



Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum

www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov

Library: 1000 Beal Ave., Ann Arbor, MI 48109

Museum: 303 Pearl Street, NW, Grand Rapids, MI 49504

(734) 205-0555 fax (734) 205-0571

(616) 254-0400 fax (616) 254-0386

**The documents in this
folder continue from the
previous folder.**

Monday, October 20, 1975



U.S.
D R A F T
COMMUNIQUE

10/20/75

President Gerald R. Ford of the United States of America visited the People's Republic of China at the invitation of Premier Chou En-lai from _____ to _____ 1975. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Ford, U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, and other American officials.

President Ford met with Chairman Mao Tse-tung on _____. The two leaders had _____ exchange of views on international developments and relations between the two countries. President Ford also paid a call on Premier Chou En-lai and held a _____ discussion with him.

During the visit, President Ford and Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing held a serious and constructive review of Sino-American relations since the signing of the Shanghai Communique in February 1972. In addition, they discussed a broad range of international developments of common concern, and reviewed the prospects for evolution of a more just and secure world order.

The leaders of the People's Republic of China and the United States agreed that the progress achieved in



strengthening their relationship during the past four years benefits not only their two countries but the international environment as well. They emphasized that the consolidation of a normal relationship between the two countries reflects the common desires of the peoples of China and the United States, would not be inimical to the interests of others, and would contribute to the evolution of a more secure international order. The new relationship between the two countries has become a durable element in the world.

The two sides reaffirmed the principles for the development of their relations which were first expressed in the Shanghai Communique. In particular, they re-emphasized that all countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful co-existence, and that international disputes should be settled on this basis, without resorting to the use or threat of force. They expressed their determination to support the independence, integrity, and security of all states regardless of size or social system. They



reiterated their view that neither side should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region or any other part of the world. Both sides agreed that hegemonic actions which threaten the independence and security of any nation, whatever the source and whether in the East or West, would be a cause of concern and should be opposed.

The two sides agreed that in a world of change there must be diverse and constructive relations between states, whatever their social systems, in order for their peoples to maintain independence and make progress.

In reviewing the East Asian area, the two sides agreed that the peoples of the region should be permitted to realize their future progress and security free from the threat of force or outside intervention. Both sides expressed their determination to encourage and support political processes to bring about the peaceful resolution of outstanding differences in the region.

The two sides reviewed the subject of normalizing their relations. The Chinese side reiterated their view in the Shanghai Communique, including the propositions that the Government of the People's Republic of China is the



sole legal Government of China, that Taiwan is a province of China, and that reunification of Taiwan with China is China's internal affair. The United States side, recognizing that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China, expressed its agreement with that view. In affirming the principle of one China, the United States reiterated its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. Both sides noted the progress made to date and agreed to work toward the full normalization of their relationship.

The United States side reaffirmed its commitment to the objective of the ultimate withdrawal of all its armed forces and military installations from Taiwan in accordance with its statement in the Shanghai Communique. It noted the progress that has been made toward this goal in the past four years, and expressed its intention to make further withdrawals.

The two sides noted the periodic meetings which have been held between leaders of China and the United States in Peking and New York which have enabled the two leaderships to conduct candid and wide-ranging exchanges on



issues of common interest. They also noted the effective functioning of the Liaison Offices in their respective capitals, and the greater understanding between the peoples of China and the United States which has been achieved through the growing program of cultural and scientific exchanges, and trade contacts.

In order to further strengthen their bilateral relationship, the two sides reached a number of new agreements: The work of the two Liaison Offices will be further enhanced. In addition, agreement in principle was reached to establish branch liaison offices in San Francisco and Canton. In order to enable the two leaderships to maintain even more timely and effective contact, it was agreed to establish means of direct, instantaneous communication between the two governments.

Final agreement was reached on the settlement of the outstanding issue of private claims and blocked assets. It was also agreed to initiate technical discussions leading to the establishment of a commercial navigation treaty and the establishment of civil air routes between the two countries on a reciprocal basis. In order to further strengthen commercial relations and put trade




between the two countries on a more balanced basis, it was also agreed to facilitate the holding of trade exhibitions, first in the United States and later in the People's Republic of China.

The two sides also agreed on measures which would facilitate the reuniting of families where citizens of the People's Republic and the United States have relatives living in the other country.

In order to deepen the friendship, mutual understanding, and cooperation between the two peoples on a reciprocal basis and according to the principles of equality and mutual benefit, it was agreed to expand the program of cultural, scientific, medical, industrial, leadership and other exchanges. Measures will be taken in the coming year to facilitate the exchange of students for language study in the respective countries, and to encourage the promotion of greater scientific cooperation through joint research activity. In addition, a number of specific exchange programs were agreed upon for the coming year.

Both sides reaffirmed that despite the profound differences of philosophy and social system which exist



between the United States and China, it is nonetheless possible to deepen friendship and understanding between the two peoples, and that mutual efforts will be sustained to complete the normalization of relations between China and the United States on the basis of the Shanghai Communique.

President Ford and his party expressed their deep appreciation to the Government of the People's Republic of China for the warm hospitality extended to them.



Teng/HAK
evening



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: Monday, October 20, 1975
10:00 a.m. - 11:40 a.m.

PLACE: Great Hall of the People
Peking, China

PARTICIPANTS: CHINA
Teng Hsiao-ping, Vice Premier of the State Council
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Foreign Minister
Huang Chen, Chief, PRCLC, Washington, D. C.
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Foreign Minister
Lin P'ing, Director of American Oceanic Affairs, Foreign Ministry
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director of American Oceanic Affairs (translator)
Ting Yuan-hung, Director for U.S. Affairs, American and Oceanic Affairs, Foreign Ministry
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director for U.S. Affairs, American and Oceanic Affairs, Foreign Ministry
Shih Yen-hua, Translator
plus two notetakers

UNITED STATES

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Ambassador George H. Bush, Chief United States Liaison Office, Peking
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Mr. Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Mr. Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 b (3)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Jan 20 2001



DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Dep. Ins. 9/16/03
BY SA, MARA, DATE 11/3/03

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

- 2 -

Mr. William Gleysteen, Jr., Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau
of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Miss Karlene G. Knieps, Notetaker

TENG: Anyway, we welcome you on your eighth visit to Peking.

KISSINGER: This room is very familiar to me -- I have been here quite often.

TENG: It is almost a year, eleven months actually, since your last visit. It should be said that there have been quite a few changes in the world in these eleven months and therefore there is a need to exchange views on these changed circumstances.

KISSINGER: It is always useful for us to exchange views.

TENG: It doesn't matter even if we quarrel a bit.

KISSINGER: It gives the press something to write about.

TENG: Yes, and I believe they are immediately going to report that sentence.

KISSINGER: We should ask the Foreign Minister to fire the empty cannon; then they would have even more to report.

TENG: They are all men of letters and they have very deft hands.

Now, since the press have left, the Doctor is free to express his views.

KISSINGER: Now we can say what we really think of each other.

TENG: Yes.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE



KISSINGER: How does the Vice Premier propose that we proceed?

TENG: What is your idea?

KISSINGER: We have a number of topics to discuss. As the Foreign Minister said yesterday, we have to prepare for the President's trip, and we should discuss that from the point of view of substance and procedure. With respect to substance, we would like to discuss both the public and the private aspect. That is, the sort of speeches that will be made and the sort of communique that will emerge. With respect to procedures, it is just a matter of where the President will go and what your proposals are. The second (topic) is a review of the world situation. The third is our bilateral topics.

And we would like with respect to the first topic to agree on an outline of a communique on this trip so that we avoid any possible misunderstandings during the President's trip.

TENG: As for the question of the communique, I believe you said last night that you have prepared a draft you would like to show to us. We can ask that you and our Foreign Minister first discuss the particular details (of a draft communique).

As to the places the President would like to visit, since he has been here before, we would like to defer to his preferences. I believe that is easy.

As for what we will say to each other after he comes, we can say whatever we want to say to each other. For instance, I have said before this to visiting American friends that it will be all right if we have discussions; also all right if we do not. It will be all right if our minds meet, or if they do not. We will welcome him.

KISSINGER: There are two aspects to our discussions -- the public and the private. The private discussions should be a very frank review of the world situation and our bilateral relations. (In the case of the public discussions,) it would serve the interests of neither side if it would appear that we were quarreling. I think we should reserve that for the UN and not for a Presidential visit.



SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 4 -

TENG: There is still time for further discussions on that ... for further concrete discussions. I suppose you mean the communique?

KISSINGER: Quite frankly -- and we can discuss it more privately on some occasion -- I have in mind partly the communique and partly what our newspapers will be writing. What binds us together is our common concern about hegemonial aspirations. It is our hope that the visit will be properly understood by our public.

TENG: I believe we will touch upon such matters during our discussions here.

KISSINGER: At the end of this meeting perhaps we could leave five or ten minutes and I will give our communique draft to the Foreign Minister and I will explain what we are trying to do so that you can adjust it in the direction that is appropriate for you.

TENG: Alright.

KISSINGER: The present plan, if this is agreeable to you, would be for the President to arrive here Monday, December 1 in the afternoon. And then to leave the following Saturday afternoon. That would be the 6th.

TENG: There is nothing inconvenient about the time with us.

KISSINGER: And he will not visit any other countries in Asia while he is on this trip. (Earlier) I indicated to the Chief of your Liaison Office, who, I understand speaks perfect English now, that we might visit Indonesia but we have found that the press of preparing the budget and the State of the Union Address and other matters require the President's return immediately via Hawaii.

For your information, we plan that the Vice President visit Asia in February or March instead of the President.

Would it be convenient for you if, assuming we agree on major things here, that we send a technical advance party here the first week of November for about

SECRET/SENSITIVE



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

- 5 -

a week? My paper here says the advance people would number 65 people, but that cannot be true. We will reduce the numbers, but at any rate we will need an advance party and we will agree on the numbers. That is ridiculous -- 65 people.

TENG: It is not a great matter. It will be alright if you send 100.

KISSINGER: The first time that I came here Prime Minister Chou En Lai asked me how many people would come with the President. I had no idea and I said maybe 50. I didn't realize that there were more than 50 security people alone. Eventually about 500 came, if I remember correctly.

We will, then, send the technical advance people the first week of November?

TENG: That is agreed upon.

KISSINGER: Alright. And we will be in touch with the Liaison Office about the precise times and numbers.

TENG: Fine.

KISSINGER: And we recommend that the television networks work out their own arrangements with you rather than through us, if that is agreeable to you.

TENG: I think that is alright.

KISSINGER: They will also get in touch with the Liaison Office.

Shall we assume that the total numbers will be comparable to the Nixon visit on our side, including press?

TENG: I think that would be possible. A little bit more or less would not be of consequence to us.

KISSINGER: There is no need to arrange separate meetings for the Secretary of State on this trip. All right. Shall we discuss other matters now?

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

- 6 -

TENG: Please.

KISSINGER: Maybe a brief review of the international situation and the issues that we face?

TENG: Fine.

KISSINGER: We have never had any illusions about our differences. And in any event the Foreign Minister is always there to remind us of them. But we also believe that we were brought together by certain strategic necessities. And therefore to us our relationship is not that of two enemies using each other but of two countries having a similar problem and working on it cooperatively. The strategic necessity which we both face is that of the Soviet threat. I think it is important to understand that here we face three problems: one, the overall strategy; second, the tactics that we have to pursue; and third, our relationship as it relates to the overall international situation.

As far as our strategic assessment is concerned we believe that the Soviet Union is gaining in strength and that at some point it may be tempted to translate that strength into political adventures. We think it is gaining in strength, not as a result of detente policies, but as a result of the development of technology and the general state of the economy. Since the Soviet Union is both a European and an Asian country, it is important to prevent it from achieving hegemony in either place. And since we are the principal element of defense against the Soviet Union, we have to be strong in both places. As I have said to your Foreign Minister, I do not know which theory is correct -- whether they are feinting in the East to attack in the West or feinting in the West to attack in the East. I do not think it makes any difference, because if they attack in the West and succeed, the East will eventually face a much more massive force; and if they attack in the East, then the West will eventually face a much more massive force. So, as far as the United States is concerned, the problem is not significantly different. Our strategy is to attempt to maintain the world equilibrium to prevent attacks in either the West or the East.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

- 7 -

This leads to the second question: the tactics to be pursued in carrying out the strategy. And here, there is obviously a difference between us, although some of it arises from the difference in our geographic situation and our domestic situation. You believe in taking a public posture of great intransigence, though you do not necessarily act, for a variety of reasons, in every part of the world. We believe in taking a more flexible posture publicly, but we resist in any part of the world towards where the Soviet Union stretches out its hands. Therefore, in the Middle East, in Angola, in Portugal and in other places we have been quite active in order to prevent Soviet expansion, even when we had to do it alone and even when we were criticized for doing it.

In order to pursue this policy after the domestic upheavals we have had in America as a result of Vietnam and Watergate, it is absolutely essential for us that we are in a public posture at home that we are being provoked rather than causing the tension. You have to understand that those in America who talk most toughly are most likely to produce a paralysis of action in the various places around the world where we are now acting. The very people who are attacking us, now and then, for detente -- I am speaking of Americans, I will speak of foreigners later -- are also telling us what is wrong in the Middle East is that we are not settling it cooperatively with the Soviet Union -- which has been our whole policy to avoid. You have seen enough of our people here so that you can form your own judgment. But if we had, for example, done what Mr. Vance and his crew recommended; namely, to renounce the first use of nuclear weapons, then the effect on our relative power rationale would lead to the Finlandization of Western Europe. But it cannot be, and we do not believe it can be in the interests of any country to allow the Soviet Union to believe we would accept a major strategic change -- whether it is in the East or the West -- concerning the use of nuclear weapons. It is in our interest to make the Soviet Union believe that we will not acquiesce in an overturning of the equilibrium no matter what weapons are involved. I cite this as an example of our position.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

- 8 -

These are tactics for the conduct of our strategy. You need have no concern that we are conducting detente with illusions; we are conducting it as the best method for resisting Soviet expansionism. And we are not prepared to pay any significant price for it. Our being in this position enables us to maintain high military budgets year after year and to act as a brake on our allies.

Let me in this connection talk about some of our allies. With respect to Western Europe we think there are contradictory trends. On the one hand, our relations with the principal Western European countries have greatly improved. We have very many leadership meetings now at the highest levels, including the President and the Foreign Minister, where we have intimate exchanges.

On the other hand, we believe that in many European countries there is a tendency to base foreign policy on illusions. In many of them there is the temptation to substitute goodwill for strength. And in some of them parties controlled by Moscow are strong enough to influence foreign policy, as in Italy and to some extent France.

We greatly welcome the many visits of European leaders to the People's Republic of China, and we appreciate your willingness to give them your perception of the international environment. We think, therefore, that the visit of the German Chancellor here next week can be of great significance. Our assessment is that within the Social Democratic Party he is by far the most realistic. And he is much less of a vague and sentimental mind than his predecessor. So, he would greatly benefit from your perceptions. It would strengthen him domestically and I think it would benefit the whole European situation, since he also has great influence with Giscard.

But, as I pointed out, in Europe we have the problem of perhaps especially optimistic assessments of foreign policy and we are also concerned with a leftist trend -- anti-defense rather than ideological -- which invites

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

- 9 -

a weak defense posture. We have had difficulties on the southern flank in the Mediterranean. Some of them caused by our own domestic situation, with which your Ambassador is no doubt fully familiar. No country can afford a weakening, extending over years, of its central authority without paying some price for it over the next years. But we are in the process of rectifying this, and if you separate the debate from the votes, you will see we have lately been winning on the votes in Congress, which is a reflection of public opinion.

We have improved the situation in Portugal and we hope that within the next four-six months we can solve or make major progress on the Turkish/Greek/Cyprus problem.

You are familiar with the situation in the Middle East. We believe that the Soviet Union has suffered a major setback, President Sadat is coming to Washington next week to continue the development of a common strategy. But here again it is an area where it is important for us to understand the relationship between strategy and tactics. We recognize that the best way to prevent hegemonistic desires in the Middle East is to bring about a permanent settlement. But we also realize that one cannot bring about a permanent settlement by rhetoric or by putting forward plans. Permanent settlement has a local component; it has an international component; and it has an American domestic component. Our problem is to synchronize these three aspects. We cannot master the local component unless we demonstrate the Soviet Union cannot bring about a conclusion. So that whenever the Soviet Union interferes, we have to go through a period of demonstrating its impotence. We also have to teach the Soviet clients in the Middle East that the only road to a settlement leads through Washington.

The second necessity we have is to get our domestic opinion used to a more even-handed policy between the Arabs and Israelis -- as Chairman Mao suggested when

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

- 10 -


I saw him two years ago. Every previous comprehensive American effort has failed because of the inability to mobilize our domestic support. We now believe the objective conditions exist for a comprehensive settlement for the first time under American leadership. And we intend to move in that direction immediately after our elections.

In the meantime we will take interim steps to alleviate the situation. And in any event, no one else has any realistic alternatives. But it is our fixed policy to move towards a comprehensive settlement. The major danger now is Arab disunity exploited by the Soviet Union. And whatever influence other countries may have, especially on Syria, would be of great importance.

There are other issues: Japan, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Korea. But we have several days to discuss them. I want to say one thing about Korea where we clearly have different views. We are not opposed to reunification and we are not opposed to a dialogue, but we are opposed to having separate talks with North Korea to the exclusion of South Korea. I would also like to say that it is possible that by forcing the pace of events too far, geopolitical realities could be created that are not always to the benefit of those who force the pace.

Let me say a word about our bilateral relations. On normalization, we have made clear our continuing commitment to the principles of the Shanghai Communique, and we will suggest to you some formulations in the communique which suggest some progress in that direction. We think it is important to show some vitality and forward movement in our bilateral relationship. We do not do this because we particularly care about the level of trade between the United States and China, and we believe also that China, having survived 2,000 years of its history without extensive contact with the

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

- 11 -

United States, may manage to stagger on for many more years without extensive exchange between our various cultural troupes. We can even survive your favorite songs without revolution. But to us that is not the issue. To us the issue is how to be in the best position to resist hegemonial aspirations in the West as well as in the East. And if that is the case, it is important that we show some movement in our relationship. It is difficult to gain public support for what may have to be done if China is not an important element in American consciousness, and it cannot be unless there is some improvement in our bilateral relationship. This is entirely up to you. We have nothing very material to gain from it. But if there is an inequality in American public consciousness between relations with China and the Soviet Union, it is because nothing very substantial is happening in our relationship.

While I am here, Mr. Habib is prepared to meet with anybody you designate to discuss this relationship, if you are interested. It is up to you.

To sum up, we consider our relations with the People's Republic of China, as I have now said on two public occasions, a very significant element in our overall policy. It is that, because of our assessment of the world situation. It is that, because we believe it is important to maintain the overall situation against aspirations to hegemony. We are not doing it in order to be able to divide up the world in two with the Soviet Union -- an opportunity which has often been offered to us, and which we have always rejected because we would become the ultimate victim of such a procedure. We told you about the treaty that Brezhnev offered to the President in Vladivostok.

So we are bound to have our differences in ideology and in specific countries, but I also believe we have some important common interests and it is those common interests which have brought me here eight times, I believe, for more extensive visits than to any other

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE



country. There are many other points we will want to discuss. I am sure you want to discuss Japan. And I have already discussed Angola with your Foreign Minister, where we would find it helpful if Tanzania would release some of your arms that they are blocking. But we can discuss that during the course of my visit here. You will have noticed that as a former professor, I spoke exactly fifty minutes.

TENG: Are you finished?

KISSINGER: I have another fifty minutes at least, but I want to give you an opportunity first.

TENG: So, shall we first invite you to finish your speech and then we will give our opinion? You can go on to the next fifty minutes.

KISSINGER: No. I have substantially stated my overall views. There is one additional point I wish to make. You must not judge the mood of the United States by the atmosphere in Washington. And you must not judge the attitudes of America by the mood of the most unrepresentative Congress we have ever had. This last Congress was elected in the immediate aftermath of the resignation of President Nixon when those who had been for him were very demoralized. I have been traveling through the country systematically and I am certain that we will get wide support for the policy that I have described to you. Your Liaison Office may not see that (mood) in Washington. It is no reflection on your Liaison Office -- it is simply a reflection on Washington. This is all I want to say now and I will make more comments after I have heard from you.

TENG: I have listened carefully to the views and points regarding the international situation that the Doctor has given. There is a question I would like to ask. How much grain are you selling to the Soviet Union this year?

KISSINGER: (Laughter) Let me explain the grain policy. I was going to mention it later. In the past the Soviet Union has bought grain in emergencies from the United States. Given the organization of our economy, we have no technical way of preventing this. So in 1972 they bought 20 million



~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

- 13 -

tons of grain. In subsequent years they bought very little. That means when they bought grain they have had an extremely disruptive effect on our economy. Also, we have had the problem of how to use their need for grain in order to bring about policies that are compatible with our interest, and how to do this in an economy that has no technical means of preventing the sale and to prevent pressures on us from our own agricultural interests. I want to explain our thinking to you so that you can understand it. So what we did this year is the following: they have a very bad harvest. We sold them about 9.8 million tons of grain. We then brought about a stoppage of further sales by pressure on the private companies, which caused us enormous domestic difficulties. We used this period of stoppage to force the Soviet Union to ship a substantial part of the grain in American ships, at about double the world rate, and giving us an opportunity to control the rate of delivery. We then insisted on a long-term grain agreement which will probably be signed today or tomorrow.

TENG: The annual amount?

KISSINGER: About 6 million tons for five years.

TENG: The total is 6 million?

KISSINGER: Annually 6 million tons. But the important point is that it forces them to buy when they don't need it, and it places a ceiling on what we have to sell when they are in an emergency.

TENG: Do you think that this massive buying of grain not only from the United States but also other quarters is only to fill their stomachs but also for strategic reserves?

KISSINGER: We believe that they have had a catastrophic crop this year. It is about 160 million tons, below the normal of about 225. At Helsinki Brezhnev asked to buy 15 million tons from us on top of the 9.8 million he had already bought, but we are only going to sell him about

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

- 14 -

5 million more this year. All our information is that they will have to slaughter cattle this year to reduce their livestock because they are short of food grains to feed them.

TENG: May I ask another question? That is, how are the negotiations about sales of American modern equipment and technology to the Soviet Union coming along?

KISSINGER: What modern equipment and technology?

TENG: I believe you have constant communication with them on this.

KISSINGER: They have constant interest in modern equipment and technology. We are not selling a great deal at this moment. Nothing of any significance.

TENG: We have noticed that France has been engaging in negotiations with them for long-term agreements involving about 2.5 million Francs.

KISSINGER: While we have talked more than we have done in economic credits, the Europeans have done more than they have said. They have given altogether -- between the Federal Republic and France -- about \$7.5 billion in credit. We have given them about 500 million over years.

TENG: \$7 billion?

KISSINGER: Yes. We have used the prospect of technology to moderate their foreign policy conduct and we are trying to employ a strategy of keeping the Soviets dependent by not selling plans but parts to them. It is the folly of the European countries that they are selling plans. Unfortunately the small amount of U.S. credits has had the effect of throwing the business into the hands of the Europeans who have no strategy at all. For us it is not a business proposition. We are doing it for a strategic proposition.

TENG: We have seen from publications that the amount of such dealings between the United States and the Soviet Union seems to have exceeded that of the European and other countries.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

- 15 -

KISSINGER: That is totally incorrect. The amount of dealings we can control; that is, governmental credits, have been less than \$500 million. There may be another three or four hundred million of private credits. In any event, the things we can control we do in such a manner that they can always be shut off and that they do not have rapid completion dates.

TENG: May I ask another question? What is the Doctor's assessment of the consequences of the Helsinki Conference?

KISSINGER: I do not believe ... It is one point where I do not agree, where our assessments are totally different. We sometimes disagree on tactics. I do not agree the Helsinki Conference was a significant event. In America it has had no impact whatever and insofar as it is known in America, it is as a device to ask the Soviet Union to ease their control over Eastern Europe and over their own people.

In Western Europe if one looks at (specific) countries, it may have had some minor negative impact in a minority of countries. In France, Britain, and the Federal Republic it has had no impact. In Eastern Europe it is the countries like Yugoslavia, Romania and Poland which most want to be independent of the Soviet Union which have been the most active supporters of the Helsinki Conference. I do not think we should proclaim Soviet victories that do not exist. Our role in the European Security Conference, as I told you last year, was essentially passive. We do not believe it has had a major impact.

TENG: But we have noticed that those who have been most enthusiastic in proclaiming the so-called victories of the European Security Conference are first of all the Soviet Union and secondly the United States.

KISSINGER: No. First of all the Soviet Union and secondly our domestic opponents in the United States. The United States Government has not claimed any great achievements for the European Security Conference. The Soviet Union has ... must claim success since it pursued this policy for fifteen years.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE



SECRET/SENSITIVE

- 16 -

Our indications are that the Soviet Union may feel -- whatever they say publicly -- that they have miscalculated with respect to the European Security Conference. All they got from the West were general statements about matters that had already been settled in the past while we have obtained means of very specific pressures on matters of practical issues.

There were no unsettled frontiers in Europe. The Balkan frontiers were settled in 1946-47 in the peace conferences in Paris. The Eastern frontier of Poland was settled at Yalta. The Western frontier of Poland was recognized by both German states. There are no frontiers in Europe that are not recognized. Not all of our politicians know this but this is legally a fact.

TENG: So shall we call it a morning and continue this afternoon?

KISSINGER: Alright.

TENG: And we can give our opinions.

KISSINGER: Shall I give the communique to the Foreign Minister?

TENG: Alright. Perhaps you could explain it here.

KISSINGER: May I explain a few points? In the spirit of what I said earlier we expressed the most positive things which can be said which you may want to moderate. But leaving aside the rhetorical aspects of any communique there are three categories in our relationship which attract attention: one is what we say about hegemony; second is what we say about normalization; and the third is what we say about our bilateral relations. With respect to hegemony, what we say may help ease public opinion problems of some other countries, especially if we don't put it in the preamble. What we have attempted to do with respect to both hegemony and normalization is to go some steps beyond the Shanghai Communique.

SECRET/SENSITIVE



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

- 17 -

TENG: One moment please. (Teng leaves the room.)
You can continue. Please wait. Excuse us for a moment.

(Teng returns to the room.)

KISSINGER: We did the same with the bilateral things. Since we don't know your thinking we put in everything that could conceivably be put down but to us the primary significance is symbolic. One or two things on the bilateral things I would like to explain in a more restricted meeting as I explained to the Foreign Minister yesterday in the car. More restricted on our side. I do not care who participates on your side.

[Secretary hands Communique to the Foreign Minister. *Attached.*]

KISSINGER: Is two copies enough for you?

TENG: I think that is enough.

KISSINGER: The last time I gave the Foreign Minister a three page Communique, he came back with three lines.

(Laughter)

TENG: If what you want to discuss in a restricted group is what you mentioned to the Foreign Minister in the car, if it is of that nature, then as Chairman Mao has made our position very clear to you in his discussions before, especially in the visit of 1973, it is our view that perhaps such restrictive talks will not be necessary.

KISSINGER: It is up to you.

TENG: As for the Communique draft we will look it over and then we can further consult each other. I heard you have an idea you would like to ... that you want to go to the Palace Museum this afternoon with your wife. Perhaps we should begin later. At 4:00 p.m.

KISSINGER: Good.

TENG: So we shall agree upon meeting at 4:00 p.m. this afternoon. In this same room. Because this is very close to the Palace Museum.

KISSINGER: That's fine.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE



~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE

Meeting ended at 11:40 a.m.

~~SECRET~~/SENSITIVE



Teng/HAK
morning



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

- Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council, People's Republic of China
- Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office, Washington
- Lin P'ing, Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Tsien Ta-yung, Political Counselor, PRC Liaison Office, Washington
- Ting Yuan-hung, Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Shih Yen-hua (Interpreter)

- Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
- George Bush, Chief of the United States Liaison Office, Peking
- Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
- William H. Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
- Oscar V. Armstrong, Director, People's Republic of China and Mongolian Affairs, Department of State
- Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council *RHS*

DATE AND TIME:

Monday, October 20, 1975; 4: 15 - 6: 35 p.m.

~~TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~TOP SECRET~~ - XGDS (3)
CLASSIFIED BY: HENRY A. KISSINGER

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 1.6

HQC MEMO, 11/11/88, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, STATE DEPT. REV. 9/16/03
BY _____, NARA, DATE _____



PLACE: Great Hall of the People
Peking, People's Republic of China

SUBJECT: Global Strategy for Dealing with the Soviet
Union; the Historical Lessons of the 1930s

Vice Premier Teng: You visited the Forbidden City?!

Secretary Kissinger: I love to visit there. During my last trip I
escaped my keepers and visited there by myself.

I appreciate all the arrangements you have made.

Vice Premier Teng: It seems to me that of all emperors and kings
[in the world], the Chinese emperors did not know how to enjoy life.

Secretary Kissinger: Didn't know how to enjoy life?

Vice Premier Teng: In terms of food and clothing, yes; but in terms of
the quality of their residences they did not know how to enjoy life. One
other thing is that the Chinese emperors changed their clothes every
day -- new clothes every day! Do you think they would be very
comfortable wearing new clothes every day? And at every meal the
emperor would have 99 courses. Actually they could only take whatever
was close to them.


Secretary Kissinger: It doesn't sound like trouble or hardship to me.
If you give me one corner [of the Forbidden City] I would be comfortable.

Vice Premier Teng: That was built by the Empress Dowager.

And the other feature of the Chinese emperors was that whatever [food]
they thought of they would try to get immediately. The Imperial cooks
would only give them food that was most obtainable. They didn't give
them any other dishes, otherwise the emperor would kill the cooks!

Secretary Kissinger: Why was that?

Vice Premier Teng: Because the cooks could only get the things that
were available in that season. If the emperor liked a dish and asked for
it but could not get it, he would kill the cook.



Secretary Kissinger: That is what my staff does in the State Department. They try to limit my choices.

Vice Premier Teng: Let's turn to the subjects we are going to discuss. I will first explain our views.

Our relations were started in February, 1972. That was during President Nixon's visit to China. And before that Doctor made visits to Peking to prepare for President Nixon's visit to China. And we have stated on more than one occasion that we appreciate the first remarks by former President Nixon to Chairman Mao. When he met the Chairman he said, "I have come to China out of our national interest." We also appreciate that President Nixon took this courageous step. And we also understand the sincerity of President Nixon when he said that he had come to China out of the national interest of the United States. We believe this is not diplomatic talk.

And thereafter, the Doctor made several visits to China, and Chairman Mao told President Nixon, as well as the Doctor, that we have common points which were reflected in the Shanghai Communique. Our common aim is to fix the polar bear, deal with the polar bear.

I believe the Doctor also remembers that when in talking about the Middle East, Chairman Mao also advised the United States to use two hands. You should not only use one hand to help Israel, but also the other hand to help the Arab countries, especially Egypt. In the talk, Chairman Mao emphasized that China supported the Arab countries. And this position of China is different from that of the United States. But we can also see a common ground -- that is we can both fix the polar bear.

Chairman Mao stressed on many occasions that between us there are certain problems of bilateral relations, but what is more important are the international problems. On international issues, we think we should look at the international problems from a political point of view. Only in this way can we have a common view, can we have coordination in some respects. And exactly on this point we appreciate the statesmanship of President Nixon. We have never attached any importance to what you call the Watergate event. By political problems I mean how we should deal with the Soviet Union. This is a question of strategy -- a question of global strategy.

And this morning I listened attentively to the Doctor's remarks, and according to what you said this morning the United States has a clear



world view with regard to strategy, and now you are only thinking of tactics. As I understand it, tactics are guided by strategy and serve strategy. The tactics manifest in various fields may conform to the strategy and may also deviate from strategy.

The Doctor seems to believe that the Chinese are intransigent in tactics, and I know what you are referring to. You put stress on flexibility. If we are to make an assessment of ourselves, we can say that we have never been intransigent. We think that flexibility must conform to strategic needs. Too much flexibility leads people to wonder what the strategy really is.

This morning the Doctor first talked about strategy towards the Soviet Union. There exist differences between us in this respect. We believe the focus of the Soviet strategy is in the West, in Europe -- in the Middle East, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf -- all the places linked to Europe.


Although the Soviet Union has stationed one million troops along the 7,200 kilometer border [between Russian and China] the Soviet strategy remains toward the West. The Soviet strategy is to make a feint toward the East while attacking in the West.

In this regard, the U.S. has stressed to us on many occasions the danger of a Soviet attack against China. I believe that the Doctor still remembers that Chairman Mao had a deep talk with you in this regard. He concluded that the polar bear is out to fix the United States.

We have heard, on not less than one occasion, that the Doctor has said that whether the Soviet Union was making a feint in the East while attacking the West, or making a feint in the West while attacking in the East, this makes not much difference.

We hold different views. How to assess Soviet strategy? This is not a matter of rhetoric but a matter of substance. This assessment is the starting point of the tactics formulated to deal with international matters.

We say that the focus of the Soviet strategy is in the West and it is out to fix the United States. Even the one million Soviet troops stationed in the East are directed against the U.S. Seventh Fleet first of all and not



merely against China. First we say that the Soviet troops are directed against the Seventh Fleet, and then Japan, and then China. Also we say that the Soviet focus is in the West.

We are also making solid preparations. But one should by no means be under the false impression that when China proposes this theory that China wants to direct the Soviet Union Westward so that the Soviet Union will not go to the East.

I heard that during your first trip to China, prior to President Nixon's visit, Premier Chou talked to you. I was not present, but he said China's strategy was to get prepared to deal with aggression from all sides. At that time we did not have the Shanghai Communique yet. Well, although I have read the verbal record of your talk, I do not remember what the original words were; but anyway, the Premier told you that even if the Soviet Union siezes the land north of the Yellow River, and Japan grabs the northeast, the United States the east, and India grabs Tibet, we are not afraid. That was what we thought at that time.

After the Shanghai Communique, we made no reference to these words. We have always believed that we should rely on our independent strength to deal with the Soviet Union, and we have never cherished any illusions about this. We have told this to the Doctor as well as to visiting American friends. We do not depend on nuclear weapons; even less on nuclear protection [by other countries]. We depend on two things: First is the perseverance of the 800 million Chinese people. If the Soviet Union wants to attack China it must be prepared to fight for at least two decades. We mainly depend on millet plus rifles. Of course, this millet plus rifles is different from what we had during Yenan times. We pursue a policy of self-reliance in our economic construction and also in our strategic problems.

As I said just now, we are not directing the evil of the Soviet Union Westward, but we are concerned about the West because if the Soviet Union is to make trouble its focal point is in the West. Naturally we are concerned about it. It is precisely preceeding from this assessment that we are interested in a unified and strong Europe -- including the improvement of relations between Europe and the United States.



It is also precisely preceded from this strategic assessment that we advised you to use both of your hands in dealing with Arabs and Israelis.

It is also precisely out of this strategic assessment that we expressed that we did not understand the attitude of the United States in the case when the Soviet Union and India dismembered Pakistan.

These are political problems as well as strategic problems, and these include tactics under the guidance of these problems, these strategic problems -- for instance, when we advised you to use both of your hands [in the Middle East] this was tactics.

It was also precisely out of this strategic assessment that we have often told you, as well as Japan, that Japan should put a first priority on relations between Japan and the United States and then between Japan and China. This not only concerns the West but also the East.

On this point, we have advised our American friends on many occasions that the United States should formulate its own focus of strategy. We have often said the United States was keeping ten fleas under its ten fingers and that the United States should not let itself bog down in the quagmire of Indochina.

And out of this strategic consideration, when the United States was building its military base in Diego Garcia on the Indian Ocean China did not criticize this.

On these questions and a number of other issues we proceed from political and strategic considerations to deal with international problems as well as our bilateral relations. We have made our assessment of Soviet strategy after careful study of the international situation. In our talks with the Europeans, they have constantly raised the [following] question: "If there is trouble in Europe, what will be the attitude of the United States?" I will be very candid with the Doctor, the Europeans are very apprehensive on this point.

Secretary Kissinger: But our question is what will be the attitude of the Europeans?



Vice Premier Teng: Perhaps this has something to do with your relations with the Europeans. The Doctor may recall that in 1973 Chairman Mao asked you whether it was possible for the new isolationism to emerge in the United States. You answered in the affirmative, negative term. You said no.

Secretary Kissinger: I just now said to Mr. Lord that I knew I was tricky, but I am not that tricky -- to answer "affirmatively no." (Laughter)

Vice Premier Teng: But from that you can assess what Chairman Mao is thinking, what we are thinking about. This observation of the situation dates back as early as the first nuclear arms talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Those talks took place in 1963. That treaty was prepared by three countries, and it left a deep impression on me at that time. I made my last visit to the Soviet Union as head of the delegation of the Chinese Communist Party to negotiate with the Russians, and it [the non-proliferation treaty] was made public on the day when we left [Moscow].

At that time our talks with the Soviet Union were completely bankrupt, and we were certain that a most important part of the treaty was directed against China. I don't doubt that at that time the attitude of the United States and the British was to restrain the Soviet Union from nuclear development. Of course this is a strategic problem and, in terms of tactics, after more than nine years -- nearly ten years -- in this period things have changed. They show that the aim -- the purpose -- of these tactics has failed to be achieved.

In 1972, when you reached the second [SALT] agreement, the Soviet Union drastically quickened their pace in the development of nuclear arms. Their pace was quicker than the United States. When the third agreement [on prevention of nuclear war] was reached between your countries, it [the strategic balance] had reached equilibrium. In November last year when we met [after the Vladivostok meeting], the Doctor informed us that the number of Soviet missiles had not yet reached the ceiling, and this morning you told us that the number of Soviet missiles had exceeded the ceiling -- leaving aside the quality.

This is our observation from one angle. And in the race between the Soviet Union and the United States, the United States has not gained. In terms of conventional weapons, the Soviet Union has far exceeded you and Europe.



It is almost eleven months since we met last year. During this period we have again made our observations. And through our observations we have got the impression that the Helsinki Conference is an indication -- and not only the Helsinki Conference, but things before the Helsinki Conference -- that it is worthwhile to recall history.

Secretary Kissinger: What things?

Vice Premier Teng: Well, problems of various descriptions [mentioned] earlier.

By recalling history, I mean the period prior to the Second World War -- the period 1936 to 1939, which is particularly worthwhile to recall. The Doctor studies history and I think is more knowledgeable than I.

As I understand, the Doctor once said that in actuality the Soviet Union has gone beyond the Rhineland. This shows that the Doctor has made a study of it. After the Germans entered into the Rhineland you may recall what was the attitude of the British and French, and what was the policy pursued by Chamberlain and Daladier. They pursued a policy of appeasement towards Hitler, and shortly after that the Munich agreement was concluded.

In pursuing such policies the purpose of Chamberlain and Daladier was obvious. They wanted to direct the peril Eastward, and their first aim was to appease Hitler so that he would not take rash actions. Their second aim was to direct the peril toward the East. The stark historical realities have brought out the failure of the policies carried out by Chamberlain and Daladier. Their policies have gone to the opposite of their wishes. They neither got international peace and stability nor achieved their purpose of directing the peril of Hitler to the East. Instead, the spearhead of Hitler was directed to the West -- Czechoslovakia and Poland. These countries were in the West, and they [the Germans] did not attack the Soviet Union first.

If I remember correctly from what I read in newspapers, when Chamberlain visited Germany he carried an umbrella. But it neither shaded him from the moon or the sun -- no, the rain or the sun. At that time France boasted that they had the Maginot line. But Germany did not attack the Maginot line. They attacked from Belgium and attacked France, and France collapsed and Chamberlain



gave up all resistance. He mobilized all the ships to move from Dunkirk -- that is, he wanted to slip away.

So in fact this appeasement policy led to an earlier break out of the Second World War. In our contacts with quite a number of Europeans they often raise the lessons of Munich. According to our observations, we may say that the danger of such historical tragedy is increasing.

The Doctor asked just now what were other things apart from the Helsinki Conference. I raised three questions to you this morning. This shows there were other things apart from the Helsinki Conference.

In terms of strategy, Soviet weapons have far exceeded those of the West. Also you have reached the equilibrium of weapons. In terms of total military strength, the Soviet Union has a greater military strength than the United States and the European countries put together. But the Soviet Union has two big weaknesses: One, they lack food grains; the second is that their industrial equipment and technology is backward. In the long run although the Soviet Union has a greater military strength, these two weaknesses have put the Soviet Union in a weak position. It is limited in its strength so that when a war breaks out the Soviet Union cannot hold out long.

Therefore, we do not understand why the United States and the West have used their strong points to make up for the Soviet weakness. If the United States and Europe have taken advantage of the weaknesses of the Soviet Union you might have been in a stronger negotiating position.

As for our views on the Helsinki Conference, I think you know our views, which differ from yours. We call it the European Insecurity Conference and you call it the European Security Conference. The Munich agreement pulled the wool over the eyes of Chamberlin, Daladier, and some European people. And in the case when you supply them, make up for the weak points of the Soviet Union, you help the Soviet Union to overcome its weaknesses. You can say you pulled the wool over the eyes of the West and demoralized the Western people and let them slacken their pace. We have a Chinese saying: A donkey is made to push the mill stone because when you make the donkey to push around the mill stone you have to blindfold it.



This is a political or we may say a strategic problem in the present situation which people are most concerned with. And we are now speaking our views on these problems very candidly.

As for the Russians, they now feel you cannot restrain them. They are not reliable and cannot be restrained. And, of course, in the West -- including the United States -- there are two schools of public opinion. A greater part of the public opinion has clearly seen this. A considerable, greater part of the public opinion has seen this. We understand that the Americans, Europeans, and including the Japanese, do not want a war because they have gone through two World Wars. This we can understand. They fear a war.

We always feel that to rely on the European Security Conference, or anything else in an attempt to appease the Russians, will fail. These things will be counter productive. For example, the Europeans fear war day and night. They hope to obtain peace for a certain period of time at any price. Exactly because of that, we should not blindfold them by the evolution of detente. We should remind them of the possibility of attack from the polar bear. So every time Chairman Mao meets foreign guests he advises them to get prepared. Without preparation they would suffer. The most effective way to deal with the possible attack from the Russians is not what you call agreements or treaties, [not] what is written on paper, but actual preparations.

As for China, we have told you on many occasions, and I will [again] tell you frankly, that China fears nothing under heaven or on earth. China will not ask favors from anyone. We depend on the digging of tunnels. We rely on millet plus rifles to deal with all problems internationally and locally, including the problems in the East.

There is an argument in the world to the effect that China is afraid of an attack by the Russians. As a friend, I will be candid and tell you that this assessment is wrong.

Today we are only talking about strategic problems. The Doctor was a former professor. I have taken my 50 minutes to talk and I have gone beyond 50 minutes. That was because I am only a soldier. It is not easy to confine oneself within 50 minutes. I once taught in a school. I gave a lecture for 50 minutes, but I have never been a professor. I have taken too much of your time.



Secretary Kissinger: No, it was interesting and important.

Can we take a five minute break, and maybe I will make a few observations?

Vice Premier Teng: Yes.

(There was a short break at this point.)

Secretary Kissinger: Do you want me to make some observations now, or how do you propose to proceed?

Vice Premier Teng: Yes. Please go ahead.

Secretary Kissinger: I listened with great interest to the Vice Premier's presentation and I would like to make a few observations.

First, I have noticed the frequent reference to President Nixon. I have worked very closely with President Nixon. And I think it is correct to say that we jointly designed the policy to which you referred approvingly. It is also the case that I am still in touch with him every two or three weeks at some length, so I know his views very precisely. I can safely say that the policy we are pursuing today is the policy that President Nixon would pursue if it had not been for Watergate. The policy toward the Soviet Union that is being pursued today was designed by President Nixon and myself and is the same that is being pursued today. There is no difference between President Nixon's policy toward the Soviet Union and President Ford's. If anything, President Ford is a nuance tougher toward the Soviet Union. And I say this as the one man in public life who has maintained contact with President Nixon and never criticized him and has stated publicly that he has made a great contribution in matters of foreign policy.

Leaving this aside, I must say I listened to the Vice Premier's presentation with some sadness. I had thought, obviously incorrectly, that some of the public statements which I had heard were said for public effect. But this is obviously not the case. Now what I regret is that I



can understand two countries, operating from the same perception, can operate using different tactics -- and can understand each other's tactics. That causes me no difficulty. But if there is not a common strategic perception, then one wonders what exactly the basis of our policy is. If you seriously think that we are trying to push the Soviet Union to attack in the East, then we are in grave danger of frittering away all our efforts -- with yourself and everyone else.

The Vice Premier was kind enough to point out the lessons of history between 1936 and 1939. He pointed out that those in the West who tried to push the aggressor towards the East became the first victims of the attack; and that is true. But it is also true that those in the East who sought to escape their dilemma by pushing their aggressor toward the West eventually became the objects of the aggressor anyway.

And when we say that the West and the East have essentially the same strategic problem, we don't say this because we have an interest in participating in the defense of the East. Anyone who knows the American domestic situation must know that this cannot be our overwhelming ambition. We say it because strategically wherever the attack occurs it will affect the other. And you act on these assumptions too.

And we are saying this not to do you any favors, because you are not all that helpful to us in other parts of the world. We are doing this out of our own national interest.

In 1971, in January of 1971, before we had been in China, during the crisis in India, when India had dismembered Pakistan, I talked to your Ambassador in New York on a Friday evening. He told me that China always fights as long as it has one rifle. I then told him we would move an aircraft carrier into the Bay of Bengal. On Sunday morning, when we were on the way to the Azores to meet President Pompidou, we received a message that your Ambassador in New York wanted to see us; and we sent General Haig to see him. We thought then that you might be taking some military action. And we decided that even though we had no diplomatic relations -- President Nixon and I decided -- that if you moved, and if the Soviet Union brought pressure on you, we would resist and assist you, even though you had not asked us to. We did that out of our conviction of the national interest.



And we have said recently again to the Prime Minister of Pakistan -- because he asked us about this -- we said that we would not be indifferent if the Soviet Union brought pressure on China because of the Indian situation. He must have told you this. And again, you have not asked us to do this, nor did we do this as a favor to China.

So, since I have been in Washington we have gone to a confrontation with the Soviet Union three times: Once over a nuclear submarine base in Cuba; once over the Syrian invasion of Jordan; once over the question of the alert in the Middle East in 1973 and -- no, four times -- once on the question of access routes to Berlin. We did all of these things on our own, without knowing what any other country, much less China, would do.

The Vice Premier referred to the spirit of Munich. I have studied that period and I lived through it, as a victim, so I know it rather well. The Munich policy was conducted by governments who denied that there was a danger, and who attempted to avoid their problems by denying that they existed. The current United States policy, as we have attempted to tell you, has no illusions about the danger, but it attempts to find the most effective means of resistance given the realities we face. A country that spends \$110 billion a year for defense cannot be said to be pursuing the spirit of Munich. But the reality we face is a certain attitude that has developed in the United States and an attitude that exists also in Europe even much more.

I know some of the Europeans who you talk about. Some are personally good friends of mine. But there is no European of any standing that has any question about what the United States will do. In any threat, we will be there. Our concern is whether the Europeans will be there. It is the United States that organizes the defense of the North Atlantic and that brings about the only cohesion that exists. It was not the United States that advocated the European Security Conference. It was, rather, to ease some of the pressures on the European governments that we reluctantly agreed to it in 1971.

Now the Vice Premier is quite correct, this is a problem that greatly concerns us, whether the policy that is being pursued may lead to confusion. This is a serious concern. But the Vice Premier should also consider that the policy we are pursuing is the best means we have



to rally resistance. If we pursued some other approach, the left wing parties in Europe might split the United States from Europe with the argument that the United States is a threat to the peace of the world.


If you follow the present investigations that are going on in America, you will see that it was the present Administration, including myself, that has used methods to prevent the Soviet Union from stretching out its hands -- even if these are not your preferred methods.

And if we were slow in our disengagement from Indochina -- and this was not a situation that we created -- it was precisely to prevent the mood of neoisolationism from developing that Chairman Mao talked of. We do not rely on the European Security Conference. And we do not rely on detente. Nor is everyone in the United States who talks against detente a reliable opponent of the Soviet Union, because without a strategic grasp of the situation much of it [anti-detente talk] is simply politics. To talk tough is easy -- to act with strength and maintain support for a strong policy over a period of time in a democracy is a difficult problem.

If the Soviet Union should stretch out its hands, we will be brutal in our response, no matter where it occurs -- and we won't ask people whether they share our assessment when we resist. But to be able to do this we have to prepare our public by our own methods, and by methods that will enable us to sustain this policy over many years, and not go like Dulles from a period of intransigence to a period of excessive conciliation.

The Administration in the '50's started out not willing to shake hands with Communists [translated as, "with China"] and wound up almost giving away Berlin -- had it not been for Khrushchev's clumsiness. Our strategy is exactly as we discussed it with Chairman Mao three years ago. It has not changed, and it has the strategic advantage. But we have to be the best judge of the means appropriate to our situation. And we will not stand still for a strategic advance by the Soviet Union.

And we do not separate the fronts into East and West. If the Soviet Union feels strong enough to attack in either the West or the East, the policy will already have failed. The Soviet Union must not be in a position where it feels strong enough to attack at all.




Now I would like to correct a few other misapprehensions which the Vice Premier voiced, and then I will make one other observation.

One thing has to do with relative military strength. It is perfectly true that the Soviet Union has gained in relative strength in the last decade. This is not the result of the agreements that have been signed. This is the result of changes in technology, and the erroneous decision of the Administration that was in office in the 60's when the Soviet Union was building up its strategic forces. If you analyze the results of the [SALT] agreement of 1972, since 1972 the strategic strength of the United States has increased considerably relative to that of the Soviet Union. It is also true that after some point in the field of strategic weapons, it is difficult to translate military superiority into a political advantage.

With respect to the second agreement, the Vladivostok agreement, you must have translated what I said incorrectly from the German. There has been no change in the Soviet strength since Vladivostok. Since the Soviet Union does not dismantle their obsolete units, they have 2,700 units and they have had those for five years. After Vladivostok they would have to get rid of 200. Since we do get rid of our obsolete units we have somewhat less than 2400. But numbers are not so important anyway, as each [U.S.] unit can carry more warheads. We have been ahead by a ratio of 6 or 7 to 1. Moreover, since the Soviets like big things which take room, they have about 85 to 90 percent of their forces on land, where they are vulnerable because the accuracy of our forces is improved. Less than 20 percent of our forces are on land, and they are less vulnerable. So it is not true that in the strategic balance we are behind, even though there are many newspaper articles in America written for political purposes that assert this.

In 1960 President Kennedy was elected by speaking of the missile gap, even though the Soviet Union had only 30 missiles, each of which took ten hours to get ready to fire and we had 1,200 airplanes. Ever since then it has been the secret dream of every American presidential candidate to run on a missile gap campaign, so we are in danger of this issue erupting every four years.

In 1970 when we confronted the Soviets on the submarine base in Cuba, in 1970 in Jordan, in 1970 in Berlin, and in 1973 in the Middle East, they always yielded within 36 hours when we made a military move. Their military calculations are not as optimistic as some of our European friends fear -- such as Denmark.



On the question of food grains: We have moved at the slowest pace that is politically possible for us, and have even held up our grain sales -- even while Canada, Australia, Argentina, and Western Europe have cleared out their bins in selling to the Soviets. The long term program we are now negotiating precisely prevents them from storing large quantities because it puts a ceiling on what they can buy in one year on the American market.

So our policy is quite clear, and in pursuing it we have not asked anything from China. We have kept you informed by our many discussions, but I don't recall that we have ever asked for anything from the People's Republic of China. Of course, China pursues its own policies, and we respect your independence. I hope you will make the positions which you made clear to us clear to every European visitor who comes here. We do not object to your public posture. We think it is essentially correct, and indeed it is even helpful. We do object when you direct it against us, when you accuse us of betraying our allies and endangering the security of the world by deliberately promoting war and standing on the side lines, when in fact we are doing actual things to prevent a war and preserve the world equilibrium.

And you should also consider that if the United States public finds too much discouragement around the world, and if everywhere we move we find the opposition of every country, then precisely this mood of isolationism which concerns so many other countries will develop.

We attach great significance to our relationship with the People's Republic of China because we believe you conduct a serious policy and because we believe your word counts. And we believe that the world is one entity from a strategic point of view and a political point of view.

We are prepared to coordinate actions along the lines of my conversations with Chairman Mao two years ago. But the world situation is extremely complex, and the domestic situations around the world are also extremely complex. It is important that you have a correct perception of our objectives. If you think we are engaged in petty tactical maneuvers then that would be a pity for both of us. You do not ask for favors, and we do not ask for favors. The basis of a correct policy is an accurate perception of the national interest and respect by each side for the perception of the national interest of the other.

This is why we think a visit by the President here would be useful, and that is the purpose of our policy. We don't need theater, and we don't need you to divert Soviet energies -- that would be a total misconception and it might lead to the same catastrophe as in the 1930s. After all we resisted Soviet expansion when we were allies, and we will resist it for our own reasons as you resist it for your own reasons.

I repeat, we attach great significance to our relations. We are prepared to coordinate. We think you are serious, and we are equally serious. On that basis I think we can have a useful relationship.

As I have not used up 50 minutes, I will use the remainder tomorrow.

Vice Premier Teng: Yes. It is quite late -- shall we go on tomorrow afternoon?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Vice Premier Teng: As to the time, we can discuss it later.

Secretary Kissinger: We are not going anywhere.

Vice Premier Teng: Right.

Secretary Kissinger: Good.



Report to the
President



MEMORANDUM

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.5

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MR 05-19 #4 State Rtr 8/30/06
NSC Memo 11/24/98
BY HR NARA DATE 5/16/07

~~TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE~~
~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~

October 21, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: GENERAL SCOWCROFT 


SUBJECT: Secretary's talks with Chinese Officials

Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass to you the following report of his talks with Chinese officials.

"I met with Vice Premier Teng and others for one and three quarters hours in the morning and two and one-half hours in the afternoon on Monday in the Great Hall of the People. My first day of substantive discussions with the Chinese was somewhat puzzling and ambivalent. They clearly welcome your visit but at the same time are extremely critical of our alleged strategic passivity towards the Soviet Union. As is customary, we spent almost the entire time on the international situation, most of it centering about our respective policies for dealing with Soviet hegemony. In the morning I gave a tour d'horizon, including an explanation of how we must combine flexibility with firmness versus Moscow in order to maintain public support for our foreign policy. In the afternoon Teng made a long presentation on the Soviet "Polar Bear" which was very similar to what he said last year with respect to Moscow's global aggressiveness, but much more critical of our policy in response. Whereas previously the Chinese suspected collusion between the superpowers, now they are charging us with appeasement in the face of growing Soviet power -- an indication that they consider us weaker than before. The analogy is to Western Europe's Munich policy of appeasement in the West and trying to drive the aggressor toward the East. I rebutted Teng's presentation at length, pointing out that we have resisted Soviet pressures whenever necessary while the Chinese do little more than dish out tough rhetoric while carping from the sidelines.

As usual, Teng invited me to open up the substantive discussions in the morning. I listed preparations for your trip, the international situation, and bilateral relations as the agenda for my visit. They readily agreed to every suggestion I made concerning your trip, in effect leaving its parameters up to us. Thus they accepted a visit from

~~TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE~~
~~CONTAINS CODEWORD~~




A.M. | Monday, December 1 to Saturday, December 6 with the size of the party, including press, more or less what we want. They also agreed to an advance technical team coming to China in early November. I said that you would be making no other stops in Asia because of the press of domestic business. Teng once again said you are welcome whether or not there is a meeting of the minds on various issues. I emphasized that it was in neither side's interest to have the impression created during your visit that our relations were cooling. He seemed to agree.

In my international review I gave a detailed rationale for our Soviet policy. I said that it did not matter if the initial Soviet pressures were in the East or the West. The strategic threat remained the same. On tactics I acknowledged our differences, but pointedly underlined that while we are more flexible than the Chinese, we actually take more firm actions in such areas as the Middle East, Angola, and Portugal while the Chinese confrontations are confined to rhetoric. I explained why we have to demonstrate to our public that all reasonable chances for peace are being explored if we are to resist when necessary, and then touched briefly on key areas. I pointed to the contradictory trends in Europe, with our strong relations with the major countries but difficulties on the southern flank. On the Middle East, I explained that the more even handed public attitude in America has increased the chances for a comprehensive settlement starting in 1977. And on Korea I said that we were not opposed to reunification but that South Korea had to be included in any discussions; and I warned against the use of force.

Finally, on bilateral relations, I reiterated our commitment to normalization and the principles of the Shanghai communique. I said that we would suggest some formulas in the draft communique for your visit which show some progress, though it is clearly understood that we cannot go all the way at this time. I emphasized the importance of showing some vitality in our bilateral relations in order to maintain public support for our China policy. I closed by saying that while we have different ideologies and policies towards certain countries we also have some common strategic interests.


Teng confined himself to a few pointed questions about our dealings with Moscow with respect to the grain deal, the sale of technology, and the Helsinki conference. I pointed out that the grain deal gives us greater leverage;



our technology sales are limited; and that Helsinki was a minor event in which we gave away nothing while gaining some pressure points on Moscow. At the end of the meeting I gave them a draft communique for your visit which contains some forward movement on the question of hegemony and the normalization of relations, and extensive activity in our bilateral relations. I explained this was a maximum draft.

Comment: I expected them to whittle down substantially the bilateral agreements and to insert some unacceptable language on hegemony.

Teng led off the afternoon session with a very sharp and detailed criticism of our Soviet policy. It seems clear to me that Chairman Mao had directed the outline of his presentation. His main themes were that the "Polar Bear" is gaining strategically; that the U.S. and the West are demoralized; that we are wishfully appeasing Moscow while hoping its aggressive designs would center on China; and that China would rely on its own means to defend itself. He said that our tactics versus Moscow were so flexible that they betrayed a faulty strategic perception. He continually emphasized that the primary danger was to the West and not the East. He said that the Soviet Union had achieved nuclear parity while greatly outstripping the West in conventional forces. Moscow's only weak points were in agriculture and technology, and rather than pressuring it on its economy we were bailing it out with our commercial deals. He reiterated Chairman Mao's warning about Soviet designs and the need for us to work closely with Europe and Japan and to counter Soviet influence in such areas as the Middle East, South Asia and the Persian Gulf. He pointed to growing isolationism in our public opinion. He said that European visitors questioned the U.S. willingness to come to Europe's aid if Moscow attacked. He then drew a very sharp analogy to Chamberlain's appeasement policy at Munich which led to war. He cited the "European insecurity conference" as an example of pulling the wool over the eyes of public opinion and said that the danger of an historical tragedy like World War II is increasing. He closed by saying that Chairman Mao was urging everyone in the West to prepare themselves for conflict rather than relying on appeasing documents. As for China, it feared no one, asked favors from no one, and would prepare by digging tunnels, storing millet and rifles, and resisting hegemony.



I decided to make a lengthy, and sharp rebuttal to Teng's rather disturbing presentation. Since he made several positive references to Nixon's policy, I explained that your strategic approach was quite similar, and if anything a little tougher on the Soviet Union. In any event both presidents, I emphasized, had no illusions about Soviet intentions and had demonstrated a consistent willingness to resist pressures when necessary, while maintaining public support with the kind of flexible policy that was required for our public opinion in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate. I pointedly questioned the basis of our bilateral relations with Peking if it genuinely thought that we were appeasing Moscow or trying to push it toward the East. I said that I had listened to his remarks with some sadness since they suggested different strategic perceptions and not merely tactical divergences. Once again I reiterated that it made no difference whether an initial Soviet attack was in the East or West; the objective danger would be the same, and we would react out of our own self interest. I recalled the 1971 South Asian sub-continent crisis where we made some symbolic military moves in support of Pakistan while China did nothing. This was to remind Teng that while the Chinese were strong on rhetoric, we alone have been taking concrete actions vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. I also recalled the various times we had resisted Soviet pressure, such as in the Middle East, which belied the Munich analogy. As for Europe, we would be there in a crisis; the real problem was the possible demoralization of the Europeans. I made clear that it was the Europeans that were for the Helsinki conference and that we had to demonstrate a reasonable policy or the leftists in Europe would split us off from our allies.

I emphasized that the tough rhetorical posturing by some in our country was not a real policy, since such intransigence would lose all public support for a long term steady course of resistance. I said that you were pursuing the same strategy against Moscow as I had explained to Chairman Mao two years ago; that we would resist Moscow whether in the East or West; and that the tactics for doing so were our own business. I documented how we were maintaining a strong strategic nuclear position against Moscow. I urged Teng to give a pep talk on resisting hegemony to the Europeans who needed it and not to us. And I advised the Chinese that while they should highlight dangers, they should not attack us while doing little themselves, for that would only serve to discourage our public and spur isolationism. I concluded by saying that we attach




great significance to our relations with Peking and were prepared to work in parallel with China. Our policies, however, must be based on mutual respect for each other's perceptions of their national interest. Each side had to take the other seriously. Your visit could be very useful to this end. The talks then adjourned until Tuesday.

Comment: We will see in the next couple of days whether my presentation has any impact on the Chinese perceptions. I felt there was a clear need to counter sharply the Chinese critique of our Soviet policy, which was referred to in the foreign minister's toast Sunday night and then starkly presented by the vice premier Monday in his Munich analogy.

I frankly doubt whether my explanations will make much headway for now. Teng is undoubtedly reflecting Mao's viewpoint; and only actions not words, will impress the Chinese. Peking's view has undoubtedly been shaped by the following factors: the demoralization in Europe and to a lesser extent in the U.S.; congressional hobbling of executive authority, including the Turkish aid cutoff, widespread investigations, etc; and the rhetoric posturing of some of the administration's critics on detente indeed by administration officials too. A significant factor is undoubtedly the Chinese belief that detente is in trouble in the U.S. They have shifted their theme from collusion to appeasement. This reflects our troubles at home. We were in our best shape with the Chinese in 1972-1973, precisely when detente was most active. The Chinese emphasis on the dangers of appeasement and war serve several purposes for them: They wish to rally the West; they probably are genuinely concerned about growing Soviet influence in the wake of Helsinki and Indochina; and they would love to push us into a confrontation with Moscow, if not to see the two superpowers weaken each other, then at least to ease the pressures on their own flank. Finally, there was increased emphasis on Chinese self-reliance, reflecting either suspicion of our motives, or of our capabilities, or both.

I do not wish to leave too gloomy an impression. The very Chinese concern about Moscow gives us leverage. After all, despite all the protestations about self reliance, they feel exposed and no one but the U.S. can help provide the balance. And then top leadership is spending three days nearly full time with us. So Teng's lecture can be seen as a pep talk as well as skepticism about our staying power. In any event they clearly look forward to your visit and know that it is not in their interest to jettison



our bilateral relations. The major question remains, however, whether they understand the need to show concrete progress in our bilateral relations and to ease up on their attacks on us if we are to maintain our public support for our China policy so as to serve the strategic objectives of both our countries. I have reported today's talks at some length because I suspect they are a preview of some of the themes that you will be hearing in early December."





Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library and Museum

www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov

Library: 1000 Beal Ave., Ann Arbor, MI 48109
Museum: 303 Pearl Street, NW, Grand Rapids, MI 49504

(734) 205-0555 fax (734) 205-0571
(616) 254-0400 fax (616) 254-0386

**The documents in this
folder continue into the
next folder.**