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**The documents in this  
folder continue from the  
previous folder.**

HAK/Rabin  
Memcon

A



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel  
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense  
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States  
Lt. Gen. Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff  
Mordechai Gazit, Director General, Prime  
Minister's Office  
Avraham Kidron, Director General, Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Amb. Kenneth Keating, U.S. Ambassador to  
Israel  
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for  
Political Affairs  
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary  
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian  
Affairs  
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs  
Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, March 18, 1975  
7:10 - 9:45 p.m.

PLACE: Prime Minister's Office  
Jerusalem

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

DECLASSIFIED *State Dept Review*  
E.O. 12813, SEC. 3.5 SF 9/17/03

WCO MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
*HDR*, NADA, DATE *10/01/03*

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (B) (1, 3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

[Photographers were admitted briefly.]

Rabin: Why did Ghorbal do that interview? [See Tab A]

Sisco: It was a terrible interview.

Kissinger: I didn't see it.

Allon: Not since the Holocaust has there been such an opinion expressed.

Kissinger: There are so many other things in your media. There was a cartoon in the Jerusalem Post. I know you're not responsible, but it shows the mentality. [See Tab B. Eli Mizrachi brings in a copy of the Post and the Cabinet members look at it.]

Rabin: Oh, it's Dosh. You should see the way he describes me.

Peres: He's to the right of Herut.

Rabin: For the last six months he's after my neck.


Peres: You really started a war between the hotels. The Hilton is mobilizing its forces! It's declaring an alert.

[The last of the photographers leave.]

Kissinger: Should I begin? [Rabin nods yes.]

Well, let me sum up what happened in Egypt, and let me sum up where we are and why. Then we can discuss what we do next.

I presented your formulation, your various ideas [Tab C], to Sadat, Fahmy and Gamasy, and received an extremely strong reaction. Their argument is, first of all, that for me to present this as a compromise is an insult because it's the definition of nonbelligerency without the word. Second, if they sign this they couldn't implement it -- because to give free passage to Israeli ships, they would have to leave the boycott, give up propaganda; and therefore legally it is identical to nonbelligerency. They said it goes beyond nonbelligerency in its formulation.



Sadat said he doubted whether you wanted an agreement or that an agreement was possible.

I then spoke to him alone.

He said, "what is it they want?" I tried to explain as best I could. Then we all had dinner alone, without an Egyptian host. While we were eating, Fahmy asked to see me and Joe.

I saw Sadat today and he gave me what he considers the maximum the Egyptians could do. He wanted to say to the press that this was his final offer, and I urged him not to begin operating in the form of ultimatums because it would make it impossible here. He gave a pessimistic account to the press.

But in the talks with me and with the others, his tone is certainly different. And if the negotiations continue, they will be in a slightly different framework.

He's prepared to say: "The Middle East crisis will not be solved by military force but rather by peaceful means." He's prepared to give a formal assurance in writing to the United States Government not to resort to the use of force and to put it in the agreement.

He's prepared to say that the agreement remains in force until it is superseded by a new agreement.

He had a lot of conditions in there -- "as long as the peace process continues" -- but he said he's prepared to drop them on his own but not in the agreement.

He would have Israel and Egypt give assurances to the United States not to resort to force. I think this is an additional guarantee -- because the U.S. would then have standing to react if the pledge is broken.

On UNEF, it will be independent of the peace process and independent of the duration of the agreement.

They maintain the offer of the Joint Committees.

They want in the agreement that nothing precludes the reconvening of Geneva, but there will be nothing about the Palestinians.

Dinitz: The Joint Committees?

Kissinger: It's nothing new.

Rabin: Not joint patrols.

Kissinger: Within that framework, it is possible to negotiate formulations. He will absolutely not go beyond that. I said I would come back Thursday and let him know.

Allon: There was no reference to economic warfare in addition to what was said before?

Kissinger: Nothing additional.

I'm afraid the result of what I brought was that we spent most of the time on his outrage at Israel, not on the concrete points.

Rabin: Will you let me ask some questions?

There would be a preamble with a general statement, which wouldn't relate only to Egypt and Israel?

Kissinger: "The Middle East crisis will not be solved by military force but rather by peaceful means." But I'm sure it can be put in terms of Egypt and Israel.

Rabin: Resort to force -- what is its relation to the agreement? As long as the agreement is in force?

Kissinger: That's right. And this assurance would be given to the United States. And it would be in the agreement.

Rabin: I understand.

Kissinger: He wanted it conditional on other things. If it leaks out, it should be already stated as an American proposition. He accepted it.

Rabin: On the UN, the same as in the past, annually?

Kissinger: With all respect, the previous definition was linked to the continuation of the peace process, and to the agreement.

Now the UNEF "will continue its function and its mandate will be extended annually."

Sisco: A flat commitment.

Kissinger: I wasn't inclined to try to refine his last offer. He is prepared to give to the U.S. his assurances that he will join in seeking renewal.

Rabin: No period of time?

Kissinger: Just a minute. On Geneva, he's given me an assurance that "nothing that happens at Geneva will be used to abrogate the agreement and I give this as an assurance to the United States."

Rabin: Not in writing.

Kissinger: We were not at that point. It was not the easiest conversation.

Rabin: I can imagine.

Kissinger: He acted in a somber and determined manner. There should be no illusion. He may be an actor, but....

Rabin: No, I believe it.

Kissinger: He said [if there is no agreement] he wouldn't go to war but he would act in a way that would be clearly noticeable, but he didn't say what. But he said they would not be directed at the United States.

Allon: He's not stupid.

Rabin: If we are now talking about the formulation of non-use of force, it's one issue -- what is he ready to say on the duration of the agreement? When it is tied to the peace process.

Kissinger: That he's taken out. Let me go over your points: [in Israeli document of March 11, Tab D]

-- "The agreement will be bilateral between Egypt and Israel." That is agreed.

-- The agreement "is not the final settlement." That's agreed,

-- "It does not create a pattern for the others." I raised it today. He asked, "Can there be another disengagement with Syria?" I said something can be done on peace with Syria, but the pattern is not the same. It's not in the agreement.

-- "The UNEF mandate will continue its function and will be renewed annually." He is prepared to give an assurance to us, and I'm sure in writing, that he will renew it automatically. I raised Yigal's point: What if the Soviet Union vetoes it? That produced an endless argument. If the Soviet Union vetoes it against Egyptian wishes, that will create a crisis in Egyptian-Soviet relations. If it's done in collusion, that will be an unworkable machinery. If Egypt and Israel formally request it, how can the Soviet Union do it?

Sisco: Fahmy said it would violate the Friendship Treaty.

Kissinger: I wouldn't go that far. Can the first installment be two years? I don't know.

There is no conditionality with respect to the peace process, and they accepted that "the agreement will be valid until it is superseded by another agreement." Which is the phrase you gave me.

Allon: Yes. You didn't try to add "peace agreement"?

Kissinger: They didn't explicitly reject it.

Rabin: On practical issues, there is not change, and you didn't explore it?

Kissinger: On economic warfare, there is no change, and I also didn't explore it.

The mood was not one in which one felt there was any great eagerness to explore these things.



Dinitz: Does he mean that economic warfare and propaganda, whatever he said the first time, would be part of the agreement?

Rabin: He said, no, the first time.

Kissinger: Our press -- to whom I gave unshirted hell....

Rabin: Nothing leaked from us. These nine points.

Kissinger: Our press, when they saw him, said, "What about an economic agreement? What about open bridges?" What could he say? He said it would be discussed at Geneva.

Peres: On the territorial issue?

Kissinger: On the territorial issue, he said you should be as far from the eastern end of the passes, as he is from the western end, or he should be at the mouth of the passes. Then Gamasy said it's total nonsense that this will be used for offensive maneuvers; the only thing it's good for is infantry, and the decisive battles will be fought in the north. You will know whether he's right.

I said "The Israelis say you'll launch a lightning strike through the passes." He said, "That's total nonsense, totally impossible. The passes are good only for defensive screening positions."

Rabin: Basically, he's right.

Kissinger: You can judge. What offended him most was your total inability to understand what is a moral issue for him. Here you are, a hundred miles into what he considers his territory. What will be the subject of the remaining negotiation for the remaining 100 miles? What is left for him to offer? I'm reporting what he said. He's giving up the use of force. With you a hundred miles inside his territory, to ask that he give up not only force but all other means to influence you....

Rabin: This is why I in an unofficial way offered a "big" agreement on the passes and oil.

Kissinger: He says his position will be strengthened in the Arab world if he can say he refused nonbelligerency even for the passes and fields. It would reestablish his position in the Arab world.

He would have some difficulty explaining how he got involved with us, but that he says he can handle. There may be trouble renewing UNEF. He didn't threaten it, but that's an obvious one that could happen.

He says it shows total insensitivity. To give up the use of force he considers a sweeping concession. He's told me -- it's true -- he would not accept nonbelligerency since last June. He told us; we told you.

Allon: We gave you elements of nonbelligerency.

Kissinger: Fahmy says it would be worse, because to his people it spells it out. And it's more than nonbelligerency, because they would have to leave Israeli ships.

Peres: On territorial issues, he said the passes and that's it?

Kissinger: In the south he always says the oil.

Rabin: Either we are both on the entrances or both sides are the same distances from the passes.

Kissinger: That is essentially correct.

Rabin: You see that as his basic position, with small alterations?

Kissinger: Yes, his basic position, with small alterations. Joe, do you agree?

Sisco: That's it.

Kissinger: On the oil, your only idea is that for some months his people could come as a.....

Allon: An enclave.

Kissinger: But only for some months. You said if there is an agreement, if all your conditions are met, you would want your forces to remain for many months. But for the oil....

Rabin: Yes.

Kissinger: I proposed this to him and he accepted. But Gamasy said he had to have the coastal road.

I don't know in what mood these discussions will proceed. Even if it was an act before, it wasn't a bad act to be a reasonable man accepting reasonable points. Now that threatening has begun.

If you don't accept this, he will break off the talks Thursday. There will not be another Egyptian proposal. Of that I'm sure. Joe?

Sisco: Right.

Kissinger: Same language, yes. Moving the preamble into a clause, maybe.

Sisco: The other day, particularly in the aftermath of the letter, [Rabin] he said it could be a turning point -- which he repeated in the press conference today.

Rabin: I saw it.

Sisco: Today he seemed to worry about whether Israel could be a peace partner. That is what disturbed us.

Kissinger: He started very warmly today until he saw what I brought. He said, "Is that it?" I said, yes.

Allon: I understood from our previous meetings -- maybe I was wrong -- that he would declare non-use of force. Now we see it's only to you.

Kissinger: Just a minute. If it's to each other, and one side resorts to force, the other side has recourse to force. That's automatic. I think this is better; if both sides give a pledge to the United States, then the United States is an aggrieved party too.

Sisco: The answer to your question is affirmative. It is in the document.

Kissinger: Anybody reading the document will know there is an obligation not to have recourse to force, and it is reinforced because it is an assurance to the United States.

Sisco: There are two places in the document, because it's in the preamble that the Middle East crisis will be solved only by peaceful means.

I think you [Allon] were outside when we discussed it.

Rabin: [to Allon:] When we talk among ourselves, we should discuss it as an American proposal, not an Egyptian proposal.

Kissinger: All conditionality has been removed, and the agreement stands by itself.

There are two elements of nonbelligerency he's willing to grant: (1) that it will be settled by peaceful means, and (2) that there will be no recourse to force while the agreement lasts, and it lasts until it is superseded by another agreement, and the renewal of UNEF will be done annually and we have a statement to us that it will be renewed, not "may" be renewed.

Allon: In the press conference today, he said maybe the UN can be increased.

Kissinger: You have to understand what happens there. A pack of press comes in, led by fourteen of my maniacs, who have been briefed here. They ask, "Are you prepared to strengthen UNEF?"

Allon: He said yes.

Kissinger: But it would depend on the precise proposal. My instinct is that if we settle the main issues, he will be prepared to settle fairly rapidly.

Allon: May I ask about the proposition I handed to you on the way to Lod? [Tab C]

Kissinger: I handed it to him.

He is extremely annoyed at reports in the press of your Cabinet meetings. [Laughter] Not so much the statements of what you will not do -- but the details about lowering the tone of propaganda, and so on, which were obviously from our meetings. Now he's reluctant to do it to you. He'll do more as assurances to us than to you.

I didn't know there were 8 points until Marvin Kalb told me. He acted with total confidence that he got it from someone in a position to know.

Sisco: He got it from the paper.

Kissinger: But he got briefed first.

In any case, Sadat takes violent umbrage at those leaks of the terms. If anything can be done to prevent leaks at least on Thursday, while I'm there....

Allon: Even if I drop the heading of nonbelligerency, even the components are very meager. There is so little, for what he's asking. The fact that it's Egyptian territory is not dismissed, but we're not there for a picnic; we're there as the result of a war which was imposed on us by his predecessor.

Rabin: Can you tell us what can be achieved?

Kissinger: If this is accepted in principle, maybe the details can be improved.

Rabin: As your views, your impressions, of what can be improved.

Kissinger: But it will leak.

Rabin: But as your views. Your assessment of what can be achieved.

Kissinger: The impression prevalent in your press is that I'm here to extort concessions from you. You'll be happy to know the Egyptians think that what happened here Friday afternoon, with the dual press briefings that were not congruent, he thinks was a ploy we worked out with the Israelis. When I tell him it can't be done, he asks me what I tell you.

There has been a breakdown of communication between Washington and Jerusalem. I would not be here, engaged in this two-stage process, if I didn't think the second stage would lead to an agreement.

I want to go back to last June and July. What is the U.S. strategy? The U.S. strategy is not to push Israel to the '67 borders. If we wanted to do that, we'd just go to Geneva and exert maximum pressure. That would be the least wear and tear on anybody. So that is excluded. What we have attempted to do is to insulate Israel from the pressures we saw building up. We have attempted to insulate Israel from having all your opponents join against you. And we have attempted to keep the Soviet Union and Europe out of the game. With the Europeans we think European influence will be equivalent to Soviet influence, and more insidious because it can operate on us in many ways. So the purpose of the step-by-step was to protect you against this. First of all, it was to create a state of mind in which, first, you look formidable, because if you rolled over, that would make things harder because they would think we could just ask for things. Fahmy keeps asking how a superpower can't get what it wants from a country of 3 million that is totally dependent on the U.S. for aid. I'm not debating that now. And then there is the possibility -- none of this is guaranteed -- that the Soviet Union will get discouraged and feel "why pour money down a rathole?" And what happened in Iraq may mean a move to the West.

All of this would allow us to protect Israel and preserve our interests in the Arab world, and to prevent a dichotomy from arising. All of this, together with our oil strategy, which I told Yigal Allon before I told our own bureaucrats.

And we can say we have not deviated from that strategy.

Ideally we should have had something from Jordan, and kept Syria for last. Jordan was knocked off by Rabat. At that point we had a good excuse to go to Geneva. We decided to try the step-by-step, and we lured Sadat into it.

Allon: Why did he do it?

Rabin: Because he can get something big for nothing.

Kissinger: Because he's discouraged with the Soviet Union, and because he's an Egyptian nationalist and wants to get something, at not an exorbitant price.

Dinitz: And the bilateral.

Kissinger: And the bilateral relations with us. And fourth, I think he's sincere in thinking about the possibility of peace. Whether he has an arrière-pensée that he figures later he'll finish you off more elegantly--we'll never know that. My instinct is that if you offered him the '67 frontiers in principle -- I'm just giving you my instinct -- many things would be possible. I don't think he'd fight for the Syrians or for the Palestinians. At many luncheons, at many dinners I've had with him, I've never heard him speak about these except as friendly foreign countries to be manipulated. To him, Pan Arabism is a diplomatic card he'll play. Fahmy doesn't give a damn at all about the Arabs; to him, paradise is Paris and New York. He's only been in Damascus once, and never overnight. [Laughter]

It's a fact that we encouraged him to pursue this. And we kept the Europeans quiet, and we totally outmaneuvered the Soviets. Even if they're waiting to come in next day, they've been paralyzed up to now. Even the Palestinians are trying to psychoanalyze our statement that unless they recognize Israel we have no decision to make.

I've had a list made of the times I've told you -- since last June, I've told you so many times that it doesn't bear repeating -- that non-belligerency is unattainable. I would not have come here if I knew that two weeks into the shuttle we'd be here. I don't like to stake the prestige of the United States and my own on something that leads to embarrassment. The Shah of Iran said to me last November, "Don't stake your prestige on the Middle East. You're too much needed elsewhere in the world." And Bhutto said the same. That was their cold-blooded assessment.

It was my impression from our many talks that of course you'd ask for nonbelligerency, but that at some point you'd call a political victory what were elements of nonbelligerency. But public opinion here...

Rabin: Let's not talk public opinion. The problem is that here we have no idea how long this will last. I told the President 5-7 years.

Kissinger: I remember.

Rabin: But there is a time limit here.

Allon: There is no minimum time.



Rabin: No minimum time.

We live in the Middle East, Dr. Kissinger.

Allon: We want to remain alive!

Rabin: Why did you mention '67?

Kissinger: I never discussed it with him. I've educated them all never to raise it. I was giving my psychological assessment -- he isn't a man who will cede Egyptian territory.

Rabin: He said, "Let's leave peace to the next generation."

Allon: He said that before.

Rabin: To have a separate peace with Egypt, Israel would be prepared to pay a lot. What are we being asked to pay today? To give the best parts we have for a bargain. We also have a problem. This government was criticized: "Why do you start this process towards peace? It will be salami tactics. Why don't you go directly to a final settlement?" The problem is either to proceed on one course or the other.

Kissinger: I agree.

Rabin: Let's face it. If you analyze the Sinai, in terms of key strategic places, it's the oil from the economic point of view and the passes from the strategic point of view. And to get for these practically nothing, in terms of the hopes and expectations, is a serious problem. It is not public opinion; I have to convince myself.

Kissinger: First, that it's a serious problem for you is understood. I'm not saying the Israeli side is frivolous, or needlessly stubborn. But I'm not sure it's nothing to have an Arab state make these assertions -- that it will not use force, that the problem will be settled by peaceful means.

Rabin: We have it in armistice agreements, maybe more.

Kissinger: But the armistice lasted -- what 19 years?

Gazit: Eighteen.

Rabin: In 1952 was the blockage of the straits; in 1956 was the blockade of the Canal.

Kissinger: The 1956 war you started.

Rabin: We try to ask ourselves, "What is the new element for which we can give the best cards for a final settlement?" I'm thinking aloud.

Kissinger: Well, I'm not familiar with 1949...

Rabin: Well, believe me, I remember. I was on the team. I remember the atmosphere that arose. Everyone was meeting with the Egyptians -- we had no need for going between. We talked directly.

It is not just a question of formulations. It is a question of confidence.

Gur: You described it very well in the preface to your first book on Metternich.

Kissinger: What is that?

Gur: That people's perception is at least as important as what is objective.

Kissinger: But I wanted to say the tragedy is that people can bring about exactly what they fear the most.

German diplomacy after Bismarck really showed an obsession with security. They were not particularly bellicose but they behaved in such a way that they couldn't split their opponents and they brought about the coalescence of all their opponents. I frankly think your strategic situation is analogous to pre-World War I Germany. And after 25 years, they managed to maneuver themselves into their worst nightmare.

Your policy isn't the same.

Rabin: I was criticized for not bringing a "big proposal."

Kissinger: They're fools.

Rabin: That is, the passes and the fields. I wanted to bring the negotiation without stating preconditions.



Kissinger: This is the maximum that Sadat can afford to give. If you had started with 10 kilometers, 20 kilometers, you'd be at the same point.

Rabin: I always thought we couldn't get a big agreement.

Kissinger: But he couldn't afford to pay the price in the Arab world for a small agreement.

Peres: Mr. Secretary, if you have this agreement, can you tell us the sequence of events?

Kissinger: I've told Simcha I'd be better off personally if it fails. You'll then see the outcome.

I think you should engage the Syrians in some negotiations on peace. We can reach an understanding on the intensity of our involvement. Again, you'll have no problems with Sadat for two years, except verbal battles at Geneva. At Geneva, Syria may not come. If Syria comes -- I think the main consequence of an agreement is that the U.S. will be the dominant factor there. I think it will be manageable; the strategy would be to turn it into a European Security Conference. In 1977 there will be another crisis, unless you use the time to prepare some peace proposals. It is up to you. We can reach some understanding about our involvement. You could try to change the psychological climate in the area.

Rabin: What if it fails? What about Geneva?

Kissinger: If it fails, he will continue to have UNDOF not renewed. He will certainly heat up the area. On UNEF, he will certainly put the renewal of UNEF into question, and that will be enough to prevent UNDOF renewal.

Peres: If it fails, we know what will happen.

If there is an agreement, you say there will be a peace conference with the Syrians. If this breaks down after a few months...

Rabin: It will not be direct meetings, but...

Kissinger: You will not get me into another shuttle [laughter]. I will have to do enough to calm them through the UNDOF period, and we will agree.



Peres: So we begin peace discussions with Syria. This will fail after a while, because of basically the Palestinian issue.

Kissinger: You know, the Syrians... Our moronic Congress has now cut \$75 million from the \$100 million for Syria.\*

Dinitz: Not the full Congress.

Kissinger: I think there is a ten percent chance something could come out with the Syrians.

Peres: But the 90 percent.

Kissinger: But probably it will fail.

Peres: Then what? Jordan?

Kissinger: You have two problems. I think a war is possible...probable. So one problem is to get into the best position for it militarily, and the second problem is to get into the best position for it politically. So the world doesn't think your intransigence is responsible for all the problems of the Middle East. I've told Simcha your nightmare is a war after which you'll be forced to the '67 borders even if you win. Your foreign policy problem is to seem to be the country that is willing to make peace but is prevented by Arab intransigence.

Sisco: Aren't you also making it more likely, Mr. Secretary, with this agreement, that you'll be faced with a one-front situation? If you do it fast.

Kissinger: And a situation in which the moral climate you face is more favorable.

[Food and drinks were brought in at 9:37 p.m.]

\* N.B. The Senate Appropriations Committee the next day restored the full \$100 million for the Middle East Special Requirements Fund, reversing the recommendation of its subcommittee to cut it to \$25 million.

Peres: May I ask a wild question? One of the problems you mentioned -- and I agree with it -- is that the minute we have a generous agreement with the Egyptians, the Syrians would be up to arms situation.

Kissinger: Yes.

Peres: Isn't it better to wait for a while now with the Egyptians, and turn to Syria?

Kissinger: That is exactly Asad's proposal!

Allon: Some of the best ideas come from them!

Kissinger: Let me give you my psychological assessment of Asad. If Asad is in a parallel negotiation, he'll compete with the Egyptians to show his toughness.

Rabin: And force Sadat to follow his pattern.

Kissinger: Yes. If there is first a negotiation with Egypt, Asad, to show he can do it, will give something in order to catch up. Sadat is willing to drop any conditionality on Syria, which he first said he had to have.

Peres: We could conclude it with Egypt, or not sign.

The second problem is what situation we are going to face in the wake of this agreement? It will lead to an easier situation on the southern front, but it will blow up on the northern.

Kissinger: This I no longer believe.

Rabin: It might, but...

Peres: And third, Asad, with the Palestinians, will be in a position to tell the Jordanians, "You shouldn't worry about the PLO; I'll handle them." We've noticed more in Jordanian policy that the more they like the Syrians, the less they like the Egyptians, and can't swallow Egypt as the leader of the Arab world.

I'm just questioning; I don't have any answer.

Kissinger: My impression in Jordan is they don't like the Egyptians.



Allon: Who do they like? The Israelis?

Kissinger: That may be not a joke. The country with the most interest in your survival is the Jordanians.

Gur: Lebanon.

Allon: That is not a country.

Kissinger: The Lebanese were more intransigent against Israel than Asad, because of the PLO.

Hussein I know is in favor of what we're doing now.

Allon: Is it possible to get an interim agreement with Jordan first? It's easier for them to follow the Egyptians than to follow the Syrians, and not to go to the West Bank now.

Kissinger: I proposed it to them; they are underwhelmed by it. [laughter]

Peres: What our considerations are, are not the field of propaganda. Our problem is that the minute we give up the oil, our dependency will grow to very severe dimensions. And we were ready to give up the oil if we could get a better political situation. To give up something with an economic importance and also a strategic position is worsening our situation considerably. And to face in a few months all the same thing, including a very strong Egyptian verbal attack...

Kissinger: That is true, but there is a difference whether you face an Egyptian verbal attack without it being followed by concrete action.

Peres: True.

Kissinger: The problem is whether you can get in a diplomatic position where you can defend yourselves against the international constellation which is even more of a danger to you than the military situation. If I were in your position, that would be my five-year plan.

Peres: That is true; then we should have a peace idea. Many countries will support the Arabs whatever we do.

Kissinger: True.



Peres: For that I can see no real solution. So how do we best construct something in the Middle East to create a relatively peaceful situation in the area?

Kissinger: The military question is this: If you hold the eastern end of the passes, why is your military position substantially worse than today? You lose some installations.

Rabin: You couldn't keep our airfield there. And there would not be just movement in the sector of the passes; he'd like the same amount of movement in the north too.

Kissinger: Yes, no question.

Rabin: Judging Gamasy's map, in the north he wants even farther. And in the south he wants to move too. To Abu Rudeis or beyond, I don't know.

Kissinger: I'm not sure. I've carefully avoided asking it. What they have in mind is some sort of continuous line from El Tor, wherever that is.

Allon: El Tor is half way between Abu Rudeis and Sharm el-Sheikh.

Rabin: About 50 miles south.

Peres: Tomorrow we can have the assessment of the Chief of Staff. But we can say this: (a) We'll have to construct a new line, and give up what our military people say is the best line we could have; and (b) we would need to maintain a much larger army.

Rabin: The whole logistical base would have to be moved. The airfield.

Kissinger: Is it that far forward?

Allon: We can't have an airfield so close to the front line.

Rabin: It's all the investment made since the last war.

When do you leave?

Kissinger: I leave tomorrow morning for Riyadh but I can delay it.

Rabin: When will you be back?

Kissinger: By the present schedule, I'll be back at 7:45 tomorrow evening. I told Sadat I'd come to Aswan sometime on Thursday.

Rabin: Dr. Kissinger, can I have a word with you?

[Rabin and Kissinger converse alone from 8:58 to 9:37 p.m. The meeting then reconvenes briefly.]

Kissinger: Do we have our departure time? Do we leave here at 9:00?

Rabin: Let's have breakfast tomorrow at 8:00 at my house.

Can we notify you, let's say at about midnight?

What are you going to say to the press?

Kissinger: If I say I brought very good new ideas from Egypt, I'll be accused of bringing pressure. If I say Egypt has reached the limit, I'll also be accused. I'll say we reviewed the status of the negotiations and we'll meet tomorrow. If I'm asked am I optimistic, I'll say, "I'm always optimistic."

Peres: The best thing to say tonight is that you gave us the Egyptian considerations and we're going to continue tomorrow morning. We can't say anything more indicative.

[The remarks made by the Secretary to the press waiting outside are at Tab E.]

A

AN INTERVIEW WITH ASRAFF GHORBAL, EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR TO  
TO THE USA

Translated excerpts from an article published in *Marchar*,  
No. 7, Buenos Aires

"For us, Argentina is a sister country to which we feel united by identical ideals of liberation and aspirations of grandeur. Our understanding of the problems that confront you and the similarity of the objectives that mobilize both of us has deeply penetrated the conscience of all the Arab people. You are awaiting the critical battle while we are embroiled in the struggle for victory. Our improved understanding has led to the complete identity of our causes and of our hopes of carrying on to the final victory. In this process for popular self-determination, which is not new, your Minister of Social Welfare, Mr. Jose Rega López, who is an extraordinary revolutionist, has played, and still plays, a fundamental role. Arafat and Gadaffi, those two patriots given in body and soul to the cause of the Arab people and to the destruction of Israel, love him as a brother and, the material help that we give him will never be sufficient.

"The Arab peoples are convinced that the extermination of Judaism in the Middle East is the point of departure for any process of their liberation. What, in today's world, is called 'the oil problem', that is, the problem of the prices we demand in order to maintain our industries, is nothing more than a tactical procedure, in the war against Judaism, in order to show them that the positions have been reversed and that they are now the dependents.

"Don't make mistakes. The psychological war being developed by certain big Powers generalizes the unity of the West against our right to demand a just price for our fundamental product-oil. But the unity doesn't exist. What really exists is the objective of continuously using Judaism as a bridgehead in order to confront our independence and grandeur, which are not different from yours. Thus, our irrevocable decision is to destroy Judaism as has been promised by our friends here in the United States, Russia and also in your country, as has been established by Rega-López.

(over)

"What I have stated is, briefly, the answer to your question as to how we visualize the problem of the Middle East and the world. We see this as a stage in our struggle for the liberation and the grandeur of a world like the Arab; a world which, after having given to humanity the wonderful architecture of Granada, religious tolerance and respect for the beliefs of other people - by allowing the building of churches next to our mosques - and after having given birth to the most extraordinary mathematicians of ancient times and to the most profound humanist philosophers, has been arrested in its natural evolution by the power and shame of colonialism. Precisely that element which has negated our self-determination, in order to take advantage of our oil resources: Judaism - as a bridgehead of the colonialist exploitation - has to disappear; today, tomorrow or the day after- but it will disappear!

"Arafat's men guarantee the fulfilment of our determination to defend the oil fields to the last soldier, and to destroy them in case there is a possibility of their being occupied by the enemy. By the way, you can get more precise information about this in your country since a group of your compatriots is receiving guerilla training in Libya. The validity of the guerilla liberation war, equally valid for both of us, is proved by the mysticism of your compatriots in Libya. It represents our last resource in case we are overcome and is emulated in the Armed Forces of our countries and yours. Your country doesn't lack Colonels who are prepared to overthrow their Generals as Nasser did. Your men and women are, likewise, preparing themselves to safeguard the national honour. There are elements hostile to our causes, among them the Roman Catholic Church, which has revealed itself as the most dangerous barrier to the liberation of nations. About this particular aspect, Gadaffi has been clear, and I see him as a kind of watch-dog over the capitalist periphery, much as we see Brazil and Argentine."

In response to a final question about possible Soviet influence on his answers, Ghorbal replied: "In no way. It is true that Moscow tried various tactics to control us militarily, but this has been overcome".



B



(3)

Jerusalem Post, March 18, 1975

"... and then came a clever man from America  
and brought us peace . . ."



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
3.

### NON-USE OF FORCE

Egypt and Israel hereby undertake in the relations between themselves, not to resort to the use of force and to resolve all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means. They will refrain from all military or paramilitary actions, from any warlike and hostile acts and any other forms of warfare.

NOTE : This undertaking will not be linked to anything (duration, peace process etc).

March 17, 1975



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NON-USE OF FORCE


Egypt and Israel hereby undertake in the relations between themselves not to resort to the use of force and to resolve all disputes between them by negotiations and other peaceful means.

They will refrain from permitting, encouraging, assisting, or participating in any military, paramilitary or hostile actions, from any warlike or hostile acts and any other form of warfare or hostile activity against the other Party anywhere.

Note: This undertaking will not be linked to anything (duration, peace process etc).

March 17, 1975

Y. A.



ADDITIONAL UNDERTAKINGS

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- (1) This agreement will remain in force until superseded by a peace agreement.
- (2) Undertakings regarding the duration of the agreement.
- (3) The parties recognize that the conflict between them cannot be solved by force.

Other Formulations to be included :

- (a) This is not a peace agreement it is a significant step towards just and lasting peace between them (in accordance ...etc.)
- (b) References in the agreement to some of the practical steps agreed.

March 17, 1975.

PROPOSED MAIN ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

(1) Agreement to stand on its own two feet

- (1) The agreement will be bi-lateral between Egypt and Israel. It is not linked to an agreement with other Arab countries and does not create a pattern for other discussions or settlements. Neither are there any prior conditions attached to its acceptance.
- The proposed agreement is not the final settlement between Egypt and Israel, but further settlements are not an element or an implied condition to the execution and continued validity of this agreement until superseded by a new agreement.

(2) Progress towards peace

The approach to peace and the further development of elements of peaceful relations, will find its expression in suitable formulation and in concrete and practical arrangements.

It is proposed that the agreement refer to its declared aim of the furtherance of peace between the parties and to its being a significant step towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace between Egypt and Israel.

Furthermore, the concrete arrangements based on the agreement which will express and reflect this progress towards peace will, inter alia, be as follows :

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- (a) Open bridges for tourists, family visits, goods etc.
- (b) Non-restriction on ships, planes or travellers because of call or visit to the territory of the other party.
- (c) Abstention from hostile propaganda.
- (d) Suspension of economic warfare and boycott practices.
- (e) Cessation of anti-Israel diplomatic pressures in third countries and international bodies.
- (f) Freedom of navigation on high seas, straits and waterways and freedom of flight over them.
- (g) Right of passage through the Canal.
- (h) Establishment of Joint Committees with supervision teams to oversee execution of agreement.


(3) Non-use of force

The agreement will express the resolve of the parties to refrain from any further threat or use of force against each other and the decision to settle all disputes between themselves by negotiations and other peaceful means. The document will contain the undertaking of the renunciation of belligerency, clearly and in its appropriate legal wording. The agreement will be made public.

Both parties will add a formal guarantee that they will not participate, directly or indirectly, in any hostilities between the other party and any other state or forces or provide assistance of any kind to states or forces involved in such hostilities.

(4) Arrangements on the ground

- (a) The area evacuated by Israel will be established as a buffer zone between the forces.
- (b) A defined area of limited armaments and forces east of the new line will be established.
- (c) The present area of limited armaments and forces west of Line A, established by the agreement of January 1974, remains unchanged.




- (d) Supervision will be carried out by the UN and by the Joint Committees and Supervision teams established (see 2(h)).
- (e) Alert systems of each party in the vacated zone to prevent surprise attack is proposed.
- (f) There will be aerial reconnaissance missions by aircraft of both sides.
- (g) The arrangements will be contained in a Protocol attached to the agreement.

(5) Duration

- (a) The agreement will be in force until superseded by a new agreement; no time-limit to the present agreement will be set.
- (b) Egypt will give an undertaking via the USG that it will not demand a new agreement or a further withdrawal for an agreed period.
- (c) The mandate of the supervisory organ will be for an indefinite period.
- (d) There will be an agreed timetable for the implementation of the agreement. Stage one will be a preparatory one.

(6) Relation to Geneva

The agreement should find its expression in the position of the parties, if and when the Geneva Conference is renewed. The intention of the parties expressed in the agreement, generally and in its detailed provisions, has to find its continued effect in the approaches and attitudes taken in Geneva, in a way to be agreed upon.



(7) Lines

The question of the lines will be developed subsequently ,  
after the consideration and discussion of the six points  
mentioned above and on their basis.

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TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, Henry A.), IS, PPOR

SUBJECT: Remarks of Secretary of State Kissinger following a meeting with the Israeli negotiating team in Jerusalem March 18, 1975

SECTO 167

BS 15

DEPT PASS NSCE FOR GENERAL SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN

1. Secretary Kissinger. BEGIN QUOTE The XMMX Israeli negotiating team and my colleagues and I reviewed the considerations and ideas that I brought from Aswan in reply to the Israeli considerations that I had put before the Egyptians. In the process we have also reviewed the entire status of the negotiations and the meeting was conducted in the characteristic

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APPROVED BY:

S/S Michael R. Rogers

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friendly, comradely and positive spirit. We will meet again tomorrow morning before I go to Saudi Arabia and I will be back again in the evening for further discussions. Thank you.

2. Q. Have you made any headway in these recent talks?

A. Well, we

A./ We are examining the ways by which each side is trying to meet, or take into account, the considerations of the other, and, in that sense, we are making progress.

3. There are reports, Sir, that these talks have reached a dead end. Would you say this is justified?

A. That is not my view. END QUOTE.

KISSINGER





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