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Department of State

TELEGRAM

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~~SECRET~~ 5695

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01590 041631Z

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ACTION SS-25

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.2

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES

BY *bl*, NARA, DATE *7/31/01**state visit 8/3/00*

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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O R 041527Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SELSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6892
AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE
INFO USMISSION US NATO~~SECRET~~ MOSCOW 1590

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-4
TAGS: PFOR, EFIS, UR, PO
SUBJ: REPORT ON SOVIET FISHING FACILITIES IN PORTUGAL

REF: LISBON 610

1. WE SPOKE IN SECURE CIRCUMSTANCES FEBRUARY 4 WITH PORTUGUESE EMBASSY COUNSELOR DE ANDRADE (PROTECT) REGARDING REPORT OF SOVIET FISHING FACILITIES IN PORTUGAL. ANDRADE SEEMED SURPRISED AND PERPLEXED ABOUT REPORT AND CLAIMED TO HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE OF ITS SOURCE. HE HAD JUST RECEIVED COPY OF DENIAL BY PORTUGUESE MFA THAT SOVIETS HAD SOUGHT FACILITIES FOR THEIR FISHING BOATS. SPEAKING FOR HIMSELF, HE SAID HE WAS QUITE SURE THAT SOVIETS HAD NOT REQUESTED FACILITIES. HE SAID THAT THERE ARE BILATERAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR SHARING OF FISHING TECHNOLOGY BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND THE SOVIET UNION BUT THAT THESE DID NOT PROVIDE EVEN FOR SHIP VISITS, MUCH LESS PORT FACILITIES. ANDRADE NOTED IN PASSING THAT SOVIET FISHING BOATS HAVE BEEN RECEIVING REPAIR FACILITIES AT SPANISH PORTS IN THE CANARIES FOR SOME TIME NOW. BUT HE SAID HE HAD NOTHING TO INDICATE THAT ANYTHING LIKE THIS WAS CONTEMPLATED BY PORTUGAL.

2. ANDRADE SAID THAT A MEMBER OF HIS EMBASSY HAS BEEN IN LISBON AND IS RETURNING FEBRUARY 5. WE DID NOT ASK

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☐ With concurrence _____ (not)(obtained)
 PS by *SV* Date *8/3/00*



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
Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01590 041631Z

WHO, BUT WE ASSUME IT IS MANUEL MARCELO MONTEIRO CURTO, A THIRD SECRETARY WHO IS THE ONLY OTHER OFFICER ON THE PORTUGUESE DIPLOMATIC LIST BESIDES THE AMBASSADOR AND ANDRADE. ANDRADE HIMSELF HAS NOT BEEN BACK TO PORTUGAL RECENTLY.

3. PRAVDA, MOVING UNUSUALLY FAST, HAS ALREADY REACTED TO THE WESTERN PRESS STORIES. A COMMENTARY FEBRUARY 4, LARGELY DEVOTED TO ASCRIBING SINISTER MOTIVES TO THE NATO MANEUVERS NEAR PORTUGAL, STATES: "IT IS NOT BY CHANCE, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE START OF MANEUVERS IN THE ATLANTIC IS ACCOMPANIED BY EFFORTS OF WESTERN PROPAGANDA TO SPREAD LYING REPORTS ABOUT THE DESIRE OF THE SOVIET UNION TO GET WHAT AMOUNTS TO (CHUT LI NE) 'MILITARY BASES ON THE IBERIAN PENINSULA.'" MATLOCK



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~~SECRET~~

The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched on a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a constellation of stars. The words "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" are arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it. Two small stars separate the top and bottom text on the left and right sides.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 8323

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17
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSD-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00
AECE-00 /026 W

034704

P R 051022Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0911
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 1602

EXDIS

PARIS EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR STOESEL

E.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PARM, TECH, IAEA, UR, US
SUBJ: TIBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS

REF: MOSCOW 1566

1. TIMERBAYEV CALLED FEBRUARY 5 WITH COUNTER-DRAFT OF JOINT RELEASE. SOVIET EXT IS AS FOLLOWS:

"ON FEBRUARY 10, 1975, THE USSR AND THE U.S. DELEGATIONS RESUMED NEGOTIATIONS IN MOSCOW ON QUESTIONS RELATED TO UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THESE NEGOTIATIONS RESULT FROM THE TREATY BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA ON THE LIMITATION OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS OF JULY 3, 1974, AND FROM THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. AS IS KNOWN, IN THE COURSE OF THE SOVIET-U.S. MEETING IN VLADIVOSTOK, IT WAS AGREED TO CONTINUE AN ACTIVE SEARCH FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTIONS RELATED TO UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. THE HEAD

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LOW _____
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RATLIFF _____
OAKLEY _____
SWANBER _____
SOLIMONI _____
STEARMAN _____
FARRAR _____

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66 7/31/01

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OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION IS I.G. MOROKHOV, FIRST DEPUTY CHAIRMAN, STATE COMMITTEE FOR THE UTILIZATION OF ATOMIC ENERGY. THE HEAD OF THE U.S. DELEGATION IS WALTER J. STOESSEL, JR., AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION."

2. IN RESPONSE TO OUR QUESTION, TIMERBAYEV SAID THAT THE SOVIETS REMAIN WILLING TO DROP REFERENCES TO BOTH THE TTBT AND THE NPT, AS HE HAD EARLIER SUGGESTED.

3. AS TO RELEASE PROCEDURES, TIMERBAYEV SAID THE SOVIETS WERE OPEN-MINDED REGARDING THE HOUR OF RELEASE. HE ASSUMED THAT RELEASE WOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS IN MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON ON FEBRUARY 10.

4. SECOND PNE MEETING HAS BEEN TENTATIVELY SCHEDULED FOR 10:30 A.M., FEBRUARY 12.
MATLOCK

FOR R. FORD

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01641 051710Z

64
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

039170


R 061014Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6928

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 1641

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINT, UK
SUBJ: BREZHNEV'S HEALTH

FOLLOWING SUBMITTED FOR WHAT IT MAY BE WORTH. DURING
EMBOFF'S CALL ON ROMANIAN EMBOFF FEBRUARY 3, ROMANIAN
SAID THAT BREZHNEV'S ILLNESS OBVIOUSLY HAD TO BE MORE SERIOUS THAN
FLU. HE THOUGHT IT WAS EITHER A COLD WITH SERIOUS
COMPLICATIONS, A HEART PROBLEM OF SOME KIND, OR A
RECURRENCE OF THE PARALYSIS WHICH IMMOBILIZED ONE SIDE OF
BREZHNEV'S FACE SEVEN OR EIGHT YEARS AGO. ROMANIAN DID
NOT CLAIM TO HAVE ANY SPECIAL KNOWLEDGE OF BREZHNEV'S
CURRENT CONDITION.
MATLOCK



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P.M.





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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01825 101834Z

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

P 101538Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7045

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 1825

EXDIS

F.O. 11652 GDS
TAGS: PFOR, UR, UR, US
SUBJECT: MFA COMPLAINT ABOUT RADIO LIBERTY


1. MFA USA DIVISION DEPUTY DIRECTOR KOMPLEKTOV, FOLLOWING PROTEST ON "DIALOGUE" TO DCM FEBRUARY 10 (SEPTEL), COMPLAINED ORALLY THAT RADIO LIBERTY TRANSMITS ANTI-SOVIET MATERIAL, TO WHICH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT HAS REPEATEDLY CALLED US ATTENTION. KOMPLEKTOV SAID THAT THE COUNCIL WHICH RUNS RADIO LIBERTY IS FUNDED FROM THE FEDERAL BUDGET AND IS, THEREFORE, A FEDERAL AGENCY. HE TURNED TO CHETVERIKOV, CHIEF OF THE DIVISION'S BILATERAL SECTION, WHO SAID SPECIFICALLY THAT RADIO LIBERTY WAS MAKING SLANDEROUS STATEMENTS ON THE NATIONALITY QUESTION IN THE SOVIET UNION, STATEMENTS WHICH SOUGHT TO COMPLICATE RELATIONS BETWEEN VARIOUS REPUBLICS AND BETWEEN DIFFERENT NATIONALITIES. CHETVERIKOV CONTINUED THAT RADIO LIBERTY HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF LENIN ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND OF CURRENT SOVIET LEADERS AS WELL. PICKING UP THE THEME, KOMPLEKTOV CITED THE UKRAINE AND CENTRAL ASIA AS FOCI FOR SUCH "SLANDERS." HE SAID THAT THEY HAD EVOKED INDIGNATION AMONG THE SOVIET PEOPLE, WHO ASKED HOW SUCH THINGS COULD BE BROADCAST WHEN THE U.S. LEADERS SPEAK OF THEIR DESIRE FOR BETTER BILATERAL RELATIONS. HE NOTED THAT, WHILE THIS WAS NOT AN OFFICIAL PROTEST, THE BEHAVIOR OF RADIO LIBERTY DID NOT CORRESPOND TO IMPROVED BILATERAL RELATIONS AND MEASURES SHOULD BE TAKEN TO CURB THE ABUSE CITED.

2. DCM REMARKED IN RESPONSE THAT THE COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING IS AN INDEPENDENT BODY, CREATED AND FINANCED BY

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01825 101834Z

CONGRESS, AND THAT THE OPERATION OF THE RADIO STATION IS SOLELY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THAT COMMISSION AND NOT SUBJECT TO THE DEPARTMENT'S POLICY GUIDANCE. DCM ADDED THAT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT KOMPLEKTOV'S DESCRIPTION OF THE CHARACTER OF THE TRANSMISSIONS, NOTING THAT IT IS OF COURSE IMPOSSIBLE FOR US HERE TO BE AWARE OF THE CONTENT OF RADIO LIBERTY BROADCASTS BECAUSE OF JAMING. HE PROMISED, HOWEVER, TO CONVEY KOMPLEKTOV'S VIEWS TO WASHINGTON.

3. KOMPLEKTOV CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT HE DID NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT'S RAISING THE COMPLAINT ABOUT RADIO LIBERTY ON THE OFFICIAL LEVEL.

4. COMMENT: SINCE KOMPLEKTOV'S COMMENT WAS CLEARLY TAGGED UNOFFICIAL, THERE WOULD SEEM LITTLE POINT IN REPLYING.

5. DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS USIA AND MUNICH.
STOESSEL

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED USIA, MUNICH.



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TELEGRAM

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PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01961 121737Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

128561

O 121715Z FEB 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7146

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ MOSCOW 1961

EXDIS


F.O. 11652 GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINT, UR, UK

SUBJECT: POSSIBLE BREZHNEV-WILSON MEETING

1. FINNISH EMOFF TOOK EMBASSY OFFICER ASIDE AT RECEPTION FEBRUARY 12 AND SAID THAT SERGEY LAPIN, CHAIRMAN OF THE USSR STATE COMMITTEE FOR TV AND RADIO BROADCASTING, AND A CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER, TOLD THE VISITING FINNISH TELEVISION CHIEF ON FEBRUARY 11 THAT BREZHNEV WOULD DEFINITELY MEET WITH PRIME MINISTER WILSON AND THAT THE MEETING WOULD BE SHOWN ON SOVIET TELEVISION.

2. AS OF THIS WRITING, HOWEVER, THE BRITISH EMBASSY HAS NOT BEEN ASSURED BY THE SOVIETS OF A BREZHNEV-WILSON MEETING. ALL THE SOVIETS HAVE TOLD THE BRITISH IS THAT, IF BREZHNEV IS IN MOSCOW, HE WILL MEET WILSON.
STOESSEL



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66 7/31/01

The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 5436

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

130292

R 121544Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7141
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL MINICH
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NY
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 1958

EXDIS


E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, PINT, UR
SURJ: FURTHER THOUGHTS ON BREZHNEV'S FUTURE

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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
GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

REF: MOSCOW 1127

1. SUMMARY: WHETHER OR NOT BREZHNEV RE-EMERGES DURING PRIME MINISTER WILSON'S VISIT, HE CANNOT PUT OFF FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS ABOUT HIS FUTURE MUCH LONGER AND THE QUESTION OF HIS EVENTUAL SUCCESSION MUST BE PARAMOUNT IN THE MINDS OF ALL HIS COLLEAGUES. A SERIES OF INTERNATIONAL EVENTS - VE DAY, THE WARSAW PACT'S 20TH ANNIVERSARY, A U.S.-SOVIET SUMMIT, THE CSCE THIRD STAGE, AND A EUROPEAN CP CONFERENCE -- BEGINS IN MAY; ALL OF THESE WOULD ORDINARILY REQUIRE BREZHNEV'S PRESENCE. MOREOVER, PREPARATIONS FOR THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS WILL MEAN THAT AT LEAST PRELIMINARY INTERNAL POLITICAL JOCKEYING SHOULD BE COMPLETED BY MID-YEAR. IN HIS EFFORT TO ASSURE HIS PLACE IN HISTORY, BREZHNEV WOULD SEEM TO HAVE THREE BASIC OPTIONS, ALL OF THEM WITH SERIOUS DRAWBACKS FROM HIS OWN POINT OF VIEW: (1) TO MAKE NO PLANS FOR HIS SUCCESSION AND HANG ON AS LONG AS HE CAN; (2) TO RETIRE IN FAVOR OF A COLLECTIVITY OF SENIORS, WITH KIRILENKO AS HIS DIRECT SUCCESSOR AS PARTY FIRST SECRETARY; AND (3) TO LIMIT HIS FUNCTIONS AND CONCENTRATE ON THE PARTY CONGRESS AND PERHAPS ON GROOMING A YOUNGER SUCCESSOR.

2. BREZHNEV'S ILLNESS IS IN ANY CASE LIKELY TO INTENSIFY THE POLITICAL SPARRING THAT COULD BE EXPECTED TO ACCOMPANY A PRE-PARTY CONGRESS YEAR. WE HAVE SEEN ALMOST NO OVERT SIGN THAT THIS PROCESS, IF IT HAS BEGUN AT ALL, IS AS YET EXPRESSING ITSELF IN POLICY TERMS. OUR TENTATIVE CONCLUSION AT THIS POINT IS THAT, HOWEVER THE SUCCESSION STRUGGLE DEVELOPS, IT IS NOT LIKELY THIS YEAR TO AFFECT THE OVERALL SOVIET COMMITMENT TO DETENTE. WE CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT THE DANGERS FOR THE U.S. ARE RATHER THAT SUCCESSION PROBLEMS COULD AFFECT THE DEGREE OF DETERMINATION AND ENERGY WITH WHICH THE REGIME PURSUES DETENTE AND THUS COULD MAKE IT PROGRESSIVELY LESS CAPABLE OF THE HARD DECISIONS THAT MAY BE NECESSARY TO KEEP UP THE MOMENTUM OF IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. DESPITE EARLIER ASSURANCES FROM SOVIET AND OTHER SOURCES THAT BREZHNEV IS ON THE MEND, HE HAS NOT YET APPEARED PUBLICLY AND WE CONTINUE TO HEAR VARIOUS REPORTS AND RUMORS THAT HE IS SUFFERING FROM A DISEASE WHICH IS SEVERE ENOUGH TO LIMIT HIS



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CAPACITIES IN THE FUTURE. HIS APPEARANCE IN GOOD FORM FOR PRIME MINISTER WILSON, WHO ARRIVES THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 13, WOULD REDUCE BUT NOT END SPECULATION ABOUT HIS FUTURE. HIS NON-APPEARANCE DURING WILSON'S STAY WOULD, OF COURSE, DRIVE THAT SPECULATION TOWARD NEW HEIGHTS.

4. A SERIES OF EVENTS SCHEDULED FOR 1975 WILL CALL FOR TOP-LEVEL SOVIET LEADERSHIP PARTICIPATION. ON THE EXTERNAL SIDE ALONE, THE CALENDAR INCLUDES CELEBRATIONS OF THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF VE DAY, THE WARSAW PACT 20TH ANNIVERSARY, A SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT, A SUMMIT UPON CONCLUSION OF CSCE, AND A MEETING OF EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES. IN ORDINARY TIMES ALL OF THESE EVENTS WOULD CALL FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF BREZHNEV PERSONALLY.

5. EVEN MORE IMPORTANT FOR BREZHNEV'S POSITION IN THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, PREPARATIONS FOR THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS MUST BEING SOON. IF PAST PERFORMANCE IS ANY GUIDE, THERE WILL BE A SERIES OF DOMESTIC SPEECHES BEGINNING AROUND THE MIDDLE OF THIS YEAR AND LEADING UP TO THE QUADRENNIAL ELECTIONS OF UNION-REPUBLIC SUPREME SOVIETS. THEY CYCLE OF PARTY ELECTIONS WHICH CULMINATES IN THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS SHOULD BEGIN IN THE FALL. IF THE CONGRESS IS NOT TO BE POSTPONED BEYOND ITS STATUTORY DEADLINE OF APRIL 1976, THE PRELIMINARY POLITICAL JOCKEYING SHOULD BE LINED UP IN A MANNER SATISFACTORY TO THE POLITBURO MAJORITY BY MID-YEAR. TO KEEP TO THIS TIMETABLE, THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MUST THEREFORE APPROACH FUNDAMENTAL DECISIONS ON BREZHNEV'S FUTURE IMMEDIATELY AND ADAPT DECISIONS VERY SOON IF ANY IMPORTANT CHANGES ARE TO BE MADE. THE HIERARCHICAL ELECTIONS FROM BOTTOM TO TOP OF THE CPSU, WILL PROBABLY NOT BE INITIATED UNTIL THE PROBABLE OUTCOME OF POLITICAL SUCCESSION IS CLEAR AND ACCEPTABLE. ELECTIONS BEFORE A PARTY CONGRESS TAKE A MINIMUM OF SIX MONTHS, AND THE PROCESS SHOULD GET UNDERWAY IN SEPTEMBER 1975, SHORTLY AFTER THE END OF THE JULY-AUGUST LEADERSHIP VACATIONS. THE LEADERSHIP WILL ENGAGE IN A SERIES OF STUMPING SPEECHES FOR RSFSR AND REPUBLIC SUPREME SOVIET ELECTIONS BY MID-YEAR, JUST AS IT DID IN 1974 FOR THE USSR SUPREME SOVIET. FACED WITH A MID-SUMMER LEGISLATIVE SESSION COMING PERHAPS IN JULY, THE LEADERSHIP WILL FIND ITSELF COPING WITH SEVERAL DEMANDS ON ITS TIME AND ENERGY, NOT LEAST OF WHICH WILL BE THE SOVIET-AMERICAN SUMMIT.



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NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED.



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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 5608

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W

000076

R 121544Z FEB 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7142
AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL HONG KONG
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMCONSUL MINICH
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
USLO PEKING
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
USMISSION USUN NY
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 2 OF 3 MOSCOW 1958

EXDIS

6. BREZHNEV HIMSELF MUST HAVE THESE TEMPORAL CONSIDERATIONS VERY MUCH IN MIND. WE ASSUME THAT HIS GROWING PREOCCUPATION, AS THE DAYS DWINDLE, IS TO GUARANTEE HIMSELF AN HONORED PLACE IN SOVIET HISTORY -- TO ENSURE THAT, UNLIKE ALL HIS PREDECESSORS EXCEPT LENIN, EVEN AFTER HIS RETIREMENT OR DEATH, HE WILL REMAIN LEONID ILYICH AND NOT BECOME LEONID WHO. IT SEEMS TO US


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THAT HE HAS THREE, AND POSSIBLE ONLY THREE, GENERAL OPTIONS.

A. FIRST, THE IMMORTALITY OPTION: BREZHNEV ACTS AS IF HE WILL NEVER DIE, MAKES NO PLANS FOR HIS SUCCESSION, AND HANGS ON TO AS MUCH POWER AS HE CAN. THIS IS THE OPTION MOST FAVORED BY AGING DICTATORS THROUGHOUT HISTORY. IT IS THE MOST SEDUCTIVE OPTION, BECAUSE IT INVOLVES NO DECISION TO CHANGE THE STATUS QUO AND NO MANEUVERING WITHIN THE PARTY; IN FACT, IT REQUIRES NO CHOICE AT ALL. IT ALSO WOULD SIT BEST WITH BREZHNEV'S COLLEAGUES AND WOULD BE MOST COMPATIBLE WITH HIS OWN PENCHANT FOR CAUTION AND CONSENSUS. ON THE OTHER HAND, BREZHNEV WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO EXERCISE THIS OPTION FOR LONG UNLESS HE REMAINED NEAR THE PEAK OF HIS HEALTH AND ENERGY. IF HIS ENERGIES BEGAN TO FAIL APPRECIABLY, HE WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO HAVING PERSONNEL AND POLICY DECISIONS TAKEN OUT OF HIS HANDS. MOREOVER, AS LONG AS HE RETAINED HIS FORMAL POSITION, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO GET THE POLITBURE TO ACCEPT ANY WIELDING OF HIS POWERS BY A FAVORED SUBORDINATE (E.G., KIRILENKO). THUS, THE IMMORTALITY OPTION, PERHAPS THE EASIEST AND MOST NATURAL ONE FOR BREZHNEV TO CHOOSE, WOULD PROBABLY ALSO BE THE ONE LEAST LIKELY TO ASSURE HIM A PLACE IN THE HISTORY BOOKS.

B. SECOND, THE GOLD WATCH OPTION: BREZHNEV GOES INTO HONORABLE RETIREMENT IN FAVOR OF KIRILENKO OR A COLLECTIVITY OF SENIORS. THIS WOULD BE THE MOST LIKELY OPTION IF BREZHNEV FELT HE WERE SERIOUSLY ILL AND WANTED HIS DEPARTURE TO BE ACCOMPANIED BY A MINIMUM OF INTERNAL TURMOIL. ASSUMING BREZHNEV'S POOR HEALTH PREVENTED HIM FROM GROOMING A SUCCESSOR OF A YOUNGER GENERATION (SEE OPTION THREE), HE MIGHT FEEL THAT HIS BEST CHANCE FOR A PASSPORT TO THE PANTHEON LAY IN PASSING THE MANTLE VOLUNTARILY TO KIRILENKO OR, A LESS APPEALING ALTERNATIVE, TO SOME COMBINATION OF THE FOUR SENIOR LEADERS (KIRILENKO, PODGORNYY, KOSYGIN, AND SUSLOV). THE EAST EUROPEAN PARALLELS (E.G., ULBRICHT) ARE NOT TOO AUSPICIOUS, BUT IN CIRCUMSTANCES OF GRAVE ILLNESS BREZHNEV MIGHT SEE THIS AS HIS ONLY CHOICE. IT WOULD AT LEAST HAVE THE ADVANTAGE OF GIVING A FAVORITE LIKE KIRILENKO A CLEARER MANDATE TO WHEEL AND DEAL THAN HE WOULD HAVE IF BREZHNEV HELD ONTO THE TRAPPINGS OF OFFICE AND POWER.

C. THIRD, THE OLYMPIAN OPTION: BREZHNEV RESTRICTS HIS FUNCTIONS AND CONCENTRATES ON BIG DECISIONS AND ON PREPARING THE

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


Department of State TELEGRAM

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PAGE 03 MOSCOW 01958 02 OF 03 122025Z

WAY FOR A YOUNGER SUCCESSOR WHO WOULD CARRY ON THIS NAME AND HIS POLICIES AFTER THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS. THIS OPTION WOULD GIVE BREZHNEV THE BEST CHANCE OF REAL IMMORTALITY, BUT HE WOULD HAVE TO BE ABLE TO EMPLOY HIS FULL POLITICAL SKILLS IN ORDER TO BRING IT OFF. A POSSIBLE SCENARIO WOULD BE FOR BREZHNEV -- PERHAPS AFTER A TRIUMPHAL U.S. SUMMIT -- TO GIVE UP HIS QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS AND HIS GLOBE-TROTTERING AND DEVOTE HIMSELF TO MAKING ONLY THE BIGGEST INTERNAL DECISIONS, TO PARTY WORK, TO ORGANIZING THE 25TH CONGRESS, AND TO MANEUVERING A YOUNGER ASSOCIATE (E.G., KULAKOV OR SCHERBITSKIY) INTO POSITION BE BE ELECTED THE NEXT GENERAL SECRETARY. THE OLYMPIAN OPTION HAS THE ADVANTAGE OF ALLOWING BREZHNEV TO CHANNEL HIS REMAINING POWERS INTO THE SUCCESSION QUESTION. IT HAS THE DISADVANTAGE OF MAKING BREZHNEV LOOK LIKE A LAME DUCK, AND LAME DUCKS ARE NOTORIOUSLY LACKING IN THE POWER THEY WOULD HAVE IF THEIR POLITICAL DEMISE WERE NOT INCIPIENT. THE OLYMPIAN OPTION ALSO RISKS INCURRING THE OPPOSITION OF SOME OF THE SENIOR LEADERS, WHO WOULD PROBABLY FEEL THREATENED BY THE RAPID RISE OF A YOUNGER MAN. TO WORK THIS OPTION SUCCESSFULLY, BREZHNEV PROBABLY WOULD HAVE TO KEEP SIGNALLING SOMEHOW THAT HE MAY NOT STEP DOWN AT THE NEXT CONGRESS, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME GROOMING SOMEONE ELSE TO TAKE OVER. IF HE WERE TITO, HIS CHANCES TO CARRY IT OFF WOULD PROBABLY BE FAVORABLE, BUT HIS PERSONAL PRESTIGE AND POWER ARE NOT THE EQUIVALENT OF THE YUGOSLAV LEADER'S. THUS, HERE TOO THE ODDS ARE NOT VERY GOOD FOR BREZHNEV.



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FOR POLITICAL POWER IS USUALLY CLOTHED IN ISSUES; BUT WE HAVE SEEN NO CLEAR EVIDENCE OF LEADERSHIP DISPUTES OVER PARTICULAR ISSUES. THE RODIONOV ARTICLE IN PRAVDA JANUARY 21, WHICH SO FAR IS SUI GENERIS, DID IMPLY SOME DISSATISFACTION WITH THE INABILITY OF THE PRESENT POLITBURE TO REACH DECISIONS ON KEY ECONOMIC ISSUES, BUT WAS NOT SPECIFICALLY CRITICAL OF BREZHNEV PERSONALLY. RODIONOV -- A MAN WHO LOST HIS POST OF SECOND SECRETARY OF GEORGIA UNDER THE BREZHNEV LEADERSHIP -- HOWEVER, DID WARN AGAINST THE TENDENCY OF PARTY LEADERS TO ASSUME ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT FUNCTIONS, A POLICY ASSOCIATED WITH BREZHNEV. HE ALSO MENTIONED THE PERENNIAL PROBLEM OF THE ADVANCEMENT OF YOUNGER LEADERS TO SENIOR POSTS. AS USUAL, HIS WORDS ON THIS SENSITIVE SUBJECT WERE CAREFULLY MODULATED WITH RECOGNITION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPERIENCED CADRES; BUT SIMPLY TO MENTION THE ISSUE IS TO REMIND MIDDLE-ECHELON LEADERS OF THE OBSTACLES TO PROMOTION --THE SENIOR INCUMBENTS. MOREOVER, HIS EMPHASIS ON THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVITY, THOUGH A FAMILIAR THEME FOR HIM, MAY ALSO CARRY THE IMPLICATION THAT COLLECTIVITY IS INSUFFICIENTLY REGARDED BY BREZHNEV; THIS, OF COURSE, WAS THE CHARGE AGAINST KHRUSHCHEV AND PROBABLY THE STRONGEST REASON FOR HIS OVERTHROW. NEVERTHELESS, RODIONOV'S MESSAGE IS NOT NEW AND HIS MESSAGE IS BASICALLY THE NEGATIVE ONE OF CHAFING OVER LEADERSHIP INDECISION.

8. WE CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT WHILE IT IS LIKELY THAT PRIORITIES FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS WOULD FORM THE TERRAIN ON WHICH A POSSIBLE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL POWER WOULD BE WAGED, IT ALSO SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THE ECONOMIC ISSUES WOULD BE PRIMARILY INTERNAL ONES (E.G., LIGHT-VS. - HEAVY INDUSTRY; DEFENSE SPENDING, REORGANIZATION OF AGRICULTURE) RATHER THAN ONES DIRECTLY INVOLVING SOVIET ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE WEST. DISAPPOINTMENT WITH BREZHNEV'S ECONOMIC DETENTE POLICIES COULD PLAY A SECONDARY ROLE IN A POWER STRUGGLE, BUT WE DOUBT THAT EVEN THE SETBACK ON TRADE WITH THE U.S. IS SEEN HERE AS SO SERIOUS OR SO IRREVERSIBLE AS TO MAKE ECONOMIC DETENTE A MAJOR BONE OF CONTENTION. THUS, OUR WORKING HYPOTHESIS AT THIS POINT REMAINS THAT SOVIET INTEREST IN CLOSER ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH THE WEST IS LIKELY TO CONTINUE DURING PRE-PARTI CONGRESS JOCKING.

9. AS REGARDS POLITICAL DETENTE, AN ACTIVE BREZHNEV, COUNTING HIS DAYS, WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO KEEP THINGS ON COURSE. THE PROSPECTS FOR SALT II AND CSCE ARE BRIGHT ENOUGH TO MAKE THIS



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LOOK POSSIBLE. SALT PROBABLY HAS A SPECIAL IMPORTANCE FOR BREZHNEV. HOWEVER, WHATEVER LEVERAGE THE U.S. MIGHT BE ABLE TO DERIVE FROM HIS DESIRE FOR AN AGREEMENT MAY BE OFFSET BY HIS WANING ABILITY TO KNOCK HEADS TOGETHER IN THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY. A BREZHNEV WHO, FOR HEALTH OR OTHER REASONS, IS REGARDED BY HIS COLLEAGUES AS A LAME DUCK WILL NOT BE ABLE TO AFFORD TO MAKE INTERNAL ENEMIES WITH A SOFT AGREEMENT ON STRATEGIC ARMS. EVEN IF A MORE PURELY COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP IS THE NEAR-TERM CONSEQUENCE OF A SERIOUS BREZHNEV ILLNESS, WE WOULD EXPECT A STRONG EFFORT TO BRING SALT AND CSCE TO SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSIONS DURING THE YEAR. THE REGIME IS TOO FAR DOWN THE ROAD ON BOTH ISSUES FOR STARTLING POLICY REVERSALS TO BE LIKELY. THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE HAS A MORE NEGATIVE CAST; THE OVER-RIDING OBJECTIVE (FOR THE REGIME IN GENERAL NO LESS THAN FOR BREZHNEV PERSONALLY) IS TO ENHANCE SOVIET POWER AND PRESTIGE IN THE AREA, WHICH MEANS IN THE SHORT TERM TO AVOID EMBARRASSMENT BY THE U.S. OR EGYPT.

10. LOOKING AT THE FACTORS CURRENTLY BEFORE US IN THEIR TOTALITY -- BREZHNEV'S UNCERTAIN HEALTH, THE HEAVY FOREIGN POLICY CALENDAR TO WHICH THE SOVIETS ARE ALREADY COMMITTED, THE SUCCESSION OPTIONS OPEN TO BREZHNEV, THE NEED TO GET PREPARATIONS FOR THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS SETTLED WITHIN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS --WE WOULD ADVANCE TWO TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS OF RELEVANCE TO U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS. FIRST, DURING 1975 THE SOVIETS ARE NOT LIKELY TO UNDO THEIR COMMITMENT TO EITHER THE ECONOMIC OR THE POLITICAL-MILITARY ASPECTS OF DETENTE. BUT SECOND --

WHETHER BECAUSE OF A LEADER NO LONGER ABLE TO LEAD, A GREATER COLLECTIVITY IN THE LEADERSHIP, OR A FLOW OF POWER TOWARD ANOTHER LEADER -- THEIR COMMITMENT MAY GROW PROGRESSIVELY MORE FLACCID. THE DANGERS IN OUR VIEW ARE THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP MAY BECOME LESS DETERMINED AND LESS ENERGETIC IN ITS PURSUIT OF IMPROVED U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS AND THUS PROGRESSIVELY LESS CAPABLE OF MAKING SOME OF THE HARD DECISIONS THAT MAY BE REQUIRED TO KEEP THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP MOVING FORWARD.
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION
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WITHDRAWAL ID 013587

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL Telegram

CREATOR'S NAME AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

RECEIVER'S NAME SECSTATE WASHDC

DESCRIPTION Re Gromyko's remarks about Middle East

CREATION DATE 02/13/1975

VOLUME 3 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032500349

COLLECTION TITLE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL
COUNTRY FILES FOR EUROPE AND CANADA

BOX NUMBER 20

FOLDER TITLE USSR - State Department Telegrams: To
SECSTATE - EXDIS (4)

DATE WITHDRAWN 08/08/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST GG



Department of State

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TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 1222

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 02100 141628Z

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 W

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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INFO AMEMBASSY BELGARDE
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMCONSUL MUNICH
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, UR

SUBJ: BREZHNEV REAPPEARS FOR WILSON VISIT

1. BREZHNEV'S REAPPEARANCE AFTER 50 DAYS ABSENCE WAS TREATED BY SOVIET PRESS AND TV AS COMPLETELY NORMAL EVENT. EVENING NEWS PROGRAM VREMYA FOCUSED ON BREZHNEV AT SHORT RANGE IN COVERAGE OF OPENING OF BRITISH-SOVIET TALKS IN KREMLIN. BREZHNEV SEEMED IN GOOD FORM AND SPRITS ON TV, BUT FREQUENTLY OPENED AND CLOSED HIS MOUTH AS IF UNCOMFORTABLE. HE SMOKED OSTENTATIOUSLY. RED STAR RAN LARGEST (RETOUCHED) PHOTOGRAPH OF LEADERS WHICH FEATURED BREZHNEV. SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA RAN SOME PHOTOS IN SMALLER SIZE. PRAVDA SHOWED SOVIET AND BRITISH LEADERS SEATED AT LARGE CONFERENCE TABLE. OTHER PAPERS RAN SMALLER PHOTO OF SEATED LEADERS. BRITISH JURNALIST WHO SAW BREZHNEV TOGETHER WITH WILSON THIS MORNING CHARACTERIZED



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SOVIET LEADER AS LOOKING "VERY FIT AND THE PICTURE OF GOOD HEALTH, VERY MUCH IN COMMAND OF THE SITUATION, AND SEEMINGLY FAR MORE VIGOROUS AND ENERGETIC THAN EITHER KOSYGIN OR GROMYKO."

2. COMMENT: SOVIET HANDLING OF BREZHNEV'S REAPPEARANCE WAS PREDICTABLE IN VIEW OF SOVIET PUBLIC POSITION THAT NOTHING SERIOUS WAS BOTHERING BREZHNEV AND SOVIET REFUSAL ON PRINCIPLE TO DIGNIFY STORIES OF LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS WITH PUBLIC RESPONSES. HOWEVER, NATURE OF BREZHNEV'S ILLNESS OR ILLNESSES STILL NOT KNOWN. IN THIS CONNECTION, CANADIAN AMBASSADOR FORD SAID LAST NIGHT THAT HE WAS TOLD TWO WEEKS AGO BY A "TRUSTED SOURCE" THAT BREZHNEV WOULD REAPPEAR ON TV FEBRUARY 13 FOR WILSON, BUT THAT HE WOULD NEVER FULLY RECOVER FROM HIS ILLNESS NOR RESUME A FULL WORK SCHEDULE.
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The seal of the United States Department of State, featuring an eagle with a shield, holding an olive branch and arrows, with a constellation of stars above its head. The text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" is arched above the eagle, and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" is arched below it.

Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

66, NAPA, DATE 7/31/01

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW

☐ Retain Class'n ☐ Change to

☐ Declassify in part and excise as shown

EO 12958, 25X() () ()

☒ Declassify ☐ After

☐ With concurrence _____ (not)(obtained)

PS by PU Date 8/4/00



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CHARACTERIZATION. BY THIS, HE WAS REFERRING TO THE IAEA PNE ACTIVITY AND FEASIBILITY REPORT BEING PREPARED BY ULF ERICSSON WITH ASSISTANCE FROM MYASNIKOV, PETROV, CURTIS AND NORDYKE DURING THE WEEK OF JANUARY 27 IN VIENNA. IN THAT DRAFT REPORT, THREE CATEGORIES WERE DESCRIBED: THOSE DEVELOPED TO A POINT SUITABLE FOR INDUSTRIAL USE, THOSE IN THE STAGES OF FULL SCALE FIELD TESTS, AND THOSE IN THE LABORATORY STUDY STAGE.

5. DURING FIRST WEEK, DELEGATION TRANSMITTED PNE MESSAGES ONE THROUGH TEN.

6. DURING FIRST WEEK, DELEGATION RECEIVED STATE MESSAGE 29629, 31784 AND 34245. WE UNDERSTAND THE FINAL TTBT/ PNE NUMBERS FOR THESE ARE SIX, SEVEN AND EIGHT.

7. FOR RECORD PURPOSES, WE CONSIDER FIRST WEEK TO HAVE BEGUN 0048 HOURS, FEBRUARY 10, AND TO HAVE ENDED 1645Z HOURS, FEBRUARY 14.
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The seal of the United States Department of State is located at the top center of the page. It features an eagle with wings spread, perched atop a shield with vertical stripes. Above the eagle's head is a circular emblem containing a constellation of stars. The entire seal is encircled by the text "DEPARTMENT OF STATE" at the top and "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA" at the bottom, separated by two small stars on the left and right sides.

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Department of State

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PAGE 02 MOSCOW 02255 191522Z

I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE AT THE OUTSET THAT THE PROVISIONS WE PROPOSE ARE INTENDED TO ASSURE THAT EXCAVATION PNEs DO NOT PROVIDE WEAPONS-RELATED BENEFITS OTHERWISE PRECLUDED OR LIMITED BY THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY.

I MUST ALSO EMPHASIZE, MR. MINISTER, ANOTHER IMPORTANT CONSIDERATION. IT IS CLEAR THAT ANY PNE AGREEMENT MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY OF 1963. THIS REQUIREMENT IS IN ADDITION TO AND INDEPENDENT FROM THE RELATIONSHIP OF A PNE AGREEMENT TO THE TREATY OF JULY 1974; AND IN MY REMARKS TODAY I ADDRESS ONLY THE RELATIONSHIP TO THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY.

WE HAVE STRUCTURED OUR PROPOSAL ON EXCAVATION PNEs IN TERMS OF CERTAIN LIMITATIONS, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, AND OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS WHICH WE BELIEVE WILL GIVE ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT THE POTENTIAL FOR WEAPON DEVELOPMENT OR WEAPON EFFECTS TESTS WILL BE CONSTRAINED TO A DEGREE CONSISTENT WITH THE LIMITATIONS IN THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY.


WE PROPOSE FOUR SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS ON EXCAVATION PNEs:

FIRST, THE AGGREGATE YIELD OF ANY EXCAVATION SALVO OR GROUP EXPLOSION SHOULD NOT EXCEED 500 KILOTONS.

SECOND, THERE SHOULD BE AN AGREED LIMIT ON THE MAXIMUM YIELD OF EACH INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIVE, WHETHER USED ALONE OR AS ONE EXPLOSIVE OF A SALVO OR GROUP EXPLOSION.

THIRD, THAT PORTION OF THE TOTAL YIELD OF ANY EXCAVATION EXPLOSIVE WHICH IS GENERATED BY NUCLEAR FISSION SHOULD NOT EXCEED 0.2 KILOTON.

FOURTH, EACH EXPLOSIVE IN AN EXCAVATION PNE SHOULD BE AT A DEPTH, MEASURED IN METERS, OF NOT LESS THAN 30 TIMES THE CUBE ROOT OF ITS YIELD IN KILOTONS.



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AGE 03 MOSCOW 02255 191522Z


THE PURPOSE OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND OBSERVER FUNCTIONS ARE TO AUGMENT NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF THE OTHER PARTY TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE WITH THESE LIMITATIONS AND TO ASSURE THAT THE EXCAVATION PROJECT CAN BE RECOGNIZED AS HAVING THE STATED PEACEFUL PURPOSE. AS YOU WILL NOTE, THE INFORMATION WHICH WE PROPOSE BE EXCHANGED FOR EXCAVATION PURPOSES IS SIMILAR TO THAT WE PROPOSED FOR CONTAINED PURPOSES.

IT IS NECESSARY THAT WE EXCHANGE INFORMATION IN ADVANCE ON THE PURPOSE, DATE, TIME, DEPTH, YIELD, AND GEOGRAPHICAL COORDINATES OF ALL EXPLOSIONS. WE WILL EFFORT TO ESTABLISH AN ADEQUATE PERIOD OF TIME FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF THESE FACTS. THE STATEMENT OF PURPOSE MUST ENCOMPASS A PROJECT PLAN AND SCHEDULE OF ACTIVITIES RELATED TO THE EVENT. THIS WOULD INCLUDE

- A FULL AND CLEAR DESCRIPTION OF THE PLANNED EVENT
- DETAILS ON THE EMPLACEMENT OF THE EXPLOSIVES
- THE PLANNED TIMES OF THE EMPLACEMENTS
- THE PLANNED TIMES OF INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP EXPLOSIONS
- THE DEPTHS OF BURIAL OF THE EXPLOSIVES
- THE RELATIONSHIP TO NEARBY GEOLOGICAL FEATURES, AND OTHER RELEVANT FEATURES WHICH EITHER INFLUENCE THE OBJECTIVES OF THE EXPLOSION OR CONSTRAIN THE YIELDS, DEPTHS OR OTHER CHARACTERISTICS.

IT WILL ALSO BE NECESSARY TO EXCHANGE INFORMATION ON THE GEOLOGY AND THE GEOPHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF THE MEDIUM AT AND NEAR THE BURST POINTS. THIS MUST INCLUDE DESCRIPTION OF THE GEOLOGICAL SECTION AND A STATEMENT OF THE BASIC PHYSICAL PROPERTIES OF THE LITHOLOGICALLY DISTINCT ROCK UNITS PRESENT, INCLUDING DENSITY, ROCK STRENGTH, SEISMIC VELOCITY, POROSITY, DEGREE OF WATER SATURATION AND THE DEPTH TO THE WATER TABLE.

AFTER THE EXPLOSION, THE PARTY CARRYING OUT THE EXCAVATION SHOULD PROVIDE DATA ON THE ACTUAL YIELDS AND ON THE RESULTS OBTAINED WHICH WOULD INCLUDE CRATER DIMENSIONS AND RADIATION FIELD MEASUREMENTS IN THE



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AS WEAS THE CASE WITH CONTAINED PNES, WE BELIVE THAT THE PRESENCE OF OBSERVERS IS NECESSARY TO VERIFY THE INFORMATION THAT HAS BEEN EXCHANGED. HOWEVER, IN THE CASE OF EXCAVATION PNES THERE WILL BE ADDITIONAL OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS, WHICH WE BELIEVE ARE NECESSARY.

I HAVE BRIEFLY OUTLINED IN THIS STATEMENT BASIC ELEMENTS OF VERIFICATION AS THEY APPLY TO THE USE OF PNEs FOR EXCAVATION. I WOULD NOTE THAT ANY AGREEMENT WE MIGHT REACH HERE WOULD BE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE THRESHOLD VALUE STATED IN THE TREATY OF JULY 3, 1974. IF FUTURE REVISIONS OF THE THRESHOLD OR OTHER FORMS OF LIMITATION ON NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS WERE TO BE NEGOTIATED, THEN THE PNE PROVISION MIGHT ALSO HAVE TO BE REVISED.

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ACTION SS-25

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.6
STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES *State v. 2/1 3/4/00*
BY *6/4*, NARA, DATE *7/31/01*

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

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
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E. O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PARM, US, UR
SUBJ: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS PLENARY FIVE

TTBT/PNE MESSAGE NUMBER FIFTEEN

STATE DEPT. DECLASSIFICATION REVIEW
☐ Retain Class'n ☐ Change to _____
☐ Declassify in part and excise as shown
EO 12958, 25X() () () _____
☒ Declassify ☐ After _____
☐ With concurrence _____ (not)(obtained)
PS by *PV* Date *2/4/00*

BEGIN SUMMARY. FIFTH PLENARY HELD FEBRUARY 19. MOROKHOV IN BRIEF EXTEMPERANEOUS STATEMENT REVIEWED LAST FEW MEETINGS. HE SAID THEY AT LEAST UNDERSTOOD BASIC ELEMENTS OF US POSITION ON CONTAINED PNEs, BUT NOT ALL DETAILS. AMBASSADOR STOESEL PRESENTED US PROPOSAL ON EXCAVATION PNEs. HE EMPHASIZED THAT PNE AGREEMENT MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH LTBT, BUT NOTED THAT HIS STATEMENT DID NOT DEAL WITH THAT RELATIONSHIP. US PROPOSAL INCLUDED LIMITS ON SALVO YIELD, INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIVE YIELD, FISSION YIELD AND DEPTH OF BURIAL. GEOLOGICAL AND GEOPHYSICAL DATA TO BE EXCHANGED WERE LISTED AS WELL AS RESULTS TO BE PROVIDED AFTER EVENT. PURPOSES OF ON-SITE OBSERVATION WERE LISTED INCLUDING PLACEMENT OF SEISMOMETERS AND CONFIRMATION OF FISSION YIELD LIMIT. ILLUSTRATIVE OBSERVER ACTIVITIES WILL BE PRESENTED AT NEXT PLENARY. NEXT PLENARY SCHEDULED FOR FEBRUARY 21. FROSCHER AND FRYKLUND RESPONDED TO QUESTIONS POSED BY SOVIET DELEGATION AT FEBRUARY 17 PLENARY. MEMBERS OF SOVIET DELEGATION THEN ASKED NUMBER OF QUESTIONS RELATED TO US PROPOSAL ON EXCAVATION PNEs. END SUMMARY.



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
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2. MOROKHOV MADE BRIEF EXTEMPORANEOUS STATEMENT REVIEWING WORK OF PAST FEW MEETINGS DONE IN ABSENCE OF AMBASSADOR STOESEL. HE SAID THEY AT LEAST UNDERSTOOD BASIC ELEMENTS OF US POSITION ON CONTAINED PNEs BUT NOT ALL DETAILS. HE PROMISED MORE QUESTIONS. HE WAS SURE THAT ALL WOULD BE CLARIFIED IN TIME.

3. THE AMBASSADOR PRESENTED FOR THE FIRST TIME US PROPOSALS FOR EXCAVATION PNEs. STATEMENT EMPHASIZED PROPOSALS WERE INTENDED TO ASSURE THAT EXCAVATION PNEs DO NOT PROVIDE WEAPON-RELATED BENEFITS PRECLUDED OR LIMITED BY TTBT. HE FURTHER EMPHASIZED THAT PNE AGREEMENT MUST BE CONSISTENT WITH THE LTBT BUT NOTED THAT HIS STATEMENT DID NOT DEAL WITH THAT RELATIONSHIP. PROPOSALS WERE STRUCTURED IN TERMS OF LIMITATIONS, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, AND OBSERVER RIGHTS AND FUNCTIONS. LIMITATIONS PROPOSED WERE (1) 500 KT SALVO YIELD LIMIT, (2) AGREED LIMIT ON INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIVE YIELD, (3) 0.2 KT FISSION YIELD LIMIT ON INDIVIDUAL EXCAVATION EXPLOSIVES, (4) DEPTH OF BURIAL (IN METERS) NO LESS THAN 30 TIMES CUBE ROOT OF YIELD IN KILOTONS. DATA EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS ON GEOLOGICAL AND GEOPHYSICAL INFORMATION WERE LISTED. RESULTS TO BE EXCHANGED AFTER EVENT INCLUDED YIELD, CRATER DIMENSIONS AND RADIATION FIELD MEASUREMENTS. PURPOSES OF ON-SITE OBSERVATIONS WERE LISTED. THESE INCLUDED VERIFICATION OF DATA EXCHANGED, PLACEMENT OF SEISMOMETERS AND CONFIRMATION OF FISSION YIELD LIMIT.

4. FROSCHEP RESPONDED TO MOROKHOV'S QUESTION, RAISED IN LAST PLENARY AS TO WHY IT IS NECESSARY TO LIMIT AGGREGATE YIELD OF CONTAINED GROUP EXPLOSIONS TO 100 KILOTONS, IF EACH EXPLOSIVE LESS THAN 100 KILOTONS. REPLY STATED THAT TELESEISMIC MEASUREMENTS COULD NOT DETERMINE INDIVIDUAL YIELDS OF SIMULTANEOUS GROUP EXPLOSION. IF EACH EXPLOSION COULD BE DISTINGUISHED TELESEISMICALLY, THEN YIELD LIMIT OF 100 KT WOULD APPLY TO EACH EXPLOSIVE.

5. FRYKLUND RESPONDED TO MYASNIKOV'S QUESTIONS, POSED IN LAST PLENARY, AS TO WHAT IS MEANT BY CHIPS FROM THE EMPLACEMENT HOLE AND WHAT GEOPHYSICAL DATA US WANTS TO OBTAIN. REPLY WAS THAT CHIPS WERE ROCK FRAGMENTS PRODUCED BY ROTARY BIT. THE LARGER THE CHIPS, THE EASIER THE DETERMINATION OF GEOPHYSICAL



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CHARACTERISTICS. LIST OF GEOPHYSICAL DATA TO BE PROVIDED IN DATA EXCHANGE WAS RESTATED.

6. MOROKHOV SAID HE HAD LISTENED WITH INTEREST TO AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE US POSITION. HE COULD FORESEE MANY QUESTIONS. THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS WERE ASKED:

-- BY IZRAEL: OVER WHAT DISTANCE ARE THE RADIATION FIELD MEASUREMENTS ASKED FOR TO BE TAKEN? WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RADIATION FIELD US IS INTERESTED IN--THE GAMMA INTENSITY OR RADIATION SPECTRUM? WHERE SHOULD THE GAMMA RADIATION BE MEASURED--AT THE SURFACE, IN THE GROUND, OR IN THE AIR? WHEN SHOULD THE RADIATION FIELD MEASUREMENTS BE TAKEN?

-- BY MYASNIKOVI: WHY SHOULD OBSERVERS OF EXCAVATION PNEs HAVE MORE RIGHTS THAN OBSERVERS OF CONTAINED PNEs? VERIFICATION OF EXCAVATION PNEs IS MUCH EASIER BY VIRTUE OF EXISTENCE OF CRATER AND THUS OBSERVERS NEED LESS VOLUMINOUS DATA.

-- BY MOROKHOV: WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE THRESHOLD OF 150 KT AND THE YIELD LIMITS PROPOSED?

7. MOROKHOV CONCLUDED SAYING US STATEMENT WAS HELPFUL FOR CONTINUATION OF THE WORK. STOESSEL PROMISED ANSWERS TO SOVIET QUESTIONS AT FUTURE MEETINGS.

8. NEXT PLENARY SCHEDULED FEBRUARY 21. US STATEMENT WILL
ILLUSTRATE OBSERVER ACTIVITIES.
STOESSEL



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3. COMMENT: ACCORDING TO OUR FIGURES, ABOUT 4,000 SOVIET JEWS LEFT COUNTRY IN JAN-FEB, 1974. IF NETHERLANDS' EMBASSY FIGURES ARE PROJECTED TO END OF MONTH, EMIGRATION VISA ISSUANCE FOR SAME PERIOD THIS YEAR WILL BE ABOUT 2,400, OR APPROXIMATE 40 PERCENT DECREASE IN FIRST TWO MONTHS. HOWEVER, RATE FOR FEBRUARY IS ROUGHLY SAME AS THAT FOR JANUARY. IN ANY CASE, JEWISH ACTIVIST SOURCES IN MOSCOW CONTINUE TO SEE FEW SIGNIFICANT CHANGES IN SOVIET HANDLING OF EXIT PERMISSION REQUESTS, BUT POINT OUT THAT CONTINUING SOVIET ANTI-EMIGRATION PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AND SELECTIVE HARASSMENT AND REFUSALS OF SOME CATEGORIES OF APPLICANTS HAVE FED DOUBTS OF NUMBER OF PROSPECTIVE APPLICANTS ABOUT APPLYING FOR PERMISSION TO EMIGRATE AT THIS TIME. SOME LOCAL VISA OFFICES ARE ALSO ALLEGELLY ASKING APPLICANTS FOR MORE DOCUMENTS AND THEREBY CREATING LONGER-THAN-USUAL DELAYS IN PROCESSING. MAIN FACTOR, ACCORDING TO SOURCES, IS "PSYCHOLOGY" OF SPMUATION: NUMBER OF JEWS SENSE THAT NOW IS SIMPLY NOT GOOD TIME TO APPLY TO LEAVE. STOESEL



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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

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R 25164513Z 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7570
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN UNN
AMEMBASSY BONN
USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY ROME
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 2588

EXDIS

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: UR, GW, WB
SUBJECT: DEPUTY FONMIN ON BERLIN, CSCE

1. SUMMARY. THE FRG EMBASSY HERE HAS FILLED US IN ON DETAILS OF A CALL BY AMBASSADOR SAHM ON DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ZEMSKOV ON FEBRUARY 21. SAHM HAD JUST RETURNED FROM BONN, WHERE HE SPOKE TO SCHMIDT, GENSCHER, AND OTHERS IN THE GOVERNMENT IN PREPARATION FOR THE CALL. BOTH ZEMSKOV AND SAHM WERE APPARENTLY PREPARING THEMSELVES TO TALK ABOUT THE TWO CENTRAL ISSUES IN CURRENT SOVIET-FRG POLITICAL RELATIONS: BERLIN AND PEACEFUL CHANGE IN CSCE. ON THE LATTER, SAHM REPORTEDLY CAME AWAY WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT ZEMSKOV TRIED TO BE FLEXIBLE IN TONE WHILE REMAINING VAGUE ON SUBSTANCE. HOWEVER, ZEMSKOV WAS CATEGORICAL IN SAYING THE ISSUE CANNOT BE ADDRESSED IN THE



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
PRINCIPLE ON INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS. ON BERLIN, BOTH SAHM AND ZEMSKOV RESTATED IN CATEGORICAL TERMS THEIR GOVERNMENTS' OPPOSING VIEWS ON THE ISSUE. SAHM INFORMED ZEMSKOV THAT NO BILATERAL TREATIES AFFECTING MATTERS OTHER THAN QUESTIONS OF SECURITY AND STATUS WILL BE CONCLUDED WITH THE SOVIET UNION WITHOUT THE INCLUSION OF A BERLIN CLAUSE. ZEMSKOV REPLIED THAT "IT IS USELESS TO EXPECT THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL COMPROMISE" ON THE ISSUE. ON OTHER QUESTIONS, A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF POSSIBLE DATES FOR THE SCHEEL AND GENSCHER VISITS TO MOSCOW PRODUCED NO SUGGESTED TIME FRAMES. END SUMMARY.

2. FRG EMBOFF (VON BRAUNMUHL) HAS BRIEFED US ON CALL BY FRG AMBASSADOR SAHM ON DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ZEMSKOV ON FEBRUARY 21.

3. VON BRAUNMUHL, READING FROM OUTGOING CABLE, SAID THAT SAHM MADE A GENERAL INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT TO ZEMSKOV, NOTING, INTER ALIA, THAT HE HAD BEEN ESPECIALLY RECALLED TO BONN TO PREPARE FOR THIS CALL. ZEMSKOV RATHER AIRILY DISMISSED THE PLEASANTRIES AND SAID THAT HE WANTED TO COME DIRECTLY TO A DISCUSSION OF THE TWO MAIN POINTS OF INTEREST: PEACEFUL CHANGE AND BERLIN.

4. SAHM SAID ON THE FIRST POINT HE HAD NO MANDATE TO NEGOTIATE. HE CONTINUED THAT IN VIEW OF ZEMSKOV'S ACCUSATION IN JANUARY THAT THE FRG "HAD NOT FOLLOWED THE RULES IN NEGOTIATIONS" ON THAT ISSUE, HOWEVER, HE WAS PREPARED TO OUTLINE THE HISTORY OF DISCUSSIONS ON THE PEACEFUL CHANGE ISSUE. ZEMSKOV SAID THAT HE WANTED TO HEAR NOTHING ABOUT THE HISTORY OF THE ISSUE BUT RATHER TO DISCUSS ITS SUBSTANCE. SAHM REPLIED BY REPEATING THE FRG POSITION: IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO INSERT THE LANGUAGE ON THE ISSUE IN THE INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS PRINCIPLE, THE BEST SOLUTION IS THE LANGUAGE PROPOSED BY THE U.S. ON JULY 26.

5. ZEMSKOV ANSWERED THAT IN THE SOVIET VIEW THERE ARE TWO ELEMENTS WHICH MUST BE INCLUDED IN LANGUAGE ON PEACEFUL CHANGE: (1) THE ISSUE CANNOT BE ADDRESSED IN THE PRINCIPLE ON INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS (ZEMSKOV WAS REPORTEDLY EMPHATIC AND "CATEGORICAL" ON THIS); AND (2) IT MUST CONTAIN ALL OF THE FOLLOWING ELEMENTS WITH EQUAL STRESS ON EACH: (A) INTERNATIONAL



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
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LAW, (B) PEACEFUL MEANS, AND (C) AGREEMENT BY ALL CONCERNED. ZEMSKOV CONTINUED THAT HE WAS NOT READY TO DISCUSS CONCRETE LANGUAGE, BUT THE JULY 26 LANGUAGE SEEMED TO HIM TO INCLUDE AN ELEMENT OF "PROMOTING" CHANGE. UPON QUESTIONING BY SAHM, ZEMSKOV REPEATED THIS POINT AND SAID THAT THE PROPER LANGUAGE WOULD BE THAT WHICH SIMPLY MAKES "ALLOWANCE" FOR CHANGE. SUCH LANGUAGE, ZEMSKOV CONTINUED, HAD ALREADY BEEN INCLUDED IN THE (UNSPECIFIED) SOVIET PROPOSAL.

6. ZEMSKOV THEN TURNED TO A DISCUSSION OF BERLIN. HE EMPHASIZED THE SOVIET DESIRE TO MAINTAIN AND DEVELOP FURTHER GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE FRG. BUT HE SAID THERE COULD BE NO ROOM FOR FLEXIBILITY IN THE SOVIET STANDPOINT ON BERLIN. SAHM REPLIED THAT, JUDGING FROM HIS CONSULTATIONS IN BONN, THE SOVIET POLICY ON BERLIN RUNS THE DANGER OF CREATING THE IMPRESSION IN WEST GERMANY THAT THE SOVIET INTENTION IS TO EXCLUDE BERLIN FROM ANY IMPROVEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. SAHM THEN QUOTED FROM A SCHMIDT INTERVIEW SLATED TO APPEAR IN LITERATURNAYA GAZETA (THE GERMAN EMBASSY DOES NOT KNOW WHEN) THAT THE FRG POLICY ON BERLIN IS "FULL APPLICATION" AND "STRICT OBSERVANCE" OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT, WITH NO CHANGE IN STATUS. ZEMSKOV COMPLIMENTED SCHMIDT ON THE STATEMENT AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE FRG ATTITUDE TO BERLIN WOULD CONFORM TO THOSE PRINCIPLES. SAHM CONCLUDED HIS PRESENTATION BY NOTING THAT THE AIM OF THE FRG POLICY IS TO INSURE THAT BERLIN IS INCLUDED IN ANY IMPROVEMENT IN SOVIET-FRG RELATIONS; THIS OBVIOUSLY REQUIRES THAT THE CITY BE INCLUDED IN BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.

7. SAHM THEN REFERRED TO A CALL BY SOVIET EMBASSY COUNSELOR KOPTILTSEV ON FOREIGN OFFICE IN BONN ON FEBRUARY 12. KOPTILTSEV APPARENTLY INFORMED THE FOREIGN OFFICE THAT CONSULAR SERVICES FOR CITIZENS OF WEST BERLIN IN THE SOVIET UNION "POSE NO PROBLEM." SAHM EXPANDED ON THIS TO EXPLAIN THAT THE FRG CONCEPT OF "SERVICES" (VON BRAUNMUHL SAID THAT WORD "CONSULAR" HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY DROPPED) COULD BE ILLUSTRATED BY THE FOLLOWING EXAMPLE. WHEN THE WEST BERLIN PHILHARMONIC ORCHESTRA COMES TO THE SOVIET UNION, THE FRG WOULD EXPECT THE ORCHESTRA TO BE MET BY THE FRG AMBASSADOR AT THE AIRPORT; WOULD EXPECT THE AMBASSADOR TO BE INVITED TO THE CONCERTS; AND WOULD EXPECT NO SOVIET OBJECTION TO THE AMBASSADOR HOLDING A RECEPTION FOR THE ORCHESTRA WHICH APPROPRIATE SOVIET OFFICIALS WOULD ATTEND.



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SAHM CONTINUED THAT FOR SOME WEST BERLIN ORGANIZATIONS THIS OF COURSE WOULD NOT BE NECESSARY AND "SERVICES" BY THE FRG EMBASSY WOULD BE SCALED ACCORDINGLY. HE SAID THAT THE FRG IS READY TO DISCUSS SUCH QUESTIONS ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS.



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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /026 W

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R 251645137 75
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7571
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
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USMISSION GENEVA
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY PARIS
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USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

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EXDIS

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

8. SAHM, CONTINUING ON THE ISSUE OF CULTURAL EXCHANGE, SAID THAT IN THE CASE OF DIRECT CULTURAL EXCHANGE BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND THE SOVIET UNION, THE FRG MAY WISH TO ISSUE A UNILATERAL STATEMENT. (VON BRAUNMUEHL EXPLAINED IN THIS REGARD THAT THE FRG DOES NOT INTEND TO STOP ALL SUCH DIRECT INTERCOURSE BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND THE SOVIET UNION, BUT WOULD WANT TO MAKE CLEAR IN SUCH A UNILATERAL STATEMENT THAT THE CONTINUATION OF DIRECT EXCHANGE DID NOT IMPLY THE EXISTENCE OF WEST BERLIN AS A THIRD UNIT IN GERMANY.) ZEMSKOV REPLIED THAT HE DID NOT BOTHER HIMSELF WITH DETAILS OF THIS NATURE BUT WOULD REPORT SAHM'S STATEMENT TO THE PROPER AUTHORITIES.

9. ZEMSKOV, SUMMING UP HIS ARGUMENTS, SAID THAT SPEAKING IN HIS ROLE AS "ADVISOR TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER ON GERMAN AFFAIRS," HE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR TO SAHM THAT IT IS THE INTENTION OF THE

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SOVIET UNION THAT BERLIN CONTINUE TO BE INCLUDED IN DETENTE. THE EFFORTS OF THE SOVIET UNION WERE AIMED AGAINST ATTEMPTS BY THE FRG WHICH COULD CREATE THE "IMPRESSION" THAT WEST BERLIN IS A PART OF THE FRG OR IS GOVERNED BY IT. ZEMSKOV SAID THAT WAS THE FINAL CATEGORICAL STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET POSITION. HE SAID THE SOVIETS WERE NOT READY TO MAKE ANY CONCESSION IN THIS REGARD; FOR THEM IT IS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE.


10. SAHM REPLIED THAT THE UNITY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS (RECHTSEINHEIT) BETWEEN WEST BERLIN AND THE FRG WHICH HAS DEVELOPED UNDER THREE-POWER AUSPICES WILL CONTINUE TO BE MAINTAINED BY THE FRG EXPECT IN MATTERS CONCERNING SECURITY OR STATUS. SAHM MENTIONED THAT THE MARINE AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE A BERLIN CLAUSE. ZEMSKOV ASKED SARCASTICALLY ON WHICH SEA BERLIN WAS LOCATED. SAHM REPLIED THAT JUST AS MUNICH AND STUTTGART WOULD BE INCLUDED IN SUCH AN AGREEMENT, SO WOULD WEST BERLIN BECAUSE OF THE UNITY OF LEGAL SYSTEMS.

11. SAHM THEN SAID THAT THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF CONCLUDING BILATERAL TREATIES OR AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE SOVIET UNION ON ANY ISSUE, EXCEPT THOSE AFFECTING WEST BERLIN'S SECURITY OR STATUS, WHICH DO NOT INCLUDE A BERLIN CLAUSE.

12. ZEMSKOV SUMMARIZED REMAINING DIFFERENCES, WHICH HE SAID WERE OBVIOUSLY IRRECONCILABLE IN THE PRESENT DISCUSSION, AS FOLLOWS: (1) THE SOVIETS BELIEVE THAT THE Q.A. MUST NOT BE OPEN TO "ARBITRARY INTERPRETATION" AND (2) "IT IS USELESS TO BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WILL COMPROMISE ON BERLIN."

13. AFTER DISCUSSION OF ABOVE MAIN ISSUES, SAHM ALSO RAISED QUESTION OF DATES FOR SCHEEL AND GENSCHER VISITS. ZEMSKOV MADE NO SUGGESTIONS FOR TIME FRAMES, BUT SAID HE WOULD LOOK INTO THE MATTER.

14. COMMENT: SAHM'S INTERPRETATION OF ZEMSKOV'S REMARKS ON CSCE WAS THAT ZEMSKOV, PERHAPS IN AN EFFORT TO SMOOTH OVER GLARING DIFFERENCES IN OPINION DURING SAHM'S LAST CALL ON JANUARY 20, HAD BEEN "MORE FLEXIBLE IN TONE." SAHM FELT, HOWEVER, THAT ZEMSKOV HAD BEEN TOO VAGUE ON THE SUBSTANCE OF THE ISSUE TO PERMIT ANY CONCLUSIONS ON POSSIBLE CHANGES IN THE SOVIET STANCE. FROM THE FRG EMBOFF'S CHARACTERIZATION OF THE






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DISCUSSION ON BERLIN, IT APPEARS TO US THAT BOTH SIDES ARE FIRING UP FOR SHOW-DOWN ON THE ISSUE. (A SIGNED COMMENTARY BY VLADIMIR KUZNETSOV IN THE FEBRUARY 21 ISSUE OF ZA RUZHEZHOM, A WEEKLY REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, TOOK A SIMILARLY HARD-LINE STAND ON BERLIN. IT WARNED AGAINST "DUBIOUS INTERPRETATIONS" OF THE G.A. SUCH AS GENSCHER'S CONTENTION IN A FEBRUARY 9 PRESS CONFERENCE THAT THE G.A. IS NOT "STATIC," BUT RATHER ALLOWS "DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT" OF TIES. THE COMMENTARY CONCLUDES BY STATING THAT ANY ACTIONS OTHER THAN THOSE IN STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE G.A. "WOULD AMOUNT TO LOOKING FOR CONFRONTATION.") VON BRAUNMUHL SAID THAT AS FAR AS HIS GOVERNMENT IS CONCERNED, THERE WILL BE NO PROGRESS ON BILATERAL AGREEMENTS UNTIL THE SOVIETS CASE ON THE ISSUE OF A BERLIN CLAUSE. HE SAID THAT IF THIS REQUIRES A LONG TIME, THEN HIS GOVERNMENT IS PREPARED TO LIVE WITH USCH A WAIT. HE SAID IN PASSING THAT THIS YEAR (I.E., THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF THE WAR) HOLDS NO GREAT PROMISE FOR MUCH MOVEMENT IN FRG-SOVIET RELATIONS IN ANY CASE. STOESEL



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