

KISSINGER TRIP TO THE

MIDDLE EAST

March 7 - 22, 1975


The President  
Trip Book Vol. II



KISSINGER TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST

March 7 - 22, 1975

- Chronology
- March 7, 1975
  - . Checklist for Egypt
- March 8, 1975
  - . HAK/Sadat Memcon, 11:00 a. m.
- March 9, 1975
  - . Report to the President
  - . HAK/Khaddam Memcon, 11:55 a. m. - 12:30 p. m.
  - . HAK/Asad Memcon, 3:15 - 7:30 p. m.
  - . HAK/Khaddam Memcon, 7:30 - 8:00 p. m.
  - . Report to the President
  - . Checklists for Israel
  - . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 10:30 - 11:55 p. m.
- March 10, 1975
  - . Checklist for Israel
  - . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 10:02 a. m. - 1:00 p. m.
  - . Report to the President
- March 11, 1975
  - . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 10:10 - 11:40 p. m.
  - . Report to the President
- March 12, 1975
  - . Checklist for Israel
  - . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 10:13 a. m. - 12:15 p. m.
  - . Checklists for Egypt
  - . HAK/Sadat Memcon, 6:30 - 9:45 p. m.



-- March 13, 1975

- . HAK/Sadat Memcon, 7:00 - 9:50 p. m.
- . Report to the President

-- March 14, 1975

- . Report to the President
- . Checklists for Israel
- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 1:10 - 3:45 p. m.
- . Report to the President

-- March 15, 1975

- . Checklist for Egypt
- . HAK/Khaddam Memcon, 12:02 - 12:35 p. m.
- . HAK/Khaddam Memcon, 2:00 - 2:35 p. m.
- . HAK/Asad Memcon,
- . HAK/Khaddam Memcon, 6:45 - 7:15 p. m.
- . Report to the President
- . Checklist for Jordan
- . HAK/Hussein Memcon, 8:30 - 8:45 p. m.
- . HAK/Hussein Memcon (dinner), 9:15 - 11:15 p. m.

-- March 16, 1975

- . Report to the President
- . HAK/Hussein Memcon, 10:00 - 11:55 a. m.
- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 6:07 - 10:07 p. m.
- . Report to the President

-- March 17, 1975

- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 10:15 - 11:30 a. m.
- . Checklist for Egypt
- . HAK/Sadat Memcon, 6:45 - 9:00 p. m.

-- March 18, 1975

- . Report to the President
- . HAK/Sadat Memcon, 11:45 a. m. - 2:15 p. m.
- . Report to the President
- . Checklist for Israel
- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 7:10 - 9:45 p. m.

-- March 19, 1975

- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 8:45 - 10:20 a. m.
- . Report to the President
- . Checklist for Saudi Arabia
- . HAK/Yamani Memcon, 2:25 - 2:55 p. m.
- . HAK/Fahd Memcon, 3:00 - 4:25 p. m.
- . HAK/Faisal Memcon, 4:30 - 5:30 p. m.
- . Report to the President

-- March 20, 1975

- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 9:50 a. m. - 12:35 p. m.
- . Report to the President
- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 5:30 - 6:45 p. m.
- . Report to the President
- . Checklist for Egypt
- . HAK/Sadat Memcon, 9:05 - 11:45 p. m.

-- March 21, 1975


- . Report to the President
- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 1:45 - 4:00 p. m.
- . Checklist for Israel
- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 10:10 p. m. - 12:10 a. m.

-- March 22, 1975

- . Report to the President
- . Checklist for Israel
- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 6:35 - 8:15 p. m.
- . HAK/Rabin Memcon, 10:35 p. m. - 12:05 a. m.



March 16



\*\*\*\*\*~~SECRET~~\*\*\*\*\*

DATE 03/27/75

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

1

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DEI WTE34 #0063 0752320

O 102328Z MAR 75

FM JERUSALEM//HAKTO 063//

TO THE SITUATION ROOM

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/98, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY LR, NARA, DATE 9/30/03~~SECRET~~

MARCH 16, 1975

HAKTO 03

TO: THE WHITE HOUSE  
GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: SECRETARY KISSINGER

PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO THE PRESIDENT:  
FOLLOWING MY TALKS WITH ASAD IN SYRIA, I SPENT SATURDAY  
EVENING AND SUNDAY MORNING IN JORDAN IN TALKS WITH KING  
HUSSEIN, CROWN PRINCE HASSAN, PRIME MINISTER ZAID RIFAI,  
AND CHIEF OF STAFF BIN SHAKER.

AS IT TURNED OUT, THESE TALKS WERE VERY HELPFUL. MY  
INITIAL PURPOSE IN GOING TO JORDAN WAS TO EXPLAIN WHERE WE  
STAND IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO MAINTAIN THE POSITION THAT  
JORDAN REMAINS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE EFFORT TO  
STABILIZE THE MIDDLE EAST. HOWEVER, THIS PROVED TO BE  
A USEFUL MOMENT TO REFLECT ON THE RELATIVE MERITS OF THE  
ALTERNATIVE COURSES THAT LIE AHEAD FOR US, AND HUSSEIN WITH  
HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE ARAB WORLD AND HIS DETACHMENT FOR THE  
MOMENT FROM THE NEGOTIATIONS PROVED A GOOD SOUNDING BOARD.

I DESCRIBED TO HIM THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM THAT WE  
FACE IN SYRIA -- THAT AN ISRAELI-SYRIAN NEGOTIATION CANNOT  
BE CONDUCTED IN ISRAEL AT THE SAME TIME AS AN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI  
NEGOTIATION, THAT WE RECOGNIZE THE NECESSITY OF DOING SOMETHING  
FOR SYRIA, BUT THAT TIME IS NEEDED TO PREPARE THE GROUNDWORK  
BOTH IN ISRAEL AND IN THE U.S. FOR ANOTHER NEGOTIATION  
BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIA. I ALSO TOLD HIM THAT THE NEXT  
MOVE WITH SYRIA COULD NOT JUST BE A MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT  
BUT WOULD HAVE TO BE SEEN IN ISRAEL AS A STEP TOWARD PEACE  
BECAUSE ANY MOVE ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS WILL CONFRONT ISRAEL  
WITH THE CENTRAL POLITICAL ISSUE OF PULLING BACK SETTLEMENTS.  
SINCE WE NEED TIME TO PREPARE ANOTHER ISRAELI-SYRIAN  
NEGOTIATION, I ASKED HUSSEIN WHETHER ASAD WILL GIVE US THAT  
TIME RATHER THAN APPLYING PRESSURE BY BEGINNING LOW-LEVEL  
MILITARY ACTION.

\*\*\*\*\*SECRET\*\*\*\*\*

DATE 03/27/75

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

2

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THAT DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM, I THEN ASKED HUSSEIN AND RIFAI FOR THEIR ADVICE AS TO WHAT COURSE WE SHOULD NOT FOLLOW AND WHAT THEY THOUGHT THE CHANCES WERE THAT THERE WILL BE A WAR WHETHER WE SUCCEED OR FAIL IN THE PRESENT NEGOTIATION.

HUSSEIN AND RIFAI BOTH FELT THAT IF THE PRESENT EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATION FAILS, SADAT WILL HAVE TO REVERSE HIS POLICY DRAMATICALLY OR BE DEPOSED. THIS WOULD BE A MAJOR BLOW TO POLITICAL MODERATION ACROSS THE MIDDLE EAST AND WOULD "CONDEMN THE AREA TO ANOTHER WAR." IN ADDITION, RIFAI FELT THAT THIS WOULD BE READ AS A FURTHER EXAMPLE OF WHAT HE CALLED "THE U.S. GIVING UP ITS FRIENDS AND ALLIES -- VIETNAM, KOREA, CAMBODIA, GREECE, TURKEY AND NOW SADAT AND OTHER MODERATES IN THE MIDDLE EAST." YOU MAY RECALL MY MENTIONING AFTER MY FIRST VISIT TO DAMASCUS THAT ASAD HAS USED ALMOST EXACTLY THE SAME FORMULATION.

HUSSEIN, THEREFORE, URGED VERY STRONGLY THAT WE PRESS AHEAD WITH THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATION. HE THOUGHT THAT, WHILE THE SYRIANS MIGHT JOIN THE PLO TO CREATE AS MUCH DIFFICULTY AS POSSIBLE, THE SYRIANS WOULD PROBABLY IN THE END BE MANAGEABLE, THOUGH NO ONE CAN BE CERTAIN OF THIS. IN ANY CASE, HE FELT THAT OF THE TWO RISKS WE FACE, IT WOULD BE THE LESSER TO SUCCEED IN THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS EVEN WITH THE POSSIBILITY THAT SYRIA MIGHT INITIATE MILITARY ACTION. THE GREATER WOULD BE FOR THE U.S. TO BACK AWAY WITH THE LIKELIHOOD THAT SADAT WOULD HAVE TO REVERSE HIS COURSE AND THE FUNDAMENTAL COURSE HE HAS BEGUN IN THE MIDDLE EAST AWAY FROM THE USSR AND TOWARDS US.

ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER -- IF WE HAVE THE CHANCE -- WE SHOULD ATTEMPT TO MOVE THE NEXT NEGOTIATION TO GENEVA OR AGAIN TO CONDUCT IT OURSELVES, RIFAI RATHER THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE NECESSARY TO COMBINE BOTH APPROACHES.

I REPORT THIS CONVERSATION IN SOME DETAIL BECAUSE THESE CONSIDERATIONS ARE ONES WHICH WE SHALL HAVE TO WEIGH IN THE DAYS AHEAD. BUT, OF COURSE, WE SHALL KNOW MORE ABOUT WHAT IS POSSIBLE AFTER WE LEARN FROM THE ISRAELI NEGOTIATING TEAM WHAT ACTION THE CABINET TOOK TODAY.

1200



PSN: 027749

TOR: 075/23:52Z

DTG: 19750327

HAK/Hussein  
Memcon

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

## MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

**PARTICIPANTS:** King Hussein of Jordan  
 Crown Prince Hassan  
 Zaid Rifai, Prime Minister and Minister of Defense  
 and Foreign Affairs  
 General Zaid Bin Shaker, Chief of Staff

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and  
 Assistant to the President for National Security  
 Affairs

Thomas R. Pickering, U.S. Ambassador to Jordan  
 Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for  
 Political Affairs

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of  
 State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
 of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff

Amb. Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the  
 Secretary for Press Relations

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

**DATE AND TIME:** Sunday, March 16, 1975  
 10:00 - 11:55 a.m.

**PLACE:** Royal Diwan  
 Amman, Jordan

[The King greeted the Secretary at 10:00 and the two conferred alone until 10:35. The meeting then convened. Four Jordanian photographers were admitted briefly.]

**Kissinger:** Your Majesty, with your permission, I would like to review where we stand in the negotiation of the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement, and then to discuss what might happen with respect to other Arab countries, and frankly to ask Your Majesty's advice.

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/96, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

*HR* DATE 9/30/03

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER  
 EXEMPT FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION  
 AUTHORITY OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
 DECLASSIFICATION CATEGORY 5 (A) (1,3)  
 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

On the Egyptian-Israeli negotiation, there is less there than meets the eye. It is hard to convince people watching all this shuttling how little advanced we are. I told Asad it's like the dance of the veils, and one peeks out every once in a while. We have to bring it to a decision this week.

The Egyptian demands are the passes and the oil fields. Originally they would let the zone to be evacuated be turned over to a UN buffer zone. Now I have the impression they want to move forces up. Part of the reason is Gamasy's conviction, which is probably correct, that the Egyptian position on the east bank is ludicrous as a defense of the Canal. Gamasy is more assertive than in the earlier talks. There will still be a substantial buffer zone, 20-30 kilometers. I must say there is no chance whatever of meeting the Israeli political terms unless the Egyptian army is substantially satisfied.

On the Israeli side, they are presenting essentially moderate ideas, in the most obnoxious way possible. [Laughter] There is a lot of fist-shaking. What they want is a statement of nonbelligerency, which is out of the question. As I say to Rabin -- and he keeps quoting me, -- all wars in history start between countries who are at peace; it is the peculiarity of the Middle East that in the Middle East wars start between countries who are already at war. I don't know whose readiness to go to war would be affected by a peace treaty. India and Pakistan have had four wars in conditions of peace; Israel and the Arabs have had four periods of peace in a condition of war. And there is no difference in the wars.

What they seem to want is something like they always had with Jordan but now in retrospect looks more attractive -- free movement in the Sinai, passage through the Canal, freedom of passage in the Red Sea. These would be symbolic.

The disengagement agreement already provides for non-use of military or paramilitary force. The question is what can the Egyptians say that is more than that but less than nonbelligerency? We haven't had a solution yet. The Israelis are thinking about it.

They are conducting this negotiation differently than under Golda Meir. She would rant and rave but at least you knew what they thought. With this group -- there is a movie with Gregory Peck, The Gunfighter, where a man who has a reputation as a famous gunfighter comes into town only to see his son, but every punk in town has to prove he's a better fighter than Gregory Peck. He finally gets shot in the back. I'm



in that position -- they all feel they have to prove they're not going to be taken in by the famous Kissinger. They are playing it cool, and showing how tough they are. We don't know what they really think, hard as this may be to believe, Your Majesty. They told us they would study what we brought -- and a half hour later they leak that it is unsatisfactory and that they won't yield. But there is nothing for them to accept yet either.

The trouble is, the Cabinet has not made a decision since December, so the negotiating team has had no authority and have been presenting their own ideas. They proposed a withdrawal of 30-50 kilometers, that the Egyptians agree to accept no Soviet arms, and probably withdrawal of the Egyptian army to Mersa Matruh. [Laughter]

If the Israelis don't come up tonight with concrete proposals, the negotiation will be in real trouble. If they do what they will be tempted to do, they will say to me: Go back to Egypt and get more concessions. I frankly think the negotiation will fail. They have to put something into the negotiations. I think if they do it, Sadat will go to the limit of what he can do in his domestic situation. They have no sense of the pressures they face, which ten minutes in Damascus would make obvious to them. The Egyptian army isn't loose but if they think they are in a defenseless position along the Canal, it will be difficult. I think Egypt can't give formal nonbelligerency, and they have to recover some of the territory that is evacuated and not give it all to the UN -- these are fixed elements.

If they put something in, I think it can be settled fairly quickly. If they don't, and they try to prove their manhood, they are playing with fire. Maybe they could ask for one more Egyptian refusal and do it Tuesday; that's the maximum.

Your Majesty knows the Syrian reaction to this. I think there was considerable softening in the Syrian position between my two visits. The first time, they were opposed to any Egyptian deal; the second time they seemed -- and they put it in the newspapers -- that they might settle for some movement in the Golan. Your Majesty knows the Golan is not the Sinai. It is impossible to have a movement which doesn't affect the settlements; and in Israel that can't be attempted without something really tangible for Israel -- some significant moves to peace, and duration. It can't be a simple disengagement. My problem is I can't make a specific proposal until Israel is ready. I could promise Asad anything -- I don't want to do that. I have to do two things: prepare the psychological conditions in America and prepare the psychological conditions in Israel. I can tell him a direction, but not anything specific. I frankly think, if I have



some months, that it can be done. But there has to be some significant peace move. As I told Zaid, once they make a significant move on the Golan, it really implies withdrawal from most or all of the Golan.

We are prepared to assist Syria. So it is not a question of not wanting to do something with Syria. If Your Majesty wants to repeat that to Syria, we have no objection, because it's what I've told them.

But the question is whether our present effort creates more turmoil than it's designed to solve. What is Your Majesty's view? Should we go to Geneva and let it simmer a while? It's not an American project -- we lost four months last summer because of the American domestic situation, which cost us Rabat.

Hussein: Thank you very, very much, sir.

Kissinger: We've spent all our time on theology. We haven't even discussed a line.

Sisco: That is right.

Kissinger: Unbelievable as it may seem.

Hussein: We are so grateful for the opportunity to hear from you of your monumental efforts in the recent past in this part of the world. Needless to say we have an enormous respect and admiration for your efforts and patience to move this area towards peace.

You asked for our opinion and advice. And I really believe that the possibility of Geneva is that it might be considered for after this particular phase but not at this particular point. The problem on the Arab side between Egypt and Syria is between two approaches -- one is an extreme one and the other is Sadat's, which appears genuine in terms of wanting to move to peace, or which at least shows some flexibility compared to the Syrian position.

With respect to the Egyptian position, you're very right; they couldn't realistically agree to any further concession.

Kissinger: Could Your Majesty explain?

Hussein: To move their troops forward.

Kissinger: I understand.

Hussein: They couldn't agree to less. And if there is no movement in the near future, Egypt will be in an impossible position. Sadat will not only be weakened; he may not be around for further discussions.

Kissinger: I wonder if the Israelis don't prefer Asad to Sadat.

Hussein: Yes. We were an embarrassment to them.

Kissinger: That's right. I don't have to drop it; I can just let nature take its course. Anyone who is negotiating with the Israelis knows . . . if they make a major advance in the next few days, one should continue, and shouldn't give up on the details just if it is difficult. But I don't think the American Secretary of State should be spending all his time on five kilometers -- which is what I'm reduced to. Joe?

Sisco: I'm absolutely convinced he's trying and really wants it.

Kissinger: By far the best would be a simultaneous step. Because it's not in the American interest to get the Arab world divided in this way on this issue or at all. Because it just generates pressure. On the other hand, the Israelis are physically incapable of handling simultaneous moves -- it is totally beyond their structural capabilities. And the two issues are different; it would combine the worst of both: the Egyptian is a military move; a Syrian move would be a political convulsion. The best we can hope for is that they'll do it separately.


So we can try something with Syria but we have to approach it realistically. It can't be done in two weeks. I have to prepare the ground domestically, talk to key Congressmen, or in one way or another they will block it. They will pass a law.

Hussein: The possibility of an Egyptian move now is important.

Sisco: Your Majesty, what if we do proceed on the Egyptian-Israeli side, but the best we can do is indicate just a possibility of a move on the Syrian-Israeli side? What does Your Majesty believe will happen?

Kissinger: We can do better than that; we can indicate a time frame.

Sisco: They may think a little shooting will put pressure, but that will send the balloon up in the air.



Kissinger: It will not only send the balloon up in the air; it will make it impossible.

The problem is our Congress is not only run by the people who lost the last Presidential election, but who are opposed to strong measures and who are subject to strong pressure groups.

Hussein: The Israelis have to consider whether they want Sadat, or a Sadat with a Syrian line, or no Sadat at all.

Kissinger: Is there any possibility of calming the Syrians while we do this? Because if they start a war of attrition, it will destroy everything. It will appear in Congress as if they are the aggressors. The only way we can do it is by the methods of Sadat.

Rifai: The answer has to take into account the Syrian Arab mentality as well. Failure on the Egyptian side or refusal to continue will be taken as your abandonment of the entire area. It will not defuse the Syrians. The Syrians see this as a military disengagement agreement; they'll say, "If Kissinger can't persuade the Israelis to withdraw from a few kilometers in the Sinai, how can he promote a total settlement?" So it's leaving the area to war; it means a victory for Syria, and a defeat for Sadat, for moderation, for any attempt to get a settlement. It will also -- and I'm sorry to bring this up -- be read as an extension of America giving up its commitments and allies. Asad mentioned to me Cambodia, Vietnam, Formosa, and he added Korea. Now it is Egypt and Jordan.

Kissinger: To me he mentioned Turkey.

Rifai: To me he mentioned Turkey as well. There is a possibility they won't create trouble. So there is still a slight hope. The other alternative is no hope at all.

Kissinger: All right, accepting this, assuming we conclude an agreement, I'm trying to find out from Your Majesty what will happen then.

Hussein: There is a chance that the Syrians will, as they suggested, join with the PLO, create as many difficulties as they can in the entire area, and not go to Geneva. I believe they will not risk war by themselves. But I believe this is the lesser of two evils, because no success at this stage is a victory for Syria and a defeat for Sadat.



Rifai: I asked Mahmoud Riad, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, the same question. He said the squabble between Egypt and Syria is inevitable, but the question is the duration of it -- will it be two weeks, 4 weeks or two months? Then they'll pick up again.

Kissinger: We'll be prepared to go to Geneva, or go to Geneva and try within that framework to achieve something for Syria. Did you point that out to Asad? The difficulty of the Golan is even greater than this.

Rifai: But he said, "If this is a difficulty, what prospect is there of achieving anything if there is no intention to withdraw from the Golan?"

Kissinger: In my experience -- which is short, but intense... Someone asked in '56 how long did he work for Harriman -- and he said "20 years; since 1955." [Laughter]

The only way to do it is to prepare, with the Congress, with the Jewish Community. My predecessor published a plan -- which was right -- but he was a sitting duck for all the pressure groups. The first time I talked to Golda Meir, she wouldn't move one kilometer, to put a little room between herself and them. The first time I mentioned Kuneitra, she cried -- with rage, not with sorrow. Did she do that with you?

Hussein: No, sir.

Kissinger: You never got the full treatment. [Laughter]

If I signed a paper saying we'll get the move on the Golan in two weeks, it would be a trick. It would have to be in a peace context, not another disengagement. He accepted that. What is Zaid's impression?

Rifai: He realizes he would lose another war. He has no intention now to go to war. He's worried about an Israeli preemptive strike. He's prepared for another move, either simultaneously or immediately after. He is not against the American effort, in principle.

Kissinger: A move all along the front is no more difficult than a small move, because for the Israelis any move is a matter of principle. The idea of a move in the southern part is an idea from one of my negotiating team -- the press -- Arnaud de Borchgrave. [Laughter]

The line is essentially arbitrary; there is no clear line to draw. So it depends on the nature of the political return.



Hussein: I agree.

Kissinger: We are determined to move with Syria, but if we are to move seriously, I have to be given a chance. He wants me to come with a timetable and a line. I can't come with that until a negotiation starts. Once they move settlements, it doesn't make any difference to them where to move them.

Sisco: Should the U.S. do it in the context of the Geneva Conference, or outside it?

Hussein: I think it's time to go to Geneva.

Kissinger: I think we have got to get Geneva out of everybody's system.

Hussein: You can do both.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Rifai: For the prestige of the Syrians, etc.

Kissinger: The question is, what is a nice boy like me doing here? [Laughter] If it weren't for this, my job would be fun. [Laughter] And the Congress . . .

Hussein: Congress is worse.

Sisco: I have a suggestion: have the Congress appoint a negotiating team and have them negotiate a Middle East settlement.

Hussein: The Egyptians really need the maximum possible concession. This, in itself, would have an effect. If they have a good deal . . . . .

Kissinger: OK, we will proceed on this basis.

Sisco: That is very valuable advice we have received here, Henry.

Hussein: We will naturally continue to watch very closely this Syrian-PLO approach. It will, of course, create some problem for us if it does come through.

Kissinger: I had the impression from Asad that it will come through.



Rifai: I would be very surprised.

Kissinger: I heard on the radio that they accepted.

Rifai: No, the Executive Committee decided to call the Central Committee and the Central Committee will call the National Council.

Kissinger: I am not so sure he is so eager for it, now that he has announced it.

Rifai: The quicker you can complete the Egyptian negotiation . . . . .

Kissinger: It is like the fellow who said during World War I that the way to deal with submarines is to boil them up to the surface. Someone asked him: "How do we do that?" He said, "I have given you the idea; the technical execution is up to you."

I never thought I would look back with nostalgia to Dayan and Golda Meir! At least you had some thing definable.

Hussein: If the Israeli position is something impossible, what will you do?

Kissinger: We will not withdraw from the area. Because the Israelis will ask the U. S. for support in a war, and we can't go against the Syrians and the Soviets without a platform on which to stand. We will go back to Washington. But Your Majesty can be assured we won't withdraw from the area.

But Your Majesty has given us very good advice -- to proceed with energy to get the best possible agreement. That is the only way to tranquilize the situation, and anything else to be done should be done afterward. Is that a correct statement?

Hussein: Yes.

Kissinger: That is very valuable.

Hussein: As you know, our Soviet friends have been in touch with us, saying Jordan is the most important factor in the Arab world.

Kissinger: We have always believed that.



Hussein: In any case, we told them we could not go against Rabat.

Kissinger: As far as the United States is concerned, Jordan is, of course, an original member of the Geneva Conference, and if Your Majesty wants to attend, we would support it. But I say, as a friend, I see very little that Jordan could gain there now and very much Jordan could gain there later. I say that as a friend, not officially. One thing we would not recommend -- and Your Majesty wouldn't accept -- is for Jordan to go there to represent the PLO.

Hussein: No.

Kissinger: But if Jordan were allowed to represent the West Bank and then the West Bank were to be given self-determination -- that is something else.

Asad asked if there is any possibility for the PLO to get any strip of land of the West Bank; he said, it would ease the situation with the PLO. I said no.

Rifai: Did you tell Asad the PLO were terrorists?

Kissinger: No, I said that in America they were seen as terrorists. It wasn't my view necessarily, but as long as this was their method of operation, in America there would be no support, whatever my intention.

Rifai: Maybe the translation was bad, and there are nuances.

Kissinger: I said we would be accused of dealing with terrorists and we could not make contact until we had a more moderate position.

Hussein: You told the Soviets you were in favor of Palestinian representation.

We are watching the Iraqi situation very closely.

Kissinger: There was a meeting yesterday between Iraq and Iran with Bouteflika as mediator. It will be very long! Bouteflika once saw me off at the airport and made a 50-minute departure statement. [Laughter]



Hussein: There was an agreement in principle; this is for the details.

Kissinger: What does Your Majesty think Iraq will do?

Hussein: It will become more active in the Arab world. The Kurdish situation, I don't know.

Kissinger: The agreement was to give a two-week amnesty to allow the Kurdish leadership to surrender or leave.

Hussein: We have given Hunter aircraft to Oman. Half have gone there; the other half is ready to go whenever they are ready to receive them. They need ground crews. We had a meeting with the Sultan; we are prepared to give him whatever advice we can to help him help his country. We are suffering casualties; we are trying more and more to explain here what are the reasons for our move there. We could use support.

Kissinger: I would be prepared to hear His Majesty's views.

Hussein: We need better guns.

Kissinger: Could we deliver it through Oman?

Hussein: Oman is rather short of cash now. They could use financial help.

Kissinger: That is a good way -- to pay in advance. You get as much war as you pay for! If Your Majesty could give us an idea of the needs, we will consider it very seriously.

Hussein: Air reconnaissance warning.

Kissinger: What does the British presence consist of?

Hussein: The officers are running the show. Almost a million pounds sterling.

Kissinger: For that you can buy a pretty good war.

Hussein: The number of troops is 15,000.

Kissinger: \$4 million.



Hussein: No one knows where they are coming from, who they are. We could use some of this equipment ourselves.

Kissinger: Once Your Majesty has a clear idea . . . . .

Hussein: North Yemen is replacing some of the Soviet experts. They wanted us to provide some aircraft. We explained it was difficult for us!

They are worried also about Eritrea and Somalia. If it is all Communist, it would create problems for us all.

Kissinger: What does Your Majesty think we could do about the Eritrean situation?

Hussein: Not very much. I suppose, support independence. But I don't know.

Our biggest problem is Saudi Arabia -- to get support for Yemen, Oman. You could persuade the King to be more forthcoming. Oman is in need of more help, -- material help. The situation is basically sound, but they need help.

Kissinger: Do they need money?

Hussein: Yes.

Kissinger: I will raise it.

Hussein: On the military level and also the economic, if things are done in a better way . . . . . Everything we are getting, we are paying for in advance for.

Kissinger: That is an interesting approach. I hope Congress doesn't hear about it.

Hussein: We are telling our British friends we don't want to hurt them. Sooner or later they will have to leave, but we want them to leave something behind in a reasonable condition.

Rifai: May I raise just two or three questions, on the bilateral level?

Kissinger: Please.



Rifai: There is the chronic problem of air defense.

Kissinger: We will have a recommendation the end of this month and will be prepared to discuss it in Washington next month. But it is moving in a positive direction. We will be prepared to have technical discussions next month.

Rifai: Concrete ideas the end of the month.

Kissinger: Yes. And next month discussions.

Rifai: While His Majesty is visiting?

Kissinger: Possibly. I told His Majesty the 29th is the best date for the President. We could start talks a week or two before.

Rifai: Yes. I understand the House approved the Foreign Aid bill and now it goes to the Senate.

Kissinger: We heard the opposite.

Rifai: There is no problem about budgetary aid, but nothing on the military aid part.

Kissinger: [To Atherton] What happened on military aid?

Atherton: [To Kissinger] It was quite a cut, and bad for Jordan.

Rifai: We hope if there is a cut, it doesn't reflect badly on us.

Kissinger: It depends on the nature of the cut. We will do our utmost to keep our special relationship, but until we know what the cut is, we can't tell how it affects particular countries.

Bin Shaker: This fiscal year is coming to an end; there is a new one coming up. Could these be at least a planning figure, so we can plan the budget?

Kissinger: We will let you know.

Bin Shaker: There is not much point in having a military conference unless we know roughly, so we can at least have a figure.



[Mr. Sisco shows Secretary Kissinger a cable reporting a House Foreign Affairs Committee decision eliminating military aid to Jordan.]

Rifai: When can we hear about the 1976 figures? Through Tom? We need not only the military part, but the economic part.

Atherton: [To Kissinger] It depends on the President's decision on the whole 1976 program. It is now in OMB.

Kissinger: It is in the White House, in the Office of Management and Budget. We will try to get it as quickly as possible, in the next two-three weeks. We will do our utmost to use the figures of last year. That is what I recommended, and I am not overruled all that often. This is for your information. It could vary if there is a budgetary squeeze.

Bin Shaker: We can use it as a planning figure.

Kissinger: You can use it as planning figure. It is our planning figure.

Rifai: It doesn't allow much for inflation. [Laughter]

Kissinger: You have been meeting too much with Israelis! I have said they can't take yes for an answer. [Laughter] PL-480.

Rifai: We asked for 100,000 tons and are promised 20,000 per season. You didn't meet us half way. [Laughter] We will get 20 per season, step by step. [Laughter] Twenty thousand will see us through this fiscal year.

Kissinger: We will be in a better position this year.

Rifai: The price of wheat came down, which made it a little more bearable.

Kissinger: Could I see Your Majesty alone for another minute?

[The Secretary and His Majesty conferred alone for a few minutes.]



HAK/Rabin  
Memcon

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel  
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense  
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States  
Lt. General Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff  
Mordechai Gazit, Director General, Prime  
Minister's Office  
Avraham Kidron, Director General, Ministry  
of Foreign Affairs  
Eli Mizrahi, Deputy Director, Prime  
Minister's Office  
Brig. Gen. Ephraim Paron, Military Secretary to  
the Prime Minister  
Col. Aryeh Bar-On, ADC to Minister Peres

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President for National  
Security Affairs  
Ambassador Kenneth Keating, Ambassador to  
Israel  
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for  
Political Affairs  
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary  
of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs  
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs  
Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PMR*

DATE AND TIME:

Sunday, March 16, 1975  
6:07 to 10:07 p.m.

PLACE:

Prime Minister's Office  
Jerusalem



~~SECRET~~/NODIS/XGDS

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (B) (1, 3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to det.

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
State Review  
SF 9/17/03  
12/29/03

[Photographers are admitted for a picture and then dismissed.]

Allon: You haven't been to Riyadh?

Kissinger: No, I'm planning now to go to Riyadh on Thursday.

Rabin: When do you leave tomorrow?

Kissinger: We'll have to work it out.

[More photographers are let in, and then leave.]

Rabin: Well, as usual, we welcome you and your colleagues. You come this time after a visit to Syria and Jordan, and if you think it's better, start with telling us your impressions there, and we'll then give you our response to the Egyptian comments you brought to us.

Kissinger: All right. First, I want to say I regret that in your public opinion the impression is created that the U.S. and Egypt are working in collusion to, by clever maneuvers, extort things from Israel. This will be complicating, whatever short-term advantages it may give.

In Syria, there was not much more than before. It began with an impassioned description of why a separate deal is unacceptable and why a tightening of PLO-Syrian relations is needed, and if there is nothing by the time of the UNDOF renewal, Syria would take its own decision.

The tone was slightly different. I saw him alone. He said he had to have some hope, and if all the doors were closed, he might have to go to war. I said "If you go to war, all our assessments are that you'll lose badly, whether you go to war alone or with Egypt." He said "That may be true, but we will inflict casualties. We will fight not to gain territory. Never will Israel beat us, and our whole strategy is to inflict casualties."

I said there is a difference between the Sinai and the Golan. In the Golan, it's a small area. There are only two possibilities if one looked at the map and the location of Israeli settlements. Theoretically a withdrawal could be so small as to be meaningless. If



a withdrawal is to be significant, it could only be in a different context -- a peace context. I said I had not discussed this with the Israeli Cabinet, but it could not be anything like disengagement talks on the Golan, only peace. Surprisingly to me, he said if we had any ideas, he'd be willing to listen. He wanted to know, did I have any ideas? I said no. He said he was prepared to listen to such ideas. He repeated in front of his colleagues -- the Deputy Prime Minister, the Air Force Chief of Staff Jamil, Daoudi, and the Foreign Minister, who delayed his trip to Cuba to be there for the meeting. He stressed he was the first Syrian who talked about peace with Israel. He was under no compulsion to do so; basically his people were more ready for war than for peace; he'd be more popular if he stuck to the other line.

When I saw him alone, he kept saying it was a question of principle, pride, dignity; so I told him I'd come back before I left the area, so as to give him at least some visible participation. So he was a degree less insistent on no separate deal, but he linked it to something for himself.


Rabin: Did he mean a peace agreement on his own with Israel, or in what context?

Kissinger: I thought it was dangerous for me to get into a detailed discussion with him. My impression, strangely enough -- though not enough for you -- was that it may be easier to get non-belligerency from him than from Egypt. He said "what is the problem with Egypt?" I said they're like two veiled dancers, peeking out occasionally -- with the Egyptians asking for military things the Israelis aren't willing to give. He said, will there be an agreement on Tuesday? I said no. At that point he said "if we had done it together, we could have eased the political problem with Egypt." That is worth reporting. On the whole, they were tough.

Rabin: Do you believe it is possible to reach a real serious agreement with Egypt and Syria?

Kissinger: Yes, if they don't go too far with the PLO in the meantime in Syria.

I told him it was absolutely out of the question, when we talk about Syria, to confront Israel every 6-9 months with a decision that goes to the core of the Israelis' conception of themselves; it couldn't be done by the same methods.



One other remark he made mystified me. He said he'd be prepared to have the UN at places overlooking Israel if you're worried. I thought he meant cliffs; he meant Hermon, I think. He said, there were other places overlooking Israel.

Peres: Hermon Mountain.

Kissinger: Do you know what he means?

Rabin: No. All along it overlooks Israel.

Gur: He said cliffs?

Kissinger: I said cliffs. He said, in such an agreement--a peace agreement--why can't Israel be satisfied with the UN at any point overlooking Israel? I said "you mean cliffs?" He said there were other points overlooking Israel which were some distance from the cliffs. These were the sort of enigmatic remarks; on the negative side, he was very tough.

Rabin: Like what?

Kissinger: "If all doors are closed in our faces, we'll do something." He didn't say what.

With Jordan, Vinogradov told him, according to him, that Jordan should go to Geneva and Rabat had no standing for Russia, and they should go to Geneva and talk about the West Bank and talk about its political future later. They put it into the newspapers, and Vinogradov at the airport said the PLO should go to Geneva.

I went over the situation with them, and asked their assessment. I said I have the sense we're getting into a morass here. If what I am doing is going to end in a way anyway, and get us caught in the middle, what did they think about ending my mission in the area? The King said emphatically that if this mission aborted, war in the area was inevitable and all the moderate forces in the area would be in severe difficulty. Because apparently the Syrians told them what they told me: they see America withdrawing from everywhere--from Formosa, Greece, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and second, the Syrians, far from being mollified, would become more extreme because they would say "If the Americans can't even do it in the



Sinai, how could they do more?" So both the King and Rifai both said that while there are grave dangers if an agreement is concluded, there would be greater dangers if it is not. Syria is making a major effort to approach them, but that's not new.

Allon: Is there any pressure on the King to recognize the PLO?

Kissinger: The King said he absolutely would not recognize the PLO. He wants to be recognized by the Arabs as the negotiator for the West Bank, after which he will leave it to the determination of the people and the PLO can participate.

Allon: He hasn't given up.


Kissinger: No. And, incidentally, the Crown Prince, who used to be on the side of giving up the West Bank, is now more on the side of the King.

Rabin: There are changes everywhere.

Allow me to say in the framework of the special intimate relations between Israel and the United States, that when it comes to PR and the press, we have to put on ourselves enormous restraint in the face of enormous influx of propaganda from Cairo. They, since your visit, have been putting out a flood of false information that it's worked out, that it's finished. We've done our best not to confront it, but we had to do something. It is not directed against the United States. We are in a psychological struggle too. Sadat does I don't know how many interviews in the last few days. I think we did very little, and we've had a lot of criticism. We heard in the Cabinet today: "Why don't we speak up and put our position before the people?" We've done our best not to create tension when it comes to the media, of any party. I mean the local parties. In the face of a flood of information -- most of which is not correct -- that comes from Egypt.

You should see the reaction in this country -- here this is used against any attempt to move forward.

Now to the issue itself. We have had a meeting. We have read what is put before us. You've done your utmost to put to the Egyptians our position. There are no doubts whatsoever. More than that, we really appreciate it. But when I try to sum it up, I see on the



three main points crucial to us--the question of non-use of force, the question of a real significant move toward peace, and the question of duration of the agreement -- basically very little has been achieved.

Israel will have to give something tangible, concrete, and we want to get something concrete even though it is to be expressed in words.

On non-use of force, the working is practically the same, with some variation, of what is in the disengagement agreement. In the disengagement agreement it says they will "refrain from military or paramilitary actions." Here it is ever more stressed that it's conditioned on the process of peacemaking.

On a move towards peace, there is nothing new that is not practiced today. Double passports were cancelled years ago.

Gazit: Fifteen years ago.

Rabin: Abandoned by Egypt.

In the wording again, it might be a "significant" step, but not much more than that.


On duration , except for extending the UN from 6 months to a year, again there is no commitment, even a secret commitment, to continue this, to justify big chunks of territory.

Kissinger: There is a commitment to us to renew every year.

Rabin: But they can reach agreement with the Russians to veto.

But there is not a step towards peace in the sense of an assurance there will not be a war for any reasonable period of time. It is not a step towards peace in the positive sense -- I can't recall such a flood of the anti-Israeli propaganda as in the last few days. It is not an atmosphere of peace, but of increased tension. There is no commitment not to use force.

Kissinger: I don't understand. They are prepared to use the phrase "not to resort to force."



Rabin: But in the context of the peace process. Once the process stops....

Allon: As they define it.

Rabin: As they define it, and there is no commitment on their side. In our paper, page 3, [see Israeli memorandum of March 11, Tab A] "Egypt will give an undertaking via the U.S. Government that it will not demand a new agreement or a further withdrawal for an agreed period." The answer was negative.

Kissinger: Let me check.

Rabin: Let's not go into the details. We didn't press for the question of territory. This time we pressed for a change in attitude in the sense of a move towards peace. And guarantees. We did not get any satisfactory answer on any of the three key issues.

Kissinger: Then what do you want me to say to Sadat?

Rabin: That unless he does move on these three key issues, I don't see what can be done.

Allon: And economic warfare.

Rabin: I stuck to these three key points.

Kissinger: So I can give him no idea of lines or anything you would be prepared to do, assuming he comes up with something satisfactory? You see, he suffers from the illusion he's made a big effort. And the Syrians believe he has too. We have two possibilities: If I go and ask him to do better, or, I can go back with something to show Gamasy, that he can get this if they are willing to do more.

I believe if I go back to him with this, I won't come back to Israel; I'll go home. I've told him for months he had to give some quid pro quo. He gave me a written text which I didn't even take. So he feels he's made a number of movements; he's very conscious of his environment. I think if I go back and say "do more," three out of four he'll end the discussion. It will be a serious problem how to get out of Aswan before the explosion, in a way that does the least damage to the United States, which has to be my concern.



Or, he'll give me something only marginally better.

If we can't give him an idea of what the agreement will look like.....

Do my colleagues agree? Joe?

Sisco: We should consult. But he'll ask us what the territorial part will look like. The question is what the Secretary of State can reply.

Allon: We have not reached the point where either side says take it or leave it. We have a problem on our hands. We have always said that the depth of the Israeli withdrawal will be deeply influenced by the nature of the Egyptian return. We're not in a position, with the Egyptian ideas, to ask for a definite line from the Cabinet. We thought if we could get something more concrete from Egypt on the three major points, we could.....

Kissinger: I know what you want. But each side has its domestic problems. The first thing we'll hear from Gamasy is: "Do you have a line?" And I'll have to say no. We already had a complaint from Fahmy that we didn't accept their written text. Sadat will have to say in front of his colleagues, "I'll do more." He's a very proud man. If I can bring him anything concrete....this is exactly what I had last time. Last time I said to him he had to do more to bring back to the Israelis.

Now what is it I'm telling him that's different from the last time?

Rabin: Dr. Kissinger, what do we get for the oil fields or the passes? Can you put into words what we get?

Kissinger: If that phrase, what he gave me when I was alone -- "both parties consider this conflict will not be solved by force and will only be solved by peaceful means."

Rabin: But it's conditioned on the peace process.

Allon: Why could it not be without conditions, and have a separate clause on the peace process?

Kissinger: It is not excluded. I even asked him.



Allon: Could we say "until it's superseded by a peace agreement," instead of "by another agreement?"

Kissinger: You were the ones who suggested that phrase. I haven't tried it out on him. He might even like it; it makes clear this is not a peace agreement.

I think your instruction is right. Mr. Prime Minister, that when I try to tie down that phrase, Fahmy will try to slip in the peace-process part.

Precision of thought is not his outstanding characteristic. But this is verbatim what he said.

On the extension, they said -- I can't add to what I said last time.

Rabin: When one analyzes it, it comes practically to one year.

Kissinger: If they're going to collude with the Soviets. I totally disagree with your view that the Soviet Union would veto it alone. I do believe the Prime Minister's view is possible, that the Egyptians could agree with the Soviets and the Egyptians ask for it and tell the Soviets to do it. I don't believe that any great power, against the wishes of Egypt and Israel, will veto it. But if Egypt wants someone to do it, it could even get France to do it. Or the Soviet Union.

Allon: Or China.

Kissinger: I just want to distinguish. There is no sense in getting a separate agreement with the Soviets.


It's a practical concern. I'm not saying your points are unreasonable; that's not the problem. If my judgment of Sadat is correct, if I go back to Sadat and say "do more," he may back off.

Dinitz: Duration isn't only UNEF, but duration of the agreement.

Kissinger: This I'm not sure he's focused on. How to express this?

Peres: In 5(b).

Kissinger: I know.



Peres: In the commitment to the U.S. Government.

Kissinger: First of all, it's certain to leak.

Peres: Maybe later on, but not right away.

Kissinger: It will certainly be leaked. But if he goes to Geneva... I don't know who'll be there except the Soviet Union and Israel. [Laughter]. Asad told me "I'll save you the embarrassment; we won't go!"

Rabin: Will he go if there is no interim agreement?

Kissinger: Oh, if there is no interim agreement, he'll go. Hussein's view is that under those conditions it will lead rapidly to war.

[Food is brought in. Noise is heard outside.]

Are there demonstrations out there?

Let me ask you. The Egyptians operate more intuitively and less analytically than you do. When I arrive, I'll have to ride in with Fahmy and he'll ask, "What do you bring?" There will be an explosion right away. Gamasy will want to know if there is any chance of getting the passes.

Peres: If we learn from you, he asked only about the passes. He didn't stress the oil fields.

Kissinger: No, this he takes for granted. In my view. Can I tell him it's my impression that for the right kind of thing, it's possible? That it might?

Rabin: The question of demilitarization will be destroyed through interim agreements, but from the very beginning, in the context of peace, we have always said demilitarization. The first disengagement agreement created a precedent; now we create another one. By this we create the fact that eliminates one of the crucial elements of peace in the Sinai.



We're moving back. They rejected non-belligerency, there are no moves towards peace -- and they move forward. What is the rationale for an interim settlement?

Kissinger: Again, you have this problem: If I tell him that now, since he hasn't agreed to demilitarization of the Sinai, he won't be overwhelmed by the lucidity of that argument. It will be worse.

My assessment of Sadat is this: Asad is in the process of bargaining with us right now. Sadat is also. But when he changes, he'll do it totally and brutally, like lightning.

Rabin: But you put us in the position to give an answer about the line without getting anything in return.

Kissinger: Just a minute. About the line, intellectually, one can say a final peace should leave the Egyptians in a position where they can defend the Canal and have a wide buffer. I don't believe the process of interim agreements can be continued; the next move should be to a final settlement.

Rabin: We agree.

Kissinger: So, Egyptian presence at the passes would have to be accepted, but the rest would be demilitarized. But when you are 150 kilometers into the Sinai, can Sadat accept something that he might consider when we are talking about a final settlement?

Rabin: We have a problem. Frankly, when I report what you say about the Syrians, the tendency to go for final agreement will be increased.

Kissinger: Let's not get too enthusiastic about the Syrians. He isn't willing to go for something more like what you want in the Sinai. But I haven't tried it.

Peres: Let me put it this way. If we can talk about non-belligerency, we can find a solution to the territorial issue. The quid pro quo is essentially an Israeli move on the ground. We got today over Egyptian radio they just continued the argument--"Official Egyptian sources announced that Egypt informed Dr. Kissinger that she rejects completely and finally any end of a state of belligerency with Israel,



because it's connected with the general framework of the Middle East, not just Egypt. Some sources say the file on that subject is completely closed and Egypt will not return to consider it." An Ahram article says Egypt will never accept non-belligerency, and every new agreement must be a military agreement, signed by only military people in the context of the Geneva Conference."

We're not talking just philosophy. There are three things Egypt and Israel agree about: The first stage is an armistice; the second stage is non-belligerency; the third stage is peace. We're ready to consider the second stage and we don't reject Gamasy's idea about the passes. But this is a complete change of Israel's posture. But we can't consider it unless we can hear a statement to the criminal world that there is an end to belligerency.

Allon: If President Sadat is in a capricious mood....

Kissinger: He's not in a capricious mood.

Allon: We won't give him the move. But if he is a statesman, like we think he is, let's work out formulas that can help both.

Kissinger: It's one thing if I can say: "If you remove the conditionality from these phrases, that's something we can do." Non-belligerency is out of the question, that phrase. If you went back to the El Arish line, maybe then yes.

Rabin: Non-belligerency.

Kissinger: I say maybe; I don't know. El Arish - Ras Mohammed. I've never tried. He once said: For within 20 kilometers of the final line, he's willing to consider non-belligerency. In that context, when you talk about wider zones....I have to give my best judgment. Your point is: If he gives non-belligerency, Gamasy's idea can be considered. If you mean removing the conditionality, that I believe is attainable.

Peres: From our point of view, the real basic issue is the non-belligerency, and we can negotiate about the rest. The fact that we can add one or another phrase will impress only a few people. If we can change a state, it's more than changing a document. We're changing the territorial situation; he's changing the political



situation. He has good choices. He is the leader of 40 million people, the great state of Egypt. What will Israel do with another document in the file, without a major change on the ground? What do we tell our people? That we're good authors? Documentation, with all due respect--all of us are mature enough to know not only its importance but its weaknesses. He has to understand this.

Kissinger: He does. He just can't do it. He thinks he's made an enormous step just to be willing to make a separate deal. And I can see what the other Arabs are doing.

Peres: We used to have a Minister of Austerity, who made speeches on why everything was unavailable. But the Prime Minister said "The ladies are looking for eggs, not arguments."

We're asking for a change in behavior in international relations. In the practices from before '67 -- the boycott, shaking hands with an Israeli is a national crime in Egypt.

Kissinger: If you're saying change some phrase, that's one thing. If you are saying you have to have non-belligerency, it's out of the question. We'll have to consider how to handle the break-up in Aswan.

Could I have a five-minute break?

Allon: When we talk of non-belligerency, we don't mean peace.

Kissinger: I understand.

Allon: Why not include a statement in the document that refers to non-belligerency -- that makes it clear it's not peace and that he has other demands he can make for peace?

Kissinger: Look, if he kisses me tomorrow and says he wants non-belligerency, I won't fight him. I'll accept, after 15 minutes of argument.

Can I have five minutes to consult with my colleagues?

Rabin: All right, we'll leave you here.



Kissinger: Now I know which is the bugged room.

[There was a break from 7:25 to 8:00 p.m.]

Kissinger: I took some time with my colleagues because I think we face a crucial strategic decision. We should face it explicitly rather than go through a drafting exercise with no possibilities. Therefore I want to sum up where we stand, and when I go back to Aswan, what the conceptions are -- the Egyptian and Israeli conceptions and the American one -- which are not parallel -- and my best judgment of where we are headed.

First, I do not fully agree with the Prime Minister's and others' assessment of what the Egyptians proposed, or the finality with which they proposed it. I believe the non-resort to force is not so closely linked to the peace process. It could be disentangled. On duration, an answer could be attempted. And the clause that the agreement lasts until it is superseded is not an escape clause. Moreover, it is my firm impression that Sadat would go to the absolute limit of what is possible for him in these areas if the other points could be satisfactorily resolved.

I'm not fully clear what the Israeli negotiating team wants me to say to him. If I can say the Gamasy plan is more or less acceptable if these drafting points can be solved, then we have a chance. If I am to say the Gamasy plan may be possible if it's non-belligerency, we are finished. If I am to say, "Do better, little boy, and maybe we'll give the passes and the oil fields," then there may be one more shuttle and it's over. I'm not asking for a line.

What are the different conceptions that are at work here?

First, the Egyptian. I think they want a success, and they're willing to pay the price of Arab unity. And they're realists, knowing that not until '77 can they get anything. For that he's willing to pay trouble with the Syrians and potential trouble with the Saudis because after the screaming is over, he's the one who scored a success. He cannot possibly agree not to make additional demands, but the question is how he'll press them. Your formulation on point 6 is the correct one.

Since it's in Sadat's interest to maintain a moderate pro-Western posture... Basically, it's an enhancement of Egypt's prestige.



The Israeli perception shows how very tired Israel is of war and how very eager it is to make progress towards peace. You are so tired that you're willing to sell a lot for a symbolic thing which means little more than non-resort to force.


Rabin: That is not what the legal advisers say.

Kissinger: But a legal advisor doesn't determine reality. What I'm saying applies also to non-resort to force. In any case, non-belligerency is unattainable. You have to show something tangible to your people. The tragedy comes when everyone is following the laws of his own nature and brings about the results they fear most.

From the American perception, there are only two ways: My way or Rogers' way, either a final settlement or step-by-step. It was our judgment that going for a final settlement would require us to give answers you would not like and present you with choices you would not want to make.

Also, it was my view that with the step-by-step, either through rivalry or getting tired, someone in the Arab world might break and offer something. You don't have a choice between the Syrian approach and an Egyptian move. A Syrian approach is conceivable only because they're so worried Egypt might get something. So the American approach wasn't tied to identical steps, but to the overall international situation.

We have in the last year taken the Europeans, the Soviets and the Japanese out of the game by this process that's now going on. Our assessment is, and has been, that if it's important to maintain us in a central role in the process, that goes beyond the exact balance of any agreement. That doesn't solve your domestic problem. If that is the American perception and the American reality -- which is not created by me -- then I don't believe, Mr. Prime Minister, the final judgment will be made on the basis of the merits of why these negotiations break down. For two weeks or two months we can have an interesting propaganda debate about belligerency or territory -- but then reality will take over. No one will remember the issue. The reality will be that America can't produce even a minimal withdrawal, that it's senseless to adopt this course and only a radical course will work. Since I sensed for a week this would happen, I asked Hussein what was the best course for the area.



He believes the result will be a strengthening of radicalism in the whole area, a turn to war, and the sense that America will withdraw from the area. Since we're supporting you, all the pressures will be directed on us.

My judgment of what will happen in America--this is not U.S. Government policy -- is the question is whether we'll face a stalemate with no conceivable end, and you'll be faced with pressures on the economic and military side and/or a linkage of it with negotiations in a more explicit way than ever before.

So we are not talking here about a line here and there, and we are not talking here about the fine distinction between non-belligerency and non-use of force. The decision made in August 1971 made the October war inevitable.

Rabin: August.

Kissinger: August '71, when Rogers was here. God knows I didn't support him.

We will face unique decisions in America. I'm telling you what you'll be facing. It won't come from me. This is the reality.

You can say Europe is nothing. But Europe influences America. When the Common Market passes resolutions on the '67 borders. For two months I'll be the lightning rod; everyone can blame it on the step-by-step. As some professor said here on television.

Allon: Avneri.

Kissinger: Already you've got Brzezinski backing the Rogers Plan. [See excerpt from Brzezinski article, Tab B]. George Ball.

If the Arabs do something stupid, that's another thing.

Rabin: In 1970 they saved us.

Kissinger: If you want to count on that, even then it means a prolonged period of tension.

We have to discuss what I tell Sadat tomorrow.

Second, we have to discuss how we wind it up if it leads to a blow-up.



Third, we have to discuss what happens in the future. We've been insulated from international realities for a year and a half; it will end with this negotiation.

If there is anyone on our side who disagrees....but I know I'm right.

Sisco: We discussed it and there was no dissent from this assessment.

Kissinger: And it was presented in the mildest possible way.

Rabin: We appreciate your sincerity, and you put the question right: Where do we go from here? And we should have another meeting tomorrow.

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: I took it upon myself as a person to come up on my own on ABC television to say we're ready to give up the passes and the oil fields for an end of the war. I didn't use the legal term, but in practice it's non-belligerency. I did mention the two strategic things wanted by Sadat. While the Cabinet puts it differently -- they said 30-50 kilometers, which excludes the passes and the oil fields.

You can say, following your analysis, that there is no purpose for Israel to seek peace, because in peace Israel will have to give more than in an interim agreement. And if you take the India-Pakistan struggle it doesn't make any difference between peace and war. I don't believe that analogy can be drawn. When it comes to the Arab-Israeli, a change in the state of mind has legal and political significance which amounts to a real breakthrough. If I didn't think that, I wouldn't have done what I did.

You said that for something more, the Egyptians would be ready for nonbelligerency.

Kissinger: I didn't say.

Rabin: You mentioned it. If it is for the '67 lines, it's nonsense. If it's El Tor or El Arish, that's something else. We have nothing

against your exploring it. Explore it. But nothing close to the international boundaries -- not Ras Mohammed or Sharm el-Sheikh, West of El Arish. The essence of not having the passes and oil fields is a little bit extension. I'm not negotiating now. I didn't discuss lines when I mentioned the passes and oil fields, because I was not empowered then and I'm not empowered today.

When we talk about nonuse of force and not nonbelligerency, which is the same but in a more concrete way, they can't talk about territorial concessions including either of the two objectives.

Kissinger: I've told every Israeli leader I've talked to since July that nonbelligerency was out of the question. There is no doubt about it. It is not attainable. It is not a failure of negotiation.

Dinitz: For any line?

Kissinger: For anything that was discussed.

Rabin: We are not entitled by the Cabinet to discuss anything other than nonbelligerency. So we hoped you would bring something closer to that. If so, we would discuss it with the Cabinet. Of course, the territorial concession would be different.

Allon: Since July we discussed not nonbelligerency but the components of nonbelligerency.

Kissinger: Yes.


Allon: So if they're worried about the legal aspects, why can't we discuss, in return for an agreed line -- and let's assume Gamasy's proposal is negotiable -- why can't we try "acts of belligerency" or "acts of war?"

Kissinger: That was in your December proposal.

Rabin: For either the passes or the fields.

Kissinger: Not both?

Rabin: No.



Kissinger: There is no sense fooling you. I can keep this going one more shuttle. Every shuttle increases the price to the United States. I do not think we're on anything like the same conceptual wavelength.

I think it will fail. It's a very serious question whether I should extract any more from Sadat if I think it will fail. Tell me the scenario of my first 15 minutes with Sadat: "Israel may or may not give up the passes and fields. Please give more." Before Gamasy and Fahmy?

Allon: You'll meet with him privately.

Kissinger: Yes, but what can I say to him?

Peres: We'll talk tomorrow. We can reconsider it.

Rabin: A wider-line proposal, for non-belligerency.

Kissinger: That I can do.

Rabin: But bearing in mind we're not talking about 20 kilometers from the international line.

Second, for something like what Yigal said, and on duration, we might consider something less than giving back the two objectives.

Kissinger: He won't....


I think we should schedule another meeting tomorrow, which we should plan rather carefully. Because he will have to consider how long to continue this. I don't want to be in Aswan when he moves. We're not dealing with one of nature's noblemen there.

Peres: We can't tell you what to say to Sadat.

Kissinger: Hussein's actual estimate of Sadat is closer to your assessment than to my public assessment.

Rabin: He [Hussein] experienced it after his meeting in Alexandria.

Kissinger: Right. But he said, "For the sake of the area, try to get the best deal for Sadat."



Peres: You see our dilemma. If the question is do we want an agreement or not, the answer is yes. We have to know what is the true Egyptian voice.

Kissinger: You can't get it.

Peres: If he is willing to give only a military agreement. We are ready for withdrawal in exchange for a real change on the Egyptian side. And we appreciate the exchange of letters. There must be a change.

Kissinger: He can't do it in one step. He'll tell me he's decided to go the road of peace. If he can posture himself as a victor in some way. So it's better for you if he looks like a victor rather than if he looks squeezed.

It's my honest judgment -- I'd like to see three Ministers alone -- there is danger that a breakup will produce a parting of the ways between Israel and the United States. It's not a governmental decision; it's my honest judgment, but my fear.

Dinitz: Why should he made a concession if he knows this?

Kissinger: He doesn't know this.

Dinitz: You say it doesn't make any difference who's right and who's wrong.

Kissinger: Maybe you can get by two months; maybe they'll do something stupid -- burn Americans in the streets, shoot down Pan Am.

Rabin: I'm no disagreeing.

Kissinger: Can I see the three Ministers alone?


Rabin: What time do we meet tomorrow?

Kissinger: 10:00. And we will have breakfast.

Rabin: Yes.

Kissinger: And I'll delay my departure until 3:00. Sadat sleeps in the afternoon. He's never available until 6:00.

[The Secretary goes into the inside office with Rabin, Peres and Allon and they confer from 8:40 to 10:07 p.m. After the meeting Kissinger and Allon spoke briefly to the press outside. Tab C].





PROPOSED MAIN ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

(1) Agreement to stand on its own two feet

(1) The agreement will be bi-lateral between Egypt and Israel. It is not linked to an agreement with other Arab countries and does not create a pattern for other discussions or settlements. Neither are there any prior conditions attached to its acceptance.

The proposed agreement is not the final settlement between Egypt and Israel, but further settlements are not an element or an implied condition to the execution and continued validity of this agreement until superseded by a new agreement.


(2) Progress towards peace

The approach to peace and the further development of elements of peaceful relations, will find its expression in suitable formulation and in concrete and practical arrangements.

It is proposed that the agreement refer to its declared aim of the furtherance of peace between the parties and to its being a significant step towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace between Egypt and Israel.

Furthermore, the concrete arrangements based on the agreement which will express and reflect this progress towards peace will, inter alia, be as follows :

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.5  
STATE DEPT. CONTROL INFO  
BY LR DATE 10/01/03



- (a) Open bridges for tourists, family visits, goods etc.
- (b) Non-restriction on ships, planes or travellers because of call or visit to the territory of the other party.
- (c) Abstention from hostile propaganda.
- (d) Suspension of economic warfare and boycott practices.
- (e) Cessation of anti-Israel diplomatic pressures in third countries and international bodies.
- (f) Freedom of navigation on high seas, straits and waterways and freedom of flight over them.
- (g) Right of passage through the Canal.
- (h) Establishment of Joint Committees with supervision teams to oversee execution of agreement.


(3) Non-use of force

The agreement will express the resolve of the parties to refrain from any further threat or use of force against each other and the decision to settle all disputes between themselves by negotiations and other peaceful means. The document will contain the undertaking of the renunciation of belligerency, clearly and in its appropriate legal wording. The agreement will be made public.

Both parties will add a formal guarantee that they will not participate, directly or indirectly, in any hostilities between the other party and any other state or forces or provide assistance of any kind to states or forces involved in such hostilities.

(4) Arrangements on the ground

- (a) The area evacuated by Israel will be established as a buffer zone between the forces.
- (b) A defined area of limited armaments and forces east of the new line will be established.
- (c) The present area of limited armaments and forces west of Line A, established by the agreement of January 1974, remains unchanged.



- (d) Supervision will be carried out by the UN and by the Joint Committees and Supervision teams established (see 2(h)).
- (e) Alert systems of each party in the vacated zone to prevent surprise attack is proposed.
- (f) There will be aerial reconnaissance missions by aircraft of both sides.
- (g) The arrangements will be contained in a Protocol attached to the agreement.

(5) Duration

- (a) The agreement will be in force until superseded by a new agreement; no time-limit to the present agreement will be set.
- (b) Egypt will give an undertaking via the USG that it will not demand a new agreement or a further withdrawal for an agreed period.
- (c) The mandate of the supervisory organ will be for an indefinite period.
- (d) There will be an agreed timetable for the implementation of the agreement. Stage one will be a preparatory one.

(6) Relation to Geneva


The agreement should find its expression in the position of the parties, if and when the Geneva Conference is renewed. The intention of the parties expressed in the agreement, generally and in its detailed provisions, has to find its continued effect in the approaches and attitudes taken in Geneva, in a way to be agreed upon.



(7) Lines

The question of the lines will be developed subsequently ,  
after the consideration and discussion of the six points  
mentioned above and on their basis.

11.3.75





→ HK FYI (B)

2. FOLLOWING IS MIDDLE EAST PORTION OF ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI'S "MAKING AMERICA RELEVANT" FROM MARCH 3, 1975 NEW YORK MAGAZINE:

THERE IS A RELATED ISSUE WHICH I BELIEVE TO BE IMPORTANT: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND THE POLITICAL CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE NEED TO SOLVE THAT CONFLICT IS NOW MORE ACUTE THAN EVER, NOT ONLY BECAUSE OF ITS THREAT TO WORLD PEACE, BUT BECAUSE OF ITS POLARIZING EFFECT ON AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD. WITHOUT AN ARAB-ISRAELI SETTLEMENT, WE WILL NOT CREATE THE KIND OF CONFIDENCE ON WHICH THE RESOLUTION OF SOME OF THE MONETARY PROBLEMS WITH THE OIL PRODUCERS DEPENDS.

I AM DOUBTFUL THAT THE ADMINISTRATION'S CURRENT STRATEGY- TRYING TO KEEP THE SOVIET UNION OUT OF A SOLUTION-CAN SUCCEED. IT ONLY INCREASES THE SOVIET STAKE IN SUBVERTING A SETTLEMENT. AND WHILE THE SOVIET UNION LACKS THE CAPACITY TO ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT BY ITSELF, IT CAN PREVENT A SETTLEMENT. I AM ALSO DOUBTFUL THAT A LONGTERM APPROACH OF SLOWLY GETTING THE ARABS AND ISRAELIS TOGETHER WILL SUCCEED, FOR THIS SLOW APPROACH DOES NOT TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE DISUNITY AND IMPATIENCE OF THE ARABS, BOTH OF WHICH UNDERMINE THEIR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT ANY GRADUAL COMPROMISE SOLUTION.


THUS, IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE AND TIMELY FOR THE UNITED STATES TO SPELL OUT OPENLY WHAT IT CONSIDERS TO BE THE GENERAL OUTLINES OF A DESIRABLE SETTLEMENT AND TO INDICATE THAT IT

WOULD BE PREPARED TO GUARANTEE IT. THERE IS WORLD-WIDE CONSENSUS TODAY ON WHAT THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF THAT SETTLEMENT OUGHT TO BE.

(FOOTNOTE: BRIEFLY, ITS PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ARE: RECOGNITION OF ISRAEL'S SOVEREIGNTY BY ALL PARTIES, AND PEACE TREATIES ESTABLISHING NORMAL RELATIONS; CREATION OF A DEMILITARIZED PALESTINIAN STATE; REINFORCEMENT OF FRONTIERS, BASED LARGELY ON THOSE EXISTING IN 1967, BY SECURITY ZONES; RETENTION OF A UNITED JERUSALEM BUT WITH TWO CAPITALS IN IT; AND A U.S. GUARANTEE FOR THE ABOVE.)

SPELLING OUT THE GENERAL TERMS OF A SETTLEMENT WOULD GENERATE PRESSURE ON ITS BEHALF. AND THIS IS WHAT MODERATE ARABS AND ISRAELIS ACTUALLY WANT, FOR THEY ARGUE THAT UNLESS THERE IS EXTERNAL, PARTICULARLY AMERICAN, PRESSURE ON BEHALF OF AN OPENLY ARTICULATED SETTLEMENT, IT IS DIFFICULT FOR THEM, BECAUSE OF THEIR INTERNAL PROBLEMS, TO TAKE THE LEAD IN PROMOTING IT.





# TELEGRAM

(C)

17 MAR 75  
0725Z

INDICATE:  
COLLECT  
CHARGE TO

DISTRIBUTION

ACTION: Secstate WASH DC - IMMEDIATE

INFO: Amembassy CAIRO - IMMEDIATE  
Amembassy DAMASCUS  
Amembassy AMMAN  
Amembassy RIYADH  
Amembassy BEIRUT  
Amembassy TEL AVIV

UNCLASSIFIED JERUSALEM 0498

S/S+15

SECTO 324

E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS : OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)  
SUBJECT : Remarks of Secretary Kissinger and  
FM Allon in Jerusalem, March 16, 1975

DEPT PASS NSCE FOR SCOWCROFT AND NESSEN;  
STATE FOR S/PRS FUNSETH

1. Following are remarks of Secretary Kissinger and  
FM Allon following the Secretary's meeting with the  
Israeli negotiating <sup>team</sup> ~~staff~~ at Prime Minister Rabin's  
office in Jerusalem, March 16, 1975:

2. FM Allon: BEGIN QUOTE The Secretary of State  
and myself divided labor among ourselves. I'll speak  
in Hebrew for the Israeli press and the Secretary will

DRAFTED BY:

USIS:DHAlton:jcc

DRAFTING DATE

3/16/75

TEL EXT.

APPROVED BY:

S/S:R Sherman

CLEARANCES:

S/PRS:R Anderson

UNCLASSIFIED  
Classification



say the same things, I hope, in English.

3. Allon: (translated from Hebrew) We held a detailed conversation for a number of hours with Dr. Kissinger and his group on the Egyptian proposals he brought and we have conveyed to our guest our proposals and evaluation of the proposals he brought to us in accordance with the spirit of government policy from previous sessions and today's session. I say with satisfaction that these talks were held in good spirits and with a positive trend on the part of both parties. But because of the importance of the subject and the great amount of detail, we could not complete the discussion this evening and we will continue tomorrow morning.

4. Secretary Kissinger: The Israeli negotiating team and we reviewed all the elements of the negotiation in very great detail, in a very constructive spirit, based on the discussions that took place in the Israeli cabinet today. The Israeli side presented the Israeli ideas in response to the Egyptian ideas that I brought here from Aswan and I plan to go to Egypt tomorrow to present them. The Israeli and American negotiating team<sup>s</sup> will meet again tomorrow morning. Thank you.

5. Q: Did you introduce any ideas of your own?

A: Secretary Kissinger: No. END QUOTE.

KISSINGER

UNCLASSIFIED

Classification





THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

March 16, 1975

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLYMEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT 


Secretary Kissinger has sent you the following strategic analysis of our negotiating situation:

"After two rounds of intensive discussions in Aswan and Jerusalem and talks with President Asad, I want to share with you my perception of what lies ahead in broad strategic terms and ask your judgment on how to proceed.

"I have reported to you on where matters stand in my exchange with the Egyptians and Israelis on the basic elements of another Sinai agreement, some of which seem manageable and others of which (such as non-belligerency and the numbers and location of the Egyptian army east of the Suez Canal) are very difficult issues which may or may not be resolved. You know that Syria and the PLO seem determined to block another Sinai agreement because they believe they will be left out. Finally, it is clear that there has been a slow but steady build-up of military preparedness by Syria, Israel and Egypt which has added to the underlying tension in the area.

"Broadly speaking, we have two choices. First, to persist in trying to get an interim Egyptian-Israeli agreement. The second course would be to let events force upon us a return to the broader setting of a Geneva Conference at which an overall settlement would be addressed. The fact is that each of the above courses carry risks with them and neither is entirely satisfactory.

"The advantages to us in achieving the interim Egyptian-Israeli agreement remain impressive, and I have no intention of deviating from our current efforts as long as I judge there is a reasonable hope for success. Success would keep Sadat's moderate course to the fore; it would defuse the Sinai; it would make less likely that Syria will undertake a one-front war; it would limit Soviet opportunities to reassert itself, and the U.S. would remain the central

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~  
EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLYDECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
NSC MEMO, 11/24/99, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR, 10/01/03

element in future peacemaking efforts. In short, success would improve the situation in the area and maintain our influence, but we must bear in mind that it is unlikely to usher in a period of calm in the area. Differences of interpretation, for example, are inevitable with one side seeing it as a purely military disengagement agreement and the other as primarily a political agreement. Other parts of the Arab world, led by Syria which historically has played the spoiler role in the Mideast, could substantially unite against us, seeing it as a move to split the Arabs. Some form of renewed military action (the most likely Arab strategy is a protracted war of attrition against Israel) or economic action against the U.S. cannot be precluded as a possibility, though it is less likely.

"The way to avoid this is to find some way to assure Asad he will be brought into the negotiating picture. The Israelis will take some strong convincing, and I have begun to lay the groundwork with Rabin -- but I am not optimistic on that score. Sadat has been strongly urging this, as has Faisal. But Syrian suspicion is so strong, and Israeli opposition to giving up anything more on the Golan so great, that a stalemate is likely to result. This is why Asad has refused to accept repeated assurances that we will make a major effort for Syria as the next step after Egypt. However, he might relax his opposition to my present efforts, easing the way for rapid conclusion of a Sinai agreement, if we could find a credible way to guarantee him that a Syrian-Israeli negotiation would start (either at Geneva or with the U.S. as a middleman-catalyst) before the implementation phase of any Egypt-Israel agreement begins. But our difficulties in Israel will be monumental requiring great Presidential pressure.


"Another approach, if we judge the resistance to a separate Sinai agreement is too great, would be to suspend the present Sinai effort by using the daily stalemates as an excuse and go to Geneva to discuss an overall settlement. This would not be unpopular in Israel; it would probably buy us some time with Syria; it could be portrayed as a shift to Geneva in deference to strong Arab views against a separate Egyptian-Israeli agreement; and it might help Syria support renewal of the mandate of the UN force. But it would badly strain our relations with Egypt; it would not be long at Geneva before we would be confronted with the Arabs and the USSR on one side and a recalcitrant Israel on the other over such questions as PLO participation and proposals for total Israeli withdrawal from all

occupied territory. Such developments would contribute to further radicalization in the area, and would likely bring the area soon to a renewal of hostilities in circumstances of greater Arab unity than we have ever seen before.

"We face a difficult situation. Success in the current negotiation will buy us more time provided we can find some way to engage Syria, but it will not bring the many years of tranquility as the Israelis hope. On the other hand, failure on our part and the likely frustration of Geneva could bring the area to the brink of reality of another war. Nevertheless, my overall conclusion is that a shift to Geneva is not one we should embark upon voluntarily as long as we have a chance to get an interim Egyptian-Israeli agreement which still best serves our interest, despite the risks. If Geneva is forced upon us as a result of our inability to succeed in the present negotiation, we would have to think in terms of bold overall peace plans at the conference to protect our interests and to discourage resort to war. But this is another chapter.

"I would appreciate your direction.

"Warm regards."





## *Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum*

---

*[www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov](http://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov)*

*Library: 1000 Beal Ave., Ann Arbor, MI 48109*  
*Museum: 303 Pearl Street, NW, Grand Rapids, MI 49504*

*(734) 205-0555 fax (734) 205-0571*  
*(616) 254-0400 fax (616) 254-0386*

**The documents in this  
folder continue into the  
next folder.**