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folder continue from the  
previous folder.**

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1A

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel  
 Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and  
 Minister of Foreign Affairs  
 Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense  
 Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States  
 Lt. General Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff  
 Mordechai Gazit, Director General, Prime  
 Minister's Office  
 Avraham Kidron, Director General, Ministry  
 of Foreign Affairs  
 Eli Mizrahi, Deputy Director, Prime  
 Minister's Office  
 Brig. Gen. Ephraim Paron, Military Secretary  
 to the Prime Minister  
 Col. Aryeh Bar-On, ADC to Minister Peres

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
 and Assistant to the President for  
 National Security Affairs  
 Amb. Kenneth Keating, Ambassador to Israel  
 Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for  
 Political Affairs  
 Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary  
 of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs  
 Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary  
 of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs  
 Robert B. Oakley, NSC Staff  
 Amb. Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the  
 Secretary for Press Relations  
 Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PWR*

DECLASSIFIED  
 E.O. 12958, APR. 2, 1981  
 State Dept Review  
 HQ MEMO 11/24/99, BY SP-6 BTB/CLB/ELG/SF 9/16/03  
 BY *HR* 9/24/03

DATE AND TIME:

Wednesday, March 12, 1975  
10:13 a.m. - 12:15 p.m.

PLACE:

Prime Minister's Office  
Jerusalem



[Photographers were admitted briefly, and then departed]

CLASSIFIED BY HENRY A. KISSINGER  
 EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
 SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (B) (1, 3)  
 AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

~~SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

Rabin: Well?

Kissinger: Let me make a suggestion about the letter [Israeli draft of March 11, Tab A], which on reflection we still think is as good as before. One point is stylistic. You say "exhaust the prospect of a settlement." Isn't that too complicated? Wouldn't "achieve a settlement" be better?

Rabin: On English, we'll accept your advice.

Kissinger: And would you want to consider adding "and thereby provide momentum towards peace for the region as a whole?" Or "leadership for peace." It appeals to his vanity.

Allon: It's good for us, too.

Kissinger: "And the danger of war is over." It would be better to say something like "we are entering a new era in which problems between our two countries will be settled by peaceful means."

Allon: "Or political means."

Kissinger: "Lengthier and inferior lines." But that one isn't so important. The other one I would recommend. But my judgment of the letter even without these changes is psychologically useful.

Rabin: "Only by peaceful means."

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: "Only."

Kissinger: It's a little less blunt but makes the point.

Allon: The point about the area is good. It shows it's not just Egypt and no more.

Kissinger: It's helpful to him.

Rabin: Anything new about Russia's efforts?

Kissinger: I've asked for an assessment. They've sent a letter about the date for the summit of the European Security Conference. We suggested July 15 and they June 30. This is usually a matter for the political directors' level. They sent a letter which is really insolvent, drawing Ford and Brezhnev into it.



We would certainly yield on it since the Europeans will sell out.

And on the SALT talks, the tone is wrong. They've put forward proposals which could lead to a rapid settlement or to a stalemate. They are poised in such a way they could go either way. They say "inform Washington that the range of things is unacceptable." The tone is wrong. And sending Vinogradov to the area without telling us. And strangely enough, that they're not pressing us on a date to see Gromyko. They've accepted it, but usually they would be calling three times a day.

Dinitz: Is Dobrynin back?

Kissinger: He is in Moscow for 2-1/2 months.

I think it's triggered by the trade bill but it's now beyond that -- the perceived weakness of our executive authority.

Rabin: Also the weakness of their structure?

Kissinger: Yes.

Rabin: Due to his alleged illness.


Kissinger: I saw Gromyko in Geneva after the Wilson visit, and he said Brezhnev would be out of view for four weeks. It's very unusual.

I told him we had evidence of a leadership crisis in the Kremlin. He said how? I said, "I read there was criticism in the Soviet press of a man traveling in the Middle East giving sleeping pills, and since we don't attack each other it must have meant you."

I don't know what's going on but it's a strange performance.

Allon: Three European leaders who met recently with Brezhnev -- Wilson, Giscard, and Schmidt -- all said he was sick and would be out in a year. It's from Dublin, in the papers.

Kissinger: They have no better way to know than we do. He works in spurts. He can do two spurts a day, then he needs 2-3 hours rest. There are schools of thought that he's getting radiation treatment; there is a school of thought that says it's all a dental problem. All agree he's out of action since December. It either paralyzes the government if he's in charge, or it sets off maneuvering by others. Or both. It is true there is a leadership problem, but there is also a change of policy towards the United States.



Peres: Also, Mao -- we hear he's deteriorating. Does he look fit?

Kissinger: He also needs two people to help him up, so he has had strokes. And he forms words with difficulty. Maybe we see him in his one lucid hour. The interesting thing is, reading the transcript afterward he's more impressive than the actual conversation. Usually it's the other way around.

The first meeting with Nixon and Mao, I thought it was the usual heads-of-government meeting -- but when I read it a week later he had covered every theme like a Wagner overture, so every Chinese had something to refer to. And he did it as if each point were spontaneous. Like deGaulle.

The last time I saw him, he spent 3-1/2 hours covering the whole international situation -- Iran, the whole southern rim. That's why, for him, what we're doing to Turkey will be devastating.

Allon: Why does he say things about us?

Kissinger: I've never heard him say anything anti-Israel.

Peres: He thinks we belong to the United States and the Soviet Union -- you give us arms and they give us people.

Kissinger: His main concern was the Soviet Union. Strauss said he was fit.

There is no one else in the world who can do this. And on a global basis.

Allon: Maybe the Secretary of State. [Laughter] Let me...

Rabin: According to the agenda....

Sisco: I notice a split in the Israeli delegation!

Rabin: And tomorrow a "senior American official" will describe it to the press, the Congress....

Kissinger: I want to sum up my understanding of the paper [Israeli memorandum of March 11, Tab B]. My understanding is I can discuss it as my impression of Israeli thinking, not hand over the paper. And second, that I present it as ideas for consideration, rather than as all-out demands. Also, I don't consider the language of these points as the language that will be incorporated into the agreement. These are thoughts, the substance of

which you want to achieve. Let me go through the points; it won't take very long.

On point 1, the agreement to stand on its own feet. I think we are so far in the best of all possible positions. Sadat has not raised the linkage, and I don't think I should. If we can achieve silence on it, in the agreement, and it's never raised... If there is any linkage proposal by him, then we face a specific language problem when we have to discuss between ourselves.

Rabin: Better that way.

Kissinger: Point 2: Progress towards peace. The general point, that this represents a step toward peace, I think is quite attainable. All the general points you have, I think with good drafting we could incorporate. On the specifics I have my view on the attainability of some of them. But let's see what he says.

Your idea about open bridges -- if I can put it in terms of what it gives to Egypt, in a way he might find attractive, maybe. American tourists are less attractive to him than contact between Egyptians. Let me see.

Abstention from hostile propoganda. I think he once said it was possible. Maybe abstention no, but reduction.

Now, [three], non-use of force. As I said yesterday, the first sentence is one thing. An undertaking of the renunciation of belligerency I must tell you is clearly unattainable.

The second paragraph he will certainly not do in an unconditional way. Whether some language can be found on a definition of aggression on the Syrian front it may be difficult to define. You could be triggered into something on the Syrian front, by terrorist attacks.

Rabin: Or a war of attrition.

Kissinger: Or a war of attrition.

Peres: The Syrians could try to take over southern Lebanon.

Rabin: We would have to reach an understanding with the Egyptians that Fatahland is not Syria.

Kissinger: The Egyptians only mentioned Syria.

Peres: Not wording, but as is happening -- the Syrians taking responsibility.



Kissinger: Once it's clear a renunciation of belligerency is unattainable, the way to proceed is by rewriting their point 8.

Rabin: We'll come to it.

Kissinger: That's my idea.

On point 4, arrangements on the ground: The buffer zone idea is achievable. Point (b) is achievable. You should consider the point I made yesterday, whether that zone could be expanded somewhat so he can have something for Gamsay. I think he'll have trouble with Gamasy. The fact that he knew we'd reject the line, from our prior discussion, the fact he let Gamasy do it anyway, is significant.

[Paragraph 5,] Duration: -- an open-ended one is achievable. I'll try out the idea that it's valid until superseded. It sounds to me personally a sensible idea.

Point (d), I said yesterday, he cannot do -- that he won't make a demand for a further agreement. He'll certainly do it at Geneva. The question is, what conclusion will he draw from your refusal?


Paragraph 6: I understand you want some understanding that failure to achieve Egyptian demands at Geneva will not be grounds for breaking the agreement. Let alone the demands of others.

Rabin: What is Geneva except demands for a final agreement and the demands of others?

Kissinger: They cannot say a refusal to seat the PLO or make progress on the West Bank or Syria -- however unhappy they are -- is a reason to break it. And that is how I will explain point 6.

The Egyptians on many occasions now have raised with us to raise with you to allow the Red Crescent to provide relief to Sinai flood victims. I don't know what the considerations are, but it would be a good gesture.

Peres: We've told you. A colonel met with Col. Ayub on missing bodies. We raised the missing bodies; they asked for things and we were ready to consider, except one point about releasing people who killed someone. We think it could be worthwhile, and all we asked was for the missing bodies. We're supposed to have another meeting, but they refused. Then the Red Crescent conveyed the same demands. We thought we were near an agreement. Then the flood came, and we asked, "Why don't you do what



was agreed?" The people can't understand. That's all we ask. The Red Cross, by the way, said we were completely right.

Kissinger: But supposing they're right. That's a reasonable argument.

Can I tell Sadat you'll let food go to the Bedouins in the Sinai and allow the Red Crescent if you'll get the missing bodies?

Rabin, Peres: Yes.

Rabin: More than that: to look at the names he wants released.

Kissinger: The names of their prisoners?

Peres: And we're ready to do it, except for....

Kissinger: Murderers.

Sisco: How many are we talking about?

Peres: Eight.

Kissinger: I think this is very positive.

Rabin: Let's go to the major business.

Kissinger: My suggestion is to do it as two parallel steps. Not as a deal. I'll present it as a deal, but the two sides can do it in parallel. I'll present to him the possibility of your getting back the bodies or your joint looking for them.

Rabin: Both.

Kissinger: Let me make one procedural point. I've had a talk with my colleagues about their impression of the totality of our cable traffic. I've said there is a danger of falling apart, in addition to the danger of not reaching an agreement. I'm much more worried about the Faisal cable than about the Syrians. I think Sadat has tricked Faisal, saying there will be no separate peace agreement, and Faisal thinks this means no separate agreement. Because Faisal is not tricky; he wouldn't say this. He spoke with an explicitness which we did not seek. We didn't send an Ambassador in for this, it was talk on other subjects. He put it as defending us against our detractors. I don't know what he'll do.



So, let me suggest the following: If I can get some reasonable answers from Egypt, that I come back here, that we then begin drafting a paper -- I don't want to present a paper without your approval -- and present it to the Egyptians. We could do it the other way around but I don't want to present an Egyptian paper to you. Because otherwise I don't see how we can move this thing to a concrete stage. Of course it depends on the answers we get. So we should think of reducing it to a document. I could get some of my people to start drafting, with Gazit or whomever, after the next shuttle.

My present plan is to come here Friday morning -- then leave for Syria Saturday morning. If this doesn't offend your religious people.

Dinitz: If there is no meeting Friday night.

Kissinger: No, a meeting Friday during the day. Then back to Aswan Monday, and during that week we have to do something rapid.

Rabin: First, I would like to make it clear this is the Israeli position, what we put in the paper. The way you put it to them is a tactical matter. The idea is to come back with a clear view of what is their contribution to the business. To today I'd say they've moved very little. They get a lot of territories. To get something for nothing is very easy. I see no vision or courage on the part of Sadat. I hope to see something that will to me be worthwhile to make an agreement. To today I see no point in going to the Cabinet and asking for what we see now.

I can be more specific.

Point one we discussed.

Point two: If the whole purpose of the exercise is to give Sadat territory so in a few months he can blow it up again, it is better to have this war even earlier from the present line. So there should be evidence of moves toward peace in the wording and in the execution. At least this is the explanation I can give to myself of why we're giving back territory.

On the question of nonuse of force, again, if we make a bigger or a greater deal, there must be something public that commits Egypt in a clear way that there will be no use of force.



Kissinger: What do you consider wrong with Point 8, or 7?

Rabin: Because it is to the U.S., not Israel; it's secret, not public, and the formulation. He has to do better.

Kissinger: The paper it's printed on is all right?

Mr. Prime Minister, precision of thought is not an Egyptian characteristic. I don't know how they could get five divisions to the Canal at the same moment.

Rabin: It was very well prepared.

Kissinger: I am surprised. My major point is this: If there are any elements in that that could be salvaged, I believe it's a better way to work not to say "You have to do better."

Rabin: The problem is we're not negotiating directly with the Egyptians.

Kissinger: That is the only thing preventing a war [Laughter]. My point is: To say to Sadat that the point is all right except it should be public and to Israel, that's one thing. If I say it should be changed, I have to say in what way.

I understand the need to be public. To whom it is made -- that's an intellectual problem.

Allon: While we are getting the picture of what they think, not only from what you tell us -- which we trust -- but also from what he says publicly and our intelligence of his intentions.

You're telling us what is attainable and what is not. I assume you are telling him what is attainable and what is not.

Kissinger: Certainly.

Allon: So the picture should be clear about the Israeli side. Until now, the authority the Israeli negotiating team has is the 30-50 kilometers, not including the passes and the oil fields. It is true that occasional voices can be heard saying Israel would consider withdrawing even as far as the passes



and oil fields in exchange for an end of belligerency. So maybe Sadat has these already in his pocket; he is a good negotiator. It looks like the only issue to be negotiated is the nature of Egypt's return. This is wrong, not only formally wrong but he shouldn't take it for granted.

Kissinger: Sadat is not in any confusion. But I think Fahmy may believe that. Because it makes his life easier.

Allon: The depth of Israeli withdrawal, we have told you often, depends on what we get in return. There were some Cabinet Ministers who said yesterday, "Why don't we go back to the earlier idea -- give less territory if we get less in return and then negotiate a third step later?" You may have seen in the press.

Kissinger: I saw that.


Allon: Non-belligerency becomes really a principle; it gets into the minds of people. Maybe he will convince us that legally this demand cannot be attained because there is not yet an end of the war. But if it can be at least, if not an end of the war, then a renunciation of war as a means to settle disputes, then that is important.

Kissinger: I'm making a pettier point than you are. I am saying if we could use any part of his point, that is better than scrapping his point. It's better psychologically.

Rabin: You can use one element of his point -- the relation with Syria.

Let me make a point. I believe we are in good shape, because we managed to create the appearance vis-a-vis the Arabs and the world -- by what I have said in Parliament and publicly -- that the issue is not the territory but their willingness to move towards peace. For the first time since '67 this is the issue. If it fails, we will be in good shape. They are on the spot. The Egyptians have to give an answer: What are they willing to do? We will have our problems in drafting. But I can't recall a moment when we are in a position like this from a political point of view and public relations.

Kissinger: I agree with you. It has been very skillfully handled.



Let me say though -- for once I am the one making the pettier argument. You are making a strategic point. We are dealing with a man who will be alone in a room, without staff. He can say yes or no, but he can only say yes or no if we have a way to formulate it.

On the question of assurances, let me make a substantive point. An assurance that is public to the United States may be better than an assurance to you.

Rabin: There could be elements of both.

Kissinger: Right. If the agreement said: "Egypt will give an assurance to the United States . . ." and if it's public.

Allon: We need an assurance that they will not go to war.

Kissinger: One could make a good case that a public statement that Egypt had given an assurance to the U. S. that it renounces force . . .

Rabin: That is not what I meant. There should be some element of assurance to the U.S.

Peres: To an objective observer, on the Egyptian side the issue is the geographic view; to us it is the renunciation of force. The state of belligerency is a state; the use of force is just something that can happen once in a while.

The Prime Minister said to ABC that he overcame the geographic obstacle. The difference between the present situation and a new agreement is the difference between standing on one leg and standing on two legs: the political leg as well as the military leg. From this point of view, the changes the Prime Minister made on the geographic leg was a real breakthrough.

Kissinger: There is no chance. I've been talking nonbelligerency with him for six months; this isn't the first time I've raised it.

You are tactically in a good position for the breakup of these negotiations. The difference between this and not being in a good position is a matter of a few months -- the pressures will build up again.

Rabin: I know.



Kissinger: Why do we want the U.S. in a dominant position in the Middle East? Not because of Geneva or the Europeans. But if we are out of the process and the theatre has to end, there will be a constant erosion of the American position. If the Arabs are stupid, they will turn against the U.S. Maybe a debate will start on the '67 borders, that we didn't press you hard enough. The point that steps are better will be eroded. The point is that there will be an erosion of the American ability to support you. I don't feel comfortable; I don't tell you you are all right. My worry is that we will be in a worse position for the struggle that will follow.

That is the real reason. It may not be a reason you can give publicly. But it does not change the strategic problem that in my view makes this agreement extremely desirable, even if you have achieved a good tactical position for failing.

I'm not saying this critically.

Allon: Tell Sadat we couldn't agree to a line without knowing . . . .

Kissinger: Let me say: if a tremendous brawl starts between Egypt and Syria, that's no minor achievement.

I don't say it creates a new strategic situation; it allows us to maintain our position.

Rabin: Go there, and bring back the closest you can get.

Kissinger: All right.

Rabin: Now you are asking: "You can't get it; lower your price."

Kissinger: That's a fair point.

My minor point is to give me enough latitude to give the formulations as my own, working with Fahmy.

Rabin: Work with them and give us his position.

Kissinger: All right. I understand.

Allon: We talked about the use of force and duration. This is of utmost importance.



Kissinger: Every Cabinet officer specializes in one point. [Laughter]

Allon: The renewal of the mandate for the United Nations Emergency Force is a counterproductive proposal, because what we suffer every six months we will have every twelve months. The idea that the Security Council decides doesn't avoid trouble, because of the Soviets, and the Chinese won't always keep aloof from the Middle East.

He wants to make assurances through you and not to us. Maybe we can do the same in reverse.

Take the Cyprus case. You created a voluntary fund so it doesn't depend on the budget.

Kissinger: It makes a lot of difference whether Egypt refuses to renew a force on their own territory, which everyone will understand. It is another thing for the Soviet Union to veto a force that Egypt and Israel agree to. That is starting a Middle East crisis. It is one thing to back the Arabs starting a war. If the Soviet Union wants to start a crisis, there are lots of ways it could do it.

I've gone through this with him. I don't think it is attainable.

Allon: If it is to be renewed automatically, why can't he do it for a longer period? Why only one year?


Sisco: If it's a commitment to a year, on the basis of the two sides agreeing, it will be more difficult for the Soviet Union to go in the face of it. If it's left unlimited, it will allow the Soviet Union and the Arabs to do what they do now. If you ever had to move outside the framework of the Security Council to have a fund, it would make it more difficult for the Soviets.

Dinitz: What if the Egyptians don't renew it in a year?

Sisco: It's in the agreement.

Kissinger: I've told Sadat that I interpret that point as meaning Egypt is committed to renew it every year. We can reformulate it to make that clear.

Rabin: It should be like UNFICYP; therefore, no veto right for anybody.



Allon: There is no time limit.

Kissinger: You are raising points we have told you hundreds of times will not be settled. There is not a chance of that being accepted.

Allon: Only one year is not enough.

Kissinger: It's not one year; the Egyptians agree to renew it every year. The only risk is the Soviet veto.

Sisco: The Cyprus force is voluntary but it has not obviated the need for a meeting every six months.

Allon: No one can veto it.

Sisco: That's not so. That doesn't prevent the Security Council from discussing it.

Kissinger: I'll raise it. It's my judgment that it's totally impossible.

Allon: This item is worth trying again.

Kissinger: I agree.

Allon: You will get it. I am sure. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Could I have the briefing?

Gur: [Gets up to the map on the wall:] We will start with Egyptian ground forces. They have about nine divisions. Since the last war, they had permanently about five or six of them along the Canal and the others near Cairo. There has been a reorganization in the last two months, and brought almost everybody to a close area to the Canal. There are eight to almost nine divisions to the area near the Canal and 50 kilometers west, of which five divisions are right on the Canal, and three to four are within 50 kilometers. Mechanized or armored divisions.

Kissinger: Offensively deployed?

Gur: I'll get to that.



They have fortified the Canal and brought in new elements. Now, with the passages along the Canal -- 160 of them, plus 14 bridges, they can build between a half hour and one and a half hours. There are seven permanent bridges. They can do it in almost nothing, and they train in crossing the Canal almost daily.

On top of that fortification, that includes anti-tank trenches, many mines, they also have here at least 20 ready positions for anti-aircraft missiles which gives the best sign of offensive thought. Because they have enough positions on the west side to defend the forces on the east and west side of the Canal. So if they have those positions, it means they have the intention of crossing the Canal with armored and mechanized divisions; at that point they would have to have their anti-aircraft ready. It would give them good cover to the middle area of the passes.

Now they have almost everything they need. Commando units are very close to the area.

Kissinger: What is your judgement of their ability to launch an offensive?

Gur: It is better to judge dispositions, not intentions.

About their Air Force. In the last [Soviet-Egyptian] agreement, they are getting more than 60 new planes -- mostly offensive planes. The MIG-23 and Sukhoi are bombers. The MIG-21's are interceptors.

Kissinger: He told me half of the 23's were fighters he didn't want.


Gur: So the Air Force is a lot stronger.

Peres: A lot of missiles.

Gur: In the last shipment, they got a lot of anti-tank and anti-air missiles and spare parts. That we can see quickly in the field, because the units are suddenly in operation. There is readiness at the top.

The Navy: Ships come from the Mediterranean now. All the vessels there are recently coming from the Mediterranean.

So in our assessment, they have all the units ready, full in men and equipment, and in the area of possible battle.



What are their possibilities? They could take the UN area, and most of the area up to the passes. Politically that is enough. They assume they can do it. That's the key thing. We want to prevent it.

Kissinger: My estimate is the probability of your being across the Canal is greater than their being in the passes.

Gur: We want to prevent. How it starts is one thing; where it ends up is another.

Kissinger: Your estimate is their aim is to get to the middle of the passes.

Gur: To be sure in an operation, Gamasy would be in difficulty to suggest something bigger. The commandoes are there.

Kissinger: But they won't be able to stay there?

Gur: That's a different matter.

Kissinger: The oil fields are out of reach?

Gur: That's a different operation.

They could hold Abu Rudeis by commandos long enough for political results. But not long. We think the main aim would be to achieve political things. They have enough commandos to think they can do it in the Abu Rudeis area.


So, the main point is, in the last two months the whole disposition is different.

In the Golan, we cannot show any change in the last two months.

Kissinger: Excuse me. Simply because he raised it. He makes almost the same arguments about your disposition in the Sinai. He says you have 12 regiments so disposed that you can seize the Canal without any difficulty.

Gur: That is true.

Kissinger: He says 12 regiments.



Rabin: That's the equivalent to a brigade. About 4,000 men.

Kissinger: So he exaggerates a little bit.

Gur: To have 12 regiments, our reserves would have to serve four months.

Kissinger: What is it now?

Gur: 60 to 70 days.

Peres: And we have a lot of land to protect.

Kissinger: I get the point. So you have the capability to attack by surprise.

Let me ask: Would you consider some thinning out, to eliminate the surprise capability, if he removes some back from the Canal?

Peres: West of the Canal?

Kissinger: Yes. To remove the surprise capability of both sides.

Rabin: We have two thinning-out lines already, with Egypt and Syria.

Kissinger: I could say to him I have the impression if he is really worried about an Israeli surprise attack, you are willing to do that.

Peres: The answer is yes.

Kissinger: I don't need detailed proposals, just to say you are willing.

Peres: The answer is yes.

Gur: If he says we have the capability to surprise attack, we have it.

There are some things better left undone, but be prepared to do it.

Kissinger: My estimate is he won't make a surprise attack, unless things get desperate. I think he's had a bellyfull of war with Israel.

I think he will preempt politically if he thinks it's going to fail. It is better to kick over the negotiation than to enter a separate negotiation that then fails because of the terms. He will do something that is

equivalent to kicking out the advisers.

Sisco: Could he hold the passes long enough to achieve political objectives?

Gur: We were wrong in the assessment once. His advisers could advise him and it would be hard for anyone to say they can't do it. That's the important thing.

Kissinger: I think the worry is the threat of war.

Gur: What occurs to me is: If he starts that and we mobilize some of our forces, then he can't achieve those goals.

Kissinger: My assessment is he would start a very belligerent political war -- generating pressures in Europe, etc. And since our intellectuals have very fertile political minds.....then maybe go to war later. He would not go to war right away but create a way psychosis.

Gur: His military people would object to it because then to achieve their military goals would not be possible.

Rabin: But they keep you mobilized, keep you mobilized.

Gur: But for the military people, it will be difficult. Surprise will be difficult.

Rabin: The best from Israel's point of view is how to start a war.

Gur: Gamasy's orders to his army include plans for a war of attrition.

Kissinger: A more likely eventuality is the war danger over an extended period of time, rather than a surprise attack. Don't rely on my judgment.

Can we go to Syria?

Gur: There is no change in the Syrian disposition. And no violations of agreement in any considerable matter. In the second line, less than they are permitted.

There are two armored divisions in camps, one north of Damascus and one in Damascus. What they did is fortify the area very thoroughly, which is understandable.



What we can show is their offensive operations in training, which is very above what they did in the past.

Kissinger: How do you rate the two?

Gur: The Syrians are much better in terms of attacking. Their air force is bigger.

Rabin: Bigger than the Egyptian Air Force.

Kissinger: Are the Syrians good soldiers?

Gur: If we remember the main aim is a political one, not to take the whole Golan Heights but to change the situation quickly, they are in a good position.

Allon: To force the issue on the world.

Kissinger: So you think going to war is a serious option?

Peres: The aim is to create a coalition. Iraqis now.

Kissinger: The Iraqis broke two promises to the Shah -- that they would wait two weeks and that they'd stop propaganda.

Peres: But the Syrian aim is not to fight alone but to create a coalition.


Kissinger: Are the Iraqis any good?

Rabin: 700 tanks, when they start to move and fire, is a number which is unpleasant.

Gur: The best in readiness is the Syrian army -- in ground operations, commandoes. There is no doubt the Syrians are in the highest readiness of the Arab armies.

Sisco: If the Syrians start it, is it aimed at a prolonged operation to bring in others? Or is it something more substantial?

Kissinger: My judgment is that if Asad goes to war -- first, in IQ I rate him the highest--if he goes to war, he will try for a protracted war. Whether he can succeed....



Peres: He will try, I think, to heat things in Lebanon, in Fatahland. There are 5,000 (?) already in training -- closest they ever had to a real army. Asad is warming them up for the start of war -- to create a patriotic front, to heat things up in the Arab world.

Kissinger: I don't think he will put 500 tanks where your Air Force can destroy them in the first three days. I think he will try a protracted war.

Gur: He thinks if the Iraqis come in, and Jordan, he thinks he will achieve much more than in the last war.

Rabin: Syria will do anything to prevent an interim agreement. Second, as long as this period goes on, there is risk he will interfere -- by an act of war which doesn't need to achieve much on the ground, to disrupt an interim agreement. After the achievement of an interim settlement, the same policy might be tried, on one assumption -- that Egypt won't be able for long to stay out of a limited war.

Kissinger: That is correct.

Rabin: They don't have to mobilize now for this. The Arab world doesn't need much political preparation. There is enough hatred.

There are not good signs about Jordan. The visit of Rifai to Syria is not a good thing -- so we have a lot to worry about the Syrians.

As the Chief of Staff said, what we did not foresee before the October war is their lack of need to achieve anything big by military means to achieve their objectives. This is the main assessment of the Arab world.


Kissinger: I agree.

Rabin: There is no need to go deep. There has to be a certain military sounding in the objectives. They have to have a certain kind of military objectives, and not put a thousand tanks in range of our Air Force. In October, 90% of the tanks were put out by tanks, not air force.  
[To Gur:] Right?

Gur: [hesitates] That's an internal discussion.

Kissinger: It's that or 88%.

Gur: Another thing from the last war: They didn't start negotiations because they were afraid of fire, and you didn't do the step-by-step negotiations because of fire. It might be only political pressure.



Kissinger: Not a chance of Egypt starting fire.

Gur: If they think they will lose the negotiation if they open fire.

Kissinger: Egypt won't open fire during the negotiation. It is psychologically inconceivable. Syria may, but that's a different problem.

If the negotiations fail, that's one thing. But right now he is operating as reliable.

I will probably come back Friday morning. Because Nancy's going to stay. I will leave Aswan at 9:00, and arrive by noon. That gives us several hours in the afternoon. I will stay overnight Friday night. I'll go then to Damascus, then to Amman.

Peres: In Damascus they will ask you questions. In Amman you can ask them questions.

Sisco: Amman takes on more interesting significance. We have no evidence. If the King thinks he is not getting anything....

Kissinger: He may conclude if he is ever going to get the West Bank, he needs the Syrians.

Peres: They took Rifai to a military show; and the visit of the Soviet is something new. And a certain military alertness, an awakening.

Gur: Training, alertness.

The Saudis in southern Jordan, toward Eilat/Aqaba, the Dead Sea, are becoming more active.

Kissinger: Are the Saudis there?

Gur: Yes. A Saudi brigade in Mubarak. A mechanized brigade. Now they are talking again about another one -- which might endanger Eilat. You worry about Faisal.

Kissinger: My assessment is that Faisal will not go to war first.

Gur: But with Syria.

Rabin: Jordan wouldn't go to war without Syria.



Gur: And a military city with buildings here. Tabuk (?) -- with equipment he gets from you. He has Hawk batteries....

Rabin: Prepared to go north into Jordan.

Allon: So you discovered a new army in the Middle East.

This job would be fun without the October war.


Anderson: What do we say to the press?

Kissinger: I don't think I need to give arrival and departure statements every time.

We continued a very systematic review....

[The meeting ended at 12:15 p.m.

Rabin and Kissinger confer briefly alone.]



DRAFT

10  
(A)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 11, 1975

Your Excellency,

As I address this letter to you I am fully aware of the extraordinary nature of the act. However, the fact that I can entrust it to our mutual friend, Dr. Henry Kissinger, ensures its confidentiality.

The long conflict between our two countries has brought much suffering to our peoples. Both our nations have been victim of tragic historical circumstances and I now express the sincere hope that Providence will extricate us from the vortex of warfare and enmity.

It has always been my firm conviction that Egypt, by virtue of its cultural heritage, its strength, its size and its influence, carries a leading voice with respect to the peace-making effort in our region. From what Dr. Kissinger has conveyed to me, as well as from your public statements, I feel assured that you are determined to make strenuous efforts to exhaust the prospect of a settlement.

*Antoine*

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR NADA, DATE 9/25/03



I, on my part, am determined to make all efforts to promote peace between us, and it is in this spirit that I express the aspiration that we shall yet succeed in reaching an agreement that will do honor to our two peoples. Please know that, though I am on the other side, I am endeavoring to understand your problems and to see things from your perspective. I know that no agreement is possible without difficult decisions but I am ready to grapple with them for the sake of the cause of peace between our countries.

With this in mind, permit me, Mr. President, to bring to your attention a concern which we in Israel consider of crucial importance.

The step-by-step approach, as I understand it is intended to bring our countries closer to peace. Hence, my people have to know that through the process of withdrawal to a new agreed line we have reached a turning point and that <sup>we are entering a new era in which</sup> ~~the danger of war between our two~~ <sup>problems will be settled by negotiations.</sup> ~~countries is over.~~ As Prime Minister, I must be able to convince both <sup>Mr</sup> people and Government in Israel that in surrendering physical strategic positions we shall not be exposing ourselves to increased hardships <sup>in an immediate conflict</sup> created by lengthier and inferior lines. This can be possible only if it is visibly shown that the act of withdrawal marks the real beginning of progress towards peace by deeds and words that demonstrate the intention of peace.



These, Mr. President, are some thoughts I thought worthy of bringing to your attention. They, together with the suggestions and ideas I have asked Dr. Kissinger to convey have the single purpose of contributing to an understanding of our respective problems. You will, no doubt, want to react and comment on the proposals received through Dr. Kissinger. This will enable the negotiations to develop further.

I conclude with the hope that we shall be able to advance understanding on the important matters that engage our two Governments.

With expressions of highest esteem.



PROPOSED MAIN ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

(1) Agreement to stand on its own two feet

(1) The agreement will be bi-lateral between Egypt and Israel. It is not linked to an agreement with other Arab countries and does not create a pattern for other discussions or settlements. Neither are there any prior conditions attached to its acceptance.

The proposed agreement is not the final settlement between Egypt and Israel, but further settlements are not an element or an implied condition to the execution and continued validity of this agreement until superseded by a new agreement.

(2) Progress towards peace

The approach to peace and the further development of elements of peaceful relations, will find its expression in suitable formulation and in concrete and practical arrangements.

It is proposed that the agreement refer to its declared aim of the furtherance of peace between the parties and to its being a significant step towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace between Egypt and Israel.

Furthermore, the concrete arrangements based on the agreement which will express and reflect this progress towards peace will, inter alia, be as follows :



- (a) Open bridges for tourists, family visits, goods etc.
- (b) Non-restriction on ships, planes or travellers because of call or visit to the territory of the other party.
- (c) Abstention from hostile propaganda.
- (d) Suspension of economic warfare and boycott practices.
- (e) Cessation of anti-Israel diplomatic pressures in third countries and international bodies.
- (f) Freedom of navigation on high seas, straits and waterways and freedom of flight over them.
- (g) Right of passage through the Canal.
- (h) Establishment of Joint Committees with supervision teams to oversee execution of agreement.

(3) Non-use of force

The agreement will express the resolve of the parties to refrain from any further threat or use of force against each other and the decision to settle all disputes between themselves by negotiations and other peaceful means. The document will contain the undertaking of the renunciation of belligerency, clearly and in its appropriate legal wording. The agreement will be made public.

Both parties will add a formal guarantee that they will not participate, directly or indirectly, in any hostilities between the other party and any other state or forces or provide assistance of any kind to states or forces involved in such hostilities.

(4) Arrangements on the ground

- (a) The area evacuated by Israel will be established as a buffer zone between the forces.
- (b) A defined area of limited armaments and forces east of the new line will be established.
- (c) The present area of limited armaments and forces west of Line A, established by the agreement of January 1974, remains unchanged.

- (d) Supervision will be carried out by the UN and by the Joint Committees and Supervision teams established (see 2(h)).
- (e) Alert systems of each party in the vacated zone to prevent surprise attack is proposed.
- (f) There will be aerial reconnaissance missions by aircraft of both sides.
- (g) The arrangements will be contained in a Protocol attached to the agreement.

(5) Duration

- ✓ (a) The agreement will be in force until superseded by a new agreement; no time-limit to the present agreement will be set.
- (b) Egypt will give an undertaking via the USG that it will not demand a new agreement or a further withdrawal for an agreed period.
- (c) The mandate of the supervisory organ will be for an indefinite period.
- (d) There will be an agreed timetable for the implementation of the agreement. Stage one will be a preparatory one.

(6) Relation to Geneva


The agreement should find its expression in the position of the parties, if and when the Geneva Conference is renewed. The intention of the parties expressed in the agreement, generally and in its detailed provisions, has to find its continued effect in the approaches and attitudes taken in Geneva, in a way to be agreed upon.



(7) Lines

The question of the lines will be developed subsequently , after the consideration and discussion of the six points mentioned above and on their basis.

11.3.75





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FOR ASWAN

MARCH 12-13


Attached are:

- Tab A: Rabin's principles (omitting the seventh on the lines for the moment) formulated for presentation to Sadat and keyed to revisions in in the Egyptian paper to take account of Israeli points. That revision is at the next tab.
- Tab B: The Egyptian paper revised to take account of main Israeli points.

You may want to:

- use the talking paper prepared last night for your initial discussion with Sadat and then
- turn to these papers for your summation.

If you did this, you would read the Israeli-points in the paper at Tab A and say that each might be handled by the changes noted in the relevant Egyptian paragraph. The relevant paragraph is identified in the paper at Tab A.



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STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES  
BY HR NARA, DATE 9/25/03

ISRAELI POINTS

KEYED TO REVISED EGYPTIAN PAPER

1. Israel is prepared to negotiate with each of its neighbors, but it believes each agreement should stand on its own feet and be developed according to the particular conditions on each front. (We would propose that the agreement be silent on this point although the statement of intent to continue negotiations would address part of this point in a positive way.)
2. The agreement should, in both word and content, show that it represents movement towards a peace settlement. (See Egyptian Point 9 for the general language. Those specific Israeli ideas which may be acceptable could be handled by a combination of general formulations in the agreement and by specific provisions in the understanding on the buffer zone or other side documents.)
3. The Israelis are groping for some formula other than a formal declaration of non-belligerency that would commit each side not to use force against each other in the context of the interim agreement. They would like this to be public. This point is crucial to Israelis ability to accept any agreement at all. (See Egyptian Point 8, as revised to provide for (a) a <sup>public</sup> private assurance through the U.S. along the lines of the Egyptian proposal and (b) a public commitment in the agreement to attempt to meet the Israeli non-belligerency concern without using that formulation.)
4. There should be practical arrangements to make the buffer zone as effective as possible in safeguarding both sides against surprise attack. (See Egyptian Points 3,4, 7. Israel would like "alert systems" of each party in the buffer zone and an agreed arrangement for aerial reconnaissance over it. These, if acceptable, could be handled in the buffer zone protocol.)
5. The Israelis are trying to resolve two problems: (a) They seem willing to set no definite time of duration in the agreement, but at the same time, they are concerned to avoid pressures for immediate new steps that would, in effect, undo the agreement right away. (b) They would like enough time in the implementation to develop new defenses. (See Egyptian


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BY HR, NAME, DATE 9/25/03



Points 5 and 6. Any understanding on the timing of further withdrawals would have to be dealt with on the side.)

6. The Israelis are groping for some understanding on how what happens at Geneva if the Conference is resumed will affect observance of the agreement. (This could be dealt with in the paragraph that will eventually be included on continued observance of the ceasefire. See suggestion at end of Egyptian paper.)



SALIENT POINTS RELATED TO A SECOND DISENGAGEMENT  
AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

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- 1 - The agreement should include total withdrawal of Israeli forces to the east of the passes and from all the oilfields including the town of El Tor.
- 2 - The Israeli withdrawal will be implemented in such a manner as to indicate the willingness of the Israelis to demonstrate their desire for peace namely that no roads nor installations or equipment of the oilfields be destroyed or transferred from their present location either to Israel or the remaining occupied part of Sinai.
- 3 - A buffer zone will be the subject of agreement in a separate protocol.
- 4 - The thinning of forces and their strength will be the subject of mutual agreement.
- 5 - The agreement should have as an annex a fixed timetable indicating the various phases of the implementation of the agreement bearing in mind that the full implementation should be terminated within \_\_\_\_\_ of the signature of the agreement and that Egypt receives all oilfields within \_\_\_\_\_ of the signing.




6 - Egypt, on its part, is willing to accept a formula by which the mandate of UNEF will be extended annually as long as this agreement is valid and until it is superseded by a new agreement and as long as efforts towards a just and peaceful settlement continue.

7 - Egypt and Israel are ready to activate an Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Commission to consider alleged violations by the parties to the present disengagement agreement and to assist the UNEF.

8 - Egypt and Israel will each give a formal, public guarantee or assurance to the United States that it will not initiate military or paramilitary operations against the other for the duration of this agreement, while reserving their right of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

In the agreement itself, Egypt and Israel will agree that they will refrain from any use of force and will seek to resolve their disputes by peaceful means, in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter.

9 - Both sides would agree that this agreement is not the final settlement between them but another transitional



step in the furtherance of progress towards peace between them and in the Middle East. Both sides would agree to continue their efforts to negotiate a just and lasting peace in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. Moreover, Egypt is prepared to go to Geneva to discuss with the parties concerned the conditions for a final, just and durable peaceful solution provided that the Palestinian representatives be invited to take part in the discussions at the proper time.

10 - Egypt would respect its commitment so far as the passage of Israeli cargo through the Suez Canal is concerned.


11 - Furthermore, and as a demonstration of its continuing efforts towards a peaceful settlement, Egypt would continue the process of the reconstruction of the Suez Canal area and would open the Suez Canal upon the final implementation of the present Disengagement Agreement.

12 - Egypt would be prepared to consider lifting restrictions on some American firms - and that on a selective basis - so that they could resume their activities in Egypt. This commitment would be given in the form of an oral understanding between Egypt and the United States Government.

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- Egypt and Israel would reaffirm their intention to continue to implement the Disengagement Agreement of January 18, 1974, except as altered by this agreement and until it is superseded by a further agreement leading toward peace.
  
- In order to facilitate the achievement of a peace agreement, Egypt and Israel would agree to continue their diplomatic efforts and to observe scrupulously the ceasefire on land, sea and air called for by the UN Security Council.
  
- Both sides regard the Bab al-Mandab Straits, as an international waterway for ships of all flags and agree that neither side will interfere with free passage of any ship or cargo through those straits.



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CHECK LIST

For Your Stop in Aswan

March 12-13

Attached are the following:

- Tab A: The talking paper you requested for presenting the Israeli ideas to Sadat.
- Tab B: Rabin's Seven Points.
- Tab C: The Israeli "ideas".
- Tab D: The Egyptian paper for your reference.

The letter you want to deliver to Sadat is loose in your folder.

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BY HR DATE 9/25/03



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TALKING PAPER

For Presenting Israeli Ideas to Sadat

Aswan, Wednesday, March 12

This paper suggests presenting the Israeli ideas to Sadat in terms, first, of Rabin's seven points. We have stated these, not in Rabin's words, but in a way that you could put them to Sadat.

Under each of these, you could:

- elaborate by describing more specifically how each would be reflected in the agreement;
- relate the Israeli point to the comparable Egyptian point;
- where appropriate, provide some reflections of your own.

What follows provides each point on a separate page according to the above organization. We have changed the order of Rabin's points in one instance: we suggest dealing with the possible lines first.

Thus, you would lead off your conversation--after presenting and discussing Rabin's letter---by explaining:

- Rabin began the Israeli side of the conversation by talking in terms of general points that he would like to see dealt with in an agreement rather than proposing precise formulations.
- Subsequent talks with Rabin, Allon and Peres produced a further refinement of the views Rabin originally presented and brought out some suggestions as to how the general points might be made more specific and substantive.

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BY KR NARA DATE 9/25/03



- The seven points and their elaboration do not represent the position of the Israeli Cabinet, nor were they conveyed in precise language as the definitive position of Rabin, Allon and Peres. You are trying to show Sadat how the Israeli leadership is thinking, just as you spent a great deal of time explaining to them Sadat's views and concerns. In this way it may be possible to reach very soon the stage of precise formulations which will stand a reasonable chance of being transformed into the elements of an agreement.
  
- For the sake of convenience, you are going to present the Israeli views to Sadat under the seven headings used by Rabin but relating them to the points already put forward by Sadat. You may have some additional comments of your own.



The new lines. Although Rabin has said that the new lines will be related to what is attainable on his other six points, we would suggest that you begin by making these points to Sadat:

- You have still avoided confronting the Israeli Cabinet with a decision on a definite line.
- However, you can now say for the first time that you believe the Israeli negotiating team is working in the context of Israeli withdrawal from both the oil fields and the passes.
- You will see whether you can develop a proposal on a precise line on your next trip to Israel. You have the strong impression that the lines General Gamasy described will be difficult to attain, but you do not want to go into detail on this until you have a clearer Israeli position.
- On the basis, then, of Israeli withdrawal from the oil fields and the passes, you would like to move on to the other points Rabin made.



1. Rabin Point: Israel is prepared to negotiate with each of its neighbors, but it believes each agreement should stand on its own feet and be developed according to the particular conditions on each front.

Elaboration:

This agreement, therefore, would be an agreement between Egypt and Israel. After this agreement is concluded, negotiations can continue with Egypt on a final settlement and can also take place with other Arab governments. But Israel is not ready to link this agreement to other negotiations or agreements conditional on completing other agreements. They wish this agreement to remain valid until it is superseded by another agreement.

Egyptian position:

Egypt wants assurance that the US will engage itself actively in helping to reach a second Israeli-Syrian agreement by mid-1975.

Point you might make.

Perhaps we could deal with these concerns in the following way:

- Re-state the intentions of both sides to continue their efforts to continue negotiations toward an overall peace agreement on all fronts.
- Ask Sadat what minimum commitment from you he believes would reassure Asad and Faisal that Syria will not be left out (e.g. an explicit US commitment to Syria to start negotiations by a specific date or prior to the implementation of the Egypt-Israel agreement).
- Achieve some understanding on how another Israel-Syria negotiation should be conducted (e.g. bilaterally or at Geneva; for an interim agreement or ostensibly for a final agreement which could have phased implementation).



2. Rabin point: The agreement should, in both word and content, show that it represents movement towards a peace settlement.

Elaboration:

--As in the January 1974 agreement, this agreement should state that both sides consider this a significant further step towards peace and declare their intent that its aim is the furtherance of progress towards peace.

--The agreement should contain certain practical arrangements to this end. We could decide later whether they are in the published agreement or handled separately. For instance:

- (a) Egyptians in the Sinai and Gaza would be free to exchange family visits and goods with Egypt. (For instance, this would permit free flow of Red Crescent supplies to Gaza and the Sinai and Red Crescent offices might be opened). Tourists might be free to travel back and forth (perhaps initially only selected special tour groups).
- (b) Ships, planes or travellers could come to Egypt, including the Sinai, or Israel without restriction because of their having stopped in the other country. (Perhaps initially only occasional ships or planes carrying tour groups or other special groups. The question of an intermediate stop could be important).
- (c) Both sides would abstain from hostile propaganda (but this is hard to define precisely).
- (d) Israel would like suspension of economic warfare and boycott practices.
- (e) Israel would like cessation of diplomatic pressures against Israel in third countries and international bodies.



- (f) Freedom of navigation in the straits and waterways and freedom of flight over them.
- (g) Some mention of right of passage through the Canal. (Though perhaps this could be stated as it was in January 1974 in terms of passage when there is a final peace with immediate passage of cargoes and no discrimination as to crews.)
- (h) Establishment of Joint Committees to help oversee execution of the agreement. (Perhaps the point you made to Rabin about a Mixed-not Joint-Commission to work with UNEF would bridge this gap and clear the way for a quasi-independent organization using Egyptian-Israeli officers to accompany UNEF on patrol, etc.)

Egyptian position.

You could repeat that you are mentioning these only to give Sadat the flavor of Israeli thinking and then note that the Egyptian position already meets some of these points. For instance:

- Egypt would presumably be willing to repeat the wording in the January 1974 agreement that this agreement is a step towards a final peace, not peace itself.
- Egypt would presumably agree to continue peace negotiations.
- Egypt is prepared to accept restraint on use of force (see para 3 below).
- Egypt might well have an interest in access to Egyptians in the Sinai and Gaza; in their freedom and the freedom of other Egyptians to move back and forth freely; and in the flow of Egyptian goods into and out of this area. The Red Crescent symbolism would be a good starter.



--Egypt has already given the US assurances on free passage through the straits and eventual passage of Israeli ships through the Canal in a peace agreement.

--Egypt has already offered a Commission of some sort.

In addition:

--Egypt is ready to commit itself to annual extensions of UNEF while the agreement is in force.

--Egypt accepts an effective buffer zone (see para 4 below).

--Egypt agrees to re-open the Canal and permit Israeli cargo to pass. Egypt would continue reconstruction in the Canal area.

--Egypt has said it would give the US an oral commitment to life restrictions on some American firms.

Point you might make.

Although some of these would not be mentioned in the published agreement and others might be unacceptable to Egypt, it seems that many of these could be dealt with one way or another.



3. Rabin Point: The Israelis are groping for some formula other than a formal declaration of non-belligerency that would commit each side not to use force against each other in the context of the interim agreement. They would like this to be public. This point is crucial to Israelis ability to accept any agreement at all.

Elaboration:

- One idea they have had is that both sides would settle their disputes by negotiation and other peaceful means. (There is language in the UN Charter which covers this and it could be repeated in the agreement).
- Another is that both sides would state their intent to refrain from the use or threat of force against each other.

Egyptian position:

- Presumably Egypt would be willing to restate its commitment in the January 1974 agreement to continue to observe the ceasefire.
- Egypt is ready to give its guarantee or assurance to the US that it will not undertake military or paramilitary operations against Israel if Israel gives the US its written formal guarantee or assurance that it will not undertake military or paramilitary operations against Syria or Egypt during the duration of this agreement. If Israel attacks Syria or Egypt, Egypt will no longer be bound by this.

FYI: Sadat told you he would accept a "no war" pledge.

Points you might make:

- Perhaps the best approach would be to try out some general formulations for the agreement that could be supplemented by the assurances to the US that they have already been talked about.



--We could also add to any formulation the limiting phrase "while this agreement is in effect."



4. Rabin point: There should be practical arrangements to make the buffer zone as effective as possible in safeguarding both sides against surprise attack.

Elaboration:

- UNEF would supervise in the buffer zone.
- There would be a Mixed Commission.
- The buffer zone would be supplemented by agreement on limitations of armament and forces on either side of that zone.
- There might be "alert systems" of each party in the buffer zone.
- There might be an agreed arrangement for aerial reconnaissance (by aircraft of both sides over the buffer zone with prior notification.)
- The arrangements would be detailed in a Protocol attached to the agreement.

Egyptian position:

- Gamasy said: "The buffer zone should be wide enough to avoid clashes."
- Egypt has already said it would agree to annual extensions of UNEF as long as the agreement is in effect and efforts towards a just and peaceful settlement continue.
- Egypt has said it would agree to something like the old Mixed Armistice Commission which would allow Israeli and Egyptian officers to work with the UN in supervising the buffer zone.

(N.B. The Israelis should like the concept but the name Mixed Armistice Commission and the idea of its renewal are anathema to the Israelis; however, a different, similar title such as Mixed Commission and simply incorporating it in the new agreement rather than "renewing it" might sell with both sides.)



Point you might make:

There are details to be worked out, but it seems as if some agreement is possible in this area. Considerable work will be required with Israel and Egypt to bring about the desirable strengthening of UNEF and improving its procedure, as well as working in a Mixed Commission.



5. Rabin point: The Israelis are trying to resolve two problems: (a) They seem willing to set no definite time of duration in the agreement, but at the same time, they are concerned to avoid pressures for immediate new steps that would, in effect, undo the agreement right away. (b) They would like enough time in the implementation to develop new defenses.

Elaboration:

- They are considering a statement that this agreement would remain in force until superseded by a new agreement rather than specifying any duration.
- There would be an agreed timetable for implementation of the agreement in stages.
- Israel would still like to find some way of reaching an understanding, at least through the US, that there will not be pressures for further withdrawal for an agreed period.
- They would like an indefinite mandate for UNEF. We have said annual extensions might be possible.

Egyptian position:

- Egypt has accepted an indefinite duration for the agreement.
- Egypt has accepted annual extensions of UNEF.
- Egypt accepts the idea of a timetable for implementation, though it has a shorter period in mind.

Point you might make:

- This concept will be important for Israel.
- Possible alternatives might be to have the agreement continue until there is another agreement, so long as efforts toward a just and peaceful settlement continue, or, the agreement will continue until there is another agreement, or until one year after one party officially notifies the other of his desire to terminate it.



- The Mixed Commission might be established for the duration of the agreement.
  
- On the period of implementation, has Sadat considered the advantage to him in dealing with Syria of a quick Israeli withdrawal from the oil fields to be followed by a longer period for withdrawal from the passes, during which Syrian negotiations might begin?
  
- Would Sadat still be willing to forego further Israeli withdrawals for some period of time? Perhaps there could be work in committees at Geneva on other aspects of an Egyptian-Israeli settlement.



6. Rabin point: The Israelis are groping for some understanding on how what happens at Geneva if the Conference is resumed will affect observance of the agreement.

Point for you to make:

This point is sufficiently unclear now so we might leave it aside for the moment until we see how the remainder of our discussions proceed.



SECRET/NODIS

Rabin's Seven Points

Dinner, Sunday, March 9

1. Israel is interested in a separate agreement with Egypt that stands on its own feet. But Israel remains ready to negotiate with each of its neighbors without making conditions connecting one to the other. Nor do subsequent agreements have to be of the same pattern. But it is easiest to start with Egypt.

2. It has to be a step towards peace, its meaning to be interpreted in wording and in some practical measures that give evidence that it is not just wording.

3. It has to be in terms of putting an end to the use of force in the context of an interim agreement. Whatever the legal formula is -- nonaggression, non-belligerency, whatever -- it must be a declared public commitment towards Israel, between Egypt and Israel.

4. There must be practical arrangements to ensure a buffer zone, and not just verbal arrangements. Whether by means of UN, or joint Egyptian-Israeli actions, the point is the combination of additional factors to make it more effective and to prevent a surprise attack.

5. Duration: (a) How to solve the dilemma of indefiniteness versus a long specified period, and (b) the length of time between signature of the agreement and its complete implementation.

6. Relation between the interim agreement and what takes place at Geneva: What is it that commits Egypt to continued moderate behavior under the terms of the interim agreement?

7. The nature of the new line is related concretely to what is attainable on the six points above.

SECRET/NODIS

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5  
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR NARA, DATE 9/25/03



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPOSED MAIN ELEMENTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

(1) Agreement to stand on its own two feet

(1) The agreement will be bi-lateral between Egypt and Israel. It is not linked to an agreement with other Arab countries and does not create a pattern for other discussions or settlements. Neither are there any prior conditions attached to its acceptance.

The proposed agreement is not the final settlement between Egypt and Israel, but further settlements are not an element or an implied condition to the execution and continued validity of this agreement until superseded by a new agreement.

(2) Progress towards peace

The approach to peace and the further development of elements of peaceful relations, will find its expression in suitable formulation and in concrete and practical arrangements.

It is proposed that the agreement refer to its declared aim of the furtherance of peace between the parties and to its being a significant step towards the establishment of a just and lasting peace between Egypt and Israel.

Furthermore, the concrete arrangements based on the agreement which will express and reflect this progress towards peace will, inter alia, be as follows :



- (a) Open bridges for tourists, family visits, goods etc.
- (b) Non-restriction on ships, planes or travellers because of call or visit to the territory of the other party.
- (c) Abstention from hostile propaganda.
- (d) Suspension of economic warfare and boycott practices.
- (e) Cessation of anti-Israel diplomatic pressures in third countries and international bodies.
- (f) Freedom of navigation on high seas, straits and waterways and freedom of flight over them.
- (g) Right of passage through the Canal.
- (h) Establishment of Joint Committees with supervision teams to oversee execution of agreement.

(3) Non-use of force

The agreement will express the resolve of the parties to refrain from any further threat or use of force against each other and the decision to settle all disputes between themselves by negotiations and other peaceful means. The document will contain the undertaking of the renunciation of belligerency, clearly and in its appropriate legal wording. The agreement will be made public.

Both parties will add a formal guarantee that they will not participate, directly or indirectly, in any hostilities between the other party and any other state or forces or provide assistance of any kind to states or forces involved in such hostilities.

(4) Arrangements on the ground

- (a) The area evacuated by Israel will be established as a buffer zone between the forces.
- (b) A defined area of limited armaments and forces east of the new line will be established.
- (c) The present area of limited armaments and forces west of Line A, established by the agreement of January 1974, remains unchanged.



- (d) Supervision will be carried out by the UN and by the Joint Committees and Supervision teams established (see 2(h)).
- (e) Alert systems of each party in the vacated zone to prevent surprise attack is proposed.
- (f) There will be aerial reconnaissance missions by aircraft of both sides.
- (g) The arrangements will be contained in a Protocol attached to the agreement.

(5) Duration

- (a) The agreement will be in force until superseded by a new agreement; no time-limit to the present agreement will be set.
- (b) Egypt will give an undertaking via the USG that it will not demand a new agreement or a further withdrawal for an agreed period.
- (c) The mandate of the supervisory organ will be for an indefinite period.
- (d) There will be an agreed timetable for the implementation of the agreement. Stage one will be a preparatory one.

(6) Relation to Geneva

The agreement should find its expression in the position of the parties, if and when the Geneva Conference is renewed. The intention of the parties expressed in the agreement, generally and in its detailed provisions, has to find its continued effect in the approaches and attitudes taken in Geneva, in a way to be agreed upon.



(7) Lines

The question of the Lines will be developed subsequently , after the consideration and discussion of the six points mentioned above and on their basis.

11.3.75



D

SALIENT POINTS RELATED TO A SECOND DISENGAGEMENT

AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL .

- - - -

- 1- The agreement should include total withdrawal of Israeli forces to the east of the passes and from all the oilfields including the town of El Tor.
  
- 2- The Israeli withdrawal will be implemented in such a manner as to indicate the willingness of the Israelis to demonstrate their desire for peace namely that no roads nor installations or equipment of the oilfields be destroyed or transferred from their present location either to Israel or the remaining occupied part of Si ai.
  
- 3- The United Nations Zone will be subject of agreement.
  
- 4- The thinning of forces and their strength will be the subject of mutual agreement.
  
- 5- The agreement should have as an annex a fixed time-table indicating the various phases of the implementation of the agreement bearing in mind that the full implementation should



be terminated within two months of the signature of the agreement and that Egypt receives all oilfields within two weeks of the signing.

6- Egypt, on its part, is willing to accept a formula by which the mandate of UNEF will be extended annually as long as this agreement is valid and efforts towards a just and peaceful settlement continue.

7- Egypt and Israel are ready to reactivate the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Agreement and they agree that the Mixed Armistice Commission resume its work to consider alleged violations by the parties to the present disengagement agreement.

8- Should Israel give a formal guarantee or assurance in writing to the United States that it will not undertake military or paramilitary operations against Syria and Egypt, during the duration of this agreement. Egypt on its part is ready to give to the United States Government a similar guarantee or assurance that it will not initiate military or paramilitary operations against Israel. However, should Israel attack Syria, Egypt will not be bound by this



agreement but will fulfill its obligation towards Syria. In addition, Egypt if attacked by Israel will exercise its right of self-defence under article 51 of the UN Charter.

9- Moreover, Egypt is prepared to go to Geneva to discuss with the parties concerned the conditions for a final, just and durable peaceful solution provided that the Palestinian representatives be invited to take part in the discussions at the proper time.

10- Egypt would respect its commitment so far as the passage of Israeli cargo through the Suez Canal is concerned.

11- Furthermore, and as a demonstration of its continuing efforts towards a peaceful settlement, Egypt would continue the process of the reconstruction of the Suez Canal area and would open the Suez Canal upon the final implementation of the present Disengagement Agreement.

12- Egypt would be prepared to consider lifting restrictions on some American firms - and that on a selective basis - so that they could resume their activities in Egypt. This commitment would be given in the form of an oral understanding between Egypt and the United States Government.

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HAK / Sadat  
Memcon

~~SECRET~~ NODIS CHEROKEE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Egyptian side:

President Sadat  
Foreign Minister Fahmy  
General Gamasy (part of meeting)

US side:

Secretary Kissinger  
Under Secretary Sisco  
Ambassador Eilts

SUBJECT:

Meeting with President Sadat,  
March 12, 1975

PLACE:

Aswan, Egypt


After the Secretary had briefed the President on the status of Turkish-Greek negotiations and on his talks in Syria, he reported the results of his talks in Israel as follows:

The Secretary had worked on Israel in the manner which he had previously described to the President. A frontal confrontation had been avoided since this would have split the Jewish community in the US. Instead, an effort had been made to create a body of support for the desirability of some movement forward. We had also worked on individual Israeli leaders and as a group. All of this takes time. During the Secretary's February trip, the dominant mood in Israel and in the US public media was to go to Geneva and have a stalemate. This has been changed.

The Israelis, the Secretary continued, have never made a decision on any offer other than that which Ambassador Eilts presented in December and which the President rejected. The Secretary has been dealing with an Israeli negotiating team consisting of Rabin, Allon, Peres and General Gur. The team has no authority from the Cabinet to go beyond what has already been authorized. The President's paper has been shown only to Rabin and Allon. No one in Israel has yet had to make a decision on the oilfields and the passes.

~~SECRET~~ NODIS CHEROKEE

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BY KR, NARA, DATE 9/25/03




At the present time, the Secretary opined, Rabin and Allon are probably prepared to go along with such a decision. Gur, in his judgment, will probably not make a public uproar about such a decision. Peres, however, is still maneuvering. Rabin's problem is to keep such speculation out of the press. He has kept his Cabinet in the dark. He wants to move slowly. The Secretary returns to Jerusalem on Friday. Thereafter, on Sunday, Rabin will want to propose some of the geographic limits to the Cabinet after which we can work out details. The Secretary believes a situation has been created in which Rabin and Allon will push for an agreement. They appear to understand the need for a different attitude toward Sadat. On the other hand, they need the maximum obtainable quid pro quos in order to carry the Cabinet. The Secretary knows what they want; the President will have to tell him what he can do. Some things can be handled in the context of the paper already given us. The Israelis need a record of having raised all the Cabinet's instructions.

Digressing for a moment, the Secretary alluded to the Egyptian interest in sending Red Crescent help to Sinai. In principle, the Israelis are willing to permit this and also are willing to give up some of the POWs (but not one or two murderers). If the President would also approve the return of 39 Israeli bodies, this would help. The President asked Fahmy to so instruct Gamasy.

Continuing, the Secretary pointed out that the basic Israeli problem is that they can only defend an agreement as a step toward peace. The President noted that all of his statements indicate Egypt wishes to push the peace process. However, the Israelis are seeking to give some political significance to this, which he is unable to accept. The Secretary observed that in the final analysis, the Israelis will claim one thing and Egypt can claim another.

Some statement is needed in the agreement, the Secretary said, that it is being made in furtherance of peace. The President said he has no objection to this. The Secretary thought this might be stated in terms of a significant step toward a just and lasting peace. The Israelis, he noted, will want something concrete. They want a renunciation of belligerency. He had told them that the President refused to accept this. The Israelis will, in the Secretary's judgment, seek something similar to what is in the Fahmy paper and also a reference to settling disputes through



negotiations. The President observed that if this takes place through the negotiating process and is associated with pushing peace, it is agreeable. The Secretary thought it might require a phrase to the effect that the two parties refrain from the use of force and settle disputes by peaceful means. The President responded that if such a statement is indefinite, he cannot go along. Syria must be considered. If the statement applies to the peace process or until the fulfillment of the agreement or during negotiations, it would be agreeable. Otherwise, it is not, since this would constitute non-belligerency.

The Secretary noted the Israeli objection to the phrase "unless Israel attacks Syria" on the grounds of fuzziness. Syria might, for example, begin a war of attrition; the Israelis might then hit back and it becomes a matter of who attacks whom. The President commented that if it is only a war of attrition and not an invasion, some phrasing ought to be possible and asked Fahmy to consider this.

The Secretary noted that he had changed his mind about Rabin and Allon. They are not involved in auctioneering. They have a problem in getting any agreement through the Cabinet. (Mordechai) Gazit, who is doing some of the Israeli drafting, has pointed out some of the Israeli concerns. Specifically, if a new agreement is not something more than a cease-fire, what is it? Something more than a normal cease-fire is needed. The President observed that he had agreed in principle to pushing the peace process. Fahmy contended that the initial Disengagement Agreement is not a cease-fire agreement. The Secretary asserted it is. He asked in what way is paragraph 8 of the Fahmy paper different from what is already in effect? Fahmy noted that the first part of paragraph 8 deals with Egypt and the second, with Syria. The Secretary said that the Israelis question both parts.

Fahmy read the pertinent paragraph, contending that if Israel attacks Syria, this is not a war of attrition. Moreover, Egypt does not spell out therein what kind of action it might take. The Secretary noted that if a peace agreement is signed and any party wants to go to war, it can do so in exercise of its own sovereignty. Hence, such a statement is more symbolic than substantive. The



two questions that have to be asked are: a) how is the first sentence of paragraph 8 different from what is already in the Disengagement Agreement, and b) the whole matter of a second sentence. If the first sentence applied only to Egypt, this might help. Some thought should also be given to appropriate language regarding an Israeli attack on Syria. The Israelis claim the Syrians are sending brigades to Lebanon and are worried. The President conceded this might happen. The Secretary noted that the Israelis are concerned that, in the event of strong reprisals for Palestinian raids or a war of attrition, the agreement might be affected. Fahmy said that if the action takes place in Lebanon, this is not covered. However, some reference to Syria is necessary in any agreement. He had had in mind a preemptive war on the part of the Israelis. The Secretary said that the Israelis do not want a situation where they cannot retaliate. They must show the appropriate language to their own public.


On the matter of progress toward peace, the Secretary continued, there is no problem with the general point. A number of specifics were proposed to symbolize the progress toward peace. Specifically:

a) passage through the Canal of Israeli cargoes and non-discrimination against Jews transitting the Canal;

b) suspension of economic boycott practices and restrictions. The President observed that this has to be done discreetly and selectively. Egypt is vulnerable to attacks in Arab meetings if this is not done carefully. The Secretary said publicity Arab boycott has received in the US also does not help.

c) A reduction of hostile propaganda activities. The Secretary recalled that Fahmy had told Ambassador Eilts that this might be toned down. The President responded, "Willingly."

d) Greater movement of people between the occupied parts of Sinai and Egypt. The Israelis would be prepared to permit visits of Arabs back and forth across the border. The Israelis had noted that there had been a "ferry" for students from Arish to Gaza. If they could present this



as a step toward peace, this would be helpful. The President observed that this could be difficult. He recalled the attacks on King Hussein for allowing transit of the Allenby Bridge. If it takes place, it should not be mentioned. If it can be done discreetly, he had no objection. The Secretary observed that the Israelis will not be discreet. Fahmy asked what the Israelis mean by this point? The Secretary explained they want some movement along the dividing line and a maximum amount of transit. Fahmy asked if they are talking about Egyptians, foreigners or American travellers. The President thought this was not possible. The Secretary expressed the view that the Israelis will settle for Arabs in the area simply having transit rights. The President said he could not agree to tourists coming across the lines. However, a reunion of families and students could be arranged through the Mixed Commission as long as it is under the UN. Only Egyptians might be involved. The Secretary commented that the Israelis also include tourists, but opined if such an option is limited to families, it will already help. He observed that the Israelis see these points as substitutes for a declaration of non-belligerency.

e) Reduction of Egyptian pressure on third countries. The President interjected that this is impossible. Fahmy noted that Egypt has considerable influence with the African countries. The Africans might go along as a by-product of Egyptian action.

Regarding the Voice of Palestine (VOP), Egypt cannot consider this. To do so would be political suicide. If this is what the Israelis have in mind, Egypt cannot do it. The President noted he could, however, promise to control the VOP and Fahmy said "little by little."

The Secretary again noted that the Israelis are trying very hard. It is important that we give them something. Rabin, unfortunately, had publicly stated a short time ago that Israel would withdraw from the passes and the oilfields only for a non-belligerency pledge. Begin had asked him to repeat this and Rabin is now stuck with it.

f) Ships, planes and travellers coming to or going from Israel should be able to stop in Cairo.



The President called this "absurd." When we reach the frontiers, such items can be discussed. Suppose they have Israeli passports, the President asked? In the case of foreigners, however, this might be possible. The Secretary explained there are two problems: first, travellers coming on the same plane to Cairo. The President said this is not yet possible. The second involves individuals who visit Israel and come to Cairo. The President observed that this is possible and can even be done on the same passport.

g) The area evacuated by the Israelis should be established as a buffer zone. The President asked if they had mentioned any specific area. The Secretary responded that they have not. He had given them Gamasy's map. As he had earlier told the President, they will not have the Egyptian line east of the passes. They feel strongly about this. He had suggested that the Egyptian line be moved forward a bit and that the Israelis withdraw from the passes. The President asked whether they will hold the eastern entrance to the passes? The Secretary reiterated that at the moment he has no specifics. Perhaps he could get the eastern end of the passes, but he was not sure.

The President noted Egypt has been insisting that it hold the eastern end of the passes. However, as a final fallback position he could agree to holding the western end of the passes, leaving the rest, including the eastern entrance, in UN hands. The Secretary thought it might be possible that they will give up the eastern end of the passes, but doubted they will agree to Egypt's holding the western end of the passes. He thought it might be possible to move the Egyptian line forward to the present Israeli line. The President said this was satisfactory. If the Israelis do not hold the eastern end, he could agree. The Secretary again noted that they want the entire evacuated area as a buffer zone. The President observed that if Egypt gets the present Israeli line, this is on the entrance to the passes. The Secretary pointed out this is not so. He reiterated his doubts that the Israelis will allow Egypt to hold the western end of the passes with military forces. Civilian occupation had not yet been discussed. The Secretary noted his idea was to put the areas evacuated under Egyptian civil administration.



h) Establishment of new zones of limited armaments east of the new line. The President said this was agreeable. General Gamasy, who had been invited in by the President, was asked about the relationship of the present Israeli line from the west end of the passes. He noted the line is about ten kilometers west of the entrance. The Secretary affirmed that supervision in the buffer zone will be carried out by UN forces through a mixed committee. The Israelis will call such a committee anything other than an Armistice Committee. Fahmy suggested that it be called a Committee under the UN, such a group could discuss alleged violations, but not move around. It would consist of Israeli, Egyptian and UN personnel to look into alleged violations. The Secretary commented that the Committee could not check out violations on either side, but wondered about its doing so in the buffer zone. Gamasy thought this was the responsibility of UNEF. The Secretary said he understood that the President would not want Israelis behind the Egyptian lines. In the case of the buffer zone, this ought not to be an issue. If there is Egyptian civilian administration, such a Committee might help give reassurances. In any case, he was just raising the point.

i) Each side be permitted to maintain an "alert system" in the buffer zone. The President refused and the Secretary agreed this should be dropped.

j) Air reconnaissance missions by both sides over the edge of the buffer zone. The President said that if this is reciprocal, then he could agree. Gamasy pointed out in Arabic that any such arrangement would raise problems for both sides. The Secretary explained that Gur's concept is that each side give the other a schedule of the number of flights during a given period of time. The flights should be on a north-south axis. Gamasy insisted the Israelis can already detect from their side what the Egyptians are doing. Moreover, the UNEF will have its own reconnaissance for both sides. Fahmy noted Israeli reconnaissance will only be on the Egyptian side. Why, he asked, have a buffer zone? The Secretary noted the purpose is to check on the limited armaments zone by flying over the buffer zone. The President asked why the US cannot do this in the buffer zone. The Secretary said we are doing so now in the area between the Egyptian forward line and the Israeli forward line. However, the Israelis complain that they do not get the photos for ten days or so after each flight.

It will be a complicated question. Last week's raid on Tel Aviv is the sort of thing that makes it more difficult. We, in fact, stopped the Israelis from retaliating at a time when it would be embarrassing for the President.

The President then asked about the Syrians and the next new move? The Secretary recalled he had already told Asad he is ready to make a major effort after Sinai. The President wished to know if this could be before the UNDOF renewal. The Secretary said it will take a massive effort. We are ready to make the effort and are ready to talk to Asad along these lines. The President then asked if something could be done before the end of April. The Secretary said we could begin, but progress might be limited. Alternatively, we could go to Geneva. Fahmy suggested that the Secretary visit Damascus in early May to help with the UNDOF problem. The President reiterated this should take place in late April.

The Secretary asked about the President's idea with respect to Geneva? The President responded by asking for the Secretary's views. The Secretary noted that Asad would go to Geneva now to prevent Sadat from getting an agreement. If, however, Sadat gets one, Asad will not want to go to Geneva. The President said this agreement should first be fulfilled and then the reconvening of Geneva be faced.

Finally, the Secretary noted that the Israelis are willing to give up the oilfields, but first want time to build a new defense line before relinquishing the passes. They want to keep their present lines until a new line is built. General Gur had suggested nine months. The Secretary had said this was too long. Gamasy expressed concern that such an arrangement would mean Egyptian engineers going to the oilfields will have to pass through Israeli lines. The President stressed that the return of the oilfields is the most important thing even if it means going through Israeli lines. Fahmy observed that the oilfields might be surrounded by UNEF Force. The President agreed and noted that the Egyptian engineers can be protected in the enclave. Gamasy opined that Gur is anxious to keep his present positions. The Secretary thought Gur would agree to an enclave surrounded

(At this point, Sadat explained to Gamasy in Arabic that the evacuated territories would be a buffer zone.)

The President opined that the Israeli positions were "very mild."

The Secretary noted we had previously agreed on no time limit on the agreement. The Israelis would like to express this in terms of the agreement remaining in force until superceded by another agreement. The President said all parties will go to Geneva to work out a new agreement. What, however, if one is not obtainable? The Secretary wondered if the term "indefinite" might be used. He noted the Israelis are trying to present this as an element of greater permanence than before. Even with such an agreement, he observed, sovereign states can go to war. They also want UNEF to be extended for the duration of the agreement rather than on an annual basis. The President said he could agree to one year. The Secretary referred to paragraph 6 of Fahmy's paper on this point. Fahmy observed that the language of his paper re annual renewal makes it routine and gives it continuity. The President noted that he would agree to this at the borders, but at this time the term "annual" should be sufficient. The Secretary noted it will not be. The President then said he could not give this to the Israelis, but could give it to us. We could say that assurances have been received for annual renewals as long as the peace movement continues.

The Secretary then asked about the President's views on Geneva. The President said they will ask for the '67 borders. The Secretary said Israel will refuse. The Israelis are concerned that if they refuse at Geneva, Egypt might repudiate the agreement. The President agreed this needs be solved. He thought something could be reached on the point.

President Sadat then said he had some points on the Egyptian side. First, what about the Palestinians and Geneva? The Secretary recalled he had already said Geneva would result in a stalemate. He doubted that the Israelis would receive the Palestinians. On our part, we are ready to establish contact with the Palestinians, but only after an agreement is reached. To do so earlier will only cause problems.



by the UN. Gamasy, however, continued to be worried about the position of the Egyptian engineers. Gamasy observed that there should be no problem for the Israelis to leave a corridor on the coast for the engineers. The Secretary thought Gur was reasonable, but Gamasy remained skeptical.

The Secretary also noted he had raised with the Israelis the President's concern about having too many forces in Sinai. The Israelis had responded they are willing in principle to discuss force dispositions. The President expressed pleasure. The Secretary noted the Israelis also claim Egypt is deploying its forces for an attack. Egypt had moved one division closer to the Canal. Gamasy insisted the division is 30 kilometers west of the Canal and in a training status. The President noted that after the Canal is reopened, it will be difficult for Egypt to attack. The Secretary said the Israelis believe that even with the Canal opened, Egypt can get troops across the Canal in eight hours.

AMB:HFrEilts:ajc - 3/12/75



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