

The original documents are located in Box 12, folder “India (4)” of the National Security Adviser. Presidential Country Files for Middle East and South Asia at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

Copyright Notice

The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other reproductions of copyrighted material. Gerald R. Ford donated to the United States of America his copyrights in all of his unpublished writings in National Archives collections. Works prepared by U.S. Government employees as part of their official duties are in the public domain. The copyrights to materials written by other individuals or organizations are presumed to remain with them. If you think any of the information displayed in the PDF is subject to a valid copyright claim, please contact the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 19, 1976

NOTE TO BRENT SCOWCROFT

Brent:

You asked for a copy of the Qs and As that State put together to address the Washington Post article on the U.S. role in India nuclear explosive development. They are attached.

As I mentioned to you, the Administration has recently changed its position on that role. New information provided by Canada and India has made it clear that the initial U.S. heavy water loading of the unsafeguarded CIRUS reactor had not completely evaporated or leaked as was previously believed. Undoubtedly, some of our heavy water was in the reactor during the period when the plutonium was produced for the Indian explosion. Our position is, however, that India has produced many times more heavy water in their indigenous plant, and that the U.S. heavy water was not needed. If we had recalled our heavy water (which retrospectively would have been smart from a domestic political viewpoint) it would have had no impact on the Indian explosive development. This position has already been given publicly to the NRC as part of its hearing process on fuel exports to Tarapur, and it is proposed that HAK also give to Ribicoff.

[State (OES) has just suggested to me that HAK may not have yet been personally aware of this altered position, and may have the earlier information in mind. This could explain his proposal that the President state that the "U.S. had no direct role in the Indian explosion."]

The technology on most aspects of reprocessing is in the public domain. Any contractual assistance provided by U.S. companies was not consequential and would have been easily and readily provided by companies in other countries. India technical students train here as well as most other advanced industrial countries.

Those who would have us act unilaterally to discipline India and force its acceptance of our nuclear policies are being unrealistic. Some of the more thoughtful of those who advocate unilateral U.S. action recognize this dilemma, but contend that other suppliers and recipients may be persuaded to follow our lead because (1) we are faced potentially with a highly dangerous situation, (2) it demonstrates that we are not looking for commercial gain, and (2) it is the moral position. These are three important considerations,

~~CONFIDENTIAL/GDS~~

HR 5/31/01



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

and they explain in part the (limited) success we've had in achieving the cooperation of the other supplier countries. But if we try to go too far, too fast we will lose this cooperation.

India is another matter. We have virtually no hope in achieving full fuel cycle safeguards, NPT adherence, or a cancellation of its nuclear explosive program. But by connecting their good behavior to continued U.S. supply, we might produce an indefinite delay in their testing. And the longer they wait, presumably the harder it will be for them to commence testing again. It is hoped that we can get the genie half-way back into the bottle.

D. E.

David Elliott

Attachment
a/s

~~CONFIDENTIAL/GDS~~



Question: What comment do you have on the Washington Post article that states that the United States contributed to India's 1974 atomic explosion through the supply of heavy water and through some form of assistance to its reprocessing plant?

Answer: It is well-known that the U.S. supplies heavy water to India under a 1956 contract for use in the reactor which eventually produced the plutonium used in India's 1974 explosion. Following the U.S. supply under the 1956 contract, India produced a substantially larger amount of heavy water in an Indian plant, so that the heavy water supplied by the United States was not required for the production of the plutonium which India used in that explosion.

As to U.S. assistance in the construction of India's reprocessing plant, India relied for the construction of this plant on technical information which was in the public domain since 1958, when the United States and a number of other nations declassified the technology of reprocessing. Indian scientists, like those of a number of other countries, received some unclassified training in this field and one United States firm was given a consulting contract by the Indian government on one specific feature of this plant. We understand that this contract was a small one that former officials in this firm do not regard as having been necessary to India's successful completion of this reprocessing facility. For those who view the widespread interest in the issue of non-proliferation and reprocessing, we believe it is important for the public to understand that despite the difficulty of building large scale economic reprocessing plants, the construction of small plants which do not have to meet strict economic



and environmental standards, is now within the competence of a large number of industrialized and semi-industrialized countries.



Question: Is the nuclear non-proliferation problem really getting out of hand? Is The Washington Post editorial correct in its contention that the Administration is making no concerted effort to improve U.S. non-proliferation policy?

Answer: United States concern over and active efforts to avoid or contain further proliferation are one of the highest priority objectives of the Department of State. Secretary Kissinger made this clear in his 1974 speech before the UN General Assembly, which preceded the current high level of public and Congressional interest in the non-proliferation problem. Secretary Kissinger further repeated his concerns to the UN General Assembly in September 1975, focusing on problems of reprocessing. Substantial forward progress which has been made in the last two years has been made as a result of US initiative, particularly in connection with concerting the problems of various nuclear suppliers. Here again, we believe it would be unfortunate if the US public were mislead into believing that the United States alone or even the United States acting with other suppliers can prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, in view of the widespread knowledge which already exists in the world of the technology necessary for the production of sizable amounts of fissionable material. We believe what is needed are new institutional arrangements and understandings that reduce the incentives for fissionable material production and nuclear weapons, and which provide for convincing and strong sanctions against those who violate their commitments. The Department of State and other concerned government agencies are involved in an intensive study at this very time of all of these issues.



Question: Why does the Department of State believe that we should continue to supply nuclear fuel to India in view of its nuclear explosion? How does this contribute to our non-proliferation policy?

Answer: The Department's decision that nuclear fuel should continue to be supplied to India, a decision which is shared by all other concerned agencies of the Executive Branch, is based on careful balancing of all policy considerations/on our nonproliferation objectives. It is not dictated primarily by our desire to maintain friendly bilateral relations with India, although this is of course a contributing factor.

Fundamentally, our view is based on the conviction that the failure of the United States to meet its supply undertakings when there has been no violation by the other party will lead to a serious weakening of the United States credibility as a nuclear supplier on a worldwide basis, and this in turn will hasten the process, which is unfortunately already begun, of greater reliance on other sources of supply and on indigenous nuclear developments.



Question: Wouldn't a denial of nuclear material to India, the only country that has produced a nuclear explosion using outside nuclear assistance for peaceful purposes, be understood by other countries as a strengthening of our non-proliferation policy?

Answer: The Indian situation is a particularly difficult one because the understandings which India had with other suppliers which were entered into at a very early stage did not contain a prohibition against nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Thus there was no clear cut violation by India of any of its undertakings.

The situation is made much more difficult by the fact that given the large number of suggestions now being put forward, the U.S. continue its supply commitments in various ways. There is little chance that other countries would view a cut off of supply to India as an isolated and unique action that would be applied only to countries who produce nuclear explosives.



2

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 7, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

The President has reviewed and concurs in the recommendation of the Executive Secretary of State that the appointment of Mr. Kewal Singh as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India to the United States would be agreeable to the Government of the United States. You are requested to so inform the Government of India.

William G. Hyland

WILLIAM G. HYLAND
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs



MHT
JW
RCM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)ACTION
August 31, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM G. HYLAND
FROM: ROSEMARY NIEHUSS
SUBJECT: Agreement for Indian Ambassador

With the memorandum at Tab B, Executive Secretary C. Arthur Borg recommends that the White House approve the appointment of Mr. Kewal Singh as the new Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States.

The memorandum for your signature to the Secretary of State at Tab A would forward the President's concurrence in the Department of State's recommendation.


Comment: State seems pleased with this Indian choice. Singh is not only a seasoned diplomat but also well disposed to the US. Backing up the Indian Foreign Minister, as Foreign Secretary for the past four years he has had extensive dealings with our Ambassadors in New Delhi, and is well regarded.

I am told by State that Secretary Kissinger told Indian Ambassador Kaul (in a post-South Asian trip meeting last week) that we would do our best to expedite the agreement process.

RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the memo at Tab A.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ (GDS)

1572 5/31/01





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7618226

4835

August 27, 1976

rec'd 8/30


CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BRENT SCOWCROFT
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Appointment of Kewal Singh of India as
Ambassador to the United States.

The Government of India has inquired whether our Government agrees to the appointment of Kewal Singh as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the United States (Tab 2). A biography of Kewal Singh is attached (Tab 1). A thorough review of United States Government records reveals no grounds for objection.

The Department believes from the information available that Mr. Singh will make a good ambassador to the United States and recommends that the President agree to the proposed appointment. If he concurs, the Department will inform the Government of India.



C. Arthur Borg
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. Biography.
2. Note dated August 23, 1976
from Embassy of India.

CONFIDENTIAL
GDS

NR 5/31/01



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BIOGRAPHY - Kewal Singh

Republic of India

Kewal Singh, 61, an experienced and capable diplomat, retired on March 31, 1976 as India's Foreign Secretary, a position he had held since December 1972. His Foreign Service postings prior to that assignment included: Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany (1970-72), Secretary (West) in the Foreign Ministry (1968-70), and Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1966-68). Singh also served in Turkey, Berlin, Portugal, England, Cambodia, Sweden and Pakistan, serving as Ambassador in the latter three. Earlier in his career he served as India's Consul General to Pondicherry and, with the de facto transfer of the French establishments in 1954, became Chief Commissioner.

Kewal Singh was born in Lyallpur District of the former undivided Punjab on June 1, 1915. Trained in the law, he was educated at Forman Christian College and Law College, Lahore, and Balliol College, Oxford, attending the latter in 1938-39. He joined the prestigious Indian Civil Service in 1939 and for the next nine years held various positions in the civil administration of Punjab before receiving his initial overseas assignment in 1949.

Singh is respected by his colleagues as highly professional, articulate and intelligent. He has maintained cordial and usually productive relations with U.S. officials and is considered well-disposed towards the United States. During his tenure as Foreign Secretary, he visited the U.S. on several occasions and appeared genuinely committed to improving Indo-U.S. relations.

Singh is a warm and sociable person who responds to an informal approach. He is married and has one daughter, Aruna. His only son died in 1968. He speaks German, French, Swedish, Russian and English, besides several Indian languages.

A thorough search of United States Government sources reveals no grounds for objection.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS

HR 5/31/01



P760130-224

RECEIVED
DEPARTMENT OF STATE



No. 1032/AMB/7
AMBASSADOR OF INDIA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

1976 AUG 24 PM 3 30

23rd August 1976

FACRC
DOCUMENT ANALYSIS

ACTIC
is assigned

3/25

The Ambassador of India presents his compliments to the Secretary of State of the United States of America and has the honour, under instructions from the Government of India, to state that the Government of India propose to appoint Mr. Kewal Singh as Ambassador of India in Washington. A copy of his Curriculum Vitae is enclosed.

2. The Ambassador of India will be grateful if the Secretary of State will kindly obtain and communicate, at his early convenience, the concurrence of the Government of the United States in the appointment of Mr. Kewal Singh as Ambassador.
3. The Ambassador of India avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Secretary of State the assurances of his highest consideration.



The Secretary of State of the
United States of America,
Department of State,
WASHINGTON D.C.



CURRICULUM VITAE

Mr. Kewal Singh, born June 1, 1915, B.A., LL.B., joined Indian Civil Service in 1939 and served in different capacities before his appointment as First Secretary, Indian Embassy, Turkey, 1948-49; Indian Military Mission, Berlin, 1949-51; Charge d' Affaires, Indian Legation, Lisbon, 1951-53; Consul-General, Pondicherry, 1953-54; Chief Commissioner, Pondicherry, Karaikal, Mahe and Yanam, Nov. 1955-57; awarded President's award "Padma Shree" on 26.1.1955 for distinguished services rendered in French establishments in India; Foreign Service Inspector, 1957; Ambassador of India to Cambodia, 1957-58; Ambassador of India to Sweden from August 1958 to August 1962 (concurrently accredited as Ambassador to Denmark and Finland since 25th March 1960); Deputy High Commissioner of India, London from 10.10.1962 to 26.7.1965; High Commissioner for India, Karachi, from 5.8.1965 to 10.8.1966; Ambassador of India, Moscow, from 30.8.1966 to 16.12.1968; concurrently accredited to Mongolia from 11.10.1966; Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs from 17.12.1968 to 3.11.1970; Ambassador of India to Bonn from 8.12.70 to 2.12.1972; Foreign Secretary from 4.12.1972 to 31.3.1976.



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD			LOG NUMBER
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	
8	27	8	28	9	7604835

INITIAL ACTION O

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES X FROM: SECSTATE S/S 7618226 UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
SCOWCROFT X SECDEF LOU NO. FORN NODIS
HYLAND DCI X REF C EYES ONLY EXDIS
DAVIS STATE EXSEC X \$ CODEWORD
OTHER TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Agreement for Kewal Singh of India

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION					REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	CONCURRENCE	COORDINATE	INFO		
ADV CYS SCOWCROFT/WGH	<u> </u>					MEMO FOR SCOWCROFT. <u> </u>
STAFF SECRETARY	<u>FARRAR</u>			<u>X</u>		MEMO FOR PRES <u> </u>
CONGRESSIONAL						REPLY FOR <u> </u>
ECONOMIC						APPROPRIATE ACTION <u> </u>
EUR/CANADA/OCEANS						MEMO <u>Hyland</u> TO <u>Kissinger</u> <u>X</u>
FAR EAST/PRC						RECOMMENDATIONS <u> </u>
INTELLIGENCE						JOINT MEMO <u> </u>
LATIN AMERICA						REFER TO <u> </u> FOR: <u> </u>
MID EAST/NO. AFRICA	<u>X</u>				<u>X</u>	ANY ACTION NECESSARY? <u> </u>
NSC PLANNING						CONCURRENCE <u> </u>
PROGRAM ANALYSIS						DUE DATE: <u>8/5</u>
SCIENTIFIC						COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
SUB-SAH/AFRICA/UN						

W.H. (In & Out)

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	STATUS	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	DUE	CY TO
8/31/76	Michess	Hyland	X	Spr agreement to Kissinger	(9/5)	
9-7		NGS	C	Hyland spr memo to HRC		

NSC/S DISPATCH INSTR

DISPATCH 9/7/76 NOTIFY

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: Ch/9 of Subtotal 9/7/76

SPECIAL INDEXING:

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED X

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

MICROFILM FILE ROOMS

M/F'D BY

IF

NS DY

WH SA FP

PA

SEP 09 1976

OPEN mk

CLOSE ADP