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March 13

1A

~~SECRET~~ NODIS CHEROKEE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

GOE SIDE:

President Sadat
Foreign Minister Fahmy
General Gamasy

US SIDE:

Secretary Kissinger
Under Secretary Sisco
Ambassador Eilts

SUBJECT:

Meeting with President Sadat,
March 13, 1975.

PLACE:

Aswan, Egypt

After welcoming the Secretary, the President indicated that he, Fahmy and Gamasy had been working all morning. Alluding to a former British official adept at developing alternative formulations, the President noted that Fahmy had prepared two formulas. He described the first as a compromise; the second as a final fallback position.

The Secretary indicated that if there is anything in the first formula, he would begin with that. If this is not possible, he would utilize the second. The President noted the two formulas differ only in Article III. Fahmy claimed he used the Secretary's own wording in his formulations. The Preamble, he noted, is to give the impression that more than a Disengagement Agreement is involved. Point No. 2, having to do with new lines, will not be in the agreement, but in an annex. The Secretary said these formulations would not be the agreement, but simply points. Both Sadat and Fahmy agreed.

The Secretary said he wished to make a few observations regarding the likely Israeli reaction. He would do so first in terms of the contents of the paper and second in terms of omission or points to be explained.

~~SECRET~~ NODIS CHEROKEE

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, DATE 05

STATE DEPARTMENT

NY HR 19/25/03



a) On point 1, having to do with the area of withdrawal, The Secretary thought it might be possible, although the phraseology might have to be different. The subject will probably have to be phrased in terms of mutuality. Fahmy observed that the first point is a position.

b) On point 2, the Secretary noted that the first sub-paragraph (a) is what we are talking about. Re sub-paragraph (b), he asked what the Egyptian side means by the western end of the passes? If this is intended to be taken literally, he thought it was unobtainable and certainly not unless Israel is at the eastern end of the passes.


Sub-para (c) is in principle all right. (See qualification below.)

On sub-para (d), the Secretary speculated Egyptian absorption of the UN zone might be attainable, but Israel will have trouble accepting this. Sadat inquired if this would still be true if the forces are exactly the same on the western end of the passes. General Gamasy thought Egypt should be at the western entrances. The Secretary asked if Sadat wished the Israelis out of the eastern end?

Gamasy indicated his preference that the western entrance be held by Egypt even if the Israelis hold the eastern entrance rather than giving it to the UN. The Secretary opined this will be a totally new thought to the Israelis. The Israeli idea, still without Cabinet approval, continues to be a 30-50 kilometer withdrawal with all the areas evacuated under the UN. He doubted they have yet addressed themselves to a significant forward movement of the Egyptian line.

Sub-para (d) they would accept, but if sub-para (c) means the zone of unlimited armaments is across the Canal, this will create monumental difficulties. The President noted if Egypt opens the Canal, it will be hard to close it. The entire Egyptian military posture is defensive.

The Secretary pointed out that the Israelis have been briefing the press about Egypt's now having an offensive capability.



(f) On point No. 3, having to do with formal assurances, the Secretary said he does not know which of the two formulations they would be likely to prefer. The Israelis will contend that the prohibition against introducing military and para-military forces is already in the last Disengagement Agreement. In that agreement, it is applicable to both sides. Now it would appear that only one side is being asked to do so. Fahmy observed that Egypt would be willing to put it into a Disengagement Agreement. The Secretary speculated on likely arguments which will be made by those who want the agreement. There is a subtle distinction between resort to the use of force and military and para-military operations, but what is it?

Sadat commented that in the future, we should not resort to the use of force. There eventually may be non-belligerency. The Secretary agreed, but noted that for the duration of the Agreement, something less will be required. The Israelis will say that as long as the process of moving toward a just and durable peace continues, it is agreeable. However, they will also want to know what will happen in the event they do not agree with Arab proposals at Geneva. Will force prohibitions then be ended?

Digressing, the President raised the matter of the Palestinians. The Secretary said he was convinced that to introduce the matter of the Palestinians will simply produce a prolonged stalemate. He would have to explain some of the language tomorrow. The certain Israeli reaction will be one of doubt that they can put these proposals to the Knesset.

With respect to point 4, having to do with Syria, the Secretary thought the Israelis will refuse, and especially so if there is harassment on the Syrian front. He opined that the term "attack" is better than the existing language. Fahmy stated that this is what is meant by preemptive war.

Point 5, having to do with the right of self-defense, the Secretary opined is agreeable. The same holds true with Point 6, though this should be done between and among the Arabs themselves. Re Syria, the Secretary thought we might say our efforts will be exerted to get a negotiation begun before the middle of 1975.

On point 7, concerning the duration of UNEF, the Secretary expressed concern about the clause, "as long as efforts for a just and lasting settlement are proceeding." This, the Israelis will view as an escape clause. The Secretary noted we have two problems with this article. First, we are dealing with a group of 6 or 7, which must carry the Cabinet of 25 and then the Knesset of 100. Second, they are not statesmen. The Secretary noted the concept of "annual renewal" seems to mean that one can get them out. Something about refraining from resort to force is also necessary. In practice, it is meaningless. The Israelis, he acknowledged, would like to give the agreement some permanence. Fahmy contended this would be political suicide.

The Secretary expressed understanding that if there is no movement, there will again be war. He observed that he is aware of the President's problem. Sadat noted what the Israelis want is that anything not resolved will not be handled through military action. The Secretary agreed.

Point 8, having to do with cooperation with UNEF commander, the Secretary noted, will be acceptable, but will have to be in more institutionalized form. The Israelis will want some kind of commission or committee.

Point 9, spelling out no destruction of roads or properties, should pose no problems.

On point 10, the Secretary noted two weeks for the relinquishment of the Abu Rodeis oilfields is too short. It should be a little longer. Three months is too long.

Point 11 on the Geneva conference poses no problem.

Point 12, the Secretary noted, is impossible. While conceding it to be a mild formulation, he thought this will have to be taken out. He noted if the Israelis leak this to the press it will mean trouble. In the US, the Palestinians are regarded as murderers. We must start the process of rehabilitation of the Palestinians. If Israel can get the Arab-Israeli issue focussed on the problem of the Palestinians, it has succeeded. Fahmy said he had an idea how to solve the matter based on the Secretary's comments, but did not specify.




Fahmy said that, judging from the Secretary's comments, the sides may be far apart on an agreement. There are several basic points on which Egypt cannot give way to Israel, viz

(a) the passes and the oil fields. There should be progress not only from the Egyptian point of view, but also in the Arab world. No one will believe Egypt achieved anything if only the Israelis withdraw.

(b) a second problem is political. Egypt cannot agree to language which gives public expression to the fact that it is an interim political solution. The Secretary thought this could be avoided. The Israelis could probably agree to phraseology along the lines of a "continuance of the process of peace." As to the second formula, they would like to present it to their public that henceforth disputes will be settled by peaceful means and that after the conclusion of an agreement, the danger of war has decreased. The President indicated agreement in principle.

(c) Fahmy noted that only remaining problem was that of linkage. The Secretary suggested that any reference to the "alestinians be dropped. Fahmy agreed to drop it from the agreement, but contended it should still be discussed. A letter from the US on the subject would be helpful. The Secretary observed this would be dangerous to him. Fahmy proposed language similar to that used by President Nixon with Brezhnev and by President Ford at Vladivostok. The Secretary said we can give an oral assurance. We would have had political contact with the Palestinians in November had it not been for Rabat.

The Secretary asked if his understanding is correct that Egypt wants a commitment in the agreement to continue the process of peace. The President agreed. The Secretary again alluded to the related point that settlement of disputes would be through peaceful means. The President again agreed. A third problem, the Secretary continued, is to prevent the process of peace from becoming an excuse to abrogate the agreement. The Israelis are likely to interpret all phrases the way they want. If worded positively, however, this should be agreeable. Fahmy asked what would happen if nothing



transpires. The process of peace must continue, but why should they constantly assume Egyptian mischievousness and what is wrong with Geneva.


The Secretary responded that the Israelis state that Sadat tricked them once and he can do it again. This might not be so, but the Israelis believe it. The Israelis are afraid that Egypt will engage in another Yom Kippur War, and need something for their public opinion. Israel, Egypt and the US, the Secretary continued, need an agreement. The costs of no agreement are out of proportion. He noted that the President had described the Israeli terms as more moderate than anticipated.

Sadat observed that earlier in the morning, when meeting with Fahmy and Gamasy, he had expressed a desire to make the agreement a turning point toward peace. He recognized that the Israelis are confused and do not know where they are heading. He would open the door for the Israelis.

The Secretary thought he should give the Israelis the ideas in the President's paper but not the paper itself. We could then take their views and prepare an American proposal.

The Secretary asked how the Israelis might be answered if they query in what way the present ideas differ from the earlier Fahmy paper. The President and Fahmy noted it is a step forward. On basic issues, the President said he was still confused. Would they give up to Egypt the passes? If the Israelis believe that Egypt would forego the passes, there is no agreement. The Soviets and Syrians will say what did Egypt get? It is not just a case of withdrawal but of regaining some territory. If they think only they are to move and turn over the territory to the UN, this is nothing. When the Secretary suggested Egyptian civilian administrators, Fahmy said this means nothing.

The Secretary thought if the Israelis were on the eastern end of the passes and Egypt on the west, this might just be possible. The President agreed. So did Fahmy, who said this could be sold to the Egyptian people. The Secretary reiterated that the Israelis are not really



focussing on this. They are not thinking of the balance of forces in the Sinai. Gamasy thought this means that the Israelis will want to keep their troops in the western entrances. The President said he had not discussed this. On the West Bank, the forces should be larger than under the first Disengagement Agreement. He was thinking about reopening the Suez Canal and Egypt's obligation to protect it. The Canal, he noted, is a serious barrier to a pre-emptive war.

The Secretary noted the Israeli obsession with an Egyptian attack. He conceded that it is conceivable that Egypt would do so. However, Israel has talked itself into a frame of mind where it feels threatened. He recalled that the Israelis asked for some sign from the President to rebuild the Suez area as a sign of his peaceful intent. The Israelis want it both ways. Fahmy added that Egypt cannot present any agreement as an interim agreement. To do so would be harmful to Egypt.

The Secretary wondered if some way could be found to express the two points:

a) The agreement is not final, and that the process for peace must continue, and

b) both parties pledge they will seek to settle their disputes by peaceful means. The President agreed. Fahmy thought such language should be in connection with UNSC Resolution 338.

The Secretary reiterated he will not present the paper, but only the ideas. Some decision is needed in Israel to agree to some lines. There are four positive Egyptian points:

- a) This is not a final step toward peace.
- b) All disputes will be settled by peaceful means.
- c) To refrain from resort to use of force.
- d) Annual renewal of UNEF.



On its side, Egypt wants a) a forward movement of the Egyptian line (Gamasy interjected that this is very important), and b) how the balance of forces is defined after the lines move forward.

Fahmy asked how the Israelis expected 7,000 soldiers in so large an area. The Secretary asked why not. Gamasy contended that the Israeli military position is better if they are on the other side of the passes. The Secretary said the Israelis will not see it this way. Having a mountain in back of them gives them great psychological assurances.

Asked about the other points which the Secretary had mentioned yesterday, the President said they had tried to put these into the paper. The Secretary asked if this means anything not now in the paper was unacceptable. He reiterated several of the points:

a) Families should be allowed to visit in the Sinai. Sadat agreed. This should apply to Egyptians and Palestinians in Gaza.

b) Travelers may use the same passport going to Israel and to Egypt. The President agreed.

c) Controlling progaganda. The President noted that nothing can be done about the Voice of Palestine. As far as Radio Cairo is concerned, this should be no problem. In any case, nothing of this sort can be put into an agreement.

d) Arab diplomatic pressures against Israel. Sadat said nothing could be done on this score.

e) Freedom of navigation through the Bab-el-Mandab.

f) Transit of Israelis through the Canal. The President noted cargo only, not crews. Fahmy noted people will kill the Israelis aboard the ships. The President observed if there are one or two Israelis aboard the ship, this will be all right, but not many. Fahmy thought they would make a test case out of it.

g) Arab restrictions and economic boycott. Sadat said this can begin on a selective basis. Fahmy



noted the President had the previous day ordered a change of the Egyptian representative on the boycott commission. The new man has a new spirit and new instructions.

h) Mixed Committee. Fahmy thought this was covered by his point 8. The Secretary noted that Egypt and Israel would set up a committee to assist the UN commander. Fahmy said it is not clear what is wanted. The Secretary noted it will help to have the commission or committee consist of Egyptian and Israeli officers to assist the UN commander. The President thought it was dangerous to have Israelis in the UN area. In principle, he agreed, but a formula had to be found.

i) Reconnaissance flights. The President turned this down. If the US provides Egypt with the same equipment as it does to the Israelis, then it will be all right. The Secretary said our aircraft have been flying farther out in international waters. Sadat noted this is not the case with the Israeli planes which fly reconnaissance flights every day.

j) Agreement in force until superseded by a new agreement. The President agreed in principle, but wanted better phraseology developed.

After a five-minute recess and meeting of the American side, the Secretary said he again wished to sum up as follows:

We must get the Israeli Cabinet to agree this Sunday on principles. We will meet with the Israeli negotiating team Friday. Sadat thought that perhaps Mrs. Meir might help. The Secretary said he would not present the paper since this will confuse the drafting process with the conceptual process.

On the positive side, he would say President Sadat is ready to agree to:

a) A statement that this is not a final peace settlement, but a step in the process leading to peace according to UN resolutions;

b) In the peace process, solutions to disputes will be found by peaceful means;



- c) some reference not to resort to force;
- d) as long as we make it clear that this is not the final agreement, something along the lines, "This agreement is valid until superseded by a new agreement."
- e) Mixed commissions.
- f) Annual renewal.
- g) the various items on the list.

On the Egyptian side, they want:

- a) some balanced disposition of forces;
- b) the various technical points, e.g. the non-destruction of property, roads, etc.

The Syrian and Palestinian points will have to be handled separately. The President said he would like to mention Syria in the agreement in some way. The Secretary expressed the view that the Israelis are not planning a preemptive attack. However, in the event of a war of attrition or Palestinian raids, they want the opportunity to retaliate. Some formula will have to be found for this. The Israelis are afraid of Egypt and not Syria.

At the end of the meeting, Gamasy told the Secretary that he hopes Egypt will be supported on the military side. Failure to do this could complicate matters. Subsequently, while waiting outside, Gamasy told Ambassador Eilts that if military arrangements are not acceptable, there will be no agreement. He would see to that. (The General did not speak threateningly, but almost resignedly.) Gamasy added that, in his view, it would be better to make a try for the Arish-Ras Mohamed line and in that context try to settle some of the broader issues.

AMB:HFrEilts:ajc - 3/13/75



that on the basis of the concrete ideas he is taking back to Israel, the Israeli Cabinet will be in a position to make concrete ideas of its own on Saturday?

5. Answer : Dr. Kissinger : I am of course in no position to ~~speak~~ speak for the Israeli Cabinet, but I expect that there will be some concrete Israeli ideas when I return.

6. Question : Mr. President, there have been reports this evening of troop movements on the Egyptian ~~southern~~ ^{Can} front, ~~Can~~ Can you tell us if these reports are based on anything substantial?

7. Answer : President Sadat : Not at all, the Egyptian side not at all.

8. Question : There has been no concentration of Egyptian forces along the Sinai Front?

9. Answer : President Sadat : Not at all, we are ~~honoring~~ honoring our signature on the disengagement agreement. We have with us General Gamasy.

10. (In Arabic) garbled.

11. Answer : President Sadat : (Translation from Arabic) In my talks with Dr. Kissinger we have moved from generalities to specifics, which Dr. Kissinger will take with him to Israel, after which he will ~~return~~ return to us. At this stage there is no room for guesswork. We await Dr. Kissinger's return. (End translation)



12. Question: Mr. President, you told us last time that you expected this to be a hard round. Do you still feel that way, or do you think it will be any easier?

13. Answer: President Sadat: I expect it to be difficult and hard.

14. Question: Mr. Secretary, do you have a better estimate now of how long the shuttle might last?

15. Answer: Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to make any estimates as to the length of time. Of course, I think all parties have an interest in moving it as rapidly as possible.

16. Question: Mr. President, is Egypt now prepared to give written assurances to refrain from beginning hostilities against Israel?

17. Answer: President Sadat: Well, maybe you remember the statement I made in Paris. We are not aiming at all to start any hostilities, but assurances must be on a reciprocal basis, and it is premature now to speak about specifics.

18. Question: Mr. President, on the basis of the progress that has been made so far, do you believe ~~that~~ that an agreement is now likely?

19. Answer: President Sadat: I hope so, but I can't confirm it until after Dr. Kissinger returns.

20. Question: Dr. Kissinger, are you carrying anything on paper to show anything at all in the form of maps, drawings?



21. Answer : Dr. Kissinger : We have not reached that point yet. I have had long discussions with the President and his associates on two successive evenings and I think I can reflect their thinking in a rather precise fashion, without the help of maps.

22. Question (Unclear)

23. Answer : President Sadat : Well, as I have said before, I think the mission of Dr. Kissinger has two main aims. The first is to defuse the explosive situation that exists in the area now, and second to push the peace process. I have stated also that the defusion of the explosive situation means that there must be some Israeli gesture of peace on the three fronts.

24. Question : Mr. President, could you give us some hint what your ideas are about?

25. Answer : President Sadat : It is premature, still premature.

26. Question : Mr. President, is it possible that the agreement will be in some sort of phased format, in other words, a series of stages of actions by Israel and by Egypt? Is it possible it will be more along those lines?

27. Answer : President Sadat : Why don't you wait until it is achieved?

28. Question : Mr. President, Dr. Kissinger has said that he believes that both sides in these negotiations want peace, do you

~~in the past~~



believe that Israel wants peace?

29. Answer : President Sadat : Well, I shall be waiting the return of Dr. Kissinger here. Dr. Kissinger can see both the ~~minors~~ both sides, but I can't see the other side myself. I shall be ~~waiting~~ awaiting the return of Dr. Kissinger.

30. Question : Mr. President, are you more optimistic now than ~~you~~ you were before you heard the latest Israeli response through ~~Dr.~~ Dr. Kissinger? What is your ~~feeling~~ feeling now?

31. Answer : President Sadat : I'am still optimistic, Yes.

32. Question : More than before?

President

33. Answer : ~~Mr.~~ Sadat : Still optimistic, because it is my mood. I am optimistic always.

34. Question : Mr. President, could you describe or would you define for us what is the most difficult ~~in~~ areas of the talks? Do you have any specifics about what has been the most difficult area of negotiations?

35. Answer : President Sadat: I think you should ask Dr. Kissinger this question.

36. Dr. Kissinger : At this point it is not possible to make a judgement on which is the most difficult point.

37. Question : Mr. President, have you considered having joint patrols instead of a UN Force to police the area that would be ~~demilitarized~~ demilitarized?



38. Answer: Mr. Kissinger : Remember our agreement Mr. President. (laughter)

39. Answer: President Sadat : As I said, in all these details it is premature to say anything now.

40. Question : You do not rule it out, ~~xxx~~ exclude it?

41. Answer : President Sedat : Certainly, certainly, but as I said, it is premature.

KISSINGER *EW*



Report to the
President



THE WHITE HOUSE

INFORMATION 2

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

March 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT *B DR7*

Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following report...

"I met with President Sadat and his key advisers, Foreign Minister Fahmi and General Gamasy, for about three hours, to present the points of a political character which the Israelis want included in any agreement in return for Israeli withdrawal from the passes and the oil fields. I explained to Sadat that the key problem is the Israeli domestic situation and that in order for Rabin to get the cabinet to take the decision to withdraw from the passes and the oil fields he must be in a position to show specifically the political quids he has received in return. I stressed that Rabin cannot agree to a purely military withdrawal, but it must be presented to the Israeli people as a tangible step toward peace. Sadat listened intently, commented decisively on points which he felt he could include, and, equally decisively, where he felt that certain Israeli demands were beyond his political capacity.

His two principal advisers, Fahmi and Gamasy, were, not unexpectedly, more cautious, and Sadat intends to review with them each of the points I discussed today and to give me his considered reply sometime tomorrow evening to take back to Israel. I am cautiously hopeful that Sadat will give me enough to maintain the momentum of the negotiations which could bring us in a few days to the beginning of the actual drafting stage. How much I bring back from Aswan will influence Rabin very significantly on whether and when he places before the cabinet a recommendation to withdraw out of the passes and the oil fields. My impression is that Rabin, Allon, and Chief of Staff General Ghur have taken a positive attitude towards the agreement and even Peres seems to be coming around.


Sadat continues to reflect confidence that he can manage Syria's opposition to an Egyptian-Israeli agreement, and he would like us to undertake a further effort with Syria

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
DR 9/25/03

once his agreement with Israel is consummated. He wants something started with Syria by the end of April so as to provide Syria with the justification for renewing in May the UN force in the Golan. I said I would consider this, but I made no final commitment. He did not seem perturbed at the prospect that the PLO issue might immobilize a Geneva conference at the outset, and he left this matter for further discussion between us at a later stage.

There was one particularly interesting moment when I talked to Sadat alone. I presented him with a letter from Rabin which I had suggested and in which, in very human terms, Rabin expressed his strong desire to achieve the agreement with Sadat. This letter moved Sadat to tears, and he said, that this was the kind of thing which he had always wanted. I believe this was a good psychological stroke, and I hope that it will have an impact on the considered version which Sadat will convey to me tomorrow night for subsequent presentation to the Israelis.

I will go to both Damascus and Amman on Saturday, and return to Israel on Sunday afternoon."

Warm Regards



March 14

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET-SENSITIVE

March 14, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

FROM:

BRENT SCOWCROFT BO BRM

Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following report...

"Now that the first intensive rounds with the Israelis and the Egyptians have been completed, a clearer picture has emerged as to the needs of each side, and how far each is willing to go to meet these needs. I have now finished my talks with Sadat; whether an agreement is achievable remains uncertain. We have made progress on the political aspects, but we have very difficult problems on the military side of the agreement.

"In rather precise terms, Egypt's key demands are: (A) Israeli withdrawal out of the passes and oil fields; (B) Egyptian forces to move eastward to the western entrance of the passes; and (C) agreement on a balance between all Egyptian and Israeli forces in the Sinai.

"In order to meet Israel's needs on the political side, Sadat, while not willing to give a formal declaration of non-belligerency, is willing to include in the agreement: (A) that the interim agreement is a step towards peace; (B) that Egypt is willing to resolve all differences by peaceful means; (C) that Egypt will refrain from the use of force against Israel; and (D) that as a part of the process towards peace, the agreement would remain valid until superseded by another agreement. In addition, Egypt may be willing to participate jointly with Israel in assisting the UNEF command in the buffer zone; it agrees to automatic annual review of UNEF; it is willing for Israeli cargoes to go through the canal; it is willing to reduce hostile propaganda emanating from Egyptian controlled media; it will allow free passage through the Straits of Bab al-Mandab; it agrees to freedom of movement through the Sinai and Gaza for Egyptians; and it is willing to undertake quietly and informally, particularly in relation to selected American firms, ways to ease economic boycott practices.

"What are the key problems which emerge from the above compendium of elements.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 2.5

NSC MEMO, 11/24/00, STATE DEPT. SINCE 1983

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
"First, and fundamental is whether Rabin feels the political quids Sadat is willing to provide are enough to justify putting before the cabinet on Sunday a recommendation for Israeli withdrawal out of the passes and the oil fields.

"Second, the Egyptian proposal, in which they are insisting not only on an Egyptian move of its military forces to the western entrance of the passes, but also an increase in the number of Egyptian forces east of the Suez Canal, lays bare the Egyptian strategic military objective. Its purpose is to give Egypt a stronger military presence numerically but also to extend substantially its zone east of the canal. Moreover Egypt seeks a more equitable balance in the forces in the Sinai. In other words, what the Israelis face in this proposal is not only a drawback from the passes but also a stronger Egyptian military presence east of the canal. I am virtually certain that this will prove unacceptable to Rabin. If the Egyptians stick on this proposal, it could become an issue on which the agreement could break. It might be possible, however, to work out a lesser Egyptian military move forward with limits on the number of forces, which Israel might be able to live with. It might also be possible to balance Egyptian forces at the western end of the passes with Israeli forces at the eastern entrances of the passes.

"Finally, the Israelis are seeking not only a commitment from the Egyptians that they will not use force, but also a commitment that all future issues will be resolved by peaceful means. It is significant that Sadat has agreed to give a commitment not to use force, and that this will be made public. This should prove reassuring as a practical matter to the Israelis; it would also provide the kind of cosmetically feasible practical step towards peace, going beyond the limits of the military disengagement agreement which Rabin needs to convince his cabinet.

"Moreover, the Israelis want assurances against surprise attack. In addition to the commitment against the use of force, Israel is seeking ways to strengthen UNEF, including some role for joint Egyptian/Israeli participation. On the basis of what we know at present, something along these lines may prove feasible.

"I am asking Scowcroft to show you a cable of the intensity of Syrian pressure. The tragedy is that a few kilometers in the Golan would solve the problem.



"I will be meeting with Rabin and his colleagues tomorrow, and we will know a bit more clearly where matters stand. Further adjustments in the positions of both sides will be required if an agreement is to be achieved. Whether each side has enough political room for maneuver still remains in doubt. Nevertheless, we have received enough from each side to give us something to work with. I therefore expect to continue the process in hopes that we will find ways to close the gap on key issues."

Warm Regards





Department of State

TELEGRAM

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SUBJECT: SYRIAN PESSIMISM

REF: DAMASCUS 0924

1. THERE HAS BEEN NO CLEAR ECHO IN SYRIAN NEWS MEDIA OR, WITH ONE EXCEPTION, ON LOCAL DIPLOMATIC CIRCUIT OF THAT EDGIER MORE BELLICOSE SYRIAN TONE I NOTED IN YOUR MARCH 9 MEETING. THIS LEADERSHIP HAS APPARENTLY BEEN KEEPING ITS COUNSEL.

2. CALLED ON YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR PERIC TODAY, WHO BY VIRTUE OF THE STRONG TITO-ASAD LINK, SYRIA'S RESPECT FOR THE YUGOSLAV MODEL AND HIS OWN PERSONAL QUALITIES IS ON UNUSUALLY CLOSE TERMS WITH BOTH GOVERNMENT AND PARTY LEADERS IN DAMASCUS. AFTER DESCRIBING HIS VIEWS OF THE PROPOSED JOINT PALESTINIAN-SYRIAN COMMAND, PERIC SAID HE WANTED SHARE WITH ME COMMENTS KHADDAM HAD MADE TO HIM MARCH 10 ABOUT SYRIAN REACTION TO YOUR MEETING. (KHADDAM, HE SAID, HAD PREFACED HIS COMMENTS WITH THE STATEMENT HE WOULD BE DISCUSSING THEM WITH NO OTHER DIPLOMAT IN DAMASCUS.) THE FUNNIN HAD CALMLY AND COLDLY STATED THAT SYRIA HAS ON VERGE OF LOSING "ALL CONFIDENCE" IN YOUR MISSION. KHADDAM

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, DATE 6/5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY *HR* DATE 9/25/03



Department of State

TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 DAMASC 00967 131021Z

ASKED, "WHAT ARE WE SUPPOSED TO DO WHEN WE ARE TOLD AMERICA WILL HAVE NO CONTACTS WITH THE PLU; THAT WE MUST WAIT OUR TURN FOR SOME POSSIBLE FUTURE MOVEMENT ON GOLAN; AND WHEN NOTHING IS SAID ABOUT CONVENING GENEVA?" WAR, KHADDAM CONCLUDED, LOGICALLY WAS BECOMING SARGIS ONLY ALTERNATIVE TO PRESERVE ARAB UNITY AND SECURE ARAB RIGHTS. HE THEN PARROTED ASAD'S STATEMENT TO YOU THAT "WHAT IS LOST BY FORCE, FORCE MUST REGAIN."

3. THE YUGOSLAV, WHO HAS FOLLOWED YOUR MISSION HERE IN THE AREA WITH THE CLOSEST ATTENTION AND SYMPATHY FROM ITS INCEPTION, COMMENTED THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME IN HIS MANY DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SYRIANS ABOUT YOUR EFFORTS THAT HE FELT THEY MIGHT BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING SUSPENDING CONTACT WITH YOU. PERIC THEN OBSERVED THAT IF THE SYRIANS ARE, INDEED, ABOUT TO BOYCOTT YOUR MISSION, THEY MAY VISUALIZE THE PROPOSED JOINT COMMAND AS SYRIA'S CHANCE TO START TO PULL TOGETHER THE "NORTHERN FRONT." HE PREDICTED AN IMPROVEMENT IN SYRO-IRAGI RELATIONS, A DEVELOPMENT WHICH HE THOUGHT BOTH COUNTRIES SHOULD FIND A DESIRABLE AND ATTAINABLE GOAL. I MADE NO COMMENT TO THE YUGOSLAV IN RESPONSE TO WHAT HE HAD VOLUNTEERED.

4. COMMENT: HOPE I AM NOT CRYING WOLF IN PREDICTING THAT YOUR SATURDAY MEETING HERE WILL BE A CRITICAL ONE IN TERMS OF KEEPING LINES OF COMMUNICATION OPEN WITH ASAD. YOU WILL HAVE VISITED ISRAEL TWICE SINCE YOUR LAST MEETING WITH HIM. HE WILL EXPECT YOUR ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTS FOR GOLAN NEGOTIATIONS AND, I AM CONVINCED, HOPES DEEPLY THAT YOU WILL BRING SUFFICIENT GROUNDS FOR HIM TO CONTINUE WITH YOUR HELP SEARCHING FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION. THIS WILL BE IN ADDITION TO EXPECTING TO HEAR ABOUT THE STATUS OF EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS.

5. ASAD SUGGESTED TO YOU THAT YOU FULLY PREPARE AN EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI ARRANGEMENT BUT DELAY ITS FINALIZATION UNTIL SOMETHING CAN BE WORKED OUT FOR SYRIA, INITIALLY THIS STRUCK ME AS OFF HANDED AND NAIVE. ON REFLECTION HIS IDEA LOOKS BETTER ALTHOUGH I HAVE NO WAY OF JUDGING

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03 DANASE 80967 131821Z

WHAT ITS ACCEPTABILITY MIGHT BE IN THE OTHER CAPITALS.
IT WOULD OFFER A MINIMUM ACCOMMODATION TO SYRIA IN THE
ABSENCE OF ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO ENGAGE IN SIMULTANEOUS
TALKS ON BOTH FRONTS.
MURPHY



~~SECRET~~

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4a

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017116

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction
TYPE OF MATERIAL List
RECEIVER'S NAME Henry Kissinger
RECEIVER'S TITLE Secretary
TITLE Check List for Israel
CREATION DATE 03/14/1975
VOLUME 3 pages
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033100040
COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. KISSINGER
REPORTS ON USSR, CHINA, AND MIDDLE EAST
DISCUSSIONS
BOX NUMBER 3
FOLDER TITLE March 7-22, 1975 - Kissinger's Trip -
Vol. I (7)
DATE WITHDRAWN 10/03/2003
WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

Sanitized 9/9/04

2A
4A

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CHECK LIST FOR ISRAEL

MARCH 14, 1975

NEGOTIATING ISSUES

Attached are:

- Tab A: a Talking Paper which:
 - repeats each of the Israeli points and
 - provides under each Israeli point the Egyptian position related to that point. Where applicable, the formulations from the new Egyptian paper are included.
- Tab B: The new Egyptian paper. The alternative formulations of paragraphs 3 and 4 (non-use of force) are typed separately on a final page.
- Tab C: The Israeli "ideas" paper for reference.

The key issues seem to be:

- The Egyptian demand for moving its line to the western end of the passes and for a balance of forces in the Sinai.
- The Egyptian language on the non-use of force falls far short of Israel's position since it is conditional and would not be included in the public document.
- The problem of duration has not been resolved and, in the Egyptian document, it is linked to Israel's not attacking Syria.
- The Egyptian resistance to many of the specific elements of non-belligerency which the Israelis

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AUTHORITY CA review 7/1/84; State review 9/17/03
BY lh NLF, DATE 6/29/07 NSC guidelines



have proposed and will consider particularly important in the absence of a formal non-belligerency pledge per se.

- Finally, you will need to decide at what point you begin talking to the Israelis about a negotiation with Syria.

One new idea may need to be introduced now that it has been mentioned to Sadat -- the extension of Egyptian civilian administration through the buffer zone as an inducement for Egypt not moving its forces past the present Israeli line.

Another idea which could help with (a) non-use of force, (b) duration, (c) Egypt's commitment to come to Syria's defense if the latter is attacked and (d) Israel's desire to avoid further withdrawals for a specific period would be to combine these points in a side package of bilateral commitments to the U.S.

RELATED ISSUES

1. Israeli Bodies, Red Crescent Aid for Sinai Flood Victims of Prisoners

You will want to tell the Israelis that Sadat was pleased at Israel's positive attitude on the Red Crescent and release of prisoners and agreed to the search for Israeli bodies. You can suggest that Israel and Egypt make the necessary working-level contacts to get rapid action underway on these questions. This would help prepare public attitudes on both sides for a Sinai agreement.

2. Egyptian Military Dispositions and Intentions

You can tell the Israeli team of your discussions with Sadat and Gamasy on this matter.

As to Egyptian intentions, you judge they still want peace but they have prudently prepared themselves for a breakdown in negotiations -- just as Israel has done.

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1. Israeli position:


"The agreement will be bi-lateral between Egypt and Israel. It is not linked to an agreement with other Arab countries and does not create a pattern for other discussions or settlements. Neither are there any prior conditions attached to its acceptance.

The proposed agreement is not the final settlement between Egypt and Israel, but further settlements are not an element or an implied condition to the execution and continued validity of this agreement until superseded by a new agreement."

Egyptian position:

-- The U.S. view is that this subject is best handled by not mentioning any relationship between this and other agreements. The Egyptians still have not suggested any formal linkage in the agreement itself.

-- However, "The President of the U.S. is expected to give his assurances to President Sadat that the U.S. will actively exert their efforts in order that a further disengagement between Syria and Israel takes place before the middle of 1975."



2. Israeli position:

"The approach to peace and the further development of elements of peaceful relations will find its expression in suitable formulation and in concrete and practical arrangements.

It is proposed that the agreement refer to its declared aim of the furtherance of peace between the parties and to its being a significant step towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace between Egypt and Israel.

Furthermore, the concrete arrangements based on the agreement which will express and reflect this progress towards peace will, inter alia, be as described below."

Egyptian position:


- There can be a preambular statement in the agreement: "Desirous to reach ultimately the final and just peaceful settlement prescribed by Security Council Resolution 338 and as a significant step towards that end, Egypt and Israel agree to conclude the following disengagement agreement."
- "This agreement is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement."
- On the concrete measures which Israel proposes:
 - (a) On movement of people: Sadat said that movement of people would be difficult and that it should not be mentioned in the agreement. He then said there could be freedom of movement for Egyptians between Egypt proper, the Sinai and Gaza if arranged under the UN.
 - (b) On non-restriction of travelers, ships, planes: The Egyptians are not yet prepared to have ships and planes go from one country to the other but would allow travelers who had been in Israel to come to Cairo on the same passport.
 - (c) Abstention from hostile propaganda: In general,



Sadat is prepared to tone down hostile propaganda "willingly." Voice of Palestine could be controlled "little by little."

- (d) Suspension of economic warfare and boycott: This has to be done discreetly and selectively for U.S. companies as stated in Fahmy's initial ideas.
- (e) Cessation of anti-Israel diplomatic pressures: Egypt feels its example may cause African states to improve relations with Israel.
- (f) Freedom of navigation in straits: We already have an Egyptian letter on the Bab al-Mandab from last January. Sadat reconfirmed this commitment.
- (g) Right of passage through the Canal: (1) Egypt has already agreed to Israeli passage in the context of a final peace. (2) Egypt would respect its commitment to allow the passage of Israeli cargo through the Suez Canal when the Canal is opened after this agreement. (3) Crews of all ships passing through the Canal would transit without discrimination on the basis of nationality but they cannot be 100% Israeli.
- (h) Joint Committees: A Committee can be established under the UN to discuss violations. The relationship to UNEF's inspection responsibilities still has to be worked out. In their new document, the Egyptians have cut this back. See 4(d) below.

-- The Egyptians would add: "The Israeli withdrawal will be implemented in such a manner as to indicate the willingness of the Israelis to demonstrate their desire for peace, namely that no roads or installations or equipment of the oilfields be destroyed or transferred from their present location either to Israel or the remaining occupied territories."



3. Israeli position:

"The agreement will express the resolve of the parties to refrain from any further threat or use of force against each other and the decision to settle all disputes between themselves by negotiations and other peaceful means. The document will contain the undertaking of the renunciation of belligerency, clearly and in its appropriate legal wording. The agreement will be made public.

"Both parties will add a formal guarantee that they will not participate, directly or indirectly, in any hostilities between the other party and any other state or forces or provide assistance of any kind to states or forces involved in such hostilities."

Egyptian position:

--In conversation Sadat said the agreement could include a statement that disputes between Egypt and Israel will be settled through the negotiating process leading toward a just and lasting peace as long as efforts to achieve peace continue. (Sadat could do this in the context of Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, but not indefinitely. Syria must be considered.) Sadat said that the Egyptian formulations mean that in the future, no matter what happens (except an attack on Syria) there should be no resort to force and this "will be non-belligerency".

--The preferred Egyptian formulation:

"Israel and Egypt would be prepared to give a formal assurance in writing to the US Government of their intention not to undertake military or paramilitary operations for the duration of this agreement and as long as the process for reaching a just and durable peace is continuing in accordance with the letter and the spirit of Security Council Resolution 338 and other relevant UN resolutions.

"Israel should undertake not to initiate military or paramilitary operations against Syria; in the event that this undertaking is violated by Israel, Egypt will fulfill its obligations toward Syria.



"Nothing in this agreement would prevent Egypt from exercising its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter."

--The alternate Egyptian formulation:

"Israel and Egypt would be prepared to give a formal assurance in writing to the US Government of their intention not to resort to the use of force for the duration of this agreement and as long as the process for reaching a just and durable peace is continuing in accordance with the letter and the spirit of Security Council Resolution 338 and other relevant UN resolutions.

"Israel should undertake not to resort to the use of force against Syria; in the event that this undertaking is violated by Israel, Egypt will fulfill its obligations towards Syria."



4. Israeli position:

"(a) The area evacuated by Israel will be established as a buffer zone between the forces.

(b) A defined area of limited armaments and forces east of the new line will be established.

(c) The present area of limited armaments and forces west of Line A, established by the agreement of January, 1974, remains unchanged.

(d) Supervision will be carried out by the UN and by the Joint Committees and Supervision teams established (see 2(h)).

(e) Alert systems of each party in the vacated zone to prevent surprise attack is proposed.

(f) There will be aerial reconnaissance missions by aircraft of both sides.

(g) The arrangements will be contained in a Protocol attached to the agreement."

Egyptian position:

(a) The Egyptians agree to a buffer zone between the forces but want to move their forces forward past the present Israeli line into the Western end of the passes. (Gamasy estimated this at 10 kms.)

(b) Egypt proposes a zone 10 kms. deep to the east of the now Israeli line.

(c) Egypt proposes a zone 10 kms. deep west of its now line. This means a significant change in the present zone west of Line A and would allow for a substantial increase in Egyptian forces east of the Canal.


(d) UNEF will supervise the buffer zone. In conversation, Sadat said that a Commission under the UN consisting of Israeli, Egyptian and UN personnel could discuss alleged violations (but not move around). Responsibilities need to be discussed further. In their document:

"The two parties will cooperate with the UNEF Chief of Staff and agree that their military representatives meet with him if necessary in the zone of disengagement to discuss problems arising from the implementation of this agreement."

(e) Egypt has rejected the idea of an "alert system" for each side in the buffer zone.

(f) Egypt is considering the question of aerial reconnaissance over the buffer zone and seems favorable to allowing it for both Egypt and Israel over a part (not all) of the buffer zone. Sadat asked why the US cannot continue doing this.

(g) There is no objection to a separate Protocol.



5. Israeli position:

"(a) The agreement will be in force until superseded by a new agreement; no time limit to the present agreement will be set.

(b) Egypt will give an undertaking via the USG that it will not demand a new agreement or a further withdrawal for an agreed period.

(c) The mandate of the supervisory organ will be for an indefinite period.

(d) There will be an agreed timetable for the implementation of the agreement. Stage one will be a preparatory one."


Egyptian position:

(a) Duration of the agreement: still under discussion but Sadat indicated that in principle -- depending upon the phraseology -- he could accept the agreement remaining in force until superseded by a new agreement.

(b) The ideas that Egypt will not demand a further withdrawal for an agreed period: still under consideration.

(c) On UNEF: "The United Nations Emergency Force will continue in its function as long as the efforts towards a just and peaceful settlement are proceeding and, towards that end, its mandate will be extended annually."

(d) On implementation: Sadat felt that evacuation of the oil fields and the passes could take place in separate stages of an agreed timetable. Gamasy urged that there be some Israeli pullback in the north to leave a corridor along the coast so Egyptian engineers going to the oil fields would not have to pass through Israeli lines. In the Egyptian document: "The agreement should have as an annex a fixed timetable indicating the various phases of the implementation of the agreement bearing in mind that the full implementation should be terminated within three months of the signature of the agreement and that Egypt receives all oil fields within two weeks of the signing of the present agreement."



6. Israeli position:

"The agreement should find its expression in the position of the parties, if and when the Geneva Conference is renewed. The intention of the parties expressed in the agreement, generally and in its detailed provisions, has to find its continued effect in the approaches and attitudes taken in Geneva, in a way to be agreed upon."

Egyptian position:

-- "Nothing in this agreement precludes the reconvening of the Geneva Conference which is to take place at the earliest possible date with the participation of all the parties concerned for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

The parties agreed that no just and durable peace in the Middle East could be achieved without the participation of the Palestinians."



7. Israeli position:

The question of the lines will be developed subsequently, after the consideration and discussion of the six points mentioned above and on their basis.

Egyptian position:

- "The agreement should include total withdrawal of Israeli forces to the east of the passes and from all the oilfields including the town of El Tor."
- "The new lines will be drawn on the following basis:
 - a) The Israeli forces will withdraw from their present line to a new line east of the passes.
 - b) The Egyptian forces will move up to the western entrance of the passes.
 - c) The area between the Egyptian line and the Israeli line will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed.
 - d) The area between the new Israeli line and a line 10 kilometers to the east of it will be limited in armament and forces.
 - e) The area between the new Egyptian line and a line 10 kilometers to the west of it will be limited in armament and forces." (Sadat at an early point said he might settle for the present Israeli line if Israel does not hold the eastern end of the passes.)"
- (The Egyptians have heard the idea that all the area evacuated would be under Egyptian civil administration.)



Desirous to reach ultimately the final and just peaceful settlement prescribed by Security Council Resolution 338 and as a significant step towards that end, Egypt and Israel agree to conclude the following disengagement agreement: 40

1- The agreement should include total withdrawal of Israeli forces to the east of the passes and from all the oilfields including the town of El Tor.

2- The new lines will be drawn on the following basis:

a) The Israeli forces will withdraw from their present line to a new line east of the passes;


b) The Egyptian forces will move up to the western entrance of the passes;

c) The area between the Egyptian line and the Israeli line will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed;

d) The area between the new Israeli line and a line 10 kilometers to the east of it will be limited in armament and forces;

e) The area between the new Egyptian line and a line 10 kilometers to the west of it will be limited in armament and forces.

3- Israel and Egypt would be prepared to give a formal assurance in writing to the U.S. Government of their intention not to undertake military or paramilitary operations for the duration of this agreement and as long as the process for reaching a just and durable peace is continuing in accordance with the letter and the spirit of Security Council Resolution 338 and other relevant UN resolutions.




ALTERNATE PARAGRAPH THREE

3- Israel and Egypt would be prepared to give a formal assurance in writing to the U.S. Government of their intention not to resort to the use of force for the duration of this agreement and as long as the process for reaching a just and durable peace is continuing in accordance with the letter and the spirit of Security Council Resolution 338 and other relevant UN resolutions.

ALTERNATE PARAGRAPH FOUR

4- Israel should undertake not to resort to the use of force against Syria; in the event that this undertaking is violated by Israel, Egypt will fulfill its obligations towards Syria.



4- Israel should undertake not to initiate military or paramilitary operations against Syria; in the event that this undertaking is violated by Israel, Egypt will fulfill its obligations towards Syria.

5- Nothing in this agreement would prevent Egypt from exercising its right to self-defence under article 51 of the Charter.

6- The President of the U.S. is expected to give his assurances to President Sadat that the U.S. will actively exert their efforts in order that a further disengagement between Syria and Israel takes place before the middle of 1975.

7- The United Nations Emergency Force will continue in its functions as long as the efforts towards a just and peaceful settlement are proceeding and, towards that end, its mandate will be extended annually.

8- The two parties will cooperate with the UNEF Chief of Staff and agree that their military representatives meet with him if necessary in the zone of disengagement to discuss problems arising from the implementation of this agreement.

9- The Israeli withdrawal will be implemented in such a manner as to indicate the willingness of the Israelis to demonstrate their desire for peace, namely that no roads or installations

or equipment of the oilfields be destroyed or transferred from their present location either to Israel or the remaining occupied territories.

10- The agreement should have as an annex a fixed time-table indicating the various phases of the implementation of the agreement bearing in mind that the full implementation should be terminated within three months of the signature of the agreement and that Egypt receives all oilfields within two weeks of the signing of the present agreement.

11- Nothing in this agreement precludes the reconvening of the Geneva Conference which is to take place at the earliest possible date with the participation of all the parties concerned for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

12- The parties agreed that no just and durable peace in the Middle East could be achieved without the participation of the Palestinians.

13- This agreement is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement.



PROPOSED MAIN ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

(1) Agreement to stand on its own two feet

(1) The agreement will be bi-lateral between Egypt and Israel. It is not linked to an agreement with other Arab countries and does not create a pattern for other discussions or settlements. Neither are there any prior conditions attached to its acceptance.


The proposed agreement is not the final settlement between Egypt and Israel, but further settlements are not an element or an implied condition to the execution and continued validity of this agreement until superseded by a new agreement.

(2) Progress towards peace

The approach to peace and the further development of elements of peaceful relations, will find its expression in suitable formulation and in concrete and practical arrangements.

It is proposed that the agreement refer to its declared aim of the furtherance of peace between the parties and to its being a significant step towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace between Egypt and Israel.

Furthermore, the concrete arrangements based on the agreement which will express and reflect this progress towards peace will, inter alia, be as follows :



- (a) Open bridges for tourists, family visits, goods etc.
- (b) Non-restriction on ships, planes or travellers because of call or visit to the territory of the other party.
- (c) Abstention from hostile propaganda.
- (d) Suspension of economic warfare and boycott practices.
- (e) Cessation of anti-Israel diplomatic pressures in third countries and international bodies.
- (f) Freedom of navigation on high seas, straits and waterways and freedom of flight over them.
- (g) Right of passage through the Canal.
- (h) Establishment of Joint Committees with supervision teams to oversee execution of agreement.

(3) Non-use of force

The agreement will express the resolve of the parties to refrain from any further threat or use of force against each other and the decision to settle all disputes between themselves by negotiations and other peaceful means. The document will contain the undertaking of the renunciation of belligerency, clearly and in its appropriate legal wording. The agreement will be made public.

Both parties will add a formal guarantee that they will not participate, directly or indirectly, in any hostilities between the other party and any other state or forces or provide assistance of any kind to states or forces involved in such hostilities.

(4) Arrangements on the ground

- (a) The area evacuated by Israel will be established as a buffer zone between the forces.
- (b) A defined area of limited armaments and forces east of the new line will be established.
- (c) The present area of limited armaments and forces west of Line A, established by the agreement of January 1974, remains unchanged.




- 2 -
- (d) Supervision will be carried out by the UN and by the Joint Committees and Supervision teams established (see 2(n)).
 - (e) Alert systems of each party in the vacated zone to prevent surprise attack is proposed.
 - (f) There will be aerial reconnaissance missions by aircraft of both sides.
 - (g) The arrangements will be contained in a Protocol attached to the agreement.

(5) Duration

- (a) The agreement will be in force until superseded by a new agreement; no time-limit to the present agreement will be set.
- (b) Egypt will give an undertaking via the USG that it will not demand a new agreement or a further withdrawal for an agreed period.
- (c) The mandate of the supervisory organ will be for an indefinite period.
- (d) There will be an agreed timetable for the implementation of the agreement. Stage one will be a preparatory one.

(6) Relation to Geneva

The agreement should find its expression in the position of the parties, if and when the Geneva Conference is renewed. The intention of the parties expressed in the agreement, generally and in its detailed provisions, has to find its continued effect in the approaches and attitudes taken in Geneva, in a way to be agreed upon.



(7) Lines

The question of the lines will be developed subsequently, after the consideration and discussion of the six points mentioned above and on their basis.

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57

3/14

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY

Mr. Secretary:

1. In addition to the negotiating checklist Joe did for you, the attached covers a couple of other issues you will want to cover.
2. Underneath is a detailed comparison point-by-point of the Israeli and Egyptian positions. This is a working paper which may be useful at some point.

Hal Saunders

56

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017117

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL List

RECEIVER'S NAME Henry Kissinger

RECEIVER'S TITLE Secretary

TITLE Related Issues

CREATION DATE 03/14/1975

VOLUME 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033100040

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. KISSINGER
REPORTS ON USSR, CHINA, AND MIDDLE EAST
DISCUSSIONS

BOX NUMBER 3

FOLDER TITLE March 7-22, 1975 - Kissinger's Trip -
Vol. I (7)

DATE WITHDRAWN 10/03/2003

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST HJR

3/14

56

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

1. Israeli position:

"The agreement will be bi-lateral between Egypt and Israel. It is not linked to an agreement with other Arab countries and does not create a pattern for other discussions or settlements. Neither are there any prior conditions attached to its acceptance.

The proposed agreement is not the final settlement between Egypt and Israel, but further settlements are not an element or an implied condition to the execution and continued validity of this agreement until superseded by a new agreement."

Egyptian position:

- The U.S. view is that this subject is best handled by not mentioning any relationship between this and other agreements. The Egyptians still have not suggested any formal linkage in the agreement itself.
- However, "The President of the U.S. is expected to give his assurances to President Sadat that the U.S. will actively exert their efforts in order that a further disengagement between Syria and Israel takes place before the middle of 1975."

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DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, 50 USC 552
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
DATE 9/25/03



Israeli position

"The approach to peace and the further development of elements of peaceful relations will find its expression in suitable formulation and in concrete and practical arrangements.

It is proposed that the agreement refer to its declared aim of the furtherance of peace between the parties and to its being a significant step towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace between Egypt and Israel.

Furthermore, the concrete arrangements based on the agreement which will express and reflect this progress towards peace will, inter alia, be as described below."

Egyptian position:

There can be a preamble statement in the agreement: "Desirous to reach ultimately the final and just peaceful settlement prescribed by Security Council Resolution 338 as a significant step towards that end, Egypt and Israel agree to conclude the following disengagement agreement."

"This agreement is not intended by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement."

On the concrete measures which Israeli proposes:

(a) On movement of people: Sadat said that movement of people would be difficult and that it should not be mentioned in the agreement. When said there could be freedom of movement for Egyptians between Egypt proper, the Sinai and Gaza if arranged under the UN.

(b) On restriction of travelers, ships, planes: The Egyptians are not yet prepared to have ships or planes go from one country to the other but would allow travelers who had been in Israel to come to Cairo on the same passport.

(c) Abstention from hostile propaganda: In general



Sadat is prepared to tone down hostile propaganda "willingly." Voice of Palestine could be controlled "little by little."

- (d) Suspension of economic warfare and boycott: This has to be done discreetly and selectively for U.S. companies as stated in Fahmy's initial ideas.
- (e) Cessation of anti-Israel diplomatic pressures: Egypt feels its example may cause African states to improve relations with Israel.
- (f) Freedom of navigation in straits: We already have an Egyptian letter on the Bab al-Mandab from last January. Sadat reconfirmed this commitment.
- (g) Right of passage through the Canal: (1) Egypt has already agreed to Israeli passage in the context of a final peace. (2) Egypt would respect its commitment to allow the passage of Israeli cargo through the Suez Canal when the Canal is opened after this agreement. (3) Crews of all ships passing through the Canal would transit without discrimination on the basis of nationality but they cannot be 100% Israeli.
- (h) Joint Committees: A Committee can be established under the UN to discuss violations. The relationship to UNEF's inspection responsibilities still has to be worked out. In their new document, the Egyptians have cut this back. See 4(d) below.

-- The Egyptians would add: "The Israeli withdrawal will be implemented in such a manner as to indicate the willingness of the Israelis to demonstrate their desire for peace, namely that no roads or installations or equipment of the oilfields be destroyed or transferred from their present location either to Israel or the remaining occupied territories."



3. Israeli position:

"The agreement will express the resolve of the parties to refrain from any further threat or use of force against each other and the decision to settle all disputes between themselves by negotiations and other peaceful means. The document will contain the undertaking of the renunciation of belligerency, clearly and in its appropriate legal wording. The agreement will be made public.

"Both parties will add a formal guarantee that they will not participate, directly or indirectly, in any hostilities between the other party and any other state or forces or provide assistance of any kind to states or forces involved in such hostilities."

Egyptian position:

--In conversation Sadat said the agreement could include a statement that disputes between Egypt and Israel will be settled through the negotiating process leading toward a just and lasting peace as long as efforts to achieve peace continue. (Sadat could do this in the context of Egyptian-Israeli negotiations, but not indefinitely. Syria must be considered.) Sadat said that the Egyptian formulations mean that in the future, no matter what happens (except an attack on Syria) there should be no resort to force and this "will be non-belligerency".

--The preferred Egyptian formulation:

"Israel and Egypt would be prepared to give a formal assurance in writing to the US Government of their intention not to undertake military or paramilitary operations for the duration of this agreement and as long as the process for reaching a just and durable peace is continuing in accordance with the letter and the spirit of Security Council Resolution 338 and other relevant UN resolutions.

"Israel should undertake not to initiate military or paramilitary operations against Syria; in the event that this undertaking is violated by Israel, Egypt will fulfill its obligations toward Syria.



"Nothing in this agreement would prevent Egypt from exercising its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter."

--The alternate Egyptian formulation:

"Israel and Egypt would be prepared to give a formal assurance in writing to the US Government of their intention not to resort to the use of force for the duration of this agreement and as long as the process for reaching a just and durable peace is continuing in accordance with the letter and the spirit of Security Council Resolution 338 and other relevant UN resolutions.

"Israel should undertake not to resort to the use of force against Syria; in the event that this undertaking is violated by Israel, Egypt will fulfill its obligations towards Syria."




4. Israeli position:

- "(a) The area evacuated by Israel will be established as a buffer zone between the forces.
- (b) A defined area of limited armaments and forces east of the new line will be established.
- (c) The present area of limited armaments and forces west of Line A, established by the agreement of January, 1974, remains unchanged.
- (d) Supervision will be carried out by the UN and by the Joint Committees and Supervision teams established (see 2(h)).
- (e) Alert systems of each party in the vacated zone to prevent surprise attack is proposed.
- (f) There will be aerial reconnaissance missions by aircraft of both sides.
- (g) The arrangements will be contained in a Protocol attached to the agreement."

Egyptian position:

- (a) The Egyptians agree to a buffer zone between the forces but want to move their forces forward past the present Israeli line into the Western end of the passes. (Gamasy estimated this at 10 kms.)
- (b) Egypt proposes a zone 10 kms. deep to the east of the now Israeli line.
- (c) Egypt proposes a zone 10 kms. deep west of its now line. This means a significant change in the present zone west of Line A and would allow for a substantial increase in Egyptian forces east of the Canal.
- (d) UNEF will supervise the buffer zone. In conversation, Sadat said that a Commission under the UN consisting of Israeli, Egyptian and UN personnel could discuss alleged violations (but not move around). Responsibilities need to be discussed further. In their document:



"The two parties will cooperate with the UNEF Chief of Staff and agree that their military representatives meet with him if necessary in the zone of disengagement to discuss problems arising from the implementation of this agreement."

(e) Egypt has rejected the idea of an "alert system" for each side in the buffer zone.

(f) Egypt is considering the question of aerial reconnaissance over the buffer zone and seems favorable to allowing it for both Egypt and Israel over a part (not all) of the buffer zone. Sadat asked why the US cannot continue doing this.

(g) There is no objection to a separate Protocol.



5. Israeli position:

"(a) The agreement will be in force until superseded by a new agreement; no time limit to the present agreement will be set.

(b) Egypt will give an undertaking via the USG that it will not demand a new agreement or a further withdrawal for an agreed period.

(c) The mandate of the supervisory organ will be for an indefinite period.

(d) There will be an agreed timetable for the implementation of the agreement. Stage one will be a preparatory one."

Egyptian position:

(a) Duration of the agreement: still under discussion but Sadat indicated that in principle -- depending upon the phraseology -- he could accept the agreement remaining in force until superseded by a new agreement.

(b) The idea that Egypt will not demand a further withdrawal for an agreed period: still under consideration.

(c) On UNEF: "The United Nations Emergency Force will continue in its function as long as the efforts towards a just and peaceful settlement are proceeding and, towards that end, its mandate will be extended annually."

(d) On implementation: Sadat felt that evacuation of the oil fields and the passes could take place in separate stages of an agreed timetable. Gamasy urged that there be some Israeli pullback in the north to leave a corridor along the coast so Egyptian engineers going to the oil fields would not have to pass through Israeli lines. In the Egyptian document: "The agreement should have as an annex a fixed timetable indicating the various phases of the implementation of the agreement bearing in mind that the full implementation should be terminated within three months of the signature of the agreement and that Egypt receives all oil fields within two weeks of the signing of the present agreement."



6. Israeli position:

"The agreement should find its expression in the position of the parties, if and when the Geneva Conference is renewed. The intention of the parties expressed in the agreement, generally and in its detailed provisions, has to find its continued effect in the approaches and attitudes taken in Geneva, in a way to be agreed upon."

Egyptian position:

-- "Nothing in this agreement precludes the reconvening of the Geneva Conference which is to take place at the earliest possible date with the participation of all the parties concerned for the purpose of reaching a peaceful settlement of the Middle East problem in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

The parties agreed that no just and durable peace in the Middle East could be achieved without the participation of the Palestinians."



~~SECRET/NODIS~~

7. Israeli position:

The question of the lines will be developed subsequently, after the consideration and discussion of the six points mentioned above and on their basis.

Egyptian position:

- "The agreement should include total withdrawal of Israeli forces to the east of the passes and from all the oilfields including the town of El Tor."
- "The new lines will be drawn on the following basis:
 - a) The Israeli forces will withdraw from their present line to a new line east of the passes.
 - b) The Egyptian forces will move up to the western entrance of the passes.
 - c) The area between the Egyptian line and the Israeli line will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed.
 - d) The area between the new Israeli line and a line 10 kilometers to the east of it will be limited in armament and forces.
 - e) The area between the new Egyptian line and a line 10 kilometers to the west of it will be limited in armament and forces." (Sadat at an early point said he might settle for the present Israeli line if Israel does not hold the eastern end of the passes.)"
- (The Egyptians have heard the idea that all the area evacuated would be under Egyptian civil administration.)

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