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Department of State

~~SECRET~~

TELEGRAM

R 110850Z NOV 74
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2690
BT
~~SECRET~~ PEKING 1946

CONTROL: 28690
RECD: 11 NOV 74 5:29 AM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR CH
SUBJECT: US-PRC RELATIONS

REF: A. TAIPEI 6788 B. STATE 247190

1. I AM INCREASINGLY CONCERNED OVER THE GROWING NUMBER OF ARTICLES WHICH ARE APPEARING IN THE PRESS INDICATING THAT U.S.-PRC RELATIONS ARE DETERIORATING, THAT U.S. DIPLOMATS IN PEKING HAVE NO CONTACT WITH CHINESE, THAT U.S.-CHINESE CULTURAL EXCHANGES HAVE DWINDLED TO NIL, ETC. AL JENKINS' VISIT TO TAIWAN (REF A) AND TERHORST ARTICLE IN CHICAGO TRIBUNE (REF B) ARE ONLY TWO THE MOST RECENT OF SUCH INDICATORS, BUT THEY MAY BE READ BY CHINESE AS OFFICIALLY INSPIRED SIGNALS OF U.S. DISILLUSION WITH OUR RELATIONSHIP.

2. THERE MAY BE SOME WHO WOULD ARGUE WE SHOULD NOT DISABUSE THE CHINESE OF THIS NOTION. WE WOULD CERTAINLY LIKE INCREASED CONTACTS AND GREATER CHINESE FLEXIBILITY AND WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THEM ON THIS. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FACTS ARE THAT WE HAVE ABOUT AS MUCH ACCESS TO CHINESE OFFICIALS AS ANY OTHER NON-SOCIALIST COUNTRY AND IN SOME CASES MORE. OUR HIGH LEVEL DELEGATIONS HAVE BEEN GIVEN FIRST RATE TREATMENT AND ACCESS, AND OUR CULTURAL EXCHANGES, WITH A FEW EXCEPTIONS HAVE PROCEEDED VERY SMOOTHLY.

3. I CAN SEE NO ADVANTAGE TO US IN LETTING THIS IMPRESSION OF DISILLUSIONMENT GO TOO FAR. THE CHINESE ARE NOT GOING TO CHANGE THEIR SPOTS. THIS IS A CLOSED SOCIETY, AND NO ONE EXPECTS THE KIND OF ACCESS ONE WOULD NORMALLY HAVE, EVEN IN THE SOVIET UNION. I ALSO DOUBT THAT A CHINESE SENSE OF U.S. DISPLEASURE IN THESE AREAS IS LIKELY TO HAVE ANY POSITIVE INFLUENCE ON THEIR ATTITUDES REGARDING THE LARGER ISSUES BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. I SUGGEST, THEREFORE, THAT WE CONSIDER AN ON-THE-RECORD INTERVIEW OR A CLEARLY IDENTIFIABLE BACK-GRINDER IN WHICH WE SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT ON, AMONG OTHER

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Hr 5/14/01

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Department of State

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TELEGRAM

-2- PEKING 1946, NOV 11

THINGS, THIS YEAR'S EXCHANGES, GROWTH OF TRADE AND AMOUNT OF OFFICIAL CONTACT. PERHAPS THIS SHOULD BE DONE IN WASHINGTON, BUT WE COULD EFFECTIVELY DO IT HERE.

4. WE MUST FIND THE DELICATE BALANCE POINT BETWEEN
A) HAVING PRC UNDERSTAND ALL IS NOT PERFECT BUT MORE
PROGRESS REQUIRED SO POLICY CONTINUES TO HOLD SUPPORT
IN USA AND B) HAVING PRC REALIZE WE ARE NOT GRIPING
BECAUSE OF CONDITIONS IN PEKING OR BECAUSE OF
UNREALISTIC EXPECTATIONS THAT ABOUNDED RIGHT
AFTER SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE.

BUSH



~~SECRET~~



Department of State

TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

O 130430Z NOV 74
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2706
BT
~~SECRET~~ PEKING 1969

Control: 34570
Recd: Nov 13, 1974
12:00 AM

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, CH
SUBJECT: US-PRC RELATIONS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM CHIEF, USLO

1. IF YOU FEEL THAT SOME SMALL OUTWARD SIGNS OF PROGRESS MUST BE SEEN FOLLOWING YOUR VISIT YOU MAY WANT TO CONSIDER SOME USLO EXPANSION AS A SMALL BUT VISIBLE STEP WHICH WOULD BE IN KEEPING WITH NOVEMBER 14, 1973 COMMUNIQUE STATEMENT: "THE SCOPE OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE LIAISON OFFICE SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE EXPANDED."
2. WE HAVE SOME SPECIFIC THOUGHTS ON THIS WHICH WE WILL BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS WITH YOU ON YOUR ARRIVAL.
3. ANY INCREASE IN USLO PERSONNEL WOULD NECESSITATE MORE OFFICE SPACE, MORE LIVING QUARTERS AND MORE ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT. FIRM PRC AGREEMENT ON THIS WOULD BE ESSENTIAL -- PARTICULARLY ON SPACE REQUIREMENT.
4. OUR STAFF IS HIGHLY REGARDED HERE. IF ANY EXPANSION IS CONTEMPLATED I WOULD LIKE TO SEE US RETAIN HIGH LEVEL OF CHINESE LANGUAGE CAPABILITY.
5. I AM NOT PRESSING FOR ANY INCREASE BUT IF IT IS IN THE INTEREST OF OVERALL POLICY TO SHOW PROGRESS IN THIS AREA ABOVE FUNCTIONS COULD BE CONSTRUCTIVELY UTILIZED.
6. WITH REFERENCE TO STATE 249466, WE WILL GIVE NO INTERVIEWS ON OR OFF THE RECORD. UNFOUNDED SPECULATION STILL PERSISTS ON POLICY DETERIORATION BUT USLO WILL STAY CALM AND COOL. I DID NOT WANT TO OVERSTATE THE CASE, BUT FELT YOU SHOULD BE AWARE, AS PRC OFFICIALS ARE, OF THIS SPECULATIVE CLIMATE.

BUSH

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HR 514101



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TELEGRAM

O 160405Z NOV 74
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2730
BT
~~SECRET~~ PEKING 2004

CONTROL: 4627Q
RECD: 16 NOV 74 12:15 AM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PDIP CH
SUBJECT: CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO CHIAO KUAN-HUA.

REF: STATE 253429

CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO CHIAO KUAN-HUA DELIVERED BY
DIPLOMATIC NOTE NOVEMBER 16.

BUSH

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hr 5/14/01





Department of State

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TELEGRAM

PAGE 01 PEKING 02082 251108Z

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 7001 W

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101304

O 251015Z NOV 74
FM USLO PEKING
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2784

Control: 72970
Recd: Nov 26, 1974
6:15 AM

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 2082

NODIS/CHEROKEE

SECTO 171

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR THE SHAH ON MIDEAST PORTION OF VLADIVOSTOK
COMMUNIQUE

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER FROM ME TO THE SHAH
ALONG WITH TEXT OF MIDDLE EAST PORTION OF COMMUNIQUE PER PARA 3
BELOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

YOUR MAJESTY:

IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR CLOSE FRIENDSHIP AND CONSULTATION,
PRESIDENT FORD HAS ASKED ME TO ENSURE THAT YOU ARE PROMPTLY
INFORMED OF THE RESULTS OF HIS MEETING IN VLADIVOSTOK
WITH SOVIET GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV. I HAVE ASKED AMBASSADOR
HELMS TO CONVEY TO YOU THE MIDDLE EAST PORTION OF THE
COMMUNIQUE ISSUED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THIS MEETING, ALONG WITH
THIS PERSONAL REPORT ON THE TALKS.

THE ESSENTIAL POINT IS THAT PRESIDENT FORD HELD FIRMLY TO
THE STRATEGY THAT WE HAVE BEEN PURSUING, WHICH I DISCUSSED WITH

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/5/03

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PAGE 02 PEKING 02082 251108Z

YOUR MAJESTY AT SOME LENGTH DURING MY RECENT VISIT TO TEHRAN.

WHILE AGREEING THAT CONTINUED US/SOVIET CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION REMAIN IMPORTANT, THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THE NECESSITY OF CAREFUL PREPARATION FOR ANY FURTHER DIPLOMATIC MOVES. PUBLICLY IN THE COMMUNIQUE, THE PRESIDENT AGREED THAT THE "WORK" OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE SHOULD RESUME AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IN HIS PRIVATE TALKS, HE EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF LAYING THE GROUNDWORK SYSTEMATICALLY AND CHOOSING CAREFULLY THE APPROPRIATE TIME FOR SUCH A MOVE.

THUS, OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH THE NEGOTIATING PARTIES WILL CONTINUE FROM THE BASIS WHICH I DESCRIBED TO YOUR MAJESTY DURING MY RECENT VISIT. IN THIS CONNECTION, I WANT YOUR MAJESTY TO KNOW THAT I HAVE ASKED FOREIGN MINISTER ALLON TO COME TO WASHINGTON SHORTLY AFTER MY RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES IN ORDER TO CONTINUE OUR CONSULTATIONS ON HOW BEST NOW TO PROCEED. THE TALKS IN VLADIVOSTOK IN NO WAY LIMITED OUR ABILITY TO PROMOTE FURTHER PROGRESS TOWARD PEACE IN THE DIRECTION WHICH I HAVE DESCRIBED TO YOU. IT IS OUR INTENTION TO PURSUE THESE EFFORTS WITH ENERGY AND DEDICATION IN THE WEEKS AHEAD.

YOUR MAJESTY WILL NOTICE THAT THE COMMUNIQUE REFLECTS THE CONTINUING AMERICAN CONVICTION THAT THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ANY JUST AND LASTING SOLUTION. AS I TOLD YOUR MAJESTY IN DISCUSSING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE OF ARAB LEADERS IN RABAT, THE QUESTION IS NOT WHETHER LEGITIMATE PALESTINIAN INTERESTS SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS BUT HOW THIS CAN BE DONE. THIS IS THE ISSUE THAT MUST BE ADDRESSED IN THE MORE DIFFICULT SITUATION CREATED BY THE RABAT CONFERENCE. AS I HAVE EXPLAINED TO YOUR MAJESTY, THE OVERRIDING CONCERN OF THE UNITED STATES AT THIS POINT IS TO ACHIEVE FURTHER PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ALREADY LAUNCHED SO THAT A NEW SITUATION WILL BE CREATED WHICH MAY MAKE FURTHER STEPS POSSIBLE.

IN SHORT, WHILE THE TALKS IN VLADIVOSTOK SIGNIFICANTLY ADVANCED US/SOVIET RELATIONS ON OTHER MATTERS OF GLOBAL IMPORTANCE, THE U.S. REMAINS FREE TO PURSUE THE STRATEGY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WHICH HAS RESULTED IN THE PROGRESS OF THE PAST YEAR. THE

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PAGE 03 PEKING 02082 251108Z

UNDERSTANDING ON STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS WAS AN IMPORTANT BREAKTHROUGH. I WANT TO ASSURE YOUR MAJESTY, AS I WILL BE ASSURING OUR OTHER ALLIES, THAT THIS UNDERSTANDING HAS BEEN REACHED WITHOUT IN ANY WAY LIMITING THE CAPACITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO GO ON PLAYING ITS CENTRAL ROLE IN THE DEFENSE OF THE FREE WORLD. I WILL WRITE YOU IN GREATER DETAIL ON THIS MATTER IN THE NEXT TWENTY-FOUR HOURS.

PRESIDENT FORD HAS ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS WARMEST PERSONAL WISHES TO YOU AS I SEND YOU THIS REPORT OF HIS TALKS WITH THE SOVIET LEADERS.

WARM PERSONAL REGARDS. HENRY A. KISSINGER

3. TEXT OF MIDEAST PORTION OF VLADIVOSTOK COMMUNIQUE, TO BE DELIVERED ALONG WITH LETTER, IS AS FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT:

IN THE COURSE OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THE MIDDLE EAST BOTH SIDES EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERN WITH REGARD TO THE DANGEROUS SITUATION IN THAT REGION. THEY REAFFIRMED THEIR INTENTION TO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO PROMOTE A SOLUTION OF THE KEY ISSUES OF A JUST AND LAST PEACE IN THAT AREA ON THE BASIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 338, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE LEGITIMATE INTERESTS OF ALL THE PEOPLES IN THE AREA, INCLUDING THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE, AND RESPECT FOR THE RIGHT TO INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE OF ALL STATES IN THE AREA.

THE SIDES BELIEVE THAT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE SHOULD PLAY AN IMPORTANT PART IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND SHOULD RESUME ITS WORK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. END TEXT.
KISSINGER

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NOD958

PAGE 01 PEKING 02153 271510Z

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 7001 W

003430

O 251502Z NOV 74 ZFF-4

FM USLO PEKING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2800

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 2153

NODIS/CHEROKEE

TO EAGLEBURGER FROM BREMER

SECTO 232

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJ: LONDON

BILL IS THE ONE.

KISSINGER

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HR 5/14/01

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NOD722 Copy 12 of 13 copies

PAGE 01 PEKING 02083 251055Z

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 7001 W

O 251037Z NOV 74 ZFF4
FM USLO PEKING
TO AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2709

101091
Control: 7295Q
Recd: Nov 25, 1974
6:03 AM

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 2083

NODIS/CHEROKEE

SECTO 172

FOR AMBASSADOR EILTS FROM SECRETARY; WASHINGTON FOR SISCO

E.O. 11652; XGDS-3
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SADAT ON ALLON VISIT

1. FOR EILTS: PLEASE PASS MESSAGE BELOW FROM ME TO
PRESIDENT SADAT.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

ON TUESDAY, WE WILL BE ANNOUNCING FOREIGN MINISTER
ALLON'S VISIT TO WASHINGTON TO MEET WITH ME ON
DECEMBER 9. I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT THIS IS THE FIRST
STEP IN FOLLOWING THROUGH THE STRATEGY WHICH YOU AND I
HAVE DISCUSSED. I WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO MAKE OUR
MEETING PRODUCTIVE IN DEVELOPING AN APPROPRIATE BASE
FOR FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS. ANY FURTHER THOUGHTS YOU MAY
WISH TO CONVEY BEFORE THAT MEETING WILL BE MOST HELPFUL.
I SHALL KEEP YOU INFORMED ABOUT THOSE TALKS. ONCE
THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THIS VISIT IS MADE, THE PRESS WILL
AGAIN BEGIN TO SPECULATE ON THE PURPOSE OF THIS TRIP.
I WANT TO ASSURE YOU THAT WE WILL DO WHAT WE CAN ON OUR

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5 *State Dept Review*

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES TD 9/27/02

BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/5/03

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PAGE 02 PEKING 02083 251055Z

SIDE TO AVOID CREATING DIFFICULTIES FOR YOU, AND WE ARE AGAIN CAUTIONING THE ISRAELIS ON THIS SUBJECT. WARM PERSONAL REGARDS. HENRY.

END TEXT.

3. FOR SISCO: PLEASE CALL DINITZ AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AND URGE HIM AGAIN IN CONNECTION WITH ANNOUNCEMENT OF ALLON VISIT TO ASK HIS GOVERNMENT TO DO ALL IN ITS POWER TO HELP AVOID PRESS SPECULATION THAT WOULD COMPLICATE SADAT'S ABILITY TO NEGOTIATE. KISSINGER

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PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES

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NOD798

PAGE 01 PEKING 02091 260357Z

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 7001 W

110647

Q 260320Z NOV 74 ZFF4
FM USLO PEKING
TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2799

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 2091

NODIS

SECTO 181

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR THE SHAH

1. PLEASE TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING PERSONAL MESSAGE TO THE SHAH FROM ME.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY:

WITH REFERENCE TO MY PREVIOUS MESSAGE TO YOU, I WANTED TO GIVE YOU A FULLER RUNDOWN ON THE STRATEGIC ARMS DISCUSSION IN VLADIVOSTOK.

AS YOU KNOW, WHILE WE WISH TO REACH AN AGREEMENT THAT WILL FURTHER CURB THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE, WE HAVE NO INTENTION OF TAKING ANY STEPS THAT WOULD WEAKEN WESTERN DEFENSES OR HINDER OUR OVERALL INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY THAT WE HAVE DISCUSSED. I AM PLEASED TO TELL YOU THAT IN THE TALKS BETWEEN PRESIDENT FORD AND GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV WE MADE SUBSTANTIAL PROGRESS TOWARD A TEN YEAR FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENT TO SALT I THAT SHOULD BOTH ENHANCE GLOBAL STABILITY AND ASSURE CONTINUED STRONG

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E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT. GUIDELINES

BY HR, NARA, DATE 2/5/03

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PAGE 02 PEKING 02091 260357Z

WESTERN DEFENSES.

THE SOVIET SIDE FIRST PROPOSED THAT IT BE PERMITTED A LARGER NUMBER OF CENTRAL SYSTEMS WHILE WE COULD HAVE A SLIGHTLY LARGER NUMBER OF MIRVED MISSILES. THIS HAD BEEN THE PATTERN IN OUR DISCUSSIONS OVER RECENT MONTHS. WHILE IN PRINCIPLE THERE WERE POSSIBILITIES IN THIS APPROACH IF THE ACTUAL NUMBERS WERE SATISFACTORY, IT MIGHT HAVE HAD SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL DISADVANTAGES IN FORMALIZING A SOVIET EDGE IN NUMBERS OF CENTRAL SYSTEMS. EVEN THOUGH SUCH AN EDGE WOULD BE MEANINGLESS IN STRATEGIC TERMS.

AFTER THE PRESIDENT HELD FIRM, THE SOVIET SIDE CHANGED ITS POSITION TO AGREE TO EQUAL NUMBERS IN CENTRAL SYSTEMS AS WELL AS MIRVED MISSILES. IN ADDITION THE SOVIETS DROPPED THEIR INSISTENCE ON INCLUDING OUR FORWARD BASED SYSTEMS WITH OUR ALLIES OR ON THE SOVIETS RECEIVING COMPENSATION FOR OTHER THREATS TO THE USSR. WE REACHED AGREEMENT ON ACTUAL NUMBERS AS WELL AS THESE BASIC PRINCIPLES. ACCORDINGLY, I THINK WE HAVE OVERCOME THE MAJOR POLITICAL AND CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS FOR A NEW SALT AGREEMENT. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE MANY DIFFICULT TECHNICAL PROBLEMS TO WORK OUT, PRIMARILY REGARDING VERIFICATION, THERE IS A VERY GOOD CHANCE THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO SIGN AN AGREEMENT NEXT SUMMER WHEN GENERAL SECRETARY BREZHNEV VISITS THE UNITED STATES.

YOUR MAJESTY, I THINK THIS HOPEFUL PROGRESS DEMONSTRATES THE SOVIET NEED TO MAINTAIN THE MOMENTUM OF GOOD RELATIONS WITH US. THE AGREEMENT THAT NOW SEEMS POSSIBLE IS DUE IN PART TO OUR FIRM STANCE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE CLEAR SIGNALS WE HAVE SENT ON OUR READINESS TO CONTINUE TO DEVELOP OUR DEFENSES IF MOSCOW IS NOT PREPARED TO BE REASONABLE. I THINK THE COURSE WE ARE ON SHOULD BE IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS AND CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE SECURE WORLD.

I WILL CONTINUE, YOUR MAJESTY, TO KEEP YOU INFORMED ON THESE IMPORTANT NEGOTIATIONS, WARM REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER.

END TEXT. KISSINGER

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Department of State

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N00803

PAGE 01 PEKING 02096 260727Z

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 7001 W

112501

O 260715Z NOV 74 ZFF-4

FM USLO PEKING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2004

CONTROL: 7600Q

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 2096RECD : NOV 26, 1974
2:29 A.M.

NODIS

FOR SISCO FROM SECRETARY

SECTO 183

E.O. 11652: COS

TAGS: OVIP (HENERY E. KISSINGER)

SUBJ: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION

1. I BELIEVE WE SHOULD APPROACH THE AUSTRIANS TUESDAY AND LET THEM START THE PROCESS OF CONSULTATIONS WITH THE OTHER SC MEMBERS RIGHT AWAY. PLEASE INSTRUCT SCALI TO DO SO.

2. WE DID NOT DISCUSS THIS WITH THE SOVIETS, BUT MY ASSUMPTION IS THAT, THE SYRIANS HAVING AGREED, THEY WILL GO AHEAD AND THE SOVIETS WILL NOT GET OUT IN FRONT OF THEM. IN ANY CASE, THERE MAY BE ADANTAGE IN NOT GIVING THE SYRIANS TIME FOR SECOND THOUGHTS WITH WALDHEIM. WE HAVE TOLD THEM WE ARE MOVING AND SHOULD BE IN POSITION TO SEND THEM A REPORT TUESDAY THAT THE WHEELS HAVE STARTED TURNING.

3. IT SEEMS TO ME IT IS MORE RISKY TO RUN UP AGAINST A DEADLINE, WHICH WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY BE THE CASE IF WE WAIT ANY LONGER TO START THE CONSULTATIONS.
KISSINGER

~~SECRET~~

HR 5/14/01





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PAGE 01 PEKING 02097 260733Z

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 7001 W

O 260723Z NOV 74 ZFF-4

FM USLO PEKING

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2605

INFO AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE

112646

CONTROL: 7603Q

RECD : NOV 26, 1974
2:38 A.M.

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 2097

NODIS

SECTO 184

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PROG, JA, NZ, CB

SUBJ: KHMER CREDENTIALS AND AFTERMATH

REF: STATE 260084 (TOSSEC 456)

1. ALL RECIPIENTS REPTEL SHOULD AVOID ANY FURTHER
DISCUSSION ON AFTERMATH KHMER VOTE. IN PARTICULAR, DO
NOT MAKE ANY SUGGESTIONS ON ARRANGING BILATERAL OR MULTI-
LATERAL NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORT MENTIONED PARA 3 REPTEL.
KISSINGER

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HR 5/14/01



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O 260729Z NOV 74 ZFF-4
FM USLO PEKING
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2807

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 2099

CONTROL: 7614Q
RECD: NOV 26, 1974
03:20AM

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SECTO 186

FOR GOMPERT FROM BREMER

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: NATO AND MARTINIQUE TRIPS

REF: STATE 260085

YOU WILL UNDERSTAND MY RELUCTANCE TO RAISE THE NATO-
MARTINIQUE TIMING QUESTION WITH THE SECRETARY IN THE
ABSENCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT (A) WHEN NATO IS LIKELY
TO CONCLUDE ON DECEMBER 13; (B) FLYING TIMES FROM
BRUSSELS TO MARTINIQUE; (C) WHAT TIME THE PRESIDENT PLANS
TO LEAVE ON DECEMBER 14; (D) FLYING TIME FROM WASHINGTON TO
MARTINIQUE; (E) PLANNED ARRIVAL TIME OF THE FRENCH IN
MARTINIQUE; (F) SCHEDULE IN MARTINIQUE. EVEN WITH ALL OF THAT IN-
FORMATION IT SEEMS UNLIKELY I WILL GET AN ANSWER THIS EARLY BUT
WITH IT, I WOULD BE WILLING TO TRY.
KISSINGER

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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INFO OCT-01 7001 W

112794

O 260729Z NOV 74 ZFF-4
FM USLO PEKING
TO AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2808

CONTROL: 7608Q
RECD: NOV 26, 1974

~~SECRET~~ PEKING 2100

0306AM

NODIS

SECTO 187

E.O., 11652: GOS
TAGS: PFOR, VE
SUBJ: REPORT BY VENEZUELAN PRESIDENT OF ALLEGED COMMENT BY
SECRETARY KISSINGER ON QUITO CONFERENCE

REF: CARACAS 11638

FOR AMBASSADOR MCCLINTOCK FROM THE SECRETARY

I HAVE SEEN YOUR REPORT ON WHAT RABASA ALLEGES. I SAID
ABOUT THE QUITO CONFERENCE IN MEXICO. YOU SHOULD TELL
THE VENEZUELAN THAT IT IS SIMPLY NOT TRUE, THAT I
SAID THE QUITO CONFERENCE WAS QUOTE UNIMPORTANT. UNQUOTE.
KISSINGER

~~SECRET~~
HR 5/14/01



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INFO OCT-01 7001 W

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O 260732Z NOV 74

FM USLO PEKING

TO AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE

CONTROL: 7619Q

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2809

RECD: NOV 26, 1974

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ USLO PEKING 2102

03:59AM

NOD18

SECTO 189

FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

E O 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR

SUBJ: US-USSR COMMUNIQUE

1. PLEASE DELIVER TO BITSIOS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO KARAMANLIS, ALONG WITH THE TEXT OF THE CYPRUS PARAGRAPH OF THE VLADIVOSTOK COMMUNIQUE IN PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW:

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

I HAVE ASKED AMBASSADOR KUBISCH TO PROVIDE YOU WITH A COPY OF THE TEXT OF THE PARAGRAPH DEALING WITH CYPRUS WHICH WAS INCLUDED IN THE US-USSR COMMUNIQUE ISSUED IN VLADIVOSTOK. I ALSO WANTED YOU TO HAVE THIS BRIEF PERSONAL REPORT OF OUR MEETING THERE.

ALTHOUGH THERE IS A PARAGRAPH IN THE COMMUNIQUE ON CYPRUS, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT AT NO TIME WERE THERE ANY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ON CYPRUS EXCEPT BY THE WORKING LEVEL COMMUNIQUE DRAFTERS. IN ANY EVENT, THIS

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HR-514101

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PAGE 02 PEKING 02102 260844Z

IS NOT A SUBJECT WHICH WE DISCUSSED WITH THE SOVIETS REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE SOVIETS MAY TELL YOU OR OTHERS.

FOR OUR PART, WE PROPOSE TO PROCEED ALONG THE LINES I HAVE PREVIOUSLY OUTLINED. I LOOK FORWARD TO A COMPLETE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON THESE MATTERS WITH FOREIGN MINISTER BITSIOS IN TWO WEEKS IN BRUSSELS. WARM REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER,
END TEXT.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF CYPRUS PARAGRAPH:

HAVING DISCUSSED THE SITUATION EXISTING IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, BOTH SIDES STATE THEIR FIRM SUPPORT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF CYPRUS AND WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT IN THIS DIRECTION. THEY CONSIDER THAT A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS QUESTION MUST BE BASED ON THE STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS REGARDING CYPRUS. END TEXT.
KISSINGER

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PAGE 01 PEKING 02103 260809Z

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CONTROL: 76150

RECD: NOV .26, 1974

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 2103

03:30AM

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FOR AMBASSADOR FROM SECRETARY

SECTO 190

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR
SUBJ: US-USSR COMMUNIQUE

1. PLEASE DELIVER FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME TO CLERIDES
ALONG WITH TEXT OF CYPRUS PARAGRAPH OF US-USSR COMMUNIQUE
IN PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

I HAVE ASKED AMBASSADOR CRAWFORD TO PROVIDE YOU WITH
A COPY OF THE TEXT OF THE PARAGRAPH DEALING WITH CYPRUS WHICH
WAS INCLUDED IN THE US-USSR COMMUNIQUE ISSUED IN VLADIVOSTOK.
I ALSO WANTED YOU TO HAVE THIS BRIEF PERSONAL REPORT OF OUR
MEETINGS THERE.

ALTHOUGH THERE IS A PARAGRAPH ON CYPRUS IN THE
COMMUNIQUE, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT AT NO TIME DURING OUR
MEETINGS WERE THERE ANY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS ON
CYPRUS EXCEPT AMONG WORKING LEVEL COMMUNIQUE DRAFTERS.
THIS IS NOT, IN ANY EVENT, A SUBJECT WHICH WE DISCUSS

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PAGE 02 PEKING 02103 260809Z

WITH THE SOVIETS, REGARDLESS OF WHAT THEY MAY TELL
YOU OR OTHERS. WARM REGARDS, HENRY A. KISSINGER

3. BEGIN TEXT OF CYPRUS PARAGRAPH:

HAVING DISCUSSED THE SITUATION EXISTING IN THE
EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, BOTH SIDES STATE THEIR FIRM SUPPORT
FOR THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY
OF CYPRUS AND WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT IN THIS DIRECTION.
THEY CONSIDER THAT A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS QUESTION
MUST BE BASED ON THE STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTIONS
ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS REGARDING CYPRUS. END TEXT,
KISSINGER

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CONTROL: 7621Q

RECD: NOV 26, 1974

03:40AM

SECTO 101

NO. 116521 GDS

TAGS: PFCR

SUBJ: US-USSR COMMUNIQUE

1. PLEASE DELIVER TO ESENBEL FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM ME
ALONG WITH THE TEXT OF THE CYPRUS PARAGRAPH OF THE
VLADIVOSTOK COMMUNIQUE IN PARAGRAPH 3 BELOW:

2. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. FOREIGN MINISTER:

I HAVE ASKED AMBASSADOR MACOMBER TO PROVIDE YOU WITH A COPY OF THE TEXT OF THE PARAGRAPH DEALING WITH CRPRUS WHICH WAS INCLUDED IN THE US-USSR COMMUNIQUE ISSUED IN VLADIVOSTOK. IN THE SPIRIT OF OUR CONTINUING FRANK DISCUSSIONS, I ALSO WANTED YOU TO HAVE THIS BRIEF PERSONAL REPORT OF OUR MEETINGS THERE.

ALTHOUGH THERE IS A PARAGRAPH ON CYPRUS IN THE COMMUNIQUE, I WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT AT NO TIME DURING OUR MEETINGS WERE THERE ANY SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS OF ANY KIND ON CYPRUS EXCEPT AMONG WORKING LEVEL COMMUNIQUE DRAFTERS.

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PAGE 02 PEKING 02104 260027Z

AT THE OFFICIAL MEETINGS, THE SOVIETS MADE REPEATED ANTI-TURKISH STATEMENTS AND PRESSED US FOR A COMMITMENT TO OPPOSE A BIZONAL SOLUTION ON CYPRUS. THIS WE REFUSED TO DISCUSS OR ACCEPT. IN ANY EVENT, I WANT YOU TO BE ASSURED THAT CYPRUS IS NOT A SUBJECT WHICH WE DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIETS REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE SOVIETS MAY TELL YOU OR OTHERS.

WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO PROCEEDING ALONG THE LINES WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED WITH YOU AND MINISTER ESENBEL. I LOOK FORWARD TO A COMPLETE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH HIM IN BURSSELS DURING THE NATO MEETINGS. WARM REGARDS,
HENRY A. KISSINGER. END TEXT.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF CYPRUS PARAGRAPH:

HAVING DISCUSSED THE SITUATION EXISTING IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN, BOTH SIDES STATE THEIR FIRM SUPPORT FOR THE INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF CYPRUS AND WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT IN THIS DIRECTION. THEY CONSIDER THAT A JUST SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS QUESTION MUST BE BASED ON THE STRICT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS REGARDING CYPRUS. END TEXT.
KISSINGER

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INFO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2821

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SECTO 197

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJ: US-USSR COMMUNIQUE

REF: ANAKRA 9219

ASSUMPTION CORRECT!
KISSINGER

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FOR ROGERS FROM THE SECRETARY

SECTO 198

E.O. 116521 GDS
TAGS: PFOR UY PE
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT VELASCOS ACCUSATIONS

REF: STATE 259372

1. I HAVE RECEIVED YOUR PROPOSED STATEMENT FOR SIRACUSA AND I MUST SAY I AM STILL NOT CONVINCED THAT SUCH A FORMAL STATEMENT IS EITHER NECESSARY OR DESIRABLE. IN FACT, MY INSTINCT IS THAT WE RISK PROTESTING OUR INNOCENCE TOO MUCH, THEREBY FEEDING THE STORY ITSELF.

2. I HAVE SEEN, HOWEVER, AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT WHICH STATES THAT THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT BELIEVES US INTELLIGENCE IS MASTERMINDING A PLOT AGAINST IT. THE REPORT ALLEGES THAT THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT IS CONVINCED THAT U.S. INTELLIGENCE IS HEAVILY INVOLVED IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL EFFORTS TO WEAKEN THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT.

3. I WOULD LIKE YOU TO DO A MESSAGE FROM ME TO DE LA FLOR, WHICH I SHOULD CLEAR, TELLING HIM WE HAVE HEARD REPORTS ALONG THESE LINES. WE FIND IT HARD TO BELIEVE THAT THE PERUVIAN GOVERNMENT FEELS THIS WAY. BUT, IN ANY CASE, IF THEY SHOULD, I WANT TO ASSURE THEM

DECLASSIFIED

E.O. 12958, SEC. 3.5

STATE DEPT, GUIDELINES

BY HE, NARA, DATE 2/5/03

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PAGE 02 PEKING 02114 261712Z

THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO TRUTH TO THE REPORT. I
PLACE A HIGH VALUE ON GOOD RELATIONS BETWEEN PERU AND THE
U.S. AND VERY MUCH LOOK FORWARD TO VISITING PERU ON
MY TRIP TO SOUTH AMERICA NEXT YEAR.
KISSINGER

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 2115

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FOR HARTMAN AND KATZ

SECTO 199

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: EGEN OTRA
SUBJECT: VISIT OF CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT

REF: STATE 200368

SECRETARY APPROVES YOUR COURSE OF ACTION RECOMMENDED
IN REFTEL.
KISSINGER

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HR 5714/01



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SECTO 200

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
SUBJECT: KHMER IN 29TH GA

REF: A. PHNOM PENH 15663 B. STATE 260157

WE DO NOT INTEND TO PURSUE LINE PROPOSED REFTEL A. IT IS TOO LATE, TOO COMPLICATED, TOO CONTRARY TO WHAT WE HAVE BEEN DOING, AND STANDS NO CHANCE OF GAINING NECESSARY ACCEPTANCE OF CHINESE. AT THIS POINT WE SHOULD STICK WITH OUR EFFORTS TO GAIN NECESSARY VOTES ON PRIORITY AND FRIENDLY RESOLUTION, AND SEEK TO HEAD OFF SUPPORT AND ASSORTED MANEUVERS FAVORABLE TO OPPOSING RESOLUTION. KISSINGER

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HR 5714101



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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2827

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ PEKING 2119

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FOR SONNENFELDT AND HARTMAN

SECTO 203

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: FR

SUBJECT: SONNENFELDT/HARTMAN TALK WITH FRENCH AMBASSADOR

REF: STATE 260370

SECRETARY FEELS THAT ESTABLISHING A SPECIAL ECONOMIC CONSULTATIVE ARRANGEMENT WITH THE FRENCH IS OUT OF THE QUESTION. IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT WOULD SIMPLY REWARD THE FRENCH FOR THEIR BEHAVIOR. AND IT WOULD RUIN OR SERIOUSLY DAMAGE OUR RELATIONS WITH NINE.
KISSINGER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

HR 5/14/01

