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**The documents in this
folder continue from the
previous folder.**

CHECK LIST

ISRAEL, MARCH 21

General Observations

Mood was of disappointment, bordering on disillusionment regarding Israeli conduct of this negotiation.

Serious questioning that Israel can be worked with in a future towards peace.

Reaction to Specific Points

1. Non use for force

Israeli formula acceptable, except last phrase in 3rd paragraph which goes beyond language of disengagement agreement.

2. Syria

Satisfactory oral assurance to us. Sadat said, If Syria attacks Israel, and it is confirmed by the UN force, Egypt will not attack Israel. Seem to say it also applied to a Syrian initiated war of attrition against Israel.

3. Duration

Present formula is open ended: "The United Nations emergency force will continue in its function" and "will be extended annually".

Unwilling to give a three or four year commitment.

4. Other Elements of Belligerency -- Defacto

Nothing new on selective easing of boycott, possibility of getting something more but not much.

5. Military Aspects

Rejected strongly and categorically line going through the passes.

Rejected categorically idea of an enclave around the oil fields.



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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY: HR DATE: 10/02/03

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Insists on principle that neither Egypt nor Israel would be in the passes.

Feels that Israelis have Aqaba, he should exercise influence in the Gulf of Suez.

No real interest in monitoring station, though this is probably still open.

Pressing for Egyptian line west of the passes. Maybe they could be persuaded to limit forward movement to the present Israeli zone of limitation with large buffer zones in between. What are problems for Israel connected with this?

Possibility of establishing separate demilitarized UN zone in South around oil fields.

6. Scenario for Break-up

To be discussed if Rabin decides not to take latest proposal to Cabinet.

Attached are:

- Tab A: The latest Israeli formulation on the non-use of force.
- Tab B: Draft announcement of breaking off talks.
- Tab C: The last Fahmy paper as you wished to present it to the Israelis (minus three paragraphs).
- Tab D: The basic Israeli paper and earlier formulations.

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
Egypt and Israel resolve that the conflict between them shall not be solved by military means and can only be solved by peaceful means.

They hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force against each other and to settle all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means. The Parties will give written assurances to the USG to this effect.

They confirm their obligation to scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other and from assisting in military or para-military actions against the other party.

(Non-use of force)

March 20, 1975



Considering that the Middle East crisis will not ultimately be solved by military force but rather by peaceful means;

Desirous to reach ultimately the final and just peaceful settlement prescribed by Security Council Resolution 338 and as a significant step towards that end, Egypt and Israel agree to conclude the following disengagement agreement:

1- The agreement should include total withdrawal of Israeli forces to the east of the passes and from the oilfields including the town of El Tor.

2- The new lines will be drawn on the following basis:

a) the Israeli forces will withdraw from their present line to a new line east of the passes;

b) the Egyptian forces will move up to the western entrance of the passes;

c) the area between the Egyptian line and the Israeli line will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed;

d) the area between the new Israeli line and a line ten kilometers to the east of it will be limited

in armament and forces;

3) the area between the new Egyptian line and a line ten kilometers to the west of it will be limited in armament and forces.

3- Israel and Egypt would be prepared to give a formal assurance in writing to the U.S. Government of their intention not to resort to the use of force for the duration of this agreement and as long as the process for reaching a just and durable peace is continuing in accordance with the letter and the spirit of Security Council Resolution 338 and other relevant UN resolutions.

4- Nothing in this agreement would prevent Egypt from exercising its right to self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter.

5- The United Nations Emergency Force will continue in its function and its mandate will be extended annually.

6- A committee under the auspices of the United Nations or the chairmanship of the UN Chief of Staff will be established in order that military representatives of the parties discuss, in the zone of disengagement, problems arising from the implementation of this agreement.

7- The Israeli withdrawal will be implemented in such a manner as to indicate the willingness of the Israelis to demonstrate their desire for peace, namely that no roads or installations or equipment of the oilfields be destroyed or transferred from their present location either to Israel or the remaining occupied territories.

8- The agreement should have as an annex a fixed timetable indicating the various phases of the implementation of the agreement bearing in mind that the full implementation should be terminated within three months of the signature of the agreement and that Egypt receives all oilfields within two weeks of the signing of the present agreement.

9- Nothing in this agreement precludes the reconvening of the Geneva Conference which is to take place at the earliest possible date with the participation of all the parties concerned for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

10- This disengagement agreement is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement.

11- This disengagement agreement remains valid until superseded by a new agreement.



New article 3

3- Israel and Egypt would be prepared to give a formal assurance in writing to the U.S. Government of their intention not to resort to the use of force for the duration of this agreement.



NON-USE OF FORCE

Egypt and Israel hereby undertake in the relations between themselves not to resort to the use of force and to resolve all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means.

They will refrain from permitting, encouraging, assisting, or participating in any military, paramilitary or hostile actions, from any warlike or hostile acts and any other form of warfare or hostile activity against the other Party anywhere.

Note: This undertaking will not be linked to anything (duration, peace process etc).

March 17, 1975

Y. A.



3.

NON-USE OF FORCE

Egypt and Israel hereby undertake in the relations between themselves, not to resort to the use of force and to resolve all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means. They will refrain from all military or paramilitary actions, from any warlike and hostile acts and any other forms of warfare.

NOTE : This undertaking will not be linked to anything (duration, peace process etc).



March 17, 1975

ADDITIONAL UNDERTAKINGS

- (1) This agreement will remain in force until superseded by a peace agreement.
- (2) Undertakings regarding the duration of the agreement.
- (3) The parties recognize that the conflict between them cannot be solved by force.

Other Formulations to be included :

- (a) This is not a peace agreement it is a significant stop towards just and lasting peace between them (in accordance ...etc.)
- (b) References in the agreement to some of the practical steps agreed.

March 17, 1975



PROPOSED MAIN ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

(1) Agreement to stand on its own two feet

(1) The agreement will be bi-lateral between Egypt and Israel. It is not linked to an agreement with other Arab countries and does not create a pattern for other discussions or settlements. Neither are there any prior conditions attached to its acceptance.

The proposed agreement is not the final settlement between Egypt and Israel, but further settlements are not an element or an implied condition to the execution and continued validity of this agreement until superseded by a new agreement.

(2) Progress towards peace

The approach to peace and the further development of elements of peaceful relations, will find its expression in suitable formulation and in concrete and practical arrangements.

It is proposed that the agreement refer to its declared aim of the furtherance of peace between the parties and to its being a significant step towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace between Egypt and Israel.

Furthermore, the concrete arrangements based on the agreement which will express and reflect this progress towards peace will, inter alia, be as follows :

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STATE DEPT. CONTROL
BY LR DATE 10/02/03



- 2 -
- (a) Open bridges for tourists, family visits, goods etc.
 - (b) Non-restriction on ships, planes or travellers because of call or visit to the territory of the other party.
 - (c) Abstention from hostile propaganda.
 - (d) Suspension of economic warfare and boycott practices.
 - (e) Cessation of anti-Israel diplomatic pressures in third countries and international bodies.
 - (f) Freedom of navigation on high seas, straits and waterways and freedom of flight over them.
 - (g) Right of passage through the Canal.
 - (h) Establishment of Joint Committees with supervision teams to oversee execution of agreement.

(3) Non-use of force

The agreement will express the resolve of the parties to refrain from any further threat or use of force against each other and the decision to settle all disputes between themselves by negotiations and other peaceful means. The document will contain the undertaking of the renunciation of belligerency, clearly and in its appropriate legal wording. The agreement will be made public.

Both parties will add a formal guarantee that they will not participate, directly or indirectly, in any hostilities between the other party and any other state or forces or provide assistance of any kind to states or forces involved in such hostilities.

(4) Arrangements on the ground

- (a) The area evacuated by Israel will be established as a buffer zone between the forces.
- (b) A defined area of limited armaments and forces east of the new line will be established.
- (c) The present area of limited armaments and forces west of Line A, established by the agreement of January 1974, remains unchanged.

- (d) Supervision will be carried out by the UN and by the Joint Committees and Supervision teams established (see 2(h)).
- (e) Alert systems of each party in the vacated zone to prevent surprise attack is proposed.
- (f) There will be aerial reconnaissance missions by aircraft of both sides.
- (g) The arrangements will be contained in a Protocol attached to the agreement.

(5) Duration

- (a) The agreement will be in force until superseded by a new agreement; no time-limit to the present agreement will be set.
- (b) Egypt will give an undertaking via the USG that it will not demand a new agreement or a further withdrawal for an agreed period.
- (c) The mandate of the supervisory organ will be for an indefinite period.
- (d) There will be an agreed timetable for the implementation of the agreement. Stage one will be a preparatory one.

(6) Relation to Geneva

The agreement should find its expression in the position of the parties, if and when the Geneva Conference is renewed. The intention of the parties expressed in the agreement, generally and in its detailed provisions, has to find its continued effect in the approaches and attitudes taken in Geneva, in a way to be agreed upon.



(7) Lines

The question of the lines will be developed subsequently , after the consideration and discussion of the six points mentioned above and on their basis.

11.3.75



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States
Lt. Gen. Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff
Mordechai Gazit, Director General, Prime
Minister's Office
Avraham Kidron, Director General, Ministry
of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and
Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs

Amb. Kenneth Keating, U.S. Ambassador to
Israel

Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for
Political Affairs

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs

Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs

Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff


PWR

DATE AND TIME:

Friday, March 21, 1975
10:10 p.m. - 12:10 a.m.

PLACE:

Prime Minister's Office
Jerusalem



[The Secretary arrived at 10:10 p.m. and conferred with the
Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Defense Minister in
the Prime Minister's private office until 11:59 p.m. The
full meeting convened briefly.]

Henry A. Kissinger

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

5(B)(1,3)

Impresso determino

Kissinger: Basically we just went over the whole position again, and as I understand the Israeli Cabinet decision, it was basically to reaffirm the original decision.

Rabin: Basically.

Kissinger: The Prime Minister and his colleagues thought we ought to meet again tomorrow. We would all profit from a day of reflection. We would send off a message to the Egyptians to see if there are any reflections there. [Message sent is at Tab A].

Rabin: Not to raise any illusions there.

Kissinger: No.

When are we going to see what your thinktank produced? We read so much about it.

Sisco: I would recommend a reduction by one! There are too many lawyers.

Peres: If our thinktank would be able to make us a ten-million nation instead of a three-million nation, it would help our problem.

Kissinger: Fahmy is getting good at public relations.

Sisco: He is a master. Very subtle.

Kissinger: We will send a message to the Egyptians. Just as we will raise no expectations with the Egyptians, you should have no illusions about what we will get back.

Peres: [Reads from Egyptian press statement:] What Bashir says is: "Egypt made proposals which should make possible an agreement." Where are the new proposals?

Kissinger: They consider demilitarization a major proposal.

Sisco: And they dropped the idea of equidistance from the passes.

Peres: "And Egypt is prepared to be flexible."



Kissinger: The passes are mentioned. As long as the passes are evacuated, they give up their insistence on being there.

Peres: They mention only Abu Rudeis.

Kissinger: That is interesting.

the

Gur: Radio Cairo says/negotiations would explode.

Kissinger: Explode?

Gur: Yes.

Kissinger: Fail?

Gur: I asked our people to check all the announcements.

Kissinger: They have a dual problem. This is designed for you.

I sent them a message this afternoon saying they had to be ready for a suspension. So this is preparing for that.

Peres: [Reads] "Four more trips by Dr. Kissinger will bring us closer to an agreement."

Allon: They are inviting you to visit again. I told you.

Rabin: You will go to Masada tomorrow?

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: We will meet at 6:00 tomorrow.

Peres: Did the barber get publicity for the haircut?

Dinitz: Since we decided there would be no leakages to the press, we didn't leak it to the press. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Do we have to say something to the press?

Peres: We can say we reported to you on the Cabinet discussions and we will rest tomorrow and meet again tomorrow.

[The meeting ended. The remarks by Peres and Kissinger to the press are at Tab B.]



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Department of State TELEGRAM

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NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

SECTO 455

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: MESSAGE FOR PRESIDENT SADAT

1. PLEASE CONTACT FAHMY AND PASS ON FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME FOR HIM AND PRESIDENT SADAT.
2. THE ISRAELI CABINET MET YESTERDAY AFTERNOON AND EVENING FOR 5-1/2 HOURS, FOLLOWING WHICH I MET AGAIN FOR TWO HOURS WITH THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATING TEAM. I MUST REPORT THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CHANGE IN THEIR POSITION. TODAY BEING THE SABBATH HERE, WE HAVE AGREED TO MEET AGAIN THIS EVENING AT 6:00 PM FOR ONE MORE GO-AROUND. BETWEEN NOW AND THEN, THERE ARE TWO QUESTIONS ON WHICH I NEED EGYPTIAN ADVICE: (A) IF THERE ARE ANY ASPECTS OF THE EGYPTIAN POSITION WHICH THEY HAVE NOT REVEALED TO ME, IS THE TIME TO TELL ME SO THAT I CAN USE THEM TO BEST ADVANTAGE IN MY TALKS HERE. FOR THE PRESIDENT'S AND FAHMY'S INFORMATION, THE QUESTION WHICH SEEMS TO LOOM PARTICULARLY LARGE IN ISRAELI EYES IS THAT OF THE DURATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND OF THE UNEF MANDATE. I HAVE NO IDEAS TO SUGGEST IN THIS REGARD BUT SIMPLY MENTION THIS BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN STRESSED SO MUCH BY THE ISRAELIS. THERE IS,



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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 JERUSA 00627 220745Z

HOWEVER, ONE POINT WHICH I THINK MIGHT GREATLY STRENGTHEN MY HAND IN TRYING TO MODIFY THE ISRAELI POSITION ON THE LINE OF WITHDRAWAL. IF EGYPT COULD AGREE TO THE MAINTENANCE OF ONE ISRAELI EARLY WARNING INSTALLATION REMAINING IN THE BUFFER ZONE IN THE PASSES, THIS WOULD BE OF PARTICULAR HELP IN INFLUENCING THE POSITION OF THE ISRAELI MILITARY. IF EGYPT COULD AGREE TO THIS, IT WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE TO BE UNDERSTOOD THAT THERE WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE AN EGYPTIAN EARLY WARNING STATION IN THE BUFFER ZONE. (2) IF THE ISRAELIS HOLD TO THEIR PRESENT POSITION IN OUR MEETING THIS EVENING, I SEE THREE OPTIONS AS TO HOW I CAN PROCEED AND WOULD LIKE TO KNOW WHICH ONE THE PRESIDENT AND FAHMY PREFER: (1) I CAN ANNOUNCE THE SUSPENSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HERE AND GO DIRECTLY HOME; (2) I CAN ANNOUNCE THE SUSPENSION HERE AND STOP IN ASWAN ON THE WAY HOME; OR (3) I CAN GO TO ASWAN AND ANNOUNCE THE SUSPENSION THERE.

3. I WANT YOU TO GET ACROSS TO FAHMY THAT WE ARE FACING A SERIOUS SITUATION. I WILL, OF COURSE, CONTINUE TO DO EVERYTHING I CAN TO GET SOME MOVEMENT IN THE ISRAELI POSITION AND WE MUST RESERVE FINAL JUDGMENT UNTIL AFTER THIS EVENING'S MEETING HERE. HE MUST, HOWEVER, FACE UP TO VERY REAL POSSIBILITY THAT THE ISRAELIS WILL REMAIN UNYIELDING AND LET ME KNOW WHAT THE PRESIDENT'S PREFERENCES ARE; WHETHER I SHOULD THEN ANNOUNCE A SUSPENSION AND WHERE I SHOULD DO IT AND WHETHER I SHOULD RETURN TO ASWAN, IF IT COMES TO THAT AS IT VERY WELL MAY.
KISSINGER



~~SECRET~~

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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Amconsul JERUSALEM

March 21, 1975

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UNCLASSIFIED JERUSALEM 0628

SECCTO 456

E.O. 11652:

N/A

TAGS:

OVIP (Kissinger, Henry A.)

SUBJECT:

Remarks of Defense Minister Peres and Secretary of State Kissinger during the early morning of March 22, 1975

1. Following are the remarks of Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger following a meeting at the Prime Minister's Office of the American and Israeli negotiating teams during the night of March 21 and the early morning hours of March 22, 1975 in Jerusalem:

2. Defense Minister Peres: BEGIN QUOTE: Well, as you know, we had an important and long cabinet

DRAFTED BY:

DRAFTING DATE:

TEL. EXT.:

APPROVED BY:

CLEARANCES:

USIS: [unclear] 3/22/75

S/S: [unclear] SW

S/PES: Randerson

RA in draft



meeting this afternoon. Afterwards we have reported to Dr. Kissinger about the deliberations in our cabinet session and we went into great details about the many and complicated problems ahead of us and since today is Friday night we have decided to continue tomorrow. I hope the Secretary will remain so we shall be able to deal with the very serious matter in a relaxed and thoughtful way tomorrow night.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

3. Q: Mr. Peres, ~~are the talks~~^{are} are the talks deadlocked? Have you hit a really serious snag?

A: Defense Minister Peres: I would not like to conclude the negotiations as long as they go on. Let us be a little bit patient and not run ahead of time, neither with guesses nor with conclusions.

4. Q: Why the special session tonight, on Friday night? A: Peres: Basically, I believe because we are a democratic country and decisions are being taken by the cabinet.

5. Q. Could we get Dr. Kissinger's assessment?



A: Secretary Kissinger: I agree with what the Defense Minister has said. We reviewed in great detail all the points that are involved in a potential agreement, ~~and we~~ We thought that both sides would benefit from a day of thinking over where we stand, and we are going to meet again tomorrow evening and continue our discussion.

6. Q: Secretary Kissinger, how do you react to these tales of deadlock? How would you characterize where it stands?

A: Secretary Kissinger: I would say that over the recent week the positions of the two sides have come closer to each other. Both sides have made a serious effort to take into account the considerations of the other, but a gap remains and, of course, as long as a gap remains there remains a lot of work to be done.

7. Q: Are you going to continue with this work? Do you plan to keep going; keep going to Aswan; keep up the shuttle?

A: Secretary Kissinger: I plan to continue the shuttle as long as I think there is a possibility of bridging the gap.

8. Q: And do you think so now, sir?

A: Secretary Kissinger: I think so now and
I will continue our discussions tomorrow.

9. Defense Minister Peres: Goodnight,
gentleman, go and have a rest. END QUOTE.

KISSINGER *JK*



March 22

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE

March 22, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

FROM:

MS

THE PRESIDENT

BRENT SCOWCROFT 

Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following report.

1. The Israeli cabinet completed five hours of discussion today, and we were informed later this evening by Rabin and his colleagues that the cabinet made no new modifications in the Israeli position and reaffirmed the position previously conveyed to us.
2. Your letter arrived before the end of the cabinet meeting, and we understand it was read to the entire cabinet. From my two hours of discussions alone with Rabin, Allon and Peres, it was clear that the letter had shaken them and all three seemed to be beginning to realize the consequences of Israeli intransigence. As a result, Rabin asked that no suspension of the talks be announced, and that they will think matters over tomorrow. We will reconvene again at 6:00 P.M. Israeli time Saturday.
3. My impression continues to be that the three key members of the negotiating team want an agreement, particularly in the aftermath of your letter, but they do not seem to know how to get out of the hole domestically they have dug for themselves. Sadat has given them two options: Egyptian forces would be in the western part of the passes while Israeli forces would be in the eastern part of the passes; or alternatively, the forces of neither side being in the passes with the UN taking it over in its entirety. Israel finds both these proposals unacceptable and has offered a smaller withdrawal largely because they have nailed themselves to such a position domestically. As to the oil fields, Israel is willing to give Egypt a small enclave within Israeli controlled territory. Sadat is equally insistent that the area along the Gulf of Suez, including the Abu Rudeis oil fields, should be a UN buffer zone in which neither side's forces are located. He feels he cannot have Egyptians cross Israeli territory to get to the oil fields. We have not been able to bridge the gap, and I do not expect the Israelis to come up with anything significantly new tomorrow night. In the meantime, I am canvassing Sadat again to see whether he has any new suggestions which might help eliminate the deadlock. The tragedy is that Israel knows it must have an agreement and yet is paralyzed by its domestic politics. We may be witnessing the twilight of democracy."


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E.O. 13526, SEC. 3.5

SECRET/SENSITIVE

NSO MEMO, MAR 23 1975

10/02/03



CHECK LIST

JERUSALEM, MARCH 22

Mr. Secretary:

It may be that the Israeli leadership has made a strategic judgment that it would be better for the present negotiations to fail than to pay what is objectively the relatively limited price Sadat is now asking, and is just maneuvering to put itself in the best possible tactical position when the failure becomes public. If this is the case, it will only prolong a fruitless debate to try to find solutions to the specific problems they raise because, under these circumstances, they are raising these issues only as a smokescreen and will find new issues as fast as old ones are resolved. For example, the whole range of questions involving specific components of non-belligerency offer opportunities for endless haggling.

On the other hand, it may also be possible that they are genuinely frightened of the consequences of a failure but just do not know how to get themselves out of the box they have put themselves in. If this is the case, then there could be some value in introducing some U.S. "ideas" -- not a written "proposal" that could become an easy target -- to try to break the stalemate.

Attached for you to think about, therefore, are:

- some talking points to open the meeting tonight putting forward some possible reflections on where the negotiations stand and then
- a separate page on each of the major outstanding issues showing how each might be resolved.
- One of these papers describes a possible approach to the problem of the lines, and a map is at the back of the package for your use only just to give you the opportunity to see how it would look.

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E.O. 12958, SEC 3.5 *State Dept Review*

STATE DEPT. AUTOMATIC SF 9/17/03


BY *HR* DATE 10/02/03

Joe, Roy, Bob, Hal



TALKING POINTS

1. We both agreed last night we would reflect on the situation during the day.
2. Let's leave aside the question of how we got here and review the conceptual problem we face.
3. A basic element in the present impasse is the following:
 - When we agreed on the step-by-step approach one of the unwritten premises was that each side would not force the other side to address the issues of a final settlement. Each side tacitly agreed not to ask for recognition of its ultimate demands as preconditions for an interim agreement.
 - A major problem in the present situation is that Israel is asking for non-belligerency, which the Arabs regard as an element of a final peace agreement or at least, a near-final settlement. Israel is asking for this in return for withdrawals to much less than final borders. I know the lawyers will argue that non-belligerency is not peace, and I don't want to get into that. No one can argue that non-belligerency is not a major component of peace and that, in return for non-belligerency the Arabs are reasonable in talking about major Israeli withdrawals.
 - The Israeli negotiating team has now reduced its requirement to an Egyptian commitment not to use force for the duration of the agreement. This is the military component of non-belligerency and would be a major step for Sadat; in return, he should expect a withdrawal which he can justify to his people and military.



SECRET

NON-USE OF FORCE

The Egyptians have agreed essentially to the Israeli formulation:

"Egypt and Israel resolve that the conflict between them shall not be solved by military means and can only be solved by peaceful means.

They hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force against each other and to settle all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means. The Parties will give written assurances to the USG to this effect.

They confirm their obligation to scrupulously observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air called for by the United Nations Security Council and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other." (The final phrase in the Israeli formulation would be dropped so the language would conform to that in the January 1974 agreement.)

In addition, Sadat has agreed to give the U.S. an oral assurance that Egypt will not participate if Syria launches an attack or a war of attrition against Israel.

U.S. idea: The U.S. could agree with Israel that the U.S. would not consider Israel to be in violation of the agreement if Syria attacks Israel or begins a war of attrition, Egypt uses force, and Israel attacks either Syria or Egypt.



SECRET

THE LINE AND ARMS LIMITATION

U.S. idea: We might think of working out a line with the following elements:

- North of the mountains, an Egyptian move east of the present Israeli limited armaments area.
- At the Gidi Pass, apply the principle of Egyptian and Israeli forces equidistant from the mouth of the pass (to allow Israel to keep its intelligence site in the buffer zone).
- At the Mitla Pass, allow Egyptian and Israeli forces at the western and eastern ends of the pass respectively.
- At the southern end of the military area, bring a dotted line to the coast just north of the Sudr Pass road. This would separate the limited armaments area from a no-armaments area. Have Mixed Commission checkpoints on the north south roads at that point.
- Establish an area of Egyptian civilian administration along the Gulf coast running to a point south of the Belayim oil fields. The UNEF could operate in this area as the UNDOF operates in the area of disengagement under the Israel-Syrian agreement. Egyptian police could operate here.
- Each side would have an early warning site in the buffer zone.

In connection with this line, limitation of forces and armament would be dealt with on the basis of two principles:


- The entire area between the Egyptian line and the Suez canal north of the area of Egyptian civilian administration would be an area of limited armaments and forces.



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There would be an area of comparable size and limitation behind the Israeli line.

- Generals Gamasy and Gur would be asked to present a plan for deployment west of the Canal and east of the Israeli limited area that would permit each side to reduce their level of mobilization.



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DURATION

Duration of the Agreement

On the duration of the agreement, Egypt has accepted that the agreement will remain in effect until it is superseded by another agreement.

U.S. idea: The U.S. would be willing to supplement this by including something like the following in a U.S.-Israeli Memo of Understanding:

"It is the policy of the United States and Israel that negotiations toward an overall peace agreement must continue and that negotiations on other fronts should take precedence over further withdrawals on the Egyptian-Israeli front. To this end, while agreeing that negotiations on the elements of an overall peace agreement must begin, the United States and Israel understand that the United States will not press Israel for further withdrawal on the Egyptian front for at least two years. In this context, it is understood that negotiations on an overall peace between Egypt and Israel may begin during this period and, in any case, not later than March 1977."

Duration the UN Force

Egypt has accepted: "The UNEF will continue in its function, and its mandate will be extended annually." Sadat has also said privately that he would extend the mandate "automatically". There is no time limit.


U.S. idea: We could perhaps include something like the following either in a separate protocol or in Egyptian-U.S. and Israeli-U.S. Memoranda of Understanding:

"Egypt and Israel commit themselves to the U.S. to do everything in their power to ensure the continuation of the UNEF for a period of at least five years or until this understanding shall be altered by agreement of both sides. If the UN

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Security Council should for any reason fail to renew the UNEF mandate, Egypt, Israel and the U.S. agree to work together to see that the responsibilities of the UNEF are carried out by other means. Among others, Egypt and Israel would request UNTSO to assume immediately the responsibilities of UNEF; would request the UN Secretary General to increase the number of UNTSO personnel for this purpose; and would strengthen their own representation to the Mixed Commission to assist in accomplishing this task."



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A STRONG BUFFER

Egypt has agreed to the UNEF and a Mixed Commission.

U.S. ideas: If it were important to the Israelis and agreement on the lines could be achieved, the U.S. might make an effort to achieve the following:


- One Egyptian and one Israeli early warning site each in the buffer zone.
 - We might try to establish the principle of civilian manning in order to make this consistent with Egyptian civilian administration.
 - UNEF could guard these sites along with Israeli or Egyptian personnel.
- We could assure U.S. aerial reconnaissance on a more frequent basis.
- We could raise again the question of Israeli and Egyptian aerial reconnaissance.



STEPS TOWARD PEACE

U.S. idea: Building on what has been agreed and what further clarifications we might achieve in Aswan, we might be able to include in some form in connection with the agreement the following in response to the Israeli list:

- (a) Open bridges: free movement of Arab people and goods in and out of Sinai and Gaza.
- (b) Non-restriction on ships and planes: We would check on whether Egypt would allow occasional cruise ships and charter flights to go directly between Egypt and Israel on a case-by-case basis. (There is precedent in current practice.)
- (c) Hostile propaganda: We would ask whether Sadat would agree with us to reduce propaganda in some specific areas which are of particular concern to Israel. (Could Israel define these?)
- (d) Suspension of economic warfare: We already have Sadat's agreement to move quietly. We could ask whether he could give us any more precise idea on how we could approach this and how many U.S. firms might be involved.
- (e) Cessation of diplomatic pressures: We would ask whether Egypt might let African nations know it has no objection to their renewing relations with Israel. Perhaps Sadat would agree not to stimulate attacks on Israel in international organizations.
- (f-g) Freedom of navigation and Canal passage: These are agreed but we could see whether Sadat would put it in the agreement.
- (h) Joint Committees: These are agreed. We could be more precise in defining responsibilities.





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