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folder continue from the  
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Teng/Ch'iao/HAK  
memcon (pm)



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council, People's Republic of China  
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Wang Hai-jung, PRC Vice Foreign Minister  
Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office, Washington  
Lin P'ing, Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Tsien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRC Liaison Office, Washington  
Ting Yuan-hung, Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Chao Chi-hua, Deputy Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Chang Han-chih, Translator  
Notetaker

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President  
Ambassador George Bush, Chief of the United States Liaison Office, Peking

Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs

Peter Rodman, Staff Member, National Security Council

Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

Karlene Knieps, Notetaker

**DECLASSIFIED**

**E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.8**

MR 05-19 #2: State letv 10/9/07

BY dal NARA DATE 10/30/08

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE



DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, November 26, 1974  
3:45 - 5:00 p.m.

PLACE: Great Hall of the People  
Peking, People's Republic of China

SUBJECT: Normalization

Secretary Kissinger: They outnumber us today.

Vice Premier Teng: Some more on our side are coming. I don't think you will ever outnumber us because we have 800 million.

Secretary Kissinger: My children and my wife very much appreciated the tour of the Forbidden City this morning. It was very nice.

Vice Premier Teng: Did they like it at all?

Secretary Kissinger: Very much.

Vice Premier Teng: How is the health of your wife? I hope it is better.

Secretary Kissinger: It is much better.

Vice Premier Teng: If you need any medical help you just let us know.

Secretary Kissinger: You are very nice. She is going to watch acupuncture.

Vice Premier Teng: Well that medical technique of China is almost as old as the Great Wall of China. A few hundred years later than the Great Wall. It was created at the time of the Han Dynasty.



Secretary Kissinger: On one trip I brought a doctor along who was very skeptical of it and after he saw it he was very impressed.

Vice Premier Teng: It goes as far back as about two hundred years after Christ. During the time of the three kingdoms. It was during that time people were able to have an operation with acupuncture.

Secretary Kissinger: It is interesting to reflect how it could have been invented. Because as I understand it, to this day nobody understands the theory, why it works, just that it works.

Vice Premier Teng: I think mainly it was through practice.

Secretary Kissinger: Who go the first idea to stick a needle into somebody?

Vice Premier Teng: It was combined with the use of herb medicine.

Secretary Kissinger: Who would have thought if you stick a needle into somebody it would help him? No other civilization thought about that.

Vice Premier Teng: Shall we come back to our subject? We will listen to the Doctor. All right?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me discuss the subject of normalization. I understand that Mr. Habib has already had a talk on the bilateral relations.


I am confident that our side can keep multiplying the complexities as long as your side can. It is something we are very good at.

Let me speak about the normalization problem.

When we met the first time, in our first two meetings [in 1971] we discussed completing the process during the second term of President Nixon.

We said that we would reduce our military forces on Taiwan, and we repeated that in the Shanghai Communique. We said we would not support any two Chinas solution, or a one China-one Taiwan solution, or any variation.

And we would not encourage other countries to pursue such a policy.



We have substantially maintained these commitments..

We have reduced our forces on Taiwan from over 10,000 to about 3,200 today. We encouraged the Japanese movement towards the People's Republic. This is in fact why you can speak of a Japanese solution. We have given no encouragement to a two Chinas or one China-one Taiwan solution; quite the contrary.

Now the problem is how we can complete the process. I would like to divide it into a number of parts:

-- There is the problem of the diplomatic status of Taiwan, and of course of the diplomatic relations between us.

-- There is the problem of our military forces on Taiwan.

-- And there is the problem of our defense commitment to Taiwan.

Our problem is different from the situation of Japan, or for that matter from the situation of any other country with which you have normalized relations, in two respects:

First, there is a formal defense relationship. Secondly, there is a rather substantial group in the United States that historically has been pro-Taiwan.

Together with your cooperation we have been able to neutralize the pro-Taiwan element in the United States by moving step-by-step in a very careful manner. But what we have to keep in mind for our common interest is to prevent Sino-American relations from becoming an extremely contentious issue in the United States.

It is not in your interest, or in that of the United States, to have emerge a Senator or Senatorial group which does to Sino-American relations what Senator Jackson has attempted to do to United States - Soviet relations.

I am speaking very frankly to you so that we understand each other exactly. After I have put my considerations before you, you will of course give me yours. Then we will see if we can solve the problem. I am here to remove obstacles, not to hide behind them.



We believe, as I have said, that while cannons have been fired -- mostly in one direction -- we have also had common fronts.

As the Premier said yesterday, they were mostly produced by the "polar bear."

We do not want to jeopardize that possibility [of developing common fronts with the PRC] given the dangers that may be ahead, and keeping in mind what Chairman Mao said to me last year of the two strands -- normalization, and the international environment.

Now having said this, let me go back to the specific issues between us.

First, on the issue of the diplomatic status: We are prepared to solve this on substantially the Japan model; and with the one variation that it would be easiest for us if we could maintain a liaison office in Taiwan and an embassy in Peking. Except for that we would follow the Japan model.

With respect to the presence of [U.S.] troops on Taiwan, we are prepared to remove all our troops from Taiwan. We would like to agree with you on a schedule, a time-frame within which this will be accomplished -- by which we would reduce the forces by half by the summer of 1976, and the remainder to be removed by the end of 1977.

Incidentally, what I am discussing is not something to which we want to agree -- we can agree to it hear, but it should not be announced until the end of 1975, the agreement we make. But we want to come to an understanding about it now, that this is what would happen.

Now that leaves the last problem, which is our defense relationship to Taiwan. And this is a problem to which, in all frankness, we have not come up with a good answer.

Our problem is this: on the face of it, it is of course absurd to say one has a defense arrangement with a part of a country one recognizes, that is, which belongs to that country.

Secondly, we obviously have no interest in maintaining a strategic base on Taiwan after we have established diplomatic relations with Peking and recognized Peking as the legal government of all China.

But as I told the Foreign Minister in New York, we need a formula that enables us to say that at least for some period of time there are



assurances of peaceful reintegration with can be reviewed after some interval in order to avoid the difficulties which I have described.

If we can, this would mean that we would have accepted Peking as the [legal] government [of China]. We would have withdrawn our recognition from Taiwan, we would have broken diplomatic relations with Taiwan. We would have withdrawn our troops from Taiwan. All that would remain is that we would have some relation to peaceful reintegration.

Speaking here frankly and realistically, the political and psychological effect of breaking relations is that our defense relationship will be eroded by the act of recognition. But we need a transition period for our public opinion in which this process can be accomplished without an excessive domestic strain.

These are our basic considerations. If we agree on the principles, we can then see what formula can then be worked out.

Vice Premier Teng: Is that all?

Secretary Kissinger: This is the essence, yes.

Let me emphasize one point. To us the question of the defense commitment is primarily a question of the way it can be presented politically. It is not a question of maintaining it for an indefinite period of time.

Vice Premier Teng: Well, actually this law was formulated by yourselves. Is that so?

Secretary Kissinger: Which law?

Vice Premier Teng: You are the ones who make the law. That is, the law of that defense commitment you have with Taiwan. That was fixed by yourselves.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course. That is absolutely true.

Vice Premier Teng: Well, since you can formulate a law, naturally you can also do away with it.

Secretary Kissinger: That is also true. Our point is not that it could not be done. Our point is that for reasons I have explained



to you. it is not expedient to do -- well, the act of recognition in itself will change the nature of that arrangement because you cannot have a defense treaty with part of a country.

Vice Premier Teng: I have noticed the consideration which the Doctor has just mentioned. And I understand that all of these imaginations the Doctor has discussed with the Foreign Minister while he was in New York in October.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Vice Premier Teng: And I believe in principle the Foreign Minister gave you the answers on our side concerning the princial matters. In essence your imaginations -- your considerations -- cannot be considered as being in accord with the Japan model.

And we feel that in essence it is still a variation of one China and one Taiwan.

Secretary Kissinger: Why is that?

Vice Premier Teng: Well, this is primarily that you just reverse the position, change the position of the liaison office. The present situation is that we have established a liaison office in Peking -- we have established our liaison office in Washington and you have established one in Peking. And you keep an embassy in Taiwan. This in itself indicates there has not been the necessary conditions for the normalization of relations.

In other words, if you change this order, that is, to have an embassy in Peking and a liaison office in Taiwan, it is not the way to correct the problem.

People will come to the conclusion that it is actually a variation of one China and one Taiwan. Therefore, we find it difficult to accept this formula.

And just now you touched upon the question of the defense treaty. That is, the defense treaty which you have with Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan. Of course, if we are to achieve the normalization of relations between our two countries and abide by the course set in the Shanghai Communique, then the treaty you have with Taiwan must be done away with.



The reasons actually have been given by the Doctor yourself just now.

Secretary Kissinger: The defense treaty can have no international status after the normalization of relations.

Vice Premier Teng: But still it has a substantial meaning.

So it appears that time is not ripe yet to solve this question, because according to your formula, it would not be possible for us to accept this method of normalization. It still looks as if you need Taiwan.

Secretary Kissinger: No, we do not need Taiwan. That is not the issue. I think that it is important to understand. That would be a mistake in understanding the problem.

What we would like to achieve is the disassociation from Taiwan in steps, in the manner we have done until now. There is no doubt that the status of Taiwan has been undermined by the process which we have followed. And this process would be rapidly accelerated by the ideas which we have advanced.

Vice Premier Teng: And the other question is the way [method] to solve the Taiwan problem. As for solving the Taiwan question, suppose you have broken diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Then the Taiwan question should be left with us Chinese to solve among ourselves.

As to what means we will [use to] solve the Taiwan question, I believe Chairman Mao Tse-tung made it very clear in his talk.

Secretary Kissinger: Chairman Mao, if I understood him correctly, made two statements: One was that he believed that the question would ultimately have to be solved by force. But he also stated that China could wait for one hundred years to bring this about, if I understood him correctly.

Vice Premier Teng: That was true. He did say that.

Of course, the number of "one hundred years" is a symbolic one.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, I understood this. I was going to say that in one hundred years I will not be Secretary of State.



I have to say this occasionally to give some hope to my associates. I understood it was symbolic. I understand also that after normalization that any attributes of sovereignty in the relationship between Taiwan and the U.S. have to be eliminated.

Vice Premier Teng: Chairman Mao Tse-tung made it very clear that the solving of the Taiwan problem is an internal affair of China, and should be left to the Chinese to solve.

Just now Dr. Kissinger said that on the Taiwan issue you wish to have a peaceful reintegration.

Secretary Kissinger: That is correct.

Vice Premier Teng: And I believe you mentioned something like a wish of the U.S. in having some part in this guarantee, relationship.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me explain what is our concern. We have not worked out a legal formula. We believe that it is -- what I am saying is capable of misinterpretation. Let me explain our position exactly.


When I came here in 1971, it was clear that we were starting a process that would lead to the gradual erosion of the position of Taiwan.

You would certainly not have been admitted to the United Nations in 1971 -- eventually it would have happened, but not in 1971. It would have taken longer. And the normalization with Japan would not have been accomplished so soon. We fully cooperated in this, and we established principles that sooner or later have been implemented. And we did this in all seriousness.

You know we have made no effort with any country to keep them from establishing relations with you and breaking them with Taiwan.

The problem we have is the impact internationally of a sudden total reversal of an American position on other friendly countries, and even perhaps on countries that are not friendly to either of us.

Vice Premier Teng: But on the other hand, if we agree to your formula we will also be creating an impact internationally that we have agreed to the formula of one China - one Taiwan.



Secretary Kissinger: No, we will work to make it clear that it is not this type of situation. We will not now attempt a solution which we have both rejected.

We have, it seems to me, two basic choices. There are two roads we can now follow: We can continue the present process, which is tolerable, and gradually withdraw our forces from Taiwan, which will continue in any event -- whatever you decide here. We will increase our relationship with you as we have done in the past three years, and wait for the opportune time to complete the process with one decision.

Or, we can do a process in which we complete the political part of our relationship quickly and make it clear that we are solving the issues of sovereignty -- of one China and one Taiwan -- at once, and find a formula in which the symbolic thought of Chairman Mao is expressed. An effort of peaceful reintegration over a reasonable period of time. We do not want a voice in the discussion on peaceful reintegration. That should be left to the Chinese. We do not want to participate in that process.


Chang Han-chih: I'm not clear about the first part of your statement.

Secretary Kissinger: The Vice Premier said that of course the one hundred years is symbolic. I understood the symbolic nature of Chairman Mao's statement about a hundred years. I understood it to mean that you are willing to give the peaceful process time to work -- that while philosophically the resolution will probably come about by force, you are prepared to give the peaceful road a long opportunity.

We do not want to participate in the process of reintegration. And we have no difficulty affirming the principle of one China. So our issue is not one China, one Taiwan.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: If I understand correctly, I see what you mean is that you are for one China, but the one China you want is a one China which is achieved through peaceful means.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly. For at least a reasonable period of time. We want to avoid a situation where the United States signs a document which leads to a military solution shortly after normalization. But we do not want a commitment which maintains the separation. What we have in mind -- we may not know the formula, but what we have in mind seems compatible with what Chairman Mao says in terms of the process.



Vice Premier Teng: We have just now checked on what Chairman Mao exactly said when he talked with Doctor, and we understand what he said is, "I don't think the normalization of relations between China and the United States will take one hundred years." So from this we understand that it does not mean that from what Chairman Mao says, that we do not wish to complete a process of the normalization as quickly as possible.

I think concerning the Taiwan question that at the same time it is also a question of the normalization of relations between China and the United States.

There are three principles to which we cannot give other consideration, which we cannot barter away. The first principle is that we insist -- that we should insist on the Shanghai Communiqué. That is, we refuse any method which will lead to the solution of "two Chinas," or "one China, one Taiwan," or any variation of these two.

The idea of setting up an embassy here in Peking and a liaison office in Taiwan is a variation on "one China-one Taiwan," which we cannot accept.

The second principle is that the solution of the Taiwan question is an internal issue of the Chinese people, and it can only be left to the Chinese people themselves to solve. As to what means we will use to finally solve the Taiwan question -- whether peaceful methods or non-peaceful methods -- it is a matter, an internal affair, which should be left to the Chinese people to decide.

The third point, which is also a principle to us, is that we do not admit that there can be another country which will take part in the solution of the Taiwan question, including the United States.

So it looks as if there is quite a distance between our two sides concerning this question. As I said just now, it appears that you still need Taiwan. If you still need Taiwan we can wait. We can wait until the time is more ripe for the solution of the question.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me comment on the three points. Then let me say one other thing.

Vice Premier Teng: We were checking with the records we have about what Chairman Mao said last year and we feel our understanding



is correct. What Chairman Mao said last year is that we should separate the two things, that is, the relations between the United States and us and the relations between Taiwan and the United States. These two things should be separate.

Then the Chairman went on to say that if you break your diplomatic relations with Taiwan, then it will be possible to solve the issue of diplomatic relations. That is to say, like what we did with Japan. We understand that refers to the Japan model.

And then the Chairman went on to say that, as for the relation between Taiwan and us, we do not believe in peaceful transition.

Then the Chairman said we can do without Taiwan -- we can wait for one hundred years to solve the problem. And the Chairman also said, "As for the relation between you and us, I do not think that will take one hundred years to solve."

I think from this conversation the meaning is clear.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree. This is exactly my recollection of the conversation. From this I also made certain deductions, produced by my brain which is somewhat slower than that of the Chinese. I have never had a Chinese contradict me on my statement (laughter).

I remember once Prime Minister Chou En-lai made the comment that I was intelligent, and I said by Chinese standards you mean I am of medium intelligence. He did not contradict me either (laughter).

But let me say what I deduce from this conversation; because my understanding is exactly the same as what the Vice Premier has said.

I deduce from it that the precondition for normalization of relations is breaking diplomatic relations with Taiwan. That we are prepared to do. And I believe we can find a mutually satisfactory formula for this.

The second conclusion I draw from the statement of the Chairman was he believes diplomatic relations could be established, and after that there might be a time interval until the real integration of Taiwan into the PRC is complete -- in his perspective of history.

Now of the three principles you have mentioned, Mr. Vice Premier, the first is, in our judgment, no problem. We will work out a solution



that leaves no doubt there is no "one China-one Taiwan." This is a soluble problem -- much easier than many other problems we have solved before.

Vice Premier Teng: But it won't do if you establish a liaison office in Taiwan, or for that matter a consulate.

Secretary Kissinger: I still believe this is a problem to which we can find a solution. I see the Ambassador [Huang Chen] has a very proprietary interest in the concept of a liaison office. He is the head of the only liaison office in the world which is headed by a Chinese Ambassador.

Huang Chen: My understanding about the nature of a liaison office is according to the ideas which Chairman Mao gave -- the nature of a liaison office.

Secretary Kissinger: I repeat, I believe we can find a solution to the first problem. Although we are not now in a detailed consultation. I believe we can find a solution to it.

The second question: We do not wish to participate in any way in the process of reintegration, or in the process of realization of reintegration.


The third problem is the one I have put to you: How we can avoid the impression that we have simply jettisoned people with whom we have been associated without giving -- as in the passage you read to me, how we can have a period of time to give this process a chance to work.

Namely, that diplomatic relations can be established before the process of reintegration is completed -- how this can be expressed in our agreement. This is the serious question.

It seems to me we have two roads we can take, and we are prepared to take either.

One road is that we, the United States, proceed unilaterally to reduce its standing on Taiwan, the way we have been doing. We will do this by withdrawing troops. And at the appropriate time before 1976 [reducing] the seniority of our diplomatic representation.

The other is that we begin a negotiation on the three points which we have discussed here. I do not believe our differences need be insurmountable.



Vice Premier Teng: I believe we can continue our discussion on this issue. I do not think we have too much time this afternoon for the question. It looks as if probably it is difficult for both sides to reach any agreement on this visit of yours.

We have another consideration about the relations between our two countries. That is, as I have said before, some people have been saying the relations between our two countries have been cooling down. The Chinese Government is therefore extending an invitation to you. That is to say, the Chinese Government wishes to extend a formal invitation to the Secretary of Defense of the United States, Mr. Schlesinger, to visit China. We think this would be a good answer to all these opinions which are going on in the world.

Secretary Kissinger: It will produce a Politburo meeting in the Kremlin.

Vice Premier Teng: We don't mind. Well, actually it is our wish that they have a Politburo meeting there. But we really extend this invitation with all seriousness.

Secretary Kissinger: I appreciate this, and let me think about it. Let me say, however, one thing in principle. We believe from our side it is highly desirable to show that our relationship has not chilled and that we should continue to show not only that it has not chilled but that it is continuing to improve. And whatever the decision on this particular invitation, I am certain we can between us find methods of showing a substantial improvement in our relationship.


Vice Premier Teng: We will be waiting for your answer then -- from your government.

Foreign Minister Ch'iao: We understand Mr. Bush is going to give a reception this afternoon.

Ambassador Bush: My wife has spent most of her time waiting, so don't worry about that.

Vice Premier Teng: We suggest 9:00 tomorrow morning [for the next meeting].

Secretary Kissinger: I suggest that at the beginning, for perhaps one-half hour, we have a very small group. On your side it is up to you. I will bring only three people, including me. You can have as many as you want.



Vice Premier Teng: We shall decide the number of our participants according to the percentage of our whole population (laughter).

Secretary Kissinger: In relation to ours! So you will have 12. It will not take very long.



Report to the  
President



MEMORANDUM

MR 97-7, #24; NSC letter 12/5/97

THE WHITE HOUSE By WT, NARA, Date 1/20/98  
WASHINGTON INFORMATION

SECRET/SENSITIVE

November 27, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: BRENT SCOWCROFT *BS*

*MR 97*



Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following report:

"After a brief visit to the Forbidden City, we launched the substantive discussions with the Chinese Tuesday morning. During the day, we had almost four hours of talks with Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-Ping and Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-Hua, covering international issues in the morning and normalization of bilateral relations in the afternoon. At the Chinese invitation, I did most of the talking; we will hear their views tomorrow. The basic impressions today were their continued preoccupation with the Soviet Union, and the possibility that we will not make major progress on the normalization question this trip. However, the Chinese stress that the two issues are separate and we have after all no reason to be over-anxious.

"We opened with a plenary session during which we agreed that I would discuss international issues and normalization with Teng and Chiao while counter-part talks would cover bilateral issues such as exchanges and trade. The Chinese noted Tanaka's resignation and said they preferred Ohira as his successor since they consider Fukuda pro-Soviet. At the outset Teng said that US-China relations were essentially on course; they would like to make progress toward diplomatic relations along the Japanese model but are prepared to wait if we cannot be as forthcoming on Taiwan as they like. Continually invoking Chairman Mao, Teng said the international situation, i. e., the Soviet threat, was more important to them.

"In a more restricted session after the plenary meeting, I gave a rundown on the major international questions:

"-- Our attitude and policy toward the Soviet Union remains unchanged. We are still wary of its hegemonial designs. It does not matter where Moscow's initial target is, for either way the danger exists over time. I made this point in response to the recent Chinese emphasis that Moscow threatens the West more than China. I outlined the SALT discussions at

SECRET/SENSITIVE

Vladivostok and said that the Soviet movement toward our position indicated that they were not as strong as some had believed. Their acceptance of equal numbers without counting FBS actually give us a numerical advantage.

"-- I noted briefly that our relations with Europe, including France, had considerably improved since my last visit to China.

"-- I reviewed the agreements in the Middle East and the erosion of Soviet influence over the past year and said that I thought gradual progress was still possible. I pointed out that our domestic situation required a step-by-step process. We are working quietly behind the scenes, and we would in any event never move in response to Soviet pressure.

"-- With regard to the South Asian sub-continent, I said we were seeking to improve relations with India in order to balance Soviet influence. We strongly stand behind Pakistan independence and we hope to give them our assistance when Bhutto visits you early next year. Iran is broadening its role in the region along the lines that the Chinese and we find useful.

"-- I introduced the new themes of energy and food, suggesting that it is not in the longer term Chinese interest to take us on blindly with respect to these issues. The weakening of the West due to the oil crisis would not be to the Chinese advantage. The US could fare well on its own but we would act firmly for the sake of our friends.

"-- Finally, I said that we would be willing to discuss Cambodia if they wish to. We are prepared to see a role for Sihanouk as a result of negotiations, but we could not simply abandon our friends for this would have ramifications beyond Cambodia. The Chinese seemed interested in pursuing this question, though they confined themselves to their standard line in this opening session.

"-- I deliberately skipped Korea, since they are the damandeur on this issue and we apparently have the voting edge in the UN.

"The afternoon session was devoted to the issue of Taiwan and diplomatic relations with the PRC. I purposely talked about principles and the problems we face rather than getting into specific formulations. I said that we are prepared to talk concretely but if we could not reach understandings, we are content to keep essentially on our present course of gradual withdrawal.



They adopted a seemingly indifferent attitude. I underlined the domestic policy problems and the effect on other countries of an abrupt abandonment of the defense of our friends on Taiwan. I said that if they could show understanding on this aspect, specifically the prospect of a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue, we would be prepared to move toward complete normalization. Otherwise we were content to continue drawing down our military presence and stringing out the diplomatic process. There are essentially three issues: Our residual presence in Taiwan once we establish diplomatic relations; the principle of one China with Taiwan being a part of it; and the prospect of a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue in place of our defense commitment. Their opening stance did not indicate much give, but this is not surprising and it is too early to judge their real positions. I will attempt to probe the degree of their flexibility, and if reasonable progress does not look possible, there is no need to press the issue on this trip.

"At the end of the Taiwan discussion, Teng said that whatever happened with respect to Taiwan we should show further progress in US-Sino relations. Therefore, they wanted to invite Schlesinger to visit the PRC. This, I believe, would have very severe repercussions in the USSR. I shall turn it off today and try to turn it into an invitation to you. I shall also offer them any other Cabinet member. If they agree, there will be no way to keep it out of the final Communique.

"After the meeting, Ambassador Bush hosted a reception at his residence. We then went to a cultural variety show at the Great Hall of the People, consisting of singing, dancing and playing of traditional instruments. The technical skills were impressive, but the revolutionary themes and choreography were crude."



November 27





3

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 017128

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction  
TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum of Conversation  
TITLE . . . . . President's Visit; Nuclear War: SALT;  
Yugoslavia  
DESCRIPTION . . . . . Participants: Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Henry  
Kissinger, et. al [9:45-11:32 a.m.]  
CREATION DATE . . . . . 11/27/1974  
VOLUME . . . . . 17 pages  
COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 033100019  
COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. KISSINGER  
REPORTS ON USSR, CHINA, AND MIDDLE EAST  
DISCUSSIONS  
BOX NUMBER . . . . . 2  
FOLDER TITLE . . . . . November 25-29, 1974 - Kissinger's Trip  
(2)  
DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 11/03/2003  
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10/9/07

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council,  
People's Republic of China  
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs,  
Amb. Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office,  
Washington, D. C.  
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs  
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of  
American and Oceanic Affairs  
Lien Cheng-pao, (Notetaker).

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WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
E.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5

*NR05-19, #3; Date Ver 10/19/07*

BY *dee* NARA DATE *10/30/08*

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
and Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
Amb. George Bush, Chief of the U. S. Liaison Office,  
Peking  
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff  
Bonnie Andrews, Secretary's Office (Notetaker)

DATE AND TIME:

Wednesday, November 27, 1974  
9:45 - 11:32 a.m.

PLACE:

Guest House #18  
Peking

SUBJECT:

President's Visit; Nuclear War: SALT;  
Yugoslavia.

Kissinger: When the Foreign Minister spoke at the United Nations,  
his most violent attacks were not understood by most Americans.

Teng: You mean including the interpreters?

Kissinger: Oh no, they understood.



~~TOP SECRET/NODIS/XGDS~~

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger  
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION  
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652  
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5 (b) (1, 3)  
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON Imp. to Det.

Teng: On yes. And before I forget, the Marshall [Yeh Chien-ying] asked yesterday evening that I send greetings to the Doctor and his wife.

Kissinger: I appreciate that very much; he is an old friend.

Teng: And he also asked me to say that because of his busy schedule, he will not be able to meet with you. I think he has met you several times.

Kissinger: I understand. He greeted me on my first visit.

Teng: Actually, on our side, he is the Minister of National Defense and Chief of the General Staff. And that is why he is very happy that our government has extended the invitation to your Secretary of Defense.

Kissinger: Yes. I wondered if that meant that he would speak only to the Secretary of Defense and not to the Secretary of State.

Teng: I don't think it means that. It means that the U.S. Secretary of Defense is invited to Peking and in that event I don't think it would be very easy for people to say that our relations have become even more cold.

Kissinger: That's true. Let me make a few observations if I may. First, we agree on the desirability of demonstrating not only that our relations have not become colder, but in fact our relations are becoming warmer. We think that is in the interest of both of our countries. And we are prepared to do this not only symbolically, but substantively.

Now, in the security field, I had some discussions with the Prime Minister on my last evening here last time and I want you to know that those principles we still maintain.

Now, about the invitation of the Secretary of Defense. This presents us with a problem. The Soviet leaders have repeatedly invited our Secretary of Defense to Moscow and have asked for a reciprocal exchange of visits between our Secretary of Defense and their Minister of Defense. And we have consistently refused. And then they proposed meetings of military commanders in Europe, and we have turned that down too. So if we begin using our Secretary of Defense for diplomatic travels, he will begin going to places that I don't believe are desirable.

But we have two possibilities. First, we would approve a visit by any other Cabinet member to Peking. And secondly, I believe also that we could consider an invitation to President Ford if that were considered desirable. So it is not a lack of interest in demonstrating a close relationship.

Teng: So, as the Doctor just now mentioned this, if President Ford desires a possibility to come to China, we would welcome him.

Kissinger: I suppose we could envisage it for the second half of next year. Or, what are your ideas?

Teng: Anytime would be all right for us.


Kissinger: We don't have to fix an exact date. When I was here the first time, we did not fix a date -- only a certain time period.

Teng: It can be decided upon on a different time.

Kissinger: Let us agree then in 1975.

Teng: I think that is all right.

Kissinger: And I think that would be an important event.



Teng: So then we can later on go into specific dates, because we don't have to settle now.

Kissinger: We don't have to settle now. What is your idea? Should we announce the invitation and acceptance at the end of my visit?

Teng: What would you think?

Kissinger: I think it's a good idea. We should have a communique at the end of my visit -- which we would perhaps publish Saturday or Sunday -- in which we should announce this, yes.

Teng: So then we will consider the announcement and communique and discuss it with you later.

Kissinger: I think there is an advantage to relating it to my visit here. When it should be published -- Saturday or Monday -- we are open-minded. Or later even.

Teng: So we will leave it to the Foreign Minister to work out the wording of the announcement with you.

Kissinger: Must I work it out with him? We spent a week one time. He is a very tough negotiator. It will be a great pleasure.

Teng: You are both philosophers.

Ch'iao: But we two must quarrel each time we meet because we belong to two different schools of philosophy.

Kissinger: That is true. But they are related.

Ch'iao: Both linked and related.

Kissinger: Like our relationship.

Teng: But you don't have to go into such length at these meetings. Just have some more mao tai. [Laughter]

Kissinger: OK. The Foreign Minister and I will discuss what should be said in the communique.

Teng: It should be like a press communique.

Ch'iao: Brief; not long, taking two weeks.

Kissinger: Yes, one page. Not like the Shanghai Communique.

Teng: I don't think we have anything else very much now to say.

Kissinger: You mean in the communique. We could reaffirm a few general principles and then make the basic announcement.

Teng: I'll leave it to you to quarrel about.

Kissinger: We could do it in German!

Teng: They say that is a very difficult language to read.

Kissinger: Yes. In German you know a man is on the stairs. But it may take two pages to know if he is going up or down. [Laughter]

Teng: And about the invitation to the Secretary of Defense. We request that your government continue to consider the invitation.

Kissinger: Maybe after the President visits we can arrange this. But we are prepared to do similar things in that area. If you are concerned about concrete things, we are prepared to do them.

Teng: Actually our invitation to your Secretary of Defense isn't mainly to discuss any specific issues. The meaning is in the invitation itself.

Kissinger: We understand.

Teng: As for the discussions of problems, it is probably still up to the Doctor and the President.

Kissinger: The last time we were here, we had to arrange a whole set of negotiations of extreme delicacy -- that will not be necessary this time --

between your Foreign Minister and ours. We will consider the invitation to our Secretary of Defense and if we can both determine the right moment to do it, we will certainly do it. We will be glad if there is any other Cabinet member you think would be desirable to have here. We can arrange it very quickly. But it is entirely up to you.

Teng: So this request is still for the consideration of your government.

Kissinger: Yes, and we will keep it between your Ambassador and me. That is on the assumption that he comes back soon.

Now, I wanted to tell you one other thing that I have already mentioned to your Ambassador for your information: When I was in Moscow in October, Brezhnev made a proposal for a new treaty to us and repeated it in more detail to President Ford in Vladivostok. And it is a rather novel and ingenious proposition. The proposal is as follows: The U.S. and Soviet Union should make a treaty with each other in which they will defend each other against any attack by any other country or they will defend each other's allies against nuclear attack from any other country.


[Meeting temporarily interrupted by Chinese girl opening outer door.]

Kissinger: I have people in the other room but they will join us for the later discussion.

Translator: They must be able to hear me because of my loud voice.

Kissinger: We asked for a practical explanation of how this would operate. The practical explanation is that in any use of nuclear weapons, regardless of who initiates it, in a war between the Soviet Union and another country or between the U.S. and another country, or between an ally of each, then the U.S. and Soviet Union would have to help each other, and if physical help is not possible, then they would have to observe benevolent neutrality.

We think it has two, well three, general purposes. The first is to undermine NATO, because it would specifically oblige us to cooperate with the Soviet Union against our allies if nuclear weapons were involved. Secondly, it would force those Arabs who are afraid of nuclear weapons being used by Israel into an alliance relationship with the Soviet Union.



And third, I think, China. Those seemed to us the three purposes, together with the general impression of condominium.

We did not accept a serious discussion of this proposal. Nor will we.

Ch'iao: Actually your treaty on preventing nuclear war could be interpreted in this way also.

Kissinger: No, absolutely not.

Teng: Because your consultations know no bounds.

Kissinger: First of all, that treaty has never been invoked. We have used that treaty and intend to use it to get a legal basis for resistance in areas that are not covered by treaty obligations. The only time that treaty has been used was by the U.S. during the October alert.

Secondly, that treaty deliberately says that to prevent nuclear war, one has to avoid conventional war. And, therefore, by the reverse, to resort to conventional war involves the danger of retaliation by nuclear war. The new Soviet proposal separates nuclear war. It makes no distinction about who uses the weapons first, and it is directed at a kind of nuclear condominium.

In the October alert, we warned the Soviet Union that if they used force in the Middle East it would be in violation of Article 2 of the Treaty on Prevention of Nuclear War, which says that the use of conventional weapons implies the risk of nuclear weapons, and we used it as a warning to the Soviet Union.

But I agree with the Foreign Minister that the Soviet intention in their draft to us on the Treaty to Prevent Nuclear War was to achieve what they are now proposing in this new treaty.

Teng: Their goals and purposes have been constant all along.

Kissinger: And their diplomacy clumsy and obvious.

Teng: But their purpose is also very clear. And their goals are clear. And we think their purposes can only be these: First of all, to utilize the signing of such an agreement with you to develop their own nuclear weapons

to standards either equivalent to yours or surpassing yours. And the reason they are expressing such interest in signing such an agreement naturally shows that they have tasted a sweet taste out of such agreements. If I recall things correctly, you signed your first treaty pertaining to nuclear matters in July 1963. At that time I was in Moscow carrying on negotiations between our two parties, and on the very day I was leaving you signed that treaty.

Kissinger: We were not informed about all your movements at the time.  
[Laughter]

Teng: And it must be said that at that time the level of Soviet weapons were lagging a considerable distance behind yours. But in the eleven years since, I must say they have been able to reach a level about the same as yours.

Kissinger: That is not exactly correct, and I will explain that to you. It is inevitable that a large industrial <sup>power</sup> will increase the numbers of its nuclear weapons. And it is the characteristic of nuclear weapons because of their destructiveness that beyond a certain point superiority is not as effective as in conventional weapons.

But in numbers, diversity, accuracy and flexibility, our nuclear weapons will be considerably superior to the Soviet Union for the whole period of the arrangement which we signed in Vladivostok. And I will explain that to you if you want, or some other time while I am here. That is true both in numbers and characteristics.

Ch'iao: I would like to add a few words if possible. We thank the Doctor for telling us of Soviet intentions, but as we have said many times, we do not attach such great importance to such treaties. We still have a treaty with the Soviet Union that has not been outdated yet and now they have now proposed to us a new treaty for mutual non-aggression. Of course, how we will deal with this new treaty will have to be seen. But on the whole, we do not attach such great importance to such matters. And the decisive fact is not any treaty but a policy, the principles and the lines.

Teng: But I haven't finished now. I have only mentioned the first goal of the Soviet Union. The second is, as Dr. Kissinger mentioned, to try to divide the U.S. from its allies, which you have discovered or perceived. But it seems that although you have revealed this point, they will never give up this goal, whether in the past, present or future. And the third purpose will be to maintain the monopolistic status of your two countries in the field of nuclear weapons.

And they will try to use this point not only to compare with your country but also intimidate countries with only a few nuclear weapons and thus reach their aim of hegemony.

So our overall view of such treaties is that we attach importance to their political significance, and as always our attitude toward such matters is that we believe they are not of much consequence, and we are not bound by any such treaty or agreement. And as the Doctor has repeated many times, your aim is not to bind others either.

Kissinger: In every meeting with the Soviet Union in discussing proposals directed against China such as nuclear testing and nuclear proliferation, we have always avoided formulations whose purpose is directed against third countries.

Teng: But even if they were so, even if they succeeded, what role would those treaties play? They would not be able to play much of a role. And if they signed such agreements, they would still be waving their baton, and if they don't sign they would still have nuclear weapons. As for our nuclear weapons, as Chairman Mao says, they are only so much [gesturing with fingers].

Kissinger: We have never discussed nuclear weapons with you from our side.

Teng: That is right.

Kissinger: We inform you of Soviet overtures not because you should pay attention but because if they should ever tell you, you will know what is happening. .... And so we inform you of things with them whether you attach significance to them or not. And we are not asking you to do anything about it.

There is one other matter that came up in Vladivostok that I wanted to mention to you. The Soviet proposed to us to have consultations on Japanese-Chinese relations and to prevent them from becoming too close. We have refused this, and we have told the Japanese in a general way about this, and have told the Japanese about our refusal.

Teng: So from this too we can see the aims of the Soviet Union. You know, their Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, has a characteristic of which we were told by Khrushchev in 1957 when Chairman Mao went to Moscow.

Khrushchev introduced Gromyko to us, and he told us that Gromyko had a lot of things in his pocket. And Khrushchev told us that this fellow Gromyko could produce this formula today, and tomorrow, and he has so many things he can produce that that is his major trait -- that was Khrushchev's introduction of Gromyko. And it seems that Brezhnev has learned that trait from Gromyko and has a lot of things in his pocket too.

As for our dealings with the Soviet Union, we do not rely on our nuclear weapons. And we don't have very much skill other than digging tunnels and having rifles. As for your signing such agreements, we do not attach such great significance to them. Maybe we won't even comment.

Kissinger: That is entirely up to you. The agreements we sign have nothing to do with China except the one on preventing nuclear war which to us gives us legal possibilities. But the agreement, or the tentative one in Vladivostok, we consider very favorable in the overall strategic balance. It is up to you if you comment or not. It has nothing to do with the People's Republic of China.

Teng: I would like to raise a question. We have heard the Doctor say that the recent meeting and the recent signing of such an agreement was a great breakthrough. Was it really so? To be more specific -- how reliable can it be -- how reliable are the prospects for ten years of detente and a cease of competition in the military field?

Kissinger: First of all, you have to understand that we have to fight on many fronts. And our domestic strategy is to isolate our left, if that is a proper thing to say in the People's Republic.

Teng: We like those on the right!

Kissinger: The ones on the right have no choice but to be with us anyway. The ones on the right are no problem with us.

Teng: Isn't Mr. Heath of Great Britain a well-known man on the right?

Kissinger: Oh, yes.

Teng: And wasn't Mr. Adenauer of your former father-land a well-known man of the right? And in France, De Gaulle, Pompidou and Giscard, Tanaka, and Ohira are famous men on the right. We like this kind, comparatively speaking.

Kissinger: We send our leftists to Peking.

Bush: I don't think I understand that.

Kissinger: The Ambassador is a left-wing Republican. No, he is here because he has our total confidence.

But it is important in the U.S. to isolate and paralyze those who would undermine our defense program and who generally conduct what I consider a stupid policy. And we can do this by pursuing policies which adopt their rhetoric.

And to answer your question, I do not believe that this guarantees ten years of detente -- not for one minute. But I do believe that if detente breaks down, or when it does, we will be better able to mobilize our public opinion having made every effort to preserve peace rather than being accused of having provoked them.

Teng: On our side we don't believe it is possible to reach detente -- still less maintain ten years of detente. And we don't think there is any agreement that can bind the hands of Russia.

Kissinger: No, but there is no way they can violate this agreement without our knowing it. I don't think it was a very intelligent agreement for them. They have two choices: they can either respect the agreement, in which case we preserve a certain strategic advantage, or they can violate the agreement, in which case we have the psychological and political possibility of massive breakout ourselves, which we would not have otherwise for domestic reasons.

Teng: As we see it, it is still necessary to have vigilance.

Kissinger: There is no doubt about that for us.

Teng: That would be good.

Kissinger: I once studied the foreign policy of Metternich, and he said the trick to dealing with Napoleon was to seem to be a fool without being one. There is no question -- in terms of our domestic situation, it is, strangely enough easier to get Congress to give funds for limits in agreements than to get funds for the same amounts without an agreement. [To Bush:] Do you think so, George?

Bush: Yes, I do.

Teng: There is something else I would like to ask about your SALT agreement. Does it mean strategic arms? Does it apply only to nuclear arms?

Kissinger: Yes, and only those with an intercontinental range.

Teng: That means that only those strategic weapons are included, not others.

Kissinger: According to the definitions of the agreement.

Teng: But outside of that agreement, what is meant by strategic weapons? For example, conventional weapons have been considered strategic?

Kissinger: No.

Teng: Then we differ a bit here. Because here is the question of whether a future war would be a nuclear war.

Kissinger: What do you think?

Teng: We don't think so necessarily.

Kissinger: I agree. But I would like to say, as I said to the Chairman and Prime Minister, we would consider any sign of expansion of the Soviet sphere -- either to the West or East, whether countries were covered by treaty or not, as a threat to our long-term security. It has nothing to do with our affection for the countries covered but strategic reality. Secondly, we don't care if that expansion comes with conventional or nuclear weapons.

Teng: You know there is a story, after Khrushchev came to Peking. He came to Peking in 1954, and he gave us this reasoning: During that visit, aside from boasting of his corn planting, he also boasted about the uselessness of naval vessels. He said that in the missile era naval vessels were nothing other than moving targets and they would be finished off at once. And the Soviet Union actually ceased to build their Navy for two or three years. But they very quickly rectified that. And since then, while energetically developing their nuclear weapons, they are at the same time continuing to build their conventional weapons and their navy also.

Kissinger: That is true, but we don't think that they have a strong navy.

Teng: But they have increased their numbers.

Kissinger: They have increased their numbers, but according to our observations -- we may be wrong -- in each Middle East crisis their navy maneuvered with very great clumsiness and we judge they would be a very easy target. We thought their panicky behavior in each crisis suggested that this is true.

Teng: But no matter what, in the past the Soviet Union had no naval forces in the Mediterranean or Indian Oceans and their activities were confined very close to their Pacific shores. But now they go everywhere, even Latin America. During the subcontinent crisis their vessels moved with greater speed than yours.

Kissinger: They are after ours.

Chiao: But anyway, that time your naval vessels moved too slowly.

Kissinger: Be that as it may, but in conventional land strength, we do not underestimate the Soviet Union. They are very strong in conventional land strength. In naval strength they are absolutely no match for us. We have hysterical admirals who, when they want money, say that no matter what country we are in war against, including Switzerland, that we are going to lose. But in reality, the only way the Soviet Union could hurt our fleet in the Mediterranean is with their land-based aircraft. And if they did that, that would be a general nuclear war. But if it is a naval battle, our carriers can strike theirs with so much greater distance and force, that there is absolutely no possibility for them to survive.

Teng: But from our discussions with some Europeans, they seem much more worried than you -- not just on naval forces but on the whole question of conventional forces.

Kissinger: On the question of conventional forces, everyone has reason to worry. On the question of naval forces, I believe we are far superior.

Teng: But the Soviet Union develops itself with greater speed. If the Soviet Union launches a war, it might not be a nuclear war; it might quite possibly be a conventional war. Under this condition, conventional weapons should not be neglected.

Kissinger: I completely agree. That is a problem the western countries do have, not in naval forces but ground conventional forces. But you will notice that we have increased the number of our divisions recently. But it is a problem. There is no question.

Teng: But your increase is proportionately much smaller than the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: That is true. But I think it would be extremely dangerous for the Soviet Union. First of all, in Europe, the Soviet Union could not achieve a decisive victory without a very large battle and in those circumstances we would use nuclear weapons.

Teng: But under those conditions, where the Soviet Union has the same destructive strength as you, would it be easy for you to make up your minds?

Kissinger: The Soviet Union does not have the same destructive force as we.

Teng: Not even enough strength for a first strike?

Kissinger: No. Let me explain the composition of the forces to you because there is so much nonsense written in the U.S. by people with specific purposes in mind that there is a very misleading impression created.

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Teng: Aren't you violating the treaty?

Kissinger: No. I will explain the treaty in a minute. And at least 250 new bombers, the B-1. But the number 240 and 250 are only planning numbers. Once we begin producing, we can produce as many as we want.

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So the Soviet Union would have to be insane to attack 1,000 missiles when we would have ..... more left over even if they destroy all the land-based missiles -- which they also couldn't do.

Teng: So for either side to use nuclear weapons against the other, it is a matter for great care by both sides.

Kissinger: That is without question. I was answering the question about the Soviet Union being able to make a first strike. My argument is that that is impossible.

Let's look at the reverse. The US has about 30% in land-based missiles, the rest either at sea or on airplanes. I would also like to tell you, we are planning to put long-range missiles into our airplanes -- something the Soviet Union cannot do because they don't have airplanes large enough to do that. The Soviet Union has 85% of its force in land-based missiles. And its sea-based missiles, up to now, are very poor. And it has only 120 airplanes that can reach the U.S., and we don't think they are very well trained. In fact, under the agreement they have to reduce their numbers. They can compose their forces any way they want -- but the level we have agreed on is 2,400 for both sides. It is below their level and above ours -- if you don't count overseas weapons. So they will have to reduce their forces. We think they will get rid of their airplanes, but we don't know.

Teng: But they will not violate the agreement when they improve qualitatively.

Kissinger: Yes, but neither will we.

Teng: So you still have your race then.

Kissinger: But we have planned our forces for the 1980's and they have planned their forces for the '70's. By the early 1980's, both land-based forces will be vulnerable. And 85% of theirs are land-based while only 35% of ours are land-based. Secondly, they are making all their improvements in the most vulnerable forces, namely in the land-based forces. We are making ours in the sea-based and air-based forces -- which are not vulnerable, or much less vulnerable. For example, on their submarines, they have not begun to test a multiple warhead -- which means they could not possibly get it before 1980 into production. Which means, in turn, we will be, in accuracy and technical procedures, 10 to 15 years ahead of them.

Teng: We are in favor of your maintaining a superiority against the Soviet Union in such aspects.

Kissinger: And I repeat that if we launched a first strike against them we could use overseas forces which are added to the strategic forces that I gave you.

Teng: I thought what we were exploring today was the position of nuclear and conventional weapons.

Kissinger: I just wanted to answer the Foreign Minister's statement that they could first attack us. But it is true that it is more difficult to use nuclear weapons today than 15 years ago. This is without question true.

Ch'iao: What I was saying was this: At present if the Soviet Union should launch an attack with conventional weapons on not necessarily a large scale, on a medium scale, for you to use nuclear weapons under those circumstances would be a difficult thing to make up your minds about.

Kissinger: It is more difficult now than 10 to 15 years ago. It depends on where the attack takes place.

Ch'iao: As we discussed in New York, if there are changes in Yugoslavia -- they need not make a direct attack, but if they incite pro-Soviet elements to bring in the Soviet armed forces -- what would you do?

Kissinger: Yugoslavia? I went to Yugoslavia after our talk and talked to Marshall Tito and his colleagues about exactly this problem. For one thing, we will begin selling military equipment to Yugoslavia next year. We are now studying what to do in such a case. We will not let it happen unchallenged. It will not be like Czechoslovakia or Hungary. We have not yet decided on the precise measures. But we believe that if the Soviet army is permitted to move outside its sphere, it will create appetites that might not stop. This is why we reacted so violently when they mobilized their airborne divisions during the Middle East crisis. Because it was our judgment that once permitted to operate far from their territory in foreign wars, not in internal quarrels, there would be no end to their appetites.

Teng: In our opinion, not only the Middle East is explosive but also the Balkan Peninsula. And this is an old strategy of the Czar.

Kissinger: For your information, if there is a European Security Conference in the spring, which is, as you know, something we have never wanted, if the President attends, he plans to stop in Bucharest and Belgrade to help make clear the American interest in the independence of these two countries. But we have not announced this, obviously.

Teng: We have no reason to be in disagreement.

Kissinger: It was no accident that on my recent trip that I stopped in Afghanistan, Yugoslavia and Romania, and made speeches in each about an independent foreign policy.

Teng: So we have been exploring some strategic issues today.

Kissinger: Yes.

Teng: Do you have anything else you want to discuss in this group?

Kissinger: No.

Teng: So, maybe after a short rest, do you want to bring in the others?

Kissinger: Yes.

[The meeting recessed at 11:32 a.m. and then reconvened in a larger group at 11:40.]

Teng/Ch'iao/HAK  
memcon (am)



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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Vice Premier of the State Council, People's Republic of China  
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Minister of Foreign Affairs  
Ambassador Huang Chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office, Washington  
Wang Hai-jung, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs  
T'ang Wen-sheng, Deputy Director, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Tsien Ta-yung, Counselor, PRC Liaison Office, Washington  
Ting Yuan-hung, Director, United States Office, Department of American and Oceanic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
Chang Han-chih, Translator  
Lien Cheng-pao, Notetaker

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador George Bush, Chief of the United States Liaison Office, Peking  
Ambassador Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations  
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State  
Philip C. Habib, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
William H. Gleysteen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs  
Richard H. Solomon, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council  
Bonnie Andrews, Notetaker

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.1

NSC MEMO, NUMBER, STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, State Review 9/15/03  
BY lhm, NARA, DATE 10/31/07

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY



DATE AND TIME: Wednesday, November 27, 1974  
11:40 a.m. - 12:20 p.m.

PLACE: Government Guest House #18  
Peking, People's Republic of China

SUBJECT: Sino-Soviet Relations; Europe

Vice Premier Teng: This evening I invite you to a Peking meal.

Secretary Kissinger: Thank you.

Vice Premier Teng: Mr. Bush has had it [this type of meal].

Ambassador Bush: In Peking and in Canton!

Vice Premier Teng: But Peking -- there are two best meals here. One is Peking Duck, and the other is the Hot Pot.

Secretary Kissinger: I have never had a Peking Hot Pot before. I look forward to it very much. Thank you very much. Did you say in a restaurant?

Vice Premier Teng: Yes, it is tasteless anywhere else.

Secretary Kissinger: I have never had a meal in a restaurant here.

Vice Premier Teng: Then tonight we invite you to a restaurant.

Secretary Kissinger: You know I remember receiving a call after one of my trips here. A singer wanted to perform in a night club [in Peking]. I told her there were none. She couldn't believe it. Now I turn these calls over to the Ambassador [Huang Chen]. He convinces them there is no China. [Laughter].

Vice Premier Teng: Shall we continue? We would like to thank the Doctor for telling us about your global trips -- or, to use a Chinese phrase, about your "travels to various lands."

I would like to give a brief summary of our understanding of some issues. I should think the first matter that the Doctor would be concerned about is the Soviet Union and Sino-Soviet relations.



Secretary Kissinger: I will adopt your method and say it is up to you.  
[Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: You know that the differences between the Soviet Union and China are profound. And you know that after Brezhnev left Vladivostok he flew to Ulan Bator to attend the anniversary of the People's Republic of Mongolia, and he made a speech. I read the press reports -- the part relating to Sino-Soviet relations, and he was boasting a little about the agreements you reached in Vladivostok.

Secretary Kissinger: I explained those to you.

Vice Premier Teng: He still repeated the old words about China and the Soviet Union. The most important [of these] was that he said between China and the Soviet Union there does not exist any border dispute. And by "disputed area" he wasn't even speaking of the larger part -- the one and one-half million kilometers. He only mentioned the smaller, spotted area along the border. So the content of the so-called "non-aggression" treaty, non-use-of-force, doesn't even include the essence of the border dispute.

Secretary Kissinger: Our analysis is the same. I noticed he praised the Foreign Minister. This I approve of highly.

Vice Premier Teng: Which one?

Secretary Kissinger: His, and ours! [Laughter]

Vice Premier Teng: That means that the very issue the two sides are negotiating about doesn't exist at all. That means also that the provisional agreement reached by the Prime Ministers, reached between our two countries in 1969, is gone with the wind. It also means that the words they mouth about improvements in relations are all empty. Of course, they pay lip service to "improving relations." And over the years the postures they have struck have many aspects, varied forms, including mediation by the Cubans and the Romanians. I recall that Chairman Mao discussed this with you. And you will also recall that Chairman Mao made the concessions of 2,000 years and said that no further concession could be made.

Secretary Kissinger: We will explain that to our Ambassador. It will give him courage. (The Secretary quietly explains the story to Ambassador Bush.)



Vice Premier Teng: So we can see from that that the recent talk about the publicization of the telegram we sent to the Soviet Union on its National Day is not quite in accord with facts.

Secretary Kissinger: Did you publish it, or did they?

Vice Premier Teng: We did not. But they deleted a bit [from the Chinese text] when they did. Actually, we put congratulations in the cable, we put in just the content of the agreement reached between the two Premiers in 1969, we just mentioned the essence of the agreement between the two Premiers: that we should maintain the status quo on the border; prevent armed conflict and avoid clashes on the border; and it has what they put forward about an agreement on non-aggression and non-use-of-force.

Secretary Kissinger: This is new?

Vice Premier Teng: It is not new. It was also part of the understanding of 1969.

Secretary Kissinger: But if they should succeed -- it will be the first such non-aggression treaty among allies.

Vice Premier Teng: Their proposals were put forward under the circumstances that the treaty still exists, our treaty of mutual assistance still exists. So it seems that the Soviet policy of hostility against China has not changed. And, of course, this doesn't exclude more tricks, such as asking this person or that person to come and mediate, but it doesn't change the essence [of China's dispute with the Soviets]. The methods that they continue to use are military threat and subversion. And they will continue their tricks such as the Asian Collective Security system. That also was something mentioned [by Brezhnev] in Ulan Bator.

Secretary Kissinger: Apparently, he discussed that with Bhutto, but he rejected it. Brezhnev also discussed it with the Shah in Moscow.

Vice Premier Teng: It was the same old theme. Others expressed a certain degree of favor for it, but --

Secretary Kissinger: The Shah will not go along with it.



Vice Premier Teng: That is also our opinion. Even India hasn't dared to openly accept it. Actually the Asian Collective Security system, although in name is directed against China, it is really aimed at dividing and controlling the countries of the area. This is the same [tactic] as the European Security Conference. It is to help Soviet forces [gain access] into the Indian Ocean and Pacific.

Secretary Kissinger: I think by now the Soviets -- the European Security Conference is ridiculous. It can no longer achieve anything significant.

Vice Premier Teng: And the Chairman asked Mr. Heath when he was in China if he thought the European Security Conference would be a success. He replied that rather than ask if it would be successful one should ask "when will it be finished?" What is your assessment of the conference? Will it be a success, or will it be concluded?

Secretary Kissinger: It cannot be a success. Our view is that it should be concluded. We feel that if it goes on it will create the impression of success, which is not warranted. This should be avoided. There will be no substantive agreement of any kind. They are discussing principles -- one of the issues they are now debating is about the peaceful change of frontiers. The Soviets want to say that frontiers are inviolable. The Germans want to say that frontiers can be changed only by peaceful means.

The other issue is that the Soviets say that all principles should be equally applied. The Germans want to say that all [principles] have equal validity. I have tried to explain the difference [between these two formulations] to the President, but I do not understand it myself. This is the sort of thing they are discussing at the Security Conference right now.

Vice Premier Teng: It is very confusing to me.

Secretary Kissinger: The instructions to the members of our delegation are to stay out of such things. For this, one must have a German or Soviet mind.

Vice Premier Teng: One can probably only write this now in German.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right. But there is no possible conclusion now that can be called a success. You cannot change history by



sentences in a treaty! However, I think it will be finished in the early part of next year.

Vice Premier Teng: As for the Soviet threat, as we have said many times, we don't pay much attention. We don't think those one million troops can be of much consequence. The Soviet military strength in the East is not just directed against China. It is also directed against Japan and your Seventh Fleet, your air and naval forces. And if they are going to attack China, as the Chairman has discussed [with you], it will be impossible to take over China with just one million troops. They will have to increase their troops by one million, and even that would not be sufficient because if they are going to make up their minds to fight with China, they will have to make up their minds to fight for 20 years. The Chinese have no great virtue, but they do have [the virtue of] patience.

Secretary Kissinger: They have a few other virtues.

Vice Premier Teng: They also have "millet plus rifles" -- and tunnels.

Secretary Kissinger: I have never seen the tunnels.

Vice Premier Teng: Hasn't Ambassador Bush done this for you? He is shirking his responsibilities.

Ambassador Bush: Not yet. I am delighted to know that I can see them.

Vice Premier Teng: The next time you can write a report to the Doctor about the tunnels.

Secretary Kissinger: Don't encourage him. Between him and the Ambassador in India [Patrick Moynihan] I have nothing to do but read cables -- although the Ambassador in India publishes his in the newspapers.

Vice Premier Teng: So that is the order of relations between the Soviet Union and China. As for the strategic emphasis of the Soviet Union, we see it as "a feint toward the East to attack in the West" -- to attack in Europe. It doesn't matter if we have different views, we can see what happens.

Secretary Kissinger: I think the strategic situation is the same. If they attack in the East it will be a threat to the West, and if they attack



in the West it will be a threat to the East. The danger is the same either way, We don't need to decide this abstractly.

Vice Premier Teng: But this strategic assessment has its practical side, especially with the Western European countries. We have exchanged views on this many times.


Secretary Kissinger: I don't believe Europe could be indifferent to an attack in the East. I don't believe you could be indifferent to an attack in the West.

Vice Premier Teng: We agree to this view. An attack in any quarter is of significance to other areas too. But to establish a strategic point of view and preparations will be of significant importance, especially to your allies in Europe. Because without [these preparations], they will suffer. When we say the emphasis is in the West, it does not mean we will ignore our own defenses.

Secretary Kissinger: We agree, and we will add to our preparations too. Unfortunately, as you know, some of the leaders in Europe are not the most heroic right now. You have met them and can form your own opinions. But we will do our best.

I might add something about the oil problem: The U.S. has two options. Economically, we can deal with the problem on our own better than in cooperation with others. But the reason I have made several specific suggestions and proposals is because I believe if Europe continues to suffer a balance of payments drain, they will lose so much confidence that they will not be able to resist Soviet pressures. And if they take money from countries like Libya and Algeria, this will continue the process of their political demoralization. So you should understand that the proposals I have made, and our policies, have nothing to do with economic considerations, because economically we would be better off making bilateral agreements with the Saudis, and we could leave Europe alone. We do this because we feel the defense of the West will be weakened if these countries are demoralized by their economic condition.

Vice Premier Teng: So, I think we spent quite a lot of time this morning. We must have something to eat, otherwise our stomachs will make revolution. Shall we meet again at 3:30 p. m. in the Great Hall of the People? In the Original Hall. All right?



Secretary Kissinger: I don't know what the Original Hall is, but I am sure someone will take us there.

Vice Premier Teng: It is the Sinkiang Room.

Secretary Kissinger: Thank you.

[The meeting adjourned at 12:20 p.m.]





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