
Scanned from the Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions (Box 5 - August 21 - September 1, 1975 - Sinai Disengagement Agreement - Vol. III (2)) at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library



Library: 1000 Beal Ave., Ann Arbor, MI 48109 Museum: 303 Pearl Street, NW, Grand Rapids, MI 49504 (734) 205-0555 fax (734) 205-0571 (616) 254-0400 fax (616) 254-0386

The documents in this folder continue from the previous folder.

A Presidential Library Administered by the National Archives and Records Administration



SECRET

Í**sruli dval**f August 28, 1975

AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed:

ARTICLE I

The conflict between them and in $t\mathbf{k}\mathbf{e}$ Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but only by peaceful means.

The Agreement concluded by the Parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973; and

They are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant step towards that end.

ARTICLE II

The Parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.

ARTICLE III

(1) The Parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other.

(2) The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

A. The military forces of the Parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following principles:

..../2



SECRET

(1) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as Line E on the attached map.

(2) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the line designated as Lines J and M on the attached map.

(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines J and K shall be limited in armament and forces.

(4) The limitations on armament and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached annex.

(5) The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and J, will be inaccessible to the Parties except as specified in the Annex attached to this Agreement. In this zone the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

(6) There will be a land connection between the city of Suez and the line terminating at the coast south of Abu-Rodeis as described on the attached map. To that area the provisions specified in the Annex shall apply.

(Fallback position:

(6) In the land connection between the city of Suez and the line terminating at the coast south of Abu-Rodeis on the attached map, the following principles will apply:

- (a) There will be no military, para-military or irregular forces, military fortifications and military installations.
- (b) The United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military, para-military or irregular forces, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have freedom of movement necessary to perform
 this function in this area.)

B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the use of the roads, the UN functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map

..../3

-<u>SECRET</u>

which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

-3-

ARTICLE V

The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.

ARTICLE VI

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration of this Agreement. It will function under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Protocol.

ARTICLE VII

Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

ARTICLE VIII

(1) This Agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

(2) The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

ARTICLE IX

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement.


.../4



-SECRET-

WITNESS





PROPOSAL

US draft Aug. 28,1975

In connection with the Early Warning System referred to in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as part of that Agreement, The United States proposes the following:

- The Early Warning System to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the annexed map shall have the following elements:
 - a. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel as shown on the annexed map. Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations. Each such station shall be under the custody of the United States.
 - b. In support of these stations, to check access to them, and to provide tactical early warning, ______ watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes as shown on the annexed map. These stations shall

10/30/03

FORD

be operated exclusively by U.S. civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established unmanned electronic sensors at both ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station.

- The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these stations.
 - a. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph la above, United States personnel will monitor operations within each station and all movement into, within, and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the UNEF, and to Joint Commission.
 - b. At each watch station described in paragraph lb above, the United States personnel will immediately report to the Joint Commission, and to UNEF any

-2-

movement of armed forces, other than the UNEF, into either Pass and any observed preparations for such movement.

-3-


- 3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by this Proposal, except for small arms required for internal security and self-defense.
- 4. The United States shall be entitled to establish support, management and secure communications facilities and its personnel shall have landing rights and unimpeded freedom of movement through and over the territories under the jurisdiction or control of either of the Parties to the Agreement in so far as necessary to perform their functions.
- 5. The United States and its personnel shall be immune from local criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction.
- 6. The United States affirms that it is willing to continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel.

SECRET

7. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Proposal, the United States may withdraw its personnel if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer in the national interest of the United States.

Accepted

RALD



Isradi redraft 28 August 1975

handed over at meeting 8/28

PROPOSAL

In connection with the Early Warning area referred to in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as part of that Agreement, the United States proposes the following:

- The Early Warning area under the custody of the United States to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the annexed map shall have the following elements:
 - a. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel as shown on the annexed map. Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.
 - b. In support of these stations, to check access to them, and to provide tactical early warning, six watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes as shown on the annexed map. The e stations shall

-SECRET

be operated exclusively by U.S. civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established unmanned electronic sensors at both ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.

- The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these stations.
 - a. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph la above, United States personnel will follow the nature of the operations of the stations and all movement into within, and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the UNEF, and to the Joint Commission
 - b. At each watch station described in paragraph lb above, the United States
 personnel will immediately report to the
 Joint Commission, and to UNEF any

- 2 -

SEGRET-

movement of armed forces, other than the UNEF, into either Pass and any observed preparations for such movement.

- 3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by this Proposal, except for small arms required for internal security and self-defense.
- 4. The United States shall be entitled to establish support, management and secure communications facilities and its personnel shall have landing rights and unimpeded freedom of movement through and over the territories under the jurisdiction or control of either of the Parties to the Agreement in so far as necessary to perform their functions.
- 5. The United States and its personnel shall be immune from local criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction.
- The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel.

.../4

- 7. No change in this Proposal shall take effect except upon the request of both Parties to the Egypt-Israel Agreement of ...
- 8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Proposal, the United States may withdraw its personnel if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer in the national interest of the United States. In such a case the Parties will be informed in advance in order to allow them to make alternative arrangements.
- 9. Technical problems arising out of the implementation of this Proposal will be worked out by a joint team.


Accepted



THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

Jab D - Israeli drøgt J prøpond letter





August 27, 1975

AGREED PRINCIPLES FOR THE GENEVA WORKING GROUP

Definitions_of_lines_and_areas

Definitions of lines; buffer-zones; areas of limited forces and armament; the area of Egyptian Civilian Administration with U.N. presence; the early warning stations of the Parties and of the USA; and other definitions, shall be as indicated on the attached map I: 100,000 (US Edition).

Buffer Zones

SEGRET

1.

2.

- The U.N. Force shall operate within the Buffer Zones in the same a) manner in which it presently operates.
- Entry into the Buffer Zones will be forbidden to military forces and b) civilians of both Parties, except as regards civilians permitted to cross through, or remain in the Buffer Zones, as will be determined by the Parties.
- c)
- Aircraft of either Party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that Party (Line E as regards Egypt, and Line J as regards Israel).
- Either Party may fly up to the median line of Buffer Zone 1 for the d) purposes of aerial photography, after giving advance notice to the Joint Commitssion.
- e) In Buffer Zone 1 there will be an early warning station be Party (E-1), and I-1.
- The Egyptian Civilian Administration Area with U.N. Presence 3.
 - The area will be demilitarized. There will be no military forces a) or infra-structures.
 - There will be no change in the present practice of navigation in the b) Gulf of Suez, including the waters adjacent to the western coastline of the area.

10130103

.../2

c) Only unarmed Egyptian civilians employed in the oilfields will be permitted to enter, remain in, and exit from the area.

- 2

- d) Entry by military vessels and military aircraft into the area will be forbidden.
- e) Entry to the area, by land or by sea, shall be only through the U.N. check-posts. The U.N. Force will be authorized to supervise such entry.
- f) The area will be supervised by the U.N. Force.
- 4.

5.

- Common Use of Sections of the Israeli Road along the Gulf of Suez
- a) Israel may use these sections free from any restrictions whatsoever.
- b) Egypt may use these sections for civilian transport only, under the supervision of the U.N.
- d) A time schedule , and other arrangements relating to the use of these sections, will be agreed upon by the Working Group.
- Areas of Limited Forces and Armament
 - A) Demarcation of these areas will be indicated on the map attached the Agreement.
 - b) The major limitations in the Areas of Limited Forces and Armament (the area between lines J and K, and the area between lines E and F) will be:.
 - I) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions
 - II) Seventy five (75) tanks

III) Thirty six (36) artillery pieces (including heavy mortars) whose range shall not exceed twelve (12)km.

IV) The total number of personnel shall not exceed seven thousand (7000).

V) It will be forbidden to introduce into the area weapons with a range capable of reaching lines E and J respectively.

.../3

VI) In the area between line A (in accordance with the Disengagement Agreement of Jan. 18, 1974) and line E of this Agreement, there will be no fortifications or installations for forces of a size beyond that permitted above.

c) The major limitations beyond the Areas of Limited Forces and Armament will be:

I) A prohibition on the emplacement of artillery pieces or other weapons within an area of thirty (30) km east of line J and west of line E, with a range capable of reaching lines J and E respectively.
II) The Parties will not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area of 12 km east of line K and west of line F, respectively.

- d) The U.N. Force will conduct inspections in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.
- e) The USA will carry out aerial reconnaissance and photography of the Areas of Limited Forces and Armament held by either Party at a frequency of one mission every seven (7) to ten (10) days. Photographs will be made available by the USA to both Israel and Egypt expeditiously.
- 6. Early Warning Stations in Buffer Zone 1
 - a) Each Party will operate its Early Warning Station in Buffer Zonel: J-1 as regards Israel, and E-1 as regards Egypt, as detailed on the attached map.
 - b) For the purpose of operating its early warning station, each Party is entitled to maintain personnel and equipment in accordance with the separate agreement between the Government of the United States and the Parties.

7. Maintenance of Civilian Infrastructures

In the area which will be under Egyptian Civilian Administration with U.N. presence, Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian foundations and infrastructures.

..../4



- 3 -

8. <u>Process of Implementation</u>

- The process of implementation of the Agreement will commence from the date of the signing of the Protocol, which will be drawn up by the Working Group.
- b) The Working Group shall determine a time table for the process of implementation of the Agreement and for any other arrangements required by the redeployment of military forces, and civilians, as according to the Agreement.

9. The Working Group

- a) The Working Group shall meet in Genevaand shall complete its task within three (3) weeks.
- b) The Working Group shall draft a Protocol which shall include the details as set out in the abovementioned agreed principles, and any other matters necessary for implementation of the Agreement.
- c) The abovementioned Protocol will constitute an integral part of the Agreement.



עותק מס'ן מתוך 30 עותקים

28 August 1975

DRAFT OF LETTER OF PRESIDENT SADAT TO PRESIDENT FORD

Dear Mr. President,

ECRE

I hereby inform you in connection with the Agreement signed by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel on ... that the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt regards the Red Sea, its approaches and the straits leading to it, including the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb, as international waterways for ships of all flags and that it will not interfere, directly or indirectly, with the free and unimpeded passage of Israeli ships or cargoes through those waterways.

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt likewise recognizes Israel's right to freedom of flights over the Red Sea and its approaches, including the Straits of Bab el-Mandeb, and it will not interfere, directly or indirectly, with the free and unimpeded flight of all Israeli aircraft in the airspace above these areas.

In connection with the Egypt-Israel Agreement of ... the Government of the Republic of Egypt reiterates, as previously stated, that all cargoes destined for and coming from Israel are permitted through the Suez Canal.

For the purposes of Article VII of the Egypt-Israel Agreement of ... the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt wishes to state that its definition of "military cargoes" comprises exclusively all types of weapons, weapon systems, ammunition, missiles and armour.









.

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

7

WITHDRAWAL ID 017134

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL Talking Paper
RECEIVER'S NAME Henry A. Kissinger
DESCRIPTION Priority Items for Discussion in Alexandria, August 28, 1975
CREATION DATE
VOLUME 5 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033100068 COLLECTION TITLE
FOLDER TITLE August 21 - September 1, 1975 - Sinai Disengagement Agreement - Vol. III (2)
DATE WITHDRAWN

Santiza 9/9/04

SECRET/NODIS

CHECKLIST

Alexandria, Thursday, August 28, 1975

I. Priority Items for Discussion in Alexandria

A. The Agreement.


-- The version at <u>Tab A</u> is the line-in/line-out copy for you to talk from in describing the Israeli suggestions of this morning. It relates to the draft Fahmy has, resulting from your discussion yesterday afternoon. As you well know, it is highly desirable to freeze the text on this round.

-- The version at <u>Tab B</u> is a clean draft you could give Fahmy

B. Early Warning Area.

The draft <u>Proposal</u> resulting from this morning's discussion in Israel is at <u>Tab C</u>. You will be both gaining Egyptian agreement to the approach and introducing the text for study. Our objective would be to get Egyptian agreement at least in the course of tomorrow. (If Monroe could send us a text in the course of Friday, it would permit us to feeeze this text Saturday night or Sunday.)

Presidential Library Review of DOS and NSC Equities is Required DECLASSIFIED, with Parties exempt AUTHORITY <u>LAC ne with 14/04</u>; State review 9/18/03; NLF, DATE <u>Lef24(L</u>) Approved For Release 2004/09/09: NLF-KR-5-1-1



Approved For Release 2004/09/09 : NLF-KR-5-1-1-2

SECRET/NODIS

-2-

C. Letter on UNEF Duration:

Israel has asked you to try to add the words "at least."

D. Although this presents a problem, you will want to continue to keep in mind that Israel wants a letter which defines what military cargoes would be excluded from the Canal (you have suggested a solution for this), repeats the January 1974 position on the Bab al-Mandab, and states that the word "blockades" does not apply to oil and raw materials.

II. The Annex

It would help with completion of the Annex to get Egyptian understanding on the following points in order of acceptability to Egyptians:

A. Non-destruction. It would help set the tone for you to confirm that in the coastal area "Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures."

B. Timetable.

-- Initialing

-- Signing in Geneva

--'Working group will complete implementation plan

within days (Israel, 3 weeks; Egypt, 7 days)

Approved For Release 2004/09/09 : NLF-KR-5-1-1-2

-- First move within...

-- Completion of implementation within... (Egypt, 3 months). C. <u>Frontier Guards</u> in area under Egyptian administration -number and equipment Egypt considers necessary. (Egypt will resent any limitation.)

D. Force limitations. Israel proposes:

- 75 tanks (Gamasy - 150)

- Additional 1000 troops (Gamasy - 21,000)

- Artillery: east of Canal - 36 guns of 12 km. range with limit on heavy mortars; west of Canal -- no limit except that there will be no artillery stationed that can reach the other side. (Gamasy - anti-tank guns, anti-tank missiles, mortars and 120 artillery pieces.)

Missiles: 12 km. from Canal (fallback - 10 km.)

(Gamasy - 15 SAMs).

[1]

(We still have to deal with the questions of road use, navigation in the Gulf, the workings of the Joint Commission, but these will have to be left until after your next talks in Israel.

Approved For Release 2004/09/09 : NLF-KR-5-1-1-2

Approved For Release 2004/09/09 ! NLF-KR-5-1-1-2

SECRET/NODIS

III. "Oral" Assurances

If you accomplish the above, you will have don e a very good evening's work. However, you will want to keep in mind the Israeli desire for assurances on:

-- propaganda;

-- boycott;

-- political action against Israel, including not working against restoration of relations and not pushing to expel Israel from international fora.

There are other lesser assurances we will put on your list taward

the end.

Approved For Release 2004/09/09 : NLF-KR-5-1-1-2

Approved For Release 2004/09/09 : NLF-KR-5-1 SECRET 'NODIS Fahmy is pressing for 1 billion tons of grain. PL 480. Β. We have promised 800,000 tons. Enders' initial reaction to the L Brit i Fritzeit. increase is that we have to maintain the present level for the moment (a) because any increase would cut into Korea, Pakistan, Chile, or Bangladesh and (b) because it wo uld require a further budget increase. ELAL, Approved For Release 2004/09/09 : NLF-KR-5-1-1-2



•

•

Ņ

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

INFORMATION

٤÷

7

-SECRET/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

August 28, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

B

BRENT SCOWCROFT

Secretary Kissinger asked that the following message be passed to you:

"After seven hours with Rabin today and three with Sadat here is where we stand:

"First, with the exception of a few very minor non-fundamental points, the text of the agreement is agreed and for all practical purposes frozen. I am sending you a text.

"Secondly, there is agreement on the U.S. technical surveillance early warning station system in the area of the passes. This will be made in the form of a U.S. proposal accepted by both sides. It is this element that will be submitted to the Congress for its approval. There will be three U.S. manned stations.

"Thirdly, the map is set with the exception that we will need to get a slight modification from the Israelis on how they have drawn the line through the Giddi Pass.

"Fourth, there is a remaining, serious problem with the Israelis on the kind of arrangements they have in mind in the corridor leading to the Abu Rudeis oil field. They revealed to us for the first time that they have fortifications right up against a single road which is along the Gulf of Suez. This would mean that when Egyptian traffic is on this road on alternate days it will be facing Israeli guns within eyesight. This is exactly what the Israelis did in Kuneitra in the Syrian agreement which has prevented Asad from ever repopulating the city. I have made clear to the Israelis that the Egyptians will not accept this kind of situation and they are studying the matter overnight to see what can be done about it. This is clearly an issue on which the agreement

SECRET/SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED E.G. 12953, 030, 3.5 100 MEMO, 11/14951, 51/14 DEPTT, CM/DELINES V. H.R. 151/16 DEPTT, CM/DELINES

SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 2 -

could break, Mr. President, because it would fundamentally abridge the principle of free access to the oil fields, to which the Israelis have been committed for a very long time.

"Fifth, there is also the large area of private commitments and assurances. Israel wants us to get the kind of written commitments from Egypt which, in the context of the Israeli leaks, Sadat is understandably very reluctant to give. Moreover the price which the Israelis are demanding on the bilateral memorandum of understanding agreement between us would restrict seriously our freedom of political action in the future, unless the Israelis back off.

"In short, Mr. President, while the agreement is not yet certain we are very close indeed. I am not certain that this agreement will have the hoped for effect of opening a new chapter of relations between Israel and Egypt. This is because of the ungenerous manner in which the Israelis have negotiated this agreement. Nor do I come away from this negotiation with the feeling that the Israelis have dealt with us as a close and intimate ally working together within a concerted strategy. The experience of the last week has not enhanced the confidence of any of us in the team which is at the helm of the Israeli government. I do not come away with the feeling that the achievement of this agreement will strengthen the fabric of U.S.-Israeli relationships as much as I had hoped. Moreover, there is the consideration that some at home, at least, will be concerned over the \$2 billion-plus price tag, the guaranty of an oil supply, and the American presence in the passes.

"Nevertheless, I believe that the achievement of this agreement is in the overall national interest. It is still the best way to buy time and reduce the risk of war in the area; it is still the best way for us to remain relevant to the diplomacy of the Middle East; it is still the best way for us to avoid a steady deterioration of our relations in the Arab world; it is still the best way to keep on an even keel with our allies in Europe on this issue; it is still the best way to reduce the influence of the Soviet Union in the Middle East and it will avoid a domestic confrontation which is more likely in circumstances of a seriously strained American-Israeli relationship.

"I appreciated receiving your observations on the Middle Eastern situation contained in your recent cable."



•

ċ

.

Friday, August 29, 1975



SECRET/NODIS

CHECKLIST

Jerusalem, Friday, August 29

In order to let you review the documents systematically, we have put together the attached book, which we will now keep up to date. Your objective is to take a set to Egypt as near to agreement as possible.

- I. The Agreement
 - -- Sadat has accepted the Agreement with some changes in Article IV - A(6). (We have extra copies of the revised text to give the Israelis. The documents you worked from yesterday are attached.
 - -- Propose to freeze the text as it stands.
- II. The Proposal on Early Warning System
 - -- Sadat accepted the concept.
 - -- The Egyptians have proposed some changes. (See <u>TAB C</u> in the book. We have copies for the Israelis.)
 - -- We would like to take a copy to Egypt which Israel is prepared to approve.

III. Letter on UNEF duration

-- In light of the favorable Sadat response on the Agreement, the words "at least" are not inserted in the letter.

SECRET/NODIS

DYGUARAI E.C. 1997 D. MAYOLAN HAR

10/30/03

-- Propose we freeze this text now.

FORD LIBRARY

IV. Annex

The above should be taken care of relatively quickly. Most of the day should be spent on The Annex (TAB B of your book). The principal problems you will want to return to are:

- -- The map of the coastal area.
- -- Force limitations.

-- Navigation in the Gulf of Suez. U

-- <u>Go through the document</u> systematically with a view to getting a text to discuss with Egypt.

V. Map

Repeat your request for:

-- a final version of the map to review. \checkmark

-- The Giddi map. ---

VI. Letter on Straits and Canal

Rough drafts are at TAB E. They will require some - Israeli review.

VII. Discuss timetable

VIII.Remaining Issues

- A. Get Israeli assurance not to harrass oil ships ______ in the Gulf.
- B. You promised the Egyptians you would raise _____ fishing rights.
- C. We suggest you leave the <u>Memorandum of Understanding</u> until the agreement documents are pinned down. Just to keep them before you, the principal outstanding



-2-

SECRET/NODIS




issues are summarized below, keyed to the page and paragraph numbers of our working document (TAB G).

- --- U.S. support for oil supply for Israel. Language needs to be carefully reviewed, given the implications of the U.S. ensuring the <u>delivery</u> of oil (possible blockade busting) as well as ensuring an adequate <u>supply</u>. On the question of duration, the Israelis have promised language relating it to the life expectancy of the Abu Rodeis oil fields.
- -- U.S. commitment to consult and support GOI in taking action against Egypt for violations (U.S. para 7; GOI paras 7 and 8, <u>page 7</u>). (We have possible compromise language if you want it.)
- -- Degree of U.S. support for Israel in the event of a threat by a world power (U.S. and GOI para 11, page 8).
- -- U.S. to get commitment from Egypt that the Agreement is unconditional and stands alone (U.S. and GOI para 13, page 9).
- -- USG commitment to support Rabin proposals in any Israel-Syria negotiations (<u>No</u> U.S. para; GOI para 15, <u>page 10</u>).
- -- Degree of U.S. support for Israel in freedom of navigation and overflight (U.S. para 16; v GOI para 17, page 11). (We have possible compromise language if you want it).
- -- U.S. action against boycott (U.S. para 17; GOI $\sqrt{para \ 18, \ pages \ 11 \ and \ 12}$). (We have possible compromise language if you want it.)

-SECRET/NODIS





Library: 1000 Beal Ave., Ann Arbor, MI 48109 Museum: 303 Pearl Street, NW, Grand Rapids, MI 49504 (734) 205-0555 fax (734) 205-0571

 $(516) 254-0400 \quad fax (616) 254-0386$

The documents in this folder continue into the next folder.