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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UR, US

SUBJECT: THE CURRENT SOVIET VIEW OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS


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1. SUMMARY. THERE HAS BEEN A DISTINCT COOLING IN SOVIET MEDIA TREATMENT OF THE U.S. IN THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS, COUPLED WITH GREATER EMPHASIS ON SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST CAMP AND ON MOSCOW'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE WORLD "PROGRESSIVE" AND "NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE OTHER POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS, WE ATTRIBUTE THIS LARGELY TO SOVIET DISAPPOINTMENT AT RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL AND BILATERAL SPHERES, INCLUDING MOST NOTABLY WESTERN BACKLASH ON CSCE, EXCLUSION FROM LATEST MIDDLE EAST DISARMAMENT, AND DELAY IN CONVERTING VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT INTO SALT II TREATY. IF WE ARE INDEED IN A PRESUCCESSION PHASE, THEN BREZHNEV'S UPCOMING ORISE MIGHT ALSO HAVE PLAYED A ROLE IN THIS CHANGED EMPHASIS, BUT WE SEE NO CLEAR EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SUCH A SUPPOSITION. WHAT IS EVIDENT TO US IS THAT THE SOVIETS ARE UNCERTAIN ABOUT CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE U.S., APPREHENSIVE ABOUT WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE THE GROWING CHORUS OF ANTI-SOVIET AND ANTI-DEFENSE SENTIMENTS BEING EXPRESSED THERE, AND WORRIED ABOUT THE IMPACT WHICH OUR ELECTION CAMPAIGN MAY HAVE ON U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. A SALT II AGREEMENT AND A WASHINGTON SUMMIT WOULD, HOWEVER, BRING RELATIONS BACK TO A MORE EVEN KEEL. IF BREZHNEV IS TO MAKE THE TRIP TO WASHINGTON, THIS WOULD IMPLY AN INTENTION TO CONTINUE HIM IN POWER FOR

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
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SOME TIME AFTER A MEETING, SINCE A LAME DUCK SUMMIT WOULD MAKE LITTLE SENSE FROM THE SOVIET POINT OF VIEW. IN ANY CASE, WE MAY WELL BE MOVING INTO A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY, WHICH MIGHT ALSO IN THE LONG RUN TURN OUT TO BE A PERIOD OF HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY. END SUMMARY.

2. THE MEDIA. WE DETECT A PERCEPTIBLE COOLING OVER THE PAST SEVERAL MONTHS IN THE RELATIVE STRESS IN THE SOVIET MEDIA ON THE IMPORTANCE OF DETENTE AND U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. CONCOMITANTLY, HEAVY COVERAGE OF RECENT SOVIET EFFORTS TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR POSITION WITHIN "THE SOCIALIST CAMP" HAS BEEN MARKED. IN ADDITION, MORE EMPHASIS HAS BEEN PLACED ON THE KREMLIN'S SUPPORT FOR "NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS AND ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SOVIET CONTRIBUTION TO SUCH MOVEMENTS. THE SOVIETS' PUBLIC POSITION TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST HAS RECENTLY TOUGHENED AND CRITICISM OF THE U.S. ROLE THERE, BOTH IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT, HAS INCREASED. TREATMENT OF CHINA, ALWAYS HARD, HAS GOTTEN HARDER. THE FIGHTING IN ANGOLA HAS OCCASIONED INCREASINGLY FREQUENT CHARGES OF U.S.-CHINESE COLLUSION AS HAVE VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY CHINESE LEADERS THAT MOSCOW IS LESS TRUSTWORTHY THAN WASHINGTON. IMPLICIT CONTRAST HAS BEEN DRAWN BETWEEN THE SECRETARY'S TRIP TO PEKING AS COMPARED WITH THAT OF GERMAN CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT IN THAT SCHMIDT'S DEFENSE OF DETENTE AGAINST CHINESE ATTACKS WAS JUXTAPOSED AGAINST WHAT THE LOCAL MEDIA PORTRAYED AS THE SECRETARY'S SILENCE ON THIS SUBJECT. COVERAGE OF THE U.S. ITSELF, TEMPORARILY BRIGHTENED BY APOLLO-SOYUZ AND THE ASTRONAUTS' TRIPS, HAS RECENTLY TENDED MORE AND MORE TO DIGGING AND JABBING IN INNUMERABLE PETTY WAYS.

3. WHILE DETENTE WITH THE WEST RETAINS ITS THEORETICAL PRIMACY, EXPRESSION OF SUPPORT FOR IT IS NOW USUALLY ACCOMPANIED BY HORRIFIED SORTIES AGAINST DETENTE'S WESTERN ENEMIES OR THEIR CHINESE HELPHATES. THE DRUMBEATING FOR "MILITARY DETENTE" AS A NEXT STEP IN THE PROCESS, INTENDED AS A MAJOR POST-HELSINKI PROPAGANDA THEME, HAS BEEN BROUGHT UP SHORT BY THE UNEXPECTED BACKLASH AGAINST CSCE. TREATMENT OF CSCE

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
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ITSELF HAS TURNED CONSISTENTLY DEFENSIVE AND SOMETIMES SURLY. DETENTE IS NOW USUALLY PAIRED WITH THE NEED FOR ATTENTION TO THE "WORLD SOCIALIST SYSTEM" AND THE "WORLD COMMUNIST AND WORKERS' MOVEMENT."

4. THE TROUBLED GISCARD VISIT RECEIVED ONLY MODERATE AND CORRECT MEDIA TREATMENT AND WAS FAR OVERSHADOWED BY THE PLAY GIVEN TO HONECKER AND LE DUAN. EVEN HUNGARIAN PREMIER LAZAR LOOKED GOOD IN GISCARD'S MAKE. THE RECEPTION FOR LE DUAN WAS LAVISH IN ITS SYMBOLIZATION OF THE SOVIET CONTRIBUTION TO "PROGRESSIVE" FORCES AS WELL AS NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS EVERYWHERE. DURING THE VISIT THE PAGES OF PRAVDA WERE OPENED TO THE KIND OF ANTI-AMERICAN STATEMENTS BY LE DUAN THAT WE HAVE NOT SEEN IN THE SOVIET PRESS IN SEVERAL YEARS. DETENTE EMERGED A VERY POOR SISTER IN THE PROCESS.

5. ON THE OTHER HAND, THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE NOTICEABLE SLACKENING OF SOVIET LIP SERVICE TO THE OVERALL CONCEPT OF DETENTE. THE PEACE POLICY OF THE 24TH CONGRESS IS STILL SINGLED OUT AS A LANDMARK. VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY U.S. GOVERNMENT LEADERS AND OTHER AMERICANS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS HAVE RECEIVED PROMINENT SPACE IN THE PAGES OF THE CENTRAL PRESS. DETENTE, THE KREMLIN CONTINUES TO MAINTAIN, BUT IN A MORE TROUBLED TONE, MUST BE MADE "IRREVERSIBLE", (PERHAPS SYMBOLIC OF THE IMPORTANCE STILL ACCORDED TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS IS THE RECENT ELEVATION OF KOPNIYENKO, HEAD OF THE USA DIVISION OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY, TO THE RANK OF DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER).

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
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6. DIRECT CRITICISM OF THE U.S. IN THE PRESS HAS EXTENDED BEYOND THE USUAL SNIPING AT THE ILLS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY--UNEMPLOYMENT, CRIME, RACIAL PROBLEMS, ETC. -- TO INCLUDE FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS REGARDING THE INHERENT STRENGTH OF "ANTI-SOVIET" POLITICAL FORCES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES. IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN POINTING WITH CONCERN AT WHAT THEY SEE AS A RISING CHORUS OF UNJUSTIFIABLE ANTI-SOVIET CRITICISM. THEY ARE WORRIED AT THE EFFECT SUCH CRITICISM MAY HAVE ON DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS AND DETENTE AS A WHOLE AND FEAR THAT OUR UPCOMING ELECTION CAMPAIGN COULD LEAD TO A FURTHER EXACERBATION OF RELATIONS. WHILE SUCH STATEMENTS ARE AT LEAST IN PART SELF-SERVING, THEY HAVE BECOME SO FREQUENT AND SO POINTED THAT THEY RAISE LEGITIMATE QUESTIONS AS TO WHETHER WE MAY BE IN FOR A SWITCH IN EMPHASIS IN SOVIET POLICY. THIS COULD CONCEIVABLY BE SEEN AS PART OF A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTY PRECEDING BREZHNEV'S DEPARTURE FOR VALHALLA, ALTHOUGH THE EVIDENCE IS FAR FROM CLEAR ON THIS.

7. OUR OWN VIEW, HOWEVER, IS THAT THE CHANGE OF EMPHASIS DESCRIBED ABOVE HAS BEEN LARGELY DETERMINED BY CONCRETE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE IN RECENT MONTHS. THE OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY LINE DOES NOT SEEM TO US TO BE IN QUESTION. SUSLOV LECTURED THE SENATORS ON IT THIS SUMMER; BRODYKO GAVE A CLEAR INDICATION OF THE LEADERSHIP'S INTENTION TO WRITE IT

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
INTO THE RECORD OF THE 25TH CONGRESS IN HIS SEPTEMBER KROMONIST ARTICLE; BREZHNEV REAFFIRMED IT AT HELSINKI AND IN HIS TOAST TO GISCARD OCTOBER 15; AND THE MEDIA PROMOTE IT WITH INCREASING VIGOR. THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS "GENERAL LINE" IN THIS HIERARCHICAL AND BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY SHOULD NOT BE UNDERESTIMATED.

G. A LIST OF SOVIET GRIEVANCES. BUT BREZHNEV'S DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE WAY THINGS HAVE WORKED OUT SINCE HELSINKI SEEMS APPARENT. HE CLEARLY HAD A DUAL-TRACK MASTER PLAN WHICH CALLED FOR CONCENTRATION AFTER HELSINKI ON MILITARY DETENTE IN POST-CSCE SOVIET RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AND, SIMULTANEOUSLY, DEVOTION OF MORE TIME TO CEMENTING RELATIONS WITHIN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT. HIS TIMETABLE CALLED FOR RUNNING UP TO THE 25TH CONGRESS ALONG BOTH FOREIGN POLICY TRACKS--I.E., HE HOPED TO SYMBOLIZE THE TRIUMPH OF HIS "PEACE PLYCY" BY HAVING SUCCESSFULLY ACHIEVED A SALT AGREEMENT AND A WASHINGTON SUMMIT, ON THE ONE HAND, AS WELL AS AN ECPC CONFERENCE ON THE OTHER. WHATEVER SUCCESS THE SOVIETS HAVE HAD, HOWEVER, HAS THUS FAR ONLY BEEN ALONG ONE OF THESE TRACKS. FOR THIS THEY LARGELY BLAME THE US AND THE WEST EUROPEANS, WHOM THEY SEE AS HAVING SABOTAGED THE ERA OF GOOD FEELING THAT WAS TO HAVE BEEN USHERED IN AFTER HELSINKI. A LIST OF SOVIET GRIEVANCES WOULD INCLUDE:

A. CSCE BACKLASH. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING, THE SOVIETS WERE UNEASY ABOUT THE FORD ADMINISTRATION AND THIS UNEASINESS HAS BEEN FED AND COMPOUNDED BY THREE MAJOR SURPRISES DURING THE PAST YEAR. THE FIRST WAS THE TOTALLY UNEXPECTED WAVE OF CRITICISM IN THE U.S. AGAINST THE VLADIVOSTOK AGREEMENT. THE SECOND WAS THE FAILURE OF THE "VLADIVOSTOK SPIRIT" TO HAVE ANY APPRECIABLE IMPACT ON THE TRADE/EMIGRATION IMPASSE. THE THIRD HAS BEEN THE UNEXPECTED BACKLASH AGAINST CSCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND WESTERN EUROPE AND THE CONSEQUENT BASIC QUESTIONING OF THE VALUE OF DETENTE BY MORE AND MORE PEOPLE WITHIN AMERICAN SOCIETY. IN ANY CASE, THIS POST-CSCE BACKLASH HAS CLEARLY THROWN A WORMEYERENCH INTO THE SOVIET SCENARIO WHICH CALLED FOR A TRIUMPHAL CSCE CULMINATION LEADING UP TO AN EQUALLY TRIUMPHAL REAFFIRMATION OF DETENTE AT THE 25TH CONGRESS.

P. THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SOVIETS ARE ALSO DISTURBED THAT

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THEY HAVE BEEN FROZEN OUT OF THE LATEST PEACE AGREEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND HAVE COMPLAINED THAT THEY ARE NOT BEING CUT INTO THE ACTION -- AS THEY THINK THEY SHOULD BE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF A DETENTE RELATIONSHIP -- IN WHAT THEY CONSIDER TO BE A VITAL AREA. THE DIRECT ATTACKS BY SADAT IMPUGNING SOVIET MOTIFS AND DISPARAGING THEIR AID WERE CLEARLY REGARDED HERE AS A CHALLENGE. THE SOVIETS MAY WELL FEEL THAT SADAT'S DISTRESSING BARBS COULD PERHAPS HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF WASHINGTON HAD INFORMED THE EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT THAT SUCH BLATANT ANTI-SOVIET BAITING WOULD BE UNWISE.


C. PORTUGAL. HACKLES HAVE ALSO BEEN RAISED IN THE KREMLIN BY CONSISTENT ALLEGATIONS IN THE WEST THAT THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN VIOLATING THE RULES OF DETENTE BY THEIR ACTIONS IN PORTUGAL. MOSCOW'S VIEW IS THAT, ON THE CONTRARY, IT HAS BEEN OPERATING WITHIN DETENTE GUIDELINES AND HAS BEEN DOING LITTLE WHICH COULD BE DESCRIBED HONESTLY AS DIRECT INTERFERENCE IN LISBON'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS OR AS IMPERILLING DETENTE. POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO A FOREIGN CP IS, IN THEIR VIEW, PERFECTLY LEGITIMATE, AND THEY PROBABLY CONCEDE OURRIGHT TO DO THE SAME IN RESPECT TO OUR FRIENDS, EVEN THOUGH THE LATTER WOULD BE CONSIDERED GRIST FOR THE PROPAGANDA MILL.)

D. CHINA. THE SOVIETS PROBABLY NOW REGARD THEIR RELATIONS WITH CHINA AND ITS EFFECT THROUGHOUT THE COMMUNIST AND THIRD WORLD AS THEIR MOST IMPORTANT FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEM. THEY ARE DEEPLY WORRIED THAT HE MAY BE MANEUVERING TO HAVE CHINA BECOME ALMOST AN ALLY OF THE U.S. THE SOVIETS FEEL THAT AT THE VERY LEAST A DETENTE RELATIONSHIP SHOULD ENSURE EQUAL TREATMENT OF MOSCOW AND PEKING. THEY ARE THEREFORE PROBABLY DISTURBED AT THE SECRETARY'S RECENT VISIT TO CHINA AND THE PRESIDENT'S UPCOMING ONE.

E. BILATERAL IRRITANTS. SOVIET AGRICULTURAL DIFFICULTIES HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY CAUSED THEM INTERNAL POLITICAL PROBLEMS, AS TESTIFIED TO BY THEIR FAILURE TO PUBLICIZE THE LONG-TERM GRAIN AGREEMENT WITH THE U.S. OUR ATTEMPTS TO USE THIS GRAIN DEAL AS A LEVER TO EXTRACT SIGNIFICANT PRICE CON-

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CESSATIONS ON SOVIET OIL, ALTHOUGH UNDERSTANDABLE, WAS UNDOUBTEDLY THE SUBJECT OF HEATED POLYTURO DISCUSSION, AND MAY HAVE RESULTED IN SOME REAL RESENTMENT. A WHOLE RANGE OF OTHER BILATERAL IRRITANTS -- SOMETIMES PETTY, SOMETIMES LESS SO -- CONTINUE TO TROUBLE THE SOVIETS. AMONG THEM ARE DIFFICULTIES REGARDING VISAS, SOME OF WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE REAL DIFFICULTY IN UNDERSTANDING. OUR FAILURE TO ALLOW A CPSU DELEGATION TO ATTEND THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS, FOR EXAMPLE, DESPITE PLEAS AT VERY HIGH LEVELS, UNDOUBTEDLY GALLED THE SOVIETS. EQUALLY IMPORTANT IN THIS REGARD HAS BEEN OUR FAILURE TO MOVE AHEAD ON CONSTRUCTION OF BOTH EMBASSY PROJECTS.

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F. SALT AND NGER. MOST IMPORTANT OF ALL, THE EXPECTED PROGRESS IN U.S.-SOVIET DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WAS INTENDED TO MOVE DETENTE ALONG AND BRING BREZHNEV TO WASHINGTON IN TRIUMPH, HAS NOT BEEN FORTHCOMING. THE SOVIETS CONSIDER THAT THEY HAVE MADE LARGE CONCESSIONS AT SALT ON VERIFICATION WHICH HAVE BEEN NEITHER MATCHED NOR EVEN SUITABLY RECOGNIZED BY THE U.S. (WE CAN CONCEIVE OF NO SOVIET OFFICIALS WITH ANY VOICE IN THESE MATTERS, NO MATTER HOW GREAT HIS PERSONAL COMMITMENT TO DETENTE, WHO WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE USSR SHOULD AGREE THAT LONG-RANGE CRUISE MISSILES SHOULD NOT BE CONSIDERED STRATEGIC WEAPONS OR THAT THE BACKFIRE BOMBER SHOULD BE WITHIN THE VLADIVOSTOK CEILING.) IN ADDITION, THE EXPECTED OFFER OF OPTION III IN NGER HAS NOT TAKEN PLACE. WHILE SOVIET COMPLAINTS ABOUT LACK OF PROGRESS IN THESE MATTERS ARE CLEARLY SELF-SERVING, WE SUSPECT THAT MOSCOW IN FACT STRONGLY RESENTS BEING DRIVEN UP AGAINST ITS OWN CONGRESS DEADLINE BY ITS U.S. NEGOTIATING PARTNER. THE OTHER SOVIET GRIEVANCES, HOWEVER, FALL IN IMPORTANCE AS COMPARED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A SECOND SALT AGREEMENT AND A SUCCESSFUL WASHINGTON SUMMIT. ACHIEVEMENT OF BOTH THESE OBJECTIVES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY RESTORE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS TO AN EVEN KEEL.

9. THE PARTY CONGRESS. ANOTHER FACTOR EXPLAINING INCREASING SOVIET PUBLIC COOLNESS TOWARD THE UNITED STATES IS THE PARTY CONGRESS ITSELF. ON PAST

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PERFORMANCE IT WAS PREDICTABLE THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD PAY MORE ATTENTION TO CONSOLIDATING AND GARNERING SUPPORT IN THE WORLD COMMUNIST MOVEMENT AS THEY PREPARED FOR THE CONGRESS. (THE HOMESTRETCH OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE WOULD ALSO PROBABLY HAVE CALLED THEM TO DO SO, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY OTHER FACTOR.) IN THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO THE CONGRESS WE EXPECT TO SEE A NARROWING SOVIET FOCUS ON A SHRINKING NUMBER OF HIGH PRIORITY AREAS, WITH SOVIET DECISION-MAKING EFFICIENCY DECLINING AS THE CONGRESS APPROACHES. SUCH A FREEZING OF THE OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS WILL PROBABLY BE HEIGHTENED IF WE ARE INDEED IN A PRESUCCESSION PERIOD, AS POSTULATED IN REPTEL.

10. THE BREZHNEV FACTOR. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE BEEN IMPRESSED BY AT LEAST SOME OF THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED IN REPTEL (A FULLER EXPOSITION OF OUR VIEWS WILL FOLLOW BY SEPTTEL), OUTWARD INDICATORS HERE ARE THAT BREZHNEV REMAINS NUMBER ONE FOR THE PRESENT. HUGE PHOTOS OF HIM HAVE BEEN MOUNTED ALL OVER MOSCOW, FOR EXAMPLE, AS PART OF THE PREPARATION FOR THE 50TH OCTOBER AND HE CONTINUES TO RECEIVE DAILY ENCOMIUMS IN ALL MEDIA. EVEN IF HE IS SHORTLY TO STEP DOWN FROM THE TOP SPOT, WE REMAIN CONVINCED IT WOULD BE FOR HEALTH RATHER THAN FOR POLITICAL REASONS. HOWEVER, HIS REMOVAL FROM THE SCENE WOULD OBVIOUSLY COMPLICATE PLANS FOR THE WASHINGTON SUMMIT AS WELL AS FOR THE PARTY CONGRESS ITSELF. ON NEITHER OCCASION WOULD IT BE USEFUL FOR THE CPSU TO HAVE A LAME DUCK PRESIDING AND MAKING VITAL DECISIONS. WE THEREFORE EXPECT THAT AT THE NEXT CPSU/CC PLENUM, PRESUMABLY DECEMBER 1, THE SITUATION MAY BE SOMEWHAT CLARIFIED BY ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE MAIN SPEAKER AT THE CONGRESS AND ITS AGENDA. THIS SHOULD BE A FIRM INDICATOR OF BREZHNEV'S PLANS, OR, CONCEIVABLY, THE PLANS BEING MADE BY OTHERS FOR BREZHNEV.

11. IN ANY CASE, ALTHOUGH THERE ARE DIFFERENCES OF NUANCE (SUSLOV AND PODGORNY, FOR EXAMPLE, SEEM TO TAKE A TOUGHER LINE THAN OTHERS TOWARD THE VALUE TO BE DERIVED FROM DETENTE), WE HAVE THUS FAR DISCERNED NO IDENTIFIABLE POLICY DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE POLITBUREAU WHICH WOULD SIGNIFY A LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE AND THEREFORE

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
CONTINUE TO ASSUME THAT IF BREZHNEV IS REPLACED FOR HEALTH REASONS IT WILL BE BY A COLLEAGUE OF PARTY ELITE CONSISTING OF KIRILENKO, POBOURNY, KOSYGIN AND SUSLOV, RATHER THAN BY A YOUNGER LEADER. WE ALSO CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THERE WOULD BE A GOOD POSSIBILITY OF BREZHNEV MOVING INTO SOME HONORARY POSITION AS A FACE-SAVING DEVICE WHEN THE TIME COMES FOR HIM TO STEP DOWN FROM OFFICE BUT THAT IF A REAL SHAKUP IS IN STORE WE WOULD PROBABLY HAVE HAD SOME INKLING OF IT BY THIS TIME. IN ANY CASE, HE HAS HAD A BUSY OCTOBER, AND THE SCHEDULE SHAPING UP FOR THE BALANCE OF THE YEAR PROMISES TO BE EQUALLY BUSY (THE CERN MEETING, THE POLISH CONGRESS OF DECEMBER 6, THE FIRST CUBAN CONGRESS AND POSSIBLY AN ECPC). HIS STAMINA, THEREFORE, IS LIKELY TO BE SUBJECTED TO A SEVERE TEST.

12. FUTURE PROSPECTS. IN THE CONTEXT OF OVERALL US-SOVIET RELATIONS, A FADING AWAY OF BREZHNEV AND HIS INFLUENCE WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY RESULT IN INCREASING CAUTION ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY DURING AN INTERIM PERIOD. TESTED AND TRIED SOVIET BUREAUCRATS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY WAIT TO SEE WHICH WAY THE WIND WAS BLOWING BEFORE MAKING LONG-TERM COMMITMENTS FOR WHICH THEY WOULD BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE LATER. THERE WOULD ALSO PROBABLY BE A MARKED OROURACY WITHIN THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY, WHICH WOULD RESIST SUBSTANTIVE CONCESSIONS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE THE HISTORIC IMPORTANCE OF A LAME DUCK.

13. IN FACT, WE HAVE NOTED JUST SUCH A MARGINAL, BUT STILL PERCEPTIBLE, CHANGE IN OUR RECENT CONTACTS WITH THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY ON A SERIES OF MATTERS - MOST NOTIC - OVER THE PAST SEVERAL WEEKS. DECISIONMAKING, NORMALLY TORPID AT BEST, SEEMS TO BE EVEN SLOWER THAN USUAL AND IN SOME CASES WE HAVE RECEIVED NEGATIVE REPLIES WHEN WE EXPECTED POSITIVE ONES. THESE PHENOMENA COULD BE SATISFACTORILY EXPLAINED AWAY AS HAVING NO SPECIAL SIGNIFICANCE IN AND OF THEMSELVES. ALTERNATIVELY, THEY COULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO A SLIGHT COOLING OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS, TO PRE-CONGRESS RIGOR MORTIS, OR PERHAPS TO THE FACT THAT WE ARE IN A PRE-SUCCESSION PERIOD. WHILE WE SEEM TO BE SOMEWHAT LESS CONVINCED THAN THE DEPARTMENT THAT THE LAST HURRAH IS IMMEDIATELY UPON US AND STRONGLY DOUBT THAT --

~~DISRUPTING A COLLAPSE--THE GENERAL SECRETARY MIGHT BE STEPPING DOWN OR MIGHT BE MOVED OUT EVEN BEFORE THE CONGRESS, BREZHNEV'S~~

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
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AGE AND PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKE IT PROBABLE THAT 1976, HIS 76th YEAR, WILL BE HIS LAST IN POWER. THUS, EVEN IF THE DANCE OF SUCCESSION HAS NOT YET ACTUALLY BEGUN, ALL THE DANCERS CAN HEAR THE MUSIC PLAYING JUST OUTSIDE THE ROOM. THIS LENDS EVEN MORE IMPORTANCE, WE WOULD ARGUE, TO ACHIEVING A SATISFACTORY SAL AGREEMENT AND TO ARRANGING A SUCCESSFUL WASHINGTON SUMMIT WHILE THIS CURRENT LEADERSHIP IS IN A POSITION TO INFLUENCE THE NEXT ONE, AND THE 25TH CPSU CONGRESS MAY BE CRUCIAL IN THIS RESPECT.

14. WE ARE, IN ANY CASE, CLEARLY MOVING INTO A TIME OF TRANSITION. LIKE ALL SUCH PERIODS, IT COULD BE ONE OF HISTORIC OPPORTUNITY. THUS, ARBATOV'S METAPHOR (MOSCOW 15952) THAT WE HAVE NOW REACHED A TIME WHEN A "WINDOW" MAY BE BRIEFLY OPENING IN OUR RELATIONS -- JUST AS A WINDOW OPENS FOR A PLANETARY PROBE AND THEN CLOSES AGAIN--MAY BE ENTIRELY APT.
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7608

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 17609

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FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: UR, US, PFOR
SUBJECT: THE MOOD IN MOSCOW


REF: MOSCOW 17607

1. IN VIEW OF OUR MEETING IN LONDON AND, MORE IMPORTANT, YOUR POSSIBLE VISIT TO MOSCOW, IT MAY BE APPROPRIATE TO CONVEY OUR THOUGHTS ON SOME OF THE PROBLEMS YOU WILL BE DEALING WITH. SINCE YOU SAW GROMYKO IN SEPTEMBER, THE SOVIETS HAVE RUN INTO UNEXPECTEDLY HEAVY WEATHER IN BOTH DOMESTIC AND, TO A LESSER EXTENT, FOREIGN POLICY. THESE SETBACKS HAVE, IN ONE SENSE, INCREASED THE SOVIET INCENTIVE TO KEEP THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US ON TRACK. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, THEY MAY HAVE LIMITED THE FLEXIBILITY OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IN MAKING THE NECESSARY COMPROMISES TO DO SO.

2. OVER THE PAST THREE MONTHS THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY PREOCCUPIED WITH PREPARATIONS FOR THEIR CONGRESS IN FEBRUARY. IT HAS BEEN CLEAR THAT BREZHNEV WISHED TO MAKE THIS CONGRESS A TRIUMPHANT RATIFICATION OF A DECADE OF SUCCESSFUL LEADERSHIP. BUT THE SECOND HARVEST DISASTER IN A FOUR YEAR PERIOD WILL UNQUESTIONABLY CAST A PALL OVER DOMESTIC PROSPECTS AND THE CONGRESS THEREFORE PROMISES TO BE HUMDRUM AFFAIR AT BEST. WHILE THE LEADERSHIP WILL CLAIM AN UNBROKEN RECORD OF DOMESTIC ACHIEVEMENT MARRED BY UNAVOIDABLE "NATURAL DISASTERS," THE ACTUAL STATE OF THE

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ECONOMY AND THE MOOD OF THE COUNTRY IS FAR FROM EXUBERANT (REFTEL). CONSEQUENTLY, THE SOVIET LEADERS MUST RUN ON THEIR FOREIGN POLICY RECORD EVEN MORE THAN BEFORE AND HERE TOO THERE IS A MIXED PICTURE.

3. AT LEAST PARTLY IN PREPARATION FOR THE CONGRESS, THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN GIVING MORE TIME AND ATTENTION TO CONSOLIDATING THE "SOCIALIST CAMP" AND PRESSING THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE THIRD WORLD. THE POST-HELSINKI SERIES OF BILATERAL SUMMITS WITH WESTERN LEADERS--KEKKONEN, COSTA GOMES, GISCARD, SCHEEL, LEONE--HAS BEEN MATCHED BY AN EVEN SPLASHER SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH MEMBERS OF THEIR OWN CLUB--HONECKER, LAZAR, LE DUAN, MUSAK AND NOW GIEREK AND OTHERS AT THE POLISH CP CONGRESS. UPCOMING PARTY CONGRESSES IN HAVANA AND ELSEWHERE, AS WELL AS SOVIET EFFORTS TO ENGINEER A EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONFERENCE AND POSSIBLY ALSO A COMECON SUMMIT, MAY PROVIDE SOMETHING MORE TO COME ON THE "SOCIALIST" SIDE. WHATEVER THE SPECIFIC SUBSTANCE OF THE INDIVIDUAL MEETINGS, ONE STRATEGIC PURPOSE OF THIS FLURRY OF ACTIVITY HAS BEEN TO BRING THE SOVIETS UP TO THE CONGRESS WITH A "BALANCED" RECORD OF FOREIGN POLICY ACCOMPLISHMENT.

4. OVERALL, FROM A TEN YEAR PERSPECTIVE, IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND THAT BREZHNEV'S RECORD IS IMPRESSIVE. THE ACHIEVEMENT OF DETENTE WITH THE CAPITALIST WORLD HAS BEEN BALANCED BY AN ENORMOUS INCREASE IN SOVIET ARMED STRENGTH AND INCREASING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, SOUTH ASIA, AFRICA, AND EVEN LATIN AMERICA. THE VAGARIES OF THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE VIETNAM WAR HAVE, IN THE INTERIM, WEAKENED THE USSR'S TWO MAJOR RIVALS. BREZHNEV'S PLATFORM OF FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESS AT THE CONGRESS MAY THEREFORE NOT BE AS RICKETY AS RECENT SETBACKS MIGHT SUGGEST.

5. THE RECORD IN RECENT MONTHS, HOWEVER, IS NOT IMPRESSIVE. THE EXPECTED POST-CSCE EUPHORIA NOT ONLY HAS NOT MATERIALIZED, BUT THE MOOD HAS TURNED EVEN MORE SOUR--PARTICULARLY IN THE UNITED STATES. SINAI II IS SEEN HERE AS A CLEAR FOREIGN POLICY REVERSAL. THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN PORTUGAL CANNOT BE PLEASING TO THE KREMLIN. AND AREAS WHICH PREVIOUSLY LOOKED MANAGEABLE WITH SOME EFFORT--THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST

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
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CONFERENCE, RELATIONS WITH YUGOSLAVIA AND ROMANIA--HAVE PROVEN UNEXPECTEDLY THORNY.

6. FACED WITH THESE DISAPPOINTMENTS, THE SOVIETS APPEAR TO HAVE REACTED MAINLY BY HUNKERING DOWN AROUND BREZHNEV AND "HIS" OVERALL FOREIGN POLICY LINE. IT HAS NOW BEEN ANNOUNCED THAT BREZHNEV AND KOSYGIN WILL GIVE THE KEY ADDRESSES AT THE CONGRESS, AND THE MOUNTING CHORUS OF PUBLIC PRAISE FOR BREZHNEV PERSONALLY (E.G., "THAT FLAMING WARRIOR FOR PEACE," "THE MOST OUTSTANDING LEADER OF OUR TIME") ALSO EXTENDS TO DOMESTIC POLICIES ASSOCIATED WITH HIM.

7. WE WILL THEREFORE BE DEALING WITH FAMILIAR LEADERS AND POLICIES AT LEAST UP TO THE CONGRESS AND PROBABLY IN ITS IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH AS WELL. BREZHNEV IS A DIMINISHED MAN PHYSICALLY, BUT HE DOES NOT YET SEEM TO BE A "LAME DUCK" IN SOVIET EYES AND DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE SERIOUSLY THREATENED AT THIS POINT. HE THEREFORE SEEMS TO HAVE RETAINED HIS CAPACITY FOR PREVAILING IN MOST INTERNAL INTRA-BUREAUCRATIC STRUGGLES IN THE USSR AND, CONSEQUENTLY, FOR CONDUCTING SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS WITH US ON THE MAJOR POINTS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

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
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8. THE "TOUGHENING" OF SOVIET POLICY IN RECENT MONTHS IS PARTLY OPTICAL: THE SOVIETS HAVE MOVED AHEAD MORE BRISKLY IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH THE "SOCIALIST CAMP" AND THE THIRD WORLD THAN THEY HAVE IN THEIR DEALINGS WITH US. BUT SINCE THE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN THE CENTERPIECE OF "BREZHNEV'S" FOREIGN POLICY, LAGGING PROGRESS WITH US STANDS OUT IN BOLDER RELIEF, AND PUTS MORE PRESSURE ON THE RELATIONSHIP. HOWEVER, THERE IS ALSO LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS HONESTLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE POTENTIAL UNRAVELLING EFFECT ON THE DETENTE PROCESS OF CSCE BACKLASH IN THE WEST, AND ESPECIALLY IN THE UNITED STATES, AND FEELS THAT THE GROWING CHILL IN OUR RELATIONS IS PRIMARILY WASHINGTON'S FAULT. WHILE THEY ARE QUITE CAPABLE FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES OF EXAGGERATING THEIR DOUBTS ABOUT OUR CAPACITY TO DELIVER, THERE IS A HARD CORE OF REAL DISQUIET IN THE CRESCENDO OF RECENT MUSINGS ABOUT THE STRENGTH

OF "RIGHT-WING" FORCES IN WESTERN POLITICAL SYSTEMS. AND, WHILE THEY MAY WELL HAVE BEEN COMFORTED BY SCHLESINGER'S REMOVAL, IT WOULD BE STRETCHING THE EVIDENCE TO SAY THEIR BASIC DISQUIET HAS BEEN ALLAYED. IN FACT, ALTHOUGH THEY HAVE NOT SAID MUCH ABOUT IT, THEY WERE PROBABLY DISTURBED BY THE PRESIDENT'S CHINA TRIP AND BY THE LIBERAL USE OF THE WORD "HEGEMONY"--TO THEM AN ANTI-SOVIET CATCHWORD. FURTHERMORE, THE THREAT OF REAGAN-JACKSON "FORCES" DISMANTLING THE WHOLE STRUCTURE OF DETENTE IS ONE THAT THEY

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
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9. IN HIS MEETINGS WITH YOU, BREZHNEV WILL THEREFORE BE SEEKING EVIDENCE OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTENTION AND CAPACITY TO PROCEED WITH THE BASIC THRUST OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. ON BALANCE, THEREFORE, YOU WILL PROBABLY FIND THE SOVIETS NARY AND PERTURBED, BUT WILLING TO MOVE FORWARD WITH US IN SPECIFIC AREAS, AND MORE THAN WILLING TO LISTEN TO YOUR VIEWS ON WHERE THE RELATIONSHIP IS AND SHOULD BE HEADING.

10. AS FOR SPECIFICS, THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP REMAINS PREEMINENT IN SOVIET THINKING, AND SALT WILL, OF COURSE, BE THE MAJOR FOCUS OF YOUR DISCUSSIONS. AS USUAL, WE CAN EXPECT TOUGH BARGAINING WITH ULTIMATE CONCESSIONS ONLY AT THE LAST POSSIBLE MINUTE. BUT I THINK SOME CONCESSIONS WILL COME. BREZHNEV WANTS AN AGREEMENT AND PROBABLY HAS A REALISTIC APPRECIATION OF THE DIFFICULTIES YOU WILL FACE IN OBTAINING CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL IN AN ELECTION YEAR. THE FIXATIONS WHICH THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVELOPED CONCERNING CRUISE MISSILES MAY RESULT FROM REALIZATION THAT THEY ARE SO FAR BEHIND IN THIS FIELD. THESE WEAPONS PROBABLY REPRESENT THE SPECTER OF TECHNOLOGICAL BACKWARDNESS WHICH DOMINATES SO MUCH OF THEIR GENERAL STRATEGIC THINKING. HOWEVER, IT HAS PROBABLY NOT ESCAPED SOVIET STRATEGISTS THAT SOME LIMITATION ON OUR ABILITY AND DESIRE TO DEVELOP THIS WEAPON IS BETTER THAN NO LIMITATION AT ALL. THUS--TO GO OUT ON A LIMB--I TEND TO BE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT YOUR SALT NEGOTIATIONS, BUT THINK THERE WILL BE TOUGH SLEDDING ON ALL OTHER TOPICS.

11. WHILE THEY WILL NOT BE IN A PARTICULARLY RECEPTIVE MOOD, IT WILL BE IMPORTANT FOR YOUR INTERLOCUTORS TO CARRY AWAY SOME IMPRESSION OF THE RESULTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S TRIP TO CHINA AND OF THE NATO MINISTERIAL. THEY MAY HAVE BEEN COMFORTED BY OUR DISAGREEMENTS WITH THE CHINESE OVER DETENTE, BUT THEIR OWN STANCE VIS-A-VIS CHINA HAS HARDENED IN RECENT MONTHS, THEY ARE LOCKED IN STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE WITH THE PRC NOT ONLY AROUND THE PERIPHERY OF ASIA BUT IN AFRICA AS WELL, AND THEY ARE HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF CHINESE EFFORTS

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
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TO SELL US AND THE EUROPEANS ON ANTI-SOVIETISM AND TO SELL THE THIRD WORLD ON THE NEED TO RESIST "GREAT POWER HEGEMONY." A PRESENTATION FROM YOU REMINDING THEM OF SOME OF THE BASIC VERITIES OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY WOULD BE A USEFUL FORM OF GENERAL REASSURANCES, EVEN IF CERTAIN ASPECTS WILL BE UNWELCOME.

12. THE MOST UNWELCOME OF THESE RELATE TO SOVIET CONDUCT IN THIRD AREAS, ESPECIALLY ANGOLA. A MODICUM OF THE INJURED INNOCENCE THEY WILL SEEK TO PROJECT IS GENUINE, BUT IT WOULD STILL BE USEFUL TO REMIND THEM THAT WE SEE PURSUIT OF UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES IN THIRD AREAS FIRMLY WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES TO WHICH WE BOTH ADHERED IN 1972. AT THE SAME TIME, I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD TAKE WHATEVER OPPORTUNITY ARISES TO REAFFIRM OUR COMMITMENT TO WORK TOGETHER WITH THEM FOR A STABLE SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ONCE MORE TO DISAVOW ANY INTENTION OF EXCLUDING THEM FROM THE PROCESS. AS WE REPORTED, OUR FEELING IS THAT THEIR NOVEMBER 9 PROPOSAL REPRESENTED PRIMARILY AN ATTEMPT TO ESCAPE FROM A DEAD END, RATHER THAN AN ATTEMPT TO MAKE TROUBLE FOR US. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT WE CAN AFFORD TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS AT LITTLE COST TO OURSELVES AND SOME BENEFIT TO OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIETS. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF WE EXPECT THEM TO PLAY THE GAME, WE SHOULD TREAT THEM--OR AT LEAST APPEAR TO TREAT THEM--AS A LEGITIMATE PLAYER.

13. DURING YOUR DISCUSSIONS, IT WILL BE USEFUL TO SUGGEST TO BREZHNEV THE DESIRABILITY OF SUPPLEMENTING WHATEVER PROGRESS WE CAN ACHIEVE ON SALT WITH A MORE SERIOUS APPROACH TO PNE AND MBFR. THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN DILATORY IN THE PNE TALKS AND THEY ARE INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT ON MATTERS OF BASIC IMPORTANCE TO THE AGREEMENT WHICH, OF COURSE, HAS A MARCH 1976 DEADLINE. WITH REGARD TO MBFR, YOU SHOULD PROBABLY TAKE THE OCCASION TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THE WEST TO GO FURTHER THAN OPTION III IN SHORT ORDER, SO THAT EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING WILL BE REQUIRED IF WE ARE TO MAKE RAPID PROGRESS IN VIENNA. WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE ON MBFR WOULD PROBABLY BE WELL-RECEIVED.

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
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14. FINALLY, YOU MAY WISH TO MAKE THE POINT THAT OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP CANNOT MOVE FORWARD AS WE WOULD WISH IT TO IF OUR DIRECT BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP IS IN POOR HEALTH, AND TO STRESS HOW MUCH TO DIRECT RELATIONSHIP DEPENDS ON CONTINUING PROGRESS IN SPECIFIC AREAS OF MUTUAL IMPORTANCE-- PARTICULARLY ON WHAT THE SOVIETS ARE ABLE TO DO IN PRACTICAL WAYS IN THE EMIGRATION FIELD. FOR OUR PART, WE WILL ALSO BE LOOKING AT WAYS TO MOVE AHEAD ON POINTS OF INTEREST TO THEM, IN THE TRADE FIELD AND ELSEWHERE, AND WE LOOK FORWARD TO SERIOUS AND PRAGMATIC TALKS ON CSCE IMPLEMENTATION. BUT WE NEED HARD EVIDENCE TO CONVINCE THE AMERICAN PUBLIC OF THE BENEFITS TO US OF THE BASKET III PROVISIONS OF CSCE, AND HENCE OF CSCE ITSELF, AND IT IS HARD TO EXAGGERATE THE POSITIVE EFFECT THAT VISIBLE PROGRESS IN SUCH AREAS AS FAMILY REUNIFICATION MIGHT HAVE ON AMERICAN ATTITUDES IN THIS REGARD. STOESEL

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7754
INFO AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 17803

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-2
TAGS: PFOR, UR, AD, CA
SUBJECT: SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON ANGOLA

REF: KINSHASA 10492

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

☐ Retain Class'n ☐ Change to _____
☐ Declassify in part and excise as shown
EO 12958, 25X() () ()
☒ Declassify ☐ After _____
☐ With concurrence _____ (not)(obtained)
PS by PV Date 8/4/00

1. ALTHOUGH THEY DO NOT YET REFLECT THE SPECIFICS REPORTED REFTEL, HINTS OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY ON ANGOLA HAVE ALSO BEGUN TO CIRCULATE IN MOSCOW.

2. AT QUADRIPARTITE MEETING DECEMBER 11, UK DCM SUTHERLAND (PROTECT) REPORTED THAT OUTGOING UK AMBASSADOR GARVEY HAD RAISED ANGOLA DURING FARREKELL CALL ON PODGORNYY WEEK OF DECEMBER 2-6, NOTING THAT "MANY THINK" SOVIET CONDUCT THERE IS INCONSISTENT WITH PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE AND DETENTE. ACCORDING UK REPORT, PODGORNYY REPLIED THAT PROBLEM IS PRINCIPALLY ONE FOR AFRICANS THEMSELVES TO SOLVE, BUT THAT SOVIETS HAD RECOGNIZED MPLA AS LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT, THAT IT HAD RIGHT TO REQUEST THEIR ASSISTANCE, AND THAT SOVIETS HAD RIGHT TO PROVIDE IT. PODGORNYY COMPLAINED THAT WESTERN PRESS HAS PRINTED A LOT ON THE SOVIETS AND LITTLE ON SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION, AND SAID THAT "TEN OR TWENTY" SOVIET SPECIALISTS CANNOT BE CALLED "MASSIVE." PODGORNYY SAID THE SOVIETS SAW "THE MPLA OR A COALITION AROUND THE MPLA" AS THE FUTURE OF ANGOLA.

3. COMMENT: WE PASS ON ABOVE IN VIEW OF PODGORNYY'S RANK, AND

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES, *State visit 8/4/00*
BY bb, NARA, DATE 8/1/01



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


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BECAUSE IT TENDS TO CORROBORATE SUGGESTIONS IN REFTEL REPORT
THAT SOVIETS PREPARING THEMSELVES FOR POSSIBILITY OF COALITION
BUILT AROUND MPLA.
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9329

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NODIS CHEROKEE

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3,4

TAGS: ASEC, US,UR

SUBJ: MOSCOW SIGNAL: APPROACH TO GROMYKO

REF: STATE 24166



1. GROMYKO RESPONDED WITHIN A FEW MINUTES TO MY URGENT REQUEST FOR A MEETING WITH HIM ON SATURDAY AND RECEIVED ME AT 12:45 TODAY, JAN. 31. I WAS ACCOMPANIED BY DCM. KOMPLEKTOV, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, USA DIVISION IN MFA, AND SOVIET NOTE TAKER WERE ALSO PRESENT. AFTER REFERRING TO PREVIOUS COMMUNICATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. I COVERED TALKING POINTS PROVIDED IN PARA 2 REFTEL, AND LEFT INFORMAL PAPER WITH GROMYKO WHICH CONTAINED FIRST EIGHT OF THESE POINTS (I.E., FROM "THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTED... TO "WILL BE HIGHLY VISIBLE"). FOLLOWING THREE POINTS DELIVERED ORALLY, BUT NOT IN WRITING. IN ADDITION, I LEFT WITH GROMYKO A SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE FINDINGS OF THE U.S. EXPERTS, TEXT OF WHICH IS BEING SENT IN SEPARATE MESSAGE, AND OFFERED TO SEND COMPLETE REPORT OF OUR SPECIALISTS MONDAY MORNING..

2. GROMYKO REPLIED AS FOLLOWS:

-- HE DID NOT WISH TO GET INTO TECHNICAL QUESTIONS, BUT WOULD SAY THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT THIS QUESTION IS AN IMAGINARY ONE. IT IS DIFFICULT TO FERRET OUT THE REASONS IT IS RAISED. HE WOULD LIMIT SELF TO THREE OBSERVATIONS.

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-- FIRST, HE WOULD CONFIRM THE MESSAGE OF BREZHNEV TO PRESIDENT FORD, I.E., ANY RADIATIONS REACHING EMBASSY FROM OUTSIDE IS OF INDUSTRIAL ORIGIN. THERE IS NO NEW RADIATION. CONJECTURES OF U.S. SPECIALISTS CANNOT CHANGE THIS FACT.

-- SECOND ALLEGED HEALTH DANGER IS FABRICATION (IZOBRETENIE). SOVIET SPECIALISTS HAVE EXAMINED EVIDENCE AND SAY THAT DANGER IS IMAGINED (VYDUMKA). US SPECIALISTS REFUSED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT SOVIET STANDARDS FOR SAFE LEVEL OF RADIATION EXPOSURE.

-- THIRD, AS FOR THE ALLUSION TO THE POSSIBILITY U.S. AND SOV EMBASSIES, OF STAFF REDUCTION AT OUR EMBASSY, THIS IS FOR U.S. TO DECIDE. BUT IF U.S. PROCEEDS IN THIS MANNER, SOVIETS WILL DRAW THE NECESSARY CONCLUSIONS. FURTHERMORE, IF US PUBLICIZES ALL OF THIS, THE SOVIETS WILL ALSO BRING THIS MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PUBLIC AND WILL PRESENT THE "TRUE FACTS."

-- GROMYKO THEN EXPRESSED HIS SURPRISE THAT WE CONTINUE TO RAISE MATTER AND PROFESSED NOT TO UNDERSTAND WHY WE ARE DOING SO, AND CONCLUDED THAT HE COULD SAY NO MORE. OUR SCIENTISTS HAVE CONFIRMED JOINT READINGS IN U.S. EMBASSY AND AS FOR DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS, THERE ARE NOT TWO "SCIENCES, BUT ONLY ONE.

3. I POINTED OUT TO GROMYKO THAT THIS IS A SERIOUS MATTER WHICH HAS IN NO WAY BEEN CREATED ARTIFICALLY. WE TOO WISH THAT IT HAD NOT COME UP, BUT OUR SPECIALISTS ARE OF FIRM OPINION THAT THERE ARE INDEED DIRECTIONAL SIGNALS AND THAT MEDICAL RECORDS OF OUR PERSONNEL DISPLAY SUSPECT SYMPTOMS. I THEREFORE REITERATED OUR REQUEST THAT THE SOVIET HYGIENE SERVICE LOCATE THE SOURCES AND HAVE THEM TURNED OFF.

4. GROMYKO OBSERVED THAT SOVIETS CANNOT ADOPT ATTITUDE OTHER THAN ONE BASED ON THE REAL SITUATION. KOMPLEKTOV MENTIONED INTERNAL RADIATION IN EMBASSY, AND GROMYKO REMARKED THAT THEIR EXPERTS FOUND EVIDENCE THAT THERE ARE SOURCES OF RADIATION FROM INSIDE THE EMBASSY. I REPLIED THAT THESE LEVELS WERE MINIMAL, IF EXISTENT AT ALL, WHEREUPON GROMYKO OBSERVED THAT U.S. SPECIALISTS WISH TO SHIFT BLAME ENTIRELY TO SOVIET SIDE.

5. I CONCLUDED BY REMINDING HIM THAT, IN ANY EVENT, IF SIGNALS DO

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
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NOT GO OFF, WE MUST BRIEF OUR PERSONNEL ON FEBRUARY 4.

6. COMMENT: THROUGHOUT OUR DISCUSSION, GROMYKO WAS CALM AND MODERATE IN TONE, BUT COMPLETELY UNYIELDING. I DO NOT FIND HIS REACTION SURPRISING, SINCE--HAVING SENT MESSAGE FROM BREZHNEV DENYING EXISTENCE OF ANY BEAMED RADIATION--SOVIETS OBVIOUSLY CANNOT ADMIT THAT SUCH EXISTS. IF THEY DECIDE TO TURN OFF SIGNALS, I ASSUME THAT THEY WILL SIMPLY BE TURNED OFF WITH NO EXPLANATION GIVEN, EITHER PRIVATELY OR OFFICIALLY. IT WOULD PROBABLY BE MOST HELPFUL IF APPROACH IS ALSO MADE TO DOBRYNIN AT THIS JUNCTURE, SINCE HE IS PROBABLY IN BETTER POSITION THAN MOST SOVIET OFFICIALS TO REALIZE DANGER TO OUR RELATIONSHIP--AND TO THE OPERATIONS OF HIS OWN MISSION--WHICH PUBLIC AIRING OF THIS MATTER WOULD INEVITABLY ENTAIL. FULL REPORT OF EXPERTS WILL BE FORWARDED THIS WEEKEND IN CASE YOU WISH TO PASS IT TO DOBRYNIN.
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


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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9330

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES
BY 66, NARA, DATE 8/1/01

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3,4
TAGS: ASEC, US, UR
SUBJ: MOSCOW SIGNAL - APPROACH TO GROMYKO

REF: MOSCOW 1436

1. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF INFORMAL PAPER LEFT WITH GROMYKO, AS MENTIONED IN PARA ONE REFTEL.

BEGIN QUOTE

PRINCIPAL CONCLUSIONS OF U.S. EXPERTS

--MEASUREMENTS OF RADIATION LEVELS TAKEN BY US SPECIALISTS IN U.S. EMBASSY MOSCOW OVER PERIOD OF SEVERAL MONTHS INDICATE THAT EMBASSY IS RECEIVING TWO RADIATION BEAMS OF MICROWAVE ENERGY IN THE FREQUENCY RANGE ABOVE ONE GIGAHERTZ. ONE COMES FROM A POINT TO THE EAST OF THE CHANCERY AND THE OTHER FROM A POINT TO THE SOUTH.

--THESE EMANATIONS ARE PRESENT, EITHER ALTERNATELY OR OCCASIONALLY SIMULTANEOUSLY, FOR PERIODS APPROXIMATING 18 HOURS PER DAY.

--THESE BEAMS HAVE RESULTED IN RADIATION DENSITIES WITHIN CHANCERY OFFICES AND SOME APARTMENTS OF PERSONNEL RANGING FROM 1 TO 15 MICROWATTS PER SQUARE CENTIMETER.

--JOINT MEASUREMENTS CONDUCTED WITH SOVIET EXPERTS ON JANUARY 28,

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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WHEN ONLY ONE OF THE PREVIOUSLY DETECTED SOURCES WAS EMITTING IN THE LOWER ENERGY RANGE OBSERVED PREVIOUSLY, WERE CONSISTENT WITH PREVIOUS U.S. MEASUREMENTS. IN PARTICULAR THEY CLEARLY REVEALED THE DIRECTIONALITY OF THE BEAM FROM THE EAST.

--THE LEVELS OF RADIATION IN THE EMBASSY BUILDING MEASURED OVER TIME BY U.S. TECHNICIANS, AND THOSE MEASURED JOINTLY WITH SOVIET TECHNICIANS, ARE SEVERAL ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE ABOVE THE TYPICAL BACKGROUND LEVEL IN U.S. CITIES, AND ALSO ABOVE THE BACKGROUND LEVEL MEASURED IN U.S. RESIDENCES IN MOSCOW WHICH ARE AWAY FROM THE CHANCERY BUILDING.

--OUR MEDICAL EXPERTS ARE OF THE CONSIDERED OPINION THAT PROLONGED EXPOSURE TO MICROWAVE RADIATION AT THE LEVELS MEASURED IN THE U.S. EMBASSY CONSTITUTE A POTENTIAL HEALTH HAZARD.

--NO LEVEL OF RADIATION IN THE U.S. EMBASSY WHICH IS SIGNIFICANTLY ABOVE THE TYPICAL BACKGROUND LEVEL IN RESIDENTIAL AREAS OF LARGE INDUSTRIAL CITIES IS ACCEPTABLE TO US.

END QUOTE.

2. SUMMARY OF FULL REPORT WILL BE TRANSMITTED AS SOON AS AVAILABLE, HOPEFULLY TODAY, AND TEXT FULL REPORT WILL BE SENT SO AS TO BE AVAILABLE IN WASHINGTON BY OPENING OF BUSINESS FEB. 2.
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ACTION: N00S-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /00: W PAGE / OF 15.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9393

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 1523

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E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PFOR, AO, UR, US
SUBJECT: SOVIETS AND ANGOLA

1. DURING CALL ON GROMYKO ON ANOTHER MATTER JANUARY 31, HE REMARKED TO ME TOWARD END OF CONVERSATION THAT HE HAD JUST READ THE FULL TEXT OF YOUR TESTIMONY BEFORE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE ON ANGOLA. HE THEN SAID THAT HE REGRETTED THAT YOU WERE SPENDING SO MUCH TIME AND ENERGY ON THIS QUESTION AND ADDED THAT YOUR EXPOSITION "DOES NOT ACCORD WITH THE REAL SITUATION."

2. I REPLIED THAT HE HAD HEARD WHAT YOU SAID WHEN YOU WERE HERE, AND THAT THE POSITION YOU TOOK BEFORE CONGRESS WAS QUITE CONSISTENT. THE FACT REMAINS THAT SOVIET POLICY IN ANGOLA IS STRAINING THE FABRIC OF DETENTE. AT THIS HE DROPPED THE SUBJECT AND CONCLUDED THE CONVERSATION WITH A FEW REMARKS ABOUT THE WEATHER.
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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01756 051921Z

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ACTION NO09-00

INFO OCT-01 /2001 W

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9569

~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 1756

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3,4
TAGS: ASEC, US, UR
SURJ: MOSCOW SIGNAL


REF: MOSCOW 1696

1. I CALLED ON FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KUZNETSOV
ON HIS REQUEST AT 18:30 HOURS. AFTER BRIEF REFERENCE
TO COLD WEATHER, HE READ STATEMENT FROM HANDWRITTEN
TEXT, COVERING FOLLOWING POINTS.

2. HE SAID HE HAD FOLLOWING TO COMMUNICATE IN REFERENCE TO
THE QUESTION RAISED BY ME WITH GROMYKO ON JANUARY 31.
THE SOVIET SIDE HAS GIVEN CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE CONCERN
EXPRESSED BY THE U.S. REGARDING THE LEVEL OF ELECTRO-
MAGNETIC FIELD INSIDE THE U.S. EMBASSY. THERE
IS NO NEED TO SPELL OUT THE STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN
TAKEN. SOVIETS INVITED U.S. EXPERTS TO
COME TO MOSCOW AND JOINT MEASUREMENTS WERE TAKEN
ON THE 9TH AND 6TH FLOORS OF THE U.S. EMBASSY.
HE MENTIONED NINTH FLOOR IN PARTICULAR BECAUSE
IN DOBRYNIN'S CONVERSATION WITH HYLAND LATTER
SAID THAT THE SOVIET EXPERTS REFUSED TO MEASURE

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES
BY 64, MARA, DATE 9/1/01



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THE ELECTRO-MAGNETIC FIELD IN THE UPPER FLOORS. THEY DID IN FACT PARTICIPATE IN JOINT MEASUREMENTS ON NINTH FLOOR.

3. THESE JOINT MEASUREMENTS, KUZNETSOV CONTINUED, SHOWED THAT THE LEVEL OF THE "MAGNETIC POLE" IN THE EMBASSY IS LOWER THAN EXISTING SOVIET NORMS AND THAT THEY ARE NO DANGER TO HEALTH. NEVERTHELESS, DESPITE THESE FACTS, THE U.S. SIDE IS ATTEMPTING TO SHARPEN (OBOSTRITI) THIS QUESTION.


4. THE MINISTER (GTOMYKO) HAD GIVEN HIS VIEWS ON THIS APPROACH. IT IS A TENDENTIOUS APPROACH WHICH GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF A THREAT. SUCH AN APPROACH CANNOT PRODUCE POSITIVE RESULTS. IF THE SOVIET UNION TOOK SUCH AN APPROACH THEN NATURALLY IT COULD EXPECT DIFFICULTIES IN OUR RELATIONS. BUT THE SOVIET UNION WILL NOT FOLLOW SUCH AN APPROACH.

5. THE SOVIET UNION WILL FIRMLY PURSUE THE APPROVED LINE OF IMPROVING RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND STRENGTHENING WHAT HAS BEEN ACHIEVED IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT WANT ARTIFICAL IMPEDIMENTS AND EXPECTS THE SAME ATTITUDE FROM THE UNITED STATES.

6. GUIDED BY THIS AND TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET AUTHORITIES HAVE DIRECTED APPROPRIATE ORGANS TO REDUCE TO THE MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE THE INDUSTRIAL SOURCES OF THE ELECTRO-MAGNETIC FIELD INSIDE THE EMBASSY. SOVIET SPECIALISTS NOTED THE PRESENCE OF INTERNAL SOURCES OF RADIATION DURING THE JOINT MEASUREMENTS. IF THE U.S. SIDE WOULD TAKE APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO STOP THESE, THIS WOULD BRING ABOUT A CORRESPONDING REDUCTION OF THE ELECTRO-MAGNETIC FIELD INSIDE THE EMBASSY. IT IS HOPED THAT THE U.S. SIDE WILL GIVE CONSIDERATION (RASSHOTRETI) THIS.

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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 01756 051921Z

7. KUZNETSOV CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT AMBASSADOR DORRYNIN WILL BE SPEAKING TO HYLAND IN WASHINGTON TODAY ALONG THESE SAME LINES.

8. WHEN KUZNETSOV HAD FINISHED HIS STATEMENT, I MADE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

A. REGARDING THE PLACE OF THE JOINT MEASUREMENTS, WE OFFERED THE ROOFS OF THE WINGS OF THE EMBASSY. SOVIET SPECIALISTS DID NOT AGREE TO TAKE THEM THERE. THEY ALSO WOULD NOT AGREE TO MEASURE AMBIENT LEVELS OUTSIDE THE EMBASSY. THIS IS PROBABLY WHAT HYLAND REFERRED TO.

B. AS I HAD EXPRESSED TO GROMYKO, OUR CONCERN IS THAT THE EMISSIONS WE ARE RECEIVING, WHILE LOWER THAN SOVIET STANDARDS MOST OF THE TIME, ARE HIGHER THAN THE AMBIENT LEVEL AND IN OUR VIEW POSE A HEALTH RISK.

C. SINCE WE FEEL THAT THERE IS A HEALTH RISK, WE CONSIDERED IT NECESSARY TO EXPLAIN THE SITUATION TO OUR EMPLOYEES. THIS OF COURSE COULD RESULT IN SOME PUBLICITY. WE HAVE ABSOLUTELY NO DESIRE TO SHARPEN OR WORSEN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IT IS THE SITUATION WHICH CONSTITUTES AN IMPEDIMENT TO OUR RELATIONS.

D. I TOOK NOTE OF THE STATEMENT THAT APPROPRIATE SOVIET AUTHORITIES WILL BE DIRECTED TO REDUCE TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT THE INDUSTRIAL RADIATION REACHING OUR EMBASSY AND STATED THAT WE HOPE THESE EMISSIONS WILL BE ELIMINATED ENTIRELY AND TRUST THAT THIS WILL HAPPEN.

9. KUZNETSOV SAID THAT HE WAS NOT AN EXPERT, BUT FROM HIS EXPERIENCE AS AN ENGINEER IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT IT IS DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE WHAT THE CONCENTRATION OF POLLUTANTS IS. FOR EXAMPLE, AS REGARDS AIR POLLUTION, MORE IS CONCENTRATED AROUND TRAFFIC LIGHTS WHERE CARS START AND STOP THAN

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ELSEWHERE. THEREFORE, THERE ARE WIDE VARIATIONS IN A CITY, AND THIS MAY ALSO APPLY TO RADIATION: CONCENTRATIONS WILL DIFFER FROM ONE PLACE TO ANOTHER.

10. I POINTED OUT THAT THE JOINT MEASUREMENTS WHICH WERE TAKEN LAST WEEK SHOWED, IN THE VIEW OF OUR SPECIALISTS, THAT THE RADIATION IS DIRECTIONAL, AND ASKED WHEN THE DIRECTIVE HE HAD MENTIONED WOULD TAKE EFFECT.

11. KUZNETSOV REPLIED THAT HE COULD NOT SAY, BUT ADDED: "WE WILL DO OUR BEST."

12. I ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS ANTICIPATED FURTHER TALKS IN WASHINGTON ON THIS MATTER. KUZNETSOV SAID HE HAD NO DIRECT INFORMATION ON THIS POINT, BUT DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY. THIS MAY BE CLEARER, HE ADDED, FOLLOWING THE HYLAND-DOBRYNIN MEETING TODAY.

13. IN ENDING THE CONVERSATION, KUZNETSOV REMARKED THAT HE HOPED WE WOULD APPROACH THE MATTER WITH A BUSINESS-LIKE ATTITUDE.
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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3,4

TAGS: ASEC, US, UR

SUBJ: MOSCOW SIGNAL

REF: STATE 27189


1. CANCELLATION OF EMBASSY BRIEFING HAS, AS ANTICIPATED, PRODUCED WIDESPREAD AND INTENSE SPECULATION WITHIN EMBASSY. THIS SITUATION AT MINIMUM, WILL LEAD TO SERIOUS MORALE PROBLEMS IF EXPLANATION NOT FORTHCOMING IN VERY NEAR FUTURE.

2. AS FOR POSSIBILITY OF LEAKS, WE ARE TOTALLY CONFIDENT THAT NO EMPLOYEE WHO HAS BEEN BRIEFED ON PROBLEM IS ENGAGING IN ANY SPECULATION OR GOSSIP WHATEVER. HOWEVER, SITUATION IS SUCH THAT VARIOUS UNBRIEFED MEMBERS OF STAFF ARE BEGINNING TO TAKE NOTE OF VARIOUS RECENT ANOMALITIES OF PROCEDURES AND ACTIVITIES HERE AND ARE SPECULATING ON THE BASIS OF THESE BITS AND PIECES. CANCELLATION OF UNPRECEDENTED SCHEDULED BRIEFING HAS IN ADDITION ALERTED ALL TO FACT THAT SOMETHING HIGHLY UNUSUAL IS GOING ON AND THAT THEY ARE NOT BEING INFORMED.

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5
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BY 66, NARA, DATE 8/1/01





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3. FOLLOWING EXAMPLES ARE ILLUSTRATIVE OF GENERAL PROBLEM WHICH IS NOW SPREADING WITH SPEED OF PRAIRIE FIRE:

---GSO EMPLOYEE WHO WIFE IS NURSE HAS NOTED ARRIVAL OF SCREENING AND MEDICAL TECHNICIAN AND HAS CONVEYED TO SUPERVISOR SERIOUS CONCERN OF BOTH THAT OST FACING UNSTATED MEDICAL PROBLEMS.

---WIFE OF LOCAL CORRESPONDENT WHO IS LAB TECHNICIAN AND WORKS PART TIME IN DISPENSARY IS AWARE NOW THAT DOCTOR HAS CANCELLED, THEN REINSTATED, APPOINTMENTS TWO DAYS IN ROW AND THAT FULL-TIME MEDICAL TECHNICIAN HAS ARRIVED.

---TWO C&R EMPLOYEES WITH ELECTRONICS TRAINING HAVE EXPRESSED (TO SUPERVISOR) CONCERN OVER FIGURES SEEN IN SY CHANNEL MESSAGES

4. LOCAL PRESS IS AWARE THAT MEETING WAS CALLED FOR BRIEFING (PRESS ATTACHE WAS INUNDATED WITH CALLS EVENING OF FEB. 4 FOR EXPLANATION) AND ARE DOUBTLESS BY NOW AWARE THAT IT WAS CANCELLED. STORIES TO THIS EFFECT, WITH POSSIBLE SPECULATION BY CORRESPONDENTS, MAY WELL BE FILED SOON.

5. REGARDING CURRENT MEDICAL SITUATION, DR. POLLACK HAS PROVIDED FOLLOWING OBSERVATIONS. THERE ARE PREGNANT WOMEN LIVING IN EMBASSY COMPOUND WHO MAY BECOME PREGNANT SINCE EARLY DECEMBER. DELAYS IN BRIEFING INCREASE THE PROBLEMS OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE EVENT OF GENETIC DEFECTS, REGARDLESS OF CAUSE. HE RECOMMENDS OUR ARRANGING WITH WIESBADEN FOR FACILITIES TO CARRY OUT TEST ON THESE WOMEN FOR CHROMOSOMAL DEVIATIONS IN AMNIOTIC FLUID. FURTHERMORE, MRS. DAVID FERGUSON, WHO RECENTLY DEPARTED MOSCOW AND IS NOW IN WASHINGTON EN ROUTE TO NEW POST, IS ALSO PREGNANT. DR. POLLACK SUGGESTS THAT AS SOON AS BRIEFINGS ARE COMPLETED THAT SIMILAR STUDIES BE CARRIED OUT BY MEDICAL DIVISION. I STRONGLY URGE THAT IMMEDIATE ACTION BE TAKEN IN REGARD TO THESE PARTICULAR CASES.

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6. I HAVE CONSIDERED ALTERNATIVE OF PROCEEDING WITH SCREENING OF MOST EXPOSED OFFICES AND APARTMENTS, SIMPLY INFORMING THOSE DIRECTLY INVOLVED THAT THIS IS A SECURITY MEASURE. UPON REFLECTION, HOWEVER, I FEEL THAT THIS COURSE WOULD NOT BE ADVISABLE IN THE ABSENCE OF A GENERAL BRIEFING. IT WOULD BE VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO ACCOMPLISH WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF A FAIRLY WIDE CIRCLE OF EMPLOYEES AND IT WOULD OPEN US TO CHARGES LATER OF FAVORITISM.

7. RE PARA 2, STATE 27561, I ASSUME YOU ARE AWARE OF PLANS FOR SUPPORT FLIGHTS FEB. 21 AND MARCH 10. THESE WOULD INVOLVE USE, FOR FIRST TIME OF LARGER AIRCRAFT THAT HITHERTO. WHILE WE HAVE NO RECORD OF SOVIETS COMPLAINING HERE ABOUT TYPE OF CARGO, I WOULD NOTE THAT CARGO SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY AND MARCH IS MUCH GREATER VOLUME AND WEIGHT THAN ANY SHIPMENTS IN RECENT MEMORY.

8. IN SUM, I MUST STATE FRANKLY THAT WE MAY HAVE CROSSED RUBICON IN ANNOUNCING BRIEFING, AND IN VIEW OF FACT THAT SIGNAL IS ON AGAIN TODAY, FURTHER DELAYS SEEM MORE LIKELY TO COMPLICATE THAN SOLVE PROBLEM. IN ANY EVENT, IT APPEARS MOST UNLIKELY THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO WITHHOLD INFORMATION MUCH LONGER FROM OUR EMPLOYEES, WHETHER OR NOT SIGNALS ARE TURNED OFF.

9. MFA HAS JUST CALLED TO SET APPOINTMENT FOR ME WITH KUZNETSOV FOR 1830 HOURS LOCAL. ANY INSTRUCTIONS SHOULD BE SENT FLASH.
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 TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 9514

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E.O. 11652: XGDS-3,4
 TAGS: ASEC, UR, US
 SUBJ: MOSCOW SIGNAL

REF: STATE 27189, STATE 27561

1. SCHEDULED BRIEFING CANCELLED.

2. KOMPLEKTOV TELEPHONED DCM AT 9:20 THIS MORNING
 "REGARDING QUESTION WITH WHICH WE HAVE BEEN INVOLVED."
 HE ASKED IF AMBASSADOR INFORMED OF DOBRYNIN-HYLAND
 MEETING YESTERDAY AND WAS TOLD THAT AMBASSADOR
 AWARE OF MEETING. KOMPLEKTOV THEN SAID THAT THEY
 WISHED TO MAKE SURE THAT EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS THAT
 "THIS QUESTION IS UNDER CONSIDERATION" (ETOT VOPROS
 RASSMATRIVAYETSYA). HE CONCLUDED CONVERSATION
 BY SAYING "THAT IS ALL."


3. KOMPLEKTOV TELEPHONED AGAIN AT 9:50 TO NOTIFY US
 THAT FIRST DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER KUZNETSOV WOULD
 PROBABLY REPEAT PROBABLY ASK AMBASSADOR TO COME
 BY THIS AFTERNOON.

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STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY ghNARA, DATE 2/1/01

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4. SIGNALS WENT OFF AT 1800 HOURS FEB. 4,
WHICH IS UNUSUAL BUT NOT TOTALLY UNPRECEDENTED, BUT EAST SIGNAL
REAPPEARED AT 0730 FEB. 5.
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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 03251 031030Z

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FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS:


TAGS: PFOR, ETRD, UR, US

SUBJECT: SCHEDULED MEETING OF US-USSR JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION

1. I UNDERSTAND THAT A FINAL DECISION HAS NOT YET BEEN MADE REGARDING THE NEXT MEETING OF THE US-USSR JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION. IF IT FOLLOWS THE ANTICIPATED SCHEDULE, IT WOULD BE HELD THIS SPRING IN WASHINGTON.
2. GIVEN THE UNACCEPTABLE SOVIET PERFORMANCE IN ANGOLA, THE STRESS IN BREZHNEV'S REPORT TO THE PARTY CONGRESS ON AID TO "NATIONAL-LIBERATION STRUGGLES" -- WHICH CAN BE USED TO EXPLAIN AWAY MORE OF THE SAME ELSEWHERE -- AND ALSO THE SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE ON OTHER IMPORTANT BILATERAL MATTERS SUCH AS THE RADIATION ISSUE, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT THE TIME HAS COME TO MOVE FROM WORDS OF WARNING TO SOME SLOWING OF ACTIVITIES IMPORTANT TO THE SOVIETS. ONE OBVIOUS CANDIDATE IS THE MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION, PARTICULARLY SINCE THE THRUST OF THE ECONOMIC POLICY ENUNCIATED AT THE PARTY CONGRESS IMPLIES INCREASED RESORT TO THE IMPORT OF FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY.
3. I THEREFORE URGE THAT THE SOVIETS BE TOLD THAT THIS SPRING IS NOT A PROPITIOUS TIME FOR A MEETING OF THE JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION. A POSTPONEMENT SINE DIE

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 03251 031030Z

WOULD NOT OF COURSE COMMIT US TO ANY PARTICULAR COURSE
OF ACTION IN THE TRADE FIELD, BUT WOULD BE A CLEAR
SIGNAL THAT WE MAY IF NECESSARY BE FORCED TO CONSIDER
STEPS WHICH WOULD AFFECT THEIR ABILITY TO IMPLEMENT A
FEATURE OF THEIR CURRENT ECONOMIC POLICY TO WHICH THEY
OBVIOUSLY ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE. STOESEL

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