Congress and we have to listen to him. The easing of diplomatic and economic warfare were sold to the Cabinet already in March as a great achievement, or about to be achieved, and all of a sudden it is melting down. When? When diplomatic warfare is at its height. You probably saw the Israeli papers saying that if Israel is suspended the agreement will not survive.

Kissinger: That is probably right. That is what we told the Arabs.

Allon: Can you write a letter summing up the struggle against this and mentioning Egypt's attitude, not as part of the agreement?

Sisco: It is a reality.

Kissinger: It's a fact. In Lima they did it. [To Sisco:] Who do they have in Lima? Some minor figure?



Sisco: No, Mohammed Riad. He's now a Minister of State.

Kissinger: They have actively cooperated. It's senseless. We have already sought the assurances from Egypt. We have got it and acted upon it.

Sisco: And acted successfully.

Kissinger: They supported you publicly. When our press asked Sadat when I was there, "what about expulsion?" he said "we have stated our view publicly and we haven't changed it."

Sisco: He told them he was not backing off.

Allon: All right. I shall not recommend to the Government to break the agreement on these two things, but I think on important items we have been defeated -- the economic warfare and the political warfare. But I accept it; I am a good loser.

Sisco: How have you been defeated?

Allon: Look, it is not an accident that you cannot get any assurances from them. Today they are good, tomorrow they are bad, and they will fool the two of us. Joe, I haven't forgotten the 30 missiles in the stand-still area in 1970, when the State Department kept saying for weeks that they had not moved.


Kissinger: What does that have to do with what we are discussing?

Allon: Because tomorrow they may initiate a diplomatic campaign against us, and I would like to get from them assurances through you. We are giving back something substantial; they have to give some commitments. I am not asking for peace or cordiality.

Kissinger: What to me is an absolute phenomenon is that any concession we bring here sort of disappears into a hole.

Sisco: You have got it. It was acted on effectively and you have just put it behind you.

Kissinger: On economic warfare, all they ever promised in March was three American firms. Now they have promised an unlimited number of American firms. You cannot say you have been defeated. You have had exactly what you were told. European firms is something you added later.



Allon: You are punishing Europe because they signed a trade agreement with us. It is a revenge.

Kissinger: No. If you have any illusions about Europe, as you seem to have . . .

Allon: Europe is very important to us. If it is a weak link in the chain, then it is important. You use it quite often when you are telling us what Europe will do during a war: "Europe will do that, Japan will do this." To us an agreement with Europe is very important. Most of our trade is with Europe.

Peres: What can be helpful, I believe, is simply to cross out "American" and say "companies." They say "on a selective basis", anyway. And then I think you can meet Yigal's point.

Rabin: "On a selective basis."

Kissinger: Let's be realistic. Who are we kidding? Yigal can go to the Cabinet and say "companies." You know which companies; I know which companies.

Peres: But when he meets a European minister, he can say, "We insisted on 'companies.' We couldn't get more." I think if you cross out "Americans," Yigal can accept it.

Kissinger: It's not as if you're negotiating with us.

To say we have been defeated in political warfare when Sadat puts into a governmental statement "problems will be solved by peaceful means" as an operative article, puts in military blockade, cargoes -- it is insane to say you have been defeated. Of course, I agree he can change all of that too. That is the inherent nature of the agreement.

Allon: But here he has nothing to change.

Kissinger: Supposing I say to you "companies on a selective basis"? It would be like some of the maneuvers we are playing with each other. He has specifically told us no other companies. First of all, I don't



know why European leaders have to know about this unless you want to publish it.

Allon: No, they will know about it from the very first day that one European and one American company want to do business, and the American is being accepted. It will be known. So I prefer not to have it altogether.

Kissinger: I think it will happen that way anyway, because they probably want to lean towards us.

Peres: I think they will allow European companies as well, by the way.

Kissinger: That is what I think too.

Peres: So if you cross out "American" . . .

Kissinger: Except that I have no basis for doing that. If you want a statement of what I think will happen, I will be glad to give it to you.

Rabin: The Secretary stresses that he hasn't got it. He can write it this way on the assumption that we know that what he got is only "American."

Kissinger: Even that I can't do, because those who know America know very well that if any dispute arises about this, they will say "That son of a bitch-Kissinger . . ."


All of this is great stuff. If I had no other purpose in life except to get you to sign this agreement -- great! If you are going to say you were defeated on the political thing, the hell with this Agreement, then.

Allon: I said I shall not dispute the signing of the Agreement without this.

Rabin: When it comes to 10, after we have it in the Agreement, the only thing to specify is what is a military cargo.

Dinitz: In a letter.

Kissinger: I thought I'd do a letter to Sadat. Isn't that what we said?



Rabin: Yes. Then we don't need it. 10 is out.

Kissinger: The next one you don't need.

Rabin: The question is, should there be reference to Bab el-Mandeb? Do we need it? Let's have a discussion about it.

Dinitz: What do we do with Article 11?

Peres: Since you have promised on the Bab el-Mandeb issue to give us a special effort, we don't have to have it, except to add the flights to it. You have to add free navigation and flights. If you give it in a letter, we don't have to have it.

Kissinger: Wait a minute (reading article). All of this is covered by blockade in the open Agreement.

Sisco: That's right.

Kissinger: Air flights I agree with.

Sisco: When this was written, Shimon, believe me, none of us expected that we could get the blockade language in the open Agreement.

Kissinger: Including the Israelis.

Allon: The inclusion of the blockade is extremely important.

Kissinger: It mitigates the defeat. [Laughter]

Rabin: We will see.

Kissinger: 12 is impossible. I don't know what you're talking about.

Peres: Mr. Secretary, if you can have in your letter that military blockade covers the problems of flights as well, in the letter . . .

Rabin: Only over the Red Sea.

Peres: Then it cancels our purpose.



Kissinger: Okay, let me get it either one way or the other -- either by my writing a letter to Sadat, "please confirm", or "we are assuming that this is acceptable to you." So that there is nothing . . .

Sisco: We will try our best.

Rabin: Now, you talked about Israeli crews in March. I don't know if it is individuals or what.

Sisco: Mixed crews.

Kissinger: Aha, except you remember what Fahmy said when I asked him.

Rabin: You told us: that the Israelis are tricky; they will have a ship with the majority Israeli.

Kissinger: "They will have 95 percent Israelis on the ships, playing Hatikvah." [Laughter]

Allon: I wish we had 95 percent Israelis on our own ships!

Gur: And they don't play Hatikvah!

Sisco: You won't ship any oil through the Suez Canal anyway.

Allon: Maybe yes, to the Haifa refineries.

Peres: Why wouldn't we?

Sisco: You have got a pipeline that you put a lot of money in. That's another point. I didn't mean to raise it.

Rabin: All right, we will find a way to deal with it.

Kissinger: That takes care of 14, too.

Peres: I'm sorry, Mr. Secretary, 13.

Kissinger: All this is that we will seek Egyptian assurance.



Peres: I think it is for Egypt as important as for us and I would suggest that this would be put in the military protocol, which is the right place. Because we have ships and they have ships. May I say the problem arises, in my judgment, since the Libyan plane that was shot down. I think it is in their interest as well as ours.

Kissinger: I have no problem with 13.

Peres: And then put it in the military protocol. It is mutually beneficial.

Sisco: If you want to raise that when you are at Geneva, that's your business, but this asks us to get an assurance. I think we can just try.

Peres: Joe, I want to explain. That since planes are wandering around and ships don't exactly know where the line is, and from time to time a poor fisherman is crossing the place, what we suggest is that in case of stress both parties will make arrangements that no innocent people in planes or boats will be hurt.

Kissinger: All I know is that there is no political science course that can prepare anyone for this experience and therefore my successor will have to start from scratch! [Laughter]

13, we will try. 14 is impossible. 15, I say we take out because this implies if Egypt does not give us the assurance, the publication invalidates them. If I ask an Egyptian assurance that the publication will not invalidate, which implies that it requires an Egyptian assurance to keep them valid. You're better off if we don't say anything.

Allon: Let me remind you of one fact, that when Israel's right to use the Suez Canal for cargo became known, the Egyptians raised hell and you said, "They will never let you now use the Canal." It can happen that if by accident one of the important items which is secret is being publicized, we are not committed.

Kissinger: This doesn't say we have assurance; it says we seek assurance. Supposing we seek assurance and they say no?

Allon: Maybe you will seek it when it happens. Not necessarily today, not before we sign.

Peres: I shall tell you what happened. We thought this is more or less accepted and agreed. We are not going to put on a fight because of that now



24 hours before we have come to an agreement. I thought that this was worked out with the Egyptians, and the sense of our working it out is really to put it down in a way that will add very much, will pave the way for us to explain our position. But if it doesn't exist, what are we going now to do? We are going to postpone, to waste the last 24 hours? It doesn't exist, forget it. That's my point. I thought it was understood.

Kissinger: The boycott was understood. We have explained it to you 100 times.

Peres: Yigal made the point on the boycott on many occasions that just the "Americans" will add some small troubles and difficulties; that was your point.

Kissinger: In March, we never heard about the Europeans. It won't give any trouble.

Rabin: Gentlemen, we have 24 hours. Let's go ahead and conclude whatever we can.

Kissinger: 16 is no problem.

Rabin: But it's "will seek assurance."

Kissinger: Didn't we have some unilateral statement saying that we will consider it that way?

Rabin: This is a different story. We wanted it from Egypt.

Kissinger: I can tell you we can seek it. I can tell you they will reject it. And obviously when we say we will seek assurance, you could not be under a misapprehension that we have already gotten it. Otherwise, we wouldn't seek it. There I would like to point out to you that if we seek a third country whose behavior doesn't affect the agreement, that's one thing. If you seek assurance from Egypt about the UN zone, you are implying that without its assurance this might be true. I think you are better off with our assurance in the other part, that the US will consider this to be the case, and the hell with Egypt, no matter what Egypt's position is. I will be glad to keep this in. It is no skin off our back to keep this in. From your point of view, I think it is damaging. If you want it, we will seek assurance.



Sisco: What is important to you is America's position on that.

Kissinger: You know Egypt's position. If you want us to seek the assurance, it is no embarrassment to us.

Rabin: I think as a result of what is said in the letter on the three items, seeking renewals, General Assembly, augmented UNTSO -- the letter that has been agreed -- what we will need is one thing, which is the buffer zone. What is the problem? UNEF is not there; does it mean that they can cross the line?

Kissinger: I have told you our position will be that if UNEF is withdrawn, the buffer zone is maintained. I have no objection whatever to telling you that as an American position. That's a firm commitment. That's something you can do something with.

Dinitz: That we have to talk about when we come to the direct American assurances.

Kissinger: But to go to Egypt and say, "Please tell us if UNEF is removed, what is the status of this?" -- really implies that they can determine it unilaterally.

Allon: I assume you will tell the Egyptians the same thing, that you consider the buffer zone as such.

Kissinger: We will take that position, whenever we have to. Why make an issue of it?


Peres: And you will let the Egyptians know what is your position?

Kissinger: As you know, Mr. Defense Minister, I am not as enthusiastic about the American presence as you are, but I nevertheless . . .

Rabin: Why should you mention it every time?

Kissinger: I mention it to you now because I wanted to say something positive about the American presence. [Laughter]

That is why I am saying so. I say for Egypt to take the dual decision to take the American presence and the UN out of the area is a political event which has certain consequences.



Peres: This is a point that's easy for me to agree with you. [Laughter]

Kissinger: And if on top of that they then say -- after ordering everybody out and even if they should then do so, whether or not -- that they also have the right to grab the buffer zone, I think that in world opinion would be a casus belli of overwhelming proportions. In addition, the process of getting everybody out will be sufficiently long to give you time to mobilize.

Peres: Our lawyers said to me: "The ultimate position of medicine is to enable men to die while they're still healthy." [Laughter]

Kissinger: Robert Frost once said he became more optimistic as he got older because he rarely read in the newspapers about 89-year-old men dying. [Laughter]

Dinitz: So what do we do with paragraph 16, just for the record?

Peres: Leave it in that language.

Rabin: If we put it this way, then we expect then that the US will try to seek it. Why to seek it?

Kissinger: The only reason I am in favor of keeping it in is that it should give you an incentive not to leak the document.

Rabin: I think what we should try is to find in the military protocol, also in the annex, some sort of a definition that under no circumstances, so long as the Agreement is in force -- and the Agreement is in force until it is superseded -- no one of the sides, except the UN, will be allowed to cross the lines. Something of this kind.

Sisco: You'll never get it.

Kissinger: I think you are well off now. You have got it defined as a buffer zone, which you didn't ask for. You have got it defined with the two kinds of presence in there. You have got our commitment that we will treat it that way. I frankly think that's as much as the traffic will bear at this point.

Rabin: All right.



Dinitz: What I was going to suggest, Mr. Prime Minister, instead of paragraph 16, to delete it and instead we deal with this problem in the bilateral. "The US will inform Egypt of its position." So then we are not seeking from Egypt anything and Egypt knows that this is an American interpretation.

Allon: We wouldn't mind if you tell the Egyptians after the Agreement has been signed that this is your position.

Dinitz: That is the point that is really important for us.

Kissinger: I think we have the problem of Egyptian sensitivity that a document -- on which we now always have to consider, especially on the bilateral American assurance to you, that we have no basis of keeping from the Congress -- I think it is going to be embarrassing to Egypt. They know our view on the subject. We made it 100 times clear to them during the renewal. We give you a commitment that this is the way we will interpret it. More than that we really can't do. How we implement our diplomacy is up to us.

Rabin: All right.

Peres: 18 and 19 are no longer necessary.

[There was a brief break from 2:57 to 3:12 p.m., and the meeting resumed.]

Kissinger: Let's turn to the PLO.

Dinitz: Paragraph 1 is that the Geneva Peace Conference . . .

Kissinger: No problem.

Dinitz: Paragraph 2.

Kissinger: Our policy with respect to the PLO, which I will be glad to confirm in writing, is that until the PLO recognizes the existence of Israel and observes the relevant UN resolutions, we have no decision to make. This is what I have always said publicly. I have not then said what decision we would make. But I don't think I can say for all eternity that no matter what the PLO does, no matter how it is constituted, we will



never recognize and negotiate. I can say until the PLO recognizes the existence of Israel and the relevant resolutions -- I'd just like to tie it to that some way.

Allon: May I? Even if the PLO would say something about recognizing Israel, it doesn't mean necessarily that this is the Palestinian people.

Kissinger: I am not saying that.

Allon: It is an organization. Secondly, the relevant UN resolutions are very dangerous weapons.

Kissinger: You're right on that. We can say Security Council resolution 242 or 338.

Allon: So many resolutions that have been adopted and will be adopted in the future.

Kissinger: I have no problem tying it to Security Council resolution 242 and 338.

Sisco: You are right about it being too broad.

Kissinger: Our policy, as I have stated it publicly, is this: until they do this, we have no decision to make. I did not then say what decision we would make if they did it, but at least it gave me some maneuvering room.


Rabin: Can we see a proposed draft?

Sisco: We can add a sentence or two sentences there.

Kissinger: Okay, will you do a draft? I'd be glad to avoid any implications that if they do this, we will recognize them. We have never said that we recognize them if they do. You remember I always said specifically that right now we have no decision to make. When they do it, we will consider the problem.

Sisco: I think we can write it to meet the requirements. I think it is clearly understood.

Kissinger: The rest of paragraph 2, I have no problem.



Dinitz: Do you have any problem with Article 3?

Rabin: Your Article 3, our 4, the same, since it is "every effort."

Kissinger: I have no problem.

Rabin: It doesn't mean very much.

Kissinger: 5 is not necessary.

Sisco: It is redundant. We have got it elsewhere.

Rabin: Let's put everything which relates to the Geneva Conference under Geneva Conference and we will strike it out somewhere else.

Kissinger: Sadat says, "I will raise hell at Geneva but I will not use it to break up the Agreement."

The next paragraph I have trouble understanding.

Dinitz: "The US will oppose, and if necessary, vote against any initiative in the Security Council to alter the terms of reference of the Geneva Peace Conference or to change Resolutions 242 and 338."

Kissinger: Supposing somebody wants to put a new resolution that we agree with that alters 242?


Allon: If it contradicts 242 or 338. This reference is only to these two resolutions, and now that the PLO are attempting to introduce a change in 242 . . .

Kissinger: I don't mind saying "that in its view is incompatible with 242 and 338." This means any attempt. Supposing we agree with it?

Dinitz: You mean "we", the United States?

Kissinger: Well, under this even if you and we agree, we would have to vote against it.

Allon: If necessary.



Kissinger: Look, a year ago I would have said "if necessary" gives us a way out. Right now in the present climate of America, I would rather have things fail.

Rabin: What do you propose to add?

Kissinger: I have no trouble saying, "the US will oppose and, if necessary" -- or leave out "if necessary" -- "and vote against any initiative in the Security Council to alter the terms of reference of the Geneva Peace Conference or alter or change resolution 242 in a way which in its view is incompatible with its original purpose. "

Dinitz: This gives you the right to decide if they, for instance, decide on evacuation of all their territories.

Kissinger: If I understand Joe correctly, "if necessary" is supposed to give us that too.

Sisco: That's right.

Kissinger: But I don't like being cute.

Allon: How would you phrase it? "Incompatible"?

Sisco: And strike out "if necessary. "

Kissinger: We might want to change the terms.

Dinitz: "That both parties will agree is incompatible"? This doesn't give you a veto or us a veto.

Allon: What you said is good, "incompatible with 242 and 338. "

Kissinger: Simcha, I don't save the Egyptians from their mistakes, but when you say, "which in the joint view of the two governments is incompatible", therefore, we both have to agree that it is incompatible. If we decide that it is compatible, it doesn't apply. You don't want that.

Rabin: Can we put it this way: "which are incompatible", without saying "in its view" or "joint".



Dinitz: "Will vote against any alternative which is incompatible with the contents or original intent."

Kissinger: Let me talk to Joe and Monroe Leigh for a moment.

Sisco: We'd better draft this pretty carefully.

[Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Leigh and Mr. Sisco confer briefly.]

Kissinger: We will take out "in its view" and say, "which is incompatible."

Rabin: We understand what is the meaning of this.

Kissinger: Okay, so long as we understand. A few more victories like this, and you can get a cup of coffee for a quarter.

Dinitz: "The US undertakes to ensure that the role of the cosponsors will be consistent with what was agreed in the Memorandum of Understanding of December 20, 1973."

Kissinger: What that means, I don't know, but I'm for it.

Allon: One question that is not related to the text: Since the Russians are behaving as they are, can't we raise the problem? Couldn't you do something about it?

Kissinger: The Russians aren't behaving as badly as they could.


Allon: Not with you; with us. They are behaving very badly. They are supplying arms to Syria.

Kissinger: In limited quantities.

Allon: Radio Moscow is continuing its propaganda. Harassing Jews in Russia. Nothing good. And they want to be cosponsors with you. Why should we accept? We can create some problems as well.

Kissinger: Okay. We are finished.

Rabin: Can we have a few moments for the military protocol?



Kissinger: I would recommend that we go to the military protocol next, because we have to take it to Egypt.

Peres: It won't take much time.

[At 3:27 the Israeli side retired to the Prime Minister's office to confer. The full meeting resumed shortly thereafter.]

Peres: The annex. Instead of going over again our draft, we took your draft [Tab B] and we shall follow with our comments on that. In the preamble, there are two problems. One is, the group will start, and there is a blank space for it, within so many days.

Kissinger: We shouldn't say "after initialling." We should say after signature.

Peres: The problem is as follows: We have to conclude the work of this group after it will pass through the Congress, so it should be by the end of September.

Kissinger: No, no, my suggestion is that while we pass it through the Congress, this group meets.

Peres: That's okay. I am talking about the conclusion of it. "The working group will complete the protocol within three weeks."

Kissinger: Say three weeks.

Peres: Then the problem is when will it start? A week's time from the signature?

Kissinger: Can we use that as an occasion to discuss schedule?

As I understand it, you have to put your Agreement before the Cabinet.

Rabin: Before initialling.

Kissinger: And you would then like to initial it as quickly after it as you can, but you have no way of knowing how long the Cabinet meeting will last?



Rabin: Four to five hours.

Peres: When do you think we will be able to submit it before the Cabinet?

Rabin: Sunday evening or Monday morning.

Kissinger: Then I recommend that we initial it Monday morning. That gives us tomorrow in Egypt, tomorrow night here, part of Sunday morning. The only disagreed text is the military protocol, or annex, or whatever the thing is called.

Peres: Disagreed?

Kissinger: I have your views and there are major problems which I am hoping that Sadat will help me overcome. We initial on Monday, then we should sign on Wednesday. Then you have the excuse of Rosh Hashanna not to start until the following Tuesday.

Rabin: 9th of September, then three weeks.

Allon: When can you bring it to Congress?

Kissinger: The day after I come back. And I think we will get it through the Congress in ten days to two weeks. Depending on what Simcha's instructions are.

Rabin: Don't worry, we will support the American presence.

Dinitz: How would it be if we both appeared together before the Congressional Committees? [Laughter]

Kissinger: I think if Simcha and I work energetically together, closely together, have a common strategy in the sense you tell me which people you talked to, which we talk to, where trouble is -- if we exchange information -- we can pass it in ten days to two weeks.

Rabin: But with the knowledge that there is no signature before the Congress passes.

Kissinger: I will give you in writing, if you want to, that the US does not expect you to sign the protocol until the Congress has passed. I'd rather



not give it to you in writing, but there must be something we trust each other on.

Allon: It's understood.

Rabin: Egypt should know, because otherwise we will have a problem.

Kissinger: I have told it to Egypt.

Rabin: What is the problem? We will sign an Agreement which depends on the protocol, the protocol will be postponed until the US Congress will approve it.

Kissinger: I have told it to Egypt.

Rabin: There should be no misunderstanding, because then we can be accused of violating the Agreement, on a bilateral basis.

Kissinger: I have made it clear to Egypt. The only thing Sadat told me he cannot have is that the American Congress has to approve the agreement before it can go into effect, and this is why he had some question about putting it into the annex. He has been told -- Joe, you have heard me tell him repeatedly -- that this will not go into effect until the American proposal is approved.

Rabin: Let's assume something which looks now impossible: the Congress doesn't approve the American presence.

Kissinger: Then we have a disaster.

Rabin: You have a disaster; we have a double disaster. On the merit of the issue and, second, on the question that we have signed an agreement with Egypt which is not carried out by Israel.

Dinitz: It is written in the Agreement that it would not enter into effect . . .

Rabin: Then everybody will ask: "Because of the American presence, you don't sign the protocol?"

Kissinger: We would support you. We would say there was a firm understanding ahead of time. I will testify to that effect before the Congress.



Sisco: We are together on that.

Kissinger: Look, I will testify to the Congress as one reason for speed.

Dinitz: What the Prime Minister says, I understand, is that we would not have a legal problem, but we would have a political problem. That is what you are saying?

Rabin: We would have a legal and political problem.

Kissinger: Have you made any surveys? You are good at Congressional surveys.

Dinitz: We had problems getting an accurate survey because all the Congressmen were on leave.

Eran: And they are still on leave until the 3rd [of September].

Dinitz: So we can judge only on the few people you have talked to, who are basically the people we have.

Rabin: I assume that it will pass, but we have to take precautions as to what will happen, especially since you want the Agreement to be signed.

Kissinger: For whatever it is worth, it is the President's judgment -- and he knows the Congress -- that it will pass. I think if you can get strong supporters like Humphrey and Case and Javits, the Senate should be relatively easy. The present House is to me unfathomable, but Phil Burton has said to me a thousand times . . .

Eran: "Whatever Israel wants, I will do." He will bring in many liberals.

Kissinger: That takes in many of the Vietnam doves in the House.

Rabin: I was surprised to hear that Gary Hart came up in support.

Kissinger: That surprises me. Humphrey will help, and it is very courageous of Humphrey to support it. The House is what worries me right now.

Dinitz: Wayne Hays. You should have breakfast with him.



Kissinger: We all ought to get back as fast as possible. As soon as we are back, you and I ought to plan a strategy. The President ought to give a series of breakfasts.

Rabin: Let's go back to the annex.

Kissinger: We shall initial Monday morning. As long as we are talking about it, let's just get the mechanics straight. How do you want to do it? You initial here, and I take it to Alexandria and bring it back here?

Rabin: How was the initialling done?

Kissinger: There was no initialling last time. There was only a signature.

Saunders: Each side initialled its own copies. The initials were the authorization for the signing at Kilometer 101. So they could initial one copy to take and one to leave here. The Egyptians initial a copy as an indication . . .

Dinitz: We initialled two copies; they two copies. Then we exchanged the copies.

Kissinger: Just for example, assuming I am here Sunday night, then you initial two copies first thing Monday morning. I take it to Alexandria, come back here. They will then have their copy already from you and I will bring theirs here.

Peres: Tomorrow night we shall suggest the final timetable and then we shall know if we have some massive problems.


Kissinger: Let's aim for that: Monday morning initialling.

Rabin: If possible; otherwise, Monday afternoon.

Peres [reading from first paragraph of Tab B]: "Within ten days after the initialling."

Kissinger: I would not say "within ten days after initialling." I would say, "within six days of the signing."

Rabin: Where will the signing take place?



Kissinger: In Geneva.

Peres: "Within six days after the signing."

Rabin: Allow me to say: you distinguish between the signing of the Agreement and the signing of the Protocol?

Kissinger: Yes, oh yes. There are three different documents: the Agreement, the Annex and the Protocol. The Agreement and Annex, which is what we are now talking about, will be signed in Geneva.

Rabin: When?

Kissinger: Wednesday or Thursday.

Rabin: By whom?

Kissinger: By the Chief of Staff on their side and their Ambassador to the Geneva Conference -- Osman -- and by whomever you designate. They didn't say Chief of Staff; they said by a general.

Peres: Find out from them who is going to sign.

Kissinger: I know. It will be a general and Osman, and in your case whomever you designate. I got it confused. The initialling will be done by the Chief of Staff and I think also by Osman.

Rabin: But Osman is in Geneva.

Kissinger: He is now in Alexandria.

Rabin: Who initialled the Disengagement Agreement?

Dinitz: They were never initialled. They were signed by the military people, and the protocol was exchanged between Sadat and Golda Meir through letters to President Nixon.

Peres: Can you achieve that the signature will be done by Sadat and Rabin?

Kissinger: Of what? It could only be of the US proposal. It couldn't be of the document.



Peres: That's also important. Any document.

Allon: Why couldn't it be on the document? Did they give you a reason for that?

Kissinger: It has always been understood. It was understood in March that it would be signed by a military man and by a diplomat of ambassadorial rank. It was never said that it would be signed. The US proposal was signed. I raised it with them. The last time that Sadat signed, it was in his capacity of Prime Minister and not as President.

The annex which they were not willing last time to sign directly, they are now willing to sign directly. Initialling is not an important act; it only freezes the document.

Rabin: If you can do something that initialling can be done without the cover letter that you talk about by Foreign Ministers.

Dinitz: The initialling you said could be Sadat and Rabin?

Kissinger: They changed their minds.

Allon: What now?

Kissinger: The annex and the protocol will be initialled at the same level as the signing -- which is not an unreasonable position.

Sisco: The difference is that you have got the political and military, whereas in the Disengagement Agreement only the military.

Kissinger: And the annexes will be signed by the same people who sign the basic agreement.

Allon: Both a civilian and military man in each paper?

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: It creates a problem.

Kissinger: It has never been any different.



Rabin: You see: What is the problem? Even though it was on a military text, there was initialling by Sadat. Everybody here would say, now we are moving forward, yet . . .

Kissinger: The last Disengagement Agreement was signed by Gamaasy.

Allon: As Chief of Staff.

Rabin: I am talking about the initialling of the American proposal, or what the Americans proposed. And at least we will have to explain, which I believe it is right.

Kissinger: The American proposal, I haven't discussed yet who is going to sign it.

Rabin: The problem is that everybody will say -- it doesn't matter what is in the paper -- that there was the highest political commitment, and now it is reduced.

Kissinger: If you want to turn the basic agreement into an American proposal, which I don't recommend, they will have it initialled by the Prime Minister and still have the basic document signed by the Prime Ministers. But I don't recommend it. Since March. We told you in March exactly what would happen.

Allon: This is true. This is correct.

Kissinger: This is nothing new.

Rabin: We thought that everything will be signed; then it would appear much more naturally, that as a result of a working group that concludes the protocol, they sign, as it happened with the Syrians. Who initialled the Syrian document?

Kissinger: Only a general. There was no American proposal.

Allon: There was no initialling.

Saunders: There was no initialling at all.

Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, with all respect, you are confusing two things. There was no initialling the last time at all, because we finished



on Thursday night and signed it Friday morning and therefore there was only a signature. The documents were never initialled last time. They were only signed. They were signed then by General Gamasy. Sadat signed the Disengagement Provisions as part of the American proposal on the same day that they signed the agreement. So the issue of initialling never came up.

Allon: But at least one important document should be signed by politicians, because even in the Disengagement Agreement . . .

Kissinger: The capacity of this place to raise problems is matched only by the unwillingness to make concessions.

Allon: That's not true.

Kissinger: Or by the capacity to pocket concessions. I just don't understand the problem. Since March there has never been a dispute over who would sign it. It's never been raised on any level.

Dinitz: We haven't discussed it.

Kissinger: Oh no, it was fully discussed.

Peres: On the American proposal, you think you can get at least initialling by Sadat and Rabin?


Kissinger: I have no idea. I'll raise it.

Rabin: Since he did it in the past on the American proposal.

Allon: It may help public opinion.

Dinitz: There is a certain visibility. If as a result of all these agreements which are, we all agree, more political by nature than the previous, there would be no signature on any of the major documents by Sadat, then obviously it will be interpreted as going down in the level of agreement rather than going up. It's as simple as that.

Kissinger: Look, if it weren't for the accident of the American presence, there is literally no document which we could even ask Sadat to sign.



Dinitz: To sign either the annex or the protocol. What he signed in the Disengagement Agreement is very similar.

Kissinger: He didn't sign it with you, but he signed an American Proposal which was something entirely different.

Peres: Mr. Secretary, try to change. If on the protocol you can have the signature of Sadat and Rabin . . .

Rabin: I think it will be helpful to you in the Congress.

Peres: I think so too. That's why I suggest it. Let's go further. Then I suggest that it will be "six days after the signature", as you suggested. And then I suggest three weeks from then.

Kissinger: We are going to have massive problems with the Egyptians. I have to be honest with you. They will want to move with some greater speed.

Peres: I suggest, let's put "a working group will complete the protocol as soon as possible." Why do you need weeks? Why complicate it all together?

Kissinger: Because they are enormously suspicious and they will think you are going to drag it out. Could we start the work within three days, two days?

Peres: After the signature?

Kissinger: So it looks as if something is happening?

Rabin: It is exactly Rosh Hashanna.

Kissinger: Let's have it in five days.

Peres: The problem is completion, not the beginning.

Then here we have, as you call it, a massive problem, in the preamble, and that is that the "two governments shall meet in a working group." We would prefer to say "as a working group." The difference is that this will be a meeting like 101. Otherwise, we shall have to have the Russians in it. You see the point? In the preamble instead of "in the working group", we would like to say "as a working group."



Kissinger: How about having the Russians present? Roy?

Peres: In the signature, we don't object. But the military missions of the two parties. In the Syrian, it was UN. There wasn't a Russian.

Atherton: Ambassadors Bunker and Vinogradov were present when it was signed, and one of the other Soviets and I sat as silent observers in the working group.

Kissinger: What the hell are the Russians going to do? If they are stupid enough to come to such a meeting. They have no competence. What can they do? They'll humiliate themselves.

Peres: In paragraph 1 [of Tab B], "Definition of Lines and Areas", we feel that it should be "Buffer Zones" and not "Buffer Zone", because we are going to have more than one.

Kissinger: Where?

Peres: We didn't discuss the fate of Hamam Faroun.

Rabin: What you proposed -- I am not saying the same width -- that for Hamam Faroun there will be a UN area without Egyptian civil administration. You said that they will not be there.


Kissinger: That was when you had your bloody station there. I thought yesterday you gave that up.

Peres: We are talking about the roads in Abu Zneima. Put in "Buffer Zones", and if we will have one so we shall make a mistake in the grammar. What are you worrying about?

Instead of "other designated areas" before it, we feel there should be put in "Egyptian-controlled area with UN presence", which is the Egyptian definition.

Kissinger: That's now out of the agreement, so we have not yet decided on the definition.

Peres: Which one?



Kissinger: "Egyptian-controlled area with UN presence." What Gamasy says is that what we took was on that map they sent you: it is not a political map. It was one of his map-makers taking the Israeli map and turning it around.

Peres: What will be the definition of this area?

Kissinger: Do we need a definition? Wouldn't it be best to have no definition?

Sisco: The way we described, if you look at the heading under number 3, Shimon, how does it read?

Peres: We wanted to add to it, too.

Kissinger: We'll have one consolation: No one will ever have come closer to an agreement and failed than we will. That will be the world's record for a nearly completed agreement.

Peres: We took their definition.

Kissinger: You took a definition of theirs from a map.

Peres: Because our definition was different. We suggested "UN area with Egyptian civil administration." We tried to go and meet their request, by the way. It's not out of maliciousness.

Kissinger: No, but it was not their political definition. The biggest prize to them out of this agreement, strangely enough, is the southern corridor, in their conception, so far as I understand it, and they don't want to create the impression that they have no sovereignty. To say "Egyptian-controlled territory" on Egyptian land is an insult to them.

Gur: We say "Egyptian civil administration." ECA. No one is talking about control or sovereignty.

Sisco: Why can't we use the heading in paragraph 3?

Peres: That doesn't mean anything. This is just putting words. Then we prefer to have it "other designated area." It is wider. Then it is undefined. But we feel that in order to avoid troubles, we shall have to define it in one way or another.



Kissinger: That sounds like Gaza to them. This creates in their mind that if you say "Egyptian civil administration", this territory has the same status as the Gaza Strip.

Sisco: They never had sovereignty.

Peres: I am ready to go one step further. I would suggest to call it "Egyptian territory with civil administration."

Kissinger: That's fine.

Peres: "And UN presence." Then we don't have the question of sovereignty.

Sisco: Let's try it.

Kissinger: I will tell you quite honestly, this is something on which we will have to get some Egyptian counterproposal, because we don't know their sensitivity on this.

Dinitz: Start with "ECA" and go to the fallback.

Peres: Look at number 2. Here we have either "land, sea and air" or, if you want simply "access to the buffer zone", because there is access by helicopters and boats. Either. Cross it out.


Kissinger: "Access." You are right.

Peres: Coming to 2(B). You will remember our proposal, that we would like you to check with the Egyptians; namely, that both parties will have the right to fly to the middle of the buffer zone. Check it with them and then we shall decide how to define it.

Kissinger: What do you mean, how to define it?

Peres: If they will agree, we shall define it, instead of "forward line of that party to the middle of the buffer zone."

Dinitz: How will it read? "Aircraft of either party . . ."



Peres: "To fly up to the middle of the buffer zone."

Then here, after B, we suggest to add the following item: "In the buffer zone there will be an early warning system entrusted to the US civilian personnel as detailed in a separate protocol which is part of this annex."

Kissinger: Let's put it in. I am willing to try it.

My recommendation is: Let's try it, but we could fall back to saying "as described in a separate US proposal." Because the US proposal says it is part of the agreement. I am just trying to reduce the visibility.

Sisco: Let's try to get agreement on that formulation now, so we don't have to go back again.

Peres: That's better. "Part of this agreement."

What was (C) is now (d), and in (d) on the last line -- "will be worked out with UNEF", we suggest, "by the working group and UNEF." There are details that should be worked out by the working group.

Kissinger: Right.

Peres: Then the title of number 3 will be the name that we shall agree: "Egyptian territory with civilian administration and UN presence", as a title.


Kissinger: Can this E-T-W-C-A-A-U-N-P have a vote in the UN?
[Laughter] It will probably have more people than some UN members.

Rabin: We will come to what we propose on the ground.

Peres: Simply there is a definition, since they are using E, south of Abu Rudeis.

Line M is 100 meters from the road where the Israeli part begins. Because here you only define length, not width.

Kissinger: Line M at some point is in the sea. [Laughter]



Rabin: It has to be worked out. We will work this part, the lines, when we talk about the lines.

Peres: Okay. Now in 3(b) instead of "Egyptian frontier guards", you heard already our position about civilian police. Instead of "Egyptian frontier guards", we would like to have "Egyptian civilian police."

Kissinger: That will create massive problems.

Peres: I don't think so, really. What is the problem for them to transfer 100 soldiers from the army to the police?

Gur: With Egyptian territory, I don't think there will be massive problems.

Kissinger: They'll say "chisel." They'll transfer people and call it the Abu Rudeis civilian police force.

Peres: D, access to the . . .

Kissinger: Wait a minute. To please Gamasy -- it makes no difference to you -- when you talk about check points, can you say "check points along the road and along . . .? Never mind. Let the protocol do it. He wants some check points along the dividing line so it doesn't look to Egyptians as if the whole area is totally naked to Israelis streaming in.

Rabin: If they will agree to have the UN on the crossing, we are for it.

Kissinger: Let's write it in.

Rabin: Let's do it in the protocol. You meant that along the road there will be UN check posts?

Kissinger: He would like UN -- that too -- he wants UN along the line facing Israel.

Gur: That's Line M.

Kissinger: So that it doesn't look like the Egyptians are totally naked to the Israelis. I don't see how it hurts you.

Gur: Some of the UN points will be along line M, some will be along the coast and some will be inside the area.



Kissinger: It works the other way.

Rabin: We'd like, for example, to have a UN check post in the port to Abu Rudeis or Abu Zneima.

Peres: Let's leave it for the protocol.

Kissinger: It's all right with me. I think from your point of view, since he wants, I'd write it in here, that "the UN check posts along the roads and such other points . . ."

Rabin: But they can't say only along the road.

Kissinger: Then say "along the dividing line and other posts."

Rabin: We haven't worked it out. I see no problem in it. But without working with the UNEF about it, you can't reach agreement.

Kissinger: All I want to tell you is that for him it is a matter of great symbolic importance. All right. I'll tell him.

Rabin: Can I understand what does it mean?

Kissinger: What he wants? It is a very painful matter to him as the Minister of Defense to have Egyptian civilians without any military force in the part between them and the Israelis.

Rabin: Where is it?

Kissinger: Here along this line.

Rabin: Along the line which is agreed.

Kissinger: Along the dividing line between Israel and Egyptian territory, or whatever you called it, he wants UN check points.

Peres: Then we agree in principle, but we have to work out details.

Kissinger: The details we don't need in there, but I think to put the principle, I don't see what it hurts.



Peres: If it is not along the road.

Kissinger: He also wants them along the road. It is not to the exclusion. On this road, he is perfectly willing to have check points.

Rabin: On his road.

Kissinger: Inside the UN zone, inside the Egyptian territory, that's agreed to. And he agrees to freedom of movement, but he feels very strongly that he wants UN between the Israelis and the Egyptians.

Sisco: Mr. Secretary, we haven't come to C, where I had something on that. I wonder if I could read C, the next paragraph.

Kissinger: He keeps raising it.

Rabin: Let's first finish this.

Sisco: This is the same point. "The UNEF shall also establish check points along the dividing line and other points, the locations and number to be included in the protocol."

Kissinger: That's fine.

Sisco [to Gur]: I got that from you.

Gur: That's what I said before. I didn't want it to be mentioned that it will be only on the M line.

Kissinger: He doesn't want it only along the M line. All right.

Peres: Now on (d). In the operational support of the oil fields.

Kissinger: Have we agreed on (C)?

Rabin: We will wait for a while. We will discuss it first among ourselves and then we will let you know.

Peres: On (d), we have to add at the end of the paragraph "to be agreed upon by the working group", because of the problem of access to air space and coastal area that will need a great deal of detailing.



Kissinger: But look, everything here has to be agreed upon by the working group. These are instructions for the working group.

Sisco: And they are going to develop the protocol. That is what it is all about.

Peres: But for this we'll have a problem. On (e), there is no problem. Now on 3(f), the last line: "including a time table for periods of alternate use of the road by Israelis freely and of the Egyptian civilian personnel." Because we have agreed to that road that there will be no restriction on Israelis and we are looking for a language.

Kissinger: I think this whole paragraph has to be changed -- which proves that I have not supervised its drafting. When you say "use of common sections of the road", this is one of their sorest points. Can we say "procedures for the use of the coastal road shall be determined by the working group and detailed in the protocol" ?

Rabin: All right.

Kissinger: I mean, it makes no difference. The less detail, the better. If they want "temporary" you have to have "common", and that will be easy for the Israelis to agree to. But since this is going to be published, these two documents.

Rabin: But the basic agreement is that they have only civilian traffic and we can move everything.


Kissinger: That is the basic agreement. We will make it clear. I will spell it out to them.

Rabin: There should be no misunderstanding on that.

Kissinger: I have said it to them repeatedly. By definition, look, since they are not permitted to have military.

Dinitz: You've said it to them already.

Rabin: The question is our right to use it for military purposes.



Kissinger: There can be no dispute that they can't use it for military purposes because they are not permitted to have any military forces in that area. By the time they reach the common road they would have had to violate the agreement for 80 kilometers.

Rabin: When it comes to them, there is no problem.

Kissinger: Can we then find a language?

Rabin: First it has to be understood.

Kissinger: Unrestricted use of the road by the Israelis. I am now thinking of a different problem, whether this can be written in here now, to avoid any question. Let's phrase it as I said, and then think about it. It is a general statement.

Peres: Then we would like to add here an item. We told you about it. Either after (e) or here, it doesn't matter, but under heading 3: "There will be no change in the present practice of navigation in the Gulf of Suez including the waters adjacent to the Western coast line of the area."

Kissinger: Impossible. That means you have the right of military patrols right up to the coast.

Peres: Yes.

Kissinger: Totally out of the question. We can't even present it to them.

Sisco: No. It would blow the whole thing.

Kissinger: You can claim that there should be no military forces in that coastal waters. That makes a lot of sense, because that would be an extension of the coast. Never will they accept that.

Sisco: It is out of the question.

Peres: Well, we shall have to deal with this issue. Now we are coming to the limitations.

Kissinger: Aerial surveillance is all right.



Peres: We are coming to the limitations and we would suggest an addition here that we discussed previously. This can be after IV. "It will be forbidden to introduce into the area weapons with a range capable of reaching E and J lines respectively."

Kissinger: Then we should say, "Both sides undertake not to place weapons in such a position where they can reach the line of the other." I am just suggesting a reformulation of what you have suggested.

Rabin: But the principle is accepted.

Kissinger: It is accepted by me. "Both sides agree not to station weapons in such a position that they can reach the forward line."

Peres: Or line E and J respectively.

Kissinger: Yes, it is the same thing. I agree with the principle. But you have to remember that Gamsay has been chafing at the bit for weeks and this is just an area in which I haven't had a full discussion with him.

Peres: Then on the last page, page 5.

Kissinger: You are not changing the 8,000 men?

Peres: No. "Implementation shall begin . . ." We shall let you know what is the earliest possible date that we can and shall try to do our best. January means five months.

Kissinger: We left it blank.

Rabin: It shouldn't be weeks, but months.

Kissinger: Line E happens to be their forward line. The two kilometers -- it would be quite an achievement to stretch it out over several months.

The problem is on the buffer zone. It has been an unending series of Egyptian concessions this week to your point of view. This is the first thing he has asked for from you this week. It is in fact the only thing that I recall he has asked for from you this week that he said would make his domestic situation better. I got nothing from you that hadn't been hinted



at before I left Washington, and less in most cases. This is the one thing he has asked for to make his domestic situation easier. And you know, you have to decide whether you are making peace or sort of squeezing the lemon. You will have to pay for it somewhere. I am sure the agreement won't fail on it. It is the one thing he has asked for personally.

Rabin: Our position until today is six. I don't want to promise anything on it until we have discussed it among ourselves.

Peres: There is one point since you are mentioning here that they are moving to the Beta Line within several weeks. That is okay. But we want their assurances that the fortifications in the new Egyptian line won't exceed the number of personnel permitted to be scheduled. Otherwise, they will make fortifications for four or five divisions on the new line.

Gur: We will do the same. Now they have fortifications for five divisions.

Kissinger: They will never agree to it.

Peres: We suggest "there will be no fortifications or installations for forces of a size beyond that permitted above."

Gur: What we say is that in the new line they will build only for the 8,000 men they will have, and not for five divisions. Because this is not fortifications but an offensive area.

Kissinger: All right, "in the area between the old line and the new line." Let's phrase it that way; that they might accept.

Peres: Our phrasing was "In the area between line A (of the Disengagement Agreement of January 18, 1974) and line E of this agreement, there will be no fortifications or installations for forces of a size beyond that permitted above."

Gur: And we are doing the same on our area.

Sisco: Then say you are doing it too.



Peres: That is no problem.

Gur: The fact is that they brought enormous forces in the area in the past and we didn't.

Kissinger [to Oakley]: Will you write this as a reciprocal obligation?

[to Rabin:] Now when you talk about their movement forward, the UN force has to be put somewhere; otherwise it disappears. Some line has to be drawn into which they will go.

Rabin: They will go to the buffer zone.

Kissinger: But where will the buffer zone be?

Rabin: We have said that we will move on this line to the new line in six months.

Kissinger: When is all of this going to happen?

Sisco: If the Egyptian troops move right away . . .

Rabin: No, they are not moving right away.

Kissinger: They are moving from line A to line E.

Rabin: But the details will have to be worked out in the protocol.


Kissinger: I want you to understand this problem. Supposing you say within eight weeks.

Rabin: No, this is what we are talking about in six months. What we wanted is to give them in the beginning here something in a shorter period, in Abu Rudeis.

Kissinger: Much shorter than six months.

Rabin: Yes!

Dinitz: The Prime Minister said two months.



Kissinger: If they don't have something to show quickly, this whole thing will look like a blackmail operation. In the central front, I have understood, but I call your attention to the significance of something you have apparently . . .

Rabin: Yes, you told me yesterday.

Peres: In a matter of weeks, we can move here [south of the Beta Line] just to start.

Sisco: "Phased movement of the Egyptians into the UN zone and the rest should be worked out by the working group."

Rabin: Exactly.

Kissinger: All I want to point out to you is that here it says "the movement of Egyptian forces from Line E to A shall take place within ____ weeks."

Rabin: No, again that is connected with our withdrawal.

Kissinger: Then it is senseless to say within weeks.

Rabin: I don't know why that is written.

Sisco: You have to link all three. You have to relate the Egyptian forward movement, the movement of the UN, and your withdrawal.


Rabin: Right. Exactly the same will be applied also here and all this has to be worked out with the working group.

Sisco: All right, we will generalize it.

Peres [at the map]: I want to return to the Gulf of Suez. Instead of "adjacent", we would like the right to fly and sail, as I have told you, in the middle of the Gulf of Suez.

Kissinger: Monroe [Leigh], what is the legal status of the Gulf of Suez?

Leigh: In the American view it is high seas out from the territorial breadth of the territorial sea. The difficulty for the Egyptians with



your prior proposal was that it excluded them from any activity in their territorial sea.

Rabin: No, forget about the "adjacent."

Kissinger: All right, in our legal view there would be six miles that would be Egyptian -- that is, 3 miles on each side.

Leigh: That's right.

Kissinger: So you would have a channel within which you could navigate. But what is the Egyptian view?

Leigh: Their view has been 12 miles.

Kissinger: Which closes it. That is the problem. What is your view?

Rabin: We claim 6 miles.

Peres: I want to explain the situation. We were asked to leave this place so they will have the oil, not the coast and not the sea. Had they given up belligerency, we wouldn't have had any problems. But they refused to give it up.

Kissinger: Your military problem would be the same.

Peres: Except that now we have the right to sail along the coast. All of a sudden, because we give back the oil, we shall lose the right of a normal nation to sail, because there is no problem for any other nation to sail in the middle of the Suez.


Kissinger: There is a problem for a nation with electronic ships, that is what you are interested in.

Peres: Yes. The Russians have the right; why don't we?

Kissinger: In the Gulf of Suez I don't know whether they have the right to move electronic ships.

Gur [at the map]: I want to explain the military need. We are asking to be able to fly in the middle of the buffer zone so that we will be able . . .

Rabin: Both sides.



Gur: . . . to have good intelligence. The same applies to the Gulf of Suez. If we can fly only on our territory, we will not have any information or intelligence about what they are preparing on the other side. If we will not be able to move with our boats in the middle of the Gulf, they will be able to prepare an enormous force -- and we know their plans exactly -- in that area and to move suddenly to the Abu Rudeis and Abu Zneima area. In order to know and to be sure that they keep their cease-fire in the Gulf of Suez exactly as they do in the north, we must have the right to sail here in the middle and to fly here in the middle. Exactly as to fly here in the middle of the buffer zone.

Kissinger: How frequently do you have to sail in the middle? Just to give me an idea of what you are talking about. I am not asking you to specify, but how often would you in fact do it?

Gur: I assume whenever we have any good reason to do so, any suspicion or things we think we should know.

Kissinger: Does that mean you normally don't do it?

Gur: Today we are doing it every day and every night. •

Kissinger: Here is my problem. This is a thing Gamasy wouldn't even understand, much less discuss. I therefore have to explain it to Sadat. If I tell him that at some periodic interval you want to go with a ship, that is one thing. If you say every day you want to have five ships in there, that is another thing.

Peres: I want to explain what is the point. We shall be criticized highly that we are adding another 150 kilometers to our frontier. Because until we were on the coast, we could have patrolled the sea by air and sea and to protect our position from a surprise attack. Now we give up the land, and if we give up the sea, then we really have a problem of an additional 150 kilometers of a new frontier. Until now our explanation to the people was: "Okay, we don't really prolong the frontier, because what we did . . .

Kissinger: But it would help me with Sadat to give him some idea of the frequency. If I am going to tell him you are going to do it with great restraint, that is, so he doesn't think you're rubbing his nose in it.



Peres: Let's put it this way: sailing three times a week, flying weekly except in case of emergency. I mean we have to protect our country against a surprise attack. It is a serious problem. We don't want to spy for the sake of spying.

Kissinger: Okay, that is at least a defensible concept which is not harassment of the civil population. I am not sure he will accept it. Gamasy will scream. Let me understand the concept. In the international canal you want to patrol say, let's not argue now, three times a week.

Peres: Every second day, which is three times a week.

Kissinger: Unless that second day falls on a Saturday.

Peres: We'll do it Sunday!

Kissinger: And Jewish holidays.

Gur: No. We had a bad experience once on a holiday.

Kissinger: I tell you I knew I had a hot-shot Under Secretary for the Middle East when on the morning of Yom Kippur he called and said, "There is something going on in the Middle East. If you get on the telephone, you can get it settled in a couple of hours."

Sisco: That is an apocryphal story. And I overestimated your abilities.
[Laughter]


Kissinger: To show you my inexperience, the first person I called was Waldheim. I knew we had a problem when the Egyptians said you had attacked them in the Gulf of Suez. I knew that whatever else you did, you wouldn't attack on Yom Kippur, and by sea! Okay, I understand.

Sisco: We can move on to the bilaterals.

[There was a short break from 4:52 to 4:59 p.m.]

Kissinger: Are we operating on the assumption that the final text is frozen?

Rabin: Can you give us a text?



Sisco: Assuming we can take care of Article 51.

Kissinger: Incidentally, contrary to what we said, there is something to be said tomorrow for saying "[stations] as indicated on the attached map." Just to get it over with. I don't really care.

Rabin: All right, we can discuss.

Kissinger: We can discuss it tomorrow.

We have two important things in the Annex that we haven't solved. One is the Giddi thing, which is an insult to them, and the other is the road. When the initialling occurs, we have to give them a map.

Rabin: We will go to the road now, but we have to bring maps and air photos.

Kissinger: May I suggest one other thing. We would like to send this proposal to Egypt as it has been worked out by our lawyers.

[They pass out a retyped text of the Proposal, Tab A.]


Sisco: Would you like to look at it again and then we can send it to Egypt?

Rabin: Can't you put it just "not to exceed 200"? Why go into such details about how many are present at each watch?

Kissinger: Because it will help us enormously in the Congress. Okay, but we will testify to that. Leave in the 200. We will take out the 100, but we will have to testify to that.

[The Israelis put up maps of the Suez Gulf corridor. The formal meeting resumes at 5:07 p. m.]

Gur: First of all, I'd like to show it on the map. We have two problems with the road. The Egyptians feel they have problems with the road in two places. One is the Abu Zneima area, in which the road goes inside the wadi and creates a certain pass, and then between the area of Abu Rudeis and the area of the oil fields, again in which the road is very close to the seashore. Now, as you were discussing yesterday, there is a need



to create a certain corridor in the area that goes in the area of the passes of Abu Zneima. So what we suggest is that the whole hill of Hamam Faroun will be a prolonged buffer zone that will contain the Hamam Faroun area, in which on the eastern side we have our fortification -- I mean we have our fortifications on both sides, but as that road is a common road, we gave up already still during the discussions in Washington the western side of it, but we have to keep the eastern side of it. So that the buffer zone is prolonged from the Hamam Faroun area to the northern part of the pass, as you see it here, and then we give up the road to create a new UN area which will create a corridor of about one kilometer wide, in which the UN forces, I mean the UN responsibility, will dominate. And they will go out to the southern area in which we had some trouble, and then we do the same thing in that connection between the Abu Rudeis area and the Balaiyim area so you had it here. So that there will be a connection of at least one kilometer wide in those areas that until now included only the roads and in some places only the area between the road and the sea, which was even less than 100 yards.

But it must be understood that on this common road we are free to move and that was understood before. The difficulty here is that we are allowed to move freely in a UN area. That must be understood.

Kissinger: I understand that.

Rabin: The idea is to have a UN area -- call it buffer zone, or UN area -- that is most of the area of Hamam Faroun east of the road. The area west of the road is already Egyptian.

Dinitz: Civilian administration.

Kissinger: But the area west of the road is a joke. It is at low tide maybe an Egyptian area; at high tide it is nothing.

Rabin [at the map]: But we discussed the question of the road. Otherwise if east of the road will be Egyptian area, this is not what we had in mind. We never agreed to it.

Kissinger: I understand that. Let's separate two things here.



Rabin: Therefore there are two basic issues. What is the area under their control west of the road. It was known that it is very limited.

Kissinger: That is not the problem.

Rabin: Then east of the road -- I don't know the width of the area, about a kilometer -- it is a UN zone, which means that Israeli armed forces will not be here and they will be about one kilometer east of the road.

Kissinger [at the map]: First of all, as I remember it -- I don't have our map here -- this area was always to be given to the Egyptian civil administration anyway. Hamam Faroun. It was shown on your map, this area in here, this triangular area was always shown on your map as Egyptian civil administration.

Secondly, when misunderstandings arise with such frequency, one ought to ask oneself how they can possibly happen. But that is a subject of another conversation. We were never given any explanation whatsoever for what you wanted at Hamam Faroun, except that you wanted a warning station. And when I said why there of all possible places in the world, I wasn't told this was to establish a precept for a fortification. I was told this was so you could triangulate this with Umm Khisheiba, which made no sense to me to begin with. Our people looked at it and couldn't understand for the life of them why any other hill in that area wouldn't do equally well, and we told you that in our view you should move out of that area. The next thing, once you move out of that area we saw no reason in the world why it should not be made Egyptian civil administration.

I am just trying to make the legislative record here absolutely clear, so that it isn't always we pressing you to do things. So we have tended to present this whole thing to the Egyptians on the basis that there will be contiguous access.

So in this area [indicating] we have a different problem, in which your solution is not generous but at least almost compatible with what we discussed. So I am not talking about this area right now, but about this one [indicating]. To take all of this from Egyptian civil administration, I wouldn't even go to Alexandria to present this. I'll send Sisco and tell him my conscience doesn't permit me to go on with this. I told him there was a problem but I thought it was a soluble problem.



Rabin: Let's first go to the roads.

Kissinger: I just want to be perfectly honest about this. Now on the roads, I will tell you what I told him. I told Eilts. I am not so bothered about fortifications in this area, because we never told them anything about this area. Is it about here?

Gur: Yes.

Kissinger: That doesn't bother me, strangely enough, because . . . How visible are they, guns hanging over the road?

Gur: Only fortifications, without guns. But if there is a war, we will have guns there.

Kissinger: This doesn't bother me. No one asked anything here. That is all right. I mean, it's all right with me. That hasn't come up; they haven't made any comments on it, and if you are not going to harass the traffic. . .

Rabin: We promised we wouldn't harass.


Kissinger: So this fortification I don't consider a problem. In this area I told them, "What the Israelis have promised me is we will do a joint study on a road." I said to your Ambassador that all our people think no road can be found here. He said to me if we make a study -- we haven't really made a full study yet -- let's make a study and we will find something. Is that wrong?

Dinitz: Not exactly, Mr. Secretary. What I said is we agreed to a joint study.

Kissinger: But it's one thing to make a joint study knowing in advance what the result would be.

Rabin: I believe we told you the separation would be very, very limited in distance.

Kissinger: You told me the separation would be very limited when there are going to be two roads. Then I said -- and I even drew it on a map for you; you didn't agree to it -- I said: Why don't we shade in some area



here and say this is where we will look for a road? And we will all know it will never be used; probably we'll never find a road, and it will take years to build it anyway. The Egyptians can pretend the road will be found and we can pretend eventually some of this would go over to them if a road could be found. So here my objective was to keep it sufficiently confused.

Rabin: We accept the principle. The only question is the width.

Kissinger: All right. That width seems to me extremely ungenerous, although I don't have any quarrel with calling it UN. I have no quarrel with your definition of unrestricted use for military traffic. It is no problem at all. So this area bothers me enormously, and this area [south of Abu Zneima] I honestly think should be widened a little bit for presentation purposes. It looks like a fraud. Down here there is no problem.


Gur: We have to keep our military necessities. And the reason for the line here is not just because we don't want to give another kilometer. It is not just cosmetic. That is not the reason. But until now the whole area of the passes in the Abu Zneima area is divided into two parts, the northern part is here and the southern part along the coast is here. We know all the landing areas possible there. One of them is in Abu Rudeis. The other one is Abu Zneima. And if you see that open area, this is the area in which in the last war they landed most of that force in that area, and they will do it again.

Kissinger: What happened to them?

Gur: Then it was under our control. Now, it will be under their control. That is why we put into the Annex that we have to check with them in the working group all the access from the sea and from the air, because otherwise they might surprise us and it will be a very unpleasant surprise. That is why we insist on being able to fly in the Gulf of Suez. So we move here to the maximum we can and still keep the possibility to dominate the area militarily.

Kissinger: I understand.

Gur: So it will be about a kilometer from the road, but that will be on the ridge up there in the hills, but still we can keep an open eye on the area.



If we give the Hamam Faroun, the only place from which we can still have a certain supervision on the sea is that ridge of hills here. I know that for you, and maybe for some other people, Hamam Faroun is not so important, but for military purposes it is very important.

Kissinger: All I am asking is that someone tell me earlier what the situation is.

Gur: This is the situation.

Kissinger: This now is very late. Very late someone said there is a hill here that has strategic importance.

Gur: It is the only place where our people can observe by eye the Gulf of Suez, and for us to give that up is very, very bad. Maybe there are some political necessities, but for the military people it is very, very bad, and that is why we don't want them to be here, and that is why we insist it will be a UN zone. Because if they catch it, we are in trouble in that area, if they catch it by special units, and no doubt they will try to do it. That is why we insist no Egyptians be here.

Kissinger: That makes it impossible. It will add to the resentment. To tell them now, after saying continuous access, that they have a sort of nothing here and a nothing here and a thing here -- how will they explain that to the Arab world? Maybe it should never have gotten to this point. That doesn't argue against your military judgment. I have never understood your problem here. I thought you needed a warning station to triangulate with Umm Khisheiba.

Dinitz: After we moved the warning station at Hamam Faroun, you said you don't see why it should not be an Egyptian civil administration. After checking with home, we told you we don't want it to be a civil administration because of the hill.

Kissinger: Not very strongly. You said it will be settled on the shuttle. When you say that, I assume you have domestic reasons for not doing it before I come. If you don't want to do it, you can tell me right away. My interpretation was that it is easier for the Israeli Cabinet to see this after they have seen the concessions made by the Egyptians.

Dinitz: I said that because the instructions I got were to say it will be settled on the shuttle.



Kissinger: When I make a statement that I believe this should be under Egyptian civil administration, there are three possible answers. One is never, one is almost impossible, and one is we will settle it on the shuttle, which I interpret is for bargaining purposes on the other side -- "if you can get us everything we want, we will do it." That is how I interpreted it. The same with the Giddi pass.

Dinitz: There we went beyond what I told you is possible.

[Dr. Kissinger sits down, and the Israelis confer at the map. Then they call him up to the map again.]

Rabin: Dr. Kissinger, you remember when we had the Syrian disengagement, we had a problem of the peaks of the Hermon. Anyhow, no one lives here.

Gur: It is an entirely inhuman place.

Rabin: So there can be special arrangements that the UN will control the hill.

Kissinger: That is something I might be able to discuss with Sadat. If I tell him the truth. The best way to deal with Sadat, in my experience, is to tell him exactly what the problem is. I will even take some of the blame in saying I misunderstood the degree to which you were willing to make it civil administration primarily because of the hill.

Rabin: That would be under the UN and no civilians would be there.

Kissinger: And that in the working group we agree to establish a UN post there.

Gur: Posts.

Kissinger: Whatever it takes, and no civilians, as we did on Mount Hermon. I think that can be done.

Sisco: You explain it to him and see what the situation is.

Kissinger: I think that can be done, I don't know. Is this the maximum you can go here? It is just for presentation.



Gur: You see, we have a problem just there. At some point here we have a problem, and we will check in that area if we can.

Kissinger: The more you can do. . . I really have no interest.

Gur: This is the crucial point; we will check it.

Shafir: We shall try to do this.

Kissinger: If you can do that, it would make all the difference. Then I will defend this point.

Gur: We will check exactly what the ridge area is.

[Mr. Allon rejoins the meeting.]

Kissinger: The Giddi pimple is another thing.

Rabin: Do you need it today?

Kissinger: I haven't brought them a map so the enormity of it hasn't sunk in there yet. But if I bring them a map . . .

Allon: Cairo says here: "We will build up a strong army and get every inch back. This will help us."

Kissinger: Both parties have gotten me to the point where there will be no emotional outburst if the thing collapses. [Laughter] Only if it succeeds.

Rabin: Leave it for tomorrow. Have our people checked the text of the agreement? The letter was checked. Shall we go to the bilateral?

Kissinger: It's up to you. Do you want to break off?

Rabin: I think we are too tired. And the mood is not the best one that will serve our purpose. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I need this map for the southern part before I go to Cairo tomorrow.

[He goes over a checklist with Sisco.] Let me get clear where we stand. The only thing on the map is the Giddi pimple [laughter] and we will do that tomorrow.



Dinitz: There is a limit to the number of concessions we can make in one day.

Kissinger: I am assuming that if I can get Sadat to do in front of Fahmy what he said to me privately, namely to take Article 51 out, the text of the agreement is frozen.

On the proposal, you have agreed to this text, taking out the sentence about the 100 men. We will send it to them and get an answer when we are there tomorrow.

On the Annex, I'd better take what we have to them. This will require work. It will not go as you have it. I think you were not unreasonable in it, but this is Gamasy's baby. They are certainly going to have some counterproposals. I can't predict what they will be. I have the impression Sadat will press them to come close to what you want. I think 90% will probably be accepted, and for the rest I will bring you their counterproposals. I will urge them to keep them at the absolute minimum.

Rabin: On the Egyptian assurances.

Kissinger: On the Egyptian assurances, we have agreed on the text. Now the question is how we will handle them -- I'd like to discuss this with you -- and in what form.

On the Geneva Conference, we are agreed. So that leaves the bilateral. So that is up to you. We can do it tomorrow night when we come back, or we can do it now. It is up to you.

Rabin: Can the three of us talk to you?

Kissinger: Three against one. If I took Sisco with me, it would be four against one. [Laughter]

[Rabin, Peres and Allon confer privately with Dr. Kissinger in the Prime Minister's office from 5:40 to 6:40 p.m. When they return, the meeting is adjourned.]

[Remarks to the press by Dr. Kissinger and Foreign Minister Allon are at Tab D.]





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